Critically Discuss Nietzsches Critique of Christian Morality

Friedrich Nietzsche provides a complex critique of Christian morality which also contributes to his overall damning view of modern morality and supposed objective ethical values as a whole. In this essay I will critically discuss aspects of his critique to determine what significance and claim to authority they have. This essay is divided into three sections: Transvaluation of values due to ressentiment, Christian Morality as a social construct and Beyond Good an Evil for moral development. In the first I will introduce Nietzsches notion of a good/bad vs a good/evil morality and how a transvaluation of values has taken place between the two, leading to the development of ressentiment, from which Judeo-Christian morality has developed. In the second section I will discuss Nietzsches view that Christian morality is in fact a social construct, and that there are no objective or universal values; instead, Nietzsche proposes that we liberate ourselves from these constructs and develop our own ethical system. Finally I will introduce Nietzsches story of the Madman, and how through this he develops the idea that to achieve a higher, more life affirming morality we must reject the modern construct developed through ressentiment and go beyond the good/evil ethic that Christianity has imposed upon us. Transvaluation of values due to ressentiment One of Nietzsches most significant critiques regarding Christian morality is that it is the result of a transvaluation of values which has occurred because of an underlying ressentiment. This has concluded in a shift from a good/bad ethical system to one which revolves around a good/evil morality. Nietzsche talks about the origin of the notion of a good morality, stating that it began with the Aristocratic nobles, who used this expression to refer to themselves and their values. He writes that, the noble, powerful, high stationed and
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high minded established themselves and their actions as good. (Nietzsche, 1887 cited in Bernstein, 2002 p. 105). In contrast, bad was used by the aristocracy to refer to those who lacked their noble characteristics. This plebeian class lacked the characteristics of the good and so were defined by the aristocracy as bad. Along with this lower class, Nietzsche introduces a new distinction, the priestly aristocrats. A jealous opposition developed between this priestly class and the aristocratic nobles; however, because the priestly class were physically and psychologicall impotent they were unable to rise above them. Nietzsche states that, it is because of their impotence that in them hatred grows to monstrous and uncanny proportions (Nietzsche, 1887 cited in Bernstein, 2002 p. 106). This intense hatred is ressentiment, which, although attributed with the priestly class, is understood as an extremely dangerous and more general psychological phenomenon. During his writing Nietzsche makes reference to the Jews as this impotent priestly class. However, he is not exclusively targeting the Jews, but in fact the Judeo-Christian tradition as a whole. Unsatisfied with their social standing as subordinate to the aristocratic nobles, the priestly class instigated, an act of the most spiritual revenge. (Nietzsche, 1887 cited in Bernstein, 2002 p. 107). This, Nietzsche states, is when the ressentiment itself becomes a dangerous yet creative force, giving birth to a new set of values. The priestly class inverted the aristocratic value equation, concluding that now those who had been considered good were evil and those who had previously been bad were good. The good/bad ethic was now the good/evil. So it is through a transvaluation of values that the original values of good and bad have been reversed, and notions of morality had been inverted condemning the aristocratic nobles as evil, whilst claiming that the impotent priestly class were truly good. Therefore for Nietzsche, Christianity and Christian morality has developed from an impotent plebeian class through the intense development of ressentiment, resulting in less desirable values being given greater significance.
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The extent to which Nietzsche fiercly condemns Christianity is clear as he writes, I call Christianity the one great curse, the one great innermost corruption, the one great instinct of revenge, for which no means is poisonous, stealthy, subterranean, small enough. I call it the one immortal blemish of mankind. (Magnus & Higgins, 1996 cited in Kennedy, 2006 p. 4). Nietzsche calls for a critique of our present notion of morality, in which the values of the good/evil ethic may be called into question. Copleston notes that, Christian morality is, in Nietzsches eyes, a phenomenon of decadence, of weakness, of hostility to life. (Copleston, 1947 p. 236). In Nietzsches view, the weak and oppressed priestly class has created a morality that extols the value of helping others. The strong (aristocratic nobles) supposedly have no natural reason for helping the weak; therefore the weak must fabricate a reason for them to do so (Langsam, 1997 p. 239). This, Nietzsche argues, is the function and foundation of the Christian doctrine and is why it should be considered so undesirable. However, several aspects of Nietzsches concept of a transvaluation of values and the development of Christian morality may be called into question. Firstly, we may question the historical accuracy of his accounts of aristocratic nobles and a lower class. Nietzsche provides no suggestive dating as to when this might have occurred, nor does he provide any evidence in support of his case. Bernstein also criticises the excessive way in which Nietzsche views ressentiment, understanding it as the sole basis for Judeo-Christian morality (Bernstein 2002). Nietzsche states that there is no natural reason for the strong to support and aid the weak, however this appears to be a sweeping statement not grounded in evidence. There may indeed be a naturalistic reason behind the desire of the strong to help the weak which we do not yet understand; it does not follow then that a form of deception is at work.

