The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers of Success) Author(s): MICHAEL WALZER Reviewed work(s): Source:

Social Research, Vol. 69, No. 4, International Justice, War Crimes, and Terrorism: The U.S. Record (winter 2002), pp. 925-944 Published by: The New School Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40971584 . Accessed: 24/08/2012 14:41
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of The Triumph JustWar Theory (and the Dangers / of Success)

/

BY MICHAEL WALZER

i^OME politicaltheoriesdie and go to heaven; some, I hope, die and go to hell. But some have a long lifein thisworld,a history an but also, sometimes, mostoftenofserviceto thepowers-that-be, in of The of war the service history. theory just began oppositionist the powers.At least that is how I interpret Augustine'sachieveofChristian withthe ment:he replaced the radicalrefusal pacifists activeministry ofthe Christian soldier.Now pious Christians could behalf of the on for the sake of worldly city, imperialpeace fight but had to ; (in thiscase, literally, Romana) pax they fight justly, only forthe sake of peace, and always, witha downinsisted, Augustine cast demeanor,without anger or lust.1Seen fromthe perspective of primitive this account of just war was simplyan Christianity, and religiously excuse,a wayof makingwarmorally possible.And thatwasindeed thefunction ofthe theory. But itsdefenders would have said, and I am inclinedto agree, thatit made warpossiblein a worldwherewarwas,sometimes, necessary. Fromthe beginning, the theory had a critical edge: soldiers(or, at least,theirofficers) were supposed to refuseto fight in warsof and to or abstain from the standard conquest oppose military practicesof rape and pillage afterthe battlewas won. Butjust war was a worldly in every sense of thatterm, and it continued theory, to serveworldly interests radicalism.It is imporagainstChristian tantto note,though,thatChristian radicalism had more thanone
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butit in a pacifist ofwar, version: itcouldbe expressed rejection in thereligiously driven cruin waritself, couldalso be expressed scholasof these;themedieval sade. Augustine opposedthefirst the set themselves in tics, against following Aquinas'sfootsteps, ofreligion "Difference is Vitoria's: statement second.The classic ofthe thetime from Forcenturies, cannot be a causeof justwar." of of the Reformation wars to thereligious Crusades many years, of Christian and preachers the priests Europe,manylordsand to thelegitibarons(and evena few , had been committed kings) had their unbelievers: forceagainst they macyof usingmilitary that Vitoria of ownversion jihad. claimed, bycontrast, "thesole and onlyjust cause for wagingwar is when harm has been center of the religious inflicted."2 Justwar was an argument on theother, on theone side,and holy warriors, against pacifists, were its even enemies of its because and (and though proponents , it tookshape as a seculartheory whichis simply theologians) itsworldliness. ofdescribing another way and did not the theory, of thisworldembraced So the rulers to intellectuals warwithout a single it,or hiring describing fight ofcourse, describe it,as a warforpeace andjustice.Mostoften, thatvice paysto the tribute was hypocritical: thisdescription whopayit to those tribute the Buttheneed to pay virtue. opens - that of and virtuous, ofthevirtuous thecriticism is,ofthebrave a few(butone couldalso say:at least havebeen only there whom oftheacafrom thehistory . I willciteone heroicmoment, a few) oftheUniversity around1520,thefaculty sometime demicworld: theSpanish and votedthat metin solemn ofSalamanca assembly lawand an natural of wasa violation America ofCentral conquest aboutthesubI havenotbeen able to learnanything war.3 unjust therewere not Certainly, sequentfateof the good professors. likethatone, butwhathappenedat Salamanca moments many lostitscritical that proedge.The theory justwarnever suggests werelimbutthereasons forgoingto war, reasons videdworldly - and theyhad to be worldly. the Aztecs to ited Converting

