Epistemology and the Sociology of Knowledge: The Contributions of Mannheim, Mills, and Merton Author(s): Derek L.

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59 Theoryand Society 1(1974) 59-88 - Printedin the Netherlands ?Elsevier ScientificPublishing Company,Amsterdam

EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF MANNHEIM, MILLS, AND MERTON

DEREKL. PHILLIPS

In the naturaland social sciences alike, there exists a ratherrigid separation between those thinkers concerned with the practice of knowledge and those concerned with questions about the theory of knowledge. This is in contrast to the situation for the early Greeks and, much later, for such seventeenth century thinkers as Descartesand Locke, where there clearly existed an explicit concern with the connection between the theory and practiceof knowledge. Just as clearly, the twentieth century has witnessed an obvious separation between the interest and practices of scientists and philosophers,and, consequently,between "science"and "epistemology". This distinction between the theory and practice of knowledgeis heightened at present by the gulfs dividing different intellectual disciplines. Such a separation has been especially pronounced in sociology, where an emphasis on imitating certain methodologicalpracticesof the naturalsciences seems to have reproducedthe latter's indifferenceto what are regarded as "philosophical" problems. It is perhaps partially because of their collective insecurity about the "genuine"scientific status of their disciplinethat sociologists have reacted with either indifference or antagonismto questions about the status of their knowledge. There is, nonetheless, one branch of sociology where problems of knowing
I wish to thank my colleague,Alvin W. Gouldner,for his suggestionsand comments both substantiveand editorial - on earlierversionsof this essay. The essay itself is a productof our continuingdialogueover the past eighteenmonths,regarding questionsof science and knowledge. I also owe a continuingdebt to LudwigWittgenstein(Philosophical Investigations, New York: Macmillan, 1958; Lectures and Conservations, Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1972; Remarkson the Foundationof MatheMass.:MITPress,1972), who, more than anyone else, recognizedthe matics, Cambridge, fully socialnatureof scienceand knowledge. vanAmsterdam Universiteit

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and knowledge have been an explicit focus of attention: the sociology of Here, as well as in the sociology of science which forms one of its knowledge. there has been some interest in certain aspects of knowledge, insubparts, epistemological questions. As these fields have developed in recent cluding years,however, their practitioners have tended to ignore epistemological in favor of questions concerning such matters as the origin of questions ideas, their communicationto other scientists,scientific productiviscientific the rewardsystems in science, and relatedmatters.Indeed, the directionof ty, fields is, I believe, very much at odds with many of the earlierformulathese of the sociology of knowledgeand science. tions sociologists of knowledge and science have been concerned with the Many to originsof scientific ideas, and with the relation of these "discoveries" examfor Merton K. Robert (1970a), contexts. and culturalfactors and social ple,systematically reviews a number of questions pertaining to the social of knowledge,while generallyomitting questionsabout the validity or origins involved. This distinction between the justificationof the knowledge-claims between what Reichenbach evaluation, genesisof scientific ideas and their most is (1938) termed the contexts of discoveryandjustification, ignoredby and sociology, Indeed the division of labor between philosophy sociologists. This, of of sociology. the in maintained practice is authorized by sociologists, and the to matters philosopher course,leaves epistemological recently) (more tothe historianof science. the By ignoring epistemological issues, sociologists have put themselves in to concern of great two about problems positionof havingvery little to say and empirtheoretical the of manycontemporarythinkers:first, the problem icalfoundations upon which authority rests in Westernsociety; and, second, theproblemof authority and competence in science. The former problem has been dealt with at length in an excellent article by JohnSchaar(1970). Schaararguesthat legitimateauthorityis decliningin the modem state, and that (Schaar, 1970:279) "the crisis of legitimacy is a function of some of the basic, defining orientationsof modernityitself; specifically, rationality, the cult of efficiency and power, ethical relativism,and equalitarianism". Sociologists, I believe, by generally neglecting questions have regardingtheir status as knowers and the status of their knowledge, of legitimate effectively cut themselves off from a concern with this issue who about and something "know" to is it what about Questions authority. are to establish the criteriaor standardsfor showing that one does know or that one group knows better than another, are simply ignored by most sociologists. If one shares with Schaar, as I do, the belief that the modern

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condition is characterizedby the shatteringof authority, then one longs for "an account of an (Schaar,1970: 292): reality, explanationof why some acts are preferableto others, and a vision of a worthwhile future toward which men can aspire".Sociologists have had very little to say about such matters. Anawarenessof the absence of moral absolutes and certaintiesis, of course, in contemporary society. In widespread the notions of "right"and ethics, have cometo be recognizedas "wrong" But now there culturally-dependent. is a growing awareness that science, has been viewed by many, which includingsociologists, as the source of absolutes and certainty - is a fully human enterprise,where truth is not somethinglying "out there" but, rather, aconstructionof scientific communities.Witness,for example, recent controversiesin the philosophy and history of science, involving, among others, Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Toulmin. Despite the enormous attention given theseproblems today, they are almost ignored in the sociological literature. Thisis somewhat surprisingin that Kuhn, especially, has emphasized the sociological nature of his work, and the term "sociological" is utilized by Popper, Lakatos,and other critics of Kuhn, as a word of degradation. is not my intention pursue this controversy It here, but only to providea to brief overview of one aspect of their discussion. very Popper and Lakatos, who refer to themselves as believe that there exist uni"demarcationists", by scientific theories versal criteria which canbe compared and appraised, and by which science can be distinguishedfrom pseudo-science. Feyerabend, onthe other hand, holds that scientific theories occupy no privileged status as compared with other families of beliefs; no one epistemological is any more "correct" or "better" than another. Kuhn belief-system and like Toulmin, Feyerabend,reject the idea of universalcriteriafor comparing theories. lay down statute laws of rational But whereas the demarcationists Kuhn and appraisal, (and as Toulmin Polanyi, well) hold that science can only judged by caselaw. That is, only the members of a specific be scientific are competent to judge about specific questions of community scientific practice within that community. refers to this as Lakatos "sociologism". Both of the above problems- authority and legitimacy more generally,and within science specifically - are clearly major problems of our time. the On one hand, by accepting that separate culture or should group decide each by its own standards what properly counts as "scientific understanding"(or or we opt for relativism. the other "equality", "justice") On hand, by accepting existence of the universal, abstract definitions of "scientificunderand the like from "equality", we land ourselvesin absolustanding", tism. The question is whether we must outside, choose between these, or whether

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there exists a middle way which allows us to steer a course between the relativist and absolutist extremes. The major issue is, in short, what intellectual authority can be claimed - in principle - for one set of standards ratherthan another? In the following pages, I will consider the views of three sociologists - Karl Mannheim,C. WrightMills, and Robert K. Merton - as they touch on these mattersand, especially,as they bearon some of the issues raisedmore recently by Thomas Kuhn and others. My intentions in consideringthese men are three. First, to remindsociologistsof the enormoussensitivityof these earlier writersto the issues that were central to the so-called "revolutionary" ideas set forth by Kuhn in his influentialbook, The Structureof Scientific Revolutions. At the same time, I will note some of the "advances"attributableto Kuhn,as well as the similaritiesbetween Kuhn and the others. Second, to suggestsome possible reasons as to why sociologists failed to take seriously theepistemologicalimplicationsof these earlierviews. Third, and finally, to that many sociologistsof science and knowledgetoday are paradoxicalargue lyless sociological than are their contemporariesin other fields - especially Feyerabend,and Toulmin. Kuhn, Itis useful to begin by briefly reviewingsome of Kuhn'smore centralthemes. Timeis necessaryin order to gain a full appreciationof the extent to which theseearlier thinkers, and WrightMills, especially, anticipatedmany of the ideaswhich have today made Kuhn a center of scientific and philosophic debate.It is, Ithink, ratherironic that many sociologistswho today show an enormousenthusiasm for Kuhn's work (or, at least, for his notion of should have forgotten or ignoredmuch in the pioneeringcontribuparadigm) tionsof Mannheim,Mills, and Merton. In a profession which evidences an almostpathological tendency to claim various past luminariesas "sociologists" (for example, Marx, de Tocqueville), one would have expected a great of outpouring analyses showing the seminal contributions of these earlier to problems which are at issue in contemporary science and sociologists philosophy. Perhapsthere is a reason for this failurethat is worth noting. Kuhn (1962:10) argues that "particularcoherent traditions of scientific rewhich he terms "normalscience", take their shape from paradigms. search", While he uses the notion of paradigms in a variety of ways, in the Prefacehe defines them (Kuhn, 1962:x)"as universallyrecognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problemsand solutions to a community ofpractitioners".Paradigms include (Kuhn, 1962:10) "law, theory, applications,and instrumentation together" and "they are the source of the methods, problem-field,and standardsof solution accepted by any mature

