Weapons of Mass Destruction

Weapons of mass destruction
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Contents
Articles
Overview
Weapon of mass destruction 1 1 13 13 25 53 67 72 72 95 103 127 127 129 130 132 137 142 145 147 156 168 178 182 199 223 243 247 249 253 271
Types
Biological warfare Chemical warfare Nuclear weapon Radiological weapon
Proliferation
Nuclear proliferation Chemical weapon proliferation List of missiles by country
Countries
Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Brazil Bulgaria Burma Canada China France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Netherlands North Korea Pakistan
Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa Syria Taiwan Ukraine United Kingdom United States
293 295 298 304 309 316 324 327 331 337 347 347
Treaties
List of weapons of mass destruction treaties
References
Article Sources and Contributors Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors 351 357
Article Licenses
License 360
Overview
Weapon of mass destruction
By type

Biological Chemical Nuclear Radiological By country
Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Brazil Bulgaria Burma Canada PRC France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Mexico Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea

2
Sweden Syria ROC (Taiwan) Ukraine United Kingdom United States Proliferation

Chemical Nuclear Missiles Treaties
List of treaties Book Category
A weapon of mass destruction (WMD) is a weapon that can kill and bring significant harm to a large number of humans (and other life forms) and/or cause great damage to man-made structures (e.g. buildings), natural structures (e.g. mountains), or the biosphere in general. The scope and application of the term has evolved and been disputed, often signifying more politically than technically. Coined in reference to aerial bombing with chemical explosives, it has come to distinguish large-scale weaponry of other technologies, such as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear. This differentiates the term from more technical ones such as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (CBRN).
Early uses of the term weapon of mass destruction

The first use of the term "weapon of mass destruction" on record is by Cosmo Gordon Lang, Archbishop of Canterbury, in 1937 in reference to the aerial bombardment of Guernica, Spain: Who can think at this present time without a sickening of the heart of the appalling slaughter, the suffering, the manifold misery brought by war to Spain and to China? Who can think without horror of what another widespread war would mean, waged as it would be with all the new weapons of mass destruction?[1] At the time, the United States (with help from Western Allies) had yet to develop and use nuclear weapons. Japan conducted research on biological weapons (see Unit 731),[2] and chemical weapons had seen wide use, most notably in World War I. Following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and progressing through the Cold War, the term came to refer more to non-conventional weapons. The application of the term to specifically nuclear and radiological weapons is traced by William Safire to the Russian phrase " " oruzhiye massovovo porazheniya (weapons of mass destruction). He credits James Goodby (of the Brookings Institution) with tracing what he considers the earliest known English-language use soon after the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (although it is not quite verbatim): a communique from a 15 November 1945, meeting of Harry Truman, Clement Attlee and Mackenzie King (probably drafted by Vannevar Bush or so Bush claimed in 1970) referred to "weapons adaptable to mass destruction". That exact phrase, says Safire, was also used by Bernard Baruch in 1946 (in a speech at the United Nations probably written by Herbert Bayard Swope).[3] The same phrase found its way into the very first resolution adopted by the United Nations General assembly in January 1946 in London, which used the wording "...the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other weapons adaptable to mass destruction."[4] This resolution also created the Atomic Energy Commission (predecessor of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)).
Weapon of mass destruction An exact use of this term was given in a lecture "Atomic Energy as an Atomic Problem" by J. Robert Oppenheimer. The lecture was delivered to the Foreign Service and the State Department, on 17 September 1947. The lecture is reprinted in The Open Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955). "It is a very far reaching control which would eliminate the rivalry between nations in this field, which would prevent the surreptitious arming of one nation against another, which would provide some cushion of time before atomic attack, and presumably therefore before any attack with weapons of mass destruction, and which would go a long way toward removing atomic energy at least as a source of conflict between the powers". The term was also used in the introduction to the hugely influential US Government Document known as NSC-68 written in April 1950.[5] During a televised presentation about the Cuban Missile Crisis on 22 October 1962, John F. Kennedy made reference to "offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction.[6] " An early use of the exact phrase in an international treaty was in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, however no definition was provided.
Evolution of its use

During the Cold War, the term "weapons of mass destruction" was primarily a reference to nuclear weapons. At the time, in the West the euphemism "strategic weapons" was used to refer to the American nuclear arsenal, which was presented as a necessary deterrent against nuclear or conventional attack from the Soviet Union (see Mutual Assured Destruction). The term "weapons of mass destruction" continued to see periodic use throughout this time, usually in the context of nuclear arms control; Ronald Reagan used it during the 1986 Reykjavk Summit, when referring to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.[7] Reagan's successor, George H.W. Bush, used the term in an 1989 speech to the United Nations, using it primarily in reference to chemical arms.[8] The end of the Cold War reduced U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, causing it to shift its focus to disarmament. This period coincided with an increasing threat to U.S. interests from Islamic nations and independent Islamic groups. With the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and 1991 Gulf War, Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs became a particular concern of the first Bush Administration.[9] Following the war, Bill Clinton and other western politicians and media continued to use the term, usually in reference to ongoing attempts to dismantle Iraq's weapons programs.[citation needed] After the 11 September 2001 attacks and the 2001 anthrax attacks, an increased fear of non-conventional weapons and asymmetrical warfare took hold of the United States and other Western powers. This fear reached a crescendo with the 2002 Iraq disarmament crisis and the alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that became the primary justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. However, no WMD were found in Iraq.[a] Because of its prolific use during this period, the American Dialect Society voted "weapons of mass destruction" (and its abbreviation, "WMD") the word of the year in 2002,[10] and in 2003 Lake Superior State University added WMD to its list of terms banished for "Mis-use, Over-use and General Uselessness".[11]
Definitions of the term

United States
Strategic The most widely used definition of "weapons of mass destruction" is that of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (NBC) although there is no treaty or customary international law that contains an authoritative definition. Instead, international law has been used with respect to the specific categories of weapons within WMD, and not to WMD as a whole. The abbreviations NBC (for nuclear, biological and chemical) or CBR (chemical, biological, radiological) are used with regards to battlefield protection systems for armored vehicles, because all three involve insidious toxins that can be carried through the air and can be protected against with vehicle air filtration systems. However, there is an argument that nuclear and biological weapons do not belong in the same category as chemical and "dirty bomb" radiological weapons, which have limited destructive potential (and close to none, as far as property is concerned), whereas nuclear and biological weapons have the unique ability to kill large numbers of people with very small amounts of material, and thus could be said to belong in a class by themselves. The NBC definition has also been used in official U.S. documents, by the U.S. President,[12][13] the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,[14] the U.S. Department of Defense,[15][16] and the U.S. Government Accountability Office.[17] Other documents expand the definition of WMD to also include radiological or conventional weapons. The U.S. military refers to WMD as: Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties and exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. Also called WMD.[18] The significance of the words separable and divisible part of the weapon is that missiles such as the Pershing II and the SCUD are considered weapons of mass destruction, while aircraft capable of carrying bombloads are not. In 2004, the United Kingdom's Butler Review recognized the "considerable and long-standing academic debate about the proper interpretation of the phrase weapons of mass destruction". The committee set out to avoid the general term but when using it, employed the definition of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, which defined the systems which Iraq was required to abandon: "Nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any sub-systems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities relating to [nuclear weapons]. Chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research,development,support and manufacturing facilities. Ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities."[19] Chemical weapons expert Gert G. Harigel considers only nuclear weapons true weapons of mass destruction, because "only nuclear weapons are completely indiscriminate by their explosive power, heat radiation and radioactivity, and only they should therefore be called a weapon of mass destruction". He prefers to call chemical and biological weapons "weapons of terror" when aimed against civilians and "weapons of intimidation" for soldiers. Testimony of one such soldier expresses the same viewpoint.[20] For a period of several months in the winter of 20022003, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz frequently used the term "weapons of mass terror," apparently also recognizing the distinction between the psychological and the physical effects of many things currently falling into the WMD category. Gustavo Bell Lemus, the Vice President of Colombia, at the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, quoted the Millennium Report of the UN Secretary-General to
Weapon of mass destruction the General Assembly, in which Kofi Annan said that small arms could be described as WMD because the fatalities they cause "dwarf that of all other weapons systems and in most years greatly exceed the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki".[21] An additional condition often implicitly applied to WMD is that the use of the weapons must be strategic. In other words, they would be designed to "have consequences far outweighing the size and effectiveness of the weapons themselves".[22] The strategic nature of WMD also defines their function in the military doctrine of total war as targeting the means a country would use to support and supply its war effort, specifically its population, industry, and natural resources. Within U.S. civil defense organizations, the category is now Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE), which defines WMD as: (1) Any explosive, incendiary, poison gas, bomb, grenade, or rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces [113 g], missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce [7 g], or mine or device similar to the above. (2) Poison gas. (3) Any weapon involving a disease organism. (4) Any weapon that is designed to release radiation at a level dangerous to human life.[citation needed] Military For the general purposes of national defense,[23] US Code[24] defines a weapon of mass destruction as: any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of: toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors a disease organism radiation or radioactivity[25] For the purposes of the prevention of weapons proliferation,[26] US Code defines weapons of mass destruction as "chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and chemical, biological, and nuclear materials used in the manufacture of such weapons."[27] Criminal (Civilian) For the purposes of US Criminal law concerning terrorism,[28] weapons of mass destruction are defined as: any destructive device defined as any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, mine, or device similar to any of the devices described in the preceding clauses[29] any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors any weapon involving a biological agent, toxin, or vector any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life[30] The Federal Bureau of Investigation's definition is similar to that presented above from the terrorism statute:[31] any explosive or incendiary device, as defined in Title 18 USC, Section 921: bomb, grenade, rocket, missile, mine, or other device with a charge of more than four ounces any weapon designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors any weapon involving a disease organism any weapon designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life any device or weapon designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury by causing a malfunction of or destruction of an aircraft or other vehicle that carries humans or of an aircraft or other vehicle whose malfunction or destruction may cause said aircraft or other vehicle to cause death or serious bodily injury to humans who may
Weapon of mass destruction be within range of the vector in its course of travel or the travel of its debris. Indictments and convictions for possession and use of WMD such as truck bombs,[32] pipe bombs,[33] shoe bombs,[34] cactus needles coated with botulin toxin,[35] etc. have been obtained under 18 USC 2332a. The Washington Post reported on 30 March 2006: "Jurors asked the judge in the death penalty trial of Zacarias Moussaoui today to define the term 'weapons of mass destruction' and were told it includes airplanes used as missiles". Moussaoui was indicted and tried for the use of airplanes as WMD.
Treaties
The development and use of WMD is governed by international conventions and treaties, although not all countries have signed and ratified them: Partial Test Ban Treaty Outer Space Treaty Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Seabed Arms Control Treaty Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT, has not entered into force as of 2012) Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
WMD use, possession and access

Nuclear weapons
The only country to have used a nuclear weapon in war is the United States, which dropped two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II. There are eight countries that have declared they possess nuclear weapons and are known to have tested a nuclear weapon, only five of which are members of the NPT. The eight are China, France, India, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Israel is considered by most analysts to have nuclear weapons numbering in the low hundreds as well, but maintains an official policy of nuclear ambiguity, neither denying nor confirming its nuclear status.
U.S. nuclear warheads, 19452002
Iran is suspected by western countries of seeking nuclear weapons, a claim that it denies. While the truth is unknown, the November 2007 NIE on Iran stated that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003.[36] South Africa developed a small nuclear arsenal in the 1980s but disassembled them in the early 1990s, making it the only country to have fully given up an independently developed nuclear weapons arsenal. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine inherited stockpiles of nuclear arms following the break-up of the Soviet Union, but relinquished them to the Russian Federation. Countries with access to nuclear weapons through nuclear sharing agreements include Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. North Korea has claimed to have developed and tested nuclear devices. Although outside sources have been unable to unequivocally support the state's claims, North Korea has officially been identified to have nuclear weapons.
United States politics

Due to the indiscriminate impact of WMD, the fear of a WMD attack has shaped political policies and campaigns, fostered social movements, and has been the central theme of many films. Support for different levels of WMD development and control varies nationally and internationally. Yet understanding of the nature of the threats is not high, in part because of imprecise usage of the term by politicians and the media. Fear of WMD, or of threats diminished by the possession of WMD, has long been used to catalyze public support for various WMD policies. They include mobilization of pro- and anti-WMD campaigners alike, and generation of popular political support. The term WMD may be used as a powerful buzzword[37] or to generate a culture of fear.[38] It is also used ambiguously, particularly by not distinguishing among the different types of WMD.[39] A television commercial called Daisy, promoting Democrat Lyndon Johnson's 1964 presidential candidacy, invoked the fear of a nuclear war and was an element in Johnson's subsequent election. More recently, the threat of potential WMD in Iraq was used by President George W. Bush to generate public support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq.[40][41] Broad reference to Iraqi WMD in general was seen as an element of President Bush's arguments.[39] As Paul Wolfowitz explained: "For bureaucratic reasons, we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on."[42] To date, however, Coalition forces have found mainly degraded artillery shells. There was almost no dissent on the issue. Molly Ivins wrote: "The ONLY (source) to report skeptically on the administration's claims about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction before the war? Knight-Ridder and its terrific reporters Warren Strobel and Jonathan Landay."[43] On 21 June 2006, then-United States Republican Senator Rick Santorum claimed "We have found weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, chemical weapons." According to the Washington Post, he was referring to 500 such shells "that had been buried near the Iranian border, and then long forgotten, by Iraqi troops during their eight-year war with Iran, which ended in 1988." That night, "intelligence officials reaffirmed that the shells were old and were not the suspected weapons of mass destruction sought in Iraq after the 2003 invasion of Iraq." The shells had been uncovered and reported on in 2004.[44] In 2004, Polish troops found nineteen 1980s-era rocket warheads, thwarting an attempt by militants to buy them at $5000 each. Some of the rockets contained extremely deteriorated nerve agent.[45]
Media coverage of WMD

In 2004, the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) released a report[46] examining the medias coverage of WMD issues during three separate periods: nuclear weapons tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998; the US announcement of evidence of a North Korean nuclear weapons program in October 2002; and revelations about Iran's nuclear program in May 2003. The CISSM report notes that poor coverage resulted less from political bias among the media than from tired journalistic conventions. The reports major findings were that: 1. Most media outlets represented WMD as a monolithic menace, failing to adequately distinguish between weapons programs and actual weapons or to address the real differences among chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons. 2. Most journalists accepted the Bush administrations formulation of the War on Terror as a campaign against WMD, in contrast to coverage during the Clinton era, when many journalists made careful distinctions between acts of terrorism and the acquisition and use of WMD. 3. Many stories stenographically reported the incumbent administrations perspective on WMD, giving too little critical examination of the way officials framed the events, issues, threats, and policy options. 4. Too few stories proffered alternative perspectives to official line, a problem exacerbated by the journalistic prioritizing of breaking-news stories and the inverted pyramid style of storytelling.
Weapon of mass destruction In a separate study published in 2005,[47] a group of researchers assessed the effects reports and retractions in the media had on peoples memory regarding the search for WMD in Iraq during the 2003 Iraq War. The study focused on populations in two coalition countries (Australia and USA) and one opposed to the war (Germany). Results showed that US citizens generally did not correct initial misconceptions regarding WMD, even following disconfirmation; Australian and German citizens were more responsive to retractions. Dependence on the initial source of information led to a substantial minority of Americans exhibiting false memory that WMD were indeed discovered, while they were not. This led to three conclusions: 1. The repetition of tentative news stories, even if they are subsequently disconfirmed, can assist in the creation of false memories in a substantial proportion of people. 2. Once information is published, its subsequent correction does not alter people's beliefs unless they are suspicious about the motives underlying the events the news stories are about. 3. When people ignore corrections, they do so irrespective of how certain they are that the corrections occurred. A poll conducted between June and September 2003 asked people whether they thought evidence of WMD had been discovered in Iraq since the war ended. They were also asked which media sources they relied upon. Those who obtained their news primarily from Fox News were three times as likely to believe that evidence of WMD had been discovered in Iraq than those who relied on PBS and NPR for their news, and one third more likely than those who primarily watched CBS.
Media source Respondents believing evidence of WMD had been found in Iraq Fox CBS NBC CNN ABC Print media PBSNPR 33% 23% 20% 20% 19% 17% 11%
Based on a series of polls taken from JuneSeptember 2003.[48] In 2006 Fox News reported the claims of two Republican lawmakers that WMDs had been found in Iraq,[49] based upon unclassified portions of a report by the National Ground Intelligence Center. Quoting from the report Senator Rick Santorum said "Since 2003, coalition forces have recovered approximately 500 weapons munitions which contain degraded mustard or sarin nerve agent". According to David Kay, who appeared before the US House Armed Services Committee to discuss these badly corroded munitions, they were leftovers, many years old, improperly stored or destroyed by the Iraqis.[50] Charles Duelfer agreed, stating on NPR's Talk of the Nation: "When I was running the ISG the Iraq Survey Group we had a couple of them that had been turned in to these IEDs, the improvised explosive devices. But they are local hazards. They are not a major, you know, weapon of mass destruction."[51] Later, wikileaks would show that these kind of WMDs continued to be found as the Iraqi occupation continued.[52] Many news agencies, including Fox News, reported the conclusions of the CIA that, based upon the investigation of the Iraq Survey Group, WMDs are yet to be found in Iraq.[53][54]
Public perceptions of WMD

Awareness and opinions of WMD have varied during the course of their history. Their threat is a source of unease, security, and pride to different people. The anti-WMD movement is embodied most in nuclear disarmament, and led to the formation of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in 1957. In order to increase awareness of all kinds of WMD, in 2004 the nuclear physicist and Nobel Peace Prize winner Joseph Rotblat inspired the creation of The WMD Awareness Programme[55] to provide trustworthy and up to date information on WMD world wide. In 1998 University of New Mexico's Institute for Public Policy released their third report[56] on US perceptions including the general public, politicians and scientists of nuclear weapons since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Risks of nuclear conflict, proliferation, and terrorism were seen as substantial. While maintenance of a nuclear US arsenal was considered above average in importance, there was widespread support for a reduction in the stockpile, and very little support for developing and testing new nuclear weapons. Also in 1998, but after the UNM survey was conducted, nuclear weapons became an issue in India's election of March,[57] in relation to political tensions with neighboring Pakistan. Prior to the election the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) announced it would declare India a nuclear weapon state after coming to power. BJP won the elections, and on 14 May, three days after India tested nuclear weapons for the second time, a public opinion poll reported that a majority of Indians favored the countrys nuclear build-up.[citation needed] On 15 April 2004, the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) reported[58] that US citizens showed high levels of concern regarding WMD, and that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons should be "a very important US foreign policy goal", accomplished through multilateral arms control rather than the use of military threats. A majority also believed the US should be more forthcoming with its biological research and its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commitment of nuclear arms reduction, and incorrectly thought the US was a party to various non-proliferation treaties. A Russian opinion poll conducted on 5 August 2005 indicated half the population believes new nuclear powers have the right to possess nuclear weapons.[59] 39% believes the Russian stockpile should be reduced, though not fully eliminated.
WMD in popular culture

Weapons of mass destruction and their related impacts have been a mainstay of popular culture since the beginning of the Cold War, as both political commentary and humorous outlet.
Common hazard symbols

Symbol Unicode Toxic symbol Image
Radioactive symbol
U+2620
U+2622
Biohazard symbol
U+2623
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Radioactive weaponry/hazard symbol

The international radioactivity symbol (also known as trefoil) first appeared in 1946, at the University of California, Berkeley Radiation Laboratory. At the time, it was rendered as magenta, and was set on a blue background.[] It is drawn with a central circle of radius R, the blades having an internal radius of 1.5R and an external radius of 5R, and separated from each other by 60.[60] It is meant to represent a radiating atom. The International Atomic Energy Agency found, however, that the symbol is unintuitive and can be variously interpreted by those uneducated in its meaning, and that its role as a hazard warning was compromised as it did not clearly indicate "danger" to many non-Westerners and children who encountered it. As a result of research, a new radiation hazard symbol was developed to be placed near the most dangerous parts of radiation sources featuring a skull, someone running away, and using the color red rather than yellow as the background.[61]
Biological weaponry/hazard symbol

Developed by Dow Chemical company in the 1960s for their containment products.[62] According to Charles Dullin, an environmental-health engineer who contributed to its development:[60] We wanted something that was memorable but meaningless, so we could educate people as to what it means.
Notes
1. Stockpiles of chemical munitions including sarin and mustard agents were found, but none were considered to be in a usable condition due to corrosion.
[63]
References
[1] "Archbishop's Appeal," Times (London), 28 December 1937, p. 9. [3] "Weapons of Mass Destruction", New York Times Magazine, 19 April 1998, p.22. Retrieved 24 February 2007. [6] Kennedy JF (1962-10-22). Televised remarks to the American people re "the Soviet military buildup on the island of Cuba" [12] (http:/ / nti. org/ f_wmd411/ f1a1_letter. html) [14] CIA Site RedirectCentral Intelligence Agency (http:/ / www. odci. gov/ cia/ reports/ 721_reports/ jan_jun2003. htm) [15] (http:/ / www. defenselink. mil/ pubs/ prolif97/ message. html) [16] (http:/ / www. defenselink. mil/ pubs/ ptr20010110. pdf) [19] Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (http:/ / archive. cabinetoffice. gov. uk/ butlerreview/ report/ index. asp) (HC 898), London: The Stationery Office, 2004, 14. [22] What makes a weapon one of mass destruction? Times Online (http:/ / www. timesonline. co. uk/ article/ 0,,7813-991589,00. html) [35] (http:/ / www. terrorisminfo. mipt. org/ pdf/ usvwiseandgrebe_99-40247. pdf) [36] (http:/ / www. dni. gov/ press_releases/ 20071203_release. pdf) [39] (https:/ / ssl. tnr. com/ p/ docsub. mhtml?i=20021007& s=easterbrook100702) [42] Qtd. in Associated Press, "Wolfowitz Comments Revive Doubts Over Iraq's WMD" (http:/ / www. usatoday. com/ news/ world/ iraq/ 2003-05-30-wolfowitz-iraq_x. htm), USA Today, 30 May 2003. Retrieved 8 May 2007. [43] "Newspaper Suicide" (http:/ / www. freepress. org/ columns/ display/ 1/ 2006/ 1338), The Free Press, 23 March 2006. Retrieved 21 November 2010. [46] (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20041022050812/ http:/ / www. cissm. umd. edu/ documents/ WMDstudy_full. pdf) by Prof. Susan Moeller [48] Misperceptions, the Media and the Iraq War (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20060210232719/ www. pipa. org/ OnlineReports/ Iraq/ IraqMedia_Oct03/ IraqMedia_Oct03_rpt. pdf), PIPA, 2 October 2003 [50] Kay, David. "House Armed Services Committee Hearing", 29 June 2006

[51] Duelfer, Charles. Expert: Iraq WMD Find Did Not Point to Ongoing Program (http:/ / www. npr. org/ templates/ story/ story. php?storyId=5504298) NPR. 22 June 2006 [55] wmdawareness.org.uk (http:/ / www. wmdawareness. org. uk/ ) [61] Linda Lodding, " Drop it and Run! New Symbol Warns of Radiation Dangers and Aims to Save Lives (http:/ / www. iaea. org/ Publications/ Magazines/ Bulletin/ Bull482/ pdfs/ 18RadSymbol. pdf)," IAEA Bulletin 482 (March 2007): 7072. [63] Munitions Found in Iraq Meet WMD Criteria (http:/ / www. military. com/ features/ 0,15240,103631,00. html?ESRC=coastgnews. RSS), Military.com, report filed by American Forces Press Service, 29 June 2006
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Bibliography
Chemical and Biological Weapons: Use in Warfare, Impact on Society and Environment (http://www. wagingpeace.org/articles/2001/11/00_harigel_cbw.htm), by Gert G. Harigel, 2001.
Further reading
Definition and origin
" WMD: Words of mass dissemination (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2744411.stm)" (12 February 2003), BBC News. Michael Evans, "What makes a weapon one of mass destruction?" (6 February 2004), The Times. Bruce Schneier, " Definition of 'Weapon of Mass Destruction' (https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/ 2009/04/definition_of_w.html)" (6 April 2009), Schneier on Security.
International law
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 David P. Fidler, " Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Law (http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh97. htm)" (February 2003), American Society of International Law. Joanne Mariner, " FindLaw Forum: Weapons of mass destruction and international law's principle that civilians cannot be targeted (http://edition.cnn.com/2001/LAW/11/columns/fl.mariner.civilians.war.11.20/)" (20 November 2001), CNN.
Media
Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction (http://web.archive.org/web/20060217212308/http:// www.cissm.umd.edu/documents/WMDstudy_full.pdf), by Susan D. Moeller, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 2004. Memory for fact, fiction, and misinformation (http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal. asp?ref=0956-7976), by Stephan Lewandowsky, Werner G.K. Stritzke, Klaus Oberauer, and Michael Morales, Psychological Science, 16(3): 190195, 2005.
Ethics
Jacob M. Appel, " Is All Fair in Biological Warfare? (http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/35/7/429)," Journal of Medical Ethics, June 2009.
Public perceptions
Steven Kull et al., Americans on WMD Proliferation (http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/WMDProliferation/ WMD_Prolif_Apr04/WMDProlif_Apr04_rpt.pdf) (15 April 2004), Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks survey.
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External links
New Video: A World Without Nuclear Weapons (http://www.ploughshares.org/moment/video?p=423) United Nations: Disarmament (http://web.archive.org/web/20050624041645/http://disarmament2.un.org/ wmd/) US Department of State (http://web.archive.org/web/20070313232904/http://www.state.gov/t/np/wmd/) Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) (http://www.nti.org/) Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) (http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/index.html) Federation of American Scientists (FAS) (http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/wmd.htm) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/) GlobalSecurity.org (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/) Avoiding Armageddon (http://www.pbs.org/avoidingarmageddon/), PBS FAS assessment of countries that own weapons of mass destruction (http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/wmd_state. htm) National Counterproliferation Center Office of the Director of National Intelligence (http://www.counterwmd. gov/) HLSWatch.com (http://www.hlswatch.com/): Homeland Security Watch policy and current events resource Office of the Special Assistant for Chemical Biological Defense and Chemical Demilitarization Programs (http:// www.acq.osd.mil/cp/), Official Department of Defense web site that provides information about the DoD Chemical Biological Defense Program Terrorism and the Threat From Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East (http://web.archive.org/web/ 20010429080212/http://www.csis.org/stratassessment/reports/terror.html) Iranian Chemical Attacks Victims (http://www.payvand.com/news/06/dec/1239.html) (Payvand News Agency) Iran: 'Forgotten Victims' Of Saddam Hussein Era Await Justice (http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/12/ e448bece-def1-4c16-9051-75fa9552a4c8.html) Comparison of Chinese, Japanese and Vietnamese translations (http://www.cjvlang.com/Spicks/massweapon. html) Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (http://www.wagingpeace.org/) The WMD Awareness Programme (http://www.wmdawareness.org.uk/), Inspired by the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize winner Professor Sir Joseph Rotblat, The WMD Awareness Programme is dedicated to providing trustworthy and up to date information on Weapons of Mass Destruction world wide. Radius Engineering International Inc. "Nuclear Weapons Effects" (http://www.bomb-shelter.net/nuc table. pdf). In Radius Engineering International Inc. Retrieved 20 December 2010. These tables describe the effects of various nuclear blast sizes. All figures are for 15mph (13kn; 24km/h) winds. Thermal burns represent injuries to an unprotected person. The legend describes the data. Gareth Porter, Documents linking Iran to nuclear weapons push may have been fabricated (http://rawstory.com/ news/2008/IAEA_suspects_fraud_in_evidence_for_1109.html), TheRawStory, 10 November 2008 Gareth Porter, The Iranian Nuke Forgeries: CIA Determines Documents were Fabricated (http://www. counterpunch.org/porter12292009.html), CounterPunch, 29 December 2009
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Types
Biological warfare
By type

Biological warfare

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Biological warfare (BW) also known as germ warfare is the use of biological toxins or infectious agents such as bacteria, viruses, and fungi with intent to kill or incapacitate humans, animals or plants as an act of war. Biological weapons (often termed "bio-weapons", "biological threat agents", or "bio-agents") are living organisms or replicating entities (viruses) that reproduce or replicate within their host victims. Entomological (insect) warfare is also considered a type of Biological Weapon. Biological weapons may be employed in various ways to gain a strategic or tactical advantage over an adversary, either by threats or by actual deployments. Like some of the chemical weapons, biological weapons may also be useful as area denial weapons. These agents may be lethal or non-lethal, and may be targeted against a single individual, a group of people, or even an entire population. They may be developed, acquired, stockpiled or deployed by nation states or by non-national groups. In the latter case, or if a nation-state uses it clandestinely, it may also be considered bioterrorism.[] There is an overlap between BW and chemical warfare, as the use of toxins produced by living organisms is considered under the provisions of both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Toxins and Psychochemical weapons are often referred to as midspectrum agents. Unlike bioweapons, these midspectrum agents do not reproduce in their host and are typically characterized by shorter incubation periods.[1]
Overview
Offensive biological warfare, including mass production, stockpiling and use of biological weapons, was outlawed by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The rationale behind this treaty, which has been ratified or acceded to by 165 countries as of 2011, is to prevent a biological attack which could conceivably result in large numbers of civilian fatalities and cause severe disruption to economic and societal infrastructure.[citation needed] Many countries, including signatories of the BWC, currently pursue research into the defense or protection against BW, which is not prohibited by the BWC. A nation or group that can pose a credible threat of mass casualty has the ability to alter the terms on which other nations or groups interact with it. Biological weapons allow for the potential to create a level of destruction and loss of life far in excess of nuclear, chemical or conventional weapons, relative to their mass and cost of development and storage. Therefore, biological agents may be useful as strategic deterrents in addition to their utility as offensive weapons on the battlefield.[2][3] As a tactical weapon for military use, a significant problem with a BW attack is that it would take days to be effective, and therefore might not immediately stop an opposing force. Some biological agents (smallpox,
Biological warfare pneumonic plague) have the capability of person-to-person transmission via aerosolized respiratory droplets. This feature can be undesirable, as the agent(s) may be transmitted by this mechanism to unintended populations, including neutral or even friendly forces. While containment of BW is less of a concern for certain criminal or terrorist organizations, it remains a significant concern for the military and civilian populations of virtually all nations.
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History
War
Rudimentary forms of biological warfare have been practiced over and over again throughout history. Many examples are recorded from antiquity.[4] During the 6th century BC, the Assyrians poisoned enemy wells with a fungus that would render the enemy delirious. In 184 BC, Hannibal of Carthage had clay pots filled with venomous snakes and instructed his soldiers to throw the pots onto the decks of Pergamene ships. Historical accounts from medieval Europe detail the use of infected animal carcasses, by Mongols, Turks and other groups, to infect enemy water supplies. In 1346, the bodies of Mongol warriors of the Golden Horde who had died of plague were thrown over the walls of the besieged Crimean city of Kaffa. It has been speculated that this operation may have been responsible for the advent of the Black Death in Europe.[5] The last known incident of using plague corpses for BW purposes occurred in 1710, when Russian forces attacked the Swedes by flinging plague-infected corpses over the city walls of Reval (Tallinn). The British army at least once attempted to use smallpox as a weapon, when they gave contaminated blankets to the Lenape during Pontiac's War (176366). It is suspected by Ward Churchill, but not confirmed, that BW was used against Native Americans at other times as well. The advent of the germ theory and advances in bacteriology brought a new level of sophistication to the theoretical use of bio-agents in war. Biological sabotagein the form of anthrax and glanderswas undertaken on behalf of the Imperial German government during World War I (19141918), with indifferent results.[6] Use of such bio-weapons was banned in international law by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. (The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) extended the ban to almost all production, storage and transport. However, both the Soviet Union and Iraq, at a minimum, secretly defied the treaty and continued research and production of offensive biological weapons, despite being signatories to it. Major public proof of the Soviet program, called Biopreparat, came when Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov, its first deputy director, defected to the U.S. in 1992.[7])
Biological warfare
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During the Sino-Japanese War (19371945) and World War II (19391945), the Special Research Units of the Imperial Japanese Army, such as Unit 731, conducted human experimentation on thousands of Chinese, among others. In its military campaigns, the Japanese used BW on Chinese soldiers and civilians. This employment has been largely viewed as ineffective due to inefficient delivery systems. However, firsthand accounts testify that the Japanese infected civilians through the distribution of plagued foodstuffs and newer estimates suggest over 580,000 victims, largely due to plague and cholera outbreaks. In response to suspected BW development in Nazi Germany, the U.S., U.K., and Canada initiated a BW development program in 1941 that resulted in the weaponization of anthrax, brucellosis, and botulism toxin. Fear of the German program turned out to be vastly exaggerated. The center for U.S. military biological warfare research was Fort Detrick, Maryland.[8] The biological and chemical weapons developed during that period were tested at the Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah. Research carried out in the U.K. during World War II left Gruinard Island in Scotland contaminated with anthrax for the next 48 years.
Shiro Ishii, commander of Unit 731
Considerable research into BW was undertaken throughout the Cold War era (19471991) by the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R., and probably other major nations as well, although it is generally believed that such weapons were never used. This view was challenged by China and North Korea, who accused the U.S. of large-scale field testing of BW against them during the Korean War (19501953), but this claim has been disputed. The U.S. maintained a stated national policy of never using BW under any circumstances since an Executive Decision in November 1969, by President Richard Nixon. In 1972, the U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R., and many other nations signed the BWC, which banned "development, production and stockpiling of microbes or their poisonous products except in amounts necessary for protective and peaceful research." By then, the U.S. and U.K. had transparently destroyed all their bio-weapons stockpiles. By 2011, 165 countries had signed the treaty and none are proventhough nine are still suspected[9]to possess offensive BW programs.[9]
Modern BW operations
Offensive
It has been argued that rational people would never use biological weapons offensively. The argument is that biological weapons cannot be controlled: the weapon could backfire and harm the army on the offensive, perhaps having even worse effects than on the target. An agent like smallpox or other airborne viruses would almost certainly spread worldwide and ultimately infect the user's home country. However, this argument does not necessarily apply to bacteria. For example, anthrax can easily be controlled and even created in a garden shed. Also, using microbial methods, bacteria can be suitably modified to be effective in only a narrow environmental range, the range of the target that distinctly differs from the army on the offensive. Thus only the target might be affected adversely. The weapon may be further used to bog down an advancing army making them more vulnerable to counter attack by the defending force.
Biological warfare Anti-personnel Ideal characteristics of a biological agent to be used as a weapon against humans are high infectivity, high virulence, non-availability of vaccines, and availability of an effective and efficient delivery system. Stability of the weaponized agent (ability of the agent to retain its infectivity and virulence after a prolonged period of storage) may also be desirable, particularly for military applications, and the ease of creating one is often considered. Control of the spread of the agent may be another desired characteristic. The primary difficulty is not the production of the biological agent, as many biological agents used in weapons can often be manufactured relatively quickly, cheaply and easily. Rather, it is the weaponization, storage and delivery in an effective vehicle to a vulnerable target that pose significant problems.
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The international biological hazard symbol
For example, 'Bacillus anthracis' is considered an effective agent for several reasons. First, it forms hardy spores, perfect for dispersal aerosols. Second, this organism is not considered transmissible from person to person, and thus rarely if ever causes secondary infections. A pulmonary anthrax infection starts with ordinary influenza-like symptoms and progresses to a lethal hemorrhagic mediastinitis within 37 days, with a fatality rate that is 90% or higher in untreated patients.[10] Finally, friendly personnel can be protected with suitable antibiotics. A large-scale attack using anthrax would require the creation of aerosol particles of 1.5 to 5 microns: larger particles would not reach the lower respiratory tract, while smaller particles would be exhaled back out into the atmosphere. At this size, conductive powders tend to aggregate because of electrostatic charges, hindering dispersion. So the material must be treated to insulate and neutralize the charges. The weaponized agent must be resistant to degradation by rain and ultraviolet radiation from sunlight, while retaining the ability to efficiently infect the human lung. There are other technological difficulties as well, chiefly relating to storage of the weaponized agent. Agents considered for weaponization, or known to be weaponized, include bacteria such as Bacillus anthracis, Brucella spp., Burkholderia mallei, Burkholderia pseudomallei, Chlamydophila psittaci, Coxiella burnetii, Francisella tularensis, some of the Rickettsiaceae (especially Rickettsia prowazekii and Rickettsia rickettsii), Shigella spp., Vibrio cholerae, and Yersinia pestis. Many viral agents have been studied and/or weaponized, including some of the Bunyaviridae (especially Rift Valley fever virus), Ebolavirus, many of the Flaviviridae (especially Japanese encephalitis virus), Machupo virus, Marburg virus, Variola virus, and Yellow fever virus. Fungal agents that have been studied include Coccidioides spp..[11][12] Toxins that can be used as weapons include ricin, staphylococcal enterotoxin B, botulinum toxin, saxitoxin, and many mycotoxins. These toxins and the organisms that produce them are sometimes referred to as select agents. In the United States, their possession, use, and transfer are regulated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Select Agent Program. The former US biological warfare program categorized its weaponized anti-personnel bio-agents as either Lethal Agents (Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis, Botulinum toxin) or Incapacitating Agents (Brucella suis, Coxiella burnetii, Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, Staphylococcal enterotoxin B).
Biological warfare Anti-agriculture Anti-crop/anti-vegetation/anti-fisheries: The United States developed an anti-crop capability during the Cold War that used plant diseases (bioherbicides, or mycoherbicides) for destroying enemy agriculture. Biological weapons also target fisheries as well as water-based vegetation. It was believed that destruction of enemy agriculture on a strategic scale could thwart Sino-Soviet aggression in a general war. Diseases such as wheat blast and rice blast were weaponized in aerial spray tanks and cluster bombs for delivery to enemy watersheds in agricultural regions to initiate epiphytotics (epidemics among plants). When the United States renounced its offensive biological warfare program in 1969 and 1970, the vast majority of its biological arsenal was composed of these plant diseases.[citation needed] Enterotoxins and Mycotoxins were not affected by Nixon's order. Though herbicides are chemicals, they are often grouped with biological warfare and chemical warfare because they may work in a similar manner as biotoxins or bioregulators. The Army Biological Laboratory tested each agent and the Army's Technical Escort Unit was responsible for transport of all chemical, biological, radiological (nuclear) materials. Scorched earth tactics or destroying livestock and farmland were carried out in the Vietnam war (cf. Agent Orange)[13] and Eelam War in Sri Lanka.[citation needed] Biological warfare can also specifically target plants to destroy crops or defoliate vegetation. The United States and Britain discovered plant growth regulators (i.e., herbicides) during the Second World War, and initiated an herbicidal warfare program that was eventually used in Malaya and Vietnam in counterinsurgency operations. In 1962, the counterinsurgency school in Vietnam moved to Okinawa. USNS Schuyler Otis Bland (T-AK-277) was known to have brought highly classified "agriculture products" under armed guard to southeast Asia, Okinawa, and Panama.[] The ships logbook was found by Michelle Gatz and shows the ship was carrying classified cargo that was offloaded under armed guard at White Beach a U.S. Navy port on Okinawas east coast on April 25, 1962.[] After departing Okinawa in spring 1962, the Bland sailed to the Panama Canal Zone where, the Panamanian government asserts, the U.S. tested herbicides in the early 1960s.[] The late author Sheldon H. Harris in his book "Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-1945, and the American cover up" wrote that, The test program, [this could be part of Project AGILE or Project OCONUS] which began in fall 1962 and which was funded at least through fiscal year 1963, was considered by the Chemical Corps to be an ambitious one. The tests were designed to cover not only trials at sea, but Arctic and tropical environmental tests as well. The tests, presumably, were conducted at what research officers designated, but did not name, satellite sites. These sites were located both in the continental United States and in foreign countries. The tests conducted there were aimed at both human, animal, and plant reaction to BW. It is known that tests were undertaken in Cairo, Egypt, Liberia, in South Korea, and in Japans satellite province of Okinawa in 1961, or earlier.(Harris, 2002)[14] Sheldon H. Harris continued that, The Okinawa anti-crop research project may lend some insight to the larger projects 112 sponsored. BW experts in Okinawa and at several sites in the Midwest and south:conducted in 1961 field tests for wheat rust and rice blast disease. These tests met with partial success in the gathering of data, and led, therefore, to a significant increase in research dollars in fiscal year 1962 to conduct additional research in these areas. The money was devoted largely to developing technical advice on the conduct of defoliation and anti-crop activities in Southeast Asia. By the end of fiscal year 1962, the Chemical Corps had let or were negotiating contracts for over one thousand chemical defoliants. The Okinawa tests evidently were fruitful.(Harris, 2002)[14] Anti-livestock: In 1980s Soviet Ministry of Agriculture had successfully developed variants of foot-and-mouth disease, and rinderpest against cows, African swine fever for pigs, and psittacosis to kill chicken. These agents were prepared to spray them down from tanks attached to airplanes over hundreds of miles. The secret program was code-named "Ecology".[11]
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Biological warfare Attacking animals is another area of biological warfare intended to eliminate animal resources for transportation and food. In the First World War, German agents were arrested attempting to inoculate draft animals with anthrax, and they were believed to be responsible for outbreaks of glanders in horses and mules. The British tainted small feed cakes with anthrax in the Second World War as a potential means of attacking German cattle for food denial, but never employed the weapon. In the 1950s, the United States had a field trial with hog cholera.[citation needed] During the Mau Mau Uprising in 1952, the poisonous latex of the African milk bush was used to kill cattle.[] Unconnected with inter-human wars, humans have deliberately introduced the rabbit disease Myxomatosis, originating in South America, to Australia and Europe, with the intention of reducing the rabbit population which had devastating but temporary results, with wild rabbit populations reduced to a fraction of their former size but survivors developing immunity and increasing again. Entomological warfare Entomological warfare (EW) is a type of biological warfare that uses insects to attack the enemy. The concept has existed for centuries and research and development have continued into the modern era. EW has been used in battle by Japan and several other nations have developed and been accused of using an entomological warfare program. EW may employ insects in a direct attack or as vectors to deliver a biological agent, such as plague. Essentially, EW exists in three varieties. One type of EW involves infecting insects with a pathogen and then dispersing the insects over target areas.[15] The insects then act as a vector, infecting any person or animal they might bite. Another type of EW is a direct insect attack against crops; the insect may not be infected with any pathogen but instead represents a threat to agriculture. The final method uses uninfected insects, such as bees, wasps, etc., to directly attack the enemy.[16]
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Defensive
Research and development into medical counter-measures In 2010 at The Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction in Geneva[17] the sanitary epidemiological reconnaissance was suggested as well-tested means for enhancing the monitoring of infections and parasitic agents, for practical implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005). The aim was to prevent and minimize the consequences of natural outbreaks of dangerous infectious diseases as well as the treat of alleged use of biological weapons against BTWC States Parties. Role of public health and disease surveillance It is important to note that all classical and modern biological weapons organisms are animal diseases, the only exception being smallpox. Thus, in any use of biological weapons, it is highly likely that animals will become ill either simultaneously with, or perhaps earlier than humans. Indeed, in the largest biological weapons accident known the anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) in the Soviet Union in 1979, sheep became ill with anthrax as far as 200 kilometers from the release point of the organism from a military facility in the southeastern portion of the city (known as Compound 19 and still off limits to visitors today, see Sverdlovsk Anthrax leak). Thus, a robust surveillance system involving human clinicians and veterinarians may identify a bioweapons attack early in the course of an epidemic, permitting the prophylaxis of disease in the vast majority of people (and/or animals) exposed but not yet ill. For example in the case of anthrax, it is likely that by 2436 hours after an attack, some small percentage of individuals (those with compromised immune system or who had received a large dose of the organism due to proximity to the release point) will become ill with classical symptoms and signs (including a virtually unique chest X-ray finding, often recognized by public health officials if they receive timely reports). By making these data
Biological warfare available to local public health officials in real time, most models of anthrax epidemics indicate that more than 80% of an exposed population can receive antibiotic treatment before becoming symptomatic, and thus avoid the moderately high mortality of the disease. Identification of bioweapons The goal of biodefense is to integrate the sustained efforts of the national and homeland security, medical, public health, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement communities. Health care providers and public health officers are among the first lines of defense. In some countries private, local, and provincial (state) capabilities are being augmented by and coordinated with federal assets, to provide layered defenses against biological weapons attacks. During the first Gulf War the United Nations activated a biological and chemical response team, Task Force Scorpio, to respond to any potential use of weapons of mass destruction on civilians. The traditional approach toward protecting agriculture, food, and water: focusing on the natural or unintentional introduction of a disease is being strengthened by focused efforts to address current and anticipated future biological weapons threats that may be deliberate, multiple, and repetitive. The growing threat of biowarfare agents and bioterrorism has led to the development of specific field tools that perform on-the-spot analysis and identification of encountered suspect materials. One such technology, being developed by researchers from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), employs a "sandwich immunoassay", in which fluorescent dye-labeled antibodies aimed at specific pathogens are attached to silver and gold nanowires.[18] In the Netherlands, the company TNO has designed Bioaerosol Single Particle Recognition eQuipment (BiosparQ). This system would be implemented into the national response plan for bioweapons attacks in the Netherlands.[19] Researchers at Ben Gurion University in Israel are developing a different device called the BioPen, essentially a "Lab-in-a-Pen", which can detect known biological agents in under 20 minutes using an adaptation of the ELISA, a similar widely employed immunological technique, that in this case incorporates fiber optics.[20]
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Synthetic BW
Theoretically, novel approaches in biotechnology, such as synthetic biology could be used in the future to design novel types of biological warfare agents.[21][22][23][24] Special attention has to be laid on future experiments (of concern) that:[25] 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Would demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective; Would confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents; Would enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a nonpathogen virulent; Would increase transmissibility of a pathogen; Would alter the host range of a pathogen; Would enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection tools; Would enable the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin
Most of the biosecurity concerns in synthetic biology, however, focused on the role of DNA synthesis and the risk of producing genetic material of lethal viruses (e.g. 1918 Spanish flu, polio) in the lab.[26][27][28]
Biological warfare
21
List of BW institutions, programs, projects and sites by country

United States
Fort Detrick, Maryland U.S. Army Biological Warfare Laboratories (194369) Building 470 One-Million-Liter Test Sphere Operation Whitecoat (195473) U.S. biological defense program (1956-present) United States Army Medical Unit (USAMU; 195669) U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID; 1969present) National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) U.S. entomological warfare program Operation Big Itch Operation Big Buzz Operation Drop Kick Operation May Day Project Bacchus Project Clear Vision Project SHAD Project 112 Horn Island Testing Station Fort Terry Granite Peak Installation
Researchers working in Class III cabinets at the U.S. Army Biological Warfare Laboratories, Camp Detrick, Maryland (1940s).
United Kingdom
Porton Down Gruinard Island Nancekuke Operation Vegetarian Operation Harness off Antigua, 19481949. Operation Cauldron off Stornoway, 1952. The trawler Carella accidentally sailed through a cloud of pneumonic plague bacilli (Yersinia pestis) during this trial. It was kept under covert observation until the incubation period had elapsed but none of the crew fell ill.[29] Operation Hesperus off Stornoway, 1953. Operation Ozone off Nassau, 1954. Operation Negation off Nassau, 1954-5.
Biological warfare
22
Soviet Union and Russia

Biopreparat (18 labs and production centers) Stepnagorsk Scientific and Technical Institute for Microbiology, Stepnogorsk, northern Kazakhstan Institute of Ultra Pure Biochemical Preparations, Leningrad, a weaponized plague center Vector State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology (VECTOR), a weaponized smallpox center Institute of Applied Biochemistry, Omutninsk Kirov bioweapons production facility, Kirov, Kirov Oblast Zagorsk smallpox production facility, Zagorsk Berdsk bioweapons production facility, Berdsk Bioweapons research facility, Obolensk Sverdlovsk bioweapons production facility (Military Compound 19), Sverdlovsk, a weaponized anthrax center
Institute of Virus Preparations Poison laboratory of the Soviet secret services Vozrozhdeniya Project Bonfire Project Factor
Japan
Unit 731 Zhongma Fortress
Iraq
Main articles: Iraqi biological weapons program and Iraq and weapons of mass destruction (passim) Al Hakum Salman Pak facility Al Manal facility
Biological warfare
23
South Africa
Project Coast Delta G Scientific Company Roodeplaat Research Laboratories Protechnik
List of people associated with BW