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thegold of the wasnota just cause; norwasseizing Christianity itsinhabitants. Americas or enslaving and Pufendorf likeGrotius Writers incorporated just warthelaw,but the riseof the modernstateand oryintointernational the legal (and philosophical)acceptanceof statesovereignty Now the political foreintothebackground. pushedthe theory ofas Machiavellian wasoccupiedbypeoplewe can think ground men sometimes driven of hard women), (and by"reason princes, had todo. Worldly whodidwhat(they state," said) they prudence over realism over what wasincreasingly worldly justice; triumphed The princes oftheworld continued as naiveidealism. disparaged to defendtheirwars,usingthe languageof international law, thelanguageofjust war.Butthe which wasalso,at leastin part, defenses weremarginal to theenterprise, and I suspect itwas that theleastimportant of thestate's intellectuals whoputthemforward. States claimed a right tofight whenever their rulers deemed itnecessary, and therulers tooksovereignty to meanthat no one couldjudge theirdecisions.They not onlyfought when they how to wanted;theyfought theywanted,returning the old Romanmaximthatheld warto be a lawless inter arma activity: silent was taken to mean that there was no law leges which, again, aboveor beyond thedecreesofthestate; conventional restraints on theconduct ofwarcouldalways be overridden forthesakeof about were treated as a kindofmoralvictory.4 Arguments justice to the anarchic conditions of international izing, inappropriate For this world, society. justwarwasnotworldly enough. In the 1950sand early1960s, whenI was in graduate school, realism was the reigning doctrine in the fieldof "international relations." The standard reference wasnottojusticebutto interest.Moralargument was against the rulesof the discipline as it wascommonly a few writers defended interpracticed, although estas thenewmorality.5 Thereweremany in scientists political thoseyears whopreenedthemselves as modern Machiavellis and dreamedof whispering in the ear of the prince;and a certain number ofthem, theambition oftheothers, enoughto stimulate

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Theypracticed being cool and toughactually got to whisper. whodid notalways need to be theprinces, minded;they taught of thecalculated howto getresults application through taught, in terms of"thenational wereunderstood force. Results interest," sumof powerand wealth determined which was the objectively of future here and nowplus the probability powerand wealth. writtobe better; a few taken Moreofbothwasalmost only always morallimits of prudential ers arguedforthe acceptance limits; wartheory never discussed. thoseyears, as I remember were, Just was relegatedto religiondepartments, seminaries, theological in even those And universities. Catholic and a few places,isolated was pressed as theywerefromthe political world,the theory forthesakeofself-preservation, realist toward perhaps positions; ofitscritical surrendered itsadvocates edge. something a whilefor the it took all Vietnamchanged this,although level.Whathappenedfirst at the theoretical changeto register of The warbecamea subject in therealmof practice. occurred debate;it waswidely bypeople on the opposed,mostly political also influenced Thesewerepeople heavily left. they byMarxism; and sharedwiththe princes they spokea languageof interest; Andyet formoralizing. a disdain ofAmerican politics professors moralargument. themtoward ofthewarpressed theexperience itcould was thewarin their Of course, imprudent; eyes radically not be won; itscosts,even ifAmericans onlyof themthought unwise adventure itwasan imperialist weremuchtoohigh; selves, the States set the United it the evenfor imperialists; against cause whichwould alienateit fromthe Third of nationalliberation, failed Buttheseclaims oftheFirst). World(and significant parts feelthe war's most of of thefeelings toexpress opponents, utterly exposureofVietnamese ingsthathad to do withthe systematic Almost ofAmerican to theviolence civilians against war-making. in antiwar Allofus the intomorality. fell theleft itswill, campsud- though we did not ofjustwar thelanguage denly begantalking weweredoing. waswhat that know that

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the sincetoday It mayseemodd to recallthe '60s in thisway, evenabsolutist left seemsall tooquickto makemoralarguments, left of the contemporary But thisdescription moralarguments. A certain kindofpoliticized, seemstome mistaken. instrumental, common is indeed selective and highly increasingly moralizing It is moralargument. butthis is notserious writers, amongleftist from theVietnam tohavelearned, or ought notwhat welearned, and many that on the then was What left, people happened years. Andwhat morallanguage. was others too,lookedfora common all ofus, a We were, wasthelanguageofjust war. mostavailable in publicaboutmorality. The tospeaking unaccustomed bitrusty, had robbed us of the verywordsthatwe realistascendancy we slowly reclaimed: intervention, needed,which just aggression, noncombatant cause, self-defense, immunity, proportionality, double warcrimes. of war, civilians, effect, terrorism, prisoners thatthesewords had meanings. Of Andwe came to understand could be used instrumen thatis always trueof course, they tally; Butifwe attended to their and moralterms. meanings, political in a discussion ourselves involved that had itsownstrucwefound in a novel,concepts in a theory ture.Like characters shape the in which narrative or theargument they figure. Once thewarwas over, war became an academicsubject; just nowpolitical scientists and philosophers discovered thetheory; it waswritten aboutin the and in the universities journals taught and also in the (American) academies and warcolleges. military A smallgroupofVietnam veterans a majorrolein making played the discipline of morality centralto the military curriculum.6 had bad memories. welcomed They They justwartheory precisely becauseitwasin their a critical It is,in fact, eyes theory. doubly - ofwar's critical occasions and itsconduct. I suspect that theveterans weremost concerned with thesecondofthese. Itis notonly thatthey wantedto avoidanything like the MyLai massacre in future likeprofessional soldiers to wars; wanted, they everywhere, their from mere And because of distinguish profession butchery. their Vietnam believed thatthis had to be done experience, they

