FIRES DEATHS CAN BE ELIMINATED IN AMERICA

PART A-THE FIRE PROBLEM EXPLAINED 1. THE AMERICAN FIRE DEVESTATION How bad is the fire devastation in America? Heres how the federal government sees it: The U.S. fire problem, on a per capita basis, is one of the worst in the industrial world. To put this in context, the annual losses from floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes and other natural disasters combined in the United States average just a fraction of those from fires.Fire in the United States, 13th Edition, Federal Emergency Management Agency Page 1, Oct 2004 2. NEARLY ALL FIRE DEATHS IN BUILDINGS OCCUR IN HOMES About 95 percent of all fire deaths due to building fires occur within homes. The home is where the fire kills. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) reports that about 80 percent of the fire deaths occur in homes, but the NFPA includes non-building fires such as automobile crashes where fires occur. The intent of this report is to explain how building fire deaths can be virtually eliminated. However, whether fire occurs in a home or any other building type, there are easy solutions to the fire deaths. What is encouraging about these solutions is that they do not cost, they save money as well as lives. Fire generates more than 300 billion dollars a year in sales and expenditures which have created a conglomeration of special interests that are determined to prevent revisions in the corrupted fire regulatory programs in America. Within this report I will define and explain the near 100 percent certain solutions to fire in a step by step fashion, so clearly that I am sure that a 5th grade student will be fully able to understand all of it. The 5th grade student will have no problem understanding the fire solutions because the student is not profiting from fire. 3. FIRE KILLS BEFORE THE FIREFIGHTERS ARRIVE Within built up areas where fire stations are numerous it is quite common for fire officials to advise the public that the response time to a fire is 5 minutes or less. But that is a meaningless number. The time that counts is the time from the appearance of the first small flame, to discovery of the fire by an occupant, to the call to 911, to the relay of the information to the nearby fire station, to waking the sleeping firefighters (sometimes), to the drive to the area of the involved building (with possible traffic delays), to the hook up of the pumper to the hydrant, to the layout and charging of the hose lines, to the safe entry of the building behind the heat killing fog and only then the search for survivors. The FREE BURN TIME from the first small flame until firefighters wearing masks actually enter the burning building (behind the heat killing water fog blanket) may be anywhere from ten minutes to more than a half hour. A flaming type fire will frequently kill in less than 5 minutes. Why so many home occupants are killed by fires is because a fire will kill in much less time than the time required for the firefighters to initiate a rescue of those within. The fundamental reality of the high fire death rate in America is this: It is impossible for firefighters in a remotes station, whether near or miles away, to provide reasonable life protection to the occupants of buildings because the fast (flaming) fire can kill before the firefighters arrive. Despite organized and well disseminated lies to the contrary, it is the hot flaming fire (not the slow smoldering fire) that causes nearly all the fire deaths and injuries. Because sprinklers would eventually reduce the need for the great proliferation of fire stations the high level and influential fire officials within the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) cooperated with business organizations to prevent the installation of sprinklers in nearly all buildings. The codes enforced by fire departments are created by the NFPA. The businesses that profit from fire 1

dominate the code making committees. There are profits to be made behind ever code enforced by fire inspectors. A BASIC TRUTH OF FIRE TECHNOLOGY, NO. 1: IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR FIREFIGHTERS TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE FIRE LIFE SAFETY PROTECTION TO HOME OCCUPANTS BECAUSE FIRE KILLS FASTER THAN THE FIRE TRUCKS TRAVEL PART B-WHY FIRE IS SO QUICKLY DEADLY 1. THE THERMODYNAMICS OF FIRE Nearly all combustible materials in common usage are resistant to ignition and to burning. Firewood that is burned in the fireplace is resistant to burning. It will not ignite until some ignition source, a match first igniting crumbled up paper for example, heats the wood to its ignition temperature. Even after the wood is ignited, it requires several logs mutually exposing each other to sustain the combustion. If one ignited log is removed from the fireplace and held separately by the tongs, the heat created dissipates to the atmosphere, the temperature of the log falls below its ignition temperature and the flames go out. In order for combustibles to burn, first heat must be applied and then an environment that supports combustion must prevail. Most combustibles and flammables within buildings must be heated in excess of 500 degrees F. to be ignited. Reduce the temperature of the fires environment and fire ceases to exist. 2. ROOM FLASHOVER There is a phenomenon called flashover that was never considered when planning solutions to fire until I realized its significance, began to publicize its importance and explained how it could be tamed. When a small fire starts, say in a waste basket set beside a sofa in the living room, the fire begins to grow in size and heat production. The hot combustion gases rise, strike the ceiling and spread in all directions. It does not take long before the temperature across the ceiling of the room of fire origin is heated to approximately one thousand degrees (fires can create temperatures in excess of 2000 degrees F.). At a temperature of about a thousand degrees radiant energy from above is heating all combustibles below to their auto-ignition temperatures. Then, suddenly, all of the combustible materials within the fire room will flash into one huge total room fire. It is the same situation as a young girl standing too close to a raging fire in the fireplace with the radiant energy igniting her dress; except a thousand times more energy is suddenly released by a room flashover. The problem is that within less than five minutes a tiny fire in one room can grow to create a condition where every combustible object in that room is simultaneously burning. And, until that incredibly destructive condition called flashover occurs, occupants in rooms other than the fire room may be completely unaware that a fire exists. 3. THE POST-FLASHOVER FIRE IN THE HOME When room flashover in a home occurs, every combustible thing within that room has flashed into flames. As air (or any gas) is heated it expands. Thus, the moment flashover occurs there is an instantaneously over-pressure condition within the fire room that forces the super hot and deadly combustion gases out of the fire room into other areas. Thus, moments after flashover happens, super hot combustion gases are flowing rapidly across other rooms and most likely down the bedroom corridor. The overpressure can be so great that a grown man being hit by the tidal wave of moving gases could be knocked off his feet. The incomplete combustion due to the sudden inadequacy of oxygen will cause the gray smoke to turn jet black. Visibility will drop to near zero. When a parent in 2

the master bedroom opens the bedroom door to reach the childrens rooms, the heat could be so intense as to ignite the hair on his/her head and any flimsy night time clothing. Reaching the childrens bedroom will likely be impossible. Because so many combustibles are burning simultaneously the combustion gases will be rich in carbon monoxide and other toxic gases and near devoid of life sustaining oxygen. Once flashover occurs the possibility of survival will drop rapidly. And, when flashover occurs, a call to 911 may not even have been made. If anyone escapes it may be with terrible burns. Children will be least likely to escape. Now consider the plight of a person sleeping in an apartment six stories above the ground when flashover occurs in the living room. Access to the only exit door will be through the living room. The window is not a desirable secondary when it is 6 floors above ground. A BASIC TRUTH OF FIRE TECHNOLOGY, NO. 2 WHEN THE FIRST FIREFIGHTERS ARRIVE AT THE THE BURNING HOME, THOSE WHO ARE STILL INSIDE LIKELY WILL BE COMING OUT HORIZONTALLY. PART C-THE ULTIMATE CURE TO FIRE LOSSES 1. FIRES NEMESIS Fire has an enemy. It is water. And there are two conditions that make water the unbeatable enemy of fire. First, water must be applied to the fire early, before the fire can create a large environment of super heated combustion gases. Fire is like a tiger cub, when small it cannot kill but it is easily killed. When it becomes large it is deadly and difficult to control. The second condition that is deadly to fire is fog, meaning a fine water spray that completely envelops the fire. To continue to burn, combustibles must remain at temperatures well above 500 degrees F. But water turns to steam at slightly above 200 degrees. Heat absorption due to water vaporizing into steam will suck the heat out of a fire like magic. When water is applied as a spray (fog), the ability of the millions of small water droplets to kill fire is astounding. Each drop of water presents a surface area that absorbs heat. A large number of small drops have a greater cooling effect than a smaller number of large drops. Hence, a nozzle that creates a fine spray is especially deadly to fire. Apply water spray before any fire within a building grows large and deadly; that is all that is needed to eliminate the U.S. fire problem. 2. THE NEAR 100 PERCENT SOLUTION TO FIRE The fire sprinkler system is extremely close to a one hundred percent solution to the fire problem. In 1959 T. Seddon Duke, the President of Star Sprinkler Corporation published an article in the Forum magazine reporting the electrically supervised fire sprinkler system was 99.98 percent reliable at controlling the early fire. This data was developed over a 25 year period by a major central station alarm company. And surprisingly, that close-to-perfect reliability was achieved with a slow to operate, inadequately engineered sprinkler system designed to meet an antiquated NFPA code. (A copy of Mr. Dukes report is available on www.Americasholocaust.org.) Harry Marryatte, an Australian fire protection engineer, wrote a book dated 1971 that was revised and republished in 1988. The title of the 1988 book is FIRE, A CENTURY OF AUTOMATIC SPRINKLER PROTECTION IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 1886-1986 The data over a 100 year period revealed that only 11 fire deaths had occurred within sprinkler protected buildings. That was slightly more than one fire death in a sprinkler protected building every ten years. The conclusion is that fires and fire deaths can be near 100 percent eliminated by installing fire sprinklers. However, as of 1959 the sprinkler design standard that had been created in 1896 had been maintained for more than 60 years with almost no improvements. The standard had been locked into a format that made the installation of sprinkler systems within homes impossible and extremely difficult and costly for compartmented buildings. 3

Hence, close to 100 percent of the buildings where people assembled and were at risk to fire were devoid of fire protection. My research proved many times over, the basic design of sprinklers could be modernized with the result that an improved system could be marketed with cost savings as great as 90 percent, thus making sprinklers cost effective for all building types including homes. BASIC TRUTH OF FIRE TECHNOLOGY NO. 3 A FIRE SPRINKLER SYSTEM IS EXTREMELY CLOSE TO A 100 PERCENT SOLUTION (CONFIRMED AS 99.87 PERCENT RELIABLE) TO FIRE LOSSES AND FIRE DEATHS IN BUILDINGS.