Bioweaponeers: [30] Anton Dilger [31] Ira Baldwin [32] Paul Fildes [33] Rihab Rashid Taha [34] William C. Patrick III [35] Kanatjan Alibekov, known as Ken Alibek [36] Vladimir Pasechnik [37] Sergei Popov [38] Kurt Blome [39] Eugen von Haagen [40] Kurt Gutzeit [41] Erich Traub Shiro Ishii Arthur Galston (unwittingly) Wouter Basson Writers and activists: [42] Matthew Meselson [43] Jeanne Guillemin [44] Sheldon H. Harris [45] Joshua Lederberg Richard Preston Arthur Galston David Willman Leonard A. Cole Nicholas D. Kristof
References
[1] [2] [3] [6] [7] Gray, Colin. (2007). Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. Page 265 to 266. Phoenix. ISBN 0-304-36734-6. http:/ / www. allacademic. com/ meta/ p_mla_apa_research_citation/ 0/ 7/ 3/ 6/ 4/ p73644_index. html http:/ / www. informaworld. com/ smpp/ content~content=a714004040& db=all Koenig, Robert (2006), The Fourth Horseman: One Man's Secret Campaign to Fight the Great War in America, PublicAffairs. Ken Alibek and K Handelman (1999), Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World Trade From the Inside by the Man Who Ran It, New York, NY: Random House. [8] Covert, Norman M. (2000), "A History of Fort Detrick, Maryland", 4th Edition: 2000. (http:/ / www. detrick. army. mil/ cutting_edge/ index. cfm?chapter=contents) [9] http:/ / usiraq. procon. org/ view. resource. php?resourceID=000678 [10] (http:/ / www. upmc-biosecurity. org/ website/ our_work/ biological-threats-and-epidemics/ fact_sheets/ anthrax. html) [11] Kenneth Alibek and S. Handelman. Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran it. 1999. Delta (2000) ISBN 0-385-33496-6 (http:/ / www. amazon. com/ dp/ 0385334966/ ). [12] Potential bioweapons (http:/ / www. sciencedirect. com/ science?_ob=ArticleURL& _udi=B6WCJ-4BVPRTS-1& _user=10& _rdoc=1& _fmt=& _orig=search& _sort=d& view=c& _acct=C000050221& _version=1& _urlVersion=0& _userid=10& md5=853a10899e7fadf68b3c6fd459fa2b4a) [14] Harris, Sheldon H. 2002 "Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-1945, and the American cover up" p. 232 [15] " An Introduction to Biological Weapons, Their Prohibition, and the Relationship to Biosafety (http:/ / www. sunshine-project. org/ publications/ bk/ pdf/ bk10en. pdf)", The Sunshine Project, April 2002. Retrieved 25 December 2008. [16] Lockwood, Jeffrey A. Six-legged Soldiers: Using Insects as Weapons of War, Oxford University Press, USA, 2008, pp. 926, (ISBN 0195333055). [17] http:/ / www. opbw. org/ new_process/ msp2010/ BWC_MSP_2010_WP8_E. pdf [18] Physorg.com, "Encoded Metallic Nanowires Reveal Bioweapons", 12:50 EST, 10 August 2006. (http:/ / www. physorg. com/ news74433040. html) [19] BiosparQ features (http:/ / www. tno. nl/ content. cfm?context=markten& content=case& laag1=178& item_id=832) [20] Genuth, Iddo ; Fresco-Cohen, Lucille (13 November 2006). "BioPen Senses BioThreats" (http:/ / www. tfot. info/ content/ view/ 96/ 56/ ), The Future of Things [21] Kelle A (2009) Security issues related to synthetic biology. Chapter 7. In: Schmidt M, Kelle A, Ganguli-Mitra A, de Vriend H (eds) Synthetic biology. The technoscience and its societal consequences. Springer, Berlin
Biological warfare
[22] Garfinkel, M., Endy, D., Epstein, G., and Friedman, R. (2007). In Synthetic Genomics: Options for Governance. Available at: http:/ / www. jcvi. org/ cms/ research/ projects/ syngen-options/ overview/ . [23] National Security Advisory Board on Biotechnology (NSABB) (2010). Addressing Biosecurity Concerns Related to Synthetic Biology. Available at: http:/ / oba. od. nih. gov/ biosecurity/ pdf/ NSABB%20SynBio%20-DRAFT%20Report-FINAL%20(2)_6-7-10. pdf. Retrieved 4 September 2010. [24] M.Buller, The potential use of genetic engineering to enhance orthopox viruses as bioweapons. Presentation at the International Conference Smallpox Biosecurity. Preventing the Unthinkable (2122 October 2003) Geneva, Switzerland [25] Kelle A. 2007. Synthetic Biology & Biosecurity Awareness In Europe (http:/ / www. synbiosafe. eu/ uploads/ / / pdf/ Synbiosafe-Biosecurity_awareness_in_Europe_Kelle. pdf) . Bradford Science and Technology Report No.9 [26] Tumpej TM et al. 2005. Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus. Science Vol. 310(5745):7780 [27] Cello, J., Paul, A. V., and Wimmer, E. (2002). Chemical synthesis of poliovirus cDNA: generation of infectious virus in the absence of natural template. Science 297, 10161018. [28] Wimmer, E., Mueller, S., Tumpey, T. M., and Taubenberger, J. K. (2009). Synthetic viruses: a new opportunity to understand and prevent viral disease. Nat. Biotechnol. 27, 11631172. [37] "Interviews With Biowarriors: Sergei Popov" (http:/ / www. pbs. org/ wgbh/ nova/ bioterror/ biow_popov. html), (2001) NOVA Online. [38] Ute Deichmann, Biologists under Hitler, trans Thomas Dunlap (Harvard 1996). http:/ / books. google. com. bz/ books?id=gPrtE4K0WC8C& pg=PA173& dq=kurt+ blome& hl=en& ei=P3o3TOLMBMKCnQe39rTVAw& sa=X& oi=book_result& ct=result& resnum=1& ved=0CCYQ6AEwAA#v=onepage& q=kurt%20blome& f=false [39] B. Leyendecker and F. Klapp, "Human Hepatitis Experiments in the Second World War". U.S. Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health, 1989. http:/ / www. ncbi. nlm. nih. gov/ pubmed/ 2698560 [40] Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel for the American Military Tribunals at Nurember, 1946. http:/ / www. mazal. org/ NO-series/ NO-0124-000. htm [41] Paul Maddrell, "Operation Matchbox and the Scientific Containment of the USSR", in Peter J. Jackson and Jennifer L. Siegel (eds) Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society. Praeger, 2005.http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=I3Q3_Ww-5SMC& pg=PA194& dq=erich+ traub& hl=en& ei=DyJ_TPDPI4vEsAOvq_nwCg& sa=X& oi=book_result& ct=result& resnum=10& ved=0CE4Q6AEwCQ#v=onepage& q=erich%20traub& f=false
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Further reading
Alibek, K. and S. Handelman. Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran it. Delta (2000) ISBN 0-385-33496-6 Appel, J. M. Is all fair in biological warfare? The controversy over genetically engineered biological weapons (http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/35/7/429), Journal of Medical Ethics, Volume 35, pp.429432 (2009). Crosby, Alfred W., Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 9001900 (New York, 1986). Dembek, Zygmunt (editor), Medical Aspects of Biological Warfare (http://www.bordeninstitute.army.mil/ published_volumes/biological_warfare/biological.html); Washington, DC: Borden Institute (2007). Endicott, Stephen and Edward Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War and Korea, Indiana University Press (1998). ISBN 0-253-33472-1 Keith, Jim (1999), Biowarfare In America, Illuminet Press, ISBN1-881532-21-6 Knollenberg, Bernhard, "General Amherst and Germ Warfare," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 41 (19541955), 489494. Mangold, Tom and Goldberg, Jeff (1999), Plague Wars: a true story of biological warfare, Macmillan, London, ISBN0-333-71614-0 Maskiell, Michelle, and Adrienne Mayor. "Killer Khilats: Legends of Poisoned Robes of Honour in India. Parts 1 & 2. Folklore [London] 112 (Spring and Fall 2001): 2345, 16382. Mayor, Adrienne, Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World. Overlook, 2003, rev. ed. 2009. ISBN 1-58567-348-X. Orent, Wendy (2004), Plague, The Mysterious Past and Terrifying Future of the World's Most Dangerous Disease, Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, NY, ISBN0-7432-3685-8 Pala, Christopher (19??), Anthrax Island Preston, Richard (2002), The Demon in the Freezer, New York: Random House. Rzsa, Lajos 2009. The motivation for biological aggression is an inherent and common aspect of the human behavioural repertoire (http://www.zoologia.hu/list/motivation.pdf). Medical Hypotheses, 72, 217219.
Biological warfare Woods, Lt Col Jon B. (ed.), USAMRIIDs Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook (http:// www.usamriid.army.mil/education/bluebookpdf/USAMRIID BlueBook 6th Edition - Sep 2006.pdf), 6th edition, U.S. Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Maryland (April 2005). Zelicoff, Alan and Bellomo, Michael (2005), Microbe: Are we Ready for the Next Plague?, AMACOM Books, New York, NY, ISBN0-8144-0865-6
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External links
Biological weapons and international humanitarian law (http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/ section_ihl_biological_weapons), ICRC WHO: Health Aspects of Biological and Chemical Weapons (http://www.who.int/emc/pdfs/ BIOWEAPONS_FULL_TEXT2.pdf)
Chemical warfare
Part of a series on
Chemical agents
Lethal agents
Blood agents

Cyanogen chloride (CK) Hydrogen cyanide (AC) Blister agents Ethyldichloroarsine (ED) Methyldichloroarsine (MD) Phenyldichloroarsine (PD) Lewisite (L) Sulfur mustard (HD, H, HT, HL, HQ) Nitrogen mustard

HN1 HN2 HN3
Chemical warfare
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Nerve agents G-Agents

Tabun (GA) Sarin (GB) Soman (GD) Cyclosarin (GF) GV V-Agents
EA-3148 VE VG VM VR VX Novichok agents Nettle agents
Phosgene oxime (CX) Pulmonary agents Chlorine Chloropicrin (PS) Phosgene (CG) Diphosgene (DP)
Incapacitating agents

Agent 15 (BZ) Dimethylheptylpyran (DMHP)

EA-3167 Kolokol-1 PAVA spray Sleeping gas Riot control agents Pepper spray (OC)
CS CN (mace) CR List of chemical warfare agents
By type
Chemical warfare
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Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Brazil Bulgaria Burma Canada PRC France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Mexico Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Sweden Syria ROC (Taiwan) Ukraine United Kingdom United States Proliferation
Chemical warfare (CW) involves using the toxic properties of chemical substances as weapons. This type of warfare is distinct from Nuclear warfare and Biological warfare, which together make up NBC, the military acronym for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (warfare or weapons), all of which are considered "weapons of mass
Chemical warfare destruction" (WMD). None of these fall under the term conventional weapons which are primarily effective due to their destructive potential. Chemical warfare does not depend upon explosive force to achieve an objective. Rather it depends upon the unique properties of the chemical agent weaponized. A lethal agent is designed to injure or incapacitate the enemy, or deny unhindered use of a particular area of terrain. Defoliants are used to quickly kill vegetation and deny its use for cover and concealment. It can also be used against agriculture and livestock to promote hunger and starvation. With proper protective equipment, training, and decontamination measures, the primary effects of chemical weapons can be overcome. Many nations possess vast stockpiles of weaponized agents in preparation for wartime use. The threat and the perceived threat have become strategic tools in planning both measures, and countermeasures.
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Definition
Chemical warfare is different from the use of conventional weapons or nuclear weapons because the destructive effects of chemical weapons are not primarily due to any explosive force. The offensive use of living organisms (such as anthrax) is considered biological warfare rather than chemical warfare; however, the use of nonliving toxic products produced by living organisms (e.g. toxins such as botulinum toxin, ricin, and saxitoxin) is considered chemical warfare under the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Under this Convention, any toxic chemical, regardless of its origin, is considered a chemical weapon unless it is used for purposes that are not prohibited (an important legal definition known as the General Purpose Criterion).[1] About 70 different chemicals have been used or stockpiled as chemical warfare agents during the 20th century. The entire class known as Lethal Unitary Chemical Agents and Munitions have been scheduled for elimination by the CWC.[2] Under the Convention, chemicals that are toxic enough to be used as chemical weapons, or that may be used to manufacture such chemicals, are divided into three groups according to their purpose and treatment: Schedule 1 Have few, if any, legitimate uses. These may only be produced or used for research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes (i.e. testing of chemical weapons sensors and protective clothing). Examples include nerve agents, ricin, lewisite and mustard gas. Any production over 100 g must be notified to the OPCW and a country can have a stockpile of no more than one tonne of these chemicals. Schedule 2 Have no large-scale industrial uses, but may have legitimate small-scale uses. Examples include dimethyl methylphosphonate, a precursor to sarin but which is also used as a flame retardant and Thiodiglycol which is a precursor chemical used in the manufacture of mustard gas but is also widely used as a solvent in inks. Schedule 3 Have legitimate large-scale industrial uses. Examples include phosgene and chloropicrin. Both have been used as chemical weapons but phosgene is an important precursor in the manufacture of plastics and chloropicrin is used as a fumigant. The OPCW must be notified of, and may inspect, any plant producing more than 30 tonnes per year.
Technology
Chemical warfare
Chemical warfare technology timeline Agents 1900s Chlorine Chloropicrin Phosgene Mustard gas Lewisite Dissemination Wind dispersal Protection Gas masks, urinated-on gauze Detection Smell
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1910s 1920s
Chemical shells Projectiles w/ central bursters Aircraft bombs
Gas mask Rosin oil clothing CC-2 clothing
smell of geraniums
1930s G-series nerve agents
Blister agent detectors Color change paper Protective ointment (mustard) Collective protection Gas mask w/ Whetlerite
1940s
Missile warheads Spray tanks
1950s 1960s V-series nerve agents 1970s 1980s 1990s Novichok nerve agents Binary munitions Improved gas masks (protection, fit, comfort) Laser detection Aerodynamic Gas mask w/ water supply Nerve gas alarm
Although crude chemical warfare has been employed in many parts of the world for thousands of years,[3] "modern" chemical warfare began during World War I - see Chemical weapons in World War I. Initially, only well-known commercially available chemicals and their variants were used. These included chlorine and phosgene gas. The methods used to disperse these agents during battle were relatively unrefined and inefficient. Even so, casualties could be heavy, due to the mainly static troop positions which were characteristic features of trench warfare. Germany, the first side to employ chemical warfare on the battlefield,[4] simply opened canisters of chlorine upwind of the opposing side and let the prevailing winds do the dissemination. Soon after, the French modified artillery munitions to contain phosgene a much more effective method that became the principal means of delivery.[5]
Since the development of modern chemical warfare in World War I, nations have pursued research and development on chemical weapons that falls into four major categories: new and more deadly agents; more efficient methods of delivering agents to the target (dissemination); more reliable means of defense against chemical weapons; and more sensitive and accurate means of detecting chemical agents. Germany was the first to produce chemical agents.
A Swedish Army soldier wearing a chemical agent protective suit (C-vtskeskydd) and protection mask (skyddsmask 90).
Chemical warfare
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Chemical warfare agents

A chemical used in warfare is called a chemical warfare agent (CWA). About 70 different chemicals have been used or stockpiled as chemical warfare agents during the 20th and 21st-centuries. These agents may be in liquid, gas or solid form. Liquid agents are generally designed to evaporate quickly; such liquids are said to be volatile or have a high vapor pressure. Many chemical agents are made volatile so they can be dispersed over a large region quickly. The earliest target of chemical warfare agent research was not toxicity, but development of agents that can affect a target through the skin and clothing, rendering protective gas masks useless. In July 1917, the Germans employed mustard gas. Mustard gas easily penetrates leather and fabric to inflict painful burns on the skin. Chemical warfare agents are divided into lethal and incapacitating categories. A substance is classified as incapacitating if less than 1/100 of the lethal dose causes incapacitation, e.g., through nausea or visual problems. The distinction between lethal and incapacitating substances is not fixed, but relies on a statistical average called the LD50. Persistency One way to classify chemical warfare agents is according to their persistency, a measure of the length of time that a chemical agent remains effective after dissemination. Chemical agents are classified as persistent or nonpersistent. Agents classified as nonpersistent lose effectiveness after only a few minutes or hours or even only a few seconds. Purely gaseous agents such as chlorine are nonpersistent, as are highly volatile agents such as sarin and most other nerve agents. Tactically, nonpersistent agents are very useful against targets that are to be taken over and controlled very quickly. Apart from the agent used, the delivery mode is very important. To achieve a nonpersistent deployment, the agent is dispersed into very small droplets comparable with the mist produced by an aerosol can. In this form not only the gaseous part of the agent (around 50%) but also the fine aerosol can be inhaled or absorbed through pores in the skin. Modern doctrine requires very high concentrations almost instantly in order to be effective (one breath should contain a lethal dose of the agent). To achieve this, the primary weapons used would be rocket artillery or bombs and large ballistic missiles with cluster warheads. The contamination in the target area is only low or not existent and after four hours sarin or similar agents are not detectable anymore. By contrast, persistent agents tend to remain in the environment for as long as several weeks, complicating decontamination. Defense against persistent agents requires shielding for extended periods of time. Non-volatile liquid agents, such as blister agents and the oily VX nerve agent, do not easily evaporate into a gas, and therefore present primarily a contact hazard. The droplet size used for persistent delivery goes up to 1mm increasing the falling speed and therefore about 80% of the deployed agent reaches the ground, resulting in heavy contamination. This implies, that persistent deployment does not aim at annihilating the enemy but to constrain him. Possible targets include enemy flank positions (averting possible counterattacks), artillery regiments, commando posts or supply lines. Possible weapons to be used are wide spread, because the fast delivery of high amounts is not a critical factor. A special form of persistent agents are thickened agents. These comprise a common agent mixed with thickeners to provide gelatinous, sticky agents. Primary targets for this kind of use include airfields, due to the increased persistency and difficulty of decontaminating affected areas.
Chemical warfare Classes Chemical weapons are inert agents that come in four categories: choking, blister, blood and nerve.[6] The agents are organized into several categories according to the manner in which they affect the human body. The names and number of categories varies slightly from source to source, but in general, types of chemical warfare agents are as follows:
Classes of chemical weapon agents Class of agent Nerve Agent Names

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Mode of Action Inactivates enzyme acetylcholinesterase, preventing the breakdown of the neurotransmitter acetylcholine in the victim's synapses and causing both muscarinic and nicotinic effects
Signs and Symptoms

Rate of action
Persistency VX is persistent and a contact hazard; other agents are non-persistent and present mostly inhalation hazards.
Cyclosarin (GF) Sarin (GB) Soman (GD) Tabun (GA) VX VR Some insecticides Novichok agents Most Arsines Cyanogen chloride Hydrogen cyanide
Miosis (pinpoint pupils) Blurred/dim vision Headache Nausea, vomiting, diarrhea Copious secretions/sweating Muscle twitching/fasciculations Dyspnea Seizures Loss of consciousness Possible cherry-red skin Possible cyanosis Confusion Nausea Patients may gasp for air Seizures prior to death Metabolic acidosis
Vapors: seconds to minutes; Skin: 2 to 18 hours
Asphyxiant/Blood
Arsine: Causes intravascular hemolysis that may lead to renal failure. Cyanogen chloride/hydrogen cyanide: Cyanide directly prevents cells from using oxygen. The cells then uses anaerobic respiration, creating excess lactic acid and metabolic acidosis.
Immediate onset
Non-persistent and an inhalation hazard.
Vesicant/Blister
Sulfur mustard (HD, H) Nitrogen mustard (HN-1, HN-2, HN-3) Lewisite (L) Phosgene oxime (CX)
Agents are acid-forming compounds that damages skin and respiratory system, resulting burns and respiratory problems.
Severe skin, eye and mucosal pain and irritation Skin erythema with large fluid blisters that heal slowly and may become infected Tearing, conjunctivitis, corneal damage Mild respiratory distress to marked airway damage
Mustards: Persistent and a Vapors: 4 to contact hazard. 6 hours, eyes and lungs affected more rapidly; Skin: 2 to 48 hours Lewisite: Immediate
Chemical warfare
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Chlorine Hydrogen chloride Nitrogen oxides Phosgene Similar mechanism to blister agents in that the compounds are acids or acid-forming, but action is more pronounced in respiratory system, flooding it and resulting in suffocation; survivors often suffer chronic breathing problems. Causes severe stinging of the eyes and temporary blindness.

Choking/Pulmonary

Airway irritation Eye and skin irritation Dyspnea, cough Sore throat Chest tightness Wheezing Bronchospasm
Immediate to 3 hours
Non-persistent and an inhalation hazard.
Lachrymatory agent
Tear gas Pepper spray
Powerful eye irritation
Immediate
Non-persistent and an inhalation hazard. Extremely persistent in soil and water and on most surfaces; contact hazard.
Incapacitating
Agent 15 (BZ)
Causes atropine-like inhibition of acetylcholine in subject. Causes peripheral nervous system effects that are the opposite of those seen in nerve agent poisoning.

May appear as mass drug intoxication with erratic behaviors, shared realistic and distinct hallucinations, disrobing and confusion Hyperthermia Ataxia (lack of coordination) Mydriasis (dilated pupils) Dry mouth and skin Latent period of 4-8 hours, followed by flu-like signs and symptoms Progress within 18-24 hours to:
Inhaled: 30 minutes to 20 hours; Skin: Up to 36 hours after skin exposure to BZ. Duration is typically 72 to 96 hours.
Cytotoxic proteins
Non-living biological proteins, such as:

Inhibit protein synthesis
Ricin Abrin
Inhalation: nausea, cough, dyspnea, pulmonary edema Ingestion: Gastrointestinal hemorrhage with emesis and bloody diarrhea; eventual liver and kidney failure.
4-24 hours; see Slight; agents symptoms. degrade quickly Exposure by in environment inhalation or injection causes more pronounced signs and symptoms than exposure by ingestion
There are other chemicals used militarily that are not scheduled by the Chemical Weapons Convention, and thus are not controlled under the CWC treaties. These include: Defoliants that destroy vegetation, but are not immediately toxic to human beings. Some batches of Agent Orange, for instance, used by the United States in Vietnam, contained dioxins as manufacturing impurities. Dioxins, rather than Agent Orange itself, have long-term cancer effects and for causing genetic damage leading to serious birth deformities. Incendiary or explosive chemicals (such as napalm, extensively used by the United States in Vietnam, or dynamite) because their destructive effects are primarily due to fire or explosive force, and not direct chemical action. Viruses, bacteria, or other organisms. Their use is classified as biological warfare. Toxins produced by living organisms are considered chemical weapons, although the boundary is blurry. Toxins are covered by the Biological Weapons Convention.
Chemical warfare Designations Most chemical weapons are assigned a one- to three-letter "NATO weapon designation" in addition to, or in place of, a common name. Binary munitions, in which precursors for chemical warfare agents are automatically mixed in shell to produce the agent just prior to its use, are indicated by a "-2" following the agent's designation (for example, GB-2 and VX-2). Some examples are given below:
Blood agents: Cyanogen chloride: CK Hydrogen cyanide: AC Pulmonary agents: Phosgene: CG Lachrymatory agents: Pepper spray: OC Tear gas: CN, CS, CR Vesicants: Lewisite: L Sulfur mustard: H, HD, HS, HT Incapacitating agents: Quinuclidinyl benzilate: BZ Nerve agents: Sarin: GB VE, VG, VM, VX
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Delivery
The most important factor in the effectiveness of chemical weapons is the efficiency of its delivery, or dissemination, to a target. The most common techniques include munitions (such as bombs, projectiles, warheads) that allow dissemination at a distance and spray tanks which disseminate from low-flying aircraft. Developments in the techniques of filling and storage of munitions have also been important. Although there have been many advances in chemical weapon delivery since World War I, it is still difficult to achieve effective dispersion. The dissemination is highly dependent on atmospheric conditions because many chemical agents act in gaseous form. Thus, weather observations and forecasting are essential to optimize weapon delivery and reduce the risk of injuring friendly forces. Dispersion Dispersion is placing the chemical agent upon or adjacent to a target immediately before dissemination, so that the material is most efficiently used. Dispersion is the simplest technique of delivering an agent to its target. The most common techniques are munitions, bombs, projectiles, spray tanks and warheads.
Dispersion of chlorine in World War I
World War I saw the earliest implementation of this technique. The actual first chemical ammunition was the French 26mm cartouche suffocante rifle grenade, fired from a flare carbine. It contained 35g of the tear-producer ethyl bromoacetate, and was used in autumn 1914 with little effect on the Germans. The Germans on the other hand tried to increase the effect of 10.5cm shrapnel shells by adding an irritant dianisidine chlorosulfonate. Its use went unnoticed by the British when it was used against them at Neuve Chapelle in October 1914. Hans Tappen, a chemist in the Heavy Artillery Department of the War Ministry, suggested to his brother, the Chief of the Operations Branch at German General Headquarters, the use of the tear-gases benzyl bromide or xylyl bromide.
Chemical warfare Shells were tested successfully at the Wahn artillery range near Cologne on 9 January 1915, and an order was placed for 15cm howitzer shells, designated T-shells after Tappen. A shortage of shells limited the first use against the Russians at Bolimw on 31 January 1915; the liquid failed to vaporize in the cold weather, and again the experiment went unnoticed by the Allies. The first effective use were when the German forces at the Second Battle of Ypres simply opened cylinders of chlorine and allowed the wind to carry the gas across enemy lines. While simple, this technique had numerous disadvantages. Moving large numbers of heavy gas cylinders to the front-line positions from where the gas would be released was a lengthy and difficult logistical task. Stockpiles of cylinders had to be stored at the front line, posing a great risk if hit by artillery shells. Gas delivery depended greatly on wind speed and direction. If the wind was fickle, as at Loos, the gas could blow back, causing friendly casualties. Gas clouds gave plenty of warning, allowing the enemy time to protect themselves, though many soldiers found the sight of a creeping gas cloud unnerving. This made the gas doubly effective, as, in addition to damaging the enemy physically, it also had a psychological effect on the intended victims.
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Another disadvantage was that gas clouds had limited penetration, capable only of affecting the front-line trenches before dissipating. Although it produced limited results in World War I, this technique shows how simple chemical weapon dissemination can be. Shortly after this "open canister" dissemination, French forces developed a technique for delivery of phosgene in a non-explosive artillery shell. This technique overcame many of the risks of dealing with gas in cylinders. First, gas shells were independent of the wind and increased the effective range of gas, making any target within reach of guns vulnerable. Second, gas shells could be delivered without warning, especially the clear, nearly odorless phosgene there are numerous accounts of gas shells, landing with a "plop" rather than exploding, being initially dismissed as dud high explosive or shrapnel shells, giving the gas time to work before the soldiers were alerted and took precautions. The major drawback of artillery delivery was the difficulty of achieving a killing concentration. Each shell had a small gas payload and an area would have to be subjected to saturation bombardment to produce a cloud to match cylinder delivery. A British solution to the problem was the Livens Projector. This was effectively a large-bore mortar, dug into the ground that used the gas cylinders themselves as projectiles - firing a 14kg cylinder up to 1500 m. This combined the gas volume of cylinders with the range of artillery. Over the years, there were some refinements in this technique. In the 1950s and early 1960s, chemical artillery rockets and cluster bombs contained a multitude of submunitions, so that a large number of small clouds of the chemical agent would form directly on the target.
Aerial photograph of a German gas attack on Russian forces circa 1916
Chemical warfare Thermal dissemination Thermal dissemination is the use of explosives or pyrotechnics to deliver chemical agents. This technique, developed in the 1920s, was a major improvement over earlier dispersal techniques, in that it allowed significant quantities of an agent to be disseminated over a considerable distance. Thermal dissemination remains the principal method of disseminating chemical agents today. Most thermal dissemination devices consist of a bomb or projectile shell that contains a chemical agent and a central "burster" charge; when the burster detonates, the agent is expelled laterally. Thermal dissemination devices, though common, are not particularly efficient. First, a percentage of the agent is lost by incineration in the initial blast and by being forced onto the ground. Second, the sizes of the particles vary greatly because explosive dissemination produces a mixture of liquid droplets of variable and difficult to control sizes.
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An American-made MC-1 gas bomb
The efficacy of thermal detonation is greatly limited by the flammability of some agents. For flammable aerosols, the cloud is sometimes totally or partially ignited by the disseminating explosion in a phenomenon called flashing. Explosively disseminated VX will ignite roughly one third of the time. Despite a great deal of study, flashing is still not fully understood, and a solution to the problem would be a major technological advance. Despite the limitations of central bursters, most nations use this method in the early stages of chemical weapon development, in part because standard munitions can be adapted to carry the agents. Aerodynamic dissemination Aerodynamic dissemination is the non-explosive delivery of a chemical agent from an aircraft, allowing aerodynamic stress to disseminate the agent. This technique is the most recent major development in chemical agent dissemination, originating in the mid-1960s. This technique eliminates many of the limitations of thermal dissemination by eliminating the flashing effect and theoretically allowing precise control of particle size. In actuality, the altitude of dissemination, wind direction and velocity, and the direction and velocity of the aircraft greatly influence particle size. There are other drawbacks as well; ideal deployment requires precise knowledge of aerodynamics and fluid dynamics, and because the agent must usually be dispersed within the boundary layer (less than 200300ft above the ground), it puts pilots at risk.
Significant research is still being applied toward this technique. For example, by modifying the properties of the liquid, its breakup when subjected to aerodynamic stress can be controlled and an idealized particle distribution achieved, even at supersonic speed. Additionally, advances in fluid dynamics, computer modeling, and weather forecasting allow an ideal direction, speed, and altitude to be calculated, such that warfare agent of a predetermined particle size can predictably and reliably hit a target.
Soviet chemical weapons canisters from a stockpile in Albania
Chemical warfare
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Protection against chemical warfare

Ideal protection begins with nonproliferation treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, and detecting, very early, the signatures of someone building a chemical weapons capability. These include a wide range of intelligence disciplines, such as economic analysis of exports of dual-use chemicals and equipment, human intelligence (HUMINT) such as diplomatic, refugee, and agent reports; photography from satellites, aircraft and drones (IMINT); examination of captured equipment (TECHINT); communications intercepts (COMINT); and detection of chemical manufacturing and chemical agents themselves (MASINT).
Israel Defense Forces "Yanshuf" battalion soldiers at chemical warfare defense exercise
If all the preventive measures fail and there is a clear and present danger, then there is a need for detection of chemical attacks,[] collective protection,[][][] and decontamination. Since industrial accidents can cause dangerous chemical releases (e.g., the Bhopal disaster), these activities are things that civilian, as well as military, organizations must be prepared to carry out. In civilian situations in developed countries, these are duties of HAZMAT organizations, which most commonly are part of fire departments. Detection has been referred to above, as a technical MASINT discipline; specific military procedures, which are usually the model for civilian procedures, depend on the equipment, expertise, and personnel available. When chemical agents are detected, an alarm needs to sound, with specific warnings over emergency broadcasts and the like. There may be a warning to expect an attack. If, for example, the captain of a US Navy ship believes there is a serious threat of chemical, biological, or radiological attack, the crew may be ordered to set Circle William, which means closing all openings to outside air, running breathing air through filters, and possibly starting a system that continually washes down the exterior surfaces. Civilian authorities dealing with an attack or a toxic chemical accident will invoke the Incident Command System, or local equivalent, to coordinate defensive measures.[] Individual protection starts with a gas mask and, depending on the nature of the threat, through various levels of protective clothing up to a complete chemical-resistant suit with a self-contained air supply. The US military defines various levels of MOPP (mission-oriented protective posture) from mask to full chemical resistant suits; Hazmat suits are the civilian equivalent, but go farther to include a fully independent air supply, rather than the filters of a gas mask. Collective protection allows continued functioning of groups of people in buildings or shelters, the latter which may be fixed, mobile, or improvised. With ordinary buildings, this may be as basic as plastic sheeting and tape, although if the protection needs to be continued for any appreciable length of time, there will need to be an air supply, typically a scaled-up version of a gas mask.[][] Decontamination Decontamination varies with the particular chemical agent used. Some nonpersistent agents, such as most pulmonary agents such as chlorine and phosgene, blood gases, and nonpersistent nerve gases (e.g., GB) will dissipate from open areas, although powerful exhaust fans may be needed to clear out buildings where they have accumulated. In some cases, it might be necessary to neutralize them chemically, as with ammonia as a neutralizer for hydrogen cyanide or chlorine. Riot
Members of the Ukrainian Armys 19th Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Battalion practice decontamination drill, at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait
Chemical warfare control agents such as CS will dissipate in an open area, but things contaminated with CS powder need to be aired out, washed by people wearing protective gear, or safely discarded. Mass decontamination is a less common requirement for people than equipment, since people may be immediately affected and treatment is the action required. It is a requirement when people have been contaminated with persistent agents. Treatment and decontamination may need to be simultaneous, with the medical personnel protecting themselves so they can function.[] There may need to be immediate intervention to prevent death, such as injection of atropine for nerve agents. Decontamination is especially important for people contaminated with persistent agents; many of the fatalities after the explosion of a WWII US ammunition ship carrying mustard gas, in the harbor of Bari, Italy, after a German bombing on 2 December 1943, came when rescue workers, not knowing of the contamination, bundled cold, wet seamen in tight-fitting blankets. For decontaminating equipment and buildings exposed to persistent agents, such as blister agents, VX or other agents made persistent by mixing with a thickener, special equipment and materials might be needed. Some type of neutralizing agent will be needed; e.g. in the form of a spraying device with neutralizing agents such as Chlorine, Fichlor, strong alkaline solutions or enzymes. In other cases, a specific chemical decontaminant will be required.[]
37
Sociopolitical climate
The study of chemicals and their military uses was widespread in China and India. The use of toxic materials has historically been viewed with mixed emotions and moral qualms in the West. The practical and ethical problems surrounding poison warfare appeared in ancient Greek myths about Hercules' invention of poison arrows and Odysseus's use of toxic projectiles. There are many instances of the use of chemical weapons in battles documented in Greek and Roman historical texts; the earliest example was the deliberate poisoning of Kirrha's water supply with hellebore in the First Sacred War, Greece, about 590 BC.[7] One of the earliest reactions to the use of chemical agents was from Rome. Struggling to defend themselves from the Roman legions, Germanic tribes poisoned the wells of their enemies, with Roman jurists having been recorded as declaring "armis bella non venenis geri", meaning "war is fought with weapons, not with poisons." Yet the Romans themselves resorted to poisoning wells of besieged cities in Anatolia in the 2nd century BCE.[8] Before 1915 the use of poisonous chemicals in battle was typically the result of local initiative, and not the result of an active government chemical weapons program. There are many reports of the isolated use of chemical agents in individual battles or sieges, but there was no true tradition of their use outside of incendiaries and smoke. Despite this tendency, there have been several attempts to initiate large-scale implementation of poison gas in several wars, but with the notable exception of World War I, the responsible authorities generally rejected the proposals for ethical reasons. For example, in 1854 Lyon Playfair (later 1st Baron Playfair, GCB, PC, FRS (1 May 1818 29 May 1898), a British chemist, proposed using a cacodyl cyanide-filled artillery shell against enemy ships during the Crimean War. The British Ordnance Department rejected the proposal as "as bad a mode of warfare as poisoning the wells of the enemy."
Efforts to eradicate chemical weapons
Chemical warfare
38
Nation Albania Burma (Myanmar)
CW Possession Known Possible
Signed CWC
Ratified CWC
January 14, 1993 May 11, 1994 January 13, 1993 No January 13, 1993 April 4, 1997 No No
People's Republic of China Probable Egypt India Iran Israel Japan Libya Probable Known Known Probable Probable Known
January 14, 1993 September 3, 1996 January 13, 1993 November 3, 1997 January 13, 1993 No January 13, 1993 September 15, 1995 No January 6, 2004 (acceded) No
North Korea Pakistan Russia Serbia and Montenegro Sudan
Known Probable Known Probable
No
January 13, 1993 October 28, 1997 January 13, 1993 November 5, 1997 No April 20, 2000 (acceded) May 24, 1999 (acceded) No n/a
Possible
No
Syria Taiwan United States Vietnam
Known Possible Known Probable
No n/a
January 13, 1993 April 25, 1997 January 13, 1993 September 30, 1998
August 27, 1874: The Brussels Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War is signed, specifically forbidding the "employment of poison or poisoned weapons." September 4, 1900: The Hague Conference, which includes a declaration banning the "use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases," enters into force. February 6, 1922: After World War I, the Washington Arms Conference Treaty prohibited the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases. It was signed by the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, but France objected to other provisions in the treaty and it never went into effect. September 7, 1929: The Geneva Protocol enters into force, prohibiting the use of poison gas.
Chemical weapon proliferation

Despite numerous efforts to reduce or eliminate them, some nations continue to research and/or stockpile chemical warfare agents. To the right is a summary of the nations that have either declared weapon stockpiles or are suspected of secretly stockpiling or possessing CW research programs. Notable examples include United States and Russia. Former US Vice President Dick Cheney opposed the signing ratification of a treaty banning the use chemical weapons, a recently unearthed letter shows. In a letter dated April 8, 1997, then Halliburton-CEO Cheney told Sen. Jesse Helms, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that it would be a mistake for America to join the Convention. "Those nations most likely to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention are not likely to ever constitute a military threat to the United States. The governments we should be concerned about are likely to cheat on the CWC, even if they do participate," reads the letter,[9] published by the Federation of American Scientists.
Chemical warfare The CWC was ratified by the Senate that same month. Since then, Albania, Libya, Russia, the United States, and India have declared over 71,000 metric tons of chemical weapon stockpiles, and destroyed about a third of them. Under the terms of the agreement, the United States and Russia are supposed to eliminate the rest of their supplies of chemical weapons by 2012. But that looks unlikely the U.S. government estimates remaining stocks will be destroyed by 2017.[citation needed]
39
History
War
Ancient to medieval times