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scientific community at any given time. As a result, the reception of a new paradigm often necessitates a redefinition of the corresponding science". Such paradigms(Kuhn, 1962:108) "provide scientists not only with a map but also with some of the directions for map-making.In learninga paradigm the scientist acquirestheory, methods, and standardstogether, usually in an indicatesthe existence of inextricablemixture". For Kuhn, then, a paradigm a coherent, unified viewpoint, a kind of Weltanschauung, which determines view the world and practicetheir craft. the way a science'spractitioners Kuhn's argumentreminds us, of course, that science is a social enterprise, with an organizedconsensus of men determiningwhat is and is not to be warrantedas knowledge. Among other things, Kuhn'sviews are at odds with those formulations of science which sharply differentiate facts from interpretations. He questions the belief that the world we know is a collection of individual observable "facts" which various sciences try to order so as to predict certain events on the basis of others. Kuhn arguesthat what is seen as a "problem", a "fact", a "solution", and so on depends on presuppositions which constitute part of a paradigm. Kuhn'sviews seem to lead to a kind of relativism.By stressingthe determinative influence of paradigms,as they affect the ways in which scientistsview the world, includingtheir very conception of what is or is not a fact, Kuhn apparently denies the possibility of comparingand makingjudgments about the choice of paradigms.That is, since there are no such things as "independent" facts, or any other independent features or standards,there can be no "good reasons" for choosing one paradigmover another. For, accordingto Kuhn, what constitutes a good reason is itself establishedby the paradigm. For instance, Kuhn (1962:147) states that "the competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be resolved by proofs" and adds (Kuhn, 1962:150) that "in these matters neither proof nor erroris at issue". Furthermore,he asserts (Kuhn, 1962:119), "we may... have to relinquish the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes of paradigmscarry scientists closer to the truth". Kuhn'sarguments,then, lead to the brinkof abandoning the traditionalidea of objectivity and progressin science. Let us now turn to the three sociologists of principleinterest in this essay, beginningwith KarlMannheim. KarlMannheim In his Ideology and Utopia, first publishedin 1929 and availablein an English translation in 1946, Mannheim sets forth two goals for the sociology of

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knowledge (1972:237): "as theory it seeks to analyse the relationshipbetween knowledge and existence; as historical-sociological researchit seeks to trace the forms which this relationshiphas taken in the intellectualdevelopment of mankind".Mannheim's discussionfirmly anticipatesmany of Kuhn's central themes. Mannheimholds that not only does the individualspeakthe language of his group, but he also thinks in the manner in which his group thinks. He has at his disposal only certain words and their standardized meanings. These, to a large extent, govern his avenues of approach to the world. Individualscome to perceive the world and its objects in surrounding the way the group to which they belong does. Mannheim(1972:243) notes that: "Everyepoch has its fundamentallynew approachand its characteristic point of view, and consequently sees the "same" object from a new perspective". (We find echoes of this last observation in Kuhn's(1962:121) statement that "WhenAristotle and Galileo looked at swingingstones, the first sawconstrained fall, the seconda pendulum".) Mannheim emphasizes that "knowing" is a fundamentallycollective enterprise, and that it (Mannheim, 1972:28) "presupposes a community of knowing which growsprimarilyout of a community of experiencingprepared for in the subconscious".Rather than formulatingknowing as an individual matter, he lays heavy emphasis on the social and communal characterof knowingand of knowledge. Much of what Mannheimsays is suggestiveof Kuhn'snotion of paradigmas an organizing Weltanschauung. Mannheim notes that every perception is ordered and organized into categories, and that the extent (Mannheim, 1972:77) "to which we can organize and express our experiences in such conceptual forms is, in turn, dependent upon the frames of reference which happen to be availableat a given historical moment". And he adds (Mannheim, 1972:250) that: "the approachto a problem, the level on which the problem happens to be formulated,the stage of abstractionand the stage of concretenessthat one hopes to attain, are all and in the sameway bound up with social existence". What one finds in Mannheim,then, is an acute sensitivity to the paramount influence of social factors on the variousmodes of social thought and knowledge. But one sees further his recognitionof the impossibilityof considering any element of social life - whether language and meaning, perception, knowledge, truth - outside of a communal or social context. It is not surprising, then, that Mannheim(1972:80) acknowledgedthat "every point of view is particular to a certain definite situation ..." Then how does one distinguishtrue and false knowledge? In other words, how did Mannheim

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deal with the "relativity"problem that Kuhn and others have wrestled with in recent years? As did Kuhn, more than thirty years later, Mannheimappears to reject the idea that there exist firm, unchanging,ultimate "truths". The very notion of truth had a social character: "We see, therefore", says Mannheim(1972:262), "not merely that the notion of knowledge in general form of knowledge and modes of is dependent upon the concretely prevailing knowing expressed therein and accepted as ideal, but also that the concept of truth itself is dependentupon the alreadyexisting types of knowledge".And, he adds further,"... we mustrejectthe notion that thereis a 'sphereof truthin itself' as a disruptive and unjustifiable hypothesis". Mannheimdesignatesthe standpoint of the sociology of knowledge as "relational", which he contrastswith relativism.Withrelationalism,all intellectual phenomena are subjected to the question (Mannheim,1972:254): "In connection with what social structuresdid they arise and are they valid?" The point in relationalismis not that there are no criteriaof rightnessor wrongness in a discussion,but rather that such criteria can only be formulatedin terms of the perspectiveof a given situation. This, he argues,is different than "philosophicalrelativism",which he (Mannheim,1972:254) characterizesas denying the validity of any standardsas well as the existence of orderin the is unclearas to exactly what consequencesrelationalism world. But Mannheim has for establishingthe validity (truth) of one or anotherassertion.Consider the ambiguityof the following statement(Mannheim,1972:256): "The function of the findingsof the sociology of knowledgelies somewherein a fashion hitherto not clearly understood, between irrelevanceto the establishmentof truth on the one hand, and entire adequacy for determiningtruth on the other". Apparently, however, Mannheimbelieves that the relevance of the sociology of knowledge is in some way dependent on a comparisonwith the "facts". Thus, he states that (Mannheim,1972:256) "the mere delineation of the perspectivesis by no means a substitute for the immediate and direct discussionbetween the divergentpoints of view or the direct examinationof the facts". This statement of Mannheim'sis quite unexpected, as one would expect him to hold the view that whether something is, for example, "consistent" with the facts is itself dependenton what are regardedas facts, and as consistency, within different social contexts. That is to say, such matters as consistency, similarity,divergency,and the like, are, one would think, themselves matters of social conventions in different groups. This is, of course, Kuhn's position. Here we see that Kuhn goes beyond Mannheimby arguing that even matters of "similarity"and "difference"are dependent on social conventions.Thus, Kuhn is more radicallyrelativistic.1
As I have noted elsewhere, (in Derek Phillips, Abandoning Method, San Francisco and London: Jossey-Bass, 1973), however, Kuhn is not at all consistent or clear on this matter. 1