PART D-THE FIRE PROFITEERS 1. HOW THE FIRE INSURANCE INDUSTRY PROFITED FROM FIRES The fire insurers were allowed to price fix based on the belief that if an insurance company went bankrupt it would do damage to the public. Thus insurers created rating bureaus to price fix (set rates) for property types, etc. This allowed the underwriters, using the law of large numbers (also known as the law of averages) to set the rates and therefore the amount of money passing through the system from all insured to those who suffered losses. Lets assume that the retention was set at 50 percent; that is 50 percent of the monies received would go to pay losses and 50 percent would be retained to cover overhead and profits. Now it is easy to see that if the underwriters could calculate the losses and set the rates accordingly, 50 percent of every dollar taken in could be retained. Thus, the greater the sum of the losses (with appropriately set rates) the greater the cash flow through the system. Therefore, with accurate underwriting, a high level of losses produced an enormous cash flow into the system and the retentions and the profits were maximized. Thus, incredibly high fire losses in America produced incredibly high profits for the fire insurers. Allowing a near 100 percent solution to fire to be modernized and become cost effective for every building would be the equivalent to chopping down the insurers money tree. 2. GUARANTEEING THE CONTINUITY OF THE FIRE HOLOCAUST During 1895 the a group of New England fire insurance companies created the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) to create fire codes for their industry. The primary problem was that the fire sprinkler system was so effective that it would virtually eliminate serious fires in this nation. Many of the insurers would end up bankrupt. So, during 1896 the NFPA created its first code, a fire sprinkler code that was written to prevent the installation of sprinklers in small buildings and compartmented buildings (apartments, hotels, nursing homes, hospitals, schools, high rises, etc.). The regulations, requiring iron pipe in sizes from 4 inch diameter to 8 inch, plus thousands of gallons per minute water supplies, produced a code controlled sprinkler system that could be economically justified only in very large high hazard industrial properties. The very large industrial properties had dollar loss potentials so great that the insurers needed them to be protected. It was the same concept as the manager of a casino setting a betting limit to prevent a loss too large to cover. Small properties and compartmented buildings (only one area of the compartmented building would normally burn) did not need protection from an insurance viewpoint. Thus, a solution to fire that was later proven to be a 99.87 percent guarantee that no fire becomes large, was barred from nearly all buildings by a code produced by the NFPA. During the late 1950s I began my research into properly engineered fire sprinkler systems. Soon I was able to apply sound hydraulic engineering principles to develop the technology to 4

reduce sprinkler costs by up to 90 percent while actually creating a more reliable system. The NFPA, the insurers and others realized that allowing affordably protection (that could virtually eliminate losses) would do damage to all who profited from fire. 3. FIRE CODES DENIED SPRINKLERS FOR PROTECTING LIVES Lets pause here and seriously evaluate what has so far been revealed about the fire problem in America. The data confirmed that sprinklers, when monitored by a central station, controlled the early fire 99.87 percent of the time. Thus, sprinklers had the capability to virtually eliminate serious fires within buildings. The feds say that fire causes more damage than floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes and other natural disasters combined. Yet for 60 years, prior to the Seddon Duke report, this near absolute solution to fire had been available but not installed in near100 percent of the building types where lives were at greatest risk. I am speaking of hotels, motels, hospitals, nursing homes, apartments, single family dwellings, high rises, schools, restaurants, night clubs, bars, institutional buildings and similar properties. So, as fires raged in America for 60 years and children burned by the thousands, the NFPA codes (enforced by local fire departments) kept close to 100 percent of the buildings where lives were most at risk, devoid of fire control systems. I began my lifes work of changing fire technology to protect those unprotected buildings during the late 1950s. 4. THE KEY TO THE SOLUTION OF THE FIRE HOLOCAUST According to FEMA the fire problem within the United States is more horrific than floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, and other natural disasters combined. And, here and now I say that the fire problem has easy to apply solutions and the solutions will not cost money but will save money. So, why are not the solutions applied and the fire losses virtually eliminated? There are two sides to the fire problem. They are: 1. Those who are the victims and suffer the losses. 2. Those who profit or otherwise benefit from fire. The reason why the fire losses were not nearly eliminated years ago is because those who profit from fire or otherwise benefit from fire (fire services) would not allow the cures to be applied. That is the fundamental reason for nearly all fire losses involving buildings. Yes, I agree, this claim (that nearly all fire losses involving buildings are caused by those who benefit from fire) is not easy to believe. Fully read this report and you will believe it. BASIC TRUTH OF FIRE TECHNOLOGY NO. 4 THE NATIONAL FIRE CODES ARE WRITTEN, NOT TO ELIMINATE FIRE, BUT RATHER TO MAXIMIZE THE PROFITS FROM FIRE. PART E-HOW I DEVELOPED ENGINEERED FIRE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS 1. RESEARCH PROGRAMS FOR SEAGRAM DISTILLERS I was hired by Seagram Distillers in New York City during 1954 as a fire protection engineer because the insurers had created regulations that prevented the installation of sprinkler systems in the large rack houses (barreled whiskey in storage). Due to the absence of sprinklers and the extremely high value of the stored whiskey, the insurance rates were extremely high. After I researched the insurers fire regulations and showed how unfair they were, I was named the research director for the entire distilling industry. During the next 12 years we conducted live fire testing of modern hydraulically engineered protective systems. Probably the largest inside a building fire tests ever conducted were run within a 5

50 foot high whiskey warehouse in Owings Mill, Maryland. Our research produced more reliable sprinkler systems at dramatically reduced prices. Further, our research proved we could safely shift away from the enormously costly fireproof warehouses (heavy reinforced concrete warehouses with 6 barrel high storage per floor as had been promoted by insurers). The fireproof warehouses were costing about $36.00 per stored barrel. Based on my research we shifted to 12 barrel high storage in low cost warehousing but with full sprinkler protection at far lower insurance rates. My advanced sprinkler designs were proven effective to cover 12 barrel high storage under a layout of sprinklers (vs. the insurers required 6 barrel high limit under a sprinkler layout). The reason why the insurers made 6 barrel high storage the maximum allowed is because they ran their tests in a low roof building where only 6 barrels high would fit. The allowed area of coverage per sprinklers was doubled by my research and the demanded water supplies were reduced by much more than half. Millions of dollars were saved. My research into building construction and protection also opened up major changes in barrel handling methods and labor costs. Barrel lifting equipment was developed for the new 12 barrel high barreled whiskey storage buildings. Finally, Seagram created a captive insurance company in the Bahamas bypassing the American insurance system. I personally wrote the all-risk insurance agreement to be presented to the Lloyds of London insurers. I also wrote a master plan fire safety program report for approval by Lloyds. I made two trips to Lloyds of London plus several meetings with American reinsurance brokers to gain approvals for both our fire protection methods and our reinsurance agreement. Then, all fire insurance premiums for Seagram worldwide went to the captive in the Bahamas where, because of the tax rates in the U. S., one dollar was worth two in Nassau. Insurance became a profit making operation rather than a loser. 2. HOW INSURERS PREVENTED SPRINKLER ENGINEERING PROGRESS During the years I had opportunities to actually test the quality of fire sprinkler system design in America, I produced engineering breakthroughs that could have revolutionized fire protection in this country. However, the insurance industry made every effort to diminish and hide the advancements. The insurers had sprinkler design control via the NFPA codes and they were not going to allow the changes that would reduce their profits. So, while I produced some major gains for the distilling industry and especially Seagram, the advancements were being confined to the one industry. My work on high piled combustible storage in cardboard cartons is an example. Factory Mutual and other insurers had considered 21 foot high bottled whiskey in cardboard cartons to be extremely hazardous storage and had recommended the sprinkler design be at a density of 0.45 gpm over 9000 square feet. With hydraulic balancing this added up to 4,450 gallons per minute for the sprinkler system alone (not counting fire department hose streams). Also, FM and other insurers required that trained brigades be included because their testing indicated sprinklers could not completely extinguish high piled combustible storage. Hose streams by in-plant brigades would be needed to finalize the extinguishment. I designed protection that was tested in the FM Test facility in Norwood, Massachusetts. The 21 foot high storage was controlled with but 4 open sprinklers discharging a total of 190 gpm. This was a shock to the insurance engineers. My concept was to not design for low density over extremely large areas but rather to design for a more concentrated and fully adequate density directly over the early fire. Control that early fire and 9000 square feet of sprinklers would never open, I claimed (and proved). My test, Test No. 3, controlled the fire in the 21 foot high piles with only four sprinklers opening (see FMRC Ser. No. 17792, dated June 1970- Fire Protection Requirements for High Palletized storage of Cased Distilled Spirits, by R. M. Newman). The wetting of the piles did result in collapse of the pile after about 15 minutes. But, after collapse, the residual fire was slowly being reduced as the water was diluting the alcohol to a proof too low to burn. This very limited fire 6