Chemical weapons have been used for millennia in the form of poisoned spears and arrows, but evidence can be found for the existence of more advanced forms of chemical weapons in ancient and classical times. A good example of early chemical warfare was the late Stone Age (10 000 BC) hunter-gatherer societies in Southern Africa, known as the San.[citation needed] They used poisoned arrows, tipping the wood, bone and stone tips of their arrows with poisons obtained from their natural environment. These poisons were mainly derived from scorpion or snake venom, but it is believed that some poisonous plants were also utilized. The arrow was fired into the target of choice, usually an antelope (the favourite being an eland), with the hunter then tracking the doomed animal until the poison caused its collapse. Ancient Greek myths about Hercules poisoning his arrows with the venom of the Hydra Monster are the earliest references to toxic weapons in western literature. Homer's epics, the Iliad and the Odyssey, allude to poisoned arrows used by both sides in the legendary Trojan War (Bronze Age Greece).[8] Textual and literary evidence Some of the earliest surviving references to toxic warfare appear in the Indian epics Ramayana and Mahabharata.[] The "Laws of Manu," a Hindu treatise on statecraft (c. 400 BC) forbids the use of poison and fire arrows, but advises poisoning food and water. Kautilya's "Arthashastra", a statecraft manual of the same era, contains hundreds of recipes for creating poison weapons, toxic smokes, and other chemical weapons. Ancient Greek historians recount that Alexander the Great encountered poison arrows and fire incendiaries in India at Indus Basin in the 4th century BC.[8] Arsenical smokes were known to the Chinese as far back as c. 1000 BC[10] and Sun Tzu's "Art of War" (c. 200 BC) advises the use of fire weapons. In the 2nd century BC, writings of the Mohist sect in China describe the use of bellows to pump smoke from burning balls of mustard and other toxic vegetables into tunnels being dug by a besieging army. Other Chinese writings dating around the same period contain hundreds of recipes for the production of poisonous or irritating smokes for use in war along with numerous accounts of their use. From these accounts we know of the arsenic-containing "soul-hunting fog", and the use of finely divided lime dispersed into the air to suppress a peasant revolt in AD 178. The earliest recorded use of gas warfare in the West dates back to the 5th century BC, during the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. Spartan forces besieging an Athenian city placed a lighted mixture of wood, pitch, and sulfur under the walls hoping that the noxious smoke would incapacitate the Athenians, so that they would not be able to resist the assault that followed. Sparta was not alone in its use of unconventional tactics in ancient Greece: Solon of Athens is said to have used hellebore roots to poison the water in an aqueduct leading from the River Pleistos around 590 BC during the siege of Kirrha.[8] Polish chronicler Jan Dugosz mentions usage of poisonous gas by the Mongol army in 1241 in the Battle of Legnica. However, his report is not firsthand, as he was born in the 15th century. According to Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev, Dugosz's chronicle is unclear as to what kind of device or gas was used, giving only a description of a
Chemical warfare noxious smell. Rather, he suggests, this is a repeat of the trope of the Mongols' bad smell as an excuse for their annihilation of European defenders.[11] Historian and philosopher David Hume, in his history of England, recounts how in the reign of Henry III (r.1216 1272) the English Navy destroyed an invading French fleet, by blinding the enemy fleet with "quicklime," the old name for calcium oxide. DAlbiney employed a stratagem against them, which is said to have contributed to the victory: Having gained the wind of the French, he came down upon them with violence; and throwing in their faces a great quantity of quicklime, which he purposely carried on board, he so blinded them, that they were disabled from defending themselves.[12] Archaeological evidence There is archaeological evidence that the Sasanians deployed chemical weapons against the Roman army in 3rd century AD/CE. Research carried out on the collapsed tunnels at Dura-Europos in Syria suggests that the Iranians used bitumen and sulfur crystals to get it burning. When ignited, the materials gave off dense clouds of choking gases which killed 20 Roman soldiers in a matter of 2 minutes.[13]
40
Rediscovery
During the Renaissance, people again considered using chemical warfare. One of the earliest such references is from Leonardo da Vinci, who proposed a powder of sulfide of arsenic and verdigris in the 15th century: throw poison in the form of powder upon galleys. Chalk, fine sulfide of arsenic, and powdered verdegris may be thrown among enemy ships by means of small mangonels, and all those who, as they breathe, inhale the powder into their lungs will become asphyxiated. It is unknown whether this powder was ever actually used. In the late 15th century, Spanish conquistadors encountered a rudimentary type of chemical warfare on the island of Hispaniola. The Tano threw gourds filled with ashes and ground hot peppers at the Spaniards to create a blinding smoke screen before launching their attack.[14] In the 17th century during sieges, armies attempted to start fires by launching incendiary shells filled with sulfur, tallow, rosin, turpentine, saltpeter, and/or antimony. Even when fires were not started, the resulting smoke and fumes provided a considerable distraction. Although their primary function was never abandoned, a variety of fills for shells were developed to maximize the effects of the smoke. In 1672, during his siege of the city of Groningen, Christoph Bernhard von Galen, the Bishop of Mnster, employed several different explosive and incendiary devices, some of which had a fill that included Deadly Nightshade, intended to produce toxic fumes. Just three years later, August 27, 1675, the French and the Germans concluded the Strasbourg Agreement, which included an article banning the use of "perfidious and odious" toxic devices.[citation
needed]
In June 1845, British troops attacking Maori trenches and bunkers at Ohaeawai in New Zealand fired shells containing an unknown type of poison gas from their cannon and mortars. The Maori withstood the bombardment and won the battle.[citation needed] In 1854, Lyon Playfair, a British chemist, proposed a cacodyl cyanide artillery shell for use against enemy ships as way to solve the stalemate during the siege of Sevastopol. The proposal was backed by Admiral Thomas Cochrane of the Royal Navy. It was considered by the Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston, but the British Ordnance Department rejected the proposal as "as bad a mode of warfare as poisoning the wells of the enemy." Playfairs response was used to justify chemical warfare into the next century:[citation needed] There was no sense in this objection. It is considered a legitimate mode of warfare to fill shells with molten metal which scatters among the enemy, and produced the most frightful modes of death. Why a poisonous vapor which would kill men without suffering is to be considered illegitimate warfare is incomprehensible.
Chemical warfare War is destruction, and the more destructive it can be made with the least suffering the sooner will be ended that barbarous method of protecting national rights. No doubt in time chemistry will be used to lessen the suffering of combatants, and even of criminals condemned to death. Later, during the American Civil War, New York school teacher John Doughty proposed the offensive use of chlorine gas, delivered by filling a 10 inch (254 millimeter) artillery shell with 2 to 3 quarts (2 to 3 liters) of liquid chlorine, which could produce many cubic feet (a few cubic meters) of chlorine gas. Doughtys plan was apparently never acted on, as it was probably[citation needed] presented to Brigadier General James Wolfe Ripley, Chief of Ordnance, who was described as being congenitally immune to new ideas.Wikipedia:Avoid weasel words A general concern over the use of poison gas manifested itself in 1899 at the Hague Conference with a proposal prohibiting shells filled with asphyxiating gas. The proposal was passed, despite a single dissenting vote from the United States. The American representative, Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, justified voting against the measure on the grounds that "the inventiveness of Americans should not be restricted in the development of new weapons."
41
World War I
The Hague Declaration of 1899 and the Hague Convention of 1907 forbade the use of "poison or poisonous weapons" in warfare, yet more than 124,000 tons of gas were produced by the end of World War I. The French were the first to use chemical weapons during the First World War, using the tear gases, ethyl bromoacetate and chloroacetone. One of Germany's earliest uses of chemical weapons occurred on October 27, 1914 when shells containing the irritant, dianisidine chlorosulfonate, were fired at British troops near Neuve-Chapelle, France.[15] Germany used another irritant, xylyl bromide, in artillery shells that were fired in January 1915 at the Russians near Bolimw, nowadays in Poland.[16] The first full-scale deployment of deadly chemical warfare agents during World War I, was at the Second Battle of Ypres, on April 22, 1915, when the Germans attacked French, Canadian and Algerian troops with chlorine gas. Deaths were light, though casualties relatively heavy. A total 50,965tons of pulmonary, lachrymatory, and vesicant agents were deployed by both sides of the conflict, including chlorine, phosgene and mustard gas. Official figures declare about 1,176,500 non-fatal casualties and 85,000 fatalities directly caused by chemical warfare agents during the course of the war.[17]
Tear gas casualties from the Battle of Estaires, April 10, 1918.
A Canadian soldier with mustard gas burns, ca. 19171918.
To this day unexploded World War I-era chemical ammunition is still uncovered when the ground is dug in former battle or depot areas and continues to pose a threat to the civilian population in Belgium and France and less commonly in other countries. After the war, most of the unused German chemical warfare agents were dumped into the Baltic Sea, a common disposal method among all the participants in several bodies of water. Over time, the salt water
Chemical warfare
42
causes the shell casings to corrode, and mustard gas occasionally leaks from these containers and washes onto shore as a wax-like solid resembling ambergris.
Football team of British soldiers with gas masks, Western front, 1916
Interwar years
In 1919, the Royal Air Force dropped mustard gas on Bolshevik troops.[citation needed] After World War I chemical agents were occasionally used to subdue populations and suppress rebellion. In 1920, the Arab and Kurdish people of Mesopotamia revolted against the British occupation, which cost the British dearly. As the Mesopotamian resistance gained strength, the British resorted to increasingly repressive measures. Much speculation was made about aerial bombardment of major cities with gas in Mesopotamia, with Winston Churchill, then-Secretary of State at the British War Office, arguing in favor of it.[18] In 1925, sixteen of the world's major nations signed the Geneva Protocol, thereby pledging never to use gas in warfare again. Notably, in the United States, the Protocol languished in the Senate until 1975, when it was finally ratified. The Bolsheviks also employed poison gas in 1921 during the Tambov Rebellion. An order signed by military commanders Tukhachevsky and Vladimir Antonov-Ovseyenko stipulated: "The forests where the bandits are hiding are to be cleared by the use of poison gas. This must be carefully calculated, so that the layer of gas penetrates the forests and kills everyone hiding there."[19] During the Rif War in Spanish Morocco in 19211927, combined Spanish and French forces dropped mustard gas bombs in an attempt to put down the Berber rebellion. (See also: Chemical weapons in the Rif War) In 1935, Fascist Italy used mustard gas during the invasion of Ethiopia in the Second Italo-Abyssinian War. Ignoring the Geneva Protocol, which it signed seven years earlier, the Italian military dropped mustard gas in bombs, sprayed it from airplanes, and spread it in powdered form on the ground. 150,000 chemical casualties were reported, mostly from mustard gas.
World War II
Despite article 171 of the Versailles Peace Treaty, article V of the Treaty in Relation to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare[20] and a resolution adopted against Japan by the League of Nations on 14 May 1938, the Imperial Japanese Army frequently used chemical weapons. Because of fear of retaliation however, those weapons were never used against Westerners, but against other Asians judged "inferior" by the imperial propaganda. According to historians Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Kentaro Awaya, gas developed in Germany (1939) weapons, such as tear gas, were used only sporadically in 1937 but in early 1938, the Imperial Japanese Army began full-scale use of sneeze and nausea gas (red), and from mid-1939, used mustard gas (yellow) against both Kuomintang and Communist Chinese troops.[21]
The chemical structure of Sarin nerve gas,
Chemical warfare According to historians Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno, the chemical weapons were authorized by specific orders given by Emperor Hirohito himself, transmitted by the chief of staff of the army. For example, the Emperor authorized the use of toxic gas on 375 separate occasions during the Battle of Wuhan from August to October 1938.[22] They were also profusely used during the invasion of Changde. Those orders were transmitted either by prince Kotohito Kan'in or general Hajime Sugiyama.[23] The Imperial Japanese Army used mustard gas and the recently developed blister agent Lewisite against Chinese troops and guerrillas. Experiments involving chemical weapons were conducted on live prisoners (Unit 731 and Unit 516). The Japanese also carried chemical weapons as they swept through Southeast Asia towards Australia. Some of these items were captured and analyzed by the Allies. Historian Geoff Plunkett has recorded how Australia covertly imported 1,000,000 chemical weapons from the United Kingdom from 1942 Imperial Japanese soldiers wearing gas masks and onwards and stored them in many storage depots around the country, rubber gloves during a chemical attack in the including three tunnels in the Blue Mountains to the west of Sydney. Battle of Shanghai. They were to be as a retaliatory measure if the Japanese first used [] chemical weapons. Buried chemical weapons have been recovered at Marrangaroo and Columboola.[] Shortly after the end of World War I, Germany's General Staff enthusiastically pursued a recapture of their preeminent position in chemical warfare. In 1923, Hans von Seeckt pointed the way, by suggesting that German poison gas research move in the direction of delivery by aircraft in support of mobile warfare. Also in 1923, at the behest of the German army, poison gas expert Dr. Hugo Stoltzenberg negotiated with the USSR to build a huge chemical weapons plant at Trotsk, on the Volga river. Collaboration between Germany and the USSR in poison gas continued on and off through the 1920s. In 1924, German officers debated the use of poison gas versus non-lethal chemical weapons against civilians. Even before World War II, chemical warfare was revolutionized by Nazi Germany's discovery of the nerve agents tabun (in 1937) and sarin (in 1939) by Gerhard Schrader, a chemist of IG Farben. IG Farben was Germany's premier poison gas manufacturer during World War I, so the weaponization of these agents can not be considered accidental.[24] Both were turned over to the German Army Weapons Office prior to the outbreak of the war. The nerve agent soman was later discovered by Nobel Prize laureate Richard Kuhn and his collaborator Konrad Henkel at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Medical Research in Heidelberg in spring of 1944.[][] The Nazis developed and manufactured large quantities of several agents, but chemical warfare was not extensively used by either side. Chemical troops were set up (in Germany since 1934) and delivery technology was actively developed. Recovered Nazi documents suggest that German intelligence incorrectly thought that the Allies also knew of these compounds, interpreting their lack of mention in the Allies' scientific journals as evidence that information about them was being suppressed. Germany ultimately decided not to use the new nerve agents, fearing a potentially devastating Allied retaliatory nerve agent deployment. Fisk, Robert (December 30, 2000), "Poison gas from Germany" [25], Independent Wikipedia:Link rot William L. Shirer, in The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, writes that the British high command considered the use of chemical weapons as a last-ditch defensive measure in the event of a Nazi invasion of Britain. On the night of December 2, 1943, German Ju 88 bombers attacked the port of Bari in Southern Italy, sinking several American ships among them SSJohn Harvey, which was carrying mustard gas intended for use in retaliation by the Allies if German forces initiated gas warfare. The presence of the gas was highly classified, and authorities ashore had no knowledge of it which increased the number of fatalities, since physicians, who had no idea that they were
43
Chemical warfare dealing with the effects of mustard gas, prescribed treatment improper for those suffering from exposure and immersion. The whole affair was kept secret at the time and for many years after the war (in the opinion of some, there was a deliberate and systematic cover-up). According to the U.S. military account, "Sixty-nine deaths were attributed in whole or in part to the mustard gas, most of them American merchant seamen"[] out of 628 mustard gas military casualties.[] The large number of civilian casualties among the Italian population were not recorded. Part of the confusion and controversy derives from the fact that the German attack was highly destructive and lethal in itself, also apart from the accidental additional effects of the gas (it was nicknamed "The Little Pearl Harbor"), and attribution of the causes of death between the gas and other causes is far from easy.[][] Rick Atkinson, in his book The Day of Battle, describes the intelligence that prompted Allied leaders to deploy mustard gas to Italy. This included Italian intelligence that Adolf Hitler had threatened to use gas against Italy if the state changed sides, and prisoner of war interrogations suggesting that preparations were being made to use a "new, egregiously potent gas" if the war turned decisively against Germany. Atkinson concludes that "No commander in 1943 could be cavalier about a manifest threat by Germany to use gas."
44
North Yemen
The first attack of the North Yemen Civil War took place on June 8, 1963 against Kawma, a village of about 100 inhabitants in northern Yemen, killing about seven people and damaging the eyes and lungs of twenty-five others. This incident is considered to have been experimental, and the bombs were described as "home-made, amateurish and relatively ineffective". The Egyptian authorities suggested that the reported incidents were probably caused by napalm, not gas. There were no reports of gas during 1964, and only a few were reported in 1965. The reports grew more frequent in late 1966. On December 11, 1966, fifteen gas bombs killed two people and injured thirty-five. On January 5, 1967, the biggest gas attack came against the village of Kitaf, causing 270 casualties, including 140 fatalities. The target may have been Prince Hassan bin Yahya, who had installed his headquarters nearby. The Egyptian government denied using poison gas, and alleged that Britain and the US were using the reports as psychological warfare against Egypt. On February 12, 1967, it said it would welcome a UN investigation. On March 1, U Thant said he was "powerless" to deal with the matter. On May 10, the twin villages of Gahar and Gadafa in Wadi Hirran, where Prince Mohamed bin Mohsin was in command, were gas bombed, killing at least seventy-five. The Red Cross was alerted and on June 2, it issued a statement in Geneva expressing concern. The Institute of Forensic Medicine at the University of Berne made a statement, based on a Red Cross report, that the gas was likely to have been halogenous derivatives - phosgene, mustard gas, lewisite, chloride or cyanogen bromide. The gas attacks stopped for three weeks after the Six-Day War of June, but resumed on July, against all parts of royalist Yemen. Casualty estimates vary, and an assumption, considered conservative, is that the mustard and phosgene-filled aerial bombs caused approximately 1,500 fatalities and 1,500 injuries. [citation needed]
Chemical warfare
45
Cold War
After World War II, the Allies recovered German artillery shells containing the three German nerve agents of the day (tabun, sarin, and soman), prompting further research into nerve agents by all of the former Allies. Although the threat of global thermonuclear war was foremost in the minds of most during the Cold War, both the Soviet and Western governments put enormous resources into developing chemical and biological weapons. There is some evidence suggesting that Vietnamese troops used phosgene gas against Cambodian resistance forces in Thailand during the 1984-1985 dry-season offensive on the Thai-Cambodian border.[26][27][28] Developments by the Western governments In 1952, researchers in Porton Down, England, invented the VX nerve agent but soon abandoned the project. In 1958 the British government traded their VX technology with the United States in exchange for information on thermonuclear weapons; by 1961 the U.S. was producing large amounts of VX and performing its own nerve agent research. This research produced at least three more agents; the four agents (VE, VG, VM, VX) are collectively known as the "V-Series" class of nerve agents. Also in 1952 the U.S. Army patented a process for the "Preparation of Toxic Ricin", publishing a method of producing this powerful toxin. During the 1960s, the U.S. explored the use of anticholinergic deliriant incapacitating agents. One of these agents, assigned the weapon designation BZ, was allegedly used experimentally in the Vietnam War.[citation needed] These allegations inspired the 1990 fictional film Jacob's Ladder. Herbicidal warfare In 1961 and 1962 the Kennedy administration authorized the use of chemicals to destroy vegetation and food crops in South Vietnam. Between 1961 and 1967 the US Air Force sprayed 12 million US gallons of concentrated herbicides, mainly Agent Orange (containing dioxin as an impurity in the manufacturing process) over 6 million acres (24,000km) of foliage and trees, affecting an estimated 13% of South Vietnam's land. In 1965, 42% of all herbicides were sprayed over food crops. Besides destroying vegetation used as cover by the NLF and destroying food crops the herbicide was used to drive civilians into RVN-controlled areas.[30]
In 1997, an article published by the Wall Street Journal reported that up to half a million children were born with dioxin related deformities, and that the birth defects in North Vietnam were fourfold those in the South. The use of Agent Orange may have been contrary to international rules of war at the time. It is also of note that the most likely victims of such an assault would be small children. A 1967 study by the Agronomy Section of the Japanese Science Council concluded that 3.8 million acres (15,000km) of land had been destroyed, killing 1000 peasants and 13,000 livestock. United States chemical respiratory protection standardization In December 2001, the United States Department of Health and Human Services, CDC, NIOSH, National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory (NPPTL), along with the U.S. Army Research, Development Engineering Command (RDECOM), Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center (ECBC), and the U.S. Department of Commerce National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) published the first of six technical performance standards and test procedures designed to evaluate and certify respirators intended for use by civilian emergency responders to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon release, detonation, or terrorism incident. To date NIOSH/NPPTL has published six new respirator performance standards based on a tiered approach that relies on
Handicapped Vietnamese children. Vietnam claims that the use of Agent Orange and other herbicides by the U.S. during the Vietnam War [29] increased the number of birth defects.
Chemical warfare traditional industrial respirator certification policy, next generation emergency response respirator performance requirements, and special live chemical warfare agent testing requirements of the classes of respirators identified to offer respiratory protection against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agent inhalation hazards. These CBRN respirators are commonly known as open-circuit self-contained breathing apparatus (CBRN SCBA), air-purifying respirator (CBRN APR), air-purifying escape respirator (CBRN APER), self-contained escape respirator (CBRN SCER) and loose or tight fitting powered air-purifying respirators (CBRN PAPR). Current NIOSH-approved/certified CBRN respirator concept standards and test procedures can be found at the webpage.[31] United States Senate report A 1994 United States Senate Report, entitled "Is military research hazardous to veterans health? Lessons spanning a half century,"[] detailed the United States Department of Defense's practice of experimenting on animal and human subjects, often without their knowledge or consent. This included: Approximately 60,000 [US] military personnel were used as human subjects in the 1940s to test the chemical agents mustard gas and lewisite. "Mustard" section,[] Between the 1950s through the 1970s, at least 2,200 military personnel were subjected to various biological agents, referred to as Operation Whitecoat. Unlike most of the studies discussed in this report, Operation Whitecoat was truly voluntary. "Seventh" section,[] Between 1951 and 1969, Dugway Proving Ground was the site of testing for various chemical and biological agents, including an open air aerodynamic dissemination test in 1968 that accidentally killed, on neighboring farms, approximately 6,400 sheep by an unspecified nerve agent."Dugway" section,[] Project SHAD From 1962 to 1973, the Department of Defense planned 134 tests under Project 112, a chemical and biological weapons "vulnerability-testing program." In 2002, the Pentagon admitted for the first time that some of tests used real chemical and biological weapons, not just harmless simulants.[] Specifically under Project SHAD, 37 secret tests were conducted in California, Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland and Utah. Land tests in Alaska and Hawaii used artillery shells filled with sarin and VX, while Navy trials off the coasts of Florida, California and Hawaii tested the ability of ships and crew to perform under biological and chemical warfare, without the crew's knowledge. The code name for the sea tests was Project Shipboard Hazard and Defense -- "SHAD" for short.[] In October 2002, the Senate Armed Forces Subcommittee on Personnel held hearings, as the controversial news broke that chemical agents had been tested on thousands of American military personnel. The hearings were chaired by Senator Max Cleland, former VA administrator and Vietnam War veteran. Developments by the Soviet government There have been numerous reports of chemical weapons being used during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, sometimes against civilians.[32][33] Due to the secrecy of the Soviet Union's government, very little information was available about the direction and progress of the Soviet chemical weapons until relatively recently. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian chemist Vil Mirzayanov published articles revealing illegal chemical weapons experimentation in Russia. In 1993, Mirzayanov was imprisoned and fired from his job at the State Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology, where he had worked for 26 years. In March 1994, after a major campaign by U.S. scientists on his behalf, Mirzayanov was released.[34] Among the information related by Vil Mirzayanov was the direction of Soviet research into the development of even more toxic nerve agents, which saw most of its success during the mid-1980s. Several highly toxic agents were developed during this period; the only unclassified information regarding these agents is that they are known in the
46
Chemical warfare open literature only as "Foliant" agents (named after the program under which they were developed) and by various code designations, such as A-230 and A-232.[] According to Mirzayanov, the Soviets also developed weapons that were safer to handle, leading to the development of the binary weapons, in which precursors for the nerve agents are mixed in a munition to produce the agent just prior to its use. Because the precursors are generally significantly less hazardous than the agents themselves, this technique makes handling and transporting the munitions a great deal simpler. Additionally, precursors to the agents are usually much easier to stabilize than the agents themselves, so this technique also made it possible to increase the shelf life of the agents a great deal. During the 1980s and 1990s, binary versions of several Soviet agents were developed and are designated as "Novichok" agents (after the Russian word for "newcomer").[] Together with Lev Fedorov, he told the secret Novichok story exposed in the newspaper The Moscow News.[]
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IranIraq War
The IranIraq War began in 1980 when Iraq attacked Iran. Early in the conflict, Iraq began to employ mustard gas and tabun delivered by bombs dropped from airplanes; approximately 5% of all Iranian casualties are directly attributable to the use of these agents.[citation
needed]
Chemical weapons employed by Saddam Hussein killed and injured numerous Iranians, and possibly Iraqis. According to Iraqi documents, assistance in developing chemical weapons was obtained from firms in many countries, including the United States, West Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and France.[35] About 100,000 Iranian soldiers were victims of Iraq's chemical attacks. Many were hit by mustard gas. The official estimate does not include the civilian population contaminated in bordering towns or the children Iranian soldiers had to use full PPE in front line and relatives of veterans, many of whom have developed blood, lung of Iran-Iraq War and skin complications, according to the Organization for Veterans. Nerve gas agents killed about 20,000 Iranian soldiers immediately, according to official reports. Of the 80,000 survivors, some 5,000 seek medical treatment regularly and about 1,000 are still hospitalized with severe, chronic conditions.[36][37][38] Shortly before war ended in 1988, the Iraqi Kurdish village of Halabja was exposed to multiple chemical agents, killing about 5,000 of the town's 50,000 residents.[39] During the Gulf War in 1991, Coalition forces began a ground war in Iraq. Despite the fact that they did possess chemical weapons, Iraq did not use any chemical agents against coalition forces. The commander of the Allied Forces, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, suggested this may have been due to Iraqi fear of retaliation with nuclear weapons.[citation needed]
Falklands War
Technically, the reported employment of tear gas by Argentine forces during the 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands constitutes chemical warfare.[40] However, the tear gas grenades were employed as nonlethal weapons to avoid British casualties. The barrack buildings the weapons were used on proved to be deserted in any case. The British claim that more lethal, but legally justifiable as they are not considered chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention, white phosphorus grenades were used.[41]
Chemical warfare
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Terrorism
For many terrorist organizations, chemical weapons might be considered an ideal choice for a mode of attack, if they are available: they are cheap, relatively accessible, and easy to transport. A skilled chemist can readily synthesize most chemical agents if the precursors are available. The earliest successful use of chemical agents in a non-combat setting was in 1946, motivated by a desire to obtain revenge on Germans for the Holocaust. Three members of a Jewish group calling themselves Dahm Y'Israel Nokeam ("Avenging Israel's Blood") hid in a bakery in the Stalag 13 prison camp near Nuremberg, Germany, where several thousand SS troops were being detained. The three applied an arsenic-containing mixture to loaves of bread, sickening more than 2,000 prisoners, of whom more than 200 required hospitalization. In July 1974, a group calling themselves the Aliens of America successfully firebombed the houses of a judge, two police commissioners, and one of the commissioners cars, burned down two apartment buildings, and bombed the Pan Am Terminal at Los Angeles International Airport, killing three people and injuring eight. The organization, which turned out to be a single resident alien named Muharem Kurbegovic, claimed to have developed and possessed a supply of sarin, as well as 4 unique nerve agents named AA1, AA2, AA3, and AA4S. Although no agents were found at the time he was arrested in August 1974, he had reportedly acquired "all but one" of the ingredients required to produce a nerve agent. A search of his apartment turned up a variety of materials, including precursors for phosgene and a drum containing 25pounds of sodium cyanide.[42] The first successful use of chemical agents by terrorists against a general civilian population was on June 27, 1994, when Aum Shinrikyo, an apocalyptic group based in Japan that believed it necessary to destroy the planet, released sarin gas in Matsumoto, Japan, killing eight and harming 200. The following year, Aum Shinrikyo released sarin into the Tokyo subway system killing 12 and injuring over 5,000. On 29 December 1999, four days after Russian forces began assault of Grozny, Chechen terrorists exploded two chlorine tanks in the town. Because of the wind conditions, no Russian soldiers were injured.[43] In 2001, after carrying out the attacks in New York City on September 11, the organization Al-Qaeda announced that they were attempting to acquire radiological, biological and chemical weapons. This threat was lent a great deal of credibility when a large archive of videotapes was obtained by the cable television network CNN in August 2002 showing, among other things, the killing of three dogs by an apparent nerve agent.[44] On October 26, 2002, Russian special forces used a chemical agent (presumably KOLOKOL-1, an aerosolized fentanyl derivative), as a precursor to an assault on Chechen terrorists, ending the Moscow theater hostage crisis. All 42 of the terrorists and 120 of the hostages were killed during the raid; all but one hostage, who was killed, died from the effects of the agent. In early 2007 multiple terrorist bombings have been reported in Iraq using chlorine gas. These attacks have wounded or sickened more than 350 people. Reportedly the bombers are affiliated with Al-Qaeda in Iraq[45] and have used bombs of various sizes up to chlorine tanker trucks.[46] United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon condemned the attacks as, "clearly intended to cause panic and instability in the country."[47]
Chemical Weapons Treaty

The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and the Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, or the Geneva Convention, is an International treaty which prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare. Signed into International Law at Geneva on June 17, 1925 and entered into force on February 8, 1928, this treaty states that chemical and biological weapons are "justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilised world."[48]
Chemical warfare
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Chemical Weapons Convention

The most recent arms control agreement in International Law, the Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, or the Chemical Weapons Convention, outlaws the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. It is administered by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), an intergovernmental organisation based in The Hague.[49]
Chemical weapons destruction

India
States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Light colored territories are those states parties that have declared stockpiles of chemical weapons and/or have known production facilities for chemical weapons.
In June 1997, India declared that it had a stockpile of 1044 tonnes of sulphur mustard in its possession. India's declaration of its stockpile came after its entry into the Chemical Weapons Convention, that created the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and on January 14, 1993 India became one of the original signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention. By 2005, from among six nations that had declared their possession of chemical weapons, India was the only country to meet its deadline for chemical weapons destruction and for inspection of its facilities by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.[50][51] By 2006, India had destroyed more than 75 percent of its chemical weapons and material stockpile and was granted an extension to complete a 100 percent destruction of its stocks by April 2009. On May 14, 2009 India informed the United Nations that it has completely destroyed its stockpile of chemical weapons.[52]
Iraq
The Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, welcomed Iraq's decision to join the OPCW as a significant step to strengthening global and regional efforts to prevent the spread and use of chemical weapons. The OPCW announced "The government of Iraq has deposited its instrument of accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention with the Secretary General of the United Nations and within 30 days, on 12 February 2009, will become the 186th State Party to the Convention". Iraq has also declared stockpiles of chemical weapons, and because of their recent accession is the only State Party exempted from the destruction time-line.[53]
Japan
During the Second Sino-Japanese War (19371945) Japan stored chemical weapons on the territory of mainland China. The weapon stock mostly containing mustard gas-lewisite mixture.[54] They weapons are classified as abandoned chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention and from September 2010 Japan has started their destruction in Nanjing using mobile destruction facilities in order to do so.[55]
Russia
Russia signed into the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 13, 1993 and ratified it on November 5, 1995. Declaring an arsenal of 39,967 tons of chemical weapons in 1997, by far the largest arsenal, consisting of blister agents: Lewisite, Sulfur mustard, Lewisite-mustard mix, and nerve agents: Sarin, Soman, and VX. Russia met its treaty obligations by destroying 1 percent of its chemical agents by the 2002 deadline set out by the Chemical Weapons Convention, but requested an extension on the deadlines of 2004 and 2007 due to technical, financial, and environmental challenges of chemical disposal. Since, Russia has received help from other countries such as Canada
Chemical warfare which donated C$100,000, plus a further C$100,000 already donated, to the Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Program. This money will be used to complete work at Shchuch'ye and support the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Kizner (Russia), where the destruction of nearly 5,700 tonnes of nerve agent, stored in approximately 2 million artillery shells and munitions, will be undertaken. Canadian funds are also being used for the operation of a Green Cross Public Outreach Office, to keep the civilian population informed on the progress made in chemical weapons destruction activities.[56] As of July 2011, Russia has destroyed 48 percent (18,241 tonnes) of its stockpile at destruction facilities located in Gorny (Saratov Oblast) and Kambarka (Udmurt Republic) - where operations have finished - and Schuch'ye (Kurgan Oblast), Maradykovsky (Kirov Oblast), Leonidovka (Penza Oblast) whilst installations are under construction in Pochep (Bryansk Oblast) and Kizner (Udmurt Republic).[57][58]
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United States
On November 25, 1969, President Richard Nixon unilaterally renounced the use of chemical weapons and renounced all methods of biological warfare. He issued a decree halting the production and transport of all chemical weapons which remains in effect. From May 1964 to the early 1970s the USA participated in Operation CHASE, a United States Department of Defense program that aimed to dispose of chemical weapons by sinking ships laden with the weapons in the deep Atlantic. After the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Operation Chase was scrapped and safer disposal methods for chemical weapons was researched, with the U.S. destroying several thousand tons of mustard gas by incineration at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and nearly 4,200 tons of nerve agent by chemical neutralisation at Tooele Army Depot.[59] The U.S. ratified the Geneva Protocol which banned the use of chemical and biological weapons on January 22, 1975. In 1989 and 1990, the U.S. and the Soviet Union entered an agreement to both end their chemical weapons programs, including binary weapons. In April 1997, the United States ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, this banned the possession of most types of chemical weapons. It also banned the development of chemical weapons, and required the destruction of existing stockpiles, precursor chemicals, production facilities, and their weapon delivery systems. The U.S. began stockpile reductions in the 1980s with the removal of outdated munitions and destroying its entire stock of 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ or Agent 15) at the beginning of 1988. In June 1990 the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System began destruction of chemical agents stored on the Johnston Atoll in the Pacific, seven years before the Chemical Weapons Treaty came into effect. In 1986 President Ronald Reagan made an agreement with the Chancellor, Helmut Kohl to remove the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons from Germany. In 1990, as part of Operation Steel Box, two ships were loaded with over 100,000 shells containing Sarin and VX where taken from the U.S. Army weapons storage depots such as Miesau and then-classified FSTS (Forward Storage / Transportation Sites) and transported from Bremerhaven Germany to Johnston Atoll in the pacific, a 46-day nonstop journey.[60] In May 1991, President George H. W. Bush committed the United States to destroying all of its chemical weapons and renounced the right to chemical weapon retaliation. In 1993, the United States signed the Chemical Weapons Treaty, which required the destruction of all chemical weapon agents, dispersal systems, and production facilities by April 2012. The U.S. prohibition on the transport of chemical weapons has meant that destruction facilities had to be constructed at each of the U.S.'s nine storage facilities. The U.S. met the first three of the four deadlines set out in the treaty, destroying 45% of its stockpile of chemical weapons by 2007. Due to the destruction of chemical weapons, under the United States policy of Proportional Response, an attack upon the United States or its Allies would trigger a force-equivalent counter-attack. Since the United States only maintains nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is the stated policy that the United States will regard all WMD attacks (Biological, chemical, or nuclear) as a nuclear attack and will respond to such an attack with a nuclear strike.[61]
Chemical warfare As of 2011, stockpiles have been eliminated at 6 of the 9 chemical weapons depots and 89% of the 1997 stockpile has been destroyed. The U.S. anticipates closure of one more depot and a total of 90% stockpile reduction by the treaty deadline of April 2012. Destruction will not begin at the two remaining depots until after the treaty deadline and will use neutralization, instead of incineration.
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Notes
[2] Disarmament lessons from the Chemical Weapons Convention (http:/ / www. thebulletin. org/ web-edition/ op-eds/ disarmament-lessons-the-chemical-weapons-convention) [6] Gray, Colin. (2007). Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. Page 269. Phoenix. ISBN 0-304-36734-6. [7] Adrienne Mayor, "Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World" Overlook-Duckworth, 2003, rev ed with new Introduction 2008 [8] Mayor 2003 [11] M. Tynyshpaev, Istoriya Kazakhskogo Naroda, Qazaq Universiteti, Almaty, 1993. p. 219 [12] David Hume, History of England, Volume II. [13] Science Daily, dated January 19, 2009 Sciencedaily.com (http:/ / www. sciencedaily. com/ releases/ 2009/ 01/ 090114075921. htm) [16] "The First World War" (http:/ / www. channel4. com/ history/ microsites/ F/ firstworldwar/ cont_harbinger_3. html) (a Channel 4 documentary based on the book by Hew Strachan) [18] Libcom.org (http:/ / libcom. org/ history/ 1904-2003-history-of-iraq), Libcom 1804-2003: History of Iraq [19] Nicolas Werth, Karel Bartoek, Jean-Louis Pann, Jean-Louis Margolin, Andrzej Paczkowski, Stphane Courtois, The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, Harvard University Press, 1999, hardcover, 858 pages, ISBN 0-674-07608-7 [21] Yuki Tanaka, Poison Gas, the Story Japan Would Like to Forget, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1988, p. 16-17 [22] Y. Yoshimi and S. Matsuno, Dokugasusen Kankei Shiry II, Kaisetsu, Jugonen Sens Gokuhi Shiryoshu, 1997, p.27-29 [23] Yoshimi and Matsuno, idem, Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 2001, p.360-364 [24] Corum, James S., The Roots of Blitzkrieg, University Press of Kansas, USA, 1992, pp.106-107. [25] http:/ / www. zmag. org/ hussein. htm [26] "KPNLF says Vietnamese Using Suffocant Gas," Bangkok World, January 4, 1985, p. 1. [27] "Viets Accused of Using Gas Against Rebels," Associated Press, Feb 19, 1985. [28] "Thais Report a Clash with Vietnamese Troops," Associated Press, Feb 20, 1985. [29] Getipm.com (http:/ / www. getipm. com/ articles/ agent-orange-vietnam. htm) [30] Anatomy of a War by Gabriel Kolko, ISBN 1-56584-218-9 pages 144-145 [31] CDC.gov (http:/ / www. cdc. gov/ niosh/ npptl/ standardsdev/ cbrn/ ) [32] The Story of Genocide in Afghanistan (http:/ / publishing. cdlib. org/ ucpressebooks/ view?docId=ft7b69p12h& chunk. id=ch013& toc. depth=1& toc. id=ch013& brand=eschol) Hassan Kakar [33] Report from Afghanistan (http:/ / www. paulbogdanor. com/ left/ afghan/ report. pdf) Claude Malhuret [34] Yevgenia Albats and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia - Past, Present, and Future, 1994. ISBN 0-374-18104-7 (see pages 325328) [39] Death Clouds: Saddam Husseins Chemical War Against the Kurds (http:/ / www. dlawer. net/ ?q=node/ 79) [40] The Argentine Fight for The Falklands, Lieutenant-Commander Sanchez-Sabarots [41] Falkland Islanders at war, Bound, Graham, Pen and Sword Books Limited, ISBN 1-84415-429-7. [43] . XX : . 5: (http:/ / militera. lib. ru/ research/ myalo_kg/ 05. html). .: , 2002 [48] http:/ / www. brad. ac. uk/ acad/ sbtwc/ keytext/ genprot. htm [50] http:/ / www. highbeam. com/ doc/ 1P1-3987660. html [57] http:/ / cns. miis. edu/ npr/ pdfs/ tucker41. pdf [60] The Oceans and Environmental Security: Shared U.S. and Russian Perspectives.
Chemical warfare
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References
CBWInfo.com (2001). A Brief History of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Ancient Times to the 19th Century (http://www.cbwinfo.com/History/History.html). Retrieved Nov. 24, 2004. Chomsky, Noam (Mar. 4, 2001). Prospects for Peace in the Middle East (http://www.countercurrents.org/ chomsky1.htm), page 2. Lecture. Cordette, Jessica, MPH(c) (2003). Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction (http://www.want2race.net/hper/ Chemical_Weapons_of_Mass_Destruction.ppt). Retrieved Nov. 29, 2004. Croddy, Eric (2001), Chemical and Biological Warfare, Copernicus, ISBN0-387-95076-1 Smart, Jeffery K., M.A. (1997). History of Biological and Chemical Warfare (http://www.usuhs.mil/cbw/ history.htm). Retrieved Nov. 24, 2004. United States Senate, 103d Congress, 2d Session. (May 25, 1994). The Riegle Report (http://www.gulfweb.org/ bigdoc/report/riegle1.html). Retrieved Nov. 6, 2004. Gerard J Fitzgerald. American Journal of Public Health. Washington: Apr 2008. Vol. 98, Iss. 4; p.611
Further reading
Leo P. Brophy and George J. B. Fisher; The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959; L. P. Brophy, W. D. Miles and C. C. Cochrane, The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field (1959); and B. E. Kleber and D. Birdsell, The Chemical Warfare Service in Combat (1966). official US history; Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree; International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation 1991 L. F. Haber. The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War Oxford University Press: 1986 James W. Hammond Jr; Poison Gas: The Myths Versus Reality Greenwood Press, 1999 Jiri Janata, Role of Analytical Chemistry in Defense Strategies Against Chemical and Biological Attack (http:// arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-anchem-060908-155242), Annual Review of Analytical Chemistry, 2009 Ishmael Jones, The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture, Encounter Books, New York 2008, revised 2010, ISBN 978-1-59403-382-7. WMD espionage. Benoit Morel and Kyle Olson; Shadows and Substance: The Chemical Weapons Convention Westview Press, 1993 Adrienne Mayor, "Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World" Overlook-Duckworth, 2003, rev ed with new Introduction 2008 Geoff Plunkett, Chemical Warfare in Australia: Australia's Involvement In Chemical Warfare 1914 - Today, (2nd Edition), 2013. (http://www.bookdepository.co.uk/Chemical-Warfare-Australia-Geoff-Plunkett/ 9780987427908). Leech Cup Books. A volume in the Army Military History Series published in association with the Army History Unit. Jonathan B. Tucker. Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda (2006)
External links
Chemical weapons and international humanitarian law (http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/ section_ihl_chemical_weapons) ATSDR Case Studies in Environmental Medicine: Cholinesterase Inhibitors, Including Insecticides and Chemical Warfare Nerve Agents (http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/csem/cholinesterase/) U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Russian Biological and Chemical Weapons (http://russianbiochemicalweapons.blogspot.com/), about the danger posed by non-state weapons transfers Gaddum Papers at the Royal Society (http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/page.asp?id=5970)
Chemical warfare Chemical Weapons stored in the United States (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/cw.htm) The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons OPCW (http://www.opcw.org) Chemical Warfare in Australia (http://www.mustardgas.org/) Classes of Chemical Agents (http://sis.nlm.nih.gov/enviro/chemicalwarfare.html#a1) U.S. National Library of Medicine Chemical warfare agent potency, logistics, human damage, dispersal, protection and types of agents (bomb-shelter.net) (http://www.bomb-shelter.net/chemical-weapons) "'War of Nerves': A History of Chemical Weapons" (http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. php?storyId=5390710) (interview with Jonathan Tucker from National Public Radio Talk of the Nation program, May 8, 2006 Chemical weapons in World War II (http://histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/air/ac-gas.html) "Our Army's Defense Against Poison Gas." (http://books.google.com/books?id=AyEDAAAAMBAJ& pg=PA106&dq=popular+science+1930&hl=en&ei=4dTRTu6lLsvUgAed8uifDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result& ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CEIQ6AEwBDhG#v=onepage&q&f=true) Popular Science, February 1945, pp.106111.
53
Nuclear weapon
The mushroom cloud of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, Japan on August 9, 1945 rose some 18 kilometers (11mi) above the bomb's hypocenter.
Nuclear weapon
54
Nuclear weapons
Background

History Warfare Arms race Design Testing Effects Delivery Espionage Proliferation Arsenals Terrorism Opposition
Nuclear-armed states

United States Russia United Kingdom France China Israel India Pakistan North Korea South Africa (former)
A nuclear weapon is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either fission or a combination of fission and fusion. Both reactions release vast quantities of energy from relatively small amounts of matter. The first fission ("atomic") bomb test released the same amount of energy as approximately 20,000 tons of TNT. The first thermonuclear ("hydrogen") bomb test released the same amount of energy as approximately 10,000,000 tons of TNT.[1] A modern thermonuclear weapon weighing little more than 2,400 pounds (1,100kg) can produce an explosive force comparable to the detonation of more than 1.2 million tons (1.1 million tonnes) of TNT.[2] Thus, even a small nuclear device no larger than traditional bombs can devastate an entire city by blast, fire and radiation. Nuclear weapons are considered weapons of mass destruction, and their use and control have been a major focus of international relations policy since their debut. Only two nuclear weapons have been used in the course of warfare, both by the United States near the end of World War II. On 6 August 1945, a uranium gun-type fission bomb code-named "Little Boy" was detonated over the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Three days later, on 9 August, a plutonium implosion-type fission bomb code-named "Fat Man" was exploded over Nagasaki, Japan. These two bombings resulted in the deaths of approximately 200,000
Nuclear weapon peoplemostly civiliansfrom acute injuries sustained from the explosions.[3] The role of the bombings in Japan's surrender, and their ethical status, remain the subject of scholarly and popular debate. Since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons have been detonated on over two thousand occasions for testing purposes and demonstrations. Only a few nations possess such weapons or are suspected of seeking them. The only countries known to have detonated nuclear weaponsand that acknowledge possessing such weaponsare (chronologically by date of first test) the United States, the Soviet Union (succeeded as a nuclear power by Russia), the United Kingdom, France, the People's Republic of China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. In addition, Israel is also widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, though it does not acknowledge having them.[][4][5] One state, South Africa, fabricated nuclear weapons in the past, but as its apartheid regime was coming to an end it disassembled its arsenal, acceded to the NPT and accepted full-scope international safeguards.[6] The Federation of American Scientists estimates there are more than 17,000 nuclear warheads in the world as of 2012, with around 4,300 of them considered "operational", ready for use.[]
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Types
There are two basic types of nuclear weapons: those that derive the majority of their energy from nuclear fission reactions alone, and those that use fission reactions to begin nuclear fusion reactions that produce a large amount of the total energy output.
Fission weapons
All existing nuclear weapons derive some of their explosive energy from nuclear fission reactions. Weapons whose explosive output is exclusively from fission reactions are commonly referred to as atomic bombs or atom bombs (abbreviated as A-bombs). This has long been noted as something of a misnomer, as their energy comes from the nucleus of the atom. In fission weapons, a mass of fissile material (enriched uranium or plutonium) is assembled into a supercritical massthe amount of material needed to start an The two basic fission weapon designs exponentially growing nuclear chain reactioneither by shooting one piece of sub-critical material into another (the "gun" method) or by compressing a sub-critical sphere of material using chemical explosives to many times its original density (the "implosion" method). The latter approach is considered more sophisticated than the former and only the latter approach can be used if the fissile material is plutonium. A major challenge in all nuclear weapon designs is to ensure that a significant fraction of the fuel is consumed before the weapon destroys itself. The amount of energy released by fission bombs can range from the equivalent of less than a ton of TNT upwards of 500,000 tons (500 kilotons) of TNT.[7]
Nuclear weapon All fission reactions necessarily generate fission products, the radioactive remains of the atomic nuclei split by the fission reactions. Many fission products are either highly radioactive (but short-lived) or moderately radioactive (but long-lived), and as such are a serious form of radioactive contamination if not fully contained. Fission products are the principal radioactive component of nuclear fallout. The most commonly used fissile materials for nuclear weapons applications have been uranium-235 and plutonium-239. Less commonly used has been uranium-233. Neptunium-237 and a number of isotopes of americium may be usable for nuclear explosives as well, but it is not clear that this has ever been implemented, and even their plausible use in nuclear weapons is a matter of scientific dispute.[8]
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Fusion weapons
The other basic type of nuclear weapon produces a large proportion of its energy in nuclear fusion reactions. Such fusion weapons are generally referred to as thermonuclear weapons or more colloquially as hydrogen bombs (abbreviated as H-bombs), as they rely on fusion reactions between isotopes of hydrogen (deuterium and tritium). All such weapons derive a significant portion, and sometimes a majority, of their energy from fission. This is because a fission weapon is required as a "trigger" for the fusion reactions, and the fusion reactions can themselves trigger additional fission reactions.[9] Only six countriesUnited States, Russia, United Kingdom, People's Republic of China, France and Indiahave conducted thermonuclear weapon tests. (Whether India has detonated a "true", multi-staged thermonuclear weapon is controversial.)[10] All thermonuclear weapons are considered much more difficult to successfully design and execute than primitive fission weapons. Almost all of the nuclear weapons deployed today use the thermonuclear design because it is more efficient.
The basics of the TellerUlam design for a hydrogen bomb: a fission bomb uses radiation to compress and heat a separate section of fusion fuel.
Nuclear weapon
57 Thermonuclear bombs work by using the energy of a fission bomb to compress and heat fusion fuel. In the Teller-Ulam design, which accounts for all multi-megaton yield hydrogen bombs, this is accomplished by placing a fission bomb and fusion fuel (tritium, deuterium, or lithium deuteride) in proximity within a special, radiation-reflecting container. When the fission bomb is detonated, gamma rays and X-rays emitted first compress the fusion fuel, then heat it to thermonuclear temperatures. The ensuing fusion reaction creates enormous numbers of high-speed neutrons, which can then induce fission in materials not normally prone to it, such as depleted uranium. Each of these components is known as a "stage", with the fission bomb as the "primary" and the fusion capsule as the "secondary". In large, megaton-range hydrogen bombs, about half of the yield comes from the final fissioning of depleted uranium.[7]
Virtually all thermonuclear weapons deployed today use the "two-stage" design described above, but it is possible to add additional fusion stageseach stage igniting a larger amount of fusion fuel in the next stage. This technique can result in thermonuclear weapons of arbitrarily large yield, in contrast to fission bombs, which are limited in their explosive force. The largest nuclear weapon ever detonatedthe Tsar Bomba of the USSR, which released an energy equivalent of over 50 million tons (50 megatons) of TNTwas a three-stage weapon. Most thermonuclear weapons are considerably smaller than this, due to practical constraints from missile warhead space and weight requirements.[] Fusion reactions do not create fission products, and thus contribute far less to the creation of nuclear fallout than fission reactions, but because all thermonuclear weapons contain at least one fission stage, and many high-yield thermonuclear devices have a final fission stage, thermonuclear weapons can generate at least as much nuclear fallout as fission-only weapons.
Edward Teller, often referred to as the "father of the hydrogen bomb"
Other types
There are other types of nuclear weapons as well. For example, a boosted fission weapon is a fission bomb that increases its explosive yield through a small amount of fusion reactions, but it is not a fusion bomb. In the boosted bomb, the neutrons produced by the fusion reactions serve primarily to increase the efficiency of the fission bomb. Some weapons are designed for special purposes; a neutron bomb is a thermonuclear weapon that yields a relatively small explosion but a relatively large amount of neutron radiation; such a device could theoretically be used to cause massive casualties while leaving infrastructure mostly intact and creating a minimal amount of fallout. The detonation of any nuclear weapon is accompanied by a blast of neutron radiation. Surrounding a nuclear weapon with suitable materials (such as cobalt or gold) creates a weapon known as a salted bomb. This device can produce exceptionally large quantities of radioactive contamination. Research has been done into the possibility of pure fusion bombs: nuclear weapons that consist of fusion reactions without requiring a fission bomb to initiate them. Such a device might provide a simpler path to thermonuclear weapons than one that required development of fission weapons first, and pure fusion weapons would create significantly less nuclear fallout than other thermonuclear weapons, since they would not disperse fission products. In 1998, the United States Department of Energy divulged that the United States had, "...made a substantial investment" in the past to develop pure fusion weapons, but that, "The U.S. does not have and is not developing a pure fusion weapon," and that, "No credible design for a pure fusion weapon resulted from the DOE investment."[11] Most variation in nuclear weapon design is for the purpose of achieving different yields for different situations, and in manipulating design elements to attempt to minimize weapon size.[7] Antimatter, which consists of particles resembling ordinary matter particles in most of their properties but having opposite electric charge, was once considered as a trigger mechanism for nuclear weapons.[12] A major obstacle is
Nuclear weapon the difficulty of producing antimatter in large enough quantities, and there is no evidence that it is feasible.[13] However, the U.S. Air Force funded studies of the physics of antimatter in the Cold War, and began considering its possible use in weapons, not just as a trigger, but as the explosive itself.[14]
58
Weapons delivery
Nuclear weapons deliverythe technology and systems used to bring a nuclear weapon to its targetis an important aspect of nuclear weapons relating both to nuclear weapon design and nuclear strategy. Additionally, development and maintenance of delivery options is among the most resource-intensive aspects of a nuclear weapons program: according to one estimate, deployment costs accounted for 57% of the total financial resources spent by the United States in relation to nuclear weapons since 1940.[15]
The first nuclear weapons were gravity bombs,
Historically the first method of delivery, and the method used in the such as this "Fat Man" weapon dropped on Nagasaki, Japan. They were very large and could two nuclear weapons used in warfare, was as a gravity bomb, dropped only be delivered by heavy bomber aircraft from bomber aircraft. This is usually the first method that countries developed, as it does not place many restrictions on the size of the weapon and weapon miniaturization requires considerable weapons design knowledge. It does, however, limit attack range, response time to an impending attack, and the number of weapons that a country can field at the same time. With the advent of miniaturization, nuclear bombs can be delivered by both strategic bombers and tactical fighter-bombers, allowing an air force to use its current fleet with little or no modification. This method may still be considered the primary means of nuclear weapons delivery; the majority of U.S. nuclear warheads, for example, are free-fall gravity bombs, namely the B61.[7] More preferable from a strategic point of view is a nuclear weapon mounted onto a missile, which can use a ballistic trajectory to deliver the warhead over the horizon. While even short range missiles allow for a faster and less vulnerable attack, the development of long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) has given some nations the ability to plausibly deliver missiles anywhere on the globe with a high likelihood of success. More advanced systems, such as multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), can launch multiple warheads at different targets from one missile, reducing the chance of a successful missile defense. Today, missiles are most common among systems designed for delivery of nuclear weapons. Making a warhead small enough to fit onto a missile, though, can be difficult.[7]
Tactical weapons have involved the most variety of delivery types, including not only gravity bombs and missiles but also artillery shells, land mines, and nuclear depth charges and torpedoes for anti-submarine warfare. An atomic mortar was also tested at one time by the United States. Small, two-man portable tactical weapons (somewhat misleadingly referred to as suitcase bombs), such as the Special Atomic Demolition Munition, have been developed, although the difficulty of combining sufficient yield with portability limits their military utility.[7]
A Trident II SLBM launched from a Royal Navy Vanguard class ballistic missile submarine.
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59
Nuclear strategy
Nuclear warfare strategy is a set of policies that deal with preventing or fighting a nuclear war. The policy of trying to prevent an attack by a nuclear weapon from another country by threatening nuclear retaliation is known as the strategy of nuclear deterrence. The goal in deterrence is to always maintain a second strike capability (the ability of a country to respond to a nuclear attack with one of its own) and potentially to strive for first strike status (the ability to completely destroy an enemy's nuclear forces before they could retaliate). During the Cold War, policy and military theorists in nuclear-enabled countries worked out models of what sorts of policies could prevent one from ever being attacked by a nuclear weapon.
Different forms of nuclear weapons delivery (see above) allow for different types of nuclear strategies. The goals of any strategy are generally to make it difficult for an enemy to launch a pre-emptive strike against the weapon system and difficult to defend against the delivery of the weapon during a potential conflict. Sometimes this has meant keeping the weapon locations hidden, such as deploying them on submarines or rail cars whose locations are very hard for an enemy to track and other times this means protecting them by burying them in hardened bunkers. Other components of nuclear strategies have included using missile defense (to destroy the missiles before they land) or implementation of civil defense measures (using early-warning systems to evacuate citizens to safe areas before an attack). Note that weapons designed to threaten large populations, or to generally deter attacks are known as strategic weapons. Weapons designed for use on a battlefield in military situations are called tactical weapons. There are critics of the very idea of nuclear strategy for waging nuclear war who have suggested that a nuclear war between two nuclear powers would result in mutual annihilation. From this point of view, the significance of nuclear weapons is purely to deter war because any nuclear war would immediately escalate out of mutual distrust and fear, resulting in mutually assured destruction. This threat of national, if not global, destruction has been a strong motivation for anti-nuclear weapons activism. Critics from the peace movement and within the military establishment have questioned the usefulness of such weapons in the current military climate. According to an advisory opinion issued by the International Court of Justice in 1996, the use of (or threat of use of) such weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, but the court did not reach an opinion as to whether or not the threat or use would be lawful in specific extreme circumstances such as if the survival of the state were at stake. Perhaps the most controversial idea in nuclear strategy is that nuclear proliferation would be desirable. This view argues that, unlike conventional weapons, nuclear weapons successfully deter all-out war between states, and they are said to have done this during the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.[16] Political scientist Kenneth Waltz is the most prominent advocate of this argument.[17][18] The threat of potentially suicidal terrorists possessing nuclear weapons (a form of nuclear terrorism) complicates the decision process. The prospect of mutually assured destruction may not deter an enemy who expects to die in the confrontation. Further, if the initial act is from a stateless terrorist instead of a sovereign nation, there is no fixed nation or fixed military targets to retaliate against. It has been argued, especially after the September 11, 2001 attacks, that this complication is the sign of the next age of nuclear strategy, distinct from the relative stability of the Cold War.[19] In 1996, the United States adopted a policy of allowing the targeting of its nuclear weapons at terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction.[20]
The United States' Peacekeeper missile was a MIRVed delivery system. Each missile could contain up to ten nuclear warheads (shown in red), each of which could be aimed at a different target. These were developed to make missile defense very difficult for an enemy country.
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60
Governance, control, and law

Because of the immense military power they can confer, the political control of nuclear weapons has been a key issue for as long as they have existed; in most countries the use of nuclear force can only be authorized by the head of government or head of state.[21] In the late 1940s, lack of mutual trust was preventing the United States and the Soviet Union from making ground towards international arms control agreements. The RussellEinstein Manifesto was issued in London on July 9, 1955 by Bertrand Russell in the midst of the Cold The International Atomic Energy Agency was War. It highlighted the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and called created in 1957 to encourage peaceful for world leaders to seek peaceful resolutions to international conflict. development of nuclear technology while providing international safeguards against nuclear The signatories included eleven pre-eminent intellectuals and proliferation. scientists, including Albert Einstein, who signed it just days before his death on April 18, 1955. A few days after the release, philanthropist Cyrus S. Eaton offered to sponsor a conferencecalled for in the manifestoin Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Eaton's birthplace. This conference was to be the first of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, held in July 1957. By the 1960s steps were being taken to limit both the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries and the environmental effects of nuclear testing. The Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) restricted all nuclear testing to underground nuclear testing, to prevent contamination from nuclear fallout, while the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) attempted to place restrictions on the types of activities signatories could participate in, with the goal of allowing the transference of non-military nuclear technology to member countries without fear of proliferation.
By type

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Brazil Bulgaria Burma Canada PRC France
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Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Mexico Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Sweden Syria ROC (Taiwan) Ukraine United Kingdom United States Proliferation

