You are on page 1of 7

Eric Apgar Senior Design The Fukushima Meltdown On March 11, 2011, three out of six of the nuclear

reactors that comprised the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations in Fukushima, Japan experienced catastrophic failure due to complications resulting from a Pacific tsunami that occurred several hours previously. Though the reactors were located along the coast and had been protected with a sea wall 10 meters high with the intention of preventing wave damage, the 15 meter high waves of the tsunami overwhelmed the preventative measures in place and caused the immediate surrounding and ground level structure of the reactor to be flooded to a capacity beyond what the reactor system was designed to withstand. At the time of the initial underwater earthquake which caused the tsunami, reactor 5 had been shut down and removed of fissionable material and reactors 4 and 6 had been already placed in cool-down mode, leaving the only reactors 1 3 to be running at full capacity. As per standard procedure, reactors 1 3 were scrammed (placed in immediate cool down mode) after detection of the earthquake to prepare for the possible damage that might ensue due to the tsunami, though it was a well-known fact that this shutdown procedure can take several days to fully eliminate all residual heat from the reactors and render them safe in terms of potential radiation leakage. The main problem occurred when the flooding caused the generators powering the cool-down of the reactors to short out and fail, causing the cool-down process to rely on a backup system of batteries. When the batteries depleted the next day, the cooling process stopped prematurely with no source of power to continue the cycle which in turn, caused a buildup of heat in the three scrammed reactors. This

buildup of heat caused the expansion and subsequent explosion of hydrogen gas in reactors 1, 3, and 4 (4 sharing piping conduits with reactor 3) which blew out radioactive material into the air surrounding the facility and causing the designation of restricted access zone around the reactor to a distance of 20 km. In addition to the damaged reactors, there were a host of other problems that resulted from the combination of reactor meltdown and flooding. By decree of the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act, a local headquarters meant for emergency response must be established close to the disaster sight upon threat of a nuclear disaster. Though such a threat was established, it was found unsuitable and ineffective by the committee formed to investigate the Fukushima disaster. This was because the temporary headquarters failed to account for an earthquake incident (which had clogged traffic and restricted mobility due to other evacuation efforts) at the same time as the nuclear accident, and because the site that was setup was inadequately shielded from radiation and ill-equipped to deal with the fallout and structural damages caused by the earthquake and tsunami. Overall, the Fukushima disaster became a disaster due to a twofold lack of quality engineering: on one hand, there was a failure to properly design and construct a safe and reliable facility to house the series of reactors and on the other hand, there was a failure to engineer and enact a proper safety protocol that accounted for multiple worse case scenarios occurring simultaneously. It was this combination of shortcomings that marked the Fukushima Disaster as one of the most impactful nuclear events of our time and what warranted such a massive post-disaster investigation by a committee created specifically to assess the problems that resulted in such a crisis.

In looking at this particular incident, it is easy to focus on the immediate problems with the situation: the inability to respond properly to the combination of nuclear event and earthquake, the short sea wall that didnt provide proper coverage, the failure of a facility that succumbed so quickly to flooding, etc. However, it is important to note that many of the reasons why Fukushima failed so spectacularly were not necessarily the result of a failure to prepare fully for the series of events that instigated the problems. The Fukushima facility was built right on the coast of Japan a decision that was made in part because the ocean was a mere several meters away. Most nuclear meltdowns and failures in mankinds history (though not extremely common) have resulted from uncontrollable high temperatures that threatened the integrity of the surrounding structure and caused meltdowns due to (as the name suggests) a rapid rise in temperature. Standard procedure to prevent such meltdowns is actually to flood the chamber surrounding the fission chamber with seawater in order to rapidly cool the core and lower the temperature of the fission process, making it harder for reactions to occur. There is no contact between the radioactive material and the sea water as the fissionable material is kept in a separate housing and so there is supposed to be no risk of leaking radioactive waste water into the environment. With this in mind, it was an intelligent decision for Japan to build the reactors next to the ocean as the large amount of sea water and easy access to such a large sink would allow a constant cooling process should ever the reactors require sustained cool down from a runaway reaction. The second point that Fukushima was faulted for (not being able to establish and maintain a nuclear disaster base because of the combination earthquake and meltdown) is also questionable as to whether or not it was an avoidable failure. Yes, the facility was unprepared