provided more than ample time for a brigade to apply hose stream water to the fire to extinguish it. About a dozen men stood nearby for the entire burn time without masks and without any discomfit, thus complete extinguishment by hose stream would not have been difficult. And, even without hose stream use the fire appeared ready to go out. Suddenly, the FM engineer in charge realized that the fire was getting close to being extinguished without any hose streams employed. And this was occurring with only four sprinklers operating. So he shouted to the man at the control valve in the corner of the test facility to shut the valve and stop the water flow. It was a Seagram paid for test so I hollered to keep the valve open. The confused FM guy did so. Then the angry FM test manager started running toward the riser screaming for the valve to be shut and I ran beside him yelling for the opposite. When the test manager reached the man at the valve he angrily barked out some threats and the valve was promptly closed. Clearly, the top engineer at FM did not want four sprinklers to actually extinguish a fire that, by FM standards could open up to 9000 square feet of sprinklers and still require the use of hose streams for control. When finally the FM report was issued engineer R. M. Newman of FM made the following comments concerning Test No. 3: Fire Control, Impossible to Conclude, recovery of pile ignited was extremely high, extent of fire spread questionable, Operation of more sprinklers could result in better dilution of spirits and also for pre-wetting to prevent spread to exposed piles. Rather than using this test to justify reduced criteria for installing protection, FM diminished the significance of the test results. The primary complaint of Mr. Newman seemed to be that not enough sprinklers opened. And, of course, by stopping the sprinkler flow before complete extinguishment occurred, the FM engineers could cast doubt on my system designs. At one of the Seagram storage facilities, insurers had demanded a one million gallon reservoir for fire protection. FM had been imposing incredibly complex and costly fire regulations on their clients for decades. Obviously, FM did not wish for their clients to believe the FM engineering, and insurance engineering in general, was in any way deficient. So, my research into sprinkler design and many other facets of fire technology were constantly being diminished by both the insurers and the NFPA. The cruelty underlying all these deceptions was that every year thousands of people were being killed and injured by fires while clearly there were ways to near eliminate the out-of-control fires. 3. ENGINEERING INCOMPETENCY ON A MASSIVE SCALE For many years I attempted to convince insurance engineers and fire protection engineers that the extra hazard sprinklers system designs criteria was a formula for disaster. The criteria of design produced often very weak systems fed by water supplies far greater than the amount of water that would actually be applied to the early fire. The high hazard system often had an 8 inch size riser and an 8 inch feed main which could deliver 2000 gpm or more. However, the systems were dead ended in one inch steel pipe notorious for being subject to corrosion. The plumbing industry had shifted to copper to avoid the corrosion problem. Thus, although the pipe near the riser could float a ship out of the warehouse, the pipe toward the ends of the branch lines might deliver less than 1/10th of that water onto the early fire (and almost none if highly corroded). On top of that The NFPA code generally keyed to 7 pounds per square inch at the sprinkler orifice, a pitifully low pressure. And, Underwriters Laboratories required the design of the sprinkler to be such that nearly all the water is concentrated close to the sprinkler with very weak density 8 feet distant. I could think of no way that a system could be designed cost more while using water less effeciently. I considered it to be engineering by Ouija board. Many times I warned that the high hazard properties protected with seemingly fantastically strong water supplies could burn for lack of engineering competency. The burning of the Safeway 7

Grocery Warehouse in Richmond, California on July 11, 1988 proved my warnings to be valid. The building was one giant open area of a half million square feet (about 10 football fields in size). Merchandise in combustible cartons was stored within racks and on pallets three high. The ceiling heights were up to 27 feet. The building had 14 sprinkler risers and 13 of them were sized 8 inch diameter. They were fed by a 10 inch underground loop and a 250,000 gallon gravity tank. A UL listed fire pump delivered 1500 gpm to the 10 inch loop At 125 psi. The sprinklers were inch orifice sized (a standard but absolutely stupid orifice size for this warehouse) with 120 square feet coverage per head. The sprinkler temperature rating was a low 165 degrees F, a temperature that encouraged the fast opening of too many sprinklers. The building had roof level draft stop curtains and automatic vents. By underwriter standards this building was loaded with code defined fire protection. Reportedly, the fire started at the top of three pallets high paper storage in cartons near the center of the warehouse. An automatic alarm was received by the Richmond fire department at 10:02 PM on a Monday evening. Since all sprinklers were electronically monitored presumably the alarm was received immediately after the first sprinkler opened. The first fire truck entered the plant 9 minutes later. However, by the time the first fire engine passed through the entrance four sprinkler systems (of the 14) had already operated (as confirmed by the ADT Central station company that monitored the systems). Thus probably 500 to 1000 sprinklers were flowing before the first fire truck arrived. The opening of at least 500 sprinklers represented a total failure of the entire fire protection system before the first fire engine arrived at trhe plant. The water supply had been overwhelmed before the first fire hose was put in use. This was the end result of what I long considered to be engineering of such stupidity (or corruption) as to be almost beyond comprehension. 4. THE TRUTH IS NOT DESIRED The loss of the Safeway warehouse resulted in a major financial blow to the City of Richmond. The fire chief had some explaining to do for the city officials and the public. The chief called a number of fire engineers into a meeting and pleaded with us to investigate the causes of the enormous disaster and to explain what had happened. I gained copies of the sprinkler system drawings and hydraulically calculated how much of the enormous water supply would actually be delivered, via the piping, to the early fire. I calculated that when four sprinklers were open above the fire approximately 216 gallons per minute would be flowing at approximately 0.44 gpm per square foot, quite inadequate. An early density of 1.0 or greater would have been easy to design for while simultaneously reducing the costs of the systems by at least 75 percent. The sprinkler system design was so wrong that the designers should have been convicted of criminal fraud. The loss was completely predictable. In fact I had been predicting this type loss for years. But the insurance engineers and the professional fire engineers had been ridiculing my concerns. Within my report I made this statement, which was directed at the insurance companies, not the fire chief: The root cause (of the loss) was not so much ignorance or unplanned for errors. It was, to a large degree, a matter of willful intent to subvert better technology. Of course, I was the only fire engineered at the time who would dare publish the truth about the NFPA/Insurance industry sprinkler codes. I sent the report to the chief believing I had defined the basic causes for the loss as he had requested. Several days later, when I telephoned the chief to ask him if he had read the report his assistant came to the phone and said, The chief is furious about that report of yours, he wont talk to you. Sometimes the truth is not what is desired. BASIC TRUTH OF FIRE TECHNOLOGY NO. 5 THOSE WHO PROFIT FROM FIRE, INCLUDING THE NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION AND UNDERWRITERS LABORATORIES, AND THE FIRE INSURANCE 8

INDUSTRY HAVE INTENTIONALY CREATED REGULATIONS TO SEVERELY LIMIT THE INSTALLATION OF SPRINKLERS IN BUILDINGS.

PART F-DEVELOPING LIFE SAFETY SOLUTIONS 1. WHY I LEFT SEAGRAM I left Seagram partly because, after the fire protection and insurance problems of Seagram were solved and they had a captive insurance company in the Bahamas (that was actually creating profits based on avoidance of taxes), Seagram did not want other firms following suit. The insurance brokers were convincing management that if I continued to be proving that the American insurance companies were not applying sensible fire solutions, the publicity might draw the attention of the feds. The IRSs interpretation of the legality of the transfer of insurance monies from New York via Montreal to the Bahamas (where taxes were nil) had not been established by prior legal cases. Seagram did not want others to follow our paths which eventually would have gained the attention of the IRS. So, to a significant degree my explorations into fire technology with the support of Seagram management were ended. The second and main reason was because I believed I could bring about major changes in fire technology that would eventually save many lives.