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Mannheimhas more to say about the sissue of "facts" in one of the last sections of his book, where he directly confronts "the epistemologicalconsequences of the sociology of knowledge". Perhaps more than any other portion of his book, this has most relevancefor the presentessay. Mannheim (1972:257) notes that the fact that the position of an observerinfluences the results of his thought, and the fact that "the partial validity of a given must sooner or later lead us to raise perspectiveis fairly exactly determinable, the question as to the significance of this problem for epistemology". He begins by questioningthe belief that the genesisof an assertionis irrelevantto its truth, arguing against an epistemology that holds this as an a priori premise. He goes on to arguethat epistemology itself must be willingto alter its foundations as it encounters new modes of thinking: "Through the proceduresof the sociology of knowledge, we discover that particularizing mode of thought" (Mannthe older epistemologyis a correlateof a particular heim, 1972:260). We are, Mannheimsays, "thus implicitly called upon to to these more variedmodes of find an epistemologicalfoundationappropriate thought". He calls for a new kind of epistemology which will take into account the facts broughtto light by the sociology of knowledge. Mannheim discusses two directions taken by epistemology: one stressing the other, emphasizingthe neutralizingfunction. With comprehensiveness; regard to the first direction, Mannheim(1972:271) states that "here preeminence is given to that perspective which gives evidence of the greater comprehensivenessand the greatest fruitfulness in dealing with empirical materials".In this statement,Mannheim againrevealshis lack of full commitment to his own generalthesis concerningthe influence of social position. As Kuhn has more recently pointed out, matters such as "comprehensiveness" and "fruitfulness"are decided by invokingvariouscommunalstandards.And these human standardsmay be in conflict in the same way as are the "points of view" discussed by Mannheim.In fact, Mannheim'sposition is far from clear about such matters, For instance, he rejects the idea that the sociology of knowledge is relativistic,because assertions are relativistic,he says, only when judged from the standpointof (Mannheim,1972:270) "external,unperspectivistic truths independentof the subjectiveexperienceof the observer". And Mannheimdoes not accept this older, static ideal of eternal truths. Thus, deciding which of two or more points of view is the best cannot rely on a comparisonof some independentmeasure- for there is none. On the other hand, Mannheimallows that decisions about the best point of view may be made on the basis of the greater comprehensivenessof one viewpoint over as if it were a fixed, stable, standard, another. He treats comprehensiveness instead of recognizing that - like truth - it is a matter of communal judgmentas to which of severalpoints of view has the greatestcomprehensive-

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ness. Thus, for Mannheim,there are "outside" independent standards.He fails to see that just as points of view may appeardifferentlyamongpeople in different social positions, so may comprehensiveness or fruitfulnessalso appear differently. With the second direction that can be taken by epistemology, Mannheim suggeststhat, ratherthan absolutizingthe concept of"situational determination", it may be possible, by discoveringthe element of situational determination in variousviews, to thereby "neutralize"it. This neutralizationthen creates a wider and more comprehensivebasisof vision. By being fully aware of situationaldetermination,it is possible to harnessit and "use"it in moving toward a more formal and abstract level of analysis. But Mannheim (1972:274) notes that "we are not yet in a position today to decide the question as to which of the two above-mentionedalternativesthe nature of the empirical data will force a scientific theory of knowledge to follow". Again, it can be seen that in some unspecified sense "empiricaldata" are considered as if they were free from the influence of situational determination. Clearly, then, there is evidence of a kind of lingering positivism in Mannheim's position. In summary, Mannheimis enormously sensitive to the influence of people's social positions on what they can perceive, what they define and accept as knowledge and truth, as well as their views, opinions, goals, and values. But he seems to think the "facts" are somethingexisting externalto human actors which can be used as a reference point for checking the influence of various social determinants.Furthermore,and despite his criticismsof the prevailing conceptions of science, he believed that the natural sciences were immune from the influence of social factors.In his words, naturalscience (Mannheim, 1972:261) "is largely detachablefrom the historical-social perspectiveof the investigator.. ." This view no doubt served to encouragethe developmentof a sociology modelling itself on the natural sciences. But Kuhn's work, as we know, has shown the extent to which the natural and biologicalsciences are fully social activities, and therefore, always subject to the influence of social factors. C. Wright Mills It is disturbing,being neitherjust nor scholarly, that C. WrightMills, one of
the best-known American sociologists of the twentieth century, should be so

thoroughly ignored when it comes to issues concerning the sociology of knowledge.2 Whilehis involvementwith this was never evidenced in a major
2 For example, none of Mills' work is included in James Curtis and John Petras, eds., The Sociology of Knowledge, New York: Praeger, 1970.

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book-length monograph,nonetheless, one would have expected his seminal articles to have been a source of continuing interest for sociologists.In the following, I will consider two of Mills'articlesthat deal with issues crucialto knowledge and methodology. These were published in 1939 and 1940, Ideology and Utopia in English. shortly after the appearanceof Mannheim's They show the influence of Mannheim'sthinking but, in my view, go conformulations. siderablybeyond Mannheim's Like Mannheim,Mills had as his major concern in these articles the social determinationof ideas and mentality. In his earlierarticle, he points out the need for a concept of mind which would allow for explicit linkagesbetween mind and other social factors. What is needed, he stresses, is fuller understanding of the social-psychologicalprocesses by which the connection influencescan be established.Mills is between the mind and social-historical dimensioninto the sociology of emphatic in insertingthe social-psychological had Mead conceived of the "generalized Herbert Whereas George knowledge. the "whole society", Millslays stresson the "selected other" as incorporating societal segments" to which different individuals orient themselves at different times. In either case, a pattern of internal conversation(thinking) between the thinker and his selected audience constitutes the structure of mentality. It is in such a manner that ideas are "logically tested". As Mills (reprintedin 1963:427) puts it: "Oneoperateslogically (appliesstandardized critiques) up'on propositions and arguments (his own included) from the standpoint of the generalizedother. It is from this socially constituted viewpoint that one approves or disapproves of given arguments as logical or illogical,valid or invalid". At this point, Millsmakesan importantobservationabout the nature of logic. the rules of logic as an innate expressionof the human Rather than regarding mind, or as having a timeless and unchangingcharacter,he recognizesthat they are human and conventional. "No individual can be logical", Mills (1963:427) points out, "unlessthere be agreementamong the membersof his universeof discourseas to the validity of some generalconceptions of good reasoning".What we term "illogicality"is very much like immorality;both the criteriaof logicality are deviations from social norms. Correspondingly, may be different at other times and in other groups.He also emphasizesthat not only what are accepted as valid arguments in the discourse within a particularsocial group but also what constitutes the elements of reasoning and analysis within a given individual are the result of social conventions. That is to say, in general,the acceptance and diffusion of ideas is dependent on conformity to what counts as following logical rules within a given group.3

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Mills also adds a new emphasis in the sociology of knowledge: the fundamental role of languagein thought. As Mills(1963:433) notes: "Ourbehavior and perception, our logic and thought, come within the control of a system of language". Mills recognizes that language precedes any given actor. A socially sustainedsystem of meaningshas a priorityover any given individual. In Mills' (1963:434) words: "Meaningis antecedently given; it is a collective 'creation'". Thus Millsrecognizesthe extent to which an individualthinkerincluding the individualscientist, although Mills says nothing about this- is circumscribedby an audience. In order to communicate, to be understood, by this or that audience (his family, peer group, or scientific colleagues) he must use languagein such a mannerthat it evokes the same responsein them as it does in himself. This is much of what Kuhn is talking about when he views a paradigmas establishingwhat constitutes "similarity","new facts", and the like. For the individualthinker, as Mills (1963:435) observes: "The process of 'externalizing'his thought in language is thus, by virtue of the commonnessessentialto meaning,under the control of the audience". In a second important article, published one year later, Mills evidences a developing originality and insight concerning the relationship between the sociology of knowledge, epistemology, and methodology. Whilehis focus is on the social sciences, many of his ideas and conclusionshave direct relevance for problems of all scientific disciplines. He (Mills, 1963:453) begins by criticizing the views of those - for example, Hans Speier, Talcott Parsons, Robert MacIver,and Robert K. Merton - who hold "that the sociology of knowledge has no relevancefor epistemology;that sociologicalinvestigations or inquirieshave no consequencesfor norms of'truth and validity' ". It is true, Mills says, that one cannot deduce the truth or falsity of an individual's statements by virtue of knowledge of his social position. He argues,however that the matter is considerablymore complicatedthan that, and he sets out to provide answers to two broad sets of questions (Mills, 1963:454): "(1) What is the genetic character, derivation, and function of epistemological forms, criteriaof truth, or verificatorymodels? (2) Exactly wherein, at what junctures, and in what types of inquiry may social factors enter as determinantsof knowledge?"
3 Mills' views on the fully social nature of logic and reasoning clearly anticipate current controversies surrounding these issues. See, for example, Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962 and 2nd ed., Chicago, 1970, as well as his paper "Reflections on my critics", in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970; Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes", ibid.; and Bryan Wilson, ed., Rationality, New York: Harper and Row, 1970.