In 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established under the mandate of the United Nations to encourage development of peaceful applications for nuclear technology, provide international safeguards against its misuse, and facilitate the application of safety measures in its use. In 1996, many nations signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,[22] which prohibits all testing of nuclear weapons. A testing ban imposes a significant hindrance to nuclear arms development by any complying country.[23] The Treaty requires the ratification by 44 specific states before it can go into force; as of 2012, the ratification of eight of these states is still required.[22] Additional treaties and agreements have governed nuclear weapons stockpiles between the countries with the two largest stockpiles, the United States and the Soviet Union, and later between the United States and Russia. These include treaties such as SALT II (never ratified), START I (expired), INF, START II (never ratified), SORT, and New START, as well as non-binding agreements such as SALT I and the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives[24] of 1991. Even when they did not enter into force, these agreements helped limit and later reduce the numbers and types of nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. Nuclear weapons have also been opposed by agreements between countries. Many nations have been declared Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, areas where nuclear weapons production and deployment are prohibited, through the use of treaties. The Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) prohibited any production or deployment of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Treaty of Pelindaba (1964) prohibits nuclear weapons in many African
Nuclear weapon countries. As recently as 2006 a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone was established amongst the former Soviet republics of Central Asia prohibiting nuclear weapons. In the middle of 1996, the International Court of Justice, the highest court of the United Nations, issued an Advisory Opinion concerned with the "Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons". The court ruled that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would violate various articles of international law, including the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions, the UN Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In view of the unique, destructive characteristics of nuclear weapons, the International Committee of the Red Cross calls on States to ensure that these weapons are never used, irrespective of whether they consider them lawful or not.[25] Additionally, there have been other, specific actions meant to discourage countries from developing nuclear arms. In the wake of the tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, economic sanctions were (temporarily) levied against both countries, though neither were signatories with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. One of the stated casus belli for the initiation of the 2003 Iraq War was an accusation by the United States that Iraq was actively pursuing nuclear arms (though this was soon discovered not to be the case as the program had been discontinued). In 1981, Israel had bombed a nuclear reactor being constructed in Osirak, Iraq, in what it called an attempt to halt Iraq's previous nuclear arms ambitions; in 2007, Israel bombed another reactor being constructed in Syria.
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Disarmament
Nuclear disarmament refers to both the act of reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons and to the end state of a nuclear-free world, in which nuclear weapons are completely eliminated. Beginning with the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and continuing through the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, there have been many treaties to limit or reduce nuclear weapons testing and stockpiles. The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has as one of its explicit conditions that all signatories must "pursue negotiations in good faith" towards the long-term goal of "complete disarmament". The nuclear weapon states have largely treated that aspect of the agreement as "decorative" and without force.[26] Only one countrySouth Africahas ever fully renounced nuclear weapons they had independently developed. The former Soviet republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine returned Soviet nuclear arms stationed in their countries to Russia after the collapse of the USSR.
Ukrainian workers use equipment provided by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency to dismantle a Soviet-era missile silo. After the end of the Cold War, Ukraine and the other non-Russian, post-Soviet republics relinquished Soviet nuclear stockpiles to Russia.
Proponents of nuclear disarmament say that it would lessen the probability of nuclear war occurring, especially accidentally. Critics of nuclear disarmament say that it would undermine the present nuclear peace and deterrence and would lead to increased global instability. Various American elder statesmen,[27] who were in office during the Cold War period, have recently been advocating the elimination of nuclear weapons. These officials include Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn, and William Perry. In January 2010, Lawrence M. Krauss stated that "no issue carries more importance to the long-term health and security of humanity than the effort to reduce, and perhaps one day, rid the world of nuclear weapons".[28] In the years after the end of the Cold War, there have been numerous campaigns to urge the abolition of nuclear weapons, such as that organized by the Global Zero movement, and the goal of a "world without nuclear weapons" was advocated by United States President Barack Obama in an April 2009 speech in Prague.[29] A CNN poll from April 2010 indicated that the American public was nearly evenly split on the issue.[30]
Nuclear weapon Others have argued that nuclear weapons have made the world relatively safer, with peace through deterrence and through the stabilityinstability paradox, including in south Asia.[31][32] Professor Kenneth Waltz has argued that nuclear weapons have helped keep an uneasy peace, and further nuclear weapon proliferation might even help avoid the large scale conventional wars that were so common prior to their invention at the end of World War II.[33] In the July 2012 issue of Foreign Affairs Waltz took issue with the view of most U.S., European, and Israeli, commentators and policymakers that a nuclear-armed Iran would be unacceptable. Instead Waltz argues that it would probably be the best possible outcome, as it would restore stability to the Middle East by balancing Israel's regional monopoly on nuclear weapons.[34] Professor John Mueller of Ohio State University, the author of Atomic Obsession,[35] has also dismissed the need to interfere with Iran's nuclear program and expressed that arms control measures are counterproductive.[36] During a 2010 lecture at the University of Missouri, which was broadcast by C-Span, Dr. Mueller has also argued that the threat from nuclear weapons, by terrorists and governments alike, has been exaggerated, both in the popular media and by officials.[37]
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United Nations
The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) is a department of the United Nations Secretariat established in January 1998 as part of the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan's plan to reform the UN as presented in his report to the General Assembly in July 1997.[38] Its goal is to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and the strengthening of the disarmament regimes in respect to other weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological weapons. It also promotes disarmament efforts in the area of conventional weapons, especially land mines and small arms, which are often the weapons of choice in contemporary conflicts.
Controversy
Even before the first nuclear weapons had been developed, scientists involved with the Manhattan Project were divided over the use of the weapon. The role of the two atomic bombings of the country in Japan's surrender and the U.S.'s ethical justification for them has been the subject of scholarly and popular debate for decades. The question of whether nations should have nuclear weapons, or test them, has been continually and nearly universally controversial.
Demonstration against nuclear testing in Lyon, France, in the 1980s.
Radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons testing was first drawn to public attention in 1954 when the Castle Bravo hydrogen bomb test at the Pacific Proving Grounds contaminated the crew and catch of the Japanese fishing boat Lucky Dragon.[39] One of the fishermen died in Japan seven months later, and the fear of contaminated tuna led to a temporary boycotting of the popular staple in Japan. The incident caused widespread concern around the world, especially regarding the effects of nuclear fallout and atmospheric nuclear testing, and "provided a decisive impetus for the emergence of the anti-nuclear weapons movement in many countries".[39] Peace movements emerged in Japan and in 1954 they converged to form a unified "Japanese Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs". Japanese opposition to nuclear weapons tests in the Pacific Ocean was widespread, and "an estimated 35 million signatures were collected on petitions calling for bans on nuclear weapons".[40] In the United Kingdom, the first Aldermaston March organised by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament took place at Easter 1958, when several thousand people marched for four days from Trafalgar Square, London, to the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment close to Aldermaston in Berkshire, England, to demonstrate their opposition to nuclear weapons.[41][] The Aldermaston marches continued into the late 1960s when tens of thousands
Nuclear weapon of people took part in the four-day marches.[40] In 1959, a letter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists was the start of a successful campaign to stop the Atomic Energy Commission dumping radioactive waste in the sea 19 kilometres from Boston.[42] In 1962, Linus Pauling won the Nobel Peace Prize for his work to stop the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, and the "Ban the Bomb" movement spread.[43] In 1963, many countries ratified the Partial Test Ban Treaty prohibiting atmospheric nuclear testing. Radioactive fallout became less of an issue and the anti-nuclear weapons movement went into decline for some years.[39][44] A resurgence of interest occurred amid European and American fears of nuclear war in the 1980s.[45] Between 1940 and 1996, the U.S. spent at least $8.63trillion in present day terms[46] on nuclear weapons development. Over half was spent on building delivery mechanisms for the weapon. $541billion in present day terms was spent on nuclear waste management and environmental remediation.[47]
64
Non-weapons uses
Apart from their use as weapons, nuclear explosives have been tested and used for various non-military uses, and proposed, but not used for large-scale earth moving. When long term health and clean-up costs were included, there was no economic advantage over conventional explosives.[48] Synthetic elements, such as einsteinium and fermium, created by neutron bombardment of uranium and plutonium during thermonuclear explosions, were discovered in the aftermath of the first thermonuclear bomb test. In 2008 the worldwide presence of new isotopes from atmospheric testing beginning in the 1950s was developed into a reliable way of detecting art forgeries, as all paintings created after that period may contain traces of caesium-137 and strontium-90, isotopes that did not exist in nature before 1945.[49]
The 1962 Sedan nuclear test formed a crater 100 m (330 ft) deep with a diameter of about 390 m (1,300 ft), as a means of investigating the possibilities of using peaceful nuclear explosions for large-scale earth moving.
Nuclear explosives have also been seriously studied as potential propulsion mechanisms for space travel (see Project Orion) and for asteroid deflection.
References
Notes
[1] [2] [5] [7] See Trinity (nuclear test) and Ivy Mike. Specifically the US B83 nuclear bomb, with a yield of up to 1.2 megatons. See also Mordechai Vanunu The best overall printed sources on nuclear weapons design are: Hansen, Chuck. U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History. San Antonio, TX: Aerofax, 1988; and the more-updated Hansen, Chuck. Swords of Armageddon: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Development since 1945. Sunnyvale, CA: Chukelea Publications, 1995. [9] Carey Sublette, Nuclear Weapons Frequently Asked Questions: 4.5.2 "Dirty" and "Clean" Weapons (http:/ / nuclearweaponarchive. org/ Nwfaq/ Nfaq4-5. html#Nfaq4. 5. 2), accessed 10 May 2011. [10] On India's alleged hydrogen bomb test, see Carey Sublette, What Are the Real Yields of India's Test? (http:/ / nuclearweaponarchive. org/ India/ IndiaRealYields. html). [11] U.S. Department of Energy, Restricted Data Declassification Decisions, 1946 to the Present (RDD-8) (http:/ / www. fas. org/ sgp/ othergov/ doe/ rdd-8. pdf) (January 1, 2002), accessed November 20, 2011. [12] Page discussing the possibility of using antimatter as a trigger for a thermonuclear explosion (http:/ / cui. unige. ch/ isi/ sscr/ phys/ anti-BPP-3. html) [13] Paper discussing the number of antiprotons required to ignite a thermonuclear weapon. (http:/ / www. arxiv. org/ abs/ physics/ 0507114)
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[14] "Air Force pursuing antimatter weapons: Program was touted publicly, then came official gag order" (http:/ / sfgate. com/ cgi-bin/ article. cgi?file=/ c/ a/ 2004/ 10/ 04/ MNGM393GPK1. DTL) [15] Stephen I. Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998. See also Estimated Minimum Incurred Costs of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Programs, 19401996 (http:/ / www. brook. edu/ fp/ projects/ nucwcost/ figure1. htm), an excerpt from the book. [17] Kenneth Waltz, "More May Be Better," in Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, eds., The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Norton, 1995). [18] Kenneth Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better," (http:/ / www. mtholyoke. edu/ acad/ intrel/ waltz1. htm) Adelphi Papers, no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). [19] See, for example: Feldman, Noah. " Islam, Terror and the Second Nuclear Age (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2006/ 10/ 29/ magazine/ 29islam. html)," New York Times Magazine (29 October 2006). [20] Daniel Plesch & Stephen Young, "Senseless policy", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=sgsAAAAAMBAJ& printsec=frontcover#v=onepage& q& f=false), November/December 1998, page 4. Fetched from URL on 18 April 2011. [21] In the United States, the President and the Secretary of Defense, acting as the National Command Authority, must jointly authorize the use of nuclear weapons. [22] Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (2010). " Status of Signature and Ratification (http:/ / www. ctbto. org/ the-treaty/ status-of-signature-and-ratification)". Accessed 27 May 2010. Of the "Annex 2" states whose ratification of the CTBT is required before it enters into force, China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the United States have signed but not ratified the Treaty. India, North Korea, and Pakistan have not signed the Treaty. [23] Richelson, Jeffrey. Spying on the bomb: American nuclear intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea. New York: Norton, 2006. [24] The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) on Tactical Nuclear Weapons At a Glance (http:/ / www. armscontrol. org/ factsheets/ pniglance), Fact Sheet, Arms Control Association. [25] Nuclear weapons and international humanitarian law (http:/ / www. icrc. org/ web/ eng/ siteeng0. nsf/ htmlall/ section_ihl_nuclear_weapons) International Committee of the Red Cross [26] Gusterson, Hugh, " Finding Article VI (http:/ / www. thebulletin. org/ web-edition/ columnists/ hugh-gusterson/ finding-article-vi)" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (8 January 2007). [28] Lawrence M. Krauss. The Doomsday Clock Still Ticks, Scientific American, January 2010, p. 26. [29] Obama Prague Speech On Nuclear Weapons (http:/ / www. huffingtonpost. com/ 2009/ 04/ 05/ obama-prague-speech-on-nu_n_183219. html) [30] CNN Poll: Public divided on eliminating all nuclear weapons (http:/ / politicalticker. blogs. cnn. com/ 2010/ 04/ 12/ cnn-poll-public-divided-on-eliminating-all-nuclear-weapons/ ) [31] http:/ / www. stimson. org/ images/ uploads/ research-pdfs/ ESCCONTROLCHAPTER1. pdf [32] http:/ / krepon. armscontrolwonk. com/ archive/ 2911/ the-stability-instability-paradox [33] https:/ / www. mtholyoke. edu/ acad/ intrel/ waltz1. htm Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better, [35] http:/ / www. oup. com/ us/ catalog/ general/ subject/ Politics/ InternationalStudies/ InternationalSecurityStrategicSt/ ?view=usa& ci=9780195381368 [36] http:/ / bloggingheads. tv/ videos/ 2333 From 19:00 to 26:00 minutes [37] http:/ / www. c-spanvideo. org/ program/ AtomicO: John Mueller, "Atomic Obsession" [38] Renewing the United Nations: A Program for Reform (A/51/950) (http:/ / daccess-dds-ny. un. org/ doc/ UNDOC/ GEN/ N97/ 189/ 79/ IMG/ N9718979. pdf?OpenElement) [39] Wolfgang Rudig (1990). Anti-nuclear Movements: A World Survey of Opposition to Nuclear Energy, Longman, p. 54-55. [40] Jim Falk (1982). Global Fission: The Battle Over Nuclear Power, Oxford University Press, pp. 9697. [41] A brief history of CND (http:/ / www. cnduk. org/ pages/ binfo/ hist. html) [42] Jim Falk (1982). Global Fission: The Battle Over Nuclear Power, Oxford University Press, p. 93. [43] Jerry Brown and Rinaldo Brutoco (1997). Profiles in Power: The Anti-nuclear Movement and the Dawn of the Solar Age, Twayne Publishers, pp. 191192. [44] Jim Falk (1982). Global Fission: The Battle Over Nuclear Power, Oxford University Press, p. 98. [45] Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), chapters 16 and 19. [46] Staff. Consumer Price Index (estimate) 18002012 (http:/ / www. minneapolisfed. org/ community_education/ teacher/ calc/ hist1800. cfm). Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Retrieved February 22, 2012. [47] Brookings Institution, "Estimated Minimum Incurred Costs of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Programs, 1940-1996", at http:/ / www. brook. edu/ fp/ projects/ nucwcost/ figure1. htm
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Bibliography
Bethe, Hans Albrecht. The Road from Los Alamos. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. ISBN 0-671-74012-1 DeVolpi, Alexander, Minkov, Vladimir E., Simonenko, Vadim A., and Stanford, George S. Nuclear Shadowboxing: Contemporary Threats from Cold War Weaponry. Fidlar Doubleday, 2004 (Two volumes, both accessible on Google Book Search) (Content of both volumes is now available in the 2009 trilogy by Alexander DeVolpi: Nuclear Insights: The Cold War Legacy available on (http://www.Amazon.com). Glasstone, Samuel and Dolan, Philip J. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (third edition). (http://www.cddc.vt. edu/host/atomic/nukeffct/) Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. Available online (PDF). (http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/effects/effects.shtml) NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations (Part I Nuclear) (http://www.fas.org/ nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/dod/fm8-9/1toc.htm). Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force: Washington, D.C., 1996 Hansen, Chuck. U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History. Arlington, TX: Aerofax, 1988 Hansen, Chuck. The Swords of Armageddon: U.S. nuclear weapons development since 1945. Sunnyvale, CA: Chukelea Publications, 1995. (http://www.uscoldwar.com/) Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994. ISBN 0-300-06056-4 The Manhattan Engineer District, " The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (http://www. atomicarchive.com/Docs/MED/index.shtml)" (1946) Smyth, Henry DeWolf. Atomic Energy for Military Purposes. (http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/ SmythReport/index.shtml) Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1945. (Smyth Report the first declassified report by the US government on nuclear weapons) The Effects of Nuclear War (http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/7906/index.html). Office of Technology Assessment, May 1979. Rhodes, Richard. Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995. ISBN 0-684-82414-0 Rhodes, Richard. The Making of the Atomic Bomb. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986 ISBN 0-684-81378-5 Weart, Spencer R. Nuclear Fear: A History of Images. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988. ISBN 0-674-62836-5 Weart, Spencer R. The Rise of Nuclear Fear. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012. ISBN 0-674-05233-1
External links
Current World Nuclear Arsenals (http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/database/nukestab.html) has estimates of nuclear arsenals in the respective countries.
General
Nuclear Weapon Archive from Carey Sublette (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/) is a reliable source of information and has links to other sources and an informative FAQ (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/ Nfaq0.html). The Federation of American Scientists (http://fas.org) provide solid information on weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons (http://fas.org/nuke/) and their effects (http://www.fas.org/nuke/ intro/nuke/effects.htm) Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues (http://alsos.wlu.edu/)contains many resources related to nuclear weapons, including a historical and technical overview and searchable bibliography of web and print resources. Everything you wanted to know about nuclear technology (http://www.newscientist.com/channel/mech-tech/ nuclear)Provided by New Scientist.
Nuclear weapon Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports regarding Nuclear weapons (http://digital.library.unt.edu/ govdocs/crs/search.tkl?q=nuclear+weapons&search_crit=title&search=Search&date1=Anytime& date2=Anytime&type=form) Video archive of US, Soviet, UK, Chinese and French Nuclear Weapon Testing (http://sonicbomb.com/ modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=39) at sonicbomb.com (http://www.sonicbomb.com) The National Museum of Nuclear Science & History (United States) (http://www.nuclearmuseum.org/ )located in Albuquerque, New Mexico; a Smithsonian Affiliate Museum Nuclear Emergency and Radiation Resources (http://www.ibiblio.org/rcip/nuclear.html)
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Historical
The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb (http://www.atomicarchive.com/History/mp/index.shtml) at AtomicArchive.com Los Alamos National Laboratory: History (http://www.lanl.gov/history/) (U.S. nuclear history) Race for the Superbomb (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/), PBS website on the history of the H-bomb U.S. nuclear test photographs (http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/photos/default.htm) from the DOE Nevada Site Office U.S. nuclear test film clips (http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/films/default.htm) from the DOE Nevada Site Office Recordings of recollections of the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (http://www.voshn.com) The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (http://www.wilsoncenter. org/program/NPIHP/) or NPIHP is a global network of individuals and institutions engaged in the study of international nuclear history through archival documents, oral history interviews and other empirical sources.
Radiological weapon
By type

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Brazil Bulgaria Burma
Radiological weapon

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Canada PRC France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Mexico Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Sweden Syria ROC (Taiwan) Ukraine United Kingdom United States Proliferation

A radiological weapon or radiological dispersion device (RDD) is any weapon that is designed to spread radioactive material with the intent to kill and cause disruption. One version, known as a dirty bomb, is not a true nuclear weapon and does not yield the same explosive power. It uses conventional explosives to spread radioactive material, most commonly the spent fuels from nuclear power plants or radioactive medical waste. Another version is the salted bomb, a true nuclear weapon designed to produce larger amounts of nuclear fallout than a regular nuclear weapon.
Radiological weapon
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Explanation
Radiological weapons of mass destruction have been suggested as a possible weapon of terrorism used to create panic and casualties in densely populated areas. They could also render a great deal of property useless for an extended period, unless costly remediation were undertaken. The radiological source and quality greatly impacts the effectiveness of a radiological weapon. Factors such as: energy and type of radiation, half-life, longevity, availability, shielding, portability, and the role of the environment will determine the effect of the radiological weapon. Radioisotopes that pose the greatest security risk include: 137Cs, used in radiological medical equipment, 60Co, 241Am, 252Cf, 192Ir, 238Pu, 90Sr, and 226Ra. All of these isotopes, except for the final one, are created in nuclear power plants. While the amount of radiation dispersed from the event will likely be minimal, the fact of any radiation may be enough to cause panic and disruption.
History
The professional history of radioactive weaponry may be traced to a 1943 memo from James Bryant Conant, Arthur Holly Compton, and Harold Urey, to Brigadier General Leslie Groves of the Manhattan Project and to a 1940 science fiction story, "Solution Unsatisfactory"[1] by Lt. J. G. Robert A. Heinlein, USN(R). Transmitting a report entitled, "Use of Radioactive Materials as a Military Weapon," the Groves memo states: As a gas warfare instrument the material would ... be inhaled by personnel. The amount necessary to cause death to a person inhaling the material is extremely small. It has been estimated that one millionth of a gram accumulating in a person's body would be fatal. There are no known methods of treatment for such a casualty.... It cannot be detected by the senses; It can be distributed in a dust or smoke form so finely powdered that it will permeate a standard gas mask filter in quantities large enough to be extremely damaging.... Radioactive warfare can be used [...] To make evacuated areas uninhabitable; To contaminate small critical areas such as rail-road yards and airports; As a radioactive poison gas to create casualties among troops; Against large cities, to promote panic, and create casualties among civilian populations. Areas so contaminated by radioactive dusts and smokes, would be dangerous as long as a high enough concentration of material could be maintained.... they can be stirred up as a fine dust from the terrain by winds, movement of vehicles or troops, etc., and would remain a potential hazard for a long time. These materials may also be so disposed as to be taken into the body by ingestion instead of inhalation. Reservoirs or wells would be contaminated or food poisoned with an effect similar to that resulting from inhalation of dust or smoke. Four days production could contaminate a million gallons of water to an extent that a quart drunk in one day would probably result in complete incapacitation or death in about a month's time.
Radiological weapon
70
The United States, however, chose not to pursue radiological weapons during World War II, though early on in the project considered it as a backup plan in case nuclear fission proved impossible to tame. Some US policymakers and scientists involved in the project felt that radiological weapons would qualify as chemical weapons and thus violate international law.
Deployment
One possible way of dispersing the material is by using a dirty bomb, a conventional explosive which disperses radioactive material. Dirty bombs are not a type of nuclear weapon, which requires a nuclear chain reaction and the creation of a critical mass. Whereas a nuclear weapon will usually create mass casualties immediately following the blast, a dirty bomb scenario would initially cause only minimal casualties from the conventional explosion. Means of radiological warfare that do not rely on any specific weapon, but rather on spreading radioactive contamination via a food chain or water table, seem to be more effective in some ways, but share many of the same problems as chemical warfare.
October 30, 1943 memo from Drs. Conant, Compton, and Urey to Brigadier General L. R. Groves, Manhattan District, Oak Ridge, Tennessee; declassified June 5, 1974.
Military uses
Radiological weapons are widely considered to be militarily useless for a state-sponsored army and are initially not hoped to be used by any military forces. Firstly, the use of such a weapon is of no use to an occupying force, as the target area becomes uninhabitable (due to the fallout caused by radioactive poisoning of the involved environment). Furthermore, area-denial weapons are generally of limited use to an attacking army, as it slows the rate of advance.
Dirty bombs
A dirty bomb is a radiological weapon dispersed with conventional explosives. There is currently (as of 2007) an ongoing debate about the damage that terrorists using such a weapon might inflict. Many experts believe that a dirty bomb such that terrorists might reasonably be able to construct would be unlikely to harm more than a few people and hence it would be no more deadly than a conventional bomb. Furthermore, the casualties would be a result of the initial explosion, because alpha and beta emitting material needs to be inhaled to do damage to the human body. Gamma radiation emitting material is so radioactive that it can't be deployed without wrapping an amount of shielding material around the bomb that would make transport by car or plane impossible without risking detection. Because of this a dirty bomb with radioactive material around an explosive device would be almost useless, unless said shielding was removed shortly before detonation. This is not only because of the effectiveness but also because this material would be easy to clean up. Furthermore, the possibility of terrorists making a gas or aerosol that is radioactive is very unlikely because of the complex chemical work to achieve this goal.[2] Hence, this line of argument goes, the objectively dominant effect would be the moral and economic damage due to the massive fear and panic such an incident would spur. On the other hand, some believe that the fatalities and injuries might be in fact much more severe. This point was made by physicist Peter D. Zimmerman (King's College London) who reexamined the Goinia accident which is arguably comparable.[3] and popularized in a subsequent
Radiological weapon fictionalized account produced by the BBC and broadcast in the United States by PBS.[4] The latter program showed how shielding might be used to minimize the detection risk.
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Salted bomb
A salted bomb is a theoretical nuclear weapon designed to produce enhanced quantities of radioactive fallout, rendering a large area uninhabitable. As far as is publicly known none has ever been built.
Notes
[1] http:/ / www. webscription. net/ chapters/ 0743471598/ 0743471598___5. htm Full story at publisher's web site [2] http:/ / news. illinois. edu/ gentips/ 02/ 07dirtybomb. html [3] http:/ / hps. org/ documents/ RDD_report. pdf Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited in Defense Horizons, Feb. 2004, a publication of the National Defense University [4] http:/ / www. pbs. org/ wgbh/ nova/ dirtybomb/ Dirty Bomb
References External links

Annotated bibliography for radiological dispersal devices (RDD) from the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues (http://alsos.wlu.edu/qsearch.aspx?browse=warfare/Radiological+Dispersal+Devices+(RDD))
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Proliferation
Nuclear proliferation
World map with List of countries with nuclear weaponsnuclear weapons development status represented by color. Five "nuclear weapons states" from the NPTOther states known to possess nuclear weaponsStates formerly possessing nuclear weaponsStates suspected of being in the process of developing nuclear weapons and/or nuclear programsStates which at one point had nuclear weapons and/or nuclear weapons research programsStates that possess nuclear weapons, but have not widely adopted them
Nuclear weapons
Background


United States Russia

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United Kingdom France China Israel India Pakistan North Korea South Africa (former)
Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons, fissile material, and weapons-applicable nuclear technology and information to nations not recognized as "Nuclear Weapon States" by the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT. Proliferation has been opposed by many nations with and without nuclear weapons, the governments of which fear that more countries with nuclear weapons may increase the possibility of nuclear warfare (up to and including the so-called "countervalue" targeting of civilians with nuclear weapons), de-stabilize international or regional relations, or infringe upon the national sovereignty of states. Four countries besides the five recognized Nuclear Weapons States have acquired, or are presumed to have acquired, nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. None of these four is a party to the NPT, although North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985, then withdrew in 2003 and conducted announced nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013. One critique of the NPT is that it is discriminatory in recognizing as nuclear weapon states only those countries that tested nuclear weapons before 1968 and requiring all other states joining the treaty to forswear nuclear weapons.[citation needed]
Research into the development of nuclear weapons was undertaken during World War II by the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and the USSR. The United States was the first and is the only country to have used a nuclear weapon in war, when it used two bombs against Japan in August 1945. With their loss during the war, Germany and Japan ceased to be involved in any nuclear weapon research. In August 1949, the USSR tested a nuclear weapon.[1] The United Kingdom tested a nuclear weapon in October 1952. France developed a nuclear weapon in 1960. The People's Republic of China detonated a nuclear weapon in 1964. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, and Pakistan tested a weapon in 1998. In 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test.
Non-proliferation efforts
Early efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation involved intense government secrecy, the wartime acquisition of known uranium stores (the Combined Development Trust), and at times even outright sabotagesuch as the bombing of a heavy-water facility thought to be used for a German nuclear program. None of these efforts were explicitly public, because the weapon developments themselves were kept secret until the bombing of Hiroshima. Earnest international efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation began soon after World War II, when the Truman Administration proposed the Baruch Plan[2] of 1946, named after Bernard Baruch, America's first representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. The Baruch Plan, which drew heavily from the AchesonLilienthal Report of 1946, proposed the verifiable dismantlement and destruction of the U.S. nuclear arsenal (which, at that time, was the only nuclear arsenal in the world) after all governments had cooperated successfully to accomplish two things: (1) the establishment of an "international atomic development authority," which would actually own and control all military-applicable nuclear materials and activities, and (2) the creation of a system of automatic sanctions, which not even the U.N. Security Council could veto, and which would proportionately punish states attempting to acquire the capability to make nuclear weapons or fissile material.
Nuclear proliferation Although the Baruch Plan enjoyed wide international support, it failed to emerge from the UNAEC because the Soviet Union planned to veto it in the Security Council. Still, it remained official American policy until 1953, when President Eisenhower made his "Atoms for Peace" proposal before the U.N. General Assembly. Eisenhower's proposal led eventually to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957. Under the "Atoms for Peace" program thousands of scientists from around the world were educated in nuclear science and then dispatched home, where many later pursued secret weapons programs in their home country.[] Efforts to conclude an international agreement to limit the spread of nuclear weapons did not begin until the early 1960s, after four nations (the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France) had acquired nuclear weapons (see List of states with nuclear weapons for more information). Although these efforts stalled in the early 1960s, they renewed once again in 1964, after China detonated a nuclear weapon. In 1968, governments represented at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) finished negotiations on the text of the NPT. In June 1968, the U.N. General Assembly endorsed the NPT with General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII), and in July 1968, the NPT opened for signature in Washington, DC, London and Moscow. The NPT entered into force in March 1970. Since the mid-1970s, the primary focus of non-proliferation efforts has been to maintain, and even increase, international control over the fissile material and specialized technologies necessary to build such devices because these are the most difficult and expensive parts of a nuclear weapons program. The main materials whose generation and distribution is controlled are highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Other than the acquisition of these special materials, the scientific and technical means for weapons construction to develop rudimentary, but working, nuclear explosive devices are considered to be within the reach of industrialized nations. Since its founding by the United Nations in 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has promoted two, sometimes contradictory, missions: on the one hand, the Agency seeks to promote and spread internationally the use of civilian nuclear energy; on the other hand, it seeks to prevent, or at least detect, the diversion of civilian nuclear energy to nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices or purposes unknown. The IAEA now operates a safeguards system as specified under Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, which aims to ensure that civil stocks of uranium, plutonium, as well as facilities and technologies associated with these nuclear materials, are used only for peaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to proliferation or nuclear weapons programs. It is often argued that proliferation of nuclear weapons to many other states has been prevented by the extension of assurances and mutual defence treaties to these states by nuclear powers, but other factors, such as national prestige, or specific historical experiences, also play a part in hastening or stopping nuclear proliferation.[3]
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Dual use technology

Dual-use technology refers to the possibility of military use of civilian nuclear power technology. Many technologies and materials associated with the creation of a nuclear power program have a dual-use capability, in that they can be used to make nuclear weapons if a country chooses to do so. When this happens a nuclear power program can become a route leading to the atomic bomb or a public annex to a secret bomb program. The crisis over Irans nuclear activities is a case in point.[] Many UN and US agencies warn that building more nuclear reactors unavoidably increases nuclear proliferation risks.[4] A fundamental goal for American and global security is to minimize the proliferation risks associated with the expansion of nuclear power. If this development is "poorly managed or efforts to contain risks are unsuccessful, the nuclear future will be dangerous".[] For nuclear power programs to be developed and managed safely and securely, it is important that countries have domestic good governance characteristics that will encourage proper nuclear operations and management:[] These characteristics include low degrees of corruption (to avoid officials selling materials and technology for their own personal gain as occurred with the A.Q. Khan smuggling network in Pakistan), high degrees of political stability (defined by the World Bank as likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated
Nuclear proliferation violence and terrorism), high governmental effectiveness scores (a World Bank aggregate measure of the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures [and] the quality of policy formulation and implementation), and a strong degree of regulatory competence.[]
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International cooperation
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
At present, 189 countries are States Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, more commonly known as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT. These include the five Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) recognized by the NPT: the People's Republic of China, France, Russian Federation, the UK, and the United States. Notable non-signatories to the NPT are Israel, Pakistan, and India (the latter two have since tested nuclear weapons, while Israel is considered by most to be an unacknowledged nuclear weapons state). North Korea was once a signatory but withdrew in January 2003. The legality of North Korea's withdrawal is debatable but as of 9 October 2006, North Korea clearly possesses the capability to make a nuclear explosive device.
International Atomic Energy Agency

The IAEA was established on 29 July 1957 to help nations develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Allied to this role is the administration of safeguards arrangements to provide assurance to the international community that individual countries are honoring their commitments under the treaty. Though established under its own international treaty, the IAEA reports to both the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council. The IAEA regularly inspects civil nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation supplied to it. The agency checks inventories, and samples and analyzes materials. Safeguards are designed to deter diversion of nuclear material by increasing the risk of early detection. They are complemented by controls on the export of sensitive technology from countries such as UK and United States through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The main concern of the IAEA is that uranium not be enriched beyond what is necessary for commercial civil plants, and that plutonium which is produced by nuclear reactors not be refined into a form that would be suitable for bomb production.
Scope of safeguards
Traditional safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes. Parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguard measures applied by the IAEA. These require that operators of nuclear facilities maintain and declare detailed accounting records of all movements and transactions involving nuclear material. Over 550 facilities and several hundred other locations are subject to regular inspection, and their records and the nuclear material being audited. Inspections by the IAEA are complemented by other measures such as surveillance cameras and instrumentation. The inspections act as an alert system providing a warning of the possible diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities. The system relies on; 1. Material Accountancy tracking all inward and outward transfers and the flow of materials in any nuclear facility. This includes sampling and analysis of nuclear material, on-site inspections, and review and verification of operating records. 2. Physical Security restricting access to nuclear materials at the site. 3. Containment and Surveillance use of seals, automatic cameras and other instruments to detect unreported movement or tampering with nuclear materials, as well as spot checks on-site.
Nuclear proliferation All NPT non-weapons states must accept these full-scope safeguards. In the five weapons states plus the non-NPT states (India, Pakistan and Israel), facility-specific safeguards apply. IAEA inspectors regularly visit these facilities to verify completeness and accuracy of records. The terms of the NPT cannot be enforced by the IAEA itself, nor can nations be forced to sign the treaty. In reality, as shown in Iraq and North Korea, safeguards can be backed up by diplomatic, political and economic measures. While traditional safeguards easily verified the correctness of formal declarations by suspect states, in the 1990s attention turned to what might not have been declared. While accepting safeguards at declared facilities, Iraq had set up elaborate equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium to weapons grade. North Korea attempted to use research reactors (not commercial electricity-generating reactors) and a reprocessing plant to produce some weapons-grade plutonium. The weakness of the NPT regime lay in the fact that no obvious diversion of material was involved. The uranium used as fuel probably came from indigenous sources, and the nuclear facilities were built by the countries themselves without being declared or placed under safeguards. Iraq, as an NPT party, was obliged to declare all facilities but did not do so. Nevertheless, the activities were detected and brought under control using international diplomacy. In Iraq, a military defeat assisted this process. In North Korea, the activities concerned took place before the conclusion of its NPT safeguards agreement. With North Korea, the promised provision of commercial power reactors appeared to resolve the situation for a time, but it later withdrew from the NPT and declared it had nuclear weapons.
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Additional Protocol
In 1993 a program was initiated to strengthen and extend the classical safeguards system, and a model protocol was agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors 1997. The measures boosted the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no connection to the civil fuel cycle. Innovations were of two kinds. Some could be implemented on the basis of IAEA's existing legal authority through safeguards agreements and inspections. Others required further legal authority to be conferred through an Additional Protocol. This must be agreed by each non-weapons state with IAEA, as a supplement to any existing comprehensive safeguards agreement. Weapons states have agreed to accept the principles of the model additional protocol. Key elements of the model Additional Protocol: The IAEA is to be given considerably more information on nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including R & D, production of uranium and thorium (regardless of whether it is traded), and nuclear-related imports and exports. IAEA inspectors will have greater rights of access. This will include any suspect location, it can be at short notice (e.g., two hours), and the IAEA can deploy environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit activities. States must streamline administrative procedures so that IAEA inspectors get automatic visa renewal and can communicate more readily with IAEA headquarters. Further evolution of safeguards is towards evaluation of each state, taking account of its particular situation and the kind of nuclear materials it has. This will involve greater judgement on the part of IAEA and the development of effective methodologies which reassure NPT States. As of 20 December 2010, 139 countries have signed Additional Protocols, 104 have brought them into force, and one (Iraq) is implementing its protocol provisionally.[5] The IAEA is also applying the measures of the Additional Protocol in Taiwan.[6] Among the leading countries that have not signed the Additional Protocol are Egypt, which says it will not sign until Israel accepts comprehensive IAEA safeguards,[7] and Brazil, which opposes making the protocol a requirement for international cooperation on enrichment and reprocessing,[8] but has not ruled out signing.[9]
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Limitations of Safeguards
The greatest risk from nuclear weapons proliferation comes from countries which have not joined the NPT and which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities; India, Pakistan, and Israel fall within this category. While safeguards apply to some of their activities, others remain beyond scrutiny. A further concern is that countries may develop various sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities and research reactors under full safeguards and then subsequently opt out of the NPT. Bilateral agreements, such as insisted upon by Australia and Canada for sale of uranium, address this by including fallback provisions, but many countries are outside the scope of these agreements. If a nuclear-capable country does leave the NPT, it is likely to be reported by the IAEA to the UN Security Council, just as if it were in breach of its safeguards agreement. Trade sanctions would then be likely. IAEA safeguards, together with bilateral safeguards applied under the NPT can, and do, ensure that uranium supplied by countries such as Australia and Canada does not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact, the worldwide application of those safeguards and the substantial world trade in uranium for nuclear electricity make the proliferation of nuclear weapons much less likely. The Additional Protocol, once it is widely in force, will provide credible assurance that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in the states concerned. This will be a major step forward in preventing nuclear proliferation.
Other developments
The Nuclear Suppliers Group communicated its guidelines, essentially a set of export rules, to the IAEA in 1978. These were to ensure that transfers of nuclear material or equipment would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities, and formal government assurances to this effect were required from recipients. The Guidelines also recognised the need for physical protection measures in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable materials, and strengthened retransfer provisions. The group began with seven members the United States, the former USSR, the UK, France, Germany, Canada and Japan but now includes 46 countries including all five nuclear weapons states. According to Kenneth D. Bergeron's Tritium on Ice: The Dangerous New Alliance of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power, tritium is not classified as a 'special nuclear material' but rather as a 'by-product'. It is seen as an important litmus test on the seriousness of the United States' intention to nuclear disarm. This radioactive super-heavy hydrogen isotope is used to boost the efficiency of fissile materials in nuclear weapons. The United States resumed tritium production in 2003 for the first time in 15 years. This could indicate that there is a potential nuclear arm stockpile replacement since the isotope naturally decays. In May 1995, NPT parties reaffirmed their commitment to a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty to prohibit the production of any further fissile material for weapons. This aims to complement the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996 (not entered into force as of 2011) and to codify commitments made by the United States, the UK, France and Russia to cease production of weapons material, as well as putting a similar ban on China. This treaty will also put more pressure on Israel, India and Pakistan to agree to international verification.[citation needed] On 9 August 2005, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. Khamenei's official statement was made at the meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna.[10] As of February 2006 Iran formally announced that uranium enrichment within their borders has continued. Iran claims it is for peaceful purposes but the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States claim the purpose is for nuclear weapons research and construction.[11]
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Unsanctioned nuclear activity
By type

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Brazil Bulgaria Burma Canada PRC France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Mexico Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Sweden Syria ROC (Taiwan) Ukraine United Kingdom United States
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Proliferation

NPT Non-Signatories
India, Pakistan and Israel have been "threshold" countries in terms of the international non-proliferation regime. They possess or are quickly capable of assembling one or more nuclear weapons. They have remained outside the 1970 NPT. They are thus largely excluded from trade in nuclear plant or materials, except for safety-related devices for a few safeguarded facilities. In May 1998 India and Pakistan each exploded several nuclear devices underground. This heightened concerns regarding an arms race between them, with Pakistan involving the People's Republic of China, an acknowledged nuclear weapons state. Both countries are opposed to the NPT as it stands, and India has consistently attacked the Treaty since its inception in 1970 labeling it as a lopsided treaty in favor of the nuclear powers. Relations between the two countries are tense and hostile, and the risks of nuclear conflict between them have long been considered quite high. Kashmir is a prime cause of bilateral tension, its sovereignty being in dispute since 1948. There is persistent low level military conflict due to Pakistan backing an insurgency there and the disputed status of Kashmir. Both engaged in a conventional arms race in the 1980s, including sophisticated technology and equipment capable of delivering nuclear weapons. In the 1990s the arms race quickened. In 1994 India reversed a four-year trend of reduced allocations for defence, and despite its much smaller economy, Pakistan was expected to push its own expenditures yet higher. Both have lost their patrons: India, the former USSR, and Pakistan, the United States. But it is the growth and modernization of China's nuclear arsenal and its assistance with Pakistan's nuclear power programme and, reportedly, with missile technology, which exacerbate Indian concerns. In particular, Pakistan is aided by China's People's Liberation Army, which operates somewhat autonomously within that country as an exporter of military material. India Nuclear power for civil use is well established in India. Its civil nuclear strategy has been directed towards complete independence in the nuclear fuel cycle, necessary because of its outspoken rejection of the NPT. This self-sufficiency extends from uranium exploration and mining through fuel fabrication, heavy water production, reactor design and construction, to reprocessing and waste management. It has a small fast breeder reactor and is planning a much larger one. It is also developing technology to utilise its abundant resources of thorium as a nuclear fuel. India has 14 small nuclear power reactors in commercial operation, two larger ones under construction, and ten more planned. The 14 operating ones (2548 MWe total) comprise: two 150 MWe BWRs from the United States, which started up in 1969, now use locally enriched uranium and are under safeguards, two small Canadian PHWRs (1972 & 1980), also under safeguards, and ten local PHWRs based on Canadian designs, two of 150 and eight 200 MWe. two new 540 MWe and two 700 MWe plants at Tarapur (known as TAPP: Tarapur Atomic Power Project)
Nuclear proliferation The two under construction and two of the planned ones are 450 MWe versions of these 200 MWe domestic products. Construction has been seriously delayed by financial and technical problems. In 2001 a final agreement was signed with Russia for the country's first large nuclear power plant, comprising two VVER-1000 reactors, under a Russian-financed US$3 billion contract. The first unit is due to be commissioned in 2007. A further two Russian units are under consideration for the site. Nuclear power supplied 3.1% of India's electricity in 2000 and this was expected to reach 10% by 2005. Its industry is largely without IAEA safeguards, though a few plants (see above) are under facility-specific safeguards. As a result India's nuclear power programme proceeds largely without fuel or technological assistance from other countries. Its weapons material appears to come from a Canadian-designed 40MW "research" reactor which started up in 1960, well before the NPT, and a 100MW indigenous unit in operation since 1985. Both use local uranium, as India does not import any nuclear fuel. It is estimated that India may have built up enough weapons-grade plutonium for a hundred nuclear warheads. It is widely believed that the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan used CANDU reactors to produce fissionable materials for their weapons; however, this is not accurate. Both Canada (by supplying the 40 MW research reactor) and the United States (by supplying 21 tons of heavy water) supplied India with the technology necessary to create a nuclear weapons program, dubbed CIRUS (Canada-India Reactor, United States). Canada sold India the reactor on the condition that the reactor and any by-products would be "employed for peaceful purposes only." [12]. Similarly, the United States sold India heavy water for use in the reactor "only... in connection with research into and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes" [13]. India, in violation of these agreements, used the Canadian-supplied reactor and American-supplied heavy water to produce plutonium for their first nuclear explosion, Smiling Buddha.[] The Indian government controversially justified this, however, by claiming that Smiling Buddha was a "peaceful nuclear explosion." The country has at least three other research reactors including the tiny one which is exploring the use of thorium as a nuclear fuel, by breeding fissile U-233. In addition, an advanced heavy-water thorium cycle is under development. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, the so-called Smiling Buddha test, which it has consistently claimed was for peaceful purposes. Others saw it as a response to China's nuclear weapons capability. It was then universally perceived, notwithstanding official denials, to possess, or to be able to quickly assemble, nuclear weapons. In 1999 it deployed its own medium-range missile and has developed an intermediate-range missile capable of reaching targets in China's industrial heartland. In 1995 the United States quietly intervened to head off a proposed nuclear test. However, in 1998 there were five more tests in Operation Shakti. These were unambiguously military, including one claimed to be of a sophisticated thermonuclear device, and their declared purpose was "to help in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields and different delivery systems". Indian security policies are driven by: its determination to be recognized as a dominant power in the region its increasing concern with China's expanding nuclear weapons and missile delivery programmes its concern with Pakistan's capability to deliver nuclear weapons deep into India It perceives nuclear weapons as a cost-effective political counter to China's nuclear and conventional weaponry, and the effects of its nuclear weapons policy in provoking Pakistan is, by some accounts, considered incidental. India has had an unhappy relationship with China. After an uneasy ceasefire ended the 1962 war, relations between the two nations were frozen until 1998. Since then a degree of high-level contact has been established and a few elementary confidence-building measures put in place. China still occupies some territory which it captured during the aforementioned war, claimed by India, and India still occupies some territory claimed by China. Its nuclear weapon and missile support for Pakistan is a major bone of contention.
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Nuclear proliferation American President George W. Bush met with India Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to discuss India's involvement with nuclear weapons. The two countries agreed that the United States would give nuclear power assistance to India.[citation needed] Pakistan Over the several years, the Nuclear power infrastructure has been well established by Pakistan which is dedicated for the industrial and economic development of the country.[] Its current nuclear policy is directed and aimed to promote the socio-economic development of the people as a "foremost priority";[] and to fulfill the energy, economic, and industrial needs from the nuclear sources.[] Currently, there are three operational mega-commercial nuclear power plants while three larger ones are under construction.[] The nuclear power supplies 787MW (roughly ~3.6%) of electricity as of 2012, and the country has projected to produce 8800MW electricity by 2030.[] Infrastructure established by the IAEA and the U.S. in 1950s1960s were based on peaceful research and development and economic prosperity of the country.[]
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In 2003, Libya admitted that the nuclear weapons-related material including these centrifuges, known as Pak-1, were acquired from Pakistan
Although the civil-sector nuclear power was established in 1950s, the country has an active nuclear weapons program which was started in 1970s.[] The bomb program has its roots after East-Pakistan gained its independence as Bangladesh after India's successful intervention led to a decisive victory on Pakistan in 1971.[] This large-scale but clandestine atomic bomb project was directed towards the development of ingenious development of reactor and military-grade plutonium.[] In 1974, when India surprised the outer world with its successful detonation of its own bomb, codename Smiling Buddha, it became "imperative for Pakistan" to pursue the weapons research.[] According to leading scientist in the program, it became clear once India detonated the bomb, "Newton's third law" came into "operation", from then on it was a classic case of "action and reaction".[] Earlier efforts were directed towards mastering the plutonium technology from France, but plutonium route was partially slowed down when the plan was failed after the U.S. intervention to cancel the project.[] Contrary to popular perception, Pakistan did not forego the "plutonium" route and covertly continued its indegenious research under Munir Khan and it succeeded with plutonium route in early 1980s.[] Reacting on India's nuclear test (Smiling Buddha), Bhutto and the country's elite political and military science circle sensed this test as final and dangerous anticipation to Pakistan's "moral and physical existence."[] With Aziz Ahmed on his side, Bhutto launched a serious diplomatic offense and aggressively maintained at the session of the United Nations Security Council: Pakistan was exposed to a kind of "nuclear threat and blackmail" unparalleled elsewhere..... (...)... If the world's community failed to provide political insurance to Pakistan and other countries against the nuclear blackmail, these countries would be constraint to launch atomic bomb programs of their own!... [A]ssurances provided by the United Nations were not "Enough!"... Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, statement written in "Eating Grass",source[] After 1974, Bhutto's government redoubled its effort, this time equally focused on uranium and plutonium.[] Pakistan had established science directorates in almost all of her embassies in the important countries of the world, with theoretical physicist S.A. Butt being the director.[] Abdul Qadeer Khan then established a network through Dubai to smuggle URENCO technology to Engineering Research Laboratories.[14][15][][][16][17] Earlier, he worked with Physics Dynamics Research Laboratories (FDO), a subsidiary of the Dutch firm VMF-Stork based in Amsterdam. Later after joining, the Urenco, he had access through photographs and documents of the technology.[] Against the popular perception, the technology that A.Q. Khan had brought from Urenco was based on first generation civil rector technology, filled with many serious technical errors, though it was authentic and vital link for centrifuge
Nuclear proliferation project of the country.[] After the British Government stopped the British subsidiary of the American Emerson Electric Co. from shipping the components to Pakistan, he describes his frustration with a supplier from Germany as: "That man from the German team was unethical.[] When he did not get the order from us, he wrote a letter to a Labour Party member and questions were asked in [British] Parliament."[] By 1978, his efforts were paid off and made him into a national hero.[] In 1981, as a tribute, President General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, renamed the research institute after his name.[] In early 1996, Prime minister Benazir Bhutto made it clear that "if India conducts a nuclear test, Pakistan could be forced to "follow suit".[18][] In 1997, her statement was echoed by Prime minister Nawaz Sharif who maintained to the fact that: "Since 1972, [P]akistan had progressed significantly, and we have left that stage (developmental) far behind. Pakistan will not be made a "hostage" to India by signing the CTBT, before (India).!"[] In May 1998, within weeks of India's nuclear tests, Pakistan announced that it had conducted six underground tests in the Chagai Hills, five on the 28th and one on the 30th of that month. Seismic events consistent with these claims were recorded. In 2003, the IAEA unearthed a large-scale controversial nuclear scandal with close ties to Pakistan.[19] In 2004, the revelation of A.Q. Khan's efforts also led the exposure of many defunct European consortium who defied export restrictions in 1970s, and many of defunct Dutch companies exported thousands of centrifuges to Pakistan as early as 1976.[20] The findings exposed the Israeli involvement in this scandal when the Israeli national Asher Karni was arrested, who used the same route to provide aide to Israeli nuclear program.[19] On contrary, the centrifuge components were apparently manufactured in Malaysian Scomi Precision Engineering with the assistance of South Asian and German companies, and used a UAE-based computer company as a false front.[19] The investigations also led the exposure of many defunct European consortium who defied export restrictions in 1970s, and many of defunct Dutch companies exported thousands of centrifuges to Pakistan as early as 1976.[20] The findings exposed the Israeli involvement in this scandal when the Israeli national Asher Karni was arrested, who used the same route to provide aide to Israeli nuclear program.[19] It was widely believed to have direct involvement of the government of Pakistan.[] This claim could not be verified due to the refusal of the government of Pakistan to allow IAEA to interview the alleged head of the nuclear black market, who happened to be no other than A.Q. Khan. Confessing his crimes later a month on national television, he bailed out the government by taking full responsibility.[] Independent investigation conducted by IISS confirmed that he had control over the import-export deals, and his acquisition activities were largely unsupervised by Pakistan governmental authorities.[] All of his activities went undetected for several years. He duly confessed of running the atomic proliferation ring from Pakistan to Iran and North Korea. He was immediately given presidential immunity.[] Exact nature of the involvement at the governmental level is still unclear, but the manner in which the government acted cast doubt on the sincerity of Pakistan.[] North Korea The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (or better known as North Korea), joined the NPT in 1985 and had subsequently signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. However, it was believed that North Korea was diverting plutonium extracted from the fuel of its reactor at Yongbyon, for use in nuclear weapons. The subsequent confrontation with IAEA on the issue of inspections and suspected violations, resulted in North Korea threatening to withdraw from the NPT in 1993. This eventually led to negotiations with the United States resulting in the Agreed Framework of 1994, which provided for IAEA safeguards being applied to its reactors and spent fuel rods. These spent fuel rods were sealed in canisters by the United States to prevent North Korea from extracting plutonium from them. North Korea had to therefore freeze its plutonium programme. During this period, Pakistan-North Korea cooperation in missile technology transfer was being established. A high level delegation of Pakistan military visited North Korea in AugustSeptember 1992, reportedly to discuss the supply of missile technology to Pakistan. In 1993, PM Benazir Bhutto repeatedly traveled to China, and the paid state visit to North Korea. The visits are believed to be related to the subsequent acquisition technology to developed
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Nuclear proliferation its Ghauri system by Pakistan. During the period 19921994, A.Q. Khan was reported to have visited North Korea thirteen times. The missile cooperation program with North Korea was under Dr. A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories. At this time China was under U.S. pressure not to supply the M Dongfeng series of missiles to Pakistan. It is believed by experts that possibly with Chinese connivance and facilitation, the latter was forced to approach North Korea for missile transfers. Reports indicate that North Korea was willing to supply missile sub-systems including rocket motors, inertial guidance systems, control and testing equipment for US$ 50 million. It is not clear what North Korea got in return. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. in Jane's Defence Weekly (27 November 2002) reports that Western analysts had begun to question what North Korea received in payment for the missiles; many suspected it was the nuclear technology. The KRL was in charge of both uranium program and also of the missile program with North Korea. It is therefore likely during this period that cooperation in nuclear technology between Pakistan and North Korea was initiated. Western intelligence agencies began to notice exchange of personnel, technology and components between KRL and entities of the North Korean 2nd Economic Committee (responsible for weapons production). A New York Times report on 18 October 2002 quoted U.S. intelligence officials having stated that Pakistan was a major supplier of critical equipment to North Korea. The report added that equipment such as gas centrifuges appeared to have been "part of a barter deal" in which North Korea supplied Pakistan with missiles. Separate reports indicate (The Washington Times, 22 November 2002) that U.S. intelligence had as early as 1999 picked up signs that North Korea was continuing to develop nuclear arms. Other reports also indicate that North Korea had been working covertly to develop an enrichment capability for nuclear weapons for at least five years and had used technology obtained from Pakistan (Washington Times, 18 October 2002). Israel Israel is also thought to possess an arsenal of potentially up to several hundred nuclear warheads based on estimates of the amount of fissile material produced by Israel.[21] This has never been openly confirmed or denied however, due to Israel's policy of deliberate ambiguity.[22] An Israeli nuclear installation is located about ten kilometers to the south of Dimona, the Negev Nuclear Research Center. Its construction commenced in 1958, with French assistance. The official reason given by the Israeli and French governments was to build a nuclear reactor to power a "desalination plant", in order to "green the Negev". The purpose of the Dimona plant is widely assumed to be the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, and the majority of defense experts have concluded that it does in fact do that.[citation needed] However, the Israeli government refuses to confirm or deny this publicly, a policy it refers to as "ambiguity". Norway sold 20 tonnes of heavy water needed for the reactor to Israel in 1959 and 1960 in a secret deal. There were no "safeguards" required in this deal to prevent usage of the heavy water for non-peaceful purposes. The British newspaper Daily Express accused Israel of working on a bomb in 1960.[23] When the United States intelligence community discovered the purpose of the Dimona plant in the early 1960s, it demanded that Israel agree to international inspections. Israel agreed, but on a condition that U.S., rather than IAEA, inspectors were used, and that Israel would receive advanced notice of all inspections. Some claim that because Israel knew the schedule of the inspectors' visits, it was able to hide the alleged purpose of the site from the inspectors by installing temporary false walls and other devices before each inspection. The inspectors eventually informed the U.S. government that their inspections were useless due to Israeli restrictions on what areas of the facility they could inspect. In 1969, the United States terminated the inspections. In 1986, Mordechai Vanunu, a former technician at the Dimona plant, revealed to the media some evidence of Israel's nuclear program. Israeli agents arrested him from Italy, drugged him and transported him to Israel, and an Israeli court then tried him in secret on charges of treason and espionage,[citation needed] and sentenced him to eighteen years imprisonment. He was freed on 21 April 2004, but was severely limited by the Israeli government. He was arrested again on 11 November 2004, though formal charges were not immediately filed.
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Nuclear proliferation Comments on photographs taken by Mordechai Vanunu inside the Negev Nuclear Research Center have been made by prominent scientists. British nuclear weapons scientist Frank Barnaby, who questioned Vanunu over several days, estimated Israel had enough plutonium for about 150 weapons.[] Ted Taylor, a bomb designer employed by the United States of America has confirmed the several hundred warhead estimate based on Vanunu's photographs.[citation needed]
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Nuclear arms control in South Asia