2. THE CREATION OF THE LIFE SAFETY SYSTEM I left Seagram with the idea that it was wrong for thousand of fire deaths to be happening each year when, in reality, there were practical solutions that were being denied the public. Eventually I received funding from the Copper Development Association (CDA) to develop a modernized sprinkler system for protecting human life within buildings. Despite the past cooperation between the NFPA and the fire insurers to restrict the advancement of sprinkler technology, I believed that no one could oppose the creation of a system specifically intended to protect human life. So I asked for cooperation from the NFPA. Mr. Charles Morgan, President of the NFPA, helped me to put together a committee including a representative of just about every important government and private organization involved with fire safety in this country. It was agreed that if I conducted the research and fire testing, to be witnessed by the created committee of nation fire experts, and if the committee agreed that the system was valid, the NFPA would adopt it to become a national code. I conducted the research and the testing and wrote a performance oriented code. The code was moderately revised and adopted by the committee. After final testing in the Pioneer Hotel in Tucson, Arizona, the Life Safety System code (as I named it) was uniformly adopted by the committee. So, it was now time for Mr. Morgan of the NFPA to keep his word and move the code into the NFPA system of codes. I did not realize it at the time, but as the code was being voted into existence at the Pioneer Hotel in Tucson, the site of the final tests, Charles Morgan was organizing opposition to the code. An elaborate strategy was hatched to kill the Life safety Code. But, due to my tenacity and considerable help from the honest fire officials, it took the NFPA and the others (who put money above the lives of children) many years to completely kill the technology developed. 3. SPRINKLER COST REDUCTIONS OF 90 PERCENT POSSIBLE On this web site (TheWorldFireSafetyFoundation.org) I have posted a documentary story explaining how I designed a properly engineered a sprinkler system for a 1.2 million square foot medical center in Kansas City, Kansas. This system was hydraulically engineered rather than conforming to the corrupted sprinkler codes of the NFPA. It was installed at approximately one tenth the cost of a standard NFPA design system. The installed cost was 35 cents a square foot vs. $2.88 9

a square foot for the NFPA code designed system (to be installed in the basement only, which was typical at that time). Both designs had been put out for bids. My design was analyzed by the State Architect of Kansas and appropriate state and private professional engineers. It was found to be of sound design. Because the medical center was to be completely sprinklered (very unusual at the time) the fire resistance ratings were reduced by one hour thus saving more than $5 million in construction costs. An investment in a properly engineered protection system, costing less than 500 thousand dollars produced a reduction in construction costs exceeding $5 million. This was but one of the ways by which properly engineered fire control systems would save money, not cost money. 4. MUCH OPPOSITION TO THE LIFE SAFETY SYSTEM Despite the best efforts of the NFPA and its allies to kill the Life Safety Sprinkler System and prevent any organization from approving it, I gained approvals from two national building code organizations. The LSS standard code was legally adopted into the Basic Building code covering much of the United States. The Ohio Building Code adopted the LSS code verbatim. I was advised that the Southern Standard Building Code would honor it. While there were some who embraced the idea that building types that had never previously been sprinkler protected (except rarely) should be protected, there was an abundance of opposition. As an example, The State Fire Marshal of Nevada, Dan Quinan, attempted to get the MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas protected with the LSS. He assumed that by allowing inexpensive protection the owners and builders would be receptive. But the Las Vegas fire officials were friendly with the casino operators and apparently had reasons to keep the fire marshal out of the equation. So, Dan Quinan, the state fire marshal of Nevada, was ordered to stay out of Las Vegas, the major city in Nevada. Dan Quinan was not the most popular fire official to begin with. Previously he had tested the ionization type so called smoke detectors in a school and found out they would not detect the smoke. There was an accepted method of testing smoke detectors with a spray can. The spray can created the right stuff (billions of near atomic sized particles) to make the phony smoke detectors sound. Quinan ignited a fire inside the school in a garbage can and created real smoke. The detectors would not detect real smoke. So that was a black mark against Quinan to begin with. Fire officials were not supposed to test the smoke detectors with real smoke. For a state fire marshal to be ordered to not enter the biggest city in the state was unusual to say the least. But then a concerned fire engineer reported to him that the fireproofing contractor was not fireproofing much of the steel in the MGM Grand Hotel. This represented a major endangerment to the building in case of fire. A hot fire can cause unprotected structural steel to fail sometimes in as little as ten minutes. So, despite orders to stay away, he forced a correction of the fireproofing. Later, when an old hotel with very inadequate exits was being refurbished and restored to use in another city, Dan Quinan again recommended that sprinklers be installed to compensate for inadequate exits. This time he was removed from office. This illustrates one of the ways that the fire establishment keeps the corruption under wraps. During 1980 that huge MGM hotel in Las Vegas, claimed to be the largest hotel in the world, suffered one of the most devastation high rise fires of all time. The fire killed 85 people. But of even more significance, over 5000 occupants above the casino floor were trapped until the enormous (non sprinklered) casino fire was finally controlled. Stairways are often smoke filled and useless as exits and the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) cut a deal with the elevator industry to take elevators out of service (preventing them to be used as exits). When an alarm sounds for any reason the elevators are dropped automatically to the ground floor, making them available only to the fire fighters. This leaves all those endangered above the fire devoid of any reliable exit from the building. Before control occurred most of the deaths were occurring on the top floors as toxic gases were 10

rising via elevator and stairway shafts. The fire had been so intense and so large that control had been very much in doubt. At one point the firefighters had to evacuate the building to regroup before reentering. If the fireproofing had not been properly applied, collapse of the casino roof would have been likely with horrendous results. It would have been a near certainty, if structural collapse had occurred that many firefighters would have died. The fire control operations would have been disrupted and probably the 5000 trapped above would have died. I believe that the actions of Dan Quinan to force the proper fireproofing of the structural steel in the MGM saved the lives of those who had been trapped above. But for his efforts his career was destroyed. BASIC TRUTH OF FIRE TECHNOLOGY NO. 6 THE AMERICAN FIRE CLUB AS I CALL IT HAS WAYS TO DESTROY THOSE WHO WOULD SERIOUSLY REDUCE FIRES AND FIRE DEATHS. AND THEY HAVE NO QUALMS ABOUT USING THEIR POWERS EVEN THOUGH THOUSNDS OF CHILDREN ARE KILLED AND INJURED EACH YEAR DUE TO THEIR CRIMINAL ACTS. PART G- PRACTICAL AUTOMATIC FIRE CONTROL NOT ALLOWED IN HOMES 1. MY EXPERIENCE WITH RESIDENTIAL SPRINKLERS I promoted residential sprinklers for many years before they were permitted and Ive been referred to as the father of residential sprinklers. I claimed that if there is enough water in the home to take a shower there is enough to extinguish the early fire. But for years I have been attacked by the experts of the fire field for promoting this idea. One of the things I researched was smaller orifice sprinklers at higher pressure than the NFPA code calls for. The NFPA code set 7 psi (a horribly low pressure) at the orifice of a half inch sprinkler as the standard. This produced a very weak - large drop spray. Nearly all the water discharged ran off as slightly heated water. I tested small orifice sprinklers at 20 psi and higher, producing small drops that were converted into steam and provided far better cooling. I found that 5 gpm or 7 gpm at higher pressure (at the orifice of a or 5/16th inch sprinkler) would provide better fire control than the standard sprinkler at standard pressure. This confirmed that a residence could be protected with the amount of water that a shower uses. But, the NFPA and its allies set out to kill the idea that a normal water line to a home would provide the quantity of water needed for protection. Prior to the 1980 NFPA annual convention a test program was run under the NFPA Research banner and the tests were rigged to prove that the minimum amount of water needed for a home sprinkler system was 40 gpm. Thus the NFPA set criteria to dramatically overprice the residential sprinklers and therefore severely restrict the installations. Again, as a designer of hydraulically valid sprinkler systems, I was proven to be wrong with deliberately falsified fire tests and blatant performance lies. 2. ONE FIRE OFFICIALS REACTION TO RESIDENTIAL SPRINKLERS Some fire officials, especially in California, welcomed the installation of affordable sprinkler systems within their jurisdictions. But the great majority of officials opposed low cost sprinklers. My experience with the fire marshal in Rancho Cordova illustrates the problem. The purchaser of a home under construction hired me to design and install a system during the construction stage. When I approached the Rancho Cordova fire marshal with my drawings and calculations he refused to look at them and told me that there was no code requiring sprinklers. So why install them, He asked. Despite his disinterest I proceeded to install the system assuming that a lack of regulations requiring protection did not mean the system could not be installed. The system was completed to the point where the wallboard could be installed covering all pipe. The day before the sheathing was to be installed a red tag was put on my system halting any further work on the home. When I asked why 11

the system was red tagged, I was told it did not meet code. But you dont have a sprinkler code, I replied. Thats it he said, Since we dont have a code your system is not code complying. It required great persistence and about a month of battling the bureaucrats to finally get the red tag removed. By then the protected home was far behind schedule and the builder was furious. The message had been delivered: You are not going to install any more residential sprinklers in my area. BASIC TRUTH OF FIRE TECHNOLOGY NO. 7 THE AMERICAN HOME PRODUCES NEARLY ALL FIRE DEATH. HOWEVER, HOME FIRES ALSO PRODUCES ENORMOUS BENEFITS FOR THOSE WHO PROFIT FROM FIRE. THAT IS WHY AFFORDABLE AND RELIABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE HOME FIRE PROBLEM WILL NOT BE TOLERATED. PART G-A FEW EXAMPLES OF SPRINKLER FRAUD 1. MAKING SURE THOSE RESTAURANTS BURNED Restaurants were one of the cash cows for the insurers. Restaurants had a very high burn rate and therefore they could be subjected to very high insurance premiums. For example, a restaurant with buildings and contents valued at one million dollars might have a $100 thousand dollar annual premium for the property damage and business interruption cover, which could drop to less than $20 thousand if sprinklered. But what was really profitable was when a restaurant was located within a motel or hotel. The sky high restaurant rate could then be applied to the entire building. Although the seating areas of a restaurant were obviously light hazard and the kitchens were near devoid of combustibles; the NFPA Sprinkler code classed them as ordinary hazard. This unjustified classification allowed even more excessive water demands to be applied. By pricing sprinklers beyond reason the restaurants could be kept devoid of protection and therefore very high premiums could be maintained. Restaurants devoid of sprinklers were money in the bank for insurers, especially when they were in rural areas where the water supply and the fire department classifications could be classed as weak by NFPA standards