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a code butalso a theory. Once itrequired notonly systematically; I suppose, aristocratic honorhad grounded themilupona time, in more democratic and the code code; a egalitarian age, itary with had to be defended arguments. and debates were Andso weargued. The discussions wide-rangacademic. It war was were even once the over, if, they mostly ing is in the United the academic world to how is easy forget large ofproand tens ofthousands aremillions ofstudents States: there and army future citizens So a lotofpeoplewereinvolved, fessors. was mostly and the theory officers, presented, thoughthisprefor wartime criticism. as a manual was also sentation disputed, Vietnamand were Our cases and exampleswere drawnfrom criticism to invite framed (the debate overnucleardeterrence wasa highly butthis thelanguageofjust war, also used,in part, than did Vietdebate and engagedfarfewer technical people and that havefought, we shouldnever nam). Herewasa warthat So it as iftherewereno morallimits. we fought brutally, badly, a line and for an occasionfordrawing became,retrospectively, to determoral the to ourselves necessary casuistry committing oftheline.EversincePascal'sbrilliant location minetheprecise has had a bad name among moral denunciation, casuistry takento be excessively it is commonly permissive, philosophers; of the moralrules. as a relaxation not so muchan application we were Whenwe lookedbackat theVietnamese cases,however, thanto grant to denypermission morelikely it,insisting again had been done shouldnothavebeen done. what and againthat thatgavethemoral ofVietnam feature wasanother Butthere and the we lost, itwasa warthat ofthewarspecialforce: critique conalmost the war withwhichwe fought certainly brutality rather and minds," In a warfor"hearts to our defeat. tributed out to be a keyto victhanforland and resources, justiceturns doclookedonce again liketheworldly So just wartheory tory. is the deepestcause of the trinethatit is. And here,I think, for ofstate arenowreasons there triumph: contemporary theory's

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almostsaythat One might justicehas become a justly. fighting necessity. military inwhich thedeliberate wars earlier Therewereprobably killing about carelessness and also the commonmilitary of civilians, The Boer waris to be civilians, counterproductive. proved killing the warinwhich wasthefirst Butfor a likely us,Vietnam example. To be sure,the became apparent. value ofjus in bello practical a different lestaken to reflect is "Vietnam syndrome" generally athomeand that areunpopular wars weshouldnotfight son:that for to commit theresources we are unwilling to which necessary in connected to but not there was fact another But lesson, victory. warsabout that we shouldnotfight thesameas the"syndrome": and that once we are we are whose doubtful, engagedwe justice thecivilian so as nottoantagonize havetofight population, justly In Vietis necessary to a military whosepolitical victory. support we the relevant civilians were the Vietnamese themselves; nam, and minds." Butthisidea lostthewarwhenwe losttheir "hearts civilian hasturned outtobe bothvariabouttheneedfor support modern thesupport of difable and expansive: warfare requires ferent civilianpopulations, extending beyondthe population at risk. a moral for at risk is critStill, immediately regard civilians in winning wider forthewar. . . forany ically important support modernwar.I willcall thisthe usefulness of morality. Its wide in is new acknowledgement something radically military history. Hence the odd spectacle of GeorgeBush (the elder),during the PersianGulfwar,talking like a just wartheorist.7 Well,not for Bush's and conferences an old speeches quite: press displayed American which his son has inherited, to confuse tendency, just wars and crusades, as ifa warcan bejust only whentheforces of theforces ofevil.ButBushalso seemed good are arrayed against - and this to understand wasa constant militheme ofAmerican - thatwaris properly a warof armies, a combat tary spokesmen between from whichthecivilian should combatants, population I do notbelieve be shielded. that thebombing ofIraqin 1991met have just war standards;shieldingcivilianswould certainly