The public stance of the two states on non-proliferation differs markedly. Pakistan has initiated a series of regional security proposals. It has repeatedly proposed a nuclear free zone in South Asia and has proclaimed its willingness to engage in nuclear disarmament and to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty if India would do so. It has endorsed a United States proposal for a regional five power conference to consider non-proliferation in South Asia. India has taken the view that solutions to regional security issues should be found at the international rather than the regional level, since its chief concern is with China. It therefore rejects Pakistan's proposals. Instead, the 'Gandhi Plan', put forward in 1988, proposed the revision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it regards as inherently discriminatory in favor of the nuclear-weapon States, and a timetable for complete nuclear weapons disarmament. It endorsed early proposals for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and for an international convention to ban the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes, known as the 'cut-off' convention. The United States for some years, especially under the Clinton administration, pursued a variety of initiatives to persuade India and Pakistan to abandon their nuclear weapons programs and to accept comprehensive international safeguards on all their nuclear activities. To this end, the Clinton administration proposed a conference of the five nuclear-weapon states, Japan, Germany, India and Pakistan. India refused this and similar previous proposals, and countered with demands that other potential weapons states, such as Iran and North Korea, should be invited, and that regional limitations would only be acceptable if they were accepted equally by China. The United States would not accept the participation of Iran and North Korea and these initiatives have lapsed. Another, more recent approach, centers on 'capping' the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, which would hopefully be followed by 'roll back'. To this end, India and the United States jointly sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution in 1993 calling for negotiations for a 'cut-off' convention. Should India and Pakistan join such a convention, they would have to agree to halt the production of fissile materials for weapons and to accept international verification on their relevant nuclear facilities (enrichment and reprocessing plants). It appears that India is now prepared to join negotiations regarding such a Cut-off Treaty, under the UN Conference on Disarmament. Bilateral confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan to reduce the prospects of confrontation have been limited. In 1990 each side ratified a treaty not to attack the other's nuclear installations, and at the end of 1991 they provided one another with a list showing the location of all their nuclear plants, even though the respective lists were regarded as not being wholly accurate. Early in 1994 India proposed a bilateral agreement for a 'no first use' of nuclear weapons and an extension of the 'no attack' treaty to cover civilian and industrial targets as well as nuclear installations. Having promoted the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty since 1954, India dropped its support in 1995 and in 1996 attempted to block the Treaty. Following the 1998 tests the question has been reopened and both Pakistan and India have indicated their intention to sign the CTBT. Indian ratification may be conditional upon the five weapons states agreeing to specific reductions in nuclear arsenals. The UN Conference on Disarmament has also called upon both countries "to accede without delay to the Non-Proliferation Treaty", presumably as non-weapons states.
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NPT signatories
Egypt In 2004 and 2005, Egypt disclosed past undeclared nuclear activities and material to the IAEA. In 2007 and 2008, high enriched and low enriched uranium particles were found in environmental samples taken in Egypt.[24] In 2008, the IAEA states Egypt's statements were consistent with its own findings.[25] In May 2009, Reuters reported that the IAEA was conducting further investigation in Egypt.[26][27] Iran In 2003, the IAEA reported that Iran had been in breach of its obligations to comply with provisions of its safeguard agreement.[28] In 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors voted in a rare non-consensus decision to find Iran in non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to report that non-compliance to the UN Security Council.[29][30] In response, the UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions citing concerns about the program.[31][39][32][33][34] Iran's representative to the UN argues sanctions compel Iran to abandon its rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to peaceful nuclear technology.[35] Iran says its uranium enrichment program is exclusively for peaceful purposes[36][37] and has enriched uranium to "less than 5 percent," consistent with fuel for a nuclear power plant and significantly below the purity of WEU (around 90%) typically used in a weapons program.[38][39] The director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano, said in 2009 he had not seen any evidence in IAEA official documents that Iran was developing nuclear weapons.[40] Iraq Up to the late 1980s it was generally assumed that any undeclared nuclear activities would have to be based on the diversion of nuclear material from safeguards. States acknowledged the possibility of nuclear activities entirely separate from those covered by safeguards, but it was assumed they would be detected by national intelligence activities. There was no particular effort by IAEA to attempt to detect them. Iraq had been making efforts to secure a nuclear potential since the 1960s. In the late 1970s a specialised plant, Osiraq, was constructed near Baghdad. The plant was attacked during the IranIraq War and was destroyed by Israeli bombers in June 1981. Not until the 1990 NPT Review Conference did some states raise the possibility of making more use of (for example) provisions for "special inspections" in existing NPT Safeguards Agreements. Special inspections can be undertaken at locations other than those where safeguards routinely apply, if there is reason to believe there may be undeclared material or activities. After inspections in Iraq following the UN Gulf War cease-fire resolution showed the extent of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, it became clear that the IAEA would have to broaden the scope of its activities. Iraq was an NPT Party, and had thus agreed to place all its nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. But the inspections revealed that it had been pursuing an extensive clandestine uranium enrichment programme, as well as a nuclear weapons design programme. The main thrust of Iraq's uranium enrichment program was the development of technology for electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) of indigenous uranium. This uses the same principles as a mass spectrometer (albeit on a much larger scale). Ions of uranium-238 and uranium-235 are separated because they describe arcs of different radii when they move through a magnetic field. This process was used in the Manhattan Project to make the highly enriched uranium used in the Hiroshima bomb, but was abandoned soon afterwards. The Iraqis did the basic research work at their nuclear research establishment at Tuwaitha, near Baghdad, and were building two full-scale facilities at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat, north of Baghdad. However, when the war broke out, only a few separators had been installed at Tarmiya, and none at Ash Sharqat.
Nuclear proliferation The Iraqis were also very interested in centrifuge enrichment, and had been able to acquire some components including some carbon-fibre rotors, which they were at an early stage of testing. In May 1998, Newsweek reported that Abdul Qadeer Khan had sent Iraq centrifuge designs, which were apparently confiscated by the UNMOVIC officials. Iraqi officials said "the documents were authentic but that they had not agreed to work with A. Q. Khan, fearing an ISI sting operation, due to strained relations between two countries.[citation needed][41] The Government of Pakistan and A. Q. Khan strongly denied this allegation whilst the government declared the evidence to be "fraudulent".[] They were clearly in violation of their NPT and safeguards obligations, and the IAEA Board of Governors ruled to that effect. The UN Security Council then ordered the IAEA to remove, destroy or render harmless Iraq's nuclear weapons capability. This was done by mid 1998, but Iraq then ceased all cooperation with the UN, so the IAEA withdrew from this work. The revelations from Iraq provided the impetus for a very far-reaching reconsideration of what safeguards are intended to achieve. Myanmar A report in the Sydney Morning Herald and Searchina, a Japanese newspaper, report that two Myanmarese defectors saying that the Myanmar junta was secretly building a nuclear reactor and plutonium extraction facility with North Korea's help, with the aim of acquiring its first nuclear bomb in five years. According to the report, "The secret complex, much of it in caves tunnelled into a mountain at Naung Laing in northern Burma, runs parallel to a civilian reactor being built at another site by Russia that both the Russians and Burmese say will be put under international safeguards."[42] In 2002, Myanmar had notified IAEA of its intention to pursue a civilian nuclear programme. Later, Russia announced that it would build a nuclear reactor in Myanmar. There have also been reports that two Pakistani scientists, from the AQ Khan stable, had been dispatched to Myanmar where they had settled down, to help Myanmar's project.[citation needed] Recently, the David Albright-led Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) rang alarm bells about Myanmar attempting a nuclear project with North Korean help. [citation needed] If true, the full weight of international pressure will be brought against Myanmar, said officials familiar with developments. But equally, the information that has been peddled by the defectors is also "preliminary" and could be used by the west to turn the screws on Myanmaron democracy and human rights issuesin the run-up to the elections in the country in 2010.[citation needed] During an ASEAN meeting in Thailand in July 2009, US secretary of state Hillary Clinton highlighted concerns of the North Korean link. "We know there are also growing concerns about military cooperation between North Korea and Burma which we take very seriously," Clinton said.[43] However, in 2012, after contact between American President Barack Obama, Burmese leader Thein Sein renounced military ties with DPRK (North Korea).[44] North Korea The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) acceded to the NPT in 1985 as a condition for the supply of a nuclear power station by the USSR. However, it delayed concluding its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, a process which should take only 18 months, until April 1992. During that period, it brought into operation a small gas-cooled, graphite-moderated, natural-uranium (metal) fuelled "Experimental Power Reactor" of about 25 MWt (5 MWe), based on the UK Magnox design. While this was a well-suited design to start a wholly indigenous nuclear reactor development, it also exhibited all the features of a small plutonium production reactor for weapons purposes. North Korea also made substantial progress in the construction of two larger reactors designed on the same principles, a prototype of about 200 MWt (50 MWe), and a full-scale version of about 800 MWt (200 MWe). They made only slow progress; construction halted on both in 1994 and has not resumed. Both reactors have degraded considerably since that time and would take significant efforts to refurbish.
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Nuclear proliferation In addition it completed and commissioned a reprocessing plant that makes the Magnox spent nuclear fuel safe, recovering uranium and plutonium. That plutonium, if the fuel was only irradiated to a very low burn-up, would have been in a form very suitable for weapons. Although all these facilities at Yongbyon were to be under safeguards, there was always the risk that at some stage, the DPRK would withdraw from the NPT and use the plutonium for weapons. One of the first steps in applying NPT safeguards is for the IAEA to verify the initial stocks of uranium and plutonium to ensure that all the nuclear materials in the country have been declared for safeguards purposes. While undertaking this work in 1992, IAEA inspectors found discrepancies which indicated that the reprocessing plant had been used more often than the DPRK had declared, which suggested that the DPRK could have weapons-grade plutonium which it had not declared to the IAEA. Information passed to the IAEA by a Member State (as required by the IAEA) supported that suggestion by indicating that the DPRK had two undeclared waste or other storage sites. In February 1993 the IAEA called on the DPRK to allow special inspections of the two sites so that the initial stocks of nuclear material could be verified. The DPRK refused, and on 12 March announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT (three months' notice is required). In April 1993 the IAEA Board concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and reported the matter to the UN Security Council. In June 1993 the DPRK announced that it had "suspended" its withdrawal from the NPT, but subsequently claimed a "special status" with respect to its safeguards obligations. This was rejected by IAEA. Once the DPRK's non-compliance had been reported to the UN Security Council, the essential part of the IAEA's mission had been completed. Inspections in the DPRK continued, although inspectors were increasingly hampered in what they were permitted to do by the DPRK's claim of a "special status". However, some 8,000 corroding fuel rods associated with the experimental reactor have remained under close surveillance. Following bilateral negotiations between the United States and the DPRK, and the conclusion of the Agreed Framework in October 1994, the IAEA has been given additional responsibilities. The agreement requires a freeze on the operation and construction of the DPRK's plutonium production reactors and their related facilities, and the IAEA is responsible for monitoring the freeze until the facilities are eventually dismantled. The DPRK remains uncooperative with the IAEA verification work and has yet to comply with its safeguards agreement. While Iraq was defeated in a war, allowing the UN the opportunity to seek out and destroy its nuclear weapons programme as part of the cease-fire conditions, the DPRK was not defeated, nor was it vulnerable to other measures, such as trade sanctions. It can scarcely afford to import anything, and sanctions on vital commodities, such as oil, would either be ineffective or risk provoking war.[citation needed] Ultimately, the DPRK was persuaded to stop what appeared to be its nuclear weapons programme in exchange, under the agreed framework, for about US$5 billion in energy-related assistance. This included two 1000 MWe light water nuclear power reactors based on an advanced U.S. System-80 design. In January 2003 the DPRK withdrew from the NPT. In response, a series of discussions among the DPRK, the United States, and China, a series of six-party talks (the parties being the DPRK, the ROK, China, Japan, the United States and Russia) were held in Beijing; the first beginning in April 2004 concerning North Korea's weapons program. On 10 January 2005, North Korea declared that it was in the possession of nuclear weapons. On 19 September 2005, the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks ended with a joint statement in which North Korea agreed to end its nuclear programs and return to the NPT in exchange for diplomatic, energy and economic assistance. However, by the end of 2005 the DPRK had halted all six-party talks because the United States froze certain DPRK international financial assets such as those in a bank in Macau. On 9 October 2006, North Korea announced that it has performed its first-ever nuclear weapon test. On 18 December 2006, the six-party talks finally resumed. On 13 February 2007, the parties announced "Initial Actions" to implement the 2005 joint statement including shutdown and disablement of North Korean nuclear facilities in exchange for
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Nuclear proliferation energy assistance. Reacting to UN sanctions imposed after missile tests in April 2009, North Korea withdrew from the six-party talks, restarted its nuclear facilities and conducted a second nuclear test on 25 May 2009. On 12 February 2013, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion with an estimated yield of 6 to 7 kilotonnes. The detonation registered a magnitude 4.9 disturbance in the area around the epicenter. See also: North Korea and weapons of mass destruction and Six-party talks Russia Security of nuclear weapons in Russia remains a matter of concern. According to high-ranking Russian SVR defector Tretyakov, he had a meeting with two Russian businessman representing a state-created C-W corporation in 1991. They came up with a project of destroying large quantities of chemical wastes collected from Western countries at the island of Novaya Zemlya (a test place for Soviet nuclear weapons) using an underground nuclear blast. The project was rejected by Canadian representatives, but one of the businessmen told Tretyakov that he keeps his own nuclear bomb at his dacha outside Moscow. Tretyakov thought that man was insane, but the "businessmen" (Vladimir K. Dmitriev) replied: "Do not be so naive. With economic conditions the way they are in Russia today, anyone with enough money can buy a nuclear bomb. It's no big deal really".[45] South Africa In 1991, South Africa acceded to the NPT, concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and submitted a report on its nuclear material subject to safeguards. At the time, the state had a nuclear power programme producing nearly 10% of the country's electricity, whereas Iraq and North Korea only had research reactors. The IAEA's initial verification task was complicated by South Africa's announcement that between 1979 and 1989 it built and then dismantled a number of nuclear weapons. South Africa asked the IAEA to verify the conclusion of its weapons programme. In 1995 the IAEA declared that it was satisfied all materials were accounted for and the weapons programme had been terminated and dismantled. South Africa has signed the NPT, and now holds the distinction of being the only known state to have indigenously produced nuclear weapons, and then verifiably dismantled them.[] Syria On September 6, 2007, Israel bombed an officially unidentified site in Syria which it later asserted was a nuclear reactor under construction (see Operation Orchard).[46] The alleged reactor was not asserted to be operational and it was not asserted that nuclear material had been introduced into it.[24] Syria said the site was a military site and was not involved in any nuclear activities.[24] The IAEA requested Syria to provide further access to the site and any other locations where the debris and equipment from the building had been stored.[24] Syria denounced what it called the Western "fabrication and forging of facts" in regards to the incident.[47] IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei criticized the strikes and deplored that information regarding the matter had not been shared with his agency earlier.[]
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Nuclear proliferation United States cooperation on nuclear weapons with the United Kingdom The United States has given the UK considerable assistance with nuclear weapon design and construction since the 1958 USUK Mutual Defence Agreement. In 1974 a CIA proliferation assessment noted that "In many cases [Britain's sensitive technology in nuclear and missile fields] is based on technology received from the United States and could not legitimately be passed on without U.S. permission."[] The U.S. President authorized the transfer of "nuclear weapon parts" to the UK between at least the years 1975 to 1996.[48][49] The UK National Audit Office noted that most of the UK Trident warhead development and production expenditure was incurred in the United States, which would supply "certain warhead-related components".[50][] Some of the fissile materials for the UK Trident warhead were purchased from the United States.[] Declassified U.S. Department of Energy documents indicate the UK Trident warhead system was involved in non-nuclear design activities alongside the U.S. W76 nuclear warhead fitted in some U.S. Navy Trident missiles,[51] leading the Federation of American Scientists to speculate that the UK warhead may share design information from the W76.[52] Under the Mutual Defence Agreement 5.37 tonnes of UK-produced plutonium was sent to the United States in return for 6.7kg of tritium and 7.5 tonnes of highly enriched uranium over the period 19601979. A further 0.47 tonne of plutonium was swapped between the UK and United States for reasons that remain classified.[53] Some of the UK produced plutonium was used in 1962 by the United States for a nuclear weapon test of reactor-grade plutonium .[54] The United States has supplied nuclear weapon delivery systems to support the UK nuclear forces since before the signing of the NPT. The renewal of this agreement is due to take place through the second decade of the 21st century.[55][56]
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Arguments in favor of proliferation

There has been much debate in the academic study of International Security as to the advisability of proliferation. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Gen. Pierre Marie Gallois of France, an adviser to Charles DeGaulle, argued in books like The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age (1961) that mere possession of a nuclear arsenal, what the French called the force de frappe, was enough to ensure deterrence, and thus concluded that the spread of nuclear weapons could increase international stability. Some very prominent neo-realist scholars, such as Kenneth Waltz, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, and John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, continue to argue along the lines of Gallois (though these scholars rarely acknowledge their intellectual debt to Gallois and his contemporaries). Specifically, these scholars advocate some forms of nuclear proliferation, arguing that it will decrease the likelihood of war, especially in troubled regions of the world. Aside from the majority opinion which opposes proliferation in any form, there are two schools of thought on the matter: those, like Mearsheimer, who favor selective proliferation,[57] and those such as Waltz, who advocate a laissez-faire attitude to programs like North Korea's.
Total proliferation
In embryo, Waltz argues that the logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD) should work in all security environments, regardless of historical tensions or recent hostility. He sees the Cold War as the ultimate proof of MAD logic the only occasion when enmity between two Great Powers did not result in military conflict. This was, he argues, because nuclear weapons promote caution in decision-makers. Neither Washington nor Moscow would risk nuclear Armageddon to advance territorial or power goals, hence a peaceful stalemate ensued (Waltz and Sagan (2003), p.24). Waltz believes there to be no reason why this effect would not occur in all circumstances.
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Selective proliferation
John Mearsheimer would not support Waltz's optimism in the majority of potential instances; however, he has argued for nuclear proliferation as policy in certain places, such as postCold War Europe. In two famous articles, Professor Mearsheimer opines that Europe is bound to return to its preCold War environment of regular conflagration and suspicion at some point in the future. He advocates arming both Germany and the Ukraine with nuclear weaponry in order to achieve a balance of power between these states in the east and France/Britain in the west. If this does not occur, he is certain that war will eventually break out on the European continent (Mearsheimer (1990), pp.556 and (1993), pp.5066). Another separate argument against Waltz's open proliferation and in favor of Mearsheimer's selective distribution is the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Some countries included in the aforementioned laissez-faire distribution could predispose the transfer of nuclear materials or a bomb falling into the hands of groups not affiliated with any governments. Such countries would not have the political will or ability to safeguard attempts at devices being transferred to a third party. Not being deterred by self-annihilation, terrorism groups could push forth their own nuclear agendas or be used as shadow fronts to carry out the attack plans by mentioned unstable governments.
Arguments against both positions

There are numerous arguments presented against both selective and total proliferation, generally targeting the very neorealist assumptions (such as the primacy of military security in state agendas, the weakness of international institutions, and the long-run unimportance of economic integration and globalization to state strategy) its proponents tend to make. With respect to Mearsheimer's specific example of Europe, many economists and neoliberals argue that the economic integration of Europe through the development of the European Union has made war in most of the European continent so disastrous economically so as to serve as an effective deterrent. Constructivists take this one step further, frequently arguing that the development of EU political institutions has led or will lead to the development of a nascent European identity, which most states on the European continent wish to partake in to some degree or another, and which makes all states within or aspiring to be within the EU regard war between them as unthinkable. As for Waltz, the general opinion is that most states are not in a position to safely guard against nuclear use, that he underestimates the long-standing antipathy in many regions, and that weak states will be unable to prevent or will actively provide for the disastrous possibility of nuclear terrorism. Waltz has dealt with all of these objections at some point in his work; though to many, he has not adequately responded (Betts (2000)). The Learning Channel documentary Doomsday: "On The Brink" illustrated 40 years of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons accidents. Even the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident demonstrated a potential scenario in which Russian democratization and military downsizing at the end of the Cold War did not eliminate the danger of accidental nuclear war through command and control errors. After asking: might a future Russian ruler or renegade Russian general be tempted to use nuclear weapons to make foreign policy? the documentary writers revealed a greater danger of Russian security over its nuclear stocks, but especially the ultimate danger of human nature to want the ultimate weapon of mass destruction to exercise political and military power. Future world leaders might not understand how close the Soviets, Russians, and Americans were to doomsday, how easy it all seemed because apocalypse was avoided for a mere 40 years between rivals, politicians not terrorists, who loved their children and did not want to die, against 30,000 years of human prehistory. History and military experts agree that proliferation can be slowed, but never stopped (technology cannot be uninvented).[58]
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Proliferation begets proliferation

Proliferation begets proliferation is a concept described by Scott Sagan in his article, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?". This concept can be described as a strategic chain reaction. If one state produces a nuclear weapon it creates almost a domino effect within the region. States in the region will seek to acquire nuclear weapons to balance or eliminate the security threat. Sagan describes this reaction best in his article when he states, Every time one state develops nuclear weapons to balance against its main rival, it also creates a nuclear threat to another region, which then has to initiate its own nuclear weapons program to maintain its national security (Sagan, pg. 70). Going back through history we can see how this has taken place. When the United States demonstrated that it had nuclear power capabilities after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Russians started to develop their program in preparation for the Cold War. With the Russian military buildup, France and Great Britain perceived this as a security threat and therefore they pursued nuclear weapons (Sagan, pg 71).
Nuclear apartheid
The effective prohibition on nuclear proliferation has been characterised as a form of technological apartheid, as only a select few states (particularly the member-nations of the United Nations Security Council) are able to acquire nuclear technology and that they can use their power to prevent other states from research and development of nuclear technology. In theory, only states that are allied with states that already have nuclear power would be able to acquire nuclear technology themselves. Iran Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been a frequent critic of the concept of nuclear apartheid as it has been put into practice by several countries, particularly the United States. In an interview with CNN's Christiane Amanpour, Ahmadinejad said that Iran was "against 'nuclear apartheid,' which means some have the right to possess it, use the fuel, and then sell it to another country for 10 times its value. We're against that. We say clean energy is the right of all countries. But also it is the duty and the responsibility of all countries, including ours, to set up frameworks to stop the proliferation of it." Hours after that interview, he spoke passionately in favor of Iran's right to develop nuclear technology, claiming the nation should have the same liberties.[59] Iran is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and claims that any work done in regards to nuclear technology is related only to civilian uses, which is acceptable under the treaty.[60] Iran violated the treaty by performing uranium-enrichment in secret, after which the United Nations Security Council ordered Iran to stop all uranium-enrichment.[61] India India has also been discussed in the context of nuclear apartheid. India has consistently attempted to pass measures that would call for full international disarmament, however they have not succeeded due to protests from those states that already have nuclear weapons. In light of this, India viewed nuclear weapons as a necessary right for all nations as long as certain states were still in possession of nuclear weapons. India stated that nuclear issues were directly related to national security. Years before India's first underground nuclear test in 1998, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was passed. Some have argued that coercive language was used in an attempt to persuade India to sign the treaty, which was pushed for heavily by neighboring China.[62] India viewed the treaty as a means for countries that already had nuclear weapons, primarily the five nations of the United Nations Security Council, to keep their weapons while ensuring that no other nations could develop them.[63]
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References
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The most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is the production of fissile material
[41] "Documents Indicate A.Q. Khan Offered Nuclear Weapon Designs to Iraq in 1990: Did He Approach Other Countries?" by David Albright and Corey Hinderstein (4 February 2004). (http:/ / www. isis-online. org/ publications/ southasia/ khan_memo. html) [42] Searchina, "Reasons for digging tunnels in Burma", August 11, 2009. [43] "Myanmar building nuke reactor, says media report" (http:/ / timesofindia. indiatimes. com/ NEWS/ World/ Rest-of-World/ Myanmar-building-nuke-reactor-says-media-report/ articleshow/ 4846971. cms). The Times of India, 2 August 2009. [45] Pete Earley, "Comrade J: The Untold Secrets of Russia's Master Spy in America After the End of the Cold War", Penguin Books, 2007, ISBN 978-0-399-15439-3, pages 114121. [46] 6 September 2007 Air strike (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ military/ world/ war/ 070906-airstrike. htm) at globalsecurity.org (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org). Retrieved October 24, 2007.
[57] See page 116 [58] Doomsday: On The Brink, The Learning Channel, 1997 [59] Iranian president: No 'nuclear apartheid' (http:/ / edition. cnn. com/ 2005/ WORLD/ meast/ 09/ 17/ ahmadinejad/ index. html), CNN [60] Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (http:/ / www. state. gov/ t/ vci/ rls/ rpt/ 51977. htm), Bureau of Verification and Compliance, U.S. Department of State, August 30, 2005 [61] UN Security Council Resolution 1737 (http:/ / daccessdds. un. org/ doc/ UNDOC/ GEN/ N06/ 681/ 42/ PDF/ N0668142. pdf?OpenElement) [62] Against Nuclear Apartheid (http:/ / www. indianembassy. org/ pic/ js/ js(foreignaffairs). html), Jaswant Singh [63] Options (http:/ / search. ebscohost. com/ login. aspx?direct=true& db=f5h& AN=9611212232& site=ehost-live), Mike Moore, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
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External links and references

Ploughshares Fund Video: A World Without Nuclear Weapons (http://ploughshares.org/moment/video?p=423) National Counterproliferation Center Office of the Director of National Intelligence (http://www.counterwmd. gov) Official website of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): http://www.iaea.org/ Organizations Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (http://www.thebulletin.org) A non-technical public policy and global security magazine that has reported on nuclear proliferation issues since 1945. Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center (http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/topic/3/nuclear_proliferation. html) Publications from Harvard faculty and fellows on nuclear proliferation. Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (http://www.cnduk.org/) or CND, is a UK based non-proliferation movement based in the UK which advocates a complete ban on all nuclear weaponry. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Nonproliferation Website (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ npp/) Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/nuclear/) Council for a Livable World (http://www.clw.org/policy/nuclearweapons/) Federation of American Scientists (http://fas.org) International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (http://www.ippnw.org/) or IPPNW, is a US based non-proliferation movement advocating amongst other things, a complete ban on all nuclear weaponry. International Society for the Prevention of Nuclear War (http://www.ispnw.org) or ISPNW, is a US based non-proliferation movement advocating the full control of the world's nuclear arsenal by a restructured UN. Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (http://cns.miis.edu) Nevada Desert Experience Nevada Desert Experience (http://www.nevadadesertexperience.org) Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (http://www.npec-web.org) A not-for-profit organization based in Washington, D.C., and founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues among policymakers, scholars and the media. Nuclear Threat Initiative (http://www.nti.org) Proliferation Papers (http://www.ifri.org/frontDispatcher/ifri/publications/ proliferation_papers_1090224187156) Electronic papers published by the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri, Paris and Brussels). The Uranium Information Centre (http://www.uic.com.au/) provided much of the original material in this article. Union of Concerned Scientists articles on nuclear weapons (http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/ nuclear_weapons) Western States Legal Foundation (http://www.wslfweb.org) The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (http://www.wilsoncenter. org/program/NPIHP/) or NPIHP is a global network of individuals and institutions engaged in the study of international nuclear history through archival documents, oral history interviews and other empirical sources.
Nuclear proliferation Articles, Books and Other Media The European Union and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (http://www.iss.europa.eu/nc/actualites/ actualite/select_category/21/article/the-european-union-and-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/), Chaillot Paper No. 37, January 2000, European Union Institute for Security Studies "Going Nuclear: William Langewiesche on The Atomic Bazaar" 26 June 2007 interview (http://newsquake. netscape.com/2007/06/26/g/) at Propeller.com The Wrath of Khan (http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200511/aq-khan) from The Atlantic Monthly Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism (http://www.cfr.org/publication/10067/), a Council on Foreign Relations Special Report by Senior Fellow Charles Ferguson Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks (http://www.anthrax.osd.mil/documents/ library/proliferation.pdf) U.S. Congress, Office of Techchnology Assessment (OTA-ISC-559, August 1993) "A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network" (http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/12/ international/asia/12NUKE.html?hp) Annotated bibliography on nuclear proliferation from the Alsos Digital Library (http://alsos.wlu.edu/qsearch. aspx?browse=issues/Proliferation) Opinion essay arguing for a totally "nuclear-free" world (http://fletcher.tufts.edu/news/2004/02/najam. shtml) by Prof. Adil Najam in USA Today. 27,000 Holocausts (http://www.pinkyshow.org/archives/episodes/070211/) a Pinky Show online video interview with John Burroughs (Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy). Jones, Ishmael, The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture (2008, revised 2010) ISBN 978-1-59403-382-7, Encounter Books, New York. Nuclear proliferation espionage. Pierre Gallois, The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961). S. Sagan and K. Waltz (2003), The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, New York: W.W. Norton and Co. J.J. Mearsheimer (1990), Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War in International Security, Vol. 15, pp.556 J.J. Mearsheimer (1993), Case for a Ukrainian deterrent in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, pp.5066 R.K. Betts (2000), Universal deterrence or conceptual collapse? Liberal pessimism or utopian realism in V. A. Utgoff (ed.), The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, US Interests and World Order, Cambridge MA: MIT Press Nuclear Files.org (http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/proliferation/index. htm) Comprehensive information regarding nuclear proliferation, including case studies. Nuclear Files.org (http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/terrorism/ director-general-threat-of-nuclear-terrorism.html) Nuclear Proliferation and the Potential Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31559.pdf) Congressional Research Service Report, 26 December 2006. George Perkovich, "Principles for Reforming the Nuclear Order" (http://www.ifri.org/files/Securite_defense/ Perkovich_Reforming_Nuclear_Order.pdf), Proliferation Papers, Paris, Ifri, Fall 2008 Jamyang Norbu, The China (Proliferation) Syndrome (http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=23872& article=THE+CHINA+(PROLIFERATION)+SYNDROME+-+Jamyang+Norbu), Phayul.com, 20 February 2009. Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation: Center for Global Studies at the University of Illinois (http://cgs.illinois. edu/content/nuclear-weapons)
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95

Nation Albania Burma (Myanmar) CW Possession Known Possible Signed CWC Ratified CWC January 14, 1993 May 11, 1994 January 13, 1993 No January 13, 1993 April 4, 1997 No No
People's Republic of China Probable Egypt India Iran Israel Japan Libya Probable Known Known Probable Probable Known
January 14, 1993 September 3, 1996 January 13, 1993 November 3, 1997 January 13, 1993 No January 13, 1993 September 15, 1995 No January 6, 2004 (acceded) No
North Korea Pakistan Russia Serbia and Montenegro Sudan
Known Probable Known Probable
No
January 13, 1993 October 28, 1997 January 13, 1993 November 5, 1997 No April 20, 2000 (acceded) May 24, 1999 (acceded) No n/a
Possible
No
Syria Taiwan United States Vietnam
Known Possible Known Probable
No n/a
January 13, 1993 April 25, 1997 January 13, 1993 September 30, 1998
Despite numerous efforts to reduce or eliminate them, many nations continue to research and/or stockpile chemical weapon agents. Most states have joined the Chemical Weapons Convention, which requires the destruction of all chemical weapons by 2012. Twelve nations have declared chemical weapons production facilities and six nations have declared stockpiles of chemical weapons. All of the declared production facilities have been destroyed or converted to civilian use after the treaty went into force. According to the United States government, at least 17 nations currently have active chemical weapons programs. To the right is a summary of the nations that have either declared weapon stockpiles, or are suspected of secretly stockpiling or possessing CW research programs.
Chemical weapon details, per nation
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By type

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Albania
Albania, as a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, declared in March 2003 a stockpile of 16 tons of chemical agents. On July 11, 2007, with the help of the U.S. government's NunnLugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Ministry of Defence announced successful destruction of the entire stockpile.
China
According to the testimony Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl W. Ford before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, it is very probable that China has an advanced chemical warfare program, including research and development, production, and weaponization capabilities. Furthermore, there is considerable concern from the U.S. regarding China's contact and sharing of chemical weapons expertise with other states of proliferation concern, including Syria and Iran. Chinese government has declared that it had possessed small arsenal of chemical weapons in the past but that it had destroyed it before ratifying Convention. It has declared only two former chemical production facilities that may have produced mustard gas and Lewisite.[1]
Egypt
Egypt has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and has long appeared on various lists as having an offensive chemical weapons capability, and is thought to possess production facilities for sarin, VX, mustard gas, and phosgene. Additionally, it is possible that Egypt may possess limited stockpiles of chemical bombs, rockets and shells. The reasons for this belief are several: Egypt is known to have employed mustard gas in the Yemeni civil war from 1963 to 1967. In the early 1970s, Egypt is believed to have supplied Syria with mustard gas and nerve agents. In the 1980s, Egypt supplied Iraq with mustard gas and nerve agents, and related production and deployment technology. In testimony before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials in 1991, US Navy Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks cited this evidence in identifying Egypt as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor. More recent analyses are more careful by estimation the current status of chemical weapons program in Egypt. Only one facility has been identified as "likely involved" in the offensive activities. Although the offensive program may be still in existence, it does not seem that Egypt has a considerable stockpile of operational weapons.[2]
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Ethiopia
In 1991 Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Ethiopia as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress. Ethiopia has ratified CWC in 1996 and did not declare any offensive CW program. From that time no evidence has been presented to contradict this statement.
India
In 1997, in compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Indian government declared that it possessed a chemical weapons stockpile and opened its related facilities for inspection. Also in compliance with the CWC, it has begun to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile. [3]
Iran
Near the end of the IranIraq War, Iran is supposed to have made limited use of chemical weapons, and since that time has been steadily building stockpiles of cyanide (cyanogen chloride), phosgene, and mustard gas. The delivery vehicles Iran possesses includes artillery shells, mortars, rockets, and aerial bombs. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Iran currently maintains at least two major facilities for the research and production of chemical weapon agents. Additionally, India is currently assisting Iran in the construction of another major facility at Qazvin, near Tehran, with the purpose of manufacturing phosphorus pentasulfide, a primary precursor for nerve agents. Iran began its production of nerve agents no later than 1994. Iran signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 13, 1993 and ratified it on November 3, 1997, and denies allegations of having clandestine CW program in violation of CWC. In the official declaration submitted to OPCW Iranian government admitted that it had produced mustard gas in 1980s but that ceased the offensive program and destroyed the stockpiles of operational weapons after the end of war with Iraq.[4]
Iraq
Well before Operation Desert Storm or the U.N. inspections that followed it, Iraq had already begun to build chemical weapons. After launching a research effort in the 1970s, Iraq was able to use chemical weapons in its war against Iran and to kill large numbers of its own Kurdish population in the 1980s. During the first Gulf War, there were fears that Iraq would launch chemical-tipped missiles at its neighbors, particularly Israel, but Iraq refrained for fear of U.S. retaliation. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition troops again feared they might be hit with chemical weapons, though this did not come to pass. By 1991, the United Nations had established its Special Commission (UNSCOM) and charged it with the task of destroying, removing, or rendering harmless "all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities." By the time UNSCOM left Iraq in December 1998, it had eliminated a large portion of Iraq's chemical weapon potential. UNSCOM had overseen the destruction or incapacitation of more than 88,000 filled or unfilled chemical munitions, over 600 tons of weaponized or bulk chemical agents, some 4,000 tons of precursor chemicals, some 980 pieces of key production equipment, and some 300 pieces of analytical equipment. Notwithstanding these extraordinary achievements, there remained important uncertainties regarding Iraq's holdings of chemical weapons, their precursors, and munitions.
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Israel
As of December 2004, Israel has signed but not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, and according to the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, Israel has significant stores of chemical weapons of its own manufacture. It possesses a highly developed chemical and petrochemical industry, skilled specialists, and stocks of source material, and is capable of producing several nerve, blister and incapacitating agents. In 1974, in a hearing before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, General Almquist stated that Israel had an offensive chemical weapons capability. In 1992, El Al Flight 1862 bound for Tel Aviv crashed outside Amsterdam. In the course of the crash investigation, it was revealed that amongst the plane's cargo was fifty gallons of dimethyl methylphosphonate, a chemical that can be used in the production of the nerve agent sarin. The dimethyl methylphosphonate was bound for the Israel Institute for Biological Research in Ness Ziona, a top secret military installation outside Tel Aviv that was also responsible for producing the poison used in a September 1997 assassination attempt on a leader of the terrorist organization Hamas (Khaled Mashal). According to Israeli officials, the substance was only for defensive research purposes, to test filters for gas masks. The 1993 the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment WMD proliferation assessment [5] recorded Israel as a country generally reported as having undeclared offensive chemical warfare capabilities. In October 1998, the London Sunday Times reported that Israeli F-16 fighters were equipped to carry chemical weapons, and that their crews have been trained on the use of such weapons. According to more recent analyses, there is no evidence of production or stockpiling the chemical weapons by Israel.[6] The offensive CW program almost certainly existed in the past but its current status is unknown.[7]
Japan
As of December 1993, Japan has signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. And Japan ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1995. But JSDF possess chemical weapons facilities and some samples for protection which it said JGSDF Central NBC protection Troop. In 1995, JGSDF admitted possession of sarin for samples.
Libya
Libya produced limited quantities of chemical weapons during the 1980s, and is known to have used such weapons in combat at least once when it attempted to use chemical weapons against Chadian troops in 1987.[citation needed] Since then, Libya constructed what is believed to be the largest chemical weapon production facility in the developing world in the Rabta industrial complex. This facility was the cornerstone of the Libyan CW program, and has produced mustard gas, sarin, and phosgene since production began in the late 1980s. In March 1990 a suspicious fire broke out there following accusations by the United States.[] Strict United Nations sanctions from 1992 to 1999 rendered Rabta inactive. Libya's chemical program was completely abandoned on December 19, 2003 along with their other weapons of mass destruction programs as part of a program to get sanctions lifted and normalize relations with foreign governments. In 2004, between 27 February and 3 March, Libya destroyed 3,200 chemical weapon artillery shells under supervision of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). On March 5, 2004, Libya declared a stockpile of 23 tons of mustard gas as well as precursors for sarin and other chemicals. Libya officially acceeded to the Chemical Weapons Convention in June 2004.
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Myanmar (Burma)
Intelligence regarding Myanmar's chemical weapon status is mixed, and sometimes contradictory. In the late 1990s, US naval intelligence identified Myanmar (then referred to as Burma) as developing chemical weapons capabilities. Later, other officials contridicted that statement, claiming that the evidence supporting Burma's chemical stockpile development was primarily based upon circumstantial evidence.[8] However, in 1991, in testimony before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials in 1991, US Navy Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Myanmar as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor. Myanmar signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 13, 1993, but to date has not yet ratified the agreement.
North Korea
North Korea did not sign CWC and is believed to have maintained an extensive chemical weapons program since mid-1950s. The program includes research, production, stockpiling and weaponisation of large quantities of chemical agents (perhaps as many as 5000 tons), including blister, nerve, choking, psychoincapacitant, vomiting and riot control agents. Several dozen facilities has been identified as likely involved in the offensive program. The production capability of these facilities is estimated as 4500 tons of chemical agents per year. North Korean armed forces have also large quantities of delivery systems that could carry chemical warheads, including different artillery systems, aerial bombs, mines, tactical ballistic missiles (SCUD), and long-range ballistic missiles (Nodong and Taepodong[9] systems). However, the technological advancement of this program is uncertain, and some sources doubt whether the North Korea is able to produce large quantities of nerve agents or to fit the chemical warheads on its long-range ballistic missiles.[10]
Pakistan
In 1991 Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Pakistan as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress. However, more recent analyses indicate that although Pakistan, as many other countries with well-developed chemical industry, has technical capabilities for the production of chemical weapons, there is no evidence that it has ever possessed such weapons. Pakistan has ratified CWC in 1997 and did not declare any offensive activities in this area.[11] See also Naela Chohan, First woman and civilian to head the National Authority on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Pakistan.
Russia
See also Russia and weapons of mass destruction
Serbia and Montenegro

The former Yugoslavia is known to have produced a variety of chemical weapons (CW). The majority of stockpiled CW is believed to have been inherited by its successor, Serbia.[citation needed] Reports indicate that the former Yugoslavia's Army produced large quantities of sarin (50 tons), sulfur mustard, phosgene, the incapacitant BZ (allegedly a stockpile of 300 tons), and tear gas. At least four chemical warfare production facilities have been identified in Serbia: Prva Iskra in Baric; Miloje Blagojevic in Lucani; and Milojie Zakic and Merima in Krusevic. While the Trajal plant in Krusevic has been shut down, serious questions exist about accounting and previous production and storage of chemical materials there, as well the lack of accounting on the other three sites. Yugoslavia used its CW technologies to develop chemical munitions for Iraq prior to the first Gulf War in the "Little Hawk" program and chemical munitions for the Orkan MLRS system under the "KOL15" program. There have been
Chemical weapon proliferation allegations that CW were used in the area of the former Yugoslavia: both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats alleged that Bosnian government forces used chlorine during the conflict in Bosnia; Bosnian Serbs allegedly used BZ against Moslem refugees in July 1995; and the FRY Army may have used BZ against Kosovo Albanians in 1999. Mysterious deaths during the 1999 NATO bombings of suspected chemical facilities have also been attributed to CW production. The former Yugoslavia signed the Geneva Protocol in 1929. In April 2000, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
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South Korea
Prior to 1997, South Korea was strongly suspected of possessing an active chemical weapons program, and was identified as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor by the United States. On April 18, 1997, South Korea signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and made a secret declaration. It is thought that South Korea is the "state party" referred to in Chemical Weapons Convention materials. There are reports that South Korea is operating a secret facility in Yeongdong County, Chungcheongbuk-do Province for the destruction of chemical agents.
Sudan
Some past reports of uncertain credibility indicated that Sudan may have used chemical weapons against the rebels in the southern part of this country. Sudan accessed to CWC in 1999 and did not declare any offensive CW program. U.S. Department of State claims that it lacks sufficient evidence to determine whether Sudan is engaged in activities prohibited by CWC.[12]
Syria
Syria is not a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is believed Syria first received chemical weapons in 1973 from Egypt in the form of artillery shells.[citation needed] Since then it is thought Syria has one of the most advanced chemical weapons programs in the Middle East[citation needed] Syrias Chemical Arsenal Syria is thought to have amassed large quantities of Sarin, Tabun, Mustard and is currently weaponizing VX[citation needed] . Exact quantities are hard to know although the CIA has estimated Syria to possess several hundred liters of chemical weapons with hundreds of tons of agents produced annually.[citation needed] Production Syria has 4 main production sites. One just North of Damascus, one near Homs, one in Hama and one, al-Safir South East of Aleppo[citation needed]
Taiwan
U.S. Congress was informed in 1989 that Taiwan could have acquired offensive chemical weapons capability, including stockpiles of sarin. The alleged facilities include Tsishan and Kuanhsi. Taiwanese authorities acknowledged only the existence of defensive research program. Because of Taiwan's non-state status, it cannot join the CWC.[13]
United States
The United States has possessed a stockpile of chemical weapons since using them in World War I. It banned the production or transport of chemical weapons in 1969. The U.S. began chemical weapons disposal in the 1960s, first by deep-sea burial. By the 1970s, incineration was the disposal method used. The use of chemical weapons was renounced in 1991 and the U.S. signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993. 75% of the treaty declared
Chemical weapon proliferation stockpile was destroyed by 2010.
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References
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] NTI Research Library: country profile: China (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ China/ index. html) NTI Research Library: country profile: Egypt - chemical weapons (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ Egypt/ Chemical/ index. html) http:/ / www. defenselink. mil/ pubs/ ptr20010110. pdf Iranian Use of Chemical Weapons: A Critical Analysis of Past Allegations (http:/ / cns. miis. edu/ pubs/ dc/ briefs/ 030701. htm) http:/ / www. anthrax. osd. mil/ documents/ library/ proliferation. pdf NTI country profile - Israel (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ Israel/ index. html) NTI country profile - Israel (chemical weapons). (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ Israel/ Chemical/ index. html) Report of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Chemical Weapons Proliferation Concerns; found online at http:/ / www. stimson. org/ cbw/ ?SN=CB20011220137#myanmar (accessed 20 March 2008). [9] http:/ / toolserver. org/ %7Edispenser/ cgi-bin/ dab_solver. py?page=Chemical_weapon_proliferation& editintro=Template:Disambiguation_needed/ editintro& client=Template:Dn [10] See North Korea's profile on NTI (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ NK/ Chemical/ index. html) [11] NTI Research Library: country profile: Pakistan - chemical weapons (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ Pakistan/ Chemical/ index. html) [12] http:/ / www. state. gov/ documents/ organization/ 52113. pdf [13] NTI: country profile Taiwan (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ Japan_overview/ index_2738. html)
Resources
National Counterproliferation Center - Office of the Director of National Intelligence (http://www.counterwmd. gov) Economist. (May 2, 1997). "Chemical Weapons. Just Checking," The Economist 347, p.42. Mahnaimi, Uzi (Oct., 1998). Israeli Jets Equipped For Chemical Warfare. London Sunday Times Monterey Institute of International Studies. (Apr 9, 2002). Chemical and Biological Weapons: Possession and Programs Past and Present (http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/possess.htm). Retrieved Dec. 21, 2004. Senate Armed Services Committee, FY 1975 Authorization Hearing, Part 5, March 7, 1974 Shoham, Dany. (1998). Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt. The Nonproliferation Review 5 (Spring-Summer 1998), 4858. Russian Biological and Chemical Weapons (http://russianbiochemicalweapons.blogspot.com/), a useful page about non-state weapons transfers with a lot of links to information from CRS, the GAO and NGOs.
List of missiles by country
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This list of missiles by country displays the names of missiles in order of the country where they originate (were developed), with the countries listed alphabetically and annotated with their continent (and defence alliance, if applicable). In cases where multiple nations have developed or produced a missile, it is listed under each significantly participating nation. Within the lists of each country, missiles are ordered by designation and/or calling name (the latter being especially relevant for Russian/Soviet missiles). In some cases multiple listings are used, in order to provide cross-references for easier navigation. This is not a list of missiles in operational service by a particular country. For an alphabetical list by missile name, see the list of missiles.
Argentina (South America)