2. RURAL RESTUARANTS AND THE FIRE DEPARTMENT POLLICIES This is a situation I sometimes ran into when offering to sprinkler a restaurant with a life safety sprinkler system designed to proper hydraulic engineering criteria. It was historically proven that on average only 1.2 sprinklers opened due to fires in light hazard buildings. Further, based on Australian data (the most complete by far) a 10 gpm flow per sprinkler would control the fires (thus even a 20 gpm water supply for an electrically monitored fire sprinkler system would reduce serious restaurant fires by at least 90 percent. So, when I created the LSS code and set 80 gpm as the criteria for protecting life at risk type buildings (NFPA classed light hazard) a very substantial safety factor was included. But, the NFPA/fire insurance regulations had a different objective than reducing restaurant fires. Assume a restaurant is located in a rural area without a nearby fire department and also served by a weak water supply as per the NFPA code. A 6 inch street main that supplied perhaps 700 gpm at 50 psi pressure would be very weak by underwriting standards. Therefore, the restaurant would be subjected to an outrageously high insurance rate, which would be profitable to the insurers and devastating to the restaurant owner. But, this so called weak water supply would be extremely generous as far as the hydraulic engineering would be concerned. The probable number of open sprinklers would be two. An 80 gpm would be extremely generous from a practical viewpoint. 12

Further, with the supply as stated above, designing a system to deliver an enormously generous 250 gallons a minute (enough to virtually flood the building) would be easy engineering. Clearly, a so called weak water supply of 700 gpm should be able to reduce the insurance rate of a rural restaurant by up to 80 percent. So, if engineering honesty and a desire to protect restaurants were the goals, practical systems would have been allowed and the insurance reduction would probably completely pay for the system within two to four years. Thereafter, the restaurant owner would be able to put the savings in the bank for his/her retirement. But this not what the Fire Club desired. Every time I ran into a situation like this, where the water supply was weak as defined by insurers and fire department inspectors, I was denied the right to install a system. The insurance man, of course, would demand more water. But, if I installed the system there was an independent insurance company that had evaluated my system criteria for better than rating bureau rates. So, I would then go to the local fire department to attempt to get plans approved. The fire inspector would tell me that the water demand for hose streams would be say 2000 gpm and the main only supplied 700 gpm. Therefore the main did not have enough water for sprinklers. The hose stream demand of 2000 gpm must be included in the sprinkler design, the fire marshal would insist. I would then say that if the sprinkler controlled the fire, which was close to 100 percent assured, when you firefighters arrived all you would need is the water tank on your truck. Because the fire, if not completely out, would be confined to one small concealed area and all that wpould be needed to control the residual was perhaps 25 gpm from the small hose (booster) line taking water from the tank on the truck. With sprinklers in the restaurant the building likely would be totally involved youre your men arrived, so the 2000 gpm might be justified for a non-protected building. So, for the sake of the owner and the tax rolls, please approve the sprinkler system. But, the fire inspector would not allow a sprinkler system to replace the hose demand. With his own insurance broker trying to sabotage the sprinkler installation and the fire chief demanding that a new and larger water main be installed, the restaurant owner would not be able to protect his property. Because the restaurant would remain non-protected, the owner would stand a real risk of losing of the restaurant because, when the remote firefighters finally arrived the building would be totally involved. Few restaurant owners realized it, but when a total loss occurred the insurance payout would be very inadequate in relation to the enormous cost of rebuilding a destroyed business. The customers, the staff and the reputation would be lost. Ive seen data indicating that 9 out of 10 small businesses that suffer a major loss are never able to rebuild the business because its like starting new again. The reality is that a business owner that has a very high fire insurance rate could pay the insurer many times the total value of the building and contents over a 30 year period. And then, when the building burns the owner likely will end up bankrupt. So, after the enormous payout over many years the end result is a bankrupt person at a late time in life. However, if the owner installed a properly priced sprinkler system to begin with, over those 30 years the savings might well have accumulated to more than a million dollars. The basic intent of the NFPA sprinkler codes is to ensure that the millions of dollars in premiums over the life of a business accumulate to the insurer, not to the retirement of the owners of the business. 3. HOW TO KEEP THE LIFE AT RISK TYPE BUILDINGS BURNING Theoretically only one room within a motel will burn at a time. The construction codes require that the floor, the ceiling (or floor and ceiling system as one unit) be so designed with fireproofing that a fire within any room will not spread to any other room for at least hour, sometimes one hour. 13

Therefore, as I proved years ago, when determining how much water would be needed for a sprinkler system, only one room maximum would be burning when sprinklers first opened until firefighters arrive. In fact, I ran tests with wood cribs fires set against 1/8th inch wood paneling on wood stud walls (without any gypsum board fireproofing) to test whether such flimsy combustible walls would limit sprinkler operation to one room. It did with only one sprinkler operating. However, the NFPA code dated 1969 set the minimum water supply for a compartmented light hazard property at 500 to 750 gpm, not counting additional hose stream water as may be determined by a fire official. Further, assuming the hotel room included small closed areas such as a closet and bath, the sprinkler in the small room was required to flow the same as a sprinkler in the large room. If the large where the beds were located was 16 by 16 feet or more in size at least four sprinklers would be required all presumably flowing the required 15 gpm. I developed and tested design criteria for compartmented life at risk type buildings based on hydraulically calculated systems using small copper pipe gridded to provide multiple path flows. With these calculations I could design for most horizontal pipe to be only one inch sized and, at most, 1-1/4 size. This was like a magical solution to sprinkler design that would allow plumbers and even a good handyman mechanic to install sprinklers at a fraction of the cost of the NFPA design. The demand for these affordable and more reliable systems was increasing. As part of the strategy to defeat the LSS the NFPA code committees were building some of my innovations into the NFPA codes. Then there would be much publicity relative the NFPA systems advanced designs. The idea was for the NFPA to rake credit for any advancement and, to the greatest extent possible, to warn contactors etc. that the LSS was unnecessary and dangerous. But, whenever an advancement that I created was built into the NFPA code there were hookers that largely defeated any potential cost savings. As an example, by designing for sprinklers in only one room maximum to operate and contain the fire to that one room, I was able to dramatically reduce pipe sizing and costs. But, when I hydraulic calculate the LSS for compartmented properties such as hotels, motels, hospitals, etc I calculated for one room to be burning only. There was no way that fire would spread room to room when sprinklers were installed. However, when this advancement I developed for the LSS was built into the NFPA code they created regulations that forced the designer to calculate for sprinklers within as many as 8 separate rooms (sized 16 by 26 feet or 416 square feet in this example) to operate at the same time. That could include 7 sprinklers per room (possibly more) with sprinklers in as many as 8 rooms flowing simultaneously. That could include up to about 50 sprinklers all theoretically flowing water at the same time. Of course, those who were being conned by the NFPA code advocates would say that the advances that I created were created by the NFPA and they would not explain that my hydraulics would be based on sprinklers in one room maximum whereas the NFPA code could be interpreted to require as many as 50 sprinklers flowing simultaneously. Those who profited from fire realized that if practical protective systems were allowed, the fire losses could be reduced to near zero and the profits and perks would be reduced. So the NFPA led the efforts to maintain a high burn rate in America. BASIC TRUTH OF FIRE TECHNOLOGY NO. 8 THE NFPA AND THOSE WHO PROFITED FROM FIRE INTENTIONALLY PREVENTED FIRE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS FROM BEING ECONOMICALLY FEASABLE FOR PROTECTING HUMAN LIFE IN BUILDINGS BECAUSE THE FIRE DEATHS JUSTIFIED THE ENORMOUS EXPENDITURES FOR THE INADEQUATE FIRE PROTECTION. PART H-KILL THE EARLY FIRE BEFORE IT KILLS 14

1. A SECOND NEAR 100 PERCENT SOLUTION TO FIRE A solution to fire that will be nearly as reliable, perhaps fully as reliable as sprinkler protection, is an honest fire detection system plus an easy to use small hose with fog nozzle. The standard automatic sprinkler (for the Life at Risk type properties) distributes perhaps 15 gallons per minute (gpm) of water spray over 225 square foot of floor area. The early fire may occupy perhaps only one square foot of floor area. Therefore, only a small percent of the discharged water from a sprinkler actually lands on the fire. Yet, because of the incredible fire suppression capability of water spray the sprinkler is near 100 percent guaranteed to control that early fire. In event a reliable fire detection system was installed, the reliable early warning would provide adequate time for an occupant to use a small hose with fog nozzle against that fire. The fog nozzle would apply near 100 percent of the water directly onto that still small fire. And, a fog nozzle would deliver the water in a finer spray which greatly magnifies the waters fire control capability. Thus, an honest fire detection system coupled with the best fire control tool known to man would reduce fire deaths by probably 95 percent, perhaps closer to 100 percent.