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and waterpurifiof electricity networks excluded the destruction to modeven ifit is necessary cation plants.Urban infrastructure, to civilianexistencein a modern is also necessary ernwar-making, definedby thissecond feature.8 and it is morally Still,Amercity, in the Gulf war was the result of a compromise ican strategy betweenwhatjustice would have required and the unrestrained was far more bombing of previouswars; taken overall,targeting limitedand selectivethan it had been, forexample, in Korea or Vietnam. The reasons for the limitswere complicated: in part, to the Iraqi people (which turned a commitment theyreflected in the out not to be very , hope thatthe Iraqis would repustrong) the regimethatbegan it;in part,they diate thewarand overthrow reflectedthe political necessitiesof the coalition that made the were shaped in turnby the media war possible.Those necessities coverage of the war that is, by the immediate access of the media to the battle and of people the world over to the media. Bush and his generals believed that these people would not toland theywere probablyright(but erate a slaughterof civilians, was and is whatit mightmean forthemnot to toleratesomething unclear). Hence, although many of the countrieswhose fairly supportwas crucial to the war's success were not democracies, waysby the demos. bombingpolicywas dictatedin important and This willcontinue to be true:the media are omnipresent, in cirthese different has to be War the whole worldis watching. But does thismean thatit has to be morejust or only cumstances. thatit has to look morejust, thatit has to be described,a little thanin the past,in thelanguage ofjustice?The more persuasively is clear enough; itis amazinghow readofjust wartheory triumph wars spokesmen during the Kosovo and Afghanistan ilymilitary that used itscategories, justifiedthe warand tellinga causal story providingaccounts of the battlesthat emphasized the restraint withwhich theywere being fought.The arguments(and rationalizations)of the past wereverydifferent; theycommonlycame - fromclerics,lawyers, and profesfromoutside the armed forces sors, not fromgenerals and theycommonlylacked specificity

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these and detail.Butwhatdoes theuse of thesecategories, just and moral words, signify? in I am inclined to saythat justicehasbecome, naively, Perhaps that one ofthetests all Western countries, military anyproposed notthe the tests and one of to meet has or tactic only strategy a placeand still most one,butthis gives justwartheory important was It is easiernowthanitever had before. that itnever standing cause can't do it would we a general to imagine that; "No, saying, I am not we haveto findanother civilian too many deaths; way." butimagine whotalklikethat, are many there surethat generals that are there a moment that for are;imagine strategies evaluated thatcivilian deathsare minimized; as wellas militarily; morally to avoid or limitcollateral are designed thatnew technologies in are actually effective damage,and thatthese technologies intended has been incortheir purpose.Moraltheory achieving on whenand how into as a real constraint war-making porated This picture but it is warsare fought. is, remember, imaginary, and itmakes fora farmoreinteresting also partly true; argument claimthat thetriumph of war is pure thanthemorestandard just The triumph is real:whatthenis left fortheorists and hypocrisy. to do? philosophers in our consciousness This question is sufficiently that present one canwatch to respond. Thereare tworesponses peopletrying thatI wantto describe and criticize. The first comesfrom what be calledthepostmodern whichdoes not claimthat left, might affirmations ofjustice are hypocritical, since hypocrisy implies but rather that there are no no standards, standards, possible use ofthecategories ofjustwartheory.9 Politicians and objective who the are themselves generals adopt categories deluding no moreso thanthe theorists who developedthe catethough kill fewer gories in the first place. Maybe new technologies but there is no in about who those people, point arguing people are and whether or not killing themisjustified. No agreement about or aboutguilt or innocence, is possible. Thisview is justice, summed toourimmediate situation: "One up in a linethat speaks

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man'sterrorist is another man'sfreedom On thisview, fighter." there is nothing fortheorists and philosophers to do butchoose and there is no or that can guide their sides, theory principle foritholdsthat we canchoice.Butthis is an impossible position, ofinnonotrecognize, and actively condemn, opposethemurder centpeople. conA secondresponse is to takethemoralneed to recognize, raise the theoretical and thento demnand opposevery seriously - thatis, to strengthen that the constraints ante justiceimposes on living, so to who pridethemselves For theorists on warfare. understandable is an obvious and this at the critical edge, speak, ofjust warto we haveused thetheory For years, response. many and now it has been taken American criticize actions, military andjustify those and isbeingusedtoexplain overbythegenerals is to The easiestwayto resist we mustresist. actions.Obviously, and stronger intoa stronger makenoncombatant rule, immunity is ofcivilians rule:all killing likean absolute itis something until leadsto the therefore closeto) murder; anywarthat (something So paciwar is therefore is ofcivilians unjust; unjust. every killing that wasorigiheartof thetheory thevery from fism reemerges adopted,most nallymeant to replace it. This is the strategy war. of the Afghanistan The protest bymany opponents recently, banners featured on American marches proclaiming, campuses was very for and the argument stopping "Stop the Bombing!" and killsciviltrue):bombing endangers simple(and obviously morehad did notseemto feelthatanything ians.The marchers to be said. this seems waris still, that SinceI believe sometimes, necessary, to the a bad more to me a bad argument and, response generally, roleofthethethecritical It sustains ofjustwartheory. triumph role thecritical butitdeniesthetheory wargenerally, vis--vis ory ofwarand to thebusiness is internal which ithas always claimed, to do and to whatsoldiers to attendclosely critics try requires of this distinctions make to The refusal not to do. whatthey try a and tactical to strategic to payattention choices, kind, suggests

