The Hon Mr Tony Smith MP Chair, Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters 5 PO Box 6021 PARLIAMENT HOUSE ACT

2600
em@aph.gov.au

23-4-2014

AND TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 10 This document is not intended and neither must be deemed to be restricted for publication
Supplement 6 to Submission dated 24-2-2014

Sir, in view of my submission as to election photo ID cards and making clear I oppose any electronic voting in principle because as was shown in the USA it is open to corruption and computer programs can be manipulated by corrupt electoral commission employees, as I witnessed already with ordinary ballot papers, and considering how the WA failed general election for the Senate underlines the need for a paper trail to verify matters we ought to consider a system that allows for the use of computer programs but doesnt do away with the paper trail. For example, an elector can go to a polling booth and say scan the card to be able to access the computer terminal using a predetermined pin code. The computer then display a touch button system where the candidate can press the relevant button corresponding to the candidate the elector wish to vote for. And using the system, set out in part 5 of my submission (emailed on 22-4-2014) the elector only need to press the relevant candidate buttons as there are vacancies, with a general election for the Senate this means 6 candidates in order of preferences. With a Double Dissolution it means 12 candidates, in order of preference. With the House of Representative just one candidate. Once this is done, the computer terminal then displays the numbers relevant to the particular candidate and ask the elector to confirm the selection and the order in which they are listed or if the elector desires to make any changes or start all over again. Once the elector confirms the selection the computer terminal then prints out the ballot paper which shows the relevant numbers of the candidates selected and in which order. This the elector then can take to the ballot box and deposit it. The computer terminal doesnt keep any electronic records of how a elector voted versus the identity of the voter but can keep a record of the print out. As such, the print out record is transferred to a main terminal and as each vote is confirmed than it automatically is entered on a display board at the main terminal. Any candidate who seek to challenge the result of the votes can do so and the paper ballot paper then serve as a backup system. Where an elector does vote, say from a computer at home, then the same system applies albeit the computer terminal in the electoral office then prints out the hard copy for record. This, while the elector may print out its own copy at home, which doesnt show the electors identity but does show a random number given by the computer system which also may appear on the official ballot print out printed at the terminal at the election office. I for one once voted, while residing in a small town, for a certain candidate, but while there were a mere about 100 electors in that area discovered that no votes were recorded for this
p1 23-4-2014 INSPECTOR-RIKATI about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD A 1st edition limited special numbered book on Data DVD ISBN 978-0-9803712-6-0 PLEASE NOTE: You may order books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series by making a reservation, See also Http://www.schorel-hlavka.com Blog at Http://www.scrib.com/InspectorRikati

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

candidate. As such, I knew that my vote was missing for that candidate. Hence, I knew that something was wrong with the counting. I had checked and double checked the ballot paper at the time to make sure my vote was valid and so knew that it could not have been disregarded for incorrect numbering. It was the first time I voted in a federal election and so knew that the votes were either not counted appropriately or some corrupt official had tampered with the actual primary votes results, etc. It is therefore important not to allow this to eventuate with electronic voting systems. Where, as for example banks do when one make a payment via the internet being issued with a random number as a receipt, then if the electronic terminal does the same on the ballot paper and on the print out at home of the elector then the confidentiality of the vote of the elector is maintained. However, if needed the ballot paper could be traced by the random number without identifying the elector. As such, if a elector is at home voting for a particular candidate and has a printout at home with this random number but then discover that the tally board displays no such vote for such a candidate then the candidate may lodge through a supervisory body (above the electoral commission) a complaint. The supervisory body would not be permitted to disclose the identity of the complainant to the electoral commission but can request to have the ballot paper showing the random identical number to be checked. In this manner the actual ballot paper that is checked for verification can then establish if the vote counting was correct or not. If not then a manual re-counting of all relevant ballot paper would be required. In fact likewise so the computer terminal at polling stations could provide a print out with a random number and have the same printed out on the ballot paper. This, so that an elector finally has a written copy of voting and as the home person voting using the internet has a copy the elector attending to a polling station likewise can produce a copy.. The copy for the electors print out merely would need to have the random number shown on the ballot paper and the selected order of the candidates and wouldnt need to list all candidates as would be shown on the ballot paper. Again, the elector having attended to a polling station could still challenge the vote count if he voted for a particular candidate and find no vote recorded in that polling area for this candidate. The random allocation of numbers to both the ballot paper and the print out for the elector will ensure that only the elector will be aware what the random number is relating to his/her vote. Even if, for example, the electors print out was lost on the street anyone finding this document would not be able to associate the printout to any identity. Likewise, so with the ballot paper. Only the elector which was provided with this random number exist an ability to marry up the random number of the ballot paper versus the electors print out. As a other security measure for the elector, if the election commission were to dispute the elector having voted, then the elector can submit the random number to the supervisory body, under confidentiality, that it can check against the computer random numbers that were issued during the election if this particular random number was issued. The supervisory body then can advise the electoral commission that by its investigation the random number the elector provided was issued at the time and date the elector claimed to have voted. Essential is and remains that the election commission has no information itself as to the electors random number that was issued, and the supervisory body by law is prohibited to disclose this to anyone. As such, the only information the election commission has is the random numbers on the ballot paper. The supervisory body only has the computer random numbers and the time and date this was issued. The electors print out has only the print out of the random number with the selected candidate(s), and the personal knowledge when the elector went to vote. This would do away with having officials sitting at laptops to record who is or isn t to vote because the computer system would automatically mark of the barcode of the elector when
p2 23-4-2014 INSPECTOR-RIKATI about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD A 1st edition limited special numbered book on Data DVD ISBN 978-0-9803712-6-0 PLEASE NOTE: You may order books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series by making a reservation, See also Http://www.schorel-hlavka.com Blog at Http://www.scrib.com/InspectorRikati