2. WATER FOG WILL NOT CONDUCT ELECTRICITY A few words need also be said regarding the use of small hose and fog nozzles. The firefighters are provided with large fog nozzles for 1-1/2 inch sized hose (and 2-1/2 inch) that are Underwriters Laboratories listed as being safe for use on electrical apparatus fires, including transformer banks that involve voltages of more than 100 thousand. Because there are air gaps between the tiny drops from a spray nozzle, an electric current cannot pass back along the water spray to the person holding the nozzle. However, to prevent the use of a small fog nozzle in a home, the people have been warned that using water spray on 110 volts could be deadly.

3. THE EARLY USE OF WATER ON A FIRE IS DISCOURAGED William Shakespeare knew it centuries ago. He said, A little fire is quickly trodden out, which, being suffered, rivers cannot quench. Yes, indeed, when a fire is still small and harmless one gallon of water as a spray, perhaps even less, can do the job. But by the time the fire trucks arrive the needed water may be into the hundreds of thousands of gallons. And dont forget the ambulance. Do not think the fire officials are unaware of the time lines and growth rates of fire. There is much to suggest that the burn rate is much greater in America than in less developed nations. The reason would be that in the more primitive nations governments are not teaching the citizens to never put water on the early fire. 4. HIGH PRICED HOSE STATIONS USELESS FOR CONTROLLING FIRES In office buildings, schools, hospitals, apartment houses and similar compartmented properties, hose stations are installed costing many thousands of dollars. But, that hose (which is professional firefighter sized) is very dangerous for the untrained person to use. It must be fully removed from the rack and then one person will turn on the valve as another is holding the nozzle end of the extended hose line. When the high pressure water reaches the open nozzle the reaction could tear the nozzle from the users grip and the flailing hose could then swing the nozzle with potential killing force. Nearly always two trained firefighters or more are at the business end of a 1-1/2 inch hose line. Thus, installing too large hose to be used by a non professional is like handing a can of beer and the keys to a high powered automobile to a twelve year old boy. Fortunately, building occupants seemingly realize the danger, so the hose provided is rarely used. Fire fighters will not use it as after remaining in non use for years it may burst. They carry their own tested hose. So, why is 15

hose that cannot be used by the occupants installed in buildings to be used by the occupants? First, the useless hose stations are mandated by code because those who make and sell the hose, the cabinets and the standpipes make a fortune by doing so. Secondly, it is sold in a size that cannot be effectively used by the building occupants because the IAFC does not want the public terminating the fires before the remote firefighters arrive. It is all about preventing effective fire control systems from being installed in buildings. BASIC TRUTH OF FIRE TECHNOLOGY NO. 9 WATER SPRAY APPLIED TO INCIPIENT FIRES WITH A SMALL HOSE AND FOG NOZZEL WILL TERMINATE THE EARLY FIRE BEFORE IT GROWS LARGE AND KILLS. BUT THOSE WHO BENEFIT FROM FIRE HAVE DENIED IT TO THE PUBLIC. PART I- THE SMOKE DETECTOR FRAUD 1. THE SLOW SMOKEY FIRE There is a type of fire that will create almost no heat but, given time, will create thick smoke and an adequacy of combustion gases that can slowly intoxicate a sleeping person. An example is a smoldering fire in a sofa where a cigarette has been carelessly dropped before going to bed. Often but not always, the time required for the smoldering fire to create a potentially lethal level of carbon monoxide will be an hour or more. Then it may be another hour or more before death actually occurs. The smoldering fire is a very slow killer. During the daytime when the occupants are awake, the growing haze and the odor will alert the occupants long before conditions become deadly. Because about half of all fire deaths in homes occur during non sleeping hours and because a fire death due to a smoldering fire is very rare during daylight hours, this proves that most fire deaths are caused by flaming fires, not smoldering fires. However, at night when sleeping the senses are turned off and the smell and reduced visibility may not awaken a sleeping person. Therefore, as the gases grow more concentrated from a smoldering fire at night, the chances of a sleeping person waking up with a clear head diminishes. What makes the smoldering fire even more dangerous is that it may morph into a flaming fire. If those sleeping have been breathing a serious concentration of carbon monoxide for a while and then the fire changes to a fast spreading flaming fire, the impaired person will be ill equipped mentally to escape. 2. PROMOTING THE PHONY SMOKE DETECTOR As stated above, a reliable fire detection system combined with a small hose (not professional fire fighter sized) equipped with a fog nozzle would dramatically reduce fire losses and fire deaths in America. Early in my career (early 1960s), before I accomplished enough to finally turn the Fire Club against me, I was named the chairman of four sectional committees of the NFPA. These codes dealt with fire detection and alarm systems for commercial and industrial properties. There was no sprinkler code or fire detection code defining proper built-in protection for homes. Very close to 100 percent of all homes were without any fire detectors. By 1966 I had a code developed to define a complete and reliable fire detection system for homes that, if fully implemented, also had the potential to near eliminate fire deaths. I created the code and had it up for adoption at the 1966 NFPA convention so rapidly that it was up for vote before opposition to it was adequately organized. There was a determined last minute effort at the convention to kill it but it passed and became a national code. The Fire Club, which consists of the many organizations and businesses that benefit from fire, decided they would not allow reliable fire detection systems within homes. So, in time, fire tests were rigged and falsified to prove that the most reliable fire detector (heat detector) for saving lives 16

would be prohibited for sale in homes. The heat detector was the trigger for the sprinkler system so it had been proven to be near 100 percent reliable for warning of the most deadly type fire, the flaming fire. So, to remove the heat detector from the home fire detection system code, fire tests were deliberately rigged to prove the device would not operate until the smoke killed the occupants. During the Dunes Tests of the 1970s, out of 76 fire tests, every test but one was deliberately rigged to prove the heat detector was defective. There was only one test where a heat detector actually was installed in the fire room during a test where the temperature at the ceiling went above 200 degrees F. within ten minutes of ignition. What the corrupt researchers actually proved is that if you remove the heat detector from the fire room before you conduct a realistic fire test, no heat detector will operate. So, I ask, what type of engineering do we have in the fire game when tests are deliberately falsified to prevent life saving protection from being installed in homes? By rigging the fire tests to justify deleting the one really reliable fire detector from the code, the NFPA, UL and the manufacturers of a defective (so called) smoke detector manipulated that deadly device into at least 80 million homes. 3. SELLING PHONY SMOKE DETECTORS EQUATES TO MASS MURDER Within the last 5 years finally there have been actual fire testing of the ionization (so called smoke detector) device in an honest way and it has been proven conclusively to be defective and a killer. In fact, a court of law has determined the device to be defectively designed and a cause of fire deaths (see details of the legal decision on www.TheWorldFireSafetyFoundation.org). This same web site contains videos of fire tests that show fire test rooms filled with thick smoke and the firefighters wearing breathing apparatus wondering why the ionization devices will not detect the smoke. The marketing of these devices (based on performance lies and deliberately falsified fire tests) should clearly qualify as a criminal operation and therefore a felony. Deaths as a result of a felony can be classed as murder. I have calculated, based on available loss data, that about 75,000 fire deaths and more than 300,000 serious injuries have occurred in homes protected with the defective smoke detector. 4. A NEW AND EQUALLY DEADLY STRATEGY Over the past five years, finally the defective nature of the phony smoke detector has been proven to the degree that the cover-up is melting. The so called fire experts have finally been forced to admit the ionization device is killing people in homes. So, Club Fire has shifted gears and devised a way to continue to keep the burn rate and the fire death rates high. The new strategy is to wed the phony smoke detector with a real smoke detector, the photoelectric type. And, of course, the combination is intended to continue to substitute for the really reliable fire detector, the heat detector. The problem to those who want fire safety rather than fire profits is that the new strategy will be even more deadly than the old policy. Because the ionization device false alarms excessively the occupants will still be disabling the combination device. And, because the ionization device and the true smoke detector are not reliable for warning of the most dangerous fire type, the flaming fire, kids will continue to burn by the hundreds. BASIC TRUTH OF FIRE TECHNOLOGY NO. 10 THE FORCED SELLING OF PHONY SMOKE DETECTORS INTO 80 TO 90 MILLION U.S. HOMES HAS BEEN AMERICAS DEADLIEST FRAUD TO DATE. PART J- CODE CORRUPTION HAS BEEN PROLONGED AND DEADLY As reported above, a fire sprinkler system, when electronically monitored by a central station has produced a 99.87 reliability of fire control and a record of near zero fire deaths. And, I have 17