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ofpeoplewho Thisis theradicalism ofradical doctrine suspicion. and whoare do notexpectto exercise ever, poweror use force, and use exercise that this the to make not prepared judgments even when it demandsa just war theory, require.By contrast, ofpeople is thedoctrine actsofwar, ofparticular critique strong think We might whodo expectto exercise powerand use force. because it holds ofradical ofitas a doctrine politiresponsibility, first ofall,forthewell-being leadersresponsible, cal and military men ofinnocent ownpeople,butalso forthewell-being oftheir set themselves and womenon the otherside. Its proponents thedefense of not think about who will those realistically against to reclivein and also against thosewhorefuse thecountry they are insist that there oftheir They opponents. ognizethehumanity to do evento theenemy. thatit is morally impermissible things cannotbe morally that itself also however, fighting insist, They Ajustwaris meant tobe, and has tobe, a warthat impermissible. to fight. itis possible ofjust war But thereis another dangerposed bythetriumph I relativism and the near absolutism that not the radical theory butrather a certain of thecritical havejust described, softening If intellectuals and soldiers. are a trucebetween theorists mind, often awedand silencedbypolitical leaderswho invite themto how much more so who talk their dinner, bygenerals language? if are actually Andifthegenerals inter arma the wars, fighting just lawsspeak,whatpointis therein anything we can say?In fact, role has our not all that much. We still haveto however, changed insist that waris a morally dubiousand difficult Evenifwe activity. in theGulf, in Kosovo, and in (in theWest)havefought justwars that is no not even a useful indication, Afghanistan, guarantee, that ournext warwillbejust.Andeveniftherecognition ofnoncombatant has becomemilitarily itstill conimmunity necessary, flicts with morepressing, necessities. stillneeds to other, Justice be defended; decisions aboutwhenand howtofight conrequire stant as they have. scrutiny, exactly always

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At the same time,we have to extend our account of "whenand the new technologies,and the how" to cover the new strategies, new politicsof a global age. Old ideas maynot fitthe emerging examto takethe mostcurrent the "waragainstterrorism," reality: cooperation thatis as radiple, requires a kind of international in practice. We should in as it is theory cally undeveloped into the theoretical officers welcome military argument;theywill make it a betterargumentthan it would be ifno one but profesBut we cannot leave the argumentto them. sors took an interest. to be leftto the genAs the old sayinggoes, war is too important erals;just war even more so. The ongoing critiqueof war-making democraticactivity. is a centrally important // Let me, then,suggesttwoissues,raisedbyour mostrecentwars, thatrequire the criticaledge ofjustice. I have heard it said thatthisis a necrisk-free First, war-making. like the Kosovo war: interventions featureof humanitarian essary in contrastto soldiers defending soldiers defending humanity, willnot risktheirlives; and theirfellow-citizens, theirown country or, theirpolitical leaders will not dare to ask them to risktheir lives.Hence the rescue ofpeople in desperatetrouble,the objects war is of massacreor ethniccleansing,is onlypossible ifrisk-free a from it is possible:warscan be fought But,obviously, possible.10 aimed very (comprecisely greatdistancewithbombs and missiles a few such of radical the with only weapons imprecision pared and the out forces the decades ago) at deportakillings carrying these tions.And the technicians/soldiers weapons are, in aiming There all the recentcases, largelyinvulnerableto counterattack. So thatbars thiskind ofwarfare. is no principleofjust war theory soldiershave targets, long as theycan aim accuratelyat military And what distance. safe from a commander, everyrightto fight committedto his or her own soldiers,would not choose to fight