Christian Morality as a social construct Nietzsches proposal that Judeo-Christian values are the result of a transvaluation of values means that Christian morality must also be the result of this process. Nietzsche therefore criticises Christian morality claiming that it is a social construct, developed due to ressentiment. One of the major aspects of the Judeo-Christian morality construct which Nietzsche aims to address is the notion of a universal objective morality. As Bernstein writes, Nietzsches critique of morality is directed to exposing the self-deceptive illusion that the morality of good and evil is the universal, the only genuine morality. (Bernstein, 2002 p. 114). Christian values form the moral fibre which dominates the majority of the western world. Christian morality portrays itself as universal, objective and the only genuine morality, yet Nietzsche argues it is the result of ressentiment an intense jealousy and hatred which has caused a complete inversion of original notions of morality and desirable values. Kennedy argues that according to Nietzsche, Christian morality not the inevitable development of essential character traits of the human nature; rather it is subordinating our naturally inclined values in preference of the good/evil ethic which has been forced upon us (Kennedy, 2006). It has been the attempt of the Judeo-Christian tradition to create an abstract idea of truth that was seemingly objective, authoritative and therefore real. Instead of promoting a universal morality, or an objective moral code, Nietzsche holds that there are no objective values and that all values are in fact invented (Copleston, 1947). Nietzsche argues that good is not necessarily embodied by any specific character traits and instead advocates the development of personal moralities for the individual. For Nietzsche only those who create value themselves have significant value. Initially it may be argued that Nietzsches critique of Christian morality is something negative, challenging our values and morals, stating they are the result of an improper social construct. However, there is also a sense of liberation which may be extracted from
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Nietzsches critique. Rather than confining ourselves to the moral guidelines provided by the Judeo-Christian tradition, Nietzsche suggests that we create our own values. Solomon raises issue with this asking, What is it to create a value? Not even Nietzsche suggests one not even one! (Solomon, 2004 cited in Kennedy, 2006 p. 6). This is an issue for Nietzsche as he fails to make any mention of what these values might be. Another issue regarding Nietzsches critique of Christian morality is that he denies any notion of absolute morality or a universally binding moral code, and yet as Copleston notes, Nietzsche favours the values associated with the good/bad ethic over the good/evil (Copleston 1947). This preference of one set of values over another appears to be an inconsistency in his thinking. Beyond Good and Evil for moral development Central to Nietzsches critique of Christian morality is his belief that it is stunting humanities possibility of achieving a higher, more creative, life affirming ethic; an ethic which is beyond good/evil. With regards to the Nietzsches critique of the current moral system, to deduce that Nietzsche simply wanted to replace one morality with another is, as Langsam states, to miss the radical nature of his critique (Langsam, 1997 pp. 235-236). Nietzsche was not proposing that to escape the socially constructed morality we should simply return to the ethic of the aristocracy which he had so much preferred. He had greater expectations for humankind, and saw the possibility of a higher ethic being achieved. As Copleston argues, Nietzsches great desire was not the destruction of culture but the attainment of a higher type of culture. (Copleston, 1947 p. 232). For the development of mankind we would have to go beyond the current ethic of good and evil, which in itself would require passing beyond the nave form of the aristocratic ethic (Bernstein, 2002). Nietzsche discusses this notion of transcending beyond the good/evil ethic in his story of the Madman in which a Madman declares the death of God:

"Whither is God?" he cried; "I will tell you. We have killed him---you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving?...God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. (Nietzsche 1882, pp. 181-182). In this story Nietzsche is not talking about the literal death of God, but instead suggesting that our belief, need for a God and the other-worldly (Judeo-Christian) values that God represents is dead. The Madman represents a philosopher who realises that we no longer truly believe in God, and that we must urgently face the consequences of this moral and spiritual gap left in our lives. With the death of God mankind is looking for something to replace him. In this sense Nietzsche is talking about the end of our need for the Christian morality which has wrongly been imposed upon us. However, at the end of the story, the Madman states, "I have come too early my time is not yet. (Nietzsche, 1882 p. 182). We may understand then that Nietzsche sees our destiny, moving beyond the good/evil ethic, as something which is immanent but not currently possible. Nietzsche believes that it will be the role of the Ubermensch, or Superman to achieve this goal. The Ubermensch is that further development of mankind who will create his own values and morality, superseding our current state. These other-worldly values are responsible for, chaining down all those who would, if left to themselves, rise above the herd. (Copleston, 1947 p. 237). This, however, is where the Ubermensch will flourish. In rejecting Christian morality he will develop a new ethos which Nietzsche felt would be the most desirable and beneficial for the progress of humankind. However, we may find that Nietzsches critique of Christian morality is not fully satisfying. In one respect Nietzsches suggested rejection of contemporary morality and values is
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liberating. We may also find the notion of complete and total freedom daunting. Mankind seems to like and needs having a definitive system to follow, even if it is imposed. The morality that is currently in place appears desirable and to a large extent effective despite Nietzsches claims that it is a social construct and restrictive. Although central to Nietzsches beliefs, complete denial of Christian morality leaves an emptiness which Nietzsche fails to fulfil, believing we should aim to discover our own values. Regardless of whether it is an ethical system born from ressentiment, the desire for the strong to help the weak, (the purpose of the good/evil transvaluation) is embedded in our society, the proposed denial of which seems a near impossible feat. However, looking to Bernsteins evaluation of Nietzsche, even if we choose to dismiss his questionable histories regarding aristocratic nobles and the priestly class, and his implication that ressentiment is the sole basis for understanding Christian morality we may still find value in his philosophy (Bernstein, 2002). If we look at his portrayal of the psychological dangers of ressentiment, its ability to destroy and create, as well as considering his warning regarding modern morality and the way in which people follow it blindly, and his encouragement to develop values for ourselves, then we may find more substance and importance in his notion of the need to go beyond good and evil (Bernstein, 2002). Conclusion Nietzsche has devised a complex and revolutionary philosophy in which our entire understanding of modern morality and in particular Christian morality is called into question. In the first section of my essay Transvaluation of values due to ressentiment I looked at how Nietzsche introduced notions of the good aristocratic nobles and the bad plebeian priestly class and how through an intense jealousy and hatred the development of ressentiment takes place. This dangerous ressentiment eventually caused a transvaluation, whereby values are inverted, underpinning the entire Judeo-Christian basis of morality. Nietzsche concludes that
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Christian morality is born exclusively from ressentiment. However, we may question Nietzsches insistence that ressentiment is the sole basis for this system of values, and what historical grounding his claims have. In the second section of my essay, Christian Morality as a social construct I introduced Nietzsches consideration of the Christian socially constructed morality promoting universal, objective values which are for Nietzsche false; only those who create value have value. There does, however, appear to be some inconsistency in his philosophy as he emphatically states that there is no absolute morality and yet promotes the good/bad ethical dynamic over the good/evil. Finally in my third section, Beyond Good and Evil for moral development I discussed Nietzsches proposal that we liberate ourselves from the current ethical system. To free ourselves from the socially enforced Christian morality we must transcend the dynamic of the good/evil ethic in order to develop personally and culturally. In Nietzsches story of the Madman he suggests the death of the other-worldly Judeo-Christian values which have been represented by God, eventually leading to the rise of the Ubermensch. Ultimately though, as Bernstein suggested, I believe we should view Nietzsches philosophy as a warning about the dangers of ressentiment and of modern morality and should strive to create our own values which are not simply dependent on ethical structures presented to us which we may follow blindly.

Bibliography

Bernstein, R. 2002. Radical Evil. Cambridge: Polity Press. Copleston, F. 1947. Friedrich Nietzsche. In: Philosophy. [Online]. 17 (67), pp. 231-244. [Accessed 27th February 2014]. Available from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3747362 Kennedy, A. 2006. Critically evaluate Nietzsches critique of traditional Western ethical traditions. Does Nietzsche offer a viable alternative? [Online]. [Accessed 5th March 2014]. Available from: http://www.moot.uk.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Nietzscheakennedy.pdf Langsam, H. 1997. How to Combat Nihilism: Reflections on Nietzsches Critique of Morality. In: History of Philosophy Quarterly. [Online]. 14 (2), pp. 235-253. [Accessed 1st March 2014]. Available from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27744743 Nietzsche, F. 1882. The Gay Science. Kaufmann, W ed. 1974. New York: Vintage. Online Guide to Ethics and Moral Philosophy. 1996. The Story of the Madman. [Online]. [Accessed 3rd March 2014]. Available from: http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/cavalier/80130/part1/sect4/Nietzsche/Madman.html