Alacrn AS-25K anti-ship, air-ground ASM Cndor I (with major contributions of German technology) Cndor II (in cooperation with several Middle-Eastern countries)
Cndor III Martin Pescador MP-1000 anti-ship, air-ground ASM Mathogo anti-tank, wire-guided
Australia
Ikara Malkara (joint Australian/British)
Brazil
A-Darter Fifth generation short range infrared homing air-to-air missile (joint South Africa/Brazil) FOG-MPM Fiber Optics Guided Multiple Purpose Missile. AVMT-300 GPS and/or laser-guided long range missile. AV-TM 300 - Cruise missile with a range of 300 kilometers (under development). MAA-1A Piranha Short-range infrared homing air-to-air missile. MAA-1B Piranha Air to air missile, also known as "Piranha II". MSS-1.2 AC Anti-tank guided missile. MSA-3.1 AA Anti-aircraft guided missile. MAS-5.1 Air-to-ground missile MAR-1 Anti-radiation missile. MAN-1 (MANSUP) Anti-ship missile
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Canada (North America; NATO)

ERYX (joint French/Canadian) Velvet Glove
People's Republic of China (mainland China)

See also entries under #Republic of China (Taiwan).
Republic of China (Taiwan)

See also entries under #People's Republic of China. Hsiung Feng I (HF-1) (ship-to-ship) Hsiung Feng II (HF-2) (guided multiplatform antiship) Hsiung Feng IIE (HF-2E) (land attack cruise missile variant of HF-2) Hsiung Feng III (HF-3) (antiship and/or land attack cruise missile) Sky Bow I (TK-1) (SAM) Sky Bow II (TK-2) (SAM) Sky Bow III (TK-3) (SAM) Sky Spear (Short range SSBM) Sky Sword I (TC-1) (air-to-air) Sky Sword II (TC-2) (air-to-air) Yun Feng (long-range cruise missile)
European joint-venture (Europe; NATO)

AIM-132 ASRAAM MBDA Aster MBDA Meteor IRIS-T Martel - Anglo-French: Models AJ 168 and AS.37 MIM-115 Roland Taurus KEPD 150/350
France (Europe; NATO)

AASM Aerospatiale AS-12 Apache AS.30 ASMP Crotale surface-to-air missile ENTAC ERYX (joint French/Canadian) HOT (Franco-German) anti-tank missile Exocet Had-s (cancelled)
M5 M45
List of missiles by country M51 Magic Meteor MICA MILAN (Franco-German) anti-tank missile MISTRAL (Multinational) surface-to-air missile Pluton Matra R530 Super 530 ROLAND 2 surface-to-air missile (Germany/France) Scalp EG (Uk-French-Italy) Nord SS.10 Aerospatiale AS.11/SS.11 Nord SS.12
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Germany (Europe; NATO)

AS.34 Kormoran 1/2 MIM-115 Roland (replaced by LFK NG) ESSM Eurospike (Israel/Germany) SM-2 IIIA[1] Taurus KEPD 350 AGM Armiger IRIS-T IRIS-T SL IDAS (missile) PARS 3 LR RBS-15 (Sweden/Germany) GMLRS MEADS RIM-116 RAM LFK NG MBDA Meteor (Multinational)
A modern German Luftwaffe IRIS-T infrared homing air-to-air missile
HOT (Franco German) anti-tank missile MILAN
German missiles of WW2

V-1 flying bomb V-2 rocket Enzian missile Wasserfall missile Ruhrstahl X-4 missile Schmetterling Rheinbote Rheintochter Henschel Hs 293
Model of IDAS of the German Navy.
List of missiles by country Fritz X Feuerillie
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Iran (Asia)
As of 2009[2], Iran has an active interest in developing, acquiring, and deploying a broad range of ballistic missiles, as well as developing a space launch capability. In mid-July 2008, Iran launched a number of ballistic missiles during military exercises, reportedly including the medium-range Shahab-3. Iran announced other missile and space launch tests in August and November 2008. In February 2009, Iran announced it launched a satellite into orbit and officially achieved a presence in space.[] Toophan 1 Toophan 2 Toophan 5 Saeghe 1-2 I-RAAD & I-RAAD-T Fateh-110 Fajr-2 Fajr-3, MIRV Fajr-5 Fajr-8, upgrades copy of S-200, Iranian upgrades Tondar-69 Oghab Samid Qiam 1 Shahab-1 Shahab-2 Shahab-3 B,C,D Shahab-4 Shahab-5 Shahab-6 Ghadr-110 Ghadr-111 Sayyad, upgraded copy of HQ-2, Sayyad-1A has IR tracking. Shahin I & II, Reverse engineer of MIM-23 Hawk. R-17E, variant of Russian Scud B SS-N-22 Sunburn SS-NX-26 Yakhont Raduga Kh-55, also called X-55 Noor Kowsar Silkworm, Capable of manufacture the missiles.
SA-2 Guideline Anti-air defense missile P-800 Oniks(SS-NX-26 Yakhont) Anti-ship cruise missile SS-N-22 Sunburn Anti-ship missiles Raduga Kh-55 Air-launched strategic cruise missile
List of missiles by country Hoot Saegheh Zelzal-1 Zelzal-2 Zelzal-3 Ashoura Sejjil 1, 2 Nasr-1
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Iraq (Asia)
Al-Samoud 2 Abadil-100 Al Fahd 300 Al Fahd 500 Al Hussein Al Hijarah Al Abbas Badr 2000 Project 144 Tammuz-1 Al Abid FROG-7 Scud BM-21 MRL 122 mm ASTROS II MRL 127 mm (60+) BM-13/-16 MRL 132 mm ASTROS SS-30 MRL 180 mm Ababeel-50 MRL 262 mm (50+) ASTROS SS-60 300 mm
Israel (Asia)
Arrow missile (Anti-ballistic) Barak 1 (Naval point defense) Barak 8 (Naval area defense) Delilah missile (Cruise missile of several variants: drone, air-to-ground, possible anti-radiation variant as well) Gabriel missile (Ship-to-ship and air-to-ship variants) Iron Dome (anti-short range rocket) Jericho missile (Ground-to-ground ballistic) LAHAT (Guided anti-tank) Nimrod (Guided anti-tank) Popeye missile (Air-to-ground cruise missile. U.S. designation AGM-142 Have Nap. Possibly larger derivatives exist as well, including a submarine-launched variant)
Python 5 (Air-to-air, also ground-to-air variant named SPYDER) Derby (Air-to-air, also known as the Alto) Shavit (Space launcher)
List of missiles by country Spike/Gil missile (Portable guided anti-tank)
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Japan (Asia)
AAM-1 (Type 69 Air-to-Air Missile) AAM-2 (Program was canceled) AAM-3 (Type 90 Air-to-Air Missile) AAM-4 (Type 99 Air-to-Air Missile)
AAM-4B AAM-5 (Type 04 Air-to-Air Missile) AAM-5B (Development) ASM-1 (Type 80 Air-to-Ship Missile) ASM-1C (Type 91 Air-to-Ship Missile) ASM-2 (Type 93 Air-to-Ship Missile) ASM-2B ATM-1 (Type 64 Anti-Tank Missile) ATM-2 (Type 79 Anti-Landing craft and Anti-Tank Missile) ATM-3 (Type 87 Anti-Tank Missile) ATM-4 (Type 96 Multi-Purpose Missile System) ATM-5 (Type 01 Light Anti-Tank Missile) ATM-6 (Medium-Range Multi-Purpose Missile) SAM-1 (Type 81 Short-Range Surface-to-Air Missile)
SAM-1B SAM-1C SAM-2 (Type 91 Portable Surface-to-Air Missile) SAM-2B SAM-3 (Type 93 Short-Range Surface-to-Air Missile) SAM-4 (Type 03 Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile) SAM-4B (Development) Type 11 Short-Range Surface-to-Air Missile SSM-1 (Type 88 Surface-to-Ship Missile) SSM-1C SSM-1B (Type 90 Ship-to-Ship Missile Missile) SM-3 Block-II/IIA (Joint development with U.S) Type 73 (Type 73 lightweight torpedo) Type 80 (Type 80 heavyweight torpedo) Type 89 (Type 89 heavyweight torpedo) Type 97 (Type 97 lightweight torpedo) Type 07 (Type 07 Vertical Launched ASROC)
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South Korea (Asia)

Baeksangeo (White Shark) heavyweight torpedo Cheolmae-2 (KM-SAM) surface-to-air missile Cheongsangeo (Blue Shark) lightweight torpedo Chiron surface-to-air missile C-Star ship-to-ship missile Haeseong anti-ship missile Hongsangeo (Red Shark) rocket-based torpedo and anti-submarine missile (K-ASROC) Hyunmoo III cruise missile KM-SAM surface-to-air missile Pegasus surface-to-air missile
Norway (Europe; NATO)

Penguin (U.S. DoD AVD code: AGM-119) Naval Strike Missile
Russia and the USSR (Europe/Asia)

By Russian designation
The NATO reporting name of each missile is shown in parentheses behind the proper name. 2K11 missile (SA-4 Ganef) 2K22 missile (SA-19/SA-N-11 Grison) 3M9 missile (SA-6 Gainful) 4K40/4K51 missile (SS-N-2 Styx) 4K60/4K65 missiles (SA-N-3 Goblet) 9K33 missile (SA-8/SA-N-4 Gecko) 9K37 missile (SA-11/SA-N-7 Gadfly) 9K38 missile (SA-17/SA-N-12 Grizzly) 9K330/9K331/9K332 missiles (SA-15/SA-N-9 Gauntlet) 82R missile (SS-N-15 Starfish) 86R/88R missile (SS-N-16 Stallion) GR-1 Global Rocket fractional orbital bombardment system missile (SS-X-10 Scrag) Igla missile (SA-18/SA-N-10 Grouse) Igla-1 missile (SA-16 Gimlet) K-5 missile (AA-1 Alkali) K-8 missile (AA-3 Anab) K-9 missile (AA-4 Awl) K-13 missile (AA-2 Atoll) KSR-2 (AS-5 Kelt) MR-UR-100 Sotka intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-17 Spanker) P-1 missile (SS-N-1 Scrubber) P-270/Kh-41 long-range anti-shipping missile (SS-N-22/ASM-MSS Sunburn) P-700 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck)
R-1 theatre ballistic missile (SS-1 Scunner) R-2 theatre ballistic missile (SS-2 Sibling) R-4 missile (AA-5 Ash)
List of missiles by country R-5M rocket (SS-3 Shyster) R-7 Semyorka intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-6 Sapwood) R-9 Desna intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-8 Sasin) R-11 tactical ballistic missile (SS-1b Scud) R-12 Dvina theatre ballistic missile (SS-4 Sandal) R-13 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SS-N-4 Sark) R-14 Chusovaya theatre ballistic missile (SS-5 Skean) R-15 submarine-launched ballistic missile R-16 intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-7 Saddler) R-21 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SS-N-5 Serb) R-23 missile (AA-7 Apex) R-26 intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-8 Sasin) R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SS-N-6 Serb) R-27 missile (AA-10 Alamo) R-33 missile (AA-9 Amos) R-36 intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-9 Scarp and SS-18 Satan) R-39 missile (SS-N-20 Sturgeon) R-40 missile (AA-6 Acrid) R-46 intercontinental ballistic missile R-60 missile (AA-8 Aphid) R-73 missile (AA-11 Archer) R-77 missile (AA-12 Adder) R-300 Elbrus theatre ballistic missile (SS-1c Scud) R-400 Oka mobile theatre ballistic missile (SS-23 Spider) RS-24 intercontinental ballistic missile (Unknown) [3] RT-1 theatre ballistic missile RT-2 intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-13 Savage) RT-2PM Topol mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-25 Sickle) RT-2UTTH Topol M mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-27) RT-15 mobile theatre ballistic missile (SS-14 Scamp) RT-20 intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-15 Scrooge) RT-21 Temp 2S mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-16 Sinner) RT-21M Pioner mobile medium range ballistic missile (SS-20 Saber) RT-23 Molodets intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-24 Scalpel) RT-25 theatre ballistic missile S-25 missile (SA-1 Guild) S-75 missile (SA-2/SA-N-2 Guideline) S-125 missile (SA-3/SA-N-1 Goa) S-200 missile (SA-5 Gammon) S-300P missile (SA-10 Grumble/SA-N-6/SA-20 Gargoyle/SA-X-21 Triumf) S-300V missile (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant) Strela-1 missile (SA-9 Gaskin) Strela-2 missile (SA-7/SA-N-5 Grail) Strela-3 missile (SA-14/SA-N-8 Gremlin) Strela-10 missile (SA-13 Gopher)
110
TR-1 Temp theatre ballistic missile (SS-12 / SS-22 Scaleboard) UR-100 intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-11 Sego)
List of missiles by country UR-100N intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-19 Stiletto) UR-200 intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-X-10 Scrag)
111
By NATO name
AA-1 Alkali / Kaliningrad K-5 AA-2 Atoll / Vympel K-13 AA-3 Anab / Kaliningrad K-8 AA-4 Awl / K-9 missile AA-5 Ash / R-4 missile AA-6 Acrid / R-40 missile AA-7 Apex / R-23 missile AA-8 Aphid / R-60 missile AA-9 Amos / R-33 missile AA-10 Alamo / R-27 missile AA-11 Archer / R-73 missile AA-12 Adder R-77 missile AS-1 Kennel anti-shipping AS-2 Kipper anti-shipping AS-3 Kangaroo nuclear anti-shipping AS-4 Kitchen anti-shipping AS-5 Kelt air-to-surface AS-6 Kingfisher anti-shipping AS-7 Kerry (SA-1 Guild) S-25 missile (SA-2/SA-N-2 Guideline) S-75 missile (SA-3/SA-N-1 Goa) S-125 missile (SA-N-3 Goblet) 4K60/4K65 missiles (SA-4 Ganef) 2K11 missile (SA-5 Gammon) S-200 missile (SA-6 Gainful) 3M9 missile (SA-7/SA-N-5 Grail) Strela-2 missile (SA-8/SA-N-4 Gecko) 9K33 missile (SA-9 Gaskin) Strela-1 missile (SA-10 Grumble/SA-N-6/SA-20 Gargoyle/SA-X-21 Triumf) S-300P missile (SA-11/SA-N-7 Gadfly) 9K37 missile (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant) S-300V missile (SA-13 Gopher) Strela-10 missile (SA-14/SA-N-8 Gremlin) Strela-3 missile (SA-15/SA-N-9 Gauntlet) 9K330/9K331/9K332 missiles (SA-16 Gimlet) Igla-1 missile (SA-17/SA-N-12 Grizzly) 9K38 missile (SA-18/SA-N-10 Grouse) Igla missile (SA-19/SA-N-11 Grison) 2K22 missile
SS-1 Scunner / R-1 SS-1b Scud / R-11 SS-1c Scud / R-300 SS-2 Sibling / R-2
List of missiles by country SS-3 Shyster / R-5 SS-4 Sandal / R-12 Dvina SS-5 Skean / R-14 Chusovaya SS-6 Sapwood / R-7 Semyorka SS-7 Saddler / R-16 SS-8 Sasin / R-9 Desna SS-8 Sasin / R-26 (mistaken identification by NATO) SS-9 Scarp / R-36 SS-10 Scrag / Global Rocket 1 SS-11 Sego / UR-100 SS-12 Scaleboard / TR-1 Temp SS-13 Savage / RT-2 SS-14 Scamp / RT-15 SS-15 Scrooge / RT-20 SS-16 Sinner / RT-21 Temp 2S SS-17 Spanker / MR-UR-100 Sotka SS-18 Satan / R-36M SS-19 Stiletto / UR-100N SS-20 Saber / RT-21M Pioner SS-21 Scarab / OTR-21 Tochka SS-22 Scaleboard / TR-1 Temp SS-23 Spider / R-400 Oka SS-24 Scalpel / RT-23 Molodets SS-25 Sickle / RT-2PM Topol SS-27 / RT-2UTTH Topol M SS-N-1 Scrubber / P-1 missile SS-N-2 Styx / 4K40/4K51 missile SS-N-4 Sark / R-13 SS-N-5 Serb / R-21 SS-N-6 Serb / R-27 SS-N-15 Starfish 82R missile SS-N-16 Stallion 86R/88R missile SS-N-19 Shipwreck / P-700 rocket SS-N-20 Sturgeon / R-39 missile SS-N-21 Sampson / Raduga Kh-55 SS-N-22 Sunburn / P-270 missile SS-N-23 Skif / SS-N-23[1] SS-N-25 Switchblade / Kh-35 SS-N-27 Sizzler / 3M-54 Klub SS-X-10 Scrag / Global Rocket 1 / GR-1 SS-X-10 Scrag / UR-200
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113
Serbia (Europe)
ALAS (Advanced Light Attack System) Long-range multipurpose guided missile
South Africa (Africa)

RSA Series
RSA-1 (Variant of the Jericho II)[4] RSA-2 (Variant of the Jericho II)[5] RSA-3[6] RSA-4 (Variant of the Shavit)[7]
(Above missiles made by Houwteq)
Other
A-Darter R-Darter Ingwe Mokopa MUPSOW (Multi-Purpose Stand Off Weapon) Torgos Air-Launched Cruise Missile Umkhonto
(Above missiles made by Denel Dynamics)
Sweden (Europe)
RBS-15 RB 04 Rb 05 RBS 70 RBS 23 Taurus missile BILL 1 BILL 2 Bantam
Turkey (Asia/Europe; NATO)

TR 122 Toros 230 Toros 260 RA 7040 TR 107 Pars SAGE 227 F (Turkish munition for M270 MLRS) Kasrga WS-1 (Turkey/PRC co-production) Yldrm B-611(F600t or j-600 t) (Turkey/PRC co-production)
J Missile (status unknown, possibly under development) Roketsan UMTAS Long Range Antitank Roketsan OMTAS Medium Range Antitank
List of missiles by country Roketsan Cirit guided missile SOM (missile)[8] Cruise Missile HGK (bomb) Guided Smart munition[9] National Bunker Buster (NEB[10])
114
United Kingdom (Europe; NATO)

AIM-132 ASRAAM Bloodhound Surface-to-air Blowpipe Man portable Surface-to-air Blue Steel Nuclear "Stand Off Bomb" Blue Streak Blue Water - surface to surface nuclear Brakemine WWII SAM project Brimstone Fairey Fireflash Air-to-air Fairey Stooge anti-ship missile Fire Shadow Firestreak Air-to-air Green Cheese Javelin Surface-to-air Malkara (joint Australian/British) MBDA Meteor (European) Rapier Surface-to-air Red Dean Red Hebe Red Top Air-to-air Sea Cat Surface-to-air Sea Dart Surface-to-air Sea Eagle Sea Skua Sea Slug Surface-to-air Sea Viper (Aster Missile) Surface-to-air Sea Wolf Surface-to-air Skybolt ALBM Skyflash Starburst Starstreak Storm Shadow (British-French) Swingfire Ground to ground, anti-tank Thunderbird Tigercat UB.109T - cruise missile Vickers Vigilant
115
United States (North America; NATO)

Missile Design Series (Unified)
US DoD 4120 Mission Design Series (MDS) Designators and Symbols for Guided Missiles, Rockets, Probes, Boosters, and Satellites.[11]
Status Prefix C - Captive D - Dummy J - Special Test (temporary) M - Maintenance Launch Environment A - Air B - Multiple C - Coffin F - Man-Portable Basic Mission C - Transport D - Decoy E - Electronic / Communications G - Surface Attack I - Aerial/Space Intercept L - Launch Detection / Surveillance Vehicle Type B - Booster M - Guided Missile N - Probe R - Rocket S - Satellite
N - Special Test (Permanent) G - Surface X - Experimental Y - Prototype Z - Planning H - Stored and Launched from concrete silo
L - Silo Stored, Raised via elevator for Launch M - Scientific / Calibration N - Navigation P - Soft Pad R - Ship U - Underwater Q - Drone S - Space Support T - Training U - Underwater Attack W - Weather
Sample Missile MDS - "BGM-109G"[11]

Launch Environment Multiple Basic Mission Vehicle Type Design Number Series Surface Attack Guided Missile 109th Missile Design -B -G -M - 109
7th Version of the Design - G
The list of U. S. missiles, sorted by ascending MDS number: MGM-1 Matador RIM-2 Terrier MIM-3 Nike-Ajax AIM-4 Falcon MGM-5 Corporal RGM-6 Regulus AIM-7 Sparrow/RIM-7 Sea Sparrow RIM-8 Talos AIM-9 Sidewinder CIM-10 Bomarc PGM-11 Redstone AGM-12 Bullpup
MGM-13 Mace MIM-14 Nike-Hercules RGM-15 Regulus II
List of missiles by country CGM-16 / HGM-16 Atlas PGM-17 Thor MGM-18 Lacrosse PGM-19 Jupiter ADM-20 Quail MGM-21 (French-made) AGM-22 (French-made) MIM-23 Hawk RIM-24 Tartar LGM-25 Titan AIM-26 Falcon UGM-27 Polaris AGM-28 Hound Dog MGM-29 Sergeant LGM-30 Minuteman MGM-31 Pershing MGM-32 Entac MQM-33 BGM-34 Firebee AQM-35 MQM-36 Shelduck AQM-37 Jayhawk AQM-38 MQM-39 Cardinal MQM-40 Firefly AQM-41 Petrel MQM-42 Redhead/Roadrunner FIM-43 Redeye UUM-44 Subroc AGM-45 Shrike MIM-46 Mauler AIM-47 Falcon AGM-48 Skybolt LIM-49 Nike Zeus/Spartan RIM-50 Typhon LR MGM-51 Shillelagh MGM-52 Lance AGM-53 Condor AIM-54 Phoenix RIM-55 Typhon MR PQM-56 MQM-57 Falconer MQM-58 Overseer RGM-59 Taurus
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AQM-60 Kingfisher MQM-61 Cardinal AGM-62 Walleye
List of missiles by country AGM-63 AGM-64 Hornet AGM-65 Maverick RIM-66 Standard MR SM-2 RIM-67 Standard ER SM-2 AIM-68 Big Q AGM-69 SRAM LEM-70 Minuteman ERCS BGM-71 TOW MIM-72 Chaparral UGM-73 Poseidon BQM-74 Chukar BGM-75 AICBM AGM-76 Falcon FGM-77 Dragon AGM-78 Standard ARM AGM-79 Blue Eye AGM-80 Viper AQM-81 Firebolt AIM-82 AGM-83 Bulldog AGM-84 Harpoon RGM-84 Harpoon UGM-84 Harpoon RIM-85 AGM-86 ALCM AGM-87 Focus AGM-88 HARM UGM-89 Perseus BQM-90 ASMT[12] AQM-91 Firefly FIM-92 Stinger XQM-93 Compass Dwell GQM-94 B-Gull AIM-95 Agile UGM-96 Trident I AIM-97 Seekbat GQM-98 Tern-R LIM-99 LIM-100 RIM-101 PQM-102 Delta Dagger AQM-103 Thunderbolt[12] MIM-104 Patriot MQM-105 Aquila
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BQM-106 Teleplane MQM-107 Streaker
List of missiles by country BQM-108 VATOL[12] BGM-109 Tomahawk BGM-110 SLCM BQM-111 Firebrand AGM-112 RIM-113 SIRCS AGM-114 Hellfire MIM-115 Roland RIM-116 RAM FQM-117 RCMAT LGM-118 Peacekeeper AGM-119 Penguin (Norwegian-made) AIM-120 AMRAAM CQM-121 Pave Tiger/Seek Spinner AGM-122 Sidearm AGM-123 Skipper AGM-124 Wasp UUM-125 Sea Lance BQM-126 AQM-127 SLAT AQM-128 AGM-129 ACM AGM-130 Ripper[12] AGM-131 SRAM II AIM-132 ASRAAM UGM-133 Trident II MGM-134 Midgetman ASM-135 ASAT AGM-136 Tacit Rainbow AGM-137 TSSAM CEM-138 Pave Cricket RUM-139 VL-ASROC MGM-140 ATACMS ADM-141 TALD AGM-142 Have Nap (Israeli-made) MQM-143 RPVT ADM-144 BQM-145 Peregrine MIM-146 ADATS BQM-147 Exdrone FGM-148 Javelin PQM-149 UAV-SR PQM-150 UAV-SR FQM-151 Pointer AIM-152 AAAM
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AGM-153 AGM-154 JSOW
List of missiles by country BQM-155 Hunter RIM-156 SM-2ER Block IV MGM-157 EFOGM AGM-158 JASSM AGM-159 JASSM ADM-160 MALD RIM-161 SM-3 RIM-162 ESSM GQM-163 Coyote MGM-164 ATACMS II RGM-165 LASM MGM-166 LOSAT BQM-167 Skeeter MGM-168 ATAMCS Block IVA AGM-169 JCM MQM-170 Outlaw MQM-171 Outlaw
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FGM-172 SRAW
Joint Designation System of 1947

Status Prefix R - Research T - Training Launch Environment Target Environment System Designation Developing Service Sequence Number Modification Suffix A - Air S - Surface A - Air S - Surface U - Underwater M - Missile A - Air Force G - Army N - Navy
X - Experimental U - Underwater Y - Service Test
Test Vehicle Designations[13]

Basic Mission System Designation Developing Service Sequence Number Modification Suffix C - Control L - Launching P - Propulsion R - Research TV - Test Vehicle A - Air Force G - Army N - Navy
Sequence Numbers: Air Force: Consecutive numerical sequence for each missile mission type. Army: Single numerical sequence until 1948 when the sequence numbers were restarted. Navy: Initially even numbers transitioning to sequential. Sample Vehicle Designation "SSM-A-2 Navaho"
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Prefix
Not Used S S M A
Launch Environment S - Surface Target Environment System Designation Developing Service Sequence Number Modification Suffix S - Surface M - Missile A - Air Force
Sequencial Number 2 Not Used
Sample Test Vehicle Designation "RTV-G-1 WAC Corporal"

Basic Mission Research R
System Designation TV - Test Vehicle TV Developing Service G - Army Sequence Number Modification Suffix G 1 Not Used
United States Air Force Designation Systems

United States Air Force Designation System 1947 to 1951 The list of missiles sorted by ascending Air Force 1947-1951 designations.[13]
AAM-A-1 Firebird AAM-A-2 Falcon ASM-A-1 TARZON ASM-A-2 RASCAL LTV-A-1 Doodle Bug PTV-A-1 RTV-A-1 RTV-A-2 HIROC RTV-3 NATIV RTV-A-4 Shrike RTV-A-5 SAM-A-1 GAPA SSM-A-1 Matador SSM-A-2 Navaho SSM-A-3 Snark SSM-A-4 Navaho II SSM-A-5 Boojum SSM-A-6 Navaho III
United States Air Force Designation System 1951 to 1955[13] During this timeframe, the U.S. Air Force treated missiles as pilotless aircraft.[13]
Basic Mission B - Bomber "Ground Attack Missile" F - Fighter "Anti-Aircraft Missile" X - Experimental Sequence Number Modification Series
The list of missiles sorted by ascending Air Force 1951-1955 designations.

B-61 Matador B-62 Snark B-63 RASCAL B-64 Navaho B-65 Atlas B-67 Crossbow F-98 Falcon F-99 Bomarc F-104 Falcon1 X-7 X-8 X-9 Shrike X-10 X-112 X-122 X-17

1 2
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A version of the Falcon missile was briefly designated the F-104 before it was re-designated as the F-98.[13]
The X-11 and X-12 designations were assigned to one and three engine test missiles that would have been used to develop a five engine version of the Atlas missile.[13] United States Air Force Designation System 1955 to 1963[13]
Status Prefix H - Hardened Basic Mission GAM - Guided Air-Launched Missile Sequence Number Modification Series
R - Reconnaissance GAR - Guided Air-Launched Rocket S - Space T - Training U - Training X - Experimental Y - Service Test IM - Intercept Missile RM - Research Missile SM - Strategic Missile TM - Tactical Missile
For all basic missions except GAR (which started at 1) the sequence number started after 67 which was the last bomber designation used for guided missiles.[13] Sample Air Force 1955 - 1963 Designation - "XSM - 73"
Status Prefix Basic Mission Sequence Number Experimental Strategic Missile X SM
6th non-GAR missile after 67 73
Modification Series Not Used
The list of missiles sorted by ascending Air Force 1955-1963 designations. *

TM-61 Matador SM-62 Snark GAM-63 RASCAL SM-64 Navaho SM-65 Atlas GAM-67 Crossbow SM-68 Titan IM-69 Bomarc IM-70 Talos GAM-71 Buck Duck GAM-72 Quail SM-73 Bull Goose SM-74 SM-75 Thor TM-76 Mace GAM-77 Hound Dog SM-78 GAM-79 White Lance SM-80 Minuteman RM-81 Agena RM-82 Loki-Dart GAM-83 Bullpup RM-84 Aerobee-Hi RM-85 Nike-Cajun RM-86 Exos GAM-87 Skybolt SRM-88 Rocksonde 200 RM-89 Blue Scout I RM-90 Blue Scout II RM-91 Blue Scout Junior RM-92 Blue Scout Junior IM-99 Bomarc AIM-101 Sparrow GAR-1 Falcon GAR-2 Falcon GAR-3 Falcon GAR-4 Falcon GAR-5 Falcon GAR-6 Falcon GAR-8 Sidewider GAR-9 Falcon GAR-11 Nuclear Falcon
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United States Navy Designation Systems

United States Navy Designation System 1941 - 1945[13] The list of missiles sorted by ascending Navy 1941 - 1945 designations.
Pre-Fix Basic Mission Manufacturer Code D - McDonnell
X - Experimental BD - Assault Drone
LB - Bomb Carrying Glider E - Pratt-Read TD - Target Drone P - Piper T - Taylorcraft
Interstate BDR LBD Gargoyle LBE-1 Glomb LBP-1 Glomb LBT-1 Glomb
United States Navy Designation System 1946 - 1947[13]

Basic Mission KA - Anti-Aircraft KD - Drone KG - Ground Attack KS - Anti-Ship KU - Research and Test Manufacturer Sequence Number Manufacturer Code
None - First Missile Constructed by Manufacturer D - McDonnell 2 - Second Missile Constructed by Manufacturer 3 - 3rd Missile Constructed by Manufacturer M - Martin N - Naval Air Material Unit Q - Fairchild S - Sperry Y - Convair W - Willys-Overland
The list of missiles sorted by ascending Navy 1946-1947 designations.[13]

KAM Little Joe KAN Little Joe KA2N Gorgon IIA KA3N Gorgon IIIA [14] KAQ Lark KAS Sparrow KAY Lark KGN Gorgon IIC KGW Loon KSD Gargoyle KUD Gargoyle KUM Gorgon IV KUN Gorgon IIC KU2N Gorgon IIA KU3N Gorgon III KUW Loon
United States Navy Designation System 1947 - 1963 The list of missiles sorted by ascending Navy 1947-1963 designations.[13]
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AUM-N-4 Diver AUM-N-6 Puffin SAM-N-2 Lark SAM-N-4 Lark SAM-N-6 Talos SAM-N-7 Terrier SAM-N-8 Zeus SAM-N-8 Typhon LR SAM-N-9 Typhon MR SSM-N-2 Triton (see USSHawaii(CB-3)) SSM-N-4 Taurus SSM-N-6 Rigel SSM-N-8 Regulus SSM-N-9 Lacrosse SSM-N-9 Regulus II SUM-N-2 Grebe CTV-N-2 Gorgon IIC CTV-N-4 Gorgon IIA CTV-N-6 Gorgon IIIA CTV-N-8 Bumblebee STV CTV-N-9 Lark CTV-N-10 Lark LTV-N-2 Loon LTV-N-4 PTV-N-2 Gorgon IV PTV-N-4 Bumblebee BTV RTV-N-2 Gargoyle RTV-N-4 Gorgon IIIC RTV-N-6 Bumblebee XPM RTV-N-8 Aerobee RTV-N-10 Aerobee RTV-N-12 Viking RTV-N-13 Aerobee 150 RTV-N-15 Pollux RV-N-16 Oriole
AAM-N-2 Sparrow I AAM-N-3 Sparrow II AAM-N-4 Oriole AAM-N-5 Meteor AAM-N-6 Sparrow III AAM-N-7 Sidewinder AAM-N-9 Sparrow X AAM-N-10 Eagle AAM-N-11 Phoenix ASM-N-2 Bat ASM-N-4 Dove ASM-N-5 Gorgon V ASM-N-6 Omar ASM-N-7 Bullpup ASM-N-8 Corvus ASM-N-10 Shrike ASM-N-11 Condor AUM-N-2 Petrel
United States Army Designation Systems

United States Army Designation System 1941 - 1947[13]
Designation BG - Bomb Glider BQ - Guided Bomb GB - Glide Bomb Function Glider with explosive warhead Period of Usage 1942 to 1944
Ground-launched remote controlled drone 1942 to 1945 Guided Bomb 1941 to 1947 1943 to 1947 1943 to 1947 1943 to 1947
GT - Glide Torpedo Guided Bomb with a torpedo JB - Jet Bomb Missile
VB - Vertical Bomb Guided Bomb
The list of missiles sorted by ascending Army 1941-1947 designations. JB-1 Bat JB-2 Doodle Bug JB-3 Tiamet JB-4 Project MX-607 JB-5 Project MX-595 JB-6 Project MX-600 JB-7 Project MX-605 JB-8 GAPA JB-9 Project MX-626 JB-10 Bat
United States Army Designation System 1948 - 1955 The list of missiles sorted by ascending Army 1948 - 1955 designations.[13]
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PGM-11 Redstone SSM-G-15 Hermes A-1 SSM-G-16 Hermes A-3B SSM-G-17 Corporal SAM-A-18 Hawk SAM-A-19 Plato RV-A-22 Lark SSM-A-23 Dart SAM-A-25 Nike Hercules SSM-A-27 Sergeant
RTV-G-1 WAC Corporal RTV-G-2 Corporal E RTV-G-3 Hermes II RTV-G-4 Bumper CTV-G-5 Hermes A-1 RTV-G-6 Hermes B-1 SAM-G-7 Nike Ajax SSM-G-8 Hermes A-3A SSM-G-9 Hermes B-2 RTV-G-10 Hermes A-2 SSM-G-12 Martin Lacrosse SSM-G-13 Hermes A-2
United States Army Designation System 1955 - 1963

Prefix Army Ordnance Designator Equipment Category Sequence Number Modification Suffix
X - Pre Production M - Ordnance Designator
The list of missiles sorted by ascending Army 1955-1963 designations.[13] M1 Nike-Ajax M2 Corporal M3 Hawk M4 Lacrosse M6 Nike-Hercules M8 Redstone M9 Redstone M13 Shillelagh M14 Pershing M15 Sergeant M16 Hawk M18 Hawk M19 Pershing
United States Undesignated Missiles

The list of undesignated United States missiles sorted alphabetically:
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ERAM ERIS FABMDS Farside FLAGE Flying Bomb GBI HAVE DASH II HEDI Hera HGV HIBEX High Virgo HOE HOPI HTV HVM HyFly SIAM Skokie I Skokie II SLAM Spike Sprint SR19/SR19 SRALT STARS Storm T-16 T-22 Talos-Sergeant-Hydac THAAD Trailblazer 2 Wagtail Wizard
1 2
A-1 Affordable Weapon Alpha Draco ALVRJ Aries APKWS ASALM ATASK Athena Bold Orion Brazo Caleb Caster 4B Cherokee CKEM Cree Crow D-40 Cannonball
Jindivik1 Kettering Bug LAM LASRM LOCAAS M30 Guided MRLS NOTSNIK PAM PLV Pogo Pogo-Hi Private Rapier2 RATTLRS RSC-51 Senior Prom Sergent-Hydac Shavetail
Australian target missile briefly used by the United States Navy.
The United States procured Rapier missile systems for the air defense of United States Air Force Bases in the United Kingdom.
United States Missiles with X Designations

The list of X designated United States missiles numerically: X-7 X-8 X-9 Shrike X-10 X-11 X-12 X-17 X-41 X-42 X-43 Hyper-X X-51
References
[1] http:/ / toolserver. org/ %7Edispenser/ cgi-bin/ dab_solver. py?page=List_of_missiles_by_country& editintro=Template:Disambiguation_needed/ editintro& client=Template:Dn [2] http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ w/ index. php?title=List_of_missiles_by_country& action=edit [3] http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 1/ hi/ world/ europe/ 6700585. stm [9] http:/ / www. sage. tubitak. gov. tr/ home. do?ot=1& sid=1310& pid=547 [10] http:/ / www. sage. tubitak. gov. tr/ home. do?ot=1& sid=1340& pid=547 [11] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), DoD 4120.15-L Model Designation of Military Aerospace Vehicles, Department of Defense, May 12, 2004 [12] Bridges Derek. (2007) M-Missiles, (http:/ / www. personal. psu. edu/ users/ d/ o/ dob104/ aviation/ us/ missile. html), retrieved December 25, 2007 [13] Andreas Parsch, Pre-1963 Designations of U.S. Missile and Drones, (http:/ / www. designation-systems. net/ usmilav/ old-missiles. html), Retrieved November 17, 2007. [14] Missile's Mission: Picking Off The Strays, October 1950, Popular Science (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=7iwDAAAAMBAJ& pg=PA125& dq=popular+ science+ antitank+ cannon& hl=en& ei=UT65TL7xNsrNngedhcTHAQ& sa=X& oi=book_result& ct=result&

resnum=7& ved=0CEgQ6AEwBg#v=onepage& q& f=true) detailed article
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Countries
Albania
By type

Albania

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Albania once possessed a stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. This stockpile of chemical weapons included 16,678 kilograms (36,770lb) of mustard agent, lewisite, adamsite, and chloroacetophenone. Albania was among the initial countries who signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993.[1] The treaty, which came into force in 1997, requires the declaration of chemical stockpiles, and the destruction of all chemical weapons, delivery systems and production facilities. One of only six nations to declare a stockpile, Albania made its declaration in March 2003,[2] after the discovery, in December 2002, of 600 bulk containers of chemicals in an abandoned bunker. The material was probably acquired by Communist leader Enver Hoxha in the mid-1970s from China although no documentation was found.[3] On 11 July 2007, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) confirmed the destruction of the entire chemical weapons stockpile in Albania,[4] making Albania the first nation to completely destroy all of its chemical weapons under the terms of the CWC. Costs were approximately 48 million U.S. dollars. The United States assisted with and funded the destruction operations under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction.[5]
Biological and nuclear weapons

Albania acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention on June 3, 1992, banning biological weapons. It also acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in September 1990.[6] Albania joined the Geneva Protocol on 20 December 1989, banning chemical and biological weapons and deposited its accession to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 23 April 2003.[6]
Albanian chemical weapons.
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References
[1] Membership of the OPCW, http:/ / www. opcw. org/ en/ membership_menu. html [2] Kerry Boyd, "Albania Has Chemical Arms; CWC Review Conference Meets" (http:/ / www. armscontrol. org/ act/ 2003_06/ cwc_june03. asp), Arms Control Association, June 2003, accessed July 27, 2007 [3] "Albania's Chemical Cache Raises Fears About Others", http:/ / www. washingtonpost. com/ wp-dyn/ articles/ A61698-2005Jan9. html, Joby Warrick, Washington Post, January 10, 2005, accessed July 27, 2007 [4] U.S. Department of State, Albania First Country to Destroy All Of Its Chemical Weapons (http:/ / www. state. gov/ r/ pa/ prs/ ps/ 2007/ 88378. htm), July 13, 2007, accessed July 27, 2007 [5] Nunn-Lugar Destroys Chemical Weapons Stockpile in Albania, http:/ / lugar. senate. gov/ record. cfm?id=279351& , Press Release of Senator Lugar, July 19, 2007, accessed July 27, 2007 [6] Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, http:/ / disarmament. un. org/ TreatyStatus. nsf/ NPT%20(in%20alphabetical%20order)?OpenView, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), accessed July 27, 2007
Algeria
In 1991, the government of the United States said it had unearthed details of the alleged construction of a nuclear reactor in Algeria.[] The Washington Times accused the country of developing nuclear weapons with the help of the Chinese government.[] The Algerian government admitted it was building a reactor, but denied any secrecy or military purpose.[] Surveillance from U.S. satellites also suggested that the reactor would not be used for military purposes.[] China had secretly made an agreement in 1983 to assist Algeria in developing a nuclear reactor.[] In November of 1991, succumbing to international pressure, Algeria placed the reactor under IAEA safeguards.[] Algeria signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in January 1995, and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention[1] In August 2001, Algeria acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention.[2]
Notes
[2] (http:/ / unhq-appspub-01. un. org/ UNODA/ Treatystatus. nsf/ af5444bb1b61fed38525688f0073d8d7/ ab48b8fb110c360985256af8005590c7?OpenDocument)
References
Ref. Albright, David; and Corey Hinderstein (May/June 2001). "Algeria: Big deal in the desert?" (http:// thebulletin.metapress.com/content/t554r07076046724/?p=7fe5a1eb81494649b54eed80d7a914cc&pi=13). Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (http://thebulletin.org) 57 (3): 4552. http://www.atomicarchive.com/Almanac/Testing.shtml
Argentina
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Argentina
By type

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Brazil Bulgaria Burma Canada PRC France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Mexico Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Sweden Syria ROC (Taiwan) Ukraine United Kingdom
Argentina
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United States Proliferation

Argentina has a history with the development of weapons of mass destruction. Under the National Reorganization Process, Argentina began a nuclear weapons program in the early 1980s, and was abolished when democracy was restored in 1983.
Missile systems
During the 1980s, the Alacrn (English: Scorpion) and Cndor 2 (English: Condor) missiles were developed. The Cndor 2, with a range of around 1,000 kilometres, was reportedly scrapped during the Menem administration under pressure from the United States government. The current status of the Alacrn remains unknown.[citation needed]
Chemical weapons
Argentina acceded to the Geneva Protocol on May 12, 1969 and has been active in non-proliferation efforts, ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1979 and the Chemical Weapons Convention on October 2, 1995. In September 1991 Argentina, together with Brazil and Chile, signed the Mendoza Declaration, which commits signatories not to use, develop, produce, acquire, stock, or transferdirectly or indirectlychemical or biological weapons.
Nuclear weapons
Argentina conducted a nuclear weapon research program during the National Reorganization Process regime. Government officials at the time confirmed, in November 1983, that research carried out at the Balseiro Institute's research reactor had yielded the capacity for weapons-grade uranium enrichment.[1] The program was abandoned, however, shortly after the return of democracy, on December 10, 1983. In 1991 the parliaments of Argentina and Brazil ratified a bilateral inspection agreement that created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) to verify both countries' pledges to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. On February 10, 1995, Argentina acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state. Argentina continues to use nuclear power in non-military roles, and is noted as an exporter of civilian use nuclear technology. In 2010, the government announced that it would start working in the creation of a nuclear submarine.[2] Those types of submarines only use atomic energy for propulsion. The announcement was highly criticized by politicians from opposing parties.[3]
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References
[1] National Geographic. August 1986. p.243. [2] Promete Garr que se construir un submarino nuclear en el pas (http:/ / www. lanacion. com. ar/ 1271651) [3] La oposicin, entre las duras crticas y la irona (http:/ / www. lanacion. com. ar/ 1271656)
Sources
"The Nuclear Club: Membership has its kilotons" (http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/nuclearweapons/). CBC News Online. April 12, 2006. Archived (http://web.archive.org/web/20060414110321/http://www. cbc.ca/news/background/nuclearweapons/) from the original on 14 April 2006. Retrieved April 2006. Nuclear Threat Initiative. "Argentina" (http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Argentina/index.html). Archived (http://web.archive.org/web/20060419074131/http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/ Argentina/index.html) from the original on 19 April 2006. Retrieved May 1, 2006.
External links
The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (http://www.wilsoncenter. org/article/npihp-partner-hosts-conference-brazils-and-argentinas-nuclear-history/) Conference on Brazilian and Argentine Nuclear Programs (English)
Australia
By type

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Brazil Bulgaria Burma Canada PRC France Germany
Australia

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India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Mexico Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Sweden Syria ROC (Taiwan) Ukraine United Kingdom United States Proliferation

Australia is not known or believed to possess weapons of mass destruction, although it has participated in extensive research into nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in the past. Australia chairs the Australia Group, an informal grouping of countries that seek to minimise the risk of assisting chemical and biological weapon proliferation. All states participating in the Australia Group are parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, and strongly support efforts under those Conventions to rid the world of chemical and biological weapons.[] As with chemical and biological weapons, Australia does not possess nuclear weapons and is not at all known to be seeking to develop them.
Biological weapons
Australia has advanced research programs in immunology, microbiology and genetic engineering that support an industry providing world class vaccines for domestic use and export.[] It also has an extensive wine industry and produces microorganisms on an industrial scale to support other industries including agriculture, food technology and brewing. The dual use nature of these facilities mean that Australia, like any country with advanced biotechnological industries, could easily produce biological warfare agents. Some disease research laboratories in Australia own strains of the Ebola virus. The Australian Microbial Resources Research Network lists 37 culture collections, many of which hold samples of pathogenic organisms for legitimate research purposes.[]
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History
In the wake of the Japanese advance through South East Asia during World War II, the secretary of the Australian Department of Defence, F.G. Shedden, wrote to Macfarlane Burnet on 24 December 1946 and invited him to attend a meeting of top military officers to discuss biological warfare.[] In September 1947, Burnet was invited to join the chemical and biological warfare subcommittee of the New Weapons and Equipment Development Committee and subsequently prepared a secret report titled "Note on War from a Biological Angle".[] In 1951 the subcommittee recommended that "a panel reporting to the chemical and biological warfare subcommittee should be authorised to report on the offensive potentiality of biological agents likely to be effective against the local food supplies of South-East Asia and Indonesia".[] The activities of the chemical and biological warfare subcommittee were scaled back soon after, as Prime Minister Robert Menzies was more interested in trying to acquire nuclear weapons.[] Australia signed the Biological Weapons Convention on 10 April 1972 and deposited a certificate of ratification on 5 October 1977.[]
Chemical weapons
Australia conducted extensive research into chemical weapons during World War II. Although Australia has never produced chemical weapons, it did stockpile chemical weapons sourced from the USA and Britain.[] Chemical weapons known to have been stockpiled included mustard gas, phosgene, lewisite, adamsite and CN gas. Some of the stockpiled weapons in the form of mortar and artillery shells, aerial bombs and bulk agents were sent to New Guinea for potential use against Japanese tunnel complexes.[] No actual use of the weapons was recorded although there were many trials using 'live' chemical weapons (such as shown in the picture to the right).
An observer examining an unexploded 25 pound gas shell following a trial of gas weapons at Singleton, New South Wales in 1943.
After World War II, the chemical weapons were disposed of by burning, venting (for phosgene) or by dumping at sea. Some 21,030 tons of chemical weapons were dumped in the seas off Australia near Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne. This has been covered in a Defence report by Geoff Plunkett.[1] A complete history of Australia's involvement with chemical weapons - titled Chemical Warfare in Australia - has been published in book form by the Army History Unit (Defence Department) in 2013 (2nd Edn) [2] [3] Again it is authored by Geoff Plunkett [4]. A stockpile of 1,000 pound phosgene bombs was discovered at Embi Airfield in 1970 and disposed of by Australian Army personnel, and, up to 1990, drums of mustard gas were still being discovered in the bush where they had been tested.[] Another stockpile of chemical weapons was discovered at Maxwelton, Queensland in 1989.[] Australia signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in January 1993 and ratified it with the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act in 1994.[]
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Nuclear weapons
Australia does not have nuclear weapons and is not thought to be seeking to develop them, although several federal governments have investigated the idea and may have done some research into the question.[] Australia investigated acquiring tactical nuclear weapons from the United Kingdom or the United States as early as 1956 when Athol Townley, Minister for Air, wrote to Philip McBride, Minister for Defence, recommending the acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons to arm Australia's English Electric Canberra bombers and CAC Sabre fighters.[5][6][7] Air Chief Marshal Frederick Scherger and Minister for Operation Hurricane, a 25kt nuclear test, Monte Bello Islands, Air Athol Townley supported acquiring nuclear Australia weapons, both for international prestige and because of the small size of the country's military. While Scherger's British and American counterparts were encouraging, the Macmillan and Eisenhower governments were not. Prime Minister Robert Menzies' government decided that domestic production would be too difficult due to cost and international politics.[] Australia hosted British nuclear testing in Monte Bello Islands (Operation Hurricane), Emu Field and Maralinga between 1952 and 1963. Maralinga was developed as a joint facility with a shared funding arrangement.[] During the 1950s, Australia participated in the development of the Blue Streak missile, a Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) intended for delivery of a nuclear warhead. The Australian HIFAR nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights, Sydney, operated from 1958 to 2006 and has now been replaced by the OPAL reactor in 2006. The new reactor is designed to use low-enriched uranium fuel and an open pool light water system.[] Australia has substantial deposits of uranium which account for 30% of the world's known reserves.[] Until 1996 government policy restricted exploitation of uranium deposits to three established mines. A fourth site at Four Mile uranium mine was approved in July 2009.[8] Current policy is to develop the export potential of Australia's uranium industry by allowing mining and export of uranium under strict international agreements designed to prevent nuclear proliferation.[] Although the RAAF continued to occasionally investigate obtaining nuclear weapons during the 1960s,[] Australia signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on 27 February 1970 and ratified the treaty on 23 January 1973.[] Sir Philip Baxter first head of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC), now the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) and first Vice Chancellor of the University of New South Wales openly advocated Australia acquiring a weapons grade plutonium stockpile and thus nuclear weapons.[9] During the 1970s and 1980s, ANSTO scientists developed centrifuge enrichment technology, claimed to be comparable with the commercial URENCO centrifuge technology of the time. Such technology, if deployed on an industrial scale, would have been capable in principle of producing highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. The research lost government funding in the mid-1980s.[10] A commercial-scale enrichment plant would also be capable of producing sufficient highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapons program. An Australian company has been actively developing a novel process for uranium enrichment, Separation of Isotopes by Laser Excitation (SILEX).[] The then Prime Minister of Australia, John Howard, began a study in 2006 into the issues surrounding an increase in Australia's uranium usage.[] Amongst the topics of the study will be a domestic uranium enrichment plant for supplying low-enriched fuel for nuclear power reactors, either domestic or foreign.
Australia
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Delivery platforms
Like virtually every other developed nation and most larger developing nations, Australia has weapons systems which could be used to deliver nuclear weapons to its neighbours, if nuclear weapons were developed. [11] The Royal Australian Air Force has 71 F/A-18 Hornet strike fighters and 24 F/A-18F Super Hornet strike fighters. The Royal Australian Air Force is looking at options to purchase a further 18 F/A-18F Super Hornets due to delays in the production and arrivals of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II.
An Australian F-111
Australia previously operated the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk ground-attack aircraft and the English Electric Canberra and General Dynamics F-111C bombers, which were theoretically capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and F-111G tactical bombers which converted from United States Air Force FB-111A strategic nuclear bombers. Prior to the delivery of the F-111C, Australia briefly operated the McDonnell Douglas F-4E leased from the United States Air Force, standard Block 43/44 models capable of delivering nuclear weapons. As part of Air Staff Requirement (Operational Requirement/Air) 36 for bomber aircraft in the 1950s, the Royal Australian Air Force specified a requirement for "an offensive tactical strike capability" and "strategic defence of Australia" with targets "as far north as the Kra Peninsula". The bomber was required to have a range of not less than 4,000 nautical miles (7,400km) and be capable of carrying at least 20,000 pounds (9,100kg) of conventional bombs or one BLUE DANUBE nuclear weapon (which had been air dropped at Maralinga on 11 October 1956).[12] Locally manufactured versions of the Avro Vulcan or Handley Page Victor nuclear bombers were some of the options considered.
References
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] http:/ / www. hydro. gov. au/ n2m/ dumping/ cwa/ cwa. htm http:/ / www. bookdepository. co. uk/ Chemical-Warfare-Australia-Geoff-Plunkett/ 9780987427908 http:/ / www. mustardgas. org http:/ / www. smh. com. au/ news/ national/ deadly-chemicals-hidden-in-war-cache/ 2008/ 01/ 19/ 1200620272396. html National Archives of Australia, Department of Defence; A5954 1400/15 Re-equipment of RAAF Bomber and Fighter Squadrons with atomic weapons, 1956 [6] National Archives of Australia, Department of Defence; A1209 1957/4067 Nuclear Weapons for the Australian Forces, 1956-1958 [7] National Archives of Australia, Prime Minister's Department; A1945 186/5/3 Procurement of nuclear weapons for Australian forces, 1957 [12] National Archives of Australia, Department of Defence; A1945 1/501/694 PART 1 Royal Australian Air Force. Air staff requirement (Operational Requirement/Air 36). Bomber aircraft., 1954 - 1958
Further reading
Plunkett, Geoff (2013). Chemical Warfare in Australia: Australia's Involvement in Chemical Warfare 1914 Today (http://www.bookdepository.co.uk/Chemical-Warfare-Australia-Geoff-Plunkett/9780987427908) (2nd ed.). Leech Cup Books. ISBN9780987427908.
Brazil
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Brazil
By type