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on rebelin this whenever he or she could?In hisreflections way Camusarguesthatone cannotkillunlessone is prelion,Albert But thatargument does not seem to applyto to die.11 pared in battle, wherethewholepointis to killwhileavoiding soldiers And killed. yetthereis a widersensein whichCamusis getting right. discussed this have not,to myknowledge, Justwar theorists Massacre and ethnic but we need to do so. obviously question, takeplace on the ground. The awful work commonly cleansing bombsand poisongasdelivered from theair, be donewith might East and Sierra butin Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Timor, Leone,the wererifles, and clubs;thekilling and terrorizmachetes, weapons wascarried out from closeup. And a riskingof thepopulation - especiallyif it undertaken free intervention fromfar away in the long run is likely to be effective to cause an promises immediate on the This can be speed-up ground. stoppedonlyif theintervention itself shifts to theground, and this shift seemsto me morally The aim oftheintervention, after all,is to necessary. rescuepeoplein trouble, and fighting in thecase on theground, as I havedescribed But thenit is no it,is whatrescuerequires. risk-free. wouldanyone undertake it? longer Why In fact, risks ofthis sort area common feature ofjus inbello, and whilethereare manyexamplesof soldiers to accept unwilling there are also of their them, manyexamples acceptance.The is this: whenit is our actionthatputsinnocent principle people at risk, eveniftheactionisjustified, we are boundto do what we can toreducethoserisks, evenifthis involves risks toourownsoldiers.Ifwe are bombing in a just war, and there military targets are civilians near these we have to our living targets, adjust bombatlower the altitudes, ingpolicy byflying say so as tominimize risks we imposeon civilians. Of course, itis legitimate to balance the risks; we cannotrequireour pilotsto fly suicidalmissions. to die, butthatis Theyhaveto be, as Camussuggests, prepared consistent with measures to their lives. How the taking safeguard balancegetsworked out is something thathas to be debatedin

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it seems to me, is what each case. But what is not permissible, NATO did in the Kosovo war, where its leaders declared in would not send groundforcesinto battle,whatadvance thatthey ever happened inside Kosovo once the air war began. Responsibility for the intensified Serbian campaign against Kosovar which was the immediate consequence of the air war, civilians, belongs no doubt to the Serbian governmentand army.They were to blame. But thiswas at the same timea foreseeableresult of our action, and insofaras we did nothingto prepare for this too. We imposed result,or to deal withit,we were blameworthy riskson others and refusedto accept them for ourselves,even to help the others.12 when thatacceptance was necessary The second issue concernswar'sendings.On the standardview, because it is not a crusade) should end with a just war (precisely of the statusquo ante. The paradigmcase is a war the restoration of aggression,which ends justly when the aggressorhas been defeated,his attackrepulsed, the old boundaries restored.Perstate haps thisis not quite enough fora just conclusion:thevictim the that so the from deserve aggressorstate, reparations might can be repaired a more forcesinflicted damage the aggressor's still.And but restoration of restoration, extensive understanding should include new security arrangeperhaps the peace treaty ments,of a sortthatdid not existbeforethe war,so thatthe staBut thatis as faras the tus quo willbe more stable in the future. understooddid as itwas commonly ofvictims go; the theory rights of the enemystate,and not extend to any radical reconstitution would international law,withits assumptionsabout sovereignty, have regarded any imposed change of regime as a new act of WorldWar II in both Germany What happened after aggression. ofwar,and the and Japan was something quite new in the history is still reconstitution legitimacyof occupation and political who regardthe treatment and lawyers debated, even by theorists ofthe Nazi regime,at least,asjustified. Thus, as the Gulfwardrew to a close in 1991, therewas littlereadinessto marchon Baghdad and replace the governmentof Saddam Hussein, despite the

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in the lead-upto the war as of thatgovernment denunciation and in character. Therewere,of course,bothmilitary Nazi-like the the war once arguments againstcontinuing geopolitical had been repulsed, butthere wasalso an arguattack on Kuwait if from that even "needed" a new ment government, justice: Iraq A thatneed could onlybe metbythe Iraqi people themselves. armies wouldnever be accepted byforeign government imposed as theproduct or the future self-determination.13 of, agentof, The WorldWarII examples, however, argueagainstthislast is democratic claim. If the imposed government and moves to the arena and to elections, quickly open up political organize itmayerasethememory ofitsownimposition (hencethedifference between thewestern and eastern in post-war Gerregimes In . humanitarian intervention shifts the case, many) any radically aboutendings, becausenowthewaris from thebeginargument an effort to the that is forthe ning change regime responsible This can be done by supporting as the secession, inhumanity. Indians did in what is nowBangladesh; or byexpelling a dictator, as theTanzanians did to Uganda'sIdi Amin; or bycreating a new as theVietnamese did in Cambodia.In EastTimor, government, morerecently, theUN organized a referendum on secession and thenworked to set up a new government. Had therebeen, as there shouldhavebeen,an intervention in Rwanda, itwouldcerhave aimed at the Hutu Power tainly replacing Justice regime. wouldhaverequired thereplacement. Butwhat kindofjusticeis this? Whoare itsagents, and what rulesgovern their actions? As theRwandan most states do notwantto examplesuggests, takeon this kindofresponsibility, andwhenthey do takeiton,for whatever do not want to submit themselves reasons, political they to a setofmoralrules.In Cambodia, theVietnamese shutdown thekilling which wascertainly a good thing to do, butthey fields, thenwent on to setup a satellite to their own government, keyed which never wonlegitimacy either within or outside of interests, Cambodiaand brought no closureto thecountry's internal conflicts. and closure are thetwo criteria which we Legitimacy against

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can testwar'sendings.Both of themare likely to require,in almost all thehumanitarian intervention more cases,something thantherestoration ofthestatus ante which after quo gaverise, theintervention. and thatprompted all, to thecrisis Legitimacy arehardtests tomeet. The problems havetodo however, closure, in partwith as in the Vietnamese-Cambodian interests, strategic in a major a case.Butmaterial interests alsofigure way: remaking a it is an expensive business; requires significant government - and thebenefits are largely commitment of resources speculaof Yetwe can stillpointto theusefulness tiveand nonmaterial. A extended intervenin successful and cases like these. morality kind:notonly and ofan important tionbrings benefits gratitude in a world of peace and stability but an increment friendship, - and not onlyto its of both is costly wherethe insufficiency have willalways immediate victims. Still,anyparticular country it these or of tobearthecosts torefuse benefits; will good reasons So and thenfindreasonsto perform takeon theburden, badly. needjustice'scritical we still edge. about to theargument is similar aboutendings The argument conthat havesignificant oncewehaveactedinways risk: negative conseare also positive forother people (evenifthere sequences a humanitarian walk we cannot away.Imagine just quences), themassacres thatendswith intervention stoppedand themurthe is devastated, but the derous regimeoverthrown; country is neither there and afraid; in ruins, thepeople hungry economy thatinterThe forces law nor ordernor anyeffective authority. How can thisbe? Is it are notfinished. veneddid well,butthey to do well thepriceofdoingwellthat youacquireresponsibilities It finished. is never virtuous of the The work . . . and again? again ofinternational notonly Butin therealworld, does notseemfair. work this is the butalso ofordinary things ways morality, politics, Consider is neverso uncomplicated). of course, virtue, (though in intervened war:theAmerican theAfghan-Russian government won a and a majorway, bigvictory: byproxy, eventually fighting Thiswasthelastbattleof to withdraw. wereforced theRussians

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driven wasundoubtedly intervention The American thecoldwar. that the the conviction and strategic motives; by geopolitical a represliberation wasa warofnational against struggle Afghan thepeoplewho a partin motivating haveplayed siveregime may in Afghanistan had a very found carried itout,butthealliesthey When the war was over, restrictedidea of liberation.14 Atthat in a state ofanarchy and ruin. wasleft point, Afghanistan and were walked theAmericans wrong, politically certainly away and were the Russians withdrew to do and morally so; wrong, in that of todo so. Wehad acted(relatively) well, is, support right oftheAfghan thevast what wasprobably people,andyet majority had acted we werebound to continue well;the Russians acting if owed the off the even and were hook; they Afghan people badly no one wanted them aid (reparations), material engaged againin it is an This soundsanomalous, and yetI think affairs. Afghan Butweneed ofthedistribution ofresponsibility. accurate account ofhowthis works andwhy itworks theway a better understanding the actual itdoes,a theory of that expejustice-in-endings engages so that counrienceof humanitarian interventions, (and other) in warslike theseknowwhattheir tries responsibilities fighting be ifthey win.Itwouldalsohelpifthere what there isnot will was, an international that couldstipulate and evenenforce agency yet, theseresponsibilities. Thistheory ofjustice-in-endings willhaveto includea description of legitimate occupations, regimechanges,and protec- and also, obviously, torates a description of illegitimate and in all theseareas.Thiscombination immoral is what activity just warhas always been about:it makesactions and operations that are morally theiroccasions problematic possible by constraining and regulating their conduct. Whentheconstraints areaccepted, theactions and operations arejustified, and the theorist ofjust warhastosaythat, evenifhe sounds likean apologist for thepowers-that-be. Whenthey are not accepted, whenthebrutalities of waror itsaftermath are unconstrained, he has to saythat, evenif he is calleda traitor and an enemy ofthepeople.

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It is important not to get stuckin eithermode- defenseor critique. Indeed,just war theory requiresthatwe maintainour comto both modes at the same time.In thissense,just waris mitment there is a deep and permanenttension like good government: contradicbetweenthe adjectiveand the noun, but no necessary come to power and make tion between them. When reformers governmentbetter (less corrupt,say), we have to be able to And when theyhold on to power acknowledgethe improvement. we have to be ready fortoo long, and imitatetheirpredecessors, wartheory is not an apologyforany theirbehavior. to criticize Just particularwar, and it is not a renunciationof war itself.It is and an immanentcritique. designedto sustaina constantscrutiny and I We stillneed that,even when generalssound like theorists, will. am sure thatwe always Notes
WritAugustine's argumenton just war can be found in ThePolitical (1962: 162-183); modern readerswill need a comingsofSt. Augustine see Dean (1963: 134-171). mentary: 2See Vitoria (1991: 302-304), and for commentary, Johnson (1975: 150-171). 3See Boswell (1952:129), quoting Dr. Johnson:"'I love the University of Salamanca, forwhen the Spaniardswere in doubt as to the lawfulness of Salamanca gave it as their of conquering America, the University opinion thatit was not lawful.'He spoke thiswithgreatemotion. . . ." I cite myown discussionof military 4Withsome hesitation, necessity treatments):Walzer (and the referencesthere to more sympathetic (1977: 144-151,239-242,251-255). 5The best discussion of the realistsis Smith (1986); chapter 6, on is esoeciallvrelevantto myargumenthere. Hans Morerenthau. wrote his who eventually is one of those veterans, Hartle 6Anthony Decision own book on the ethics of war: MoralIssuesin Military Making (1989). and Cerf(1991: 197-352),which 7See thedocumentscollectedin Sifry include Bush's speeches and a wide range of otheropinions. on mfrastructural 8I made the case againstattacks immediately targets afterthe war (but othersmade it earlier) in DeCosse (1992: 12-13).

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NewYork Times Fish'sop-edpiece in The (October15,2001) 9Stanley in itsmostintelliof the an argument postmodernist provides example version. gent at a conference on 10This wasmadebyseveral participants argument frinterdisziplinre intervention held at the Zentrum humanitarian in Tanuarv Forschung. Bielefeld Universit Germanv. 2002. n"A lifeis paid forby anotherlife,and fromthesetwosacrifices ofa value."Camus(1956: 169). See also thearguthepromise springs in actI of The Assassins. Camus(1958,esp.pp. 246-247). ment fust in favor in Kosovo, 12For ofusing forces see Buckarguments ground ley(2000:293-94, 333-335, 342). on stopping theAmerican 13Bush's statement and hisdeclaadvance, ofvictory, can be foundin Sifry and Cerf(1991:449-451); ration arguforand against can be foundin DeCosse (1992: 13-14, ments stopping 29-32). Borovik a useful, (1990) provides 14Artyom though highly personal, account oftheRussian warinAfghanistan; foran academic see history, Goodson(2001).

References
ThePolitical Ed. HenryPaolucci. Augustine. Writings ofSt. Augustine. 1962. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1heHiddenWar: A Russian s Account borovik, Artyom. Journalist ofthe Soviet inAfghanistan. War London:Faberand Faber,1990. LL.D. Great Books Boswell, James.LifeofSamuel Johnson oftheWestern World. Vol. 44. Ed. Robert Hutchins. Maynard Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952. William Kosovo: Voices onBalkan Interventions. Buckley, Joseph. Contending Grand William B. Eerdmans 2000. Rapids: Publishing Company, TheRebel. Trans.Anthony Bower.NewYork:Vintage, Camus,Albert. 1956. . Caligula and Three Other Trans.Stuart Gilbert. NewYork: Plays. 1958. Vintage, A. The Political andSocial IdeasofSt.Augustine. NewYork: Dean, Herbert Columbia 1963. Press, University ItJust? onthe PerDeCosse,DavidE., ed. ButWas Reflections Morality ofthe sianGulf War. NewYork: 1992. Doubleday, P. Afghanistan's Endless War: State Goodson, Failure, Politics, Larry Regional and the Riseofthe Taliban. Seattle: of Press, University Washington 2001.

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DecisionMaking.Lawrence: Hartle, AnthonyE. Moral Issues in Military Pressof Kansas, 1989. University Reason,and theLimitation Johnson, JamesTurner. Ideology, ofWar:Reliand Secular 1200-1740. Princeton: Princeton Univergious Concepts, 1975. Press, sity eds. The GulfWar:History, DocuMicah L., and Cerf,Christopher, Sifry, New York: Times 1991. Books, ments, Opinions. to Kissinger. Baton Smith, Michael Joseph. Realist Thought fromWeber Louisiana State 1986. Press, University Rouge: Eds. Anthony Franciscode. Political Vitoria, Writings. Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,1991. Wars. New York:Basic Books, 1977. and Unjust Walzer,Michael.Just