designed protective systems with up to a 90 percent cost reduction vs. the NFPA design. These hydraulically engineered systems using non corrosive pipe and calculated to deliver a stronger density over the early fire are more reliable the cook book systems of NFPA. But the NFPA and powerful organizations that profit from fire were determined to prevent the marketing of affordable sprinklers for homes. By denying affordable protective sprinkler system to protect lives in homes, beginning as far back as 1896, the NFPA has caused many thousands of fire deaths that should have been prevented. This wanton disregard for human life became apparent again when back in 1976 we created a new standard for fire detection systems in homes, NFPA 74. We created it and pushed it through to adoption before those opposed it got their act together. But, in time fire tests were rigged to prove a phony smoke detector was the desired detector and the fire detector that had been proven as reliable for more than a hundred years was cast out. Aside from the corruption relative the fire sprinkler system, the rigging of the fire tests and the corrupting of the fire detection system code resulted in an estimated 75,000 fire deaths. Is there any level of corruption that is worse putting phony smoke detectors to protect the children? As I will mention later, there were other codes and other protective systems that have been corrupted as well. The corruption was wide spread and the results were very deadly. The media and the public have had no problem understanding that those within a police department can be corrupted. Almost every day some segment of the media is accusing members of the U.S. Congress and even the president of being dishonest, or at least incompetent. While I am not one to dispute corruption elsewhere, but there seems to an invisible barrier that prevents any questioning of the competence and/or the integrity of those who create and enforce the fire codes. Laws created by Congress can be challenged. But it appears that the fire codes and the fire regulatory policies are sacrosanct. The reality is that that engineers, scientists and highly educated scholars are not what the fire services are made of. During 50 years of fire engineering I have met and talked to many thousands of fire department officials. The number of those who actually knew anything at all about fire detectors (except for the lies put out by the manufacturers and the disinformation emanating from the NFPA) could be counted on the fingers of two hands. Ask almost any local fire official about smoke detectors and you are fed the story line created and promoted by those who make and sell them. The truth is that the ionization device that is now installed in at least 80 million U.S. homes is an abomination and a killer of children. The smoke detector fraud no doubt is the deadliest fraud ever pulled off within the United States. During 1978 the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) tested the device in real homes with real fires and discovered they were defective to the point where a failure rate of 50 to 80 percent was predicted. Then they buried the report. Then, from the top down, for all of the following years, the IAFC high level officials have disseminated performance lies about the device to help sell it to unsuspecting consumers. And, when the deaths occur because a brand new so called smoke detector with fresh battery has failed to warn, the cover-up operation goes into high gear. The parents of the children who died are blamed because the standard explanation is, the battery was dead or missing. It is the blame it on the victim methodology. BASIC TRUTH OF FIRE TECHNOLOGY NO. 11 THE AMERICAN FIRE CODES AND REGULATORY POLICIES WERE DEVELOPED AND SET IN STONE DURING A PERIOD EXCEEDING ONE HUNDRED YEARS. THEREFORE, CORRECTIONS WILL NOT BE EASY. PART K- WHY ITS MURDER 18

1. WHERE PROTECTION DENIAL EQUATED TO MASS MURDER There were building types that remained devoid of sprinkler protection that so justified protection that: criminal acts that barred protection should be classed as murder. The installation of proper sprinkler protection within buildings where large numbers of people gathered, such as restaurants, night clubs, dance halls, theatres, assembly halls and similar places of assembly was essential. It was equally corrupt to deny practical protection to places where large numbers of people slept such as motels, hotels, hospitals, nursing homes, dormitories and apartments. It also represented an extreme disregard for human life to prevent affordable protection for buildings where a fire could readily block the exits and prevent escape. The high rise building is a perfect example. Almost without exception, stairways within high rise buildings become smoke filled. When a stairway door is opened on an upper floor at the same time as a door is opened on the fire floor, a powerful updraft that will suck the smoke into the stairwell. In contrast, because the elevator car blocks the opening when that elevator is at the fire floor, elevator shafts can be maintained smoke free during a fire. But the fire officials cut a deal with the elevator companies to prevent them from being used as exit systems during a fire. Elevator controls are set to automatically drop all elevators to the ground floor the moment a fire alarm occurs. The elevator industry wanted to avoid any legal liability during a fire so the industry told the fire chiefs that all elevators could be turned over to the firefighters during a fire. The IAFC liked the idea. There is only one little problem with that elevator solution. It is the stairways nearly always become untenable and are very dangerous and slow exit system. And, of course, the elevators are no longer available for exiting the building. The elevator industry avoided any responsibility to make the elevators safe for exiting during a fire. The fire officials got sole use of the elevators. And the occupants above the fire got shafted. One of the prime examples of those trapped above the fire being unable to escape was the destruction of the World Trade Center buildings in New York City. Those trapped above the fire floors went down only when the buildings did too. 5. EXAMPLES OF WHAT SHOULD BE CLASSED AS MASS MURDER By the 1890s the ability of sprinklers to control an early fire was already well established. Its ability to virtually eliminate serious fires was so well proven that the insurers created a code making organization (NFPA) to prevent further development of the sprinkler technology and to deny it to nearly all buildings. The insurers would not have blocked the development of sprinklers if they were not abundantly aware of its ability to virtually eliminate serious fires. If the fire is controlled when small people do not die. So, it seems to me that one must be a psychopath, or a first cousin thereof, to deliberately block the use of sprinklers to protect lives. Note the way that technology has routinely advanced in this country as illustrated by aircraft, automobiles, computers, electronics, plastics, and virtually all the sciences. Yet, from 1896 until well into the 1960s there was close to zero advancement in sprinkler design. And, when I developed advanced sprinkler systems the fire establishment worked overtime to suppress the better technology. The lack of advancement in fire safety was no accident; it was planned and executed with utmost determination. To deny proper protection to the public: field fire tests were falsified, performance claims were lies, laboratory fire tests were rigged to provide the desired data, the true causes of fire deaths were covered up, honest test reports were buried, phony smoke detectors were sold into at least 80 million homes and many grew wealthy as the children burned. These dishonest acts were felonies. Felonies that result in loss of life are murder. It is a certainty that if the corruption within the fire field had not become the norm, fire science advancements would have evolved, just as improvements evolved in all other areas of commerce. 19

The preventing of solutions to fire was the result of criminal activity by the regulators, especially including the NFPA and UL. That is why I say the deaths listed below were in reality murders. These fires and many, many more are the legacy of the NFPA, Underwriters Laboratories and all others who cooperated with the crimes to profit from or benefit from the fire losses: 1940, Rhythm Club, Natchez, MS.-207 dead; 1929, Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland, OH-125 dead; 1949, St. Anthony Hospital, Ellingham, IL-74 dead; 1950, Mercy Hospital, Davenport, IA-41 dead; 1942, 1946, Winecoff Hotel, Atlanta, GA- 119 dead; 1957, Katie Jane Nursing Home, Warrenton, MO-72 dead; 1963, Golden Age Nursing home, Fitchville Township, OH- 63 dead; 1930, Ohio State Penitentiary, Columbus, OH- 320 dead; 1942, Cocoanut Grove night club, Boston, MA-492 dead; 1908, Lakeview Grammar school, Collinwood, OH-175 dead; 1923, Cleveland School, Beulah, SC-77 dead; 1937, 1958, Our Lady of Angels School, Chicago, IL-95 dead; 1963, Rhodes Opera House, Boyertown, PA-170 dead; 1977, Beverly Hills Supper Club, Southgate, KY-162 dead; 1986, Columbus, OH, Harmer House Nursing Home-28 dead; Dupont Plaza Hotel, San Juan, Puerto Rico-98 dead; MGM Grand Hotel, Las Vegas, NV-85 dead. BASIC TRUTH OF FIRE TECHNOLOGY NO. 12 THE DELIBERATE DENIAL OF FIRE SAFETY TO BUSINESSES AND TO THE PUBLIC MEETS THE LEGALLY DEFINED CRITERIA FOR MURDER.