to deal with a double crisis such as the one that occurred but there is something to be said for planning for likely events and engineering plans and structures around what is most likely to happen. Part of good engineering is not necessarily building something to withstand each and every possible problem that could go wrong, but rather preparing to counter the most likely problems to the best of ones ability. There are no nuclear facilities in the world prepared to handle a 1000 kg direct asteroid strike and that is simply because the chances of such an asteroid strike occurring directly upon a nuclear facility are so tiny that it is not a cost effective process to build such plants to be indestructible in this manner. Taking this viewpoint in context of the Fukushima reactors, it is harder to blame them for not accounting for a combination earthquake/tsunami that resulted in flooding that took out not one, but two backup measures that were in place to maintain the facility. I know for a fact that the nuclear facility in Portsmouth, NH (though built right on the coast as the Fukushima plant was) is not prepared to handle a tsunami as my hometown is a mere hour away from this facility and I have seen firsthand a sea wall that I doubt could handle a tsunami. I bring this up to say that in some cases, it is not reasonable to expect even high risk compounds to be a fortress of impenetrable and unbreakable fortitude. Nature is precarious and volatile and attempting to plan for everything She can throw at mankind is unreasonable. This being said, I believe that Fukushima did fail according to the NSPE guidelines in a variety of specifications despite the excuses one could make for the problems resulting from solely freaks of nature. Though there are numerous tenants of the NSPE code of ethics that could be determined to have been violated due to the resulting failure of the containment process, there is one in particular that I believe was most strongly violated by the facility over

all other aspects of the NSPE code. The idea that Engineers should avoid deceptive acts was violated to the utmost degree when it was discovered in October of 2012 by TEPCOs (Tokyo Electric Power Company) own admission that they failed to take stronger protective measures regarding the safety of the reactors from possible problems due to a desire to reduce public fear that the project was unstable or undesirable as a source of energy. A desire to reduce potential lawsuits and bolster confidence in the project and construction of the power plant led to TEPCO failing to fix or acknowledge infrastructure problems or fallacies in design that encouraged failure due to natural disaster. Yes, other parts of the NSPE code were violated: the public health was not held paramount, public statements were not made in a truthful manner, and representatives did not conduct themselves honorably when it came to reporting on the efficacy of the plants safety system, but all of these violations stemmed from th e original problem that TEPCO lied about the safety of their system because they didnt want to deal with consequences of a project that people feared due to undue attention over the safety system. This most grievous act of failing to take the appropriate action to ensure the well-being of the project and the participants in the surrounding community led to the problems Fukushima experienced after the meltdown a problem that could have been avoided potentially altogether if TEPCO had done its job as a firm and decided to place the welfare of the public above their own fear of the project being shut-down due to public fear. After my research into the Fukushima incident, I have come to the conclusion that TEPCO is at fault primarily for the deception that they engaged in trying to cover up potential structural problems and safety protocols that led to the displacement of many thousands of Japanese residents. I could easily forgive TEPCO for honest structural failure. I

understand the difficulty in planning to prevent disasters caused by forces more powerful than we could ever control and if you take the proper and reasonable actions towards making a safe device that will be used to provide energy across a country, I do not believe you can be faulted for an unforeseeable convergence of accidents that happened outside of your control. This was not what happened though, and TEPCO is responsible for the people they endangered by thinking selfishly as a company and not selflessly as a nation. I do think that the situation is a perfect opportunity though for a redemption story. What TEMPCO needs to do now and is in fact doing, is learn from their mistakes and show the world the dangers of nuclear reactors that are not properly equipped to handle a combination of freak accidents. Japan is in the position to reveal the dangers of placing nuclear reactors above ground in coastal regions without proper emergency response stations nearby and also to show what can be done in the future to prevent reactor shut-downs due to power loss. The nation announced in March 2011 that they were going to attempt a controlled meltdown of a reactor to learn more about the meltdown process and work to prevent any future uncontrolled meltdowns, as well as figure out the best way to respond to such a disaster. This I think, is the best thing that could be done in response at this point a problem has been found and rather than abandoning the process because of the damage it caused, people have pulled together to recreate it and understand how to fix it in the future: engineering at its best.

Works Cited: 1. Neuhauser, Alan. "Japan Nuclear Agency to Conduct 'Controlled Meltdown' of Reactor." US News. U.S.News & World Report, n.d. Web. 15 Apr. 2014.

2. Fackler, Martin. "Japan Power Company Admits Failings on Plant Precautions." The New York Times. The New York Times, 12 Oct. 2012. Web. 15 Apr. 2014.

3. "Summary of Interim Report." Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations. Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations, n.d. Web. 15 Apr. 2014.

4. "Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, 13 Apr. 2014. Web. 14 Apr. 2014.

5. "Code of Ethics." National Society of Professional Engineers. NSPE, n.d. Web. 14 Apr. 2014.

You might also like