You are on page 1of 32

1997

1999 OECD

2001
Enron
Merck Co.
Xerox
Worldcom

OECD


OECD

information asymmetry
incentive incompatibility-principal-agent
problem
sunk

Shleifer 1997
1
-
Ross1973

Corporate Governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.
7


independent utility functions

systems of rewards
results

Coase1937Jensen 1976
Fama 1983
financemanagement

Jensen 1976

23

Jensen 1976

monitoring costs

bonding costs

residual loss

Monks1995

-
property rights theory

2
3


Jensen1976

Corporate Governance2002

1994

10

2002

La Porta 1998

11

the Anglo-American modelthe


German-Japanese model

single-level board
2-1

12

2-1

1999

Model Business Corporation Act


8.01 b

Delaware 141 a

13

1.

1995
50

2.

Audit Committee
Nominating Committee Compensation
Committee

3.

14

hostile takeovers
voting by feet

the market discipline approach

Fama1980

managerial

15

labor market

Hart1983

Jensen 1983market for


corporate control
Martin 1991takeover market

price taker

homogeneous;

marginal
benefitmarginal cost
16

the ownership control approach

2-2

17

2-2

-
keiretsu
18

Grossman 1980

Shleifer 1986

2002
19

1.

2.

3.

4.

20

free-rider

Monks 1995
12
3

Monks 1995
1.
21

2.
3.
4.
5.
duty of careduty of
loyalty

Salmon5 1980

Lorsch6

Monks 1995

2001 Salmon, W.

Lorsch, J. W.
22

1. stockholder theory

2. stakeholder theory

Salmon8

7
8

2001
6
23

CEO
COOCFO

independent outside director

Cotter1997tender offer

Cotter

poison pill
Weisbach1998
CEO
Rosenstein 1990

24


5% 5% 25%

Rosenstein 1997

Brickley 1994

abnormal

Fama 1983
Jensen
1993

Gillan2000

25

Gillan 2000
Securities and Exchange Commission SEC 1992

shareholder activism SEC


Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8

Gillan2000-

26

Shleifer1997

Shleifer

Shleifer 1997

residual control
rights

27

Shleifer 1997

free-rider

Shleifer 1997pyramid schemes


expropriate
transfer pricing

perquisites

28


20
10
-
Coase1960 11

Shleifer1997 Coase

Shleifer1997

risk
aversion

OECD

OECD 1998
29

OECD 1999

1999 2004 4 OECD Principles of


Corporate Governance

2002OECD

OECD 2004

The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions

30

disproportionate
9
market for corporate control

anti-take-over

The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders


9

La Porta 2002

31

The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate


Governance
stakeholder

Disclosure and Transparency

32

The Responsibilities of the Board

33

1999

1999

34


2002

35

2-3

2000

36

2-3

reputation agent

World Bank, 1999, Corporate GovernanceA Framework for Implementation Overview.

37

You might also like