voting at the terminal but without recording the random number or the selected voting pattern with it. In 2012, while for the last time being a candidate in an election, I was given the understanding 5 by a member of a committee (of a political party) that no matter how many people would vote for me I would never succeed in being elected, and that there was a group of people, including lawyers and judges who would ensure I would never succeed. From this I gained the impression that the electoral results would be compromised to ensure I would never be elected and the courts would have its instructions to defeat any case I would to challenge the 10 election results. I have been documenting formal complaints in the past as to undue interferences by election officials when I was a candidate in (political) elections and therefore have not the slightest doubt that one cannot trust election results. 15 Where a successful candidate can so to say be set for life and walk away with millions of dollars having served in the Parliament it no longer is that they are elected for the honour to serve the people but rather for their own personal (financial and otherwise) gains as well that of the party. Generally after retirement they will be bestowed with fringe benefits and other perks (regardless how unconstitutional) and also jobs for the mates will ensure that they 20 will get good positions afterwards. It is for this also that it is essential that not just elections are held in a FAIR and PROPER manner but that they appear (to a fair minded person) to be held in a FAIR and PROPER manner. Having experienced how the election commission(s) manipulated their powers to even unduly interfere with my elections I am too well aware there must be a stricter control 25 on how any election commission (not just the AEC) conduct elections. I for one do not consider that the office of the Ombudsman is an appropriate office to deal with complaints as I experienced too often it will go along with the policies of a government regardless what might be legally applicable. We need a supervisory body toi supervise the 30 election commission which is completely independent of any government interference(s) and which deals with matters on basis of law! The Court of Disputed Returns is not the appropriate body because it acts as a de facto political body for the Parliament and can ignore legal requirements and defeat an objection regardless if the illegality was found proven, merely if it is of the opinion it would not alter the outcome. Neither do I view the High Court 35 of Australia is suitable because it can refuse (And I experienced that!) a legitimate application because it fails to understand/comprehend what is constitutionally applicable, and in any event places a person at severe financial risk whereas any offending official has no such risk because the taxpayers will cover the cost for him/her. Therefore, the special supervisory body must be one that without cost to the complainant can investigate matter of complaints against 40 the electoral commission irrespective if the complainant also pursues other legal avenues. This submission is not intended and neither must be perceived to refer to matter in any order of priority or to all details/issues. 45 I look forwards to your details response, if any courtesy will eventuate as such. Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Friends call me Gerrit)

MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

50
(

Our name is our motto!)

p3 23-4-2014 INSPECTOR-RIKATI about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD A 1st edition limited special numbered book on Data DVD ISBN 978-0-9803712-6-0 PLEASE NOTE: You may order books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series by making a reservation, See also Http://www.schorel-hlavka.com Blog at Http://www.scrib.com/InspectorRikati