Brazil
138

In the 1970s and 80s, during the military regime, Brazil had a secret program intended to develop nuclear weapons.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7] The program was dismantled in 1990, five years after the military regime ended, and Brazil is considered free of weapons of mass destruction.[8] Brazil is one of several countries that have forsworn nuclear weapons under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty[9] but possess the key technologies needed to produce nuclear weapons.[7][10][11][12]
Nuclear program
In the 1950s, President Getlio Vargas encouraged the development of independent national nuclear capabilities.[2] During the 1970s and 80s, Brazil and Argentina embarked on a nuclear competition.[1] Through technology transfers from West Germany, which did not require IAEA safeguards, Brazil pursued a covert nuclear weapons program known as the "Parallel Program",[2] with enrichment facilities (including small scale centrifuge enrichment plants, a limited reprocessing capability, and a missile program).[1] In 1987, President Sarney announced that Brazil had enriched uranium to 20%.[2] In 1990, President Fernando Collor de Mello symbolically closed the Cachimbo test site, in Par, and exposed the militarys secret plan to develop a nuclear weapon.[1] Brazil's National Congress opened an investigation into the Parallel Program.[2] Congress members visited numerous facilities, including the Institute of Advanced Studies (IEAv) in So Jos dos Campos.[2] They also interviewed key players in the nuclear program, such as former President Joo Figueiredo and retired Army General Danilo Venturini, the former head of the National Security Council under Figueiredo.[2] The congressional investigation exposed secret bank accounts, code-named "Delta", which were managed by the National Nuclear Energy Commission and used for funding the program.[2] The congressional report revealed that the IEAv had designed two atomic bomb devices, one with a yield of twenty to thirty kilotons and a second with a yield of twelve kilotons.[2] The same report revealed that Brazil's military regime secretly exported eight tons of uranium to Iraq in 1981.[2][13] In 1991, Brazil and Argentina renounced their nuclear rivalry.[1] On 13 December 1991, they signed the Quadripartite agreement, at the IAEA headquarters, creating the BrazilianArgentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and allowing fullscope IAEA safeguards of Argentine and Brazilian nuclear installations.[1] Brazil officially opened the Resende enrichment plant in May 2006.[14] Brazil's enrichment technology development, and the plant itself, involved substantial discussions with the IAEA and its constituent nations. The dispute came down to whether IAEA inspectors would be allowed to inspect the machines themselves. The Brazilian government did not allow the inspection of the centrifugal cascade halls, arguing that this would reveal technological secrets (probably relating to the use of a magnetic lower bearing in place of the more common mechanical bearing).[15] The Brazilian authorities stated that, as Brazil is not part of any "axis of evil", the pressure for full access to inspection even in universities - could be construed as an attempt to pirate industrial secrets.[16] They also claimed that their technology is better than that of the United States and France, mainly because the centrifugal axis is not mechanical, but electromagnetic. Eventually, after extensive negotiations, agreement was reached that while not directly
Brazil inspecting the centrifuges, the IAEA would inspect the composition of the gas entering and leaving the centrifuge. Then U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, stated in 2004 that he was sure that Brazil had no plans to develop nuclear weapons.[17]
139
Technological capability
It is likely that Brazil has retained the technological capacity and knowhow to produce and deliver a nuclear weapon.[7] Experts at the Los Alamos National Laboratory have concluded that in view of its previous nuclear activities, Brazil is in a position to produce nuclear weapons within three years.[18] If Brazil decided to pursue a nuclear weapon, the centrifuges at the Resende enrichment plant could be reconfigured to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Even a small enrichment plant like Resende could produce several nuclear weapons per year, but only if Brazil was willing to do so openly.[10][15][19] The Brazilian Navy is currently developing a nuclear submarine fleet, and in 2007 authorised the construction of a prototype submarine propulsion reactor.[20] In 2008, France agreed to transfer technology to Brazil for the joint development of the nuclear submarine hull.[21]
Facilities
Aramar Experimental Center
23.397S 47.601W [22] The Aramar Experimental Center (Portuguese: Centro Experimental de Aramar) located in Iper in the State of So Paulo, was inaugurated in 1988 as the first uranium-only enrichment plant in Brazil. The facility is run by the Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) and the Brazilian Navy. In addition to the Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, the facility also hosts an Isotopic Enrichment Laboratory and several Small Nuclear Centers (Portuguese: Pequenas Centrais Nucleares, or PCNs). The enrichment laboratories are under the National Safeguards control and national inspections are carried out by the Safeguards Division of CNEN.[23]
Cachimbo Test Site

9.3047S 54.9464W [24] The Cachimbo test site, officially named Brigadeiro Velloso Test Site (Portuguese: Campo de Provas Brigadeiro Velloso), is located in the State of Par and covers 45,000 square kilometres, an area larger than the Netherlands. It is within this military area that a 320 meters-deep hole at the Cachimbo Mountain Range was site for nuclear explosives tests. The shaft has been public knowledge since 1986 and was allegedly abandoned in September 1990, when President Fernando Collor de Mello used a small shovel to symbolically seal up the hole.[25]
Army's Technology Center (Guaratiba)

23.0124S 43.5639W [26]
Brazilian Navy's Nuclear Propulsion Development Facility in July, 2007. This facility produces Uranium hexafluoride gas for Uranium enrichment.
The Army's Technology Center (Portuguese: Centro Tecnolgico do Exrcito, or CTEx) located in Guaratiba in the State of Rio de Janeiro is the site of the plutonium-producing reactor facility, known as 'The Atlantic Project', managed by the Brazilian Army's Special Projects Institute IPE. Reports indicate that the gas-graphite reactor would be capable of producing plutonium for atomic bombs.[27]
Brazil
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Aerospace Technology and Science Department (So Jos dos Campos)

23.212290S 45.875120W [28] The Aerospace Technology and Science Department (Portuguese: Departamento de Cincia e Tecnologia Aerospacial, or DCTA) is a research facility located in So Jos dos Campos, in the State of So Paulo where nuclear research is also conducted.[29]
Resende (Engenheiro Passos) Nuclear Fuel Factory

22.504S 44.646W [30] The Resende Nuclear Fuel Facility (Portuguese: Fbrica de Combustveis Nucleares, or FCN) is a nuclear enrichment facility located in Resende, in the State of Rio de Janeiro. The plant is managed by the Nuclear Industries of Brazil (Portuguese: Indstrias Nucleares do Brasil, or INB) and by the Brazilian Navy. Currently the plant produces enough HEU for 26 to 31 implosion type warheads.[31][32]
Legislation and conventions

Brazil's 1988 Constitution states in Article 21 that "all nuclear activity within the national territory shall only be admitted for peaceful purposes and subject to approval by the National Congress".[33] Brazil acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on September 18, 1998, ratified the Geneva Protocol on 28 August 1970, the Biological Weapons Convention on 27 February 1973, and the Chemical Weapons Convention on 13 March 1996. Brazil signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967, making Brazil a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Brazil is also an active participant in the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, multinational agencies concerned with reducing nuclear proliferation by controlling the export and re-transfer of materials that may be applicable to nuclear weapon development.
References
[1] Brazil: Nuclear Inventory (http:/ / www. reachingcriticalwill. org/ about/ pubs/ Inventory/ Brazil. pdf) Reachingcriticalwill.org. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [2] Brazil: Nuclear Weapons Programs (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ brazil/ nuke. htm) Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [3] Brazil, IAEA Reach Inspection Agreement (http:/ / www. armscontrol. org/ act/ 2005_01-02/ Brazil) Arms Control Association. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [4] Tracking Nuclear Proliferation - Brazil (http:/ / www. pbs. org/ newshour/ indepth_coverage/ military/ proliferation/ countries/ brazil. html) PBS NewsHour. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [5] States Formerly Possessing or Pursuing Nuclear Weapons: Brazil (http:/ / nuclearweaponarchive. org/ Nwfaq/ Nfaq7-4. html) The Nuclear Weapon Archive. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [6] Country Profiles (http:/ / www. gsinstitute. org/ dpe/ countries/ argentina_brazil. html) Global Security Institute. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [7] Countries and issues of nuclear strategic concern: Brazil (http:/ / www. sipri. org/ research/ disarmament/ nuclear/ researchissues/ past_projects/ issues_of_concern/ brazil/ brazil_default) SIPRI. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [8] Life without the bomb (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ americas/ 609279. stm) BBC. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [9] Albright, Lampreia hail Brazil's accession to NPT (http:/ / www. fas. org/ nuke/ control/ npt/ news/ 98091823_llt. html) Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [10] Brazils Nuclear Puzzle (http:/ / www. wisconsinproject. org/ pubs/ articles/ 2004/ BrazilsNuclearPuzzle. htm) Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [11] Brazil and the Bomb (http:/ / www. ip-global. org/ archiv/ exclusive/ view/ 1272884882. html) German Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [12] Not-Quite-Nuclear Nations (http:/ / www. newsweek. com/ 2009/ 08/ 27/ not-quite-nuclear-nations. html) Newsweek. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [13] Congressional Report on the "Parallel Program". (http:/ / www. senado. gov. br/ atividade/ materia/ getPDF. asp?t=66808& tp=1) Senate of Brazil. Retrieved on 2012-03-23. .
Brazil
[14] BBC News: Brazil joins world's nuclear club (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 1/ hi/ world/ americas/ 4981202. stm) BBC News. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [15] How Brazil Spun the Atom (http:/ / www. spectrum. ieee. org/ energy/ nuclear/ how-brazil-spun-the-atom) Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [16] Urnio: Brasil no contra a inspeo internacional, mas contra aumento da inspeo que pode apropriar-se da tecnologia desenvolvida pelo pas (http:/ / www. jornaldaciencia. org. br/ Detalhe. jsp?id=15243) Jornal da Cincia. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. . [17] BBC News: US sure of Brazil nuclear plans (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 1/ hi/ world/ americas/ 3715556. stm) BBC News. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [18] Brazil and the Bomb (http:/ / www. defesanet. com. br/ docs1/ ruhle_brazil_nuclear. pdf) German Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved on 2011-10-23. [19] Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Resende Nuclear Fuel Factory (FCN) (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ brazil/ resende. htm) Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [22] http:/ / toolserver. org/ ~geohack/ geohack. php?pagename=Brazil_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction& params=23. 397_S_47. 601_W_ [23] WMD Facilities: Aramar Experimental Center, Iper (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ brazil/ aramar. htm) Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [24] http:/ / toolserver. org/ ~geohack/ geohack. php?pagename=Brazil_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction& params=9. 3047_S_54. 9464_W_ [25] WMD Facilities: Cachimbo (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ brazil/ cachimbo. htm) Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [26] http:/ / toolserver. org/ ~geohack/ geohack. php?pagename=Brazil_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction& params=23. 0124_S_43. 5639_W_ [27] WMD Facilities: Guaratiba (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ brazil/ guaratiba. htm) Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [28] http:/ / toolserver. org/ ~geohack/ geohack. php?pagename=Brazil_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction& params=23. 212290_S_45. 875120_W_ [29] WMD Facilities: So Jos dos Campos (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ brazil/ sao-jose-dos-campos. htm) Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [30] http:/ / toolserver. org/ ~geohack/ geohack. php?pagename=Brazil_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction& params=22. 504_S_44. 646_W_ [31] WMD Facilities: Resende Nuclear Fuel Factory (FCN) (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ brazil/ resende. htm) Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [32] INB Activities on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (http:/ / anes. fiu. edu/ Pro/ s5ara. pdf) Americas Nuclear Energy Symposiums. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [33] Constitution of Brazil: Article 21; XXIII; a (http:/ / www. v-brazil. com/ government/ laws/ titleIII. html) V-Brazil. Retrieved on 2009-09-06.
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External links
Official sites Indstrias Nucleares do Brasil (http://www.inb.gov.br/english/default.asp) Brazilian Nuclear Industries
(English)
Centro de Desenvolvimento da Tecnologia Nuclear (http://www.cdtn.br/ingles/ingles.asp) Center of Nuclear Technology Development (English) Instituto de Pesquisas Energticas Nucleares (http://www.ipen.br/sitio/) National Nuclear Energy Research Institute (Portuguese) Instituto de Engenharia Nuclear (http://www.ien.gov.br/) Nuclear Engineering Institute (Portuguese) Centro Regional de Cincias Nucleares (http://www.crcn-co.cnen.gov.br/) Central-West Nuclear Sciences Regional Center (Portuguese) Comisso Nacional de Energia Nuclear (http://www.cnen.gov.br/) National Nuclear Energy Commission
(Portuguese)
Eletronuclear (http://www.eletronuclear.gov.br/ingles/inicio/index.php) Manages Brazil's nuclear power plants (Portuguese) Associao Brasileira de Energia Nuclear (http://www.aben.com.br/) Brazilian Association of Nuclear Energy
(Portuguese)
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (http://www.abacc.org/home. htm) (English) (Portuguese) (Spanish) Campo de Provas Brigadeiro Velloso (http://www.cpbv.aer.mil.br/) Cachimbo Test Site (Portuguese)
Brazil Departamento de Cincia e Tecnologia Aeroespacial (http://www.cta.br/) Brazilian Air Force - Aerospace Technology and Science Department (Portuguese) Scientific sites Jornal da Cincia's article (in Portuguese) (http://www.jornaldaciencia.org.br/Detalhe.jsp?id=15243) Academic Sites The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (http://www.wilsoncenter. org/article/npihp-partner-hosts-conference-brazils-and-argentinas-nuclear-history/) Conference on Brazilian and Argentine Nuclear Programs (English)
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Bulgaria
By type

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Brazil Bulgaria Burma Canada PRC France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Mexico Netherlands North Korea Pakistan
Bulgaria

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Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Sweden Syria ROC (Taiwan) Ukraine United Kingdom United States Proliferation

Bulgaria has developed weapons of mass destruction, most notably chemical weapons. Chemical weapons production was concentrated in Smyadovo. This indigenous production capability was probably achieved with the help of the USSR.[1] As of 2011 Bulgaria does not possess any weapons of mass destruction.
Missile program
Bulgaria had a significant missile arsenal, including 67 SCUD-B, 50 FROG-7 and 24 SS-23 ballistic missiles.[2] Since the USSR planned to rapidly deploy its own nuclear weapons in Bulgaria in case a war broke out, the missiles were not armed with warheads, but only prepared to launch Soviet weapons.[2] The SS-23 systems had conventional warheads plus a WMD launching capability. The nuclear missile launching pads and equipment were dismantled in 1991. The first missile brigade was created in 1961.[3] In 1994 the country bought 46 conventional warheads for its SCUDs from Russia.[2] All SCUD, FROG and SS-23 missiles were destroyed in 2002. Currently Bulgaria operates a dozen SS-21 Scarab-A launchers, but information over the exact number of missiles is classified. They are all armed with conventional warheads of 160kg each.
Chemical weapons
Information over Bulgaria's chemical weapons is scarce. The only known chemical weapons production facility is located near Smyadovo, which now produces chemicals for civilian purposes. The country ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1994 and dismantled them by 2000.
Biological weapons
Bulgaria has signed and ratified the Biological Weapons Convention, and there is no information indicating that the country has ever developed such weapons.
Bulgaria
144
Nuclear weapons
Bulgaria has never developed nuclear weapons, although some treaties with the Soviet Union guaranteed the deployment of Soviet warheads on Bulgarian territory in case of a war with NATO. Its SS-23 missiles were nuclear-capable.[4] In the mid-1990s, journalist Goran Gotev investigated a testimony of an anonymous Soviet Army captain published in Komsomolskaya Pravda, who described in detail an alleged Soviet-Bulgarian nuclear weapons facility which hosted 70 warheads for tactical missiles.[] The site consisted of "four three-storey apartment blocks, barracks, a cafeteria, a sports field, a social club, a store, and a plaza", and had 130 personnel. The unit was disbanded in 1989, the warheads were quickly shipped to Ukraine and all equipment, uniforms and photos that were present at the facility were destroyed. Another Russian Army official later denied the story.[] In 2001 the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry denied the "presence" of nuclear weapons in Bulgaria.[5] The country has the potential to establish a military nuclear program, having a nuclear powerplant at Kozloduy with its own plutonium storage facility.[6] A nuclear research facility with a 200kW pool-type reactor is in operation in Sofia.[7] The reactor of the facility produces some nuclear material, which is stored near Novi Khan.[8] As part of its efforts to safeguard potentially weapons-usable atomic material, the United Nations nuclear watchdog assisted Bulgaria with the removal of highly-enriched uranium stored at the shut-down research reactor in Sofia. The substance, which was 36% enriched and took the form of fresh fuel, was airlifted in December 2003 to Russia, the original supplier, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Agency safeguards inspectors monitored and verified the packaging of the fuel, which Moscow says it will re-fabricate into low-enriched uranium.[1]
References
[1] GlobalSecurity.org - Bulgaria special weapons (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ bulgaria/ index. html) [2] StandartNews.com " , 1973 . (in Bulgarian) (http:/ / www. standartnews. com/ archive/ 2002/ 08/ 12/ interview/ s3453_2. htm) [3] Duma.bg " !" (in bulgarian) (http:/ / www. duma. bg/ 2005/ 0805/ 270805/ obshtestvo/ ob-4. html) [6] "" (http:/ / www. dnevnik. bg/ bulgaria/ 2011/ 05/ 12/ 1087868_novo_hranilishte_za_izpolzvano_iadreno_gorivo_se/ ), Dnevnik, 12 May 2011 [7] Nuclear Scientific and Experimental Centre (http:/ / irt. inrne. bas. bg/ ) [8] (in bulgarian) (http:/ / www. mlsp. government. bg/ bg/ faq/ faq. asp?qid=26965)
External links
Satellite images of an alleged nuclear facility (http://wikimapia.org/#lat=42.8308273&lon=26.6245133& z=16&l=0&m=b) Act on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and on Control of Toxic Chemicals and the Precursors thereof (http://www.mi.government.bg/en/library/ act-on-the-prohibition-of-chemical-weapons-and-on-control-of-toxic-chemicals-and-the-precursors-the-119-c25-m258-1. html), a 2002 act banning the production and storage of nuclear weapons in Bulgaria
Burma
145
Burma
By type

Burma
146

Burma (Myanmar) is reported by various anti-government sources to have developed weapons of mass destruction, with varied reports of the country's military in possession of chemical weapons and also working on a nuclear weapons program. However, there is lack of credible evidence and almost all information cannot be independently verified.[1] Academics also accuse activists of inflating numbers and defectors fabricating information for personal and political gains.[2] However, there is widespread belief and report of Burma's nuclear weapons programme, sparked by a report by the Sydney Morning Herald[3] and other articles based on it.
Chemical weapons
The first public indications of Burma's possible possession of chemical weapons came in testimony delivered to the United States Congress in 1991 by Rear Adm. Thomas Brooks, Director of Naval Intelligence of the United States Navy,[4] in which Burma was included on a list of nations that "probably possess" chemical weapons. In 2005 Belgian photojournalist Thierry Falise reported speaking to two deserters from the Burmese Army who, during their time in service, were "reportedly told to take special precautions because they were handling chemical shells."[5] The deserters described seeing artillerymen wearing masks and gloves to fire the munitions. In a separate report from the same year, a physician with Christian Solidarity Worldwide reported treating injuries of anti-government Karenni rebels that were "consistent with a chemical attack."[6] In response to the Christian Solidarity Worldwide report, the Burmese government denied the use of chemical weapons. [7] Burma signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993 but has yet to ratify the agreement.
Nuclear weapons
In 2007 Russia and Burma did a controversial nuclear research center deal. According to them, "The centre will comprise a 10MW light-water reactor working on 20%-enriched uranium-235, an activation analysis laboratory, a medical isotope production laboratory, silicon doping system, nuclear waste treatment and burial facilities".[8] According to an August 2009 report published in the Sydney Morning Herald, Burma is working to develop a nuclear weapon by 2014. The reported effort, purportedly being undertaken with assistance from North Korea, involves the construction of a nuclear reactor and plutonium extraction facilities in caves tunneled into a mountain at Naung Laing, a village in the Mandalay division .[9] The information cited in the newspaper story reportedly originated from two high-ranking defectors who had settled in Australia. On June 3, 2010, a five year investigation by an anti-government Myanmar broadcaster, the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), found evidence that allegedly shows the country's military regime begun a programme to develop nuclear weapons.[10] The DVB said evidence of Myanmar's nuclear programme came from top-secret documents smuggled out of the country over several years, including hundreds of files and other evidence provided by Sai Thein Win, a former major in the military of Myanmar.[][11] A UN report said there was evidence that North Korea had been exporting nuclear technology to Burma, Iran and Syria.[12]
Burma In 2009, pictures of a network of tunnels, allegedly built with the assistance of North Korea, were smuggled out of the country.[13]
147
References
[1] Media spin takes on nuclear proportions (http:/ / english. dvb. no/ textonly/ news. php?id=185), Democratic Voice of Burma, June 10, 2007, Accessed November 17, 2009. [2] Burma and North Korea - Smoke or Fire? (http:/ / www. burmalibrary. org/ docs07/ Policy_Analysis47. pdf), Australia Strategic Policy Institute, August 24, 2009, Accessed November 17, 2009. [3] Burma 's Nuclear Bombshell (http:/ / www. smh. com. au/ world/ burmax2019s-nuclear-secrets-20090731-e4fv. html), Sydney Morning Herald, August 24, 2009, Accessed November 17, 2009. [4] Chemical Arms; Navy Report Asserts Many Nations Seek Or Have Poison Gas (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 1991/ 03/ 10/ world/ after-war-chemical-arms-navy-report-asserts-many-nations-seek-have-poison-gas. html), New York Times, March 10, 1991, Accessed August 9, 2009. [5] Burmese junta uses chemical weapons (http:/ / www. timesonline. co. uk/ tol/ news/ world/ article519966. ece), The Sunday Times, May 8, 2005, Accessed August 9, 2009. [6] Burma 'using chemical weapons' (http:/ / www. guardian. co. uk/ world/ 2005/ apr/ 21/ burma. simonjeffery), The Guardian, April 21, 2005, Accessed August 9, 2009. [7] http:/ / www. voanews. com/ burmese/ archive/ 2005-04/ 2005-04-22-voa5. cfm?moddate=2005-04-22 [8] Russia and Burma in nuclear deal (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ asia-pacific/ 6658713. stm). BBC 15 May 2007 [9] Revealed: Burmas nuclear bombshell (http:/ / www. guardian. co. uk/ world/ 2005/ apr/ 21/ burma. simonjeffery), Sydney Morning Herald, August 1, 2009, Accessed August 10, 2009. [11] Myanmar Nuclear Weapon Program Claims Supported by Photos, Jane's Reports (http:/ / www. bloomberg. com/ news/ 2010-07-21/ myanmar-nuclear-weapon-program-claims-supported-by-photos-jane-s-reports. html), Bloomberg, 22 July 2010
Canada
By type

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Brazil Bulgaria Burma Canada PRC
Canada

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France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Mexico Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Sweden Syria ROC (Taiwan) Ukraine United Kingdom United States Proliferation

Canada does not possess any weapons of mass destruction and has signed treaties repudiating possession of them. Canada ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1930 and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1970.
Nuclear weapons
Introduction
With the world's longest undefended border and the shared responsibility for the defence of North America, Canada has long been a military ally of the United States. With the American emphasis on nuclear deterrence following the Soviet Union's atom bomb test, Canadian cooperation with the US required the alignment of Canadian doctrine with defensive elements of American nuclear weapons doctrine. The first US nuclear weapon came to Canada in 1950 when the USAF stationed 11 Fat Man atomic bombs at Goose Bay, Labrador.[1] From 1963 to 1984, Canada fielded a total of four tactical nuclear weapons systems which deployed several hundred nuclear warheads.[]
Canada Throughout the Cold War, Canada was closely aligned with defensive elements of United States programs in both NORAD and NATO. In 1964 Canada sent its White Paper on Defence to U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to ensure he would not, find anything in these references contrary to any views [he] may have expressed.[] Canada withdrew three of the four nuclear-capable weapons systems by 1972. The single system retained, the AIR-2 Genie delivered 1.5 kiloton of force, and was designed to strike enemy aircraft as opposed to ground targets, and may not qualify as a weapon of mass destruction given its limited yield.
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Early history: World War II and into the Cold War

Canadas military relationship with the United States has grown significantly since the Second World War. Although the Dominion of Canada came in to being on July 1, 1867, Canadian foreign policy was determined in Britain. Canada entered the Great War in 1914 when Great Britain declared war on Germany and the Austria-Hungarian Empire. Canadian foreign policy became independent in December 1931 with the passage of the Statutes of Westminster.[2] In 1939 Canada declared war on Germany a week later than Great Britain, on September 10, 1939.[3] The United States did not enter the war until December 7, 1941.[4] One of the first formal agreements for military cooperation was made in August 1940. Known as the Ogdensburg agreement, it established North American Warning Lines the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.[5] Both nations are founding members of the United Nations[6] as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[7] They signed the NORAD Agreement in 1957 and created the North American Air Defense Command[8] to defend the continent against attacks from the USSR. In the 1942 Quebec Agreement, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed to develop the "Tube Alloys" Project and created a committee to manage the project which included C.D. Howe, the Canadian Minister of Munitions and Supply. This was the code name for the British Uranium Committee project which had worked on a theoretical design for an atomic bomb. One significant contribution was a calculation of the critical mass of uranium. The mass was less than earlier estimates and suggested that development of a fission bomb was practical.[9] "Tube Alloys" was part of a shipment of the most secret scientific research in Great Britain that was sent to the United States for safekeeping when the threat of German invasion was significant. Materials included the cavity-magnetron which was essential to RADAR, British information related to the German Enigma machines, Jet Engine designs as well as "Tube Alloys". The United States developed the first atomic bomb under the Manhattan Project which was so secret that Vice President Harry S. Truman was unaware of it when he became President after the death of President Roosevelt. It is unlikely that Canadian officials were aware of the Manhattan Project beyond the circumstances of the delivery of "Tube Alloys". Canada's only specific role in the Manhattan Project was providing raw material, including uranium ore from a northern mine which may have been used in the construction of the atom bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.[][10] Canada would continue to supply fissionable material to the US and other allies throughout the Cold War although Canada never developed indigenous nuclear weapons as did NATO allies France and the United Kingdom.[11] Canada was little more than just a third-party supplier of rare materials, with a few exceptions. After briefly allowing nuclear weapons to be temporarily stationed in Goose Bay, Labrador, Canada agreed to a long term lease of the
Canada Goose Bay base to the US Strategic Air Command.[12] The Americans were refused permission to stockpile bomb casings for the B-36 at Goose Bay. These bombs would have been armed in wartime with materials brought from the United States. Goose Bay was used as a base for air refueling tankers which were to support the SAC B-47 and B-52 bomber forces. In 1951 the Pinetree Line was established north of the US-Canadian border, and in 1953 Canada built the Mid-Canada Air Warning Line, which was manned by the Canadian military.[13] In 1954 the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW) was established jointly by the US and Canada in the Arctic.[14] The Pinetree Line was built to control the air battle between the NORAD interceptor forces and manned Soviet bombers. Beginning with Ground Controlled Interception updated from the Second World War, the system has been computerized and automated with at least four new generations of technology being employed. It was clear, even in the early years of the Cold War, that on paper, Canada and the US were to be jointly responsible for the defence of the continent. In execution, Canadian investment in air defense has decreased significantly with the decline of the intercontinental strategic bomber threat. In the 1950s the RCAF contributed fourteen squadrons of CF-100 interceptors and this was reduced to three squadrons of CF-101s by 1970. Some of this is due to improved technology but more is due to the decline of the bomber threat and reductions in Canadian military spending.
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Inventory of Canadas nuclear armaments
BOMARC CIM-10; Warhead: W40 7-10 kiloton
Honest John; Warhead W7 8-61 kiloton
CF-104 Starfighter; Warhead: B57 bomb 5-20 kilotons; B28 bomb 70-350 kt; B43 bomb 1 Mt
VooDoo weapons test; Combat Warhead: W25 1.5 kilotons
On New Year's Eve in 1963, the Royal Canadian Air Force delivered a shipment of nuclear warheads to the Bomarc missile site near RCAF Station North Bay[15] The Government of Canada never publicly admitted to the presence of nuclear weapons on Canadian bases in Canada and Germany but their presence was common knowledge at the time. It is generally understood that the Bomarc missile warheads were delivered on this cold (-13 degrees Celsius) winter night when a group of protesters stood down from a vigil at the gates of the missile site. It was said they assumed that the RCAF would be unlikely to work on this traditional evening of celebration. The delivery was photographed by the press and this revealed to the world that the delivery had taken place. The warheads were never in the sole possession of Canadian personnel. They were the property of the Government of the United States and were always under the direct supervision of a "Custodial Detachment" from the United States Air Force (or Army, in the case of Honest John warheads). Through 1984, Canada would deploy four American designed nuclear weapons delivery systems accompanied by hundreds of US-controlled warheads: 56 BOMARC CIM-10 surface-to-air missiles[] 4 Honest John rocket systems armed with a total of 16 W31 nuclear warheads the Canadian Army deployed in Germany.[] 108 nuclear W25 Genie rockets carried by 54 CF-101 VooDoos[] estimates of 90 to 210 tactical (20-60 kiloton) nuclear warheads assigned to 6 CF-104 Starfighter squadrons (about 90 aircraft) based with NATO in Europe (there is a lack of open sources detailing exactly how many warheads were deployed)[16]
Canada In practice, each of 36 NATO squadrons (initially six Canadian squadrons Number 1 Air Division RCAF) would provide two aircraft and pilots to a Quick Reaction Alert facility. The 'Q' aircraft could be launched with an armed US nuclear weapon within 15 minutes of receiving the 'go' order. This arrangement was called the NATO Quick Reaction Alert Force. It provided a dispersed force upwards of 100 strike aircraft for use on short notice. Missions were targeted at troop concentrations, airfields, bridges, assembly and choke points and other tactical targets in order to slow the massive tank formations of the Red Army as they poured into the Fulda Gap and on towards the Rhine River. In total, there were between 250 and 450 nuclear warheads on Canadian bases between 1963 and 1972. There were at most 108 Genie missiles armed with 1.5 kiloton W25 warheads present from 1973 to 1984. There may have been fewer due to attrition of CF-101s as the program aged and as incoming CF-18s became combat-qualified.[17] This number decreased significantly through the years as various systems were withdrawn from service. The Honest John was retired by the Canadian Army in 1970. The Bomarc missile was phased out in 1972 and the CF-104 Strike/Attack squadrons in West Germany were reduced in number and reassigned to conventional ground attack at about the same time. From late in 1972, the CF-101 interceptor force remained as the only nuclear-armed system in Canadian use until it was replaced by the CF-18 in 1984.[18] The CF-18 aircraft is equipped with the AIM-7, AIM-9 and several more advanced air-to-air missiles. All of these employ conventional warheads. These missiles are more reliable, accurate and have longer range than the nuclear-tipped, short-range and unguided Genie. They are also free of the encumbering security procedures and considerable political baggage associated with nuclear warheads.
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Cold War relationship with the US

Canadas Cold War military doctrine and fate was inextricably tied with that of the United States. The two nations shared responsibility for continental air defence through NORAD (North American Air Defense Command) and both belonged to NATO and contributed forces in Europe. Should nuclear war with the USSR have broken out, Canada would have been crippled. Prime Minister Brian Mulroneys 1987 Canadian White Paper on Defence acknowledged this reality citing that, Soviet strategic planners must regard Canada and the United States as a single set of military targets no matter what political posture we might assume.[19] This sums up Canadas Cold War predicament well, as Canadas geo-political relationship with the US meant that Canada would inevitably be widely devastated by any US-Soviet nuclear exchange - whether it was targeted or not. It led to a familiar phrase of the time, incineration without representation".[20] The DEW Line and Pinetree Line radar systems formed the backbone of continental air defence in the 1950s and 1960s. The most likely routes for Soviet aircraft attacking the United States came through Canada. In particular, the Eastern Seaboard of the United States would be approached through the UK-Iceland-Greenland gap and a line of search radars ran down the coast of Labrador and on to Gander Newfoundland. These stations were supported by RCAF CF-101 interceptors at Bagotville Quebec and Chatham New Brunswick, as well as USAF F-102 interceptors stationed at Stephenville Newfoundland (Harmon Air Base). These were presumably equipped with nuclear-armed AIM-26 Nuclear Falcon missiles as this was a standard configuration on the F-102. Canada hosted no intercontinental strategic bombers but the Strategic Air Command base at Goose Bay Labrador hosted a large number of KC-135 air refueling tankers. These were intended to top up the fuel tanks of the outbound B-52 strike force headed for targets in the USSR. They also supported the SAC Airborne Alert Force and would have refueled any surviving bombers returning from the USSR.
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"Incineration without representation"

For the Canadian public, "incineration without representation" led to a popular belief that the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) was in Canadas best interest. MAD was the Cold War doctrine which held that as long as both the US and USSR possessed significant nuclear arsenals, any nuclear war would assuredly destroy both nations, thereby discouraging either state from launching any nuclear offensive. For Canadians, MAD was appealing in this light, as Canada was unlikely to emerge from any nuclear exchange unscathed given its position between the two countries, as any missiles shot down before reaching either side would likely fall on Canadian soil. In Prime Minister Pierre Trudeaus 1971 Defence White Paper, this dynamic was noted: One of the most important changes in international affairs in recent years had been the increase in stability of nuclear deterrence, and the emergence of what is, in effect, nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. Each side now has sufficient nuclear strength to assure devastating retaliation in the event of a surprise attack by the other, and thus neither could rationally consider launching a deliberate attack.[21] Even as late as 1987, Prime Minister Mulroneys Defence White Paper acknowledged that, each superpower now has the capacity to obliterate the other,the structure of mutual deterrence today is effective and stable. The Government believes that it must remain so.[22] Given the prospect of "incineration without representation", Canadians seemed to feel that the doctrine which most encouraged restraint was the strategically soundest one to support. Canadians were still nervous about US foreign policy, however. In 1950, when U.S. President Harry S. Truman announced that Washington had not entirely ruled out the use of nuclear weapons in Korea, Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson recalled the remarks caused Ottawa to collectively shudder.[23] One Cold War contemporary observer even remarked that, Canadians often think that their neighbour to the south exhibits wild swings of emotional attachmentswith other countries; that it is impatient, is prone to making sweeping judgments, and generally lacks sophistication and subtlety in its approach to the Soviet bloc and the cold war.[24] However, if Canadian leadership was nervous about US foreign policy, they did not voice their discontent through actions. Canada was consistently and significantly cooperative with the United States when it came to nuclear weapons doctrine and deployments through the Cold War.
Nuclear weapon test Apache, 1956
Continued cooperation with the US to present

The Government of Canada formally agreed to every major North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategic document, including those that implied a US strike-first policy.[25] This may suggest that successive Canadian governments were willing to follow US and NATO doctrine even if said doctrine was counter to the publicly favoured (and politically supported) doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. Professors J.T. Jockel and J.J. Sokolsky explore this assertion in-depth in their article "Canada's Cold War Nuclear Experience". Furthermore, Canada allowed for forward deployment of
NORAD blast doors
Canada US bombers and participated actively and extensively in the NORAD program; as well, Canada cooperated with the US when it came to research, early warning, surveillance and communications.[26] Canada was second only to West Germany in hosting nuclear related facilities.[27] In short, the Canadian Government was thoroughly committed to supporting US nuclear doctrine and deployments through the Cold War, in spite of any popular reservations concerning this dynamic. While it has no more permanently stationed nuclear weapons as of 1984, Canada continues to cooperate with the United States and its nuclear weapons program. Canada allows testing of nuclear weapon delivery systems; nuclear weapon carrying vessels are permitted to visit Canadian ports; and aircraft carrying nuclear warheads are permitted to fly in Canadian airspace with the permission of the Canadian government.[] There is, however, popular objection to this federal policy. Over 60% of Canadians live in cities or areas designated Nuclear Weapons Free, reflecting a contemporary disinclination towards nuclear weapons in Canada.[] Canada also continues to remain under the NATO 'nuclear umbrella'; even after disarming itself in 1984, Canada has maintained support for nuclear armed nations as doing otherwise would be counter to Canadian NATO commitments.[28]
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Chemical weapons
During both World War I and World War II, Canada was a major producer and developer of chemical weapons for the Allied war effort. These were used in combat in World War I, but not in World War II. Human experimentation was carried out during World War II, with CFB Suffield becoming the leading research facility. Thousands of Canadian soldiers were exposed to mustard gas, blister gas, tear gas, and other agents, and some were permanently injured as a result.[29] Following both world wars, Canadian military forces returning home were directed to dump millions of tons of unexploded ordnance (UXOs) into the Atlantic Ocean off ports in Nova Scotia; an undetermined amount of these UXOs are known to be chemical weapons.[30] The 1972 London Convention prohibited further marine dumping of UXOs, however the chemical weapons existing off the shores of Nova Scotia for over 60 years continue to bring concern to local communities and the fishing industry. Human testing of chemical weapons such as sarin and VX gas continued in Canada well into the 1960s, and dangerous defoliation agents were tested at CFB Gagetown from 1956 to 1967. Tests at CFB Gagetown of Agent Orange and the more toxic Agent Purple in 1966 and 1967 caused a variety of acute and chronic illnesses among soldiers and civilians working there.[31] These tests left Canada with large stockpiles of chemical weapons. Canada eventually abandoned the use of lethal chemical weapons, and had to devote a great deal of effort to safely destroying them. Canada ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention on September 26, 1995. Canada still employs Riot control agents which are classified as non-lethal weapons.
Biological weapons
Canada had a biological warfare research program in the early to middle part of the 20th century. Canadian research involved developing protections against biowarfare attacks and for offensive purposes, often with the help of the UK and the US.[32] Canada has thus experimented with such things as weaponized anthrax, botulinum toxin, ricin, rinderpest virus, Rocky Mountain spotted fever, plague, Brucellosis and tularemia. CFB Suffield is the leading research centre. Canada says it has destroyed all military stockpiles and no longer conducts toxin warfare research. Canada ratified the Biological Weapons Convention on September 18, 1972. Of particular interest is that Canada's Sir Frederick Banting, the discoverer of insulin, served as an Army Major in World War II. There have been some claims that he was a key biological warfare researcher. Like many of his peers in senior positions during the Second World War, Banting had served as a Medical Officer with the Canadian Expeditionary Force in the Great War. This experience would have made clear to him the depths of cruelty inherent in modern warfare. He is credited with raising the alarm about the potential development of biological and chemical weapons by Germany in London in 1939. His influence on members of Churchill's administration may have contributed to a later decision to conduct germ warfare research at Porton Down. Banting was killed in 1941 in the
Canada crash of a Hudson bomber just east of Gander, Newfoundland, while en route to England for work related to his research on the Franks flying suit. This was about a year prior to work on Anthrax that took place at Grosse Ile, Quebec beginning in 1942.
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Disarmament
Canada is a member of every international disarmament organization and is committed to pushing for an end to nuclear weapons testing, reduction in nuclear arsenals, a ban on all chemical and biological weapons, bans on weapons in outer space, and blocks on nuclear proliferation. However, in recent years it has become less vocal on the issue of disarmament; the need for increased border defense, particularly in the Territories, has recently overshadowed other issues in military circles. Canada maintains a division of its Foreign Affairs department devoted to pursuing these ends. It also dedicates significant resources in trying to verify that current treaties are being obeyed, passing much information on to the United Nations. In the 1970s, Canada discussed building a reconnaissance satellite to monitor adherence to such treaties, but these plans were shelved. A public furor arose in 1983, when the Canadian government approved a plan to test cruise missiles in Alberta.[33] Canada continues to promote peaceful nuclear technology exemplified by the CANDU reactor. Unlike most designs, the CANDU does not require enriched fuel, and in theory is therefore much less likely to lead to the development of weaponized missile fuel. However, like all power reactor designs, CANDU reactors produce and use plutonium in their fuel rods during normal operation (roughly 50% of the energy generated in a CANDU reactor comes from the in situ fission of plutonium created in the uranium fuel),[34] and this plutonium could be used in a nuclear explosive if separated and converted to metallic form (albeit only as reactor-grade plutonium, and therefore of limited military usefulness). Accordingly, CANDU reactors, like most power reactors in the world, are subject to safeguards under the United Nations which prevent possible diversion of plutonium. CANDU reactors are designed to be refuelled while running, which makes the details of such safeguards significantly different from other reactor designs. The end result, however, is a consistent and internationally accepted level of proliferation risk. A common accusation is that India used Canadian reactors to produce plutonium for weapons. India owns two licensed CANDU reactors and began nuclear weapons tests shortly after they became operational in 1972. However, international observers have concluded that no plutonium was diverted from the safeguarded CANDU reactors (see [35]). The plutonium for the initial bombs came from the older CIRUS reactor built by Canada (see Nuclear Weapons above), but the material for India's most recent nuclear test, Operation Shakti, is thought to come from the locally-designed Dhruva reactor. India has also built a number of reactors, not under IAEA safeguards, that were derived from the CANDU design and are used for power generation. These may also be used for plutonium production. Canada has volunteered to help destroy some of the leftover chemical weapons of the USSR. There is also talk of taking Soviet nuclear fuel and using it as fuel in CANDU reactors, but this is controversial .
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References
[2] Final Report of the French Constitutional Drafting Committee, Statute of Westminster, 1931 - Enactment No. 17 (http:/ / www. justice. gc. ca/ eng/ pi/ const/ lawreg-loireg/ p1t171. html) [3] CBC Archives, On This Day, Sept. 10, 1939 (http:/ / archives. cbc. ca/ on_this_day/ 09/ 10/ ) [30] Sea-dumped munitions: An unseen threat (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20090613023230/ http:/ / www. stfx. ca/ research/ polgov/ UnseenThreat. htm) [32] Bryden, John. "Deadly Allies: Canada's Secret War 1937-1947". ISBN 0-7710-1724-3. [33] Cruise missile testing coming to Canada (http:/ / archives. cbc. ca/ IDC-1-71-208-1040-10/ conflict_war/ cruise_missile_test/ ) - CBC, July 15, 1983. [34] Rouben, Ben, Introduction to Reactor Physics (http:/ / canteach. candu. org/ library/ 20040501. pdf) - CANTEACH (http:/ / canteach. candu. org), September, 2002. [35] http:/ / www. nuclearfaq. ca/ cnf_sectionF. htm#x1
Further reading
John Clearwater (1998), Canadian nuclear weapons: the untold story of Canada's Cold War arsenal (http:// books.google.com/books?id=0s2V4fxHfS4C&pg=PP1), Dundurn Press Ltd., ISBN978-1-55002-299-5 John Clearwater (1999). U.S. nuclear weapons in Canada (http://books.google.com/ books?id=I3_oaypyhB8C&pg=PP1). Dundurn Press Ltd. ISBN978-1-55002-329-9. Sean M. Maloney (25 July 2007). Learning to love the bomb: Canada's nuclear weapons during the Cold War (http://books.google.com/books?id=sT5Asq_OKmoC&pg=PP1). Potomac Books, Inc. ISBN978-1-57488-616-0. Andrew Richter (2002), Avoiding Armageddon: Canadian military strategy and nuclear weapons, 1950-63 (http:/ /books.google.com/books?id=3HjXd5HJYlwC&pg=PP1), UBC Press, ISBN978-0-7748-0888-0
External links
Edwards, G. Canada and the Bomb: Past and Future (http://www.ccnr.org/opinion_ge.html) Montreal Gazette. 9 August 1998.
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China
China
First nuclear weapon test Last nuclear test Largest yield test
October 16, 1964 July 29, 1996 4 Mt Atmospheric - 4 Mt (November 17, 1976) Underground - 660~1,000kt (May 21, 1992) [] [1] [] [2]
Total tests Peak stockpile Current stockpile Maximum missile range NPT signatory
45
434
~240
14,000 km
Yes (1992, one of five recognized powers)
By type

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Brazil Bulgaria Burma
China

157
Canada PRC France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Mexico Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Sweden Syria ROC (Taiwan) Ukraine United Kingdom United States Proliferation

The People's Republic of China has developed and possessed weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and nuclear weapons. China's first nuclear test took place in 1964 and first hydrogen bomb test occurred in 1967. Tests continued until 1996 when it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). China has acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984 and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997. China is estimated by the Federation of American Scientists to have an arsenal of about 180 active nuclear weapon warheads and 240 total warheads as of 2009, which would make it the second smallest nuclear arsenal amongst the five nuclear weapon states acknowledged by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. According to some estimates, the country could "more than double" the "number of warheads on missiles that could threaten the United States by the mid-2020s".[] Early in 2011, China published a defense white paper, which repeated its nuclear policies of maintaining a minimum deterrent with a no-first-use pledge. Yet China has yet to define what it means by a "minimum deterrent posture". This, together with the fact that "it is deploying four new nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, invites concern as to the scale and intention of Chinas nuclear upgrade".[]
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Chemical weapons
China signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on January 13, 1993. The CWC was ratified April 25, 1997.[3] In the official declaration submitted to OPCW Chinese government has declared that it had possessed small arsenal of chemical weapons in the past but that it had destroyed it before ratifying Convention. It has declared only three former chemical production facilities that may have produced mustard gas, phosgene and Lewisite.[4] China was found to have supplied Albania with a small stockpile of chemical weapons in the 1970s during the Cold War.[5]
Biological weapons
China is currently a signatory of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Chinese officials have stated that China has never engaged in biological activities with offensive military applications. However, China was reported to have had an active biological weapons program in the 1980s.[6] Kanatjan Alibekov, former director of one of the Soviet germ-warfare programs, said that China suffered a serious accident at one of its biological weapons plants in the late 1980s. Alibekov asserted that Soviet reconnaissance satellites identified a biological weapons laboratory and plant near a site for testing nuclear warheads. The Soviets suspected that two separate epidemics of hemorrhagic fever that swept the region in the late 1980s were caused by an accident in a lab where Chinese scientists were weaponizing viral diseases.[7] US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed her concerns over possible Chinese biological weapon transfers to Iran and other nations in a letter to Senator Robert E. Bennett (R-Utah) in January 1997.[8] Albright stated that she had received reports regarding transfers of dual-use items from Chinese entities to the Iranian government which concerned her and that the United States had to encourage China to adopt comprehensive export controls to prevent assistance to Iran's alleged biological weapons program. The United States acted upon the allegations on January 16, 2002, when it imposed sanctions on three Chinese firms accused of supplying Iran with materials used in the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons. In response to this, China issued export control protocols on dual use biological technology in late 2002.[9]
Nuclear weapons
History
Mao Zedong decided to begin a Chinese nuclear-weapons program during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954-1955 over the Quemoy and Matsu Islands. While he did not expect to be able to match the large American nuclear arsenal, Mao believed that even a few bombs would increase China's diplomatic credibility. Construction of uranium enrichment plants in Baotou and Lanzhou began in 1958, and a plutonium facility in Jiuquan and the Lop Nur nuclear test site by 1960. The Soviet Union provided assistance in the early Chinese program by sending advisers to help in the facilities devoted to fissile material production, and promised to provide a prototype bomb.[] In July 1960, however, during the Sino-Soviet split, all Soviet assistance with the Chinese nuclear program was abruptly terminated and all Soviet technicians were withdrawn from the program.[10] The American government under John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson was concerned about the program and studied ways to sabotage or attack it, perhaps with the aid of Taiwan or the Soviet Union, but Soviet leader Nikita Khruschev did not display interest. The first Chinese nuclear test, code-named 596, occurred on 16 October 1964.[]
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Warheads
Because of strict secrecy it is very difficult to determine the exact size and composition of China's nuclear forces. Several declassified U.S. government reports give historical estimates. The 1984 Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Estimative Brief estimates the Chinese nuclear stockpile as consisting of between 150 and 160 warheads.[11] A 1993 United States National Security Council report estimated that China's nuclear deterrent force relied on 60 to 70 nuclear armed ballistic missiles.[12] The Defense Intelligence Agency's The Decades Ahead: 1999 - 2020 report estimates the 1999 Nuclear Weapons' Inventory as between 140 and 157.[13] In 2004 the U.S. Department of Defense assessed that China had about 20 intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of targeting the United States.[14] In 2006 a U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency estimate presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee was that "China currently has more than 100 nuclear warheads." [15] China's first test of a nuclear device took place on October 16, 1964, at the Lop Nur test site. China's last nuclear test was on July 29, 1996. According to the Australian Geological Survey Organization in Canberra, the yield of the 1996 test was 1-5 kilotons. This was China's 22nd underground test and 45th test overall.[16] China has made significant improvements in its miniaturization techniques since the 1980s. There have been accusations, notably by the Cox Commission, that this was done primarily by covertly acquiring the U.S.'s W88 nuclear warhead design as well as guided ballistic missile technology.[citation needed] Chinese scientists have stated that they have made advances in these areas, but insist that these advances were made without espionage. Although the total number of nuclear weapons in the Chinese arsenal is A mock-up of China's first nuclear bomb. unknown, as of 2005[17] estimates vary from as low as 80 to as high as 2,000. In 2004, China stated that "among the nuclear-weapon states, China... possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal," implying China has fewer than the United Kingdom's 200 nuclear weapons.[] Several non-official sources estimate that China has around 400 nuclear warheads. However, U.S. intelligence estimates suggest a much smaller nuclear force than many non-governmental organizations.[18] In 2012, STRATCOM commander C. Robert Kehler said that the best estimates where "in the range of several hundred" warheads and FAS estimated the current total to be "approximately 240 warheads".[19] One three year study by Georgetown University raised the possibility that China had 3 000 nuclear weapons, hidden in a sophisticated tunnel network. The study was based on state media footage showing tunnel entrances, and estimated a 4 800 km (3 000 mile) network. The tunnel network was revealed after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake collapsed tunnels in the hills. China has confirmed the existing of the tunnel network.[20] [21] In response, the US military was ordered by law to study the possibility of this tunnel network concealing a nuclear arsenal. [22] A retired Russian officer also claimed that China had many more nuclear weapons, estimating the arsenal at 1 800 nuclear weapons.
[23]
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Nuclear policy
China is one of the five nuclear weapons states (NWS) recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which China ratified in 1992. China is the only NWS[] to give an unqualified security assurance to non-nuclear-weapon states: "China undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances."[] Chinese public policy has always been one of the "no first use rule" while maintaining a deterrent retaliatory force targeted for countervalue targets.[] In 2005, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released a white paper stating that the government would not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. In addition, the paper went on to state that this "no first use" policy would remain unchanged in the future and that China would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones. Historically, China has been implicated in the development of the Pakistani nuclear program. In the early 1980s, China is believed to have given Pakistan a "package" including uranium enrichment technology, high-enriched uranium, and the design for a compact nuclear weapon.[24]
Delivery Systems Estimates

2010 IISS Military Balance The following are estimates of China's strategic missile forces from the International Institute of Strategic Studies Military Balance 2010.[25] According to these estimates, China has up to 90 inter-continental range ballistic missiles (66 land-based ICBMs and 24 submarine-based JL-2 SLBMs), not counting MIRV warheads.
Type Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) ICBM 20 13,000+ km 11,200+ km 7,200+ km 5,500km Missiles Estimated Range
DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) road-mobile ICBM 24 DF-31 (CSS-10) road-mobile ICBM DF-4 (CSS-3) ICBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles DF-3A (CSS-2 Mod) IRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missiles DF-21C (CSS-5 Mod 3) road-mobile MRBM 36 DF-21 (CSS-5) road-mobile MRBM Short Range Ballistic Missiles DF-15 (CSS-6) road-mobile SRBM DF-11A (CSS-7 Mod 2) road-mobile SRBM Land Attack Cruise Missiles DH-10 LACM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles JL-1 SLBM JL-2 SLBM Total 12 24 478 54 96 108 80 2 12 10
3,000+ km
1,750+ km 1,750+ km
600km 300km
3,000+ km
1,770+ km 7,200+ km
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2010 DoD annual PRC military report The following are estimates from the United States Department of Defense 2010 report to Congress concerning the Military Power of the People's Republic of China[26]
Type CSS-2 IRBM CSS-3 ICBM DF-5A (CSS-4) ICBM DF-31 ICBM DF-31A ICBM Launchers 5-10 10-15 20 <10 10-15 Missiles 15-20 15-20 20 <10 10-15 85-95 350-400 700-750 200-500 ? ? 1395-1829 Estimated Range 3,000+ km 5,400+ km 13,000+ km 7,200+ km 11,200+ km 1,750+ km 600km 300km 1,500+ km 1,770+ km 7,200+ km
CSS-5 MRBM Mod 1/2 75-85 CSS-6 SRBM CSS-7 SRBM DH-10 LACM JL-1 SLBM JL-2 SLBM Total 90-110 120-140 45-55 ? ? 375-459
2006 FAS & NRDC report The following table is an overview of PRC nuclear forces taken from a November 2006 report by Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Matthew G. McKinzie of the Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council titled Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning.[27]:202
Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2006 China designation U.S./NATO designation Year deployed Land-based missiles DF-3A DF-4 DF-5A DF-21A DF-31 DF-31A Subtotal Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)** JL-1 JL-2 Subtotal Total strategic ballistic missiles Aircraft*** Hong-6 B-6 1965 3,100km 1-3 x bomb 100 20 CSS-NX-3 CSS-NX-4 1986 2008-2010 ? 1,770+ km 8,000+ km 1 x 200-300 kt 1x? 12 n.a. 12 105 12 n.a. 12 105 CSS-2 CSS-3 CSS-4 Mod 2 CSS-5 Mod 1/2 (CSS-X-10) n.a. 1971 1980 1981 1991 2006? 20072009 3,100km 5500km 13,000km 2,150km 7,250+ km 1 x 3.3 Mt 1 x 3.3 Mt 1 x 4-5 Mt 1 x 200-300 kt 1x? 16 22 20 35 n.a. n.a. 93 16 22 20 35 n.a. n.a. 93 Range Warhead x yield Number deployed Warheads deployed
11,270+ km 1 x ?
China
162
Attack Subtotal Short-range tactical weapons DF-15 DH-10? Total CSS-6 (LACM) 1990 2006-2007 ? 600km 1 x low ~300 n.a. ? n.a. ~145 (Q-5, others?) 1 x bomb 20 40
~1,500km ? 1 x low ?
Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles
Nuclear weapons
Background


Although unconfirmed, most Western analysts believe China has deployed anywhere from 18 to 36 Dongfeng 5 ("East Wind") intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) since the 1980s.[citation needed] The Dongfeng 5A is a single-warhead, three-stage, liquid-fueled missile with a range of 13,000+ km. In 2000, General Eugene Habiger of the U.S. Air Force, then-commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, testified before Congress that China has 18
China silo-based DF-5s.[28] Since the early 21st century, the Second Artillery Corps have also deployed up to 10 Solid-fueled mobile DF-31 ICBMs, with a range of 7,200+ km and possibly up to 3 MIRVs.[29] China has also developed the DF-31A, an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 11,200+ km with possibly 3-6 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability. China stores many of its missiles in huge underground tunnel complexes; US Representative Michael Turner[30] referring to 2009 Chinese media reports said This network of tunnels could be in excess of 5,000 kilometers (3,110 miles), and is used to transport nuclear weapons and forces,,[31] the Chinese Army newsletter calls this tunnel system an underground Great Wall of China.[32]
163
Medium range ballistic missiles

Approximately 55% of China's missiles are in the medium range category, targeted at regional theater targets.[27]:61
Tactical cruise missiles

The CJ-10 long-range cruise missile made its first public appearance during the military parade on the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China as a part of the Second Artillery Corps' long range conventional missile forces; the CJ-10 represents the next generation in rocket weapons technology in the PLA. A similar naval cruise missile, the YJ-62, was also revealed during the parade; the YJ-62 serves as the People's Liberation Army Navy's latest development into naval rocketry.
Long range ballistic missiles

The Chinese categorize long-range ballistic missiles as ones with a range between 3000 and 8000km.[27]:103 DF-4/CSS-3 The Dong Feng 4 or DF-4 (also known as the CSS-3) is a long-range two-stage Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missile with liquid fuel (nitric acid/UDMH). It was thought to be deployed in limited numbers in underground silos beginning in 1980.[27]:67 The DF-4 has a takeoff thrust of 1,224.00kN, a takeoff weight of 82000kg, a diameter of 2.25 m, a length of 28.05 m, and a fin span of 2.74 m. It is equipped with a 2190kg nuclear warhead with 3300 kt explosive yield, and its range is 5,500km.[27]:68 The missile uses inertial guidance, resulting in a relatively poor CEP of 1,500 meters.[citation needed]
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)

DF-5A/CSS-4 Mod 2 The Dongfeng 5 or DF-5 is a 3 stage Chinese ICBM. It has a length 32.6 m and a diameter of 3.35 m. It weighs 183 tonnes and has an estimated range of 12,00015,000 kilometers.[27]:71-72 The DF-5 had its first flight in 1971 and was in operational service 10 years later. One of the downsides of the missile was that it took between 30 and 60 minutes to fuel.[citation needed] DF-31/CSS-10 The Dong Feng 31 (a.k.a. CSS-10) is a medium-range, three stage, solid propellant intercontinental ballistic missile developed by the People's Republic of China. It is a land-based variant of the submarine-launched JL-2. It is operated by the Second Artillery Corps (SAC) which is estimated to have 8-12 missiles in inventory[2].[citation needed]
China DF-41/CSS-X-10 The DF-41 or CSS-X-10 is an intercontinental ballistic missile developed by China. It can carry up to 10 nuclear warheads, which are maneuverable reentry vehicles. It has a range of approximately 12,000-14,000km and can cover any position on the planet.[33][34][35][36]
164
Nuclear cruise missiles

The US DoD estimated in 2006 that the PRC was developing ground- and air-launched cruise missiles that could easily be converted to carry nuclear warheads once developed.[37] DH-10 The DongHai 10 (DH-10) is a cruise missile developed in the People's Republic of China. According to Jane's Defense Weekly, the DH-10 is a second-generation land-attack cruise missile (LACM), with over 4,000km range, integrated inertial navigation system, GPS, terrain contour mapping system, and digital scene-matching terminal-homing system. The missile is estimated to have a circular error probable (CEP) of 10 meters. CJ-10 The ChangJian-10 (Long Sword 10) is a cruise missile developed by China, based on the Hongniao missile family. It has a range of 2,200km. Although not confirmed, it is suspected that the CJ-10 could carry nuclear warheads. An air-launched variant (named CJ-20) has also been developed.[38][39] HongNiao missile family There are three missiles in this family: the HN-1, HN-2, and HN-3. Reportedly based on the Kh-SD/65 missiles, the Hongniao (or Red Bird) missiles are some of the first nuclear-capable cruise missiles in China. The HN-1 has a range of 600km, the HN-2 has a range of 1,800km, and the HN-3 has a range of 3,000km.[][][40] ChangFeng missile family There are 2 missiles in the Chang Feng (or Long Wind) family: CF-1 and CF-2. These are the first domestically developed long-range cruise missiles for China. The CF-1 has a range of 400km while the CF-2 has a range of 800km. Both variants can carry a 10kt nuclear warhead.[][]
Sea-based weapons
The submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) stockpile of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is thought to be relatively new. China launched its first second-generation nuclear submarine in April 1981. The navy currently has a 1 Type 092 Xia class SSBN at roughly 8000 tons displacement. A second Type 092 was reportedly lost in an accident in 1985. The Type 092 is equipped with 12 JL-1 SLBMs with a range of 21502500km. The JL-1 is a modified DF-21 missile. It is suspected that the Type 092 is being converted into a cruise missile submarine. The Chinese navy has developed Type 094 ballistic missile submarine, open source satellite imagery has shown that at least 2 of these have been completed. This submarine will be capable of carrying 12 of the longer ranged, more modern JL-2s with a range of approximately 14000km.[citation needed] China is also developing the Type 096 submarine, claimed to be able to carry up to 24 JL-2 ballistic missiles each. Some Chinese sources states that the submarine is already undergoing trials.[41] Also a new nuclear attack submarine is under development, the Type 095 submarine.[42][43]
China
165
Heavy bomber group

China's bomber force consists mostly of Chinese-made versions of Soviet aircraft. The People's Liberation Army Air Force has 120 H-6s (a variant of the Tupolev Tu-16). These bombers are outfitted to carry nuclear as well as conventional weapons. While the H-6 fleet is aging, it is not as old as the American B-52 Stratofortress.[27]:93-98 The Chinese have also produced the Xian JH-7 Flying Leopard fighter-bomber with a range and payload exceeding the F-111 (currently about 80 are in service) capable of delivering a nuclear strike. China has also bought the advanced Sukhoi Su-30 from Russia; currently, about 100 Su-30s (MKK and MK2 variants) have been purchased by China. The Su-30 is capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons.[27]:102 China is alleged to be testing rumored new H-8 and H-9 strategic bombers which are either described as an upgraded H-6 or an aircraft in the same class as the US B-2, able to carry nuclear weapons.[44][45][46] China is also testing the JH-7B strike fighter, a stealthy variant of the Xian JH-7.[47][48]
Missile ranges
Maximum Ranges for Chinas Conventional SRBM Force. Note: China currently is capable of deploying ballistic missile forces to support a variety of regional contingencies.
Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles. Note: China currently is capable of targeting its nuclear forces throughout the region and most of the world, including the continental United States. Newer systems, such as the DF-31, DF-31A, and JL-2, will give China a more survivable nuclear force.
Surface-to-Air Missile Coverage over the Taiwan Strait. Note: This map depicts notional coverage provided by Chinas SA-10, SA-20 SAM systems, as well as the soon-to-be acquired S-300PMU2. Actual coverage would be non-contiguous and dependent upon precise deployment sites.
Notes
[2] [3] [4] [5] http:/ / www. idsa. in/ idsacomments/ DF-41ChinasanswertotheUSBMDefforts_ArjunSubramaniam_121112 States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (http:/ / www. opcw. org/ html/ db/ members_ratifyer. html) NTI Research Library: country profile: China (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ China/ index. html) Albania's Chemical Cache Raises Fears About Others (http:/ / www. washingtonpost. com/ ac2/ wp-dyn/ A61698-2005Jan9?language=printer) - Washington Post, Monday 10 January 2005, Page A01 [6] Roland Everett Langford, Introduction to Weapons of Mass Destruction: Radiological, Chemical, and Biological, Wiley-IEEE, 2004 [7] William J Broad, Soviet Defector Says China Had Accident at a Germ Plant, New York Times, April 5, 1999 [8] Leonard Spector, Chinese Assistance to Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Programs (http:/ / www. carnegieendowment. org/ publications/ index. cfm?fa=view& id=129), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 12, 1996 [9] Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Profile: China (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ China/ Biological/ index. html) [10] John Lewis and Litai Xue, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford University Press, 1991), 53, 61, 121. [11] http:/ / www. gwu. edu/ ~nsarchiv/ news/ 19990527/ 01-01. htm [13] (http:/ / www. armscontrolwonk. com/ Primer. pdf) [15] http:/ / www. dia. mil/ publicaffairs/ Testimonies/ statement24. html [16] "Chinese Nuclear Tests Allegedly Cause 750,000 Deaths" Epoch Times. March 30, 2009. (http:/ / www. theepochtimes. com/ n2/ content/ view/ 14535/ )
China
[17] http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ w/ index. php?title=People%27s_Republic_of_China_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction& action=edit [19] Kristensen, Hans. "STRATCOM Commander Rejects High Estimates for Chinese Nuclear Arsenal." (http:/ / www. fas. org/ blog/ ssp/ 2012/ 08/ china-nukes. php) FAS, 22 August 2012. [24] Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Cornell University Press, 2010), 1. [25] IISS Military Balance 2010 (http:/ / www. iiss. org/ publications/ military-balance/ ) [26] Office of the Secretary of Defense - Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2010 (PDF) (http:/ / www. defense. gov/ pubs/ pdfs/ 2010_CMPR_Final. pdf) [27] Kristensen, Hans M; Robert S. Norris; Matthew G. McKinzie. Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning (http:/ / www. fas. org/ nuke/ guide/ china/ Book2006. pdf). Federation of American Scientists and Natural Resources Defense Council, November 2006. [28] (http:/ / www. thebulletin. org/ article. php?art_ofn=mj05lewis) [30] http:/ / chinadigitaltimes. net/ 2011/ 10/ u-s-lawmaker-warns-of-chinas-nuclear-strategy [31] http:/ / www. straitstimes. com/ BreakingNews/ Asia/ Story/ STIStory_723617. html [32] http:/ / english. chosun. com/ site/ data/ html_dir/ 2009/ 12/ 14/ 2009121400292. html [37] U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China, 2006, May 23, 2006, pp. 26, 27. [42] http:/ / www. taipeitimes. com/ News/ editorials/ archives/ 2006/ 12/ 06/ 2003339341 [43] http:/ / www. deagel. com/ Nuclear-Attack-Submarines/ Type-095_a001843001. aspx
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Further reading
Federation of American Scientists et al. (2006). Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning (http:// www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/Book2006.pdf) China Nuclear Forces Guide (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/) Federation of American Scientists
External links
Chinese Nuclear Weapon Testing Video (http://sonicbomb.com/modules. php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=146) at sonicbomb.com (http://sonicbomb.com) First nuclear test Video - 596 test (http://sonicbomb.com/modules.php?name=Content& pa=showpage&pid=153&page=2) Conference on U.S.-China Strategic Nuclear Dynamics (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/ pubs/060620_china_nuclear_report.pdf), June 2021, 2006 Fact Sheet: China: Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/cjjk/ 2622/t93539.htm), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, 2004/04/27 FY04 Report to Congress on PRC Military Power (http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/d20040528PRC.pdf), U.S. Department of Defense Status of Nuclear Powers and Their Nuclear Capabilities (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/summary.htm), Federation of American Scientists Nuclear Threat Initiative on China (http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/china/) PLA Strategic Missile Force - Chinese Defence Today (http://www.sinodefence.com/nuclear/default.asp) Jeffrey Lewis, "The ambiguous arsenal" (http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/1l02746205r708t6/ ?p=7fe893d4b1cf48adaaa1c45dbd1e23b3&pi=0), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2005. Nuclear Notebook: Chinese nuclear forces, 2003 (http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/u1r177j304r10658/ ?p=bcd107edf65d4692a6e1aa63f1ecf566&pi=6), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nov/Dec 2003. Defense Estimative Brief, Nuclear Weapons Systems in China (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/ 19990527/01-01.htm), Defense Intelligence Agency, 24 April 1984 Report to Congress on Status of China, India and Pakistan Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs (http://www. fas.org/irp/threat/930728-wmd.htm), United States National Security Council, July 28, 1993 Nuclear Files.org (http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/proliferation/china/ ) Information on the background of nuclear weapons in China
China Nuclear Files.org (http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/basics/nuclear-stockpiles. htm) Current information on nuclear stockpiles in China Parallel History Project On Cooperative Security (http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_china_wapa/ negin_smirnov_engl.cfm?navinfo=16034), Account of Soviet-China nuclear technology transfer, October 2002 Chinese nuclear forces, 2008 (http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/25094v7235832574/ ?p=32f5d223f2ab4b698a1c3f6227d32fff&pi=8), Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (http://www.thebulletin.org) Annotated bibliography for the Chinese nuclear weapons program from the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues (http://alsos.wlu.edu/adv_rst.aspx?keyword=chinese+nuclear+weapons&creator=&title=& media=all&genre=all&disc=all&level=all&sortby=relevance&results=10&period=15)
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France
168
France
France
First nuclear weapon test First fusion weapon test Last nuclear test Largest yield test Total tests Peak stockpile Current stockpile Maximum missile range NPT signatory
February 13, 1960 August 23, 1968 January 27, 1996 2.6 Mt (August 20, 1968) 210 540 (in 1992) 298 (in 2011) >10,000 km/6,000 mi. (M51 SLBM) Yes (1992, one of five recognized powers)
By type

Albania Algeria Argentina
France

169
Australia Brazil Bulgaria Burma Canada PRC France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Mexico Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Sweden Syria ROC (Taiwan) Ukraine United Kingdom United States Proliferation

France
170
Nuclear weapons
Background


France is known to have an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. France is one of the five "Nuclear Weapons States" under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; but is not known to possess or develop any chemical or biological weapons.[1][2] France was the fourth country to test an independently developed nuclear weapon in 1960, under the government of Charles de Gaulle. The French military is currently thought to retain a weapons stockpile of around 300 operational nuclear warheads, making it the third-largest in the world.[3] The weapons are part of the national Force de frappe, developed in the late 1950s and 1960s to give France the ability to distance itself from NATO while having a means of nuclear deterrence under sovereign control. France did not sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which gave it the option to conduct further nuclear tests until it signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996 and 1998 respectively. France denies currently having chemical weapons, ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1995, and acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984. France had also ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1926.
France
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History
France was one of the nuclear pioneers, going back to the work of Marie Curie. Curies last assistant Bertrand Goldschmidt became the father of the French Bomb. This was discontinued after the warWikipedia:Please clarify because of the instability of the Fourth Republic and the lack of finance available.[4] During the Second World War Goldschmidt invented the now-standard method for extracting plutonium while working as part of the British/Canadian team participating in the Manhattan Project. But after the Liberation in 1945, France had to start again almost from scratch. Nevertheless, the first French reactor went critical in 1948 and small amounts of plutonium were extracted in 1949. There was no formal commitment to a nuclear weapons program at that time, although plans were made to build reactors for the large scale production of plutonium.[5] However, in the 1950s a civilian nuclear research program was started, a byproduct of which would be plutonium. In 1956 a secret Committee for the Military Applications of Atomic Energy was formed and a development program for delivery vehicles was started. The intervention of the United States in the Suez Crisis that year is credited with convincing France that it needed to accelerate its own nuclear weapons program to remain a global power.[6] In 1957, soon after Suez and the resulting diplomatic tension with both the USSR and the United States, French president Ren Coty decided on the creation of the C.S.E.M. in the then French Sahara, a new nuclear tests facility replacing the C.I.E.E.S.[7] With the return of Charles de Gaulle to the presidency of France in the midst of the May 1958 crisis, the final decisions to build an atomic bomb were taken, and a successful test took place in 1960. Since then France has developed and maintained its own nuclear deterrent, one that would defend France even if the United States refused to risk its own cities by assisting Western Europe in a nuclear war.[] In 1956 the French agreed to secretly build the Dimona nuclear reactor in Israel and soon after agreed to construct a reprocessing plant for the extraction of plutonium at the site. The following year Euratom was created, and under cover of the peaceful use of nuclear power the French signed deals with Germany and Italy to work together on nuclear weapons development.[8] The West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer told his cabinet that he "wanted to achieve, through EURATOM, as quickly as possible, the chance of producing our own nuclear weapons".[9] The idea was short-lived. In 1958 de Gaulle became President and Germany and Italy were excluded. France developed its nuclear and thermonuclear bombs without outside assistance. The United States, however, began providing technical assistance in the early 1970s through the 1980s. The aid was secret, unlike the relationship with the British nuclear program. The Nixon administration, unlike previous presidencies, did not oppose its allies' possession of atomic weapons and believed that the Soviets would find having multiple nuclear-armed Western opponents more difficult. Because the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 prohibited sharing information on nuclear weapon design, a method known as "negative guidance" or "Twenty Questions" was used; French scientists described to their American counterparts their research, and were told whether they were correct. Areas in which the French received help included MIRV, radiation hardening, missile design, intelligence on Soviet anti-missile defenses, and advanced computer technology. Because the French program attracted "the best brains" of the nation, the Americans benefited from French research as well. The relationship also improved the two nations' military ties; despite its departure from NATO's command structure in 1966, France developed two separate nuclear targeting plans, one "national" for the Force de Frappe's role as a solely French deterrent, and one coordinated with NATO.[] France is understood to have tested neutron or enhanced radiation bombs in the past, apparently leading the field with an early test of the technology in 1967 [10] and an 'actual' neutron bomb in 1980.[11]
France
172
Testing
There were 210 French nuclear tests from 1960 until 1996. 17 of them were done in the Algerian Sahara between 1960 and 1966, starting in the middle of the Algerian War. 193 were carried out in French Polynesia.[12][13]
Saharan experiments centers (19601966)

After studying Runion, New Caledonia, and Clipperton Island, General Charles Ailleret, head of the Special Weapons Section, proposed two possible nuclear test sites for France in a January 1957 report: French Algeria in the Sahara Desert, and French Polynesia. Although he recommended against Polynesia because of its distance from France and lack of a large airport, Ailleret stated that Algeria should be chosen "provisionally", likely due in part to the Algerian War.[] A series of atmospheric nuclear tests was conducted by the Centre Saharien d'Exprimentations Militaires ("Saharan Military Experiments Center") from February 1960 until April 1961. The first, called "Gerboise bleue" ("blue jerboa") took place on 13 February 1960 in Algeria. The explosion took place at 40km from the military base of Reggane, which is the last town on the Tanezrouft Track heading south across the Sahara to Mali, and 700km/435mi. south of Bchar.[14] The device had a 70 kiloton yield. Although Algeria became independent in 1962 France continued nuclear tests there until 1966 although the later tests were underground rather than atmospheric. The General Pierre Marie Gallois was named le pre de la bombe A ("Father of the A-bomb"). Three other atmospheric tests were carried out from 1 April 1960 to 25 April 1961. These four atmospheric tests were carried out at with a forward base at Hammoudia near Reggane. Military, workers and the nomadic Touareg population of the region were present at the test sites, without any significant protection. At most, a shower after each test according to L'Humanit.[15] Gerboise Rouge (5kt), the third atomic bomb, half as powerful as Hiroshima, exploded on 27 December 1960, provoking protests from Japan, USSR, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria and Ghana.[16] After the independence of Algeria on 5 July 1962, following the 19 March Evian agreements, the French military moved to In Ecker, also in the Algerian Sahara. The Evian agreements included a secret article which stated that "Algeria concede... to France the use of certain air bases, terrains, sites and military installations which are necessary to it [France]" during five years. The C.S.E.M. was therefore replaced by the Centre d'Exprimentations Militaires des Oasis ("Military Experiments Center of the Oasis") underground tests facility. Experimentations lasted from November 1961 until February 1966. The 13 underground tests were carried out at In Ekker, 150km/93mi. north of Tamanrasset, from 7 November 1961 to 16 February 1966. By July 1, 1967, all French facilities were evacuated. An accident happened on May 1, 1962, during the "Bryl" test, four times more powerful than Hiroshima and designed as an underground shaft test.[17] Due to improper sealing of the shaft, radioactive rock and dust were released into the atmosphere. Nine soldiers of the 621st Groupe d'Armes Spciales unit were heavily contaminated by radiation.[18] The soldiers were exposed to as much as 600 mSv. The Minister of Armed Forces, Pierre Messmer, and the Minister of Research, Gaston Palewski, were present. As many as 100 additional personnel, including officials, soldiers and Algerian workers were exposed to lower levels of radiation, estimated at about 50 mSv, when the radioactive cloud produced by the blast passed over the command post, due to an unexpected change in wind direction. They escaped as they could, often without wearing any protection. Palewski died in 1984 of leukemia, which he always attributed to the Beryl incident. In 2006, Bruno Barillot, specialist of nuclear tests, measured on the site 93 microsieverts by hour of gamma ray, equivalent to 1% of the official admissible yearly dose.[15] The incident was documented in the 2006 docudrama "Vive La Bombe!"[19]
France
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Saharan facilities
C.I.E.E.S. (Centre Interarmes d'Essais d'Engins Spciaux): Hammaguir, 120km/75mi. southwest of Colomb-Bchar, Algeria: used for launching rockets from 1947 to 1967. [20] C.S.E.M. (Centre Saharien d'Exprimentations Militaires): Reggane, west of In-Salah, Tanezrouft,Algeria: used for atmospheric tests from 1960 to 1961. C.E.M.O. (Centre d'Exprimentations Militaires des Oasis): In Ekker, in the Hoggar, 150km/93mi. from Tamanrasset, Tan Afella, Algeria: used for underground tests from 1961 to 1967.
Pacific experiments center (19661996)

Despite its initial choice of Algeria for nuclear tests, the French government decided to build Faa'a International Airport in Tahiti, spending much more money and resources than would be justified by the official explanation of tourism. By 1958, two years before the first Sahara test, France began again its search for new testing sites due to potential political problems with Algeria and the possibility of a ban on above-ground tests. Many overseas France islands were studied, as well as performing underground tests in the Alps, Pyrenees, or Corsica; however, engineers found problems with most of the possible sites in metropolitan France.[] By 1962 France hoped in its negotiations with the Algerian independence movement to retain the Sahara as a test site until 1968, but decided that it needed to be able to also perform above-ground tests of hydrogen bombs, which could not be done in Algeria. Mururoa and Fangataufa in French Polynesia were chosen that year. President Charles de Gaulle announced the choice on 3 January 1963, describing it as a benefit to Polynesia's weak economy. The Polynesian people and leaders broadly supported the choice, although the tests became controversial after they began, especially among Polynesian separatists.[] A total of 193 nuclear tests were carried out in Polynesia from 1966 to 1996. On 24 August 1968 France detonated its first thermonuclear weapon codenamed Canopus over Fangataufa. A fission device ignited a lithium 6 deuteride secondary inside a jacket of highly enriched uranium to create a 2.6 megaton blast.
Simulation programme (1996-2012)

More recently, France has used supercomputers to simulate and study nuclear explosions.
Current nuclear doctrine and strategy
France
174
In 2006, French President Jacques Chirac, noted that France would be willing to use nuclear weapons against a state attacking France via terrorist means. He noted that the French nuclear forces had been configured for this option.[21] On 21 March 2008, President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that France will reduce its plane-based nuclear arsenal (which currently consists of 60 TN 81 warheads) by a third (i.e. 20 warheads), thus bringing the total French nuclear arsenal to fewer than 300 warheads.[22][23]
Anti nuclear tests protests
By 1968 only France and China were detonating nuclear weapons in the open air and the contamination caused by the H Bomb blast led to a global protest movement against further French atmospheric tests.[5]
French nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle and the American nuclear-powered carrier USS Enterprise (left), each of which carry nuclear-capable fighter aircraft
From the early 1960s New Zealand peace groups CND and the Peace Media had been organising nationwide anti nuclear campaigns in protest of atmospheric testing in French Polynesia. These included two large national petitions presented to the New Zealand government which led to a joint New Zealand and Australian Government action to take France to the International Court of Justice (1972). [24] In 1972, Greenpeace and an amalgam of New Zealand peace groups managed to delay nuclear tests by several weeks by trespassing with a ship in the testing zone. During the time, the skipper, David McTaggart, was beaten and severely injured by members of the French military. In 1973 the New Zealand Peace Media organised an international flotilla of protest yachts including the Fri, Spirit of Peace, Boy Roel, Magic Island and the Tanmure to sail into the test exclusion zone.[25] In 1973, New Zealand Prime Minister Norman Kirk as a symbolic act of protest sent two navy frigates, HMNZS Canterbury and HMNZS Otago, to Mururoa.[26] They were accompanied by HMAS Supply, a fleet oiler of the Royal Australian Navy.[27] In 1985 the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior was bombed and sunk by the French DGSE in Auckland, New Zealand, as it prepared for another protest of nuclear testing in French military zones. One crew member, Fernando Pereira of Portugal, photographer, drowned on the sinking ship while attempting to recover his photographic equipment. Two members of DGSE were captured and sentenced, but eventually repatriated to France in a controversial affair. French president Jacques Chiracs decision to run a nuclear test series at Mururoa in 1995, just one year before the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was to be signed, caused worldwide protest, including an embargo of French wine. These tests were meant to provide the nation with enough data to improve further nuclear technology without needing additional series of tests.[28] The French Military conducted almost 200 nuclear tests at Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls over a thirty-year period ending 1996, 46 of them atmospheric, of which five were without significant nuclear yield. In August 2006, an official French government report by INSERM confirmed the link between an increase in the cases of thyroid cancer and Frances atmospheric nuclear tests in the territory since 1966.[29]
France
175
Veterans' associations and symposium

An association gathering veterans of nuclear tests (AVEN, "Association des vtrans des essais nuclaires") was created in 2001.[30] Along with the Polynesian NGO Moruroa e tatou, the AVEN announced on 27 November 2002 that it would depose a complaint against X (unknown) for involuntary homicide and putting someones life in danger. On 7 June 2003, for the first time, the military court of Tours granted an invalidity pension to a veteran of the Sahara tests. According to a poll made by the AVEN with its members, only 12% have declared being in good health.[15] An international symposium on the consequences of test carried out in Algeria took place on 13 and 14 February 2007, under the official oversight of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. 150,000 civilians without taking into account the local population are estimated to have been on the location of nuclear tests, in Algeria or in French Polynesia.[15] One French veteran of the 1960s nuclear tests in Algeria described being given no protective clothing or masks, while being ordered to witness the tests at so close a range that the flash penetrated through the arm he used to cover his eyes.[31] One of several veterans groups claiming to organise those suffering ill effects, AVEN had 4500 members in early 2009.[30]
Test victims compensation

In both Algeria and French Polynesia there have been long standing demands for compensation from those who claim injury from Frances nuclear testing program. The government of France had consistently denied, since the late 1960s, that injury to military personnel and civilians had been caused by their nuclear testing.[32] Several French veterans and African and Polynesian campaign groups have waged court cases and public relations struggles demanding government reparations. In May 2009, a group of twelve French veterans, in the campaign group "Truth and Justice", who claim to have suffered health effects from nuclear testing in the 1960s had their claims denied by the government Commission for the Indemnification of Victims of Penal Infraction (CIVI), and again by a Paris appeals court, citing laws which set a statute of limitations for damages to 1976.[33] Following this rejection, the government announced it would create a 10m Euro compensation fund for military and civilian victims of its testing programme; both those carried out in the 1960s and the Polynesian tests of 19901996.[32] Defence Minister Herv Morin said the government would create a board of physicians, overseen by a French judge magistrate, to determine if individual cases were caused by French testing, and if individuals were suffering from illnesses on a United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation list of eighteen disorders linked to exposure to testing.[32][34] Pressure groups, including the Veterans group "Truth and Justice" criticised the programme as too restrictive in illnesses covered and too bureaucratic. Polynesian groups said the bill would also unduly restrict applicants to those who had been in small areas near the test zones, not taking into account the pervasive pollution and radiation.[35] Algerian groups had also complained that these restrictions would deny compensation to many victims. One Algerian group estimated there were 27,000 still living victims of ill effects from the 1960-66 testing there, while the French government had given an estimate of just 500.[36]
France
176
Non-nuclear WMD
France states that it does not currently have chemical weapons. The country ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1995, and acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984. France had also ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1926.
References
[3] Table of French Nuclear Forces (http:/ / www. nrdc. org/ nuclear/ nudb/ datab16. asp) (Natural Resources Defense Council, 2002) [5] Origin of the Force de Frappe (http:/ / nuclearweaponarchive. org/ France/ FranceOrigin. html) (Nuclear Weapon Archive) [6] Stuck in the Canal, Fromkin, David - Editorial in The New York Times, 28 October 2006 [7] (http:/ / www. defense. gouv. fr/ content/ download/ 60823/ 571529/ file/ SAHARA. pdf) [8] Die Erinnerungen, Franz Josef Strauss - Berlin 1989, p. 314 [9] Germany, the NPT, and the European Option (http:/ / www10. antenna. nl/ wise/ beyondbomb/ 4-2. html) (WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor) [10] BBC News: Neutron bomb: Why 'clean' is deadly (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 1/ hi/ sci/ tech/ 395689. stm) [11] UK parliamentary question on whether condemnation was considered by Thatcher government (http:/ / hansard. millbanksystems. com/ commons/ 1980/ jul/ 16/ french-neutron-bomb) [12] Treize ans apr-s le dernier des essais nuclaires franais, l'indemnisation des victimes en marche (http:/ / www. google. com/ hostednews/ afp/ article/ ALeqM5g-1ldRO7kq73hvOjv93wPTGz7j1Q). Herv ASQUIN, AFP. 27 May 2009. [13] Four decades of French nuclear testing (http:/ / www. france24. com/ en/ 20090324-four-decades-french-nuclear-tests-atomic-bomb-gerboise-bleue-algeria-polynesia). Julien PEYRON, France24. Tuesday 24 March 2009. [14] French Senate report #179: The first French tests in the Sahara (http:/ / www. senat. fr/ rap/ o97-179/ o97-1799. html) [15] La bombe atomique en hritage (http:/ / www. humanite. presse. fr/ journal/ 2007-02-21/ 2007-02-21-846342), L'Humanit, February 21, 2007 [16] 1960: France explodes third atomic bomb (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ onthisday/ hi/ dates/ stories/ december/ 27/ newsid_2985000/ 2985200. stm), BBC On This Day [17] Frances Nuclear Weapons (http:/ / nuclearweaponarchive. org/ France/ FranceOrigin. html) [18] Dossier de prsentation des essais nuclaires et leur suivi au Sahara (http:/ / www. defense. gouv. fr/ content/ download/ 60823/ 571529/ file/ SAHARA. pdf) [19] VIVE LA BOMBE! (http:/ / www. ecovisionfestival. com/ edizione2007/ / index. php?option=com_content& task=view& id=337& Itemid=168& lang=english) [20] http:/ / fuseurop. univ-perp. fr/ sahara_e. htm [21] France 'would use nuclear arms' (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ europe/ 4627862. stm) - BBC news, Thursday 19 January 2006 [22] Nuclaire : Mise l'eau du terrible devant Sarkozy - France - LCI (http:/ / tf1. lci. fr/ infos/ france/ politique/ 0,,3784844,00-mise-eau-terrible-devant-sarkozy-. html) [23] France cuts its nuclear weapons by a third - Telegraph (http:/ / www. telegraph. co. uk/ news/ main. jhtml?xml=/ news/ 2008/ 03/ 22/ wsarko222. xml) [24] http:/ / www. disarmsecure. org/ publications/ papers/ index. html [25] http:/ / library. bullerdc. govt. nz/ cgi-bin/ library/ liinquiry?acc=00000711 [26] http:/ / www. mururoavet. com/ [28] Les essais nucleaires (http:/ / www. senat. fr/ rap/ o97-179/ o97-1798. html#toc32) - report of the French Senate (in French) [30] Les victimes des essais nuclaires enfin reconnues (http:/ / www. lamontagne. fr/ editions_locales/ montlucon/ les_victimes_des_essais_nucleaires_enfin_reconnues@CARGNjFdJSsHFh8MBxg-. html). Marie-Christine Soigneux, Le Montange (Clermont-Ferrand). 27 May 2009. [31] Jai particip au premier essai dans le Sahara DANIEL BOURDON, 72 ans, de Thourotte (http:/ / www. leparisien. fr/ abo-oise/ j-ai-participe-au-premier-essai-dans-le-sahara-24-05-2009-524072. php). Le Parisien. 24 May 2009. [32] Government earmarks 10 million for nuclear test victims (http:/ / www. france24. com/ en/ 20090324-govt-earmarks-10-million-euros-compensate-nuclear-test-victims-france-algeria-polynesia). France 24. Tuesday 24 March 2009. [33] Court denies nuclear test victims compensation (http:/ / www. france24. com/ en/ 20090522-france-denies-reparations-victims-nuclear-tests-1960s-algeria). France 24. Friday 22 May 2009 [34] Essais nuclaires franais au sud de lAlgrie: La France dfinit six crit-res (http:/ / actualite. el-annabi. com/ article. php3?id_article=9477). "La voix de loranie" (Oran, Algeria). 21 May 2009. [35] Nuclear compensation bill falls short of expectations (http:/ / www. france24. com/ en/ 20090527-nuclear-compensation-bill-disappoints-victims-france-justice). France24. Wednesday 27 May 2009 [36] VICTIMES ALGRIENNES DES ESSAIS NUCLAIRES FRANAIS. Sur quels crit-res sera valu le handicap? (http:/ / www. lexpressiondz. com/ article/ 2/ 2009-05-18/ 63841. html). L'Expression (Algeria), 18 May 2009, p.24
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External links
In-depth background of the Development of the French Program (http://www.scribd.com/ doc/56032100/France-and-Greatness-the-Development-of-the-French-Nuclear-Program) Video archive of French Nuclear Testing (http://sonicbomb.com/modules. php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=112) at sonicbomb.com (http://www.sonicbomb. com) A Change in the French Nuclear Doctrine? (http://www.isria.com/en/free/0000024.php), Rault, Charles ISRIA, 25 January 2006. Country overview: France (http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/france/index_2701.html) (from the Nuclear Threat Initiative) Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (http://www.thebulletin.org) Nuclear Notebook: French nuclear forces, 2008 (http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/ k01h5q0wg50353k5/fulltext.pdf), September/October 2008. Nuclear policy: France stands alone (http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/f81x51w723j70458/ ?p=5a349b234b2a4525b6455a8c6ab292b6&pi=11) July/August 2004 The French atomic energy program (http://books.google.com/books?id=TQkAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA39) September 1962 Greenpeace movie (http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=4363730934900311131) (on the French bombing of the Rainbow Warrior, a ship about to protest French nuclear tests) Nuclear Files.org (http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/basics/nuclear-stockpiles. htm) (current information on nuclear stockpiles in France) (French) Archives sur le Centre d'Exprimentations Nuclaires du Pacifique (C.E.P.) Moruroa, Hao et Fangataufa (http://www.point-zero-penelope.org) Annotated bibliography for the French nuclear weapons program from the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues (http://alsos.wlu.edu/adv_rst.aspx?keyword=french+nuclear+weapons&creator=&title=& media=all&genre=all&disc=all&level=all&sortby=relevance&results=10&period=15) The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (http://www.wilsoncenter. org/nuclear-history-documents/) The Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project has primary source documents on US-French nuclear relations.
Germany
178
Germany
By type

Germany
179

Though Germany is one of the most technologically advanced countries in the world, since World War II it has generally refrained from using this technology to outfit its own armed forces with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), although it participates in the NATO nuclear weapons sharing arrangements and trains for delivering nuclear weapons. Germany is among the powers which possess the ability to create nuclear weapons but has agreed not to do so (under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as reaffirmed by the Two Plus Four Treaty). Along with most other industrial nations, Germany produces components that can be used for creating deadly agents, chemical weapons, and other WMD. Alongside other companies from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, India, the United States, Belgium, Spain, and Brazil, German companies provided Iraq with precursors of chemical agents used by Iraq to engage in chemical warfare during the IranIraq War.[1]
History
World War I
As one of the major combatants in World War I, Germany used and developed what we would today describe as weapons of mass destruction. During World War I, Germany developed and used chemical weapons, for instance mustard gas. These weapons were subsequently employed by the Allies.
World War II
During World War II, Germany worked to develop nuclear weapons, though Allied scientists ultimately beat the Germans to this goal - the international team included many displaced migr scientists from Germany itself; see German nuclear energy project. German scientists also did research on other chemical weapons during the war, including human experimentation with mustard gas. The first nerve gas, tabun, was invented by the German researcher Gerhard Schrader in 1937. During the war, Germany stockpiled tabun, sarin, and soman but refrained from their use on the battlefield. In total, Germany produced about 78,000 tons of chemical weapons.[2] By 1945 the nation produced about 12,000 tons of tabun and 1,000 pounds (450kg) of sarin.[2] Delivery systems for the nerve agents included 105mm and 150mm artillery shells, a 250kg bomb and a 150mm rocket.[2] Even when the Soviets neared Berlin, Adolf Hitler was against using tabun as the final trump card, a decision which stemmed from his own experience with chemical weapons in World War I.
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Cold War and beyond

As part of the accession negotiations of West Germany to the Western European Union at the London and Paris Conferences, the country was forbidden (by Protocol No III [3] to the revised Treaty of Brussels of 23 October 1954) to possess Nuclear, Biological or Chemical weapons. This was reiterated in domestic law by the War Weapons Control Act (Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz).[4] During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were deployed in Germany by both the United States (in West Germany) and the Soviet Union (in East Germany). Despite not being among the nuclear powers during the Cold War, Germany had a political and military interest in the balance of nuclear capability. In 1977, after the Soviet deployment of the new SS-20 IRBM, West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt expressed concern over the capability of NATO's nuclear forces compared to those of the Soviets. Later in the Cold War under the chancellorship of Helmut Kohl, the West German government expressed concern about the progress of the nuclear arms race. Particularly, they addressed the eagerness of Germany's NATO allies, the United States and United Kingdom, to seek restrictions on long-range strategic weapons while modernizing their short-range and tactical nuclear systems. Germany wanted to see such short range systems eliminated, because their major use was not deterrence but battlefield employment. Germany itself, straddling the division of the Eastern and Western blocs in Europe, was a likely battlefield in any escalation of the Cold War and battlefield use of nuclear weapons would be devastating to German territory. In 1957 the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was created to promote the use of nuclear energy in Europe. Under cover of the peaceful use of nuclear power, West Germany hoped to develop the basis of a nuclear weapons programme with France and Italy.[5] The West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer told his cabinet that he "wanted to achieve, through EURATOM, as quickly as possible, the chance of producing our own nuclear weapons".[6] The idea was short-lived. In 1958 Charles De Gaulle became President of France and Germany and Italy were excluded from the weapons project. Euratom continued as the European agency for the peaceful use of nuclear technology, becoming part of the structure of the European Economic Community in 1967. Germany ratified the Geneva Protocol on 25 April 1929, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on 2 May 1975, the Biological Weapons Convention on 7 April 1983 and the Chemical Weapons Convention on 12 August 1994. These dates signify ratification by the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), during the division of Germany the NPT and the BWC were ratified separately by the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) (on 31 October 1969 and 28 November 1972, respectively). Before German reunification in 1990, both West and East Germany ratified the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany. Germany reaffirmed its renunciation of the manufacture, possession, and control of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. In addition to banning a foreign military presence in the former East Germany, the treaty also banned nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon carriers to be stationed in the area, making it a permanent Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. The German military was allowed to possess conventional weapons systems with nonconventional capabilities, provided that they were outfitted for a purely conventional role. The United States provides about 60 tactical B61 nuclear bombs for use by Germany under a NATO nuclear weapons sharing agreement. The bombs are stored at Bchel and Ramstein Air Bases, and in time of war would be delivered by Luftwaffe Panavia Tornado warplanes. As well as being a breach of the Protocols to the (revised) Treaty of Brussels, many countries believe this violates Articles I and II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), where Germany has committed: "... not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly ... or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices ...". The U.S. insists its forces control the weapons and that no transfer of the nuclear bombs or control over them is intended "unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which the [NPT] treaty would no longer be controlling", so there is no breach of the NPT. However German pilots and other staff practice handling and delivering the U.S. nuclear bombs[7] Even if the NATO argument is considered legally correct, such peacetime
Germany operations could arguably contravene both the objective and the spirit of the NPT. Like other countries of its size and wealth, Germany has the skills and resources to create its own nuclear weapons quite quickly if desired. The Zippe-type centrifuge was, indeed, invented by captured Germans working in the Soviet Union in the 1950s, and URENCO operates a centrifuge uranium enrichment plant in Germany. There are also several power reactors in Germany that could be used to produce bomb-grade plutonium if desired. Such a development is, of course, highly unlikely in the present benign security environment. In 2007, former defence secretary Rupert Scholz stated that Germany should strive to become a nuclear power.[8] In September 2007 the French president Sarkozy offered Germany to participate in the control over the French nuclear arsenal. Chancellor Merkel and foreign minister Steinmeier declined the offer however, stating that Germany "had no interest in possessing nuclear weapons".[9]
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References
[1] Al Isa, I. K. (1-12-2003) Fresh information on the Iraqi chemical program; Iraqi money and German brains cooperated in building chemical weapons. Al Zaman, London. (http:/ / www. fas. org/ nuke/ guide/ iraq/ cw/ az120103. html) Federation of atomic scientists. Referenced 21-11-2006. [2] Smart, Jeffery K. Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare (http:/ / www. bordeninstitute. army. mil/ published_volumes/ chemBio/ chembio. html): Chapter 2 - History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: An American Perspective, ( PDF (http:/ / www. au. af. mil/ au/ awc/ awcgate/ medaspec/ Ch-2electrv699. pdf): p. 14), