Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1999 OECD
2001
Enron
Merck Co.
Xerox
Worldcom
OECD
OECD
information asymmetry
incentive incompatibility-principal-agent
problem
sunk
Shleifer 1997
1
-
Ross1973
Corporate Governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.
7
independent utility functions
systems of rewards
results
Coase1937Jensen 1976
Fama 1983
financemanagement
Jensen 1976
23
Jensen 1976
monitoring costs
bonding costs
residual loss
Monks1995
-
property rights theory
2
3
Jensen1976
Corporate Governance2002
1994
10
2002
La Porta 1998
11
single-level board
2-1
12
2-1
1999
Delaware 141 a
13
1.
1995
50
2.
Audit Committee
Nominating Committee Compensation
Committee
3.
14
hostile takeovers
voting by feet
Fama1980
managerial
15
labor market
Hart1983
price taker
homogeneous;
marginal
benefitmarginal cost
16
2-2
17
2-2
-
keiretsu
18
Grossman 1980
Shleifer 1986
2002
19
1.
2.
3.
4.
20
free-rider
Monks 1995
12
3
Monks 1995
1.
21
2.
3.
4.
5.
duty of careduty of
loyalty
Salmon5 1980
Lorsch6
Monks 1995
2001 Salmon, W.
Lorsch, J. W.
22
1. stockholder theory
2. stakeholder theory
Salmon8
7
8
2001
6
23
CEO
COOCFO
Cotter1997tender offer
Cotter
poison pill
Weisbach1998
CEO
Rosenstein 1990
24
5% 5% 25%
Rosenstein 1997
Brickley 1994
abnormal
Fama 1983
Jensen
1993
Gillan2000
25
Gillan 2000
Securities and Exchange Commission SEC 1992
Gillan2000-
26
Shleifer1997
Shleifer
Shleifer 1997
residual control
rights
27
Shleifer 1997
free-rider
perquisites
28
20
10
-
Coase1960 11
Shleifer1997 Coase
Shleifer1997
risk
aversion
OECD
OECD 1998
29
OECD 1999
2002OECD
OECD 2004
30
disproportionate
9
market for corporate control
anti-take-over
La Porta 2002
31
32
33
1999
1999
34
2002
35
2-3
2000
36
2-3
reputation agent
37