PART L-THE SOLUTION

1. Reveal the Dishonesty: The first necessary step toward eliminating fire deaths is to realize the fire codes and the regulatory system are founded on a hundred years of profit making. There must be exposure of the dishonesty so that the correct solutions can be brought forth. The current exposures relative the phony smoke detector is a start. 2. Provide The Truth to the Public Via The Internet: There is a beginning. The World Fire Safety Foundation and the Fire Crusade have created web sites that clearly warn the public relative the dangers of the ionization device. But, there are many other problems with the fire codes and the regulatory systems that need to be improved. 3. Create a Coalition of Fire Victims: The regulatory system has been able to cover-up the corruption within and shift the blame for the fires and fire deaths to others. There is a need for those who have lost loved ones to fire to first learn why the deaths are occurring. Then those who have been betrayed and suffered must cooperate to reveal the problems and demand corrections. 4. Recognize Available Water Sprinklers For Homes: The recognition of available water sprinkler systems is essential. If there is enough water to take a shower there is adequate water for a sprinkler system to contain the fire (if not fully extinguishing it). This will allow safe exiting and prevent major fire losses. The California Residential Sprinkler Code created by the State Fire Marshal of California and Richard Patton should be reborn. 5. Create an Independent (not NFPA) Life Safety System Code: Patton researched, developed, codified and gained national certifications for a modernized fire sprinkler system (LSS). Many were installed at enormous savings. However, extreme pressure and illegal activities by those who opposed affordable sprinklers finally destroyed Pattons business (three times). But, the savings and the protection validity were proven in many ways. Nearly all Life at Risk type properties can be protected with 50 to 80 gpm, low cost pumps if necessary. Economical plastic 20

and copper pipe have temperature ratings equal to or greater than steel (with mechanical joints). The corruption and criminal actions that have destroyed the marketing of better protection at lower costs must be defeated. 6. Do Not Pay 10 Times Too High For a UL Label: Where a pump is needed to increase the pressure of a LSS, it should be a high quality commercial centrifugal pump which will be far more reliable than the enormously large and too complex UL official fire pumps. 7. Correct The Long Promoted Fire Safety Lies: for more than 100 years those who profited from fire created truths about fire safety that became accepted knowledge within the fire establishment. As Hitler said, Tell a lie often enough, it becomes the truth. Some of the commonly accepted lies are discussed in the report above. There needs to be an honest and intelligent fire organization that will gradually replace the lies with the truths. 8. A Recall of the Ionization Device is Essential: To gain a maximum share of the market for fire detectors in a home the manufacturers advertised false performance claims in the NFPA Fire Journal and elsewhere for 12 years. Further, the manufacturers cooperated in the falsification of fire tests at Underwriters Laboratories and the falsification of field tests. These were criminal activities that caused thousands of fire deaths. It is extremely unlikely that the people will remove the phony smoke detectors and replace them with honest ones so long as the phony ones are allowed to remain. Government must demand a recall and a replacement with honest detectors. 9. Recognize the Marketing, Installing and Certifying of a Deadly Device as a Crime: Because the ionization type detector false alarms so often the occupants of a home frequently disable it. Then when a fire occurs there is no warning. Hence false alarms kill. Therefore, when batteries are removed due to false alarming, the manufacturers, the installers and those who approved the device must all be held accountable. Recognize the ionization type (phony) smoke detector as an endangerment to life in homes and elsewhere. Deaths due to smoke detector failures must be classed as homicides because the marketing, advertising and certifying were all of a criminal nature. 10. Within the Building Protection is Essential: The Federal Government played an important role in deceiving the public and in selling phony smoke detectors into at least 80 million homes. Therefore, government must play a role in correcting many years of defrauding and endangering the public. Tax breaks and promotional programs are necessary to encourage all new homes to be sprinkler protected during the construction stage (with available water systems) and for all existing homes to be protected with a complete and reliable fire warning system. 11. Reduce The Tax Valuation on a Building For Protection Installations: When a fire sprinkler system, a fire detection system or other fire safety system is installed in a home or business the probability that the public fire department will be needed is reduced. But, by adding a safety system to the property the assessed value of the property is increased. Therefore the property tax is increased. That is wrong. The price paid for a protective system should be multiplied by three and that is the amount that the assessed value of the property should be reduced. 12. Install Small User Friendly Fire Hose and Fog Nozzle in All buildings: A high percentage of fires are discovered early. But they are not extinguished promptly because the fire control equipment is non- existent or inadequate. One gallon or more of water delivered by a fog nozzle will control nearly all fires if discovered early. Fire extinguishers are not nearly as effective as a fog nozzle and most people do not know how to operate extinguishers. Every building should be equipped with proper sized hose and fog nozzle. 21

13. Fire Department Personnel Should hold classes in Fire Control: Rather than promoting the wrong type of fire control devices for early fire control the fire departments should conduct training sessions in the use of small hose with fog nozzle. 14. A Special Type of Fire Hose in the Home is Desirable: Assume a small hose and spray nozzle is installed in the laundry room of a home and the home contains an honest and reliable fire detection system. The probability of the fire being killed before it becomes a danger is therefore very high. However, some fires can be deep seated smoldering fires. Because of the surface tension of normal water, the spray may not penetrate to extinguish the deep seated fire. However, it would be an easy addition to the hose connection to include a jar containing an additive to reduce the surface tension. The water would then penetrate and suppress the deep seated fire. 15. Housing Complex Fire Solution: Developers of large tracts of housing should create a master plan protection system. This will include monitored sprinkler or fire detection systems with a signal going to a volunteer fire department within the complex. One or more small fire trucks (Jeep size) should be available containing a small (booster) hose line and a water tank for fast response. This would be homeowners protecting themselves. Tax credits are necessary as this will reduce the need for some public fire stations. 16. Professional Engineering is Needed: The codes created by the NFPA with the help of the businesses that profit from fire have prevented real engineering and innovation. Fire fighters are usually high school graduates at most. The fire department leadership almost always comes up through the ranks. The fire departments are well staffed for firefighting duties. However, there is a need for professional engineering, building construction expertise and innovation. Unfortunately, nearly all the fire protection engineers within the Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) are fearful of deviating from the codes to apply real engineering solutions. Therefore, I suggest the mechanical (including hydraulics) and electrical engineering societies organize code making teams to create performance oriented protection codes that will allow real engineering to be applied to the fire problems. 17. Proper Flame Spread Ratings are Essential: For more than 60 years that I know of the flame spread and fire resistance ratings of UL have been a problem. One of my earliest campaigns against the status quo involved the marketing of many millions of square feet of highly combustible ceiling boards to the do-it-yourself home owner. This sheathing burned like cardboard, created a flashover condition almost instantaneously, and killed people beyond counting. Both UL and the NFPA had ignored this problem until I exposed it. The 25 foot long tunnel test at UL does not begin to predict how a material will actually burn within large areas. Note the flashover condition at the MGM Grand Hotel when the fire spread along the ceiling so rapidly it actually chased the fire fighters out of the casino. They regrouped and finally gained control, thus saving the lives of 5000 people trapped above the fire. The Station nightclub fire is another example of the public purchasing dangerous materials while being completely unaware of the danger. The owners of that nightclub that innocently purchased the dangerous sheathing were convicted of crimes, but the certifiers and the fire inspectors who should have known of the danger were never punished. 18. Fire Resistance Ratings must be Made Honest: In theory, every apartment in an apartment house and every room in a hospital, nursing home, motel or hotel is a code complying-fire rated enclosure. The building codes say the ability of any one compartment to contain a fire (prevent spread to another room) will be a half hour (sometimes one hour). The building codes rely on the UL testing of fire resistance of walls, floor and ceiling systems, fire doors, etc. Yet, almost every week a fire occurs within one unit of a multi unit fire rated complex, and the fire has spread to two or more apartments (or rooms) even before the first fire truck has arrived. 22

Often a large building is mostly or completely destroyed due to rapid fire spread in buildings where, by code, fire would be limited to one unit. Phony fire ratings have cost many thousands of lives and must be corrected. 19. High Rise Buildings Need Reliable Elevator Exits: I consider the deal made between the fire officials and the elevator industry to be one of the worst betrayals of the public by the fire services. Stairways in high rises nearly always become blocked with smoke. When a door is opened at the fire floor and also above (normal condition when there is a fire) the stack effect of a tall stairway is sure to rapidly suck smoke into the stairway. Those above the fire will become trapped. However, elevators could be made fire safe and smoke free during a fire. Automatic blowers at the roof could pressurize the shafts. When the elevator doors are opened the car blocks the opening, thus the pressurization would work for an elevator shaft. Theoretically, the elevator shafts are already fireproof enclosures Thus, it is quite feasible to keep the elevator shafts smoke free. The elevator industry wanted to escape any liability during a high rise fire so they proposed to the fire chiefs that all elevators be automatically dropped to the ground floor when a fire alarm sounds. The chiefs would get sole control of the elevators; the elevator industry would not have to design fire safe elevator controls and would avoid any liability as well. But the occupants of the high rise located above the fire floor will likely become trapped and killed when a fire occurs. Note the people who were trapped and died during the World Trade Center disaster. Did they mainly die because the fire chiefs cut a convenient deal with the elevator industry? 20. An End to the Corruption is Necessary: There are many additional improvements to fire protection that could be recommended here. A hundred years of corrupting fire codes by the NFPA, UL and the fire insurance industry has produced lots of room for improvement. And the many decades of deal making between UL and its clients (the businesses that profit from fire and pay for the UL testing) will not be corrected overnight. But what is important now is for the problems to become recognized and for the media and the public to become better informed. The corrective process will take time but solutions will not evolve until the process begins. EVIL WINS WHEN GOOD PEOPLE DO NOTHING.

www.TheWorldFireSafetyFoundation.org www.Firecrusade.com www.Americasholocaust.org

RICHARD M. PATTON, FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEER AUTHOR, THE AMERICAN HOME IS A FIRE TRAP President of: THE CRUSADE AGAINST FIRE DEATHS, INC. POST OFFICE BOX 196 CITRUS HEIGHTS, CA 95611 PHONE 916 721 7700 rmpatton@surewest.net

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