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Mills had earlier emphasized that "truth" and "objectivity" have meaning only with reference to some accepted system of verification.That is, truth and objectivity are a matter of communal definition and, therefore, may differ within different socal groups and under different soci conditions. Mills (1963:454) rather cryptically suggests that: "He who asserts the irrelevanceof social conditions to the truthfulnessof propositions ought to state the conditionsupon wich he conceives truthfulnessactually to depend; he ought to specify exactly what it is in thinking that sociological factors cannot explan and upon which truth and validity do rest",.Mis points out that what had once constituted validation and truth in the official "paradigm"of medieval scholasticism,for example, was certainlyinfluenced by a number of social factors. And, he argues,the fact that the truthfulness of propositionsis dependent on criteriaof validity and truth with are themrelativizationmeans that the truth or falsity selves subject to social-historical of various statements or propositionsis influenced by social factors. Mills (1963:455) asserts that "Criteria,or observationaland verificatory models, are not transcendental".He observes that, for the most part, individual thinkers and scientists do not consciously select a verificatorymodel, clearly anticipatingKuhn, who later stresses that the very criteriafor verificationat different tes and in diffrent scientific communites are dependenton the in which the criteriaare located. world-viewsor paradigms Thus, Mills refutes those writers who view the sociology of knowledge as having no consequences for the validity of statements or propositions, in a the historicity of models of verification.Certain specific way by af fiming models of verificationmay be the "accepted"models at different times or in different groups because of the power and influence of certain social or scientific elites. Mills mentions two additional aspects of kowledge and truth that may be influences. First, the "categories"used by different open to social-historical of individuals are dependenton social conditions and influences.Mills groups (1963:459) notes that "Whatis taken as problematicand what concepts are availableand used may be interlinkedin certaininquiries".Secondly, thereis the influence of social factors on perception. It is worth quoting Mills (1963:459-460) at lengh her because I want to contrast his observations with more recent remarks by Kuhn: In acquiringa technical vocabularywith its terms and classifications,the thinker is acquiring,as it were, a set of colored spectacles.He sees a world of objects that ar techncal y tinted and patternized. A specialized languageconstitutes a veritablea priori form of perceptionand cognition,

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which are certainly relevant to the results of inquiry . . . Different technical elites possessdifferent perceptualcapacities. Compare this with Kuhn's remarksabout paradigmsand paradigm-changes. He argues(Kuhn, 1962:111) that: "Paradigm changes .. . cause scientiststo see the world of their research-engagement differently. In so far as their only recourse to that world is through what they see and do, we may want to say that after a [scientific] revolution scientists are respondingto a different world", Galileo's work provides Kuhn with an example for his thesis (Kuhn, 1962:117-118): Since remote antiquity most people have seen one or anotherheavy'body swingingback and forth on a string or chain until it finally comes to rest. To the Aristotelians,who believed that a heavy body is moved by its own nature from a higher position to a state of naturalrest at a lower one, the swingingbody was simply fallingwith difficulty. Constrained by the chain, it could achieve rest at its low point only after a tortuous motion and a considerable time. Galileo, on the other hand, looking at the swinging body, saw a pendulum, a body that almost succeeded in repeating the same motion over and over againad infinitum. Makinguse of the relativelynew theory of motion - the "impetustheory" allowed Galileo to "see" what the Aristotelianscould not. Until the impetus theory (Kuhn, 1962:120) "was invented, there were not pendulums,but only swingingstones, for the scientist to see". WhatKuhn, the historianof science, has done, then, is to document Mills' theses regardingmen's conceptual conditions. languageand their perceptionsas affected by social-historical A few words about Mills' brief consideration of "relativism",which, like Mannheim's,I find unconvincing.Mills attempts to deny the charge of relativism by calling on Mannheim'sdistinction between (Mannheim,1972:254) "philosophical relativismwhich denies the validity of any standardsand of the existence of order in the world" and "relationalism",where all intellectual phenomena are subjected to the question (Mannheim,1972:254): "In connection with what social structures did they arise and are they valid"? But both Mannheimand Mills ignore the question as to how we establish knowledge of "social structures";after all, this is done from some sociallysedimentedcognitive standpoint. It is not enough to answer, as Millsdoes (1963:461), that: "The imputations of the sociologist of knowledge may be tested with referenceto the verificatory model generated,e.g., by Pierceand Dewey. Theirtruthfulnessis then in

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terms of this model". Why would this not be consideredas relativism? After all, the choice of one over another verificatory model is made from some standpoint within a particularepoch and culture. Thus, the mannerin which the sociologist of knowledge approachedsuch problems as the choice of a verificatorymodel is - consistent with the centralcanons of the sociology of knowledge - conditioned by his particularstandpoint. If this is not relativism, what is? Mills (1963:461) arguesthat: "The assertionsof the sociologist of knowledge escape the 'absolutist'sdilemma'because they can refer to a degree of truth and becausethey may include the conditions underwhich they are true. Only conditional assertions are translatedfrom one perspectiveto another". But this begs the question of the "relativist's dilemma";that either the relativist's own assertionsare themselvesrelative, and, therefore, lacking truth value;or his argument is unconditionally true, and, consequently, relativism is selfcontradictory. "Relationalism" supposedly avoids having to choose between these two (logical) possibilities. Instead, however, it ignores the problem by failing to recognize the full epistemologicalimplicationsof the sociology of knowledge. For relationalismis "relativistic"in that it cannot providean answerto such questions as: from what standpoint do Mills and Mannheimdecide what should count, as, for example, the "conditions"under which this or that is true? If it is from within a designatedculture and epoch (and it could not be If, on the other hand, it is argued otherwise),then it is certainly"relativistic". that such judgmentsare made from some "absolutist"standpoint, then why call it "relationalistic"? The fact that Mills and Mannheimwere unable to provide a satisfactory solution to this problem - that is, a "solution" that allows them to conduct investigationsin the sociology of knowledgewhile, at the same time, dealingwith the question of how their own position is to be formulated vis-a-visthe implications of the theoretical position which they For even now, thirty-fiveyearslater, this problem espouse - is not surprising. is a source of debate among an increasingnumber of thinkers (for example, Kuhn, 1970a, 1970b; Lakatos, 1970; Bennett, 1964; Feyerabend, 1970; Popper, 1963, 1970; Winch, 1958; Lukes, 1967; Jarvie, 1972). What could have been very important for the developmentof sociology as an intellectual disciplineis Mills'and Mannheim'srecognitionof the need to try to consider knowledge from a uniquely sociological standpoint. With regardspecifically to Mills, he exhibited a theoretical awareness- as he did in so many other areas of sociological and intellectual inquiry - that placed him years in advance of the dominant tendencies and directions of the sociology of his day.

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RobertK. Merton RobertK. Merton'scontributions to the sociology of knowledgeand science, like have been widely recognized. They began as early as his Mannheim's, 1938 doctoral dissertation,re-publishedin 1970, in which Merton showed a concernwith problemscentralto these fields. Like Mannheim, and especially, Mills, Merton also recognized that science is a social activity; (Merton, 1970b:225) "theverificationof scientific conceptions is itself a fundamentally social process". He held that mattersof scientific knowledgeand truth are dependenton the scientific community to which the individual scientist directs his truth-claims (Merton, 1970b:219): Scienceis public and not private knowledge; and although the idea of persons"is not employed explicitly "other in science, it is always tacitly involved. In order to prove a generalization, which for the individual on the basis of his own privateexperience, scientist, may have attainedthe status of a valid law which requiresno further confirmation,the investiis compelled set gator to upcritical experiments which will satisfy the other scientists engagedin the same cooperativeactivity. This pressurefor so working out a problem that the solution will satisfy not only the own criteriaof validity and adequacy,but also the scientist's criteriaof the with whom he is actually or symbolically in group contact, constitutes a social impetus for cogent, rigorousinvestigation. powerful While not going quite so far as to argue that scientific truth and knowledge exist solely by virtue of being warrantedby the relevant scientific communities, Merton states that the "discoveries"of one or another scientist are only (Merton, 1970b:220) "imbued with significancethrough contact with other scientists". Speakingof scientific theories, he points out that (Merton, 1970b:220) "...long after the theory has been acceptable by the found individual scientist on the basis of his privateexperiencehe must continue to devise a proof or demonstrationin termsof the approvedcanons of scientific verification present in his culture". Merton also clearly recognises that the scientific standardswhich must meet may differ in different investigator the cultures. Merton's use of a distinction between the contexts early of discovery and justification has not, however, alwaysbeen evidencedin his more recent work in the work of his students) in the (or sociology of science. In a paper first published in 1945, he again emphasizedthe critical distinction between disand covery justification. Criticizing Sorokin's emphasis on intuition in scientific work, Merton(1970a:357) observes: indicatesthat 'intui"[Sorokin]

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tion' plays an importantrole as a source of scientific discovery.But does this meet the issue? The question is not one of the psychologicalsources of valid conclusions, but of the criteriaand methods of validation".Still, in one of his most recent publications, Merton (1972) appears to drop the distinction between the sourcesof knowledgeand the scientific community'sverification of knowledge claims. And when he does touch on the distinction,he totally ignores his own earlierobservationsconcerningthe criteriaof verification in different cultures. Let us, then, consider Merton'sviews as expressed in this article. Merton (1972:11) is concerned with recently emergingclaimsto group based truth: "Insidertruthsthat counter Outsideruntruthsand Outsidertruths that counter Insideruntruths". Speakingof the insiderdoctrinethat you can only understand blacks, then only white scholars can understandwhites". But specific claim, it would appear to follow that if only black scholarscan understand blacks, then only white scholarscan understand whites". But like claims to knowMerton fails to see here that claims to understanding, ledge, are a matter of meeting public (communal)criteria.Further,he fails to considerthe consequencesof this for the problemhe is considering. What the individual black scholar, for example, may say is of no special blacks, unless the relevantscientific consequence as regards"understanding" community warrantsthe correctness of his claims. If the black sociologist. formulates a sociological explanation concerning blacks, it becomes a "sociological truth" about blacks only by being warranted as such by a sociologicalcommunitylargelycomposedof whites. In one sense, Merton does acknowledge the relevanceof public criteria for To see this, it is necessaryto quote settling claims to scientific understanding. Merton(1972:42) at length here: It is the characterof an intellectual discipline that its evolving rules of evidence are adopted before they are used in assessinga particularinquiry. These criteriaof good and bad intellectual work may turn up to differing extent among Insiders and Outsidersas an artifact of immediate circumstances, and that is in itself a difficult problem for investigation.But the margin of autonomy in the culture and institution of science means that the intellectual criteria, as distinct from the social ones, for judging the validity and worth of that work transcendextraneous group allegiances. The acceptance of criteria of craftsmanshipand integrity in science and learning cuts across differences in the social affiliations and loyalties of scientists and scholars. Commitment to the intellectual values dampens

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pressuresto advancethe interests of groups at the expense group-induced of these valuesand of the intellectualproduct. In this affirmation of the transcendentalstandardsof scientific institutions, Merton seems to forget that all the standardsof science are humanly established. He forgets his own earlier observation that scientific standards ("criteriaof good and bad intellectual work", "criteriaof craftsmanship and integrity",and the like) may differ in different epochs and cultures.He fails to see that the standardsof a particularscientific discipline may have arisen from, and may be supportedby certain powerful elites; and that, therefore, the standardsof the group dominant in one or anotherscientific community may be in conflict with the standards held by other (minority)groupswithin the discipline. The conflicts and controversies surroundingthe view of a Galileo,a Darwin,or a Lysenko, make this clear. Of course, sometimes there is the involvement of what are easily identified as non-scientists or political authorities, as in the case of Russia in the 1950s where the authorities supportedLysenko's position against the neo-Darwinists.But, for the most part,it is not at all easy to locate or establishpermanentand universalcriteria thatallow for a clear demarcationbetween "scientific" and "non-scientific" considerations (or between what Merton terms "intellectual" and "social" criteria). TheNeglect of Epistemology Icome now to the second point of interest in this essay: the question as to whythe epistemologicalimplications of the theses advancedby these early writers in the sociology of knowledgehave been ignored,or at least not taken asa topic for sociological inquiry. Ido not deny that the epistemological issue,in the guise of relativism, was recognized by sociologists. The real is: why did they fear relativism? Although Ihave been unable to questionfindany explicit reactionsto Mills'two articles,sociologistswere quick to see the implications of Mannheim's views.Stung by critics' assertions that his led to total relativismand nihilism,he came to arguein termsof a standpoint pragmatic theory of adjustment to the specific requirementsof particular historical situations and, later, to stress the position of the "socially unattachedintelligentsia". By emphasizing pragmatism and the unattached he sought to escape the chargesof relativism.After the Nazis intelligentsia, seizedpower in Germany, he emigrated to England, where his intellectual interests underwent an enormous change. As Coser (1971:447) notes: "one might say that while Mannheim'sGermanwork stood under the shadow of and Marx,his Britishwork stood under the shadow of Durkheim".Not Hegel onlydid Mannheim himself resist the epistemological consequences of his

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earlierwork but, by abandoninga concern with the sociology of knowledge, he helped assure that espistemological matters did not become a central concern to sociologists. Despite Mannheim'sefforts to save his assertionsfrom the charge of relativism, Ideology and Utopia was severely criticized. In reviews appearing shortly after the book's publication in English, von Schelting (1936) and Becker (1939) raised questions about the epistemological status of the sociology of knowledge. The tenor of their criticismswas echoed in Merton's view (1957:503) observations,originallypublishedin 1941, that Mannheim's "leads at once, it would seem, to radicalrelativismwith its familiarvicious circle in which the very propositionsassertingsuch relativismare ipso facto remarksabout men speakingin categorieswhich invalid". Noting Mannheim's Merton (1957:503) points out: "Moreover,determination are inappropriate, of categoriespresupposesthe of the 'appropriateness'or 'inappropriateness' wishes to discard". very criteriaof validity which Mannheim Especially at a time when the Germanuniversitieswere undergoinga racialist purge, it was understandablethat there would be a great resistanceto any work that even suggested that science (natural and social) is necessarily affected by social factors. Merton noted in 1938 (reprinted in Merton, 1973:260) that we must resist the idea that "Scientificfindingsare held to be merely the expressionof race or class or nation". The extent of this resistance is revealed by Merton in that same article where he states (Merton, 1973:260): "It is of considerable interest that totalitarian theorists have as a political adopted the radical relativistic doctrines of Wissenssoziologie expedient for discrediting'liberal' or 'bourgeois'or 'non-Aryan'science . .. Politically effective variationsof the 'relationalism'of Karl Mannheim(for purposes example, Ideology and Utopia) have been used for propagandistic and Walter Nazi as theorists Thus, such Krieck, Rust, Rosenberg". Frank, by Mannheim one reason for the rejectionof the epistemologicalissues raisedby was undoubtedly the political struggle against Naziism prior to and during WorldWarII. But there were other reasons as well. Among these was a social climate and empiricismas opposed to the Europeanemphasison favoringpragmatism theorizing and speculation;thus there was an increasingstresson the development of empirical sociology in the United States. Certainlyduring the war years, the use of sociology for war purposes (for example, The American Soldier) laid heavy emphasis on empirical, as contrasted with theoretical, inquiry. And at Columbia University the struggle for control between the department'smore speculativewing and its more empiricallyoriented coun-

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terpart was resolved largely in favor of the latter (Jay, 1973:218). Perhaps partiallyas a result of this increasedemphasison empiricalwork and partially as a result of the kinds of problemsfacing Americansociety (and sociology), WrightMills was to generally ignore the kinds of issues which preoccupied him in his early work, discussedin the first part of this essay. In any case, at a time when sociology was only beginningto become respectablein American academic circles, and when its practitioners themselves were striving to siasm for viewpoints that tended, if taken seriously, to throw into question thevery cognitive stabilitiesof sociology itself. But this is not to say that sociologists were unawareof the epistemological issuesraised by Mannheimand Mills. Indeed, I believe that it wasprecisely becausethey were aware of these issues that sociologists concernedwith the sociologyof knowledge chose to ignore or dismiss the epistemologicalproblemsraisedby Mannheimand Mills. The fact that Mannheim and Millsthemselvesfailed to follow through with further inquiries into these problems,of course,made it even more unlikely that epistemologicalissueswould concern American sociologists. Given the insecure status of sociology in the 1940s, it could,in a sense, ill afford to entertain questions about the groundingof its own knowledge. To have faced these epistemological questions squarely wouldhave forced sociologiststo considerthe existence, or lack of same, of a line between sociology and ideology, the very difference that sociolodividing gyhad been intent on affirmingfrom its very beginnings.Whatever the social, cultural,and professional conditions conducive to the dropping of epistemological questions in sociology, sociologists of knowledge,or those utilizing certain aspects of that general perspective,came to focus on issues of ideolthe social context ogy,on issues concerningthe importanceof understanding inwhich ideas develop, and related matters. Indeed, the sociology of knowledgewas cryptic ideology, genteel ideology, prudent ideology: ideologycritique academicized. there developeda unique areaof specializationwithin sociology Furthermore, -the sociology of science - which was, in a way, predicatedon the rejection ofepistemological questions. After all, the naturalsciences- which are the main focus of concern for sociologists of science - are, at least by Mannheim'saccount, immune from the influence of social factors. And while Merton (1957:635) noted some fifteen years ago that there were few sociolowho "could gists bring themselves,in their work, to treat science as one of the great social institutions of the world", that has surely changed. Today there exists a considerableliteraturein the sociology of science, but, with the of a small number of British sociologists,4 those working in the exception
become a "real" science, it is not surprising that there was no great enthu-

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sociology of science have rejected epistemological concerns. As Whitley (1972:61) points out: "Ignoringthe cognitive aspectsof scientists'activities, they restrict sociology to discussion of social relations and processes". Ignoring epistemologicalquestions, they exclude questions pertainingto the social nature of science (including sociology) itself. Thus, the maturity of - is what is ultimately at issue here. sociology - its own self-awareness WhenKuhn'swork beganto appear,with its enormousimpact on philosophy, the history of science, and elsewhere, there were heated reactions among philosophersand practicingscientists. But these were nothing as comparedto what would have been likely had the same analysis been focused directly on the social sciences. After all, physics, chemistry, and biology, are generally seen to "work". So that howeverdeep Kuhn'scriticismsmight go, they can in no way underminethe practicesof naturalscientists. With sociology, on the other hand - and this would have been even more true at the time when Mannheim'sand Mills' work first appeared- the existence and continuance of a discipline of sociology would be seriously threatened by taking full cognizance of the social determinationof all scientific views and standpoints. Mills' suggestionthat epistemology itself was relativisticwould, if faced head on, have been highly threateningto those busy building a positivistic sociology. The same attitude seems prevalenttoday among many of those working in the sociology of science; they still refuse to see that the distinction between science and ideology is problematicat best, and that, from one point of view, science as ideology is an important topic for sociological inquiry. Thus, the internal cognitive nature and form of science are considered offlimits. The Recognitionof EpistemologicalIssues This bringsme to the third theme in this essay: that the epistemologicalissues raisedby Mannheimand Mills (and later ignored by both) are being pursued members of the today by non-sociologists, that is, by non-card-carrying some frequency is with cited Kuhn that Thomas fact the profession. Despite by sociologists, they often fail to understand the full implications of his views. They often concern themselveswith parochialquestions as to whether
See, for example, Michael Mulkay, "Some aspects of cultural growth in the natural sciences", Social Research 36, 22-52, 1969; S.B. Barnes and R.G. Dolby, 'The scientific ethos: a deviant viewpoint", European Journal of Sociology 11, 3-25, 1970; M.D. King, "Reason, tradition, and the progressiveness of science", History and Theory 10, 3-32, 1971; and Richard Whitley, "Black boxism and the sociology of science: a discussion of the major developments in the field", The Sociological Review Monograph 18, 61-91, 1972. 4

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or not sociology has a fully-developed paradigm,and, if not, the importance of acquiring one. Consider, for instance, a recent statement by Ben-David (1972:4): "The existence of subconscious assumptionsis not an important question at all... In science one obtains interpersonallyvalid knowledge throughthe subjection of personalideas and explanationsof reality to public test by logic, experimentor empiricalobservation. Thus personal biases and mistakesare corrected, and graduallyeliminated". To Ben-David,then, the contentof science is apparentlyimmune to social influences. Perhapsthis is not surprising given his view in another recent work that (Ben-David, 1971:1): "Sociologists study structures and processes of social behavior. Science,however, is not behaviorbut knowledge that can be written down, and learnedagain,with its form or content forgotten, remainingunchanged". Consistentwith this view of science, he asserts further (Ben-David, 1971:13-14) that "the possibilitiesfor either an interactionalor institutional of the conceptualand theoreticalcontents of sociology science are extremely limited". But in reachingthis conclusion, totally ignoresthe work Ben-David of Kuhn (1962, 1970a, 1970b) whom he cites in another context, as well as Hanson (1958), Feyerabend(1962, 1970a, 1970b), and Toulmin (1961)- all of whom are deeply concerned with understandingthe contents of science. These men have as a central concern the ideological commitments which scientists must share in order for the scientific enterpriseto succeed. They emphasize that the social nature of science is relevant to the validity of scientific theories (the content of science). What could be more in keeping with the aims of sociological inquiry than, for example, Kuhn's(1970b: 240) statement that "the type of question I ask has .. . been: how will a particular constellation of beliefs, values, and imperativesaffect " groupbehaviour? In fact, Kuhn's "sociological"analyses have been thoroughly derided by his - especially Lakatos (1970), critics Shapere (1964), Scheffler (1967), and Popper (1970) - partiallyon the groundsthat they are sociological. of knowledge and science, especially in the Sociologists United States, might have made their own contributions to the post-positivist critique of knowand science had they more closely followed ledge the leads of Mannheimand Mills. Despite the ambiguitiesof their views in that they often seem to be providing of positivistic science, while, at other a critique times, holding that there exists a reality which is fully independent of the human observer ("independent facts" and "regularities"in nature, for example) - they

tion, concept-formation, verificatory models, truth, and knowledge. It is ironic that sociologists, with all their pretensions to high science and their frequent excuse that sociology is only a "young science", should have failed to followthe leads providedby these two men. Instead it has been scholars

as most sociologists do not, the social recognized, nature of language, percep-

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from outside the sociological community - men like Kuhn, Feyerabend, Toulmin, and Winch - who have been the most highly critical of the dominantpositivistviews of science. Kuhn, for example, raises questions about the notion of theory-independent observation by pointing out that a theory (1962:102) is a "conceptual network through which scientists view the world". He asserts that (Kuhn, 1970a:192) "People do not see stimuli: our knowledge of them is highly theoretical and abstract". And Feyerabend (1962:29) notes that: "Introducing a new theory involves changes of outlook both with respect to the observable and with respect to the unobservablefeatures of the world... Scientific theories are ways of looking at the world; and their adoption affects our general beliefs and expectations, and thereby also our experiences and conceptions of reality".Whatthese men emphasizeis that what counts as an observation of this or that, as well as the meaning of this or that, is theory-dependent. There are, then, no raw data, no brute facts, but only (Feyerabend, 1962:50-51) data "analysed,modelled and manufacturedaccordingto some theory". Genesisand Justification Among sociologists, Mannheim, Mills, and Merton, to varying extents, do recognize that truth and knowledge exist only by virtue of the relevant of individual the truth- and knowledge-claims scientific audience warranting must use thinkers. That is to say, they see that in every science, investigators various proceduralrules for deciding whether propositions or statements are to be judged "factual" and, therefore, to be admitted to the corpus of scientific knowledge. They were able to recognize, to an extent that most contemporary sociologists do not, the distinction between the contexts of discovery and of justification - the first, havingto do with the genesis of the inquirer's ideas; the second, with his way of presenting the results of his inquiries.They see that it is in the context of justification that scientific truth and knowledgeare established. Popperhas been extremely critical of the directionstaken by early studies in the sociology of knowledge, but I think he misses the full implicationsof these inquiries. For example, he (1963:216-217) assertsthat the sociology of knowledge "shows an astonishingfailure to understandprecisely its main subject, the social aspects of knowledge, or rather of scientific method. It looks upon science or knowledge as a process in the mind or 'consciousness' of the individualscientist or perhapsas the product of such a process".What Popperis callingattention to is the context of justification,with its necessary

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reliance on proceduralrules or, what he refers to as, "scientific method". Popper shows his position most clearly in contrastinghis view with, what he regards as, the sociologicalview (Popper, 1963:216-217): If scientific objectivity were founded, as the sociologistic theory of knowledge naively assumes, upon the individual scientist's impartialityor objectivity, then we should have to say good-bye to it. . .No, what we usually mean by the term rests on different grounds. It is a matter of scientific method. . .Scientific objectivity can be describedas the inter-subjectivity of scientific method. But this social aspect of science is almost entirely neglectedby those who call themselvessociologists of knowledge. Whilemany sociologistsof knowledgedo neglect the social aspectsof science, this accusation is not correct for the writers being consideredhere. Merton (1970b:220) points out that a variety of scientific observationsin seventeenthcentury England"wereimbuedwith significancethroughcontact with other scientists". That is, (Merton, 1970b:219), "the investigatoris compelledto set up critical experiments which will satisfy the other scientists engagedin the same cooperative activity". And Mannheimand Mills stress thisthroughout the work being examinedhere, as was seen in earlierpagesof this essay. Furthermore,all three went beyond Popper, to emphasize, in a way that he does not, the full extent to which the "social aspects of knowledge"are relevantto knowledge-claims and, at the same time, subject to the influence of social-historical conditions. Only a hint of this is found in Merton's early dissertation,where his focus was on other matters. But he does firmly indicate (Merton, 1970b:220) that the individual scientist must "devisea proof or demonstration in terms of the approved canons of scientific verificationpresentin his culture".This statement certainlysuggests anawareness that these canons of verification may be different in other culturesand at other times. Speaking of the verification of knowledge, Mannheim (1972:259) points out that the "very principles, in the light of which knowledge is to be criticized, are themselves found to be socially and conditioned". historically Itwas C. WrightMills, however, who was the most explicit as to the social influences on the criteriaand standardsinvolved in justifying various claims toknowledge and truth. For example, he considers the "official and monopolisticparadigm of validation and truth accepted by medieval scholasand goes on to observe that (Mills,1963:455) "Therehave been and ticism", are diversecanons and criteriaof validity and truth, and these criteria,upon which determinationsof the truthfulnessof propositionsat any time depend, are themselves, in their persistence and change, legitimately open to social-

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historical relativization".Speakingof the current"scientific" thought-model, he notes that this model distinguishesbetween the genesis of an inquiryand the truth of its results(Mills, 1963:458): For this paradigmdemands that assertions be verified by certain operations which do not depend upon the motives or social position of the assertor. Social position does not directly affect the truthfulnessof propositions tested by this verificatorymodel. But social positions may well affect whether or not it or some other model is used by types of thinkers today and in other periods. By no means have all thinkers in all times employed this particularverificatorymodel. Mannheim,Mills, and Merton, then, all give considerableattention to the context of justification and to the social conditions influencingwhat criteria andstandardsare viewed as relevantto the processesof validation of knowledge-claims.They also, however, consider the relevance of the genesis of ideas and statements for their truth-valueor validity. Mannheim arguesthat the genesis of an idea may be relevantto its validity, while Millsand Merton
(at least in his earlier writings) maintain that the validity of an idea is not

dependent upon its genesis. They both argue that the motives or social position of an inquirer are irrelevantto the truth of his assertions,because the of his assertionsis done by the scientific or other community warrantability to which he directs his assertions.Mills, though, points out that social positions are important in the sense that they may affect which verificatory modelsare used by differentcommunitiesor audiencesat different times. All threeof these men are in generalagreement,however, that truth-claimsare settledin the scientific or intellectual community. It is by meeting various publiccriteria which satisfy other scientists or thinkers that truth is established. Mannheimand Merton,especiallyin his more recentwritings,often talk Still, asif there were some one "correct" position from which phenomenaare to viewed. This is clear in Merton's articleon "Insiders and Outsiders" (1972) be and in Mannheim's(1972:80) assertion that: "Whatis needed ... is a continual readinessto recognizethat every point of view is particular to a certain definite situation and to find out through analysisof what this particularity consists". Mannheim,as we know, believed there was one social group which was able to free itself from the influence of such particularisms:the unattached criticizedthis view at length elsewhere(Phillips, intelligentsia. have I and will not criticisms here. repeat my Rather, what I want to argue 1973),
nowis that there is a sense in which the genesis of ideas is relevant to their

and that, further, such a viewpoint does not assume the epistemologitruth,

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cally-privilegedposition of Mannheim'sunattached intelligentsia.Instead, it follows directly from the basic canons of the sociology of knowledge as formulatedby Mannheimand Mills. Simply stated, my thesis is as follows. Since it is the scientific community (and here I speak of it as a monolithic whole, although obviously it is not) which produces scientific truths and knowledge, and since further,the scientific community does consider the genesis of ideas as relevantto their truth, then indeed genesis does affect the truth of a scientist'sassertions.That is to say, those who accredit the truth- and knowledge-claimsof the individual scientist may give close attention to his social position as servingto establish what Gouldnerterms the scientist'scredibility. In a sense, then, Mannheimand others who emphasizethe importanceof the social position of the thinker as relevant to the truth of his assertionsare right. But this is not, as Mannheimseemed to believe, because some persons are in a better position than others to see or discover the truth. That is, we need not accept Mannheim's argument as regards, for example, the unattached intelligentsia occupying an epistemologicallyprivilegedposition by which they acquire a kind of "purified" mind allowing them access to undistorted reality, which they can then comparewith the distorted imagesheld by others. No, the social position of the thinker is importantto the truth of variousassertionsbecauseit is one of the factors consideredas relevantby the scientific communitieswhich produce truth and knowledge. WhatI have been trying to emphasizehere is that the communalnatureof the context of justification does not precludeconsiderationsof the genesis of the thinker's ideas. And just as attributionsof credibility may be dependent on the social position of the thinkers,so may they be dependenton such factors as his "motives". If a scientific audience responds to a man's publicationby arguing,that "Of course, he'd say that; he's just trying to get even with Y" or something similar,this means that the (attributed) motives of the thinkerdo play a part in the process by which his assertionsare or are not accepted as "true" by the scientific community. If he is seen as havinglow credibility, there is less likelihood of there being communal attributionsof truth to his work than if his credibilityis seen as high. One of the difficultieswith Mannheim's and Mills'treatmentof genesis is that they formulate the relationshipbetween the genesis of an idea and its validity or scientific truth as if it were a private matter. They view the solitary individualthinker as setting forth ideas which may or may not be affected by his motives, social position, and the social conditions of his inquiry.Then, the

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thinker'sideas or assertionsare verified by (Mills, 1963:458) "certainoperations which do not depend upon the motives or social position of the assertor". True, Mills does point out that there may be other verificatory models than the one which is dominanttoday. But he fails to see the inherent the assertor'smotives and social position as if they contradictionof regarding were fully independent of the process of verification.This may, indeed, be the model which scientistssay they follow - where the contexts of discovery and justification are separateand independent- but in the actualpractice of scienceit is otherwise. The problemfor the assertoris to convince the scientific community in which he sharesmembershipto warrantthe truth or validity of his assertions.In the actual process of verification, they may or may not attributecertainmotives to him, they may or may not view his social position as having affected his scientific assertions.Of course, they, like some sociologistsof knowledge,will regardthese not as attributionsbut as "discoveries".But it is they who- in the final analysis - provide whateverlinkagesare said to exist between the assertor'smotives, for instance, and his assertions.Putting it another way, if the scientific community decides that an individual thinker's motives are relevantto the truth of his assertions,then they are relevant.It simply makes no sense to argue, for example, that his motives are "really"irrelevantbut that this is unknown to the scientific community. For only they can decide matters of what is and is not relevant for scientific truth. After all, they decide what is to count as a "motive"or as "relevant"in such matters.There is no higher court of appeal, no superior vantage point from which such matterscan be surveyedor settled. Relativismand Rationality to the sociological studies of Kuhn, I wish to offer a few Finally, with regard and remarksas to the issues of relativismand rationalityraisedby Mannheim Mills more than thirty years ago. The same difficulties ensuing from the standpointsof these two earlierthinkers are recognizedas majorproblemsin science and intellectual life today. But whereas they were a reason for rejectingmany aspects of a sociology of knowledge orientation at that time, today they are taken as topics for seriouscontemplationand discussion. One of the consequencesof Kuhn's The Structureof ScientificRevolutions, then, is to raise anew importantquestions about the relativismof scientific standards and intellectual viewpoints. Since Kuhn regards paradigms as sovereign, as providing alternative world-views, this means that those scientists working within one paradigmshare no theoretical concepts with

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scientists working under its rivals or predecessors. Lacking a common vocabulary,they may be unable to communicate with one another, and are, consequently, unable to even formulatetopics for discussionor disagreement. From Kuhn's standpoint, there is simply no vocabularlyfor comparingand contrasting the respective theoretical positions of men operatingunder different scientific paradigms.AlthoughKuhn has revisedhis views severaltimes since the initial publication of his book in 1962, the problemraisedby Kuhn remains.Of course, Kuhn did not really "raise"this problem,as it is one that has long plagued serious thinkers (see, for example, Collingwood, 1940). Whatever its origins,however,the problemremains. If, as Kuhn, and in an inconsistent manner,Mannheimand Mills, argue, the concepts and standards accepted as authoritative in different milieux lead scientists to define the world in differentways, how can one find an impartial standpoint of rationality and thus escape the throes of relativism? How can one, for instance, compare scientific theories and decide which is the best? From what viewpoint can this be done? Kuhn (1970:264) responds to accusations of relativismby asserting that "one scientific theory is not as good as another for doing what scientistsnormallydo". But this statement is highly ambiguous.Does it meanwhat scientistsusually (ordinarily)do, or what they ideally (properly,normatively)do? If he meanswhat they "usually"do, then there is no basis for criticizingthe actual practices of a scientific community. If he means what they "ideally" do, then apparentlyhe is an absolutist, holding that there are abstract, timeless, criteriaof rationality.Should the latter be Kuhn'smeaning,then he is abandoning his originalthesis. Whateverthe ambiguities in Kuhn's position, he has been responsible for forcefully reminding us of the problem. Furthermore,he has stressed the need for a more historical and sociological approachto science. And I think that certain aspects of Mannheim'sand Mills' writingsgive rise to the same concerns. All three writers arguethat men think in terms of the intellectual and social "frames of reference", "universes of discourse", "technical languages","social categories", and "presuppositions"availableto them in their own culture or group. These determinewhat they can see, what they regard as evidence, as compelling, as consistent, and so on. Since men's standards and preferences vary between different cultures and historical milieux, what intellectual or social authority can be claimed for one set of standardsor preferences ratherthan another? The thorough-goingrelativist concedes final authority to the standards currentin a particular milieu, at the same time denying that those standardshave any relevanceor authority outside that milieu. This is almost precisely the position taken by Mannheimand Mills with what they call "relationalism",where they argue that intellectual

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criteriacan only be formulatedin terms of the perspectiveof a given situation. As I noted earlier,this strikesme as fully relativistic. Central to Kuhn's work and underlyingthe position of Mannheimand Mills then, is the necessity for philosophersof science and sociologists of knowledge to recognize the choice between the relativist approach, where the particularconceptual and theoretical systems current in one's own scientific milieu are treated as locally sovereign;and the absolutist approach, where certain abstract,ideal, universalstandardsare imposed on all milieux alike. If one accepts the basic canons of Mannheimand Mills and the conclusions of Kuhn's work, then one must choose the relativist position. Choosing the absolutistposition, on the other hand, involvesrejectionof the basic tenets of the sociology of knowledge and of recent studies, like Kuhn's,in the history of science. The decisivequestion, of course, is: Can one maintainthe relativist viewpoint, and, at the same time, defend one's own standpoint as rational? Toulmin (1972) has dealt at length with this question as to whether there is a middle ground between the absolutist and relativist extremes. While his argumentsconcerning this problem are intriguing,I do not feel that he has dilemma. to the absolutist/relativist provideda satisfactoryalternative But there remains a problem. If, indeed, people like Kuhn and Toulmin believe that some theories are better than others - so that they prefer their theories to those of Popper and Lakatos - how do they decide? Since they reject the existence of universaldemarcationcriteriawhich distinguishgood from bad theories, what criteriado they and their audiencessharethat allow them to claim, and understandone anotherwhen they do, that "this"way of looking at science is preferableto "that" way? Of course, Kuhnclaims that consensus concerning scientific knowledge is rather quickly arrived at in scientific communities. But this is certainlynot the case in the philosophy or history of science, and most assuredlynot in contemporarysociology. Given conflicting theories, how are some able to survive while others are not? of the fittest, this is not a WhereasToulmin (1972) suggestsa kind of survival terribly comfortable position to accept. Nor, on the other hand, can one be comfortable with the view that those theories survivewhose advocatesare the strongest. That is to say, while there are powerful elites in science as elsewhere, it is not, I believe, the case that "might makes right". In short, if we belief in the rationality of science held by most reject the taken-for-granted I sociologists as think we must - what are the full implicationsof this for the practice of science and for the way we individualscientistsmust live our lives? All of this is, of course, to raise questions for which neither I nor others concerned with these problems have ready answers.And, consistent with the line of inquiry followed here, we must face the question as to what is necessaryfor an "answer"to count as an answer.

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of these questions, the sociologist must ask "How do you "Why should we believe you"? As a beginning, I suggest that especially those concerned with the sociology of knowledge try to provide answers to a provocative pair of questions posed by Kuhn (1963:395). He begins by observing that: "It is not, after all, the individual who decides whether his discoveries or theoretical inventions shall become part of the body of established science. Rather it is his professional community, a community which has and sometimes exercises the privilege of declaring him a deviant". Kuhn then goes on to raise two questions that go to the heart of scientific and intellectual life: "Who are they to bear such responsibility? And on what ground should we trust their judgment? " The viability and health of the intellectual life of our time may be dependent on our ability to confront and answer these questions. And with all know"? and sociologists and science REFERENCES Barnes, S.B. and R.G. Dolby, "The scientific ethos: a deviant viewpoint", European Journal of Sociology 11, 3-25, 1970. Becker, Howard, "Review of Ideology and Utopia", American Sociological Review 3, 260-262, 1939. Ben-David, Joseph, The Scientist's Role in Society, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1971. Ben-David, Joseph, "Reflections on the state of sociological theory and the sociological community". Paper read at Conference of the Research Committee on the Sociology of Science of the ISA, London, England, 1972. Bennett, Jonathan, Rationality, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964. Collingwood, R.G., An Essay on Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940. Coser, Lewis A., Masters of Sociological Thought, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971. Curtis, James E., and John W. Petras, eds., The Sociology of Knowledge, New York: Praeger, 1970. Feyerabend, Paul F., "Explanation, reduction, and empiricism". In H. Feigl and G. Maxwell, eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. IlI, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962. Feyerabend, Paul F., "Against method: outline in an anarchistic theory of knowledge", Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4, 17-130, 1970a. Feyerabend, Paul F., "Consolations for the specialist". In Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave,eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge: University Press, 1970b. Hanson, Norwood Russell, Patterns of Discovery, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958. Jarvie, I.C., Concepts and Society, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972. Jay, Martin, The DialecticalImagination, London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1973. King, M.D., "Reason, tradition, and the progressiveness of science", History and Theory 10, 3-32, 1971. Kuhn, Thomas S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Kuhn, Thomas S., "Response to critics". In A.C. Crombie, ed., Scientific Change, London: Heinemann, 1963. Kuhn, Thomas S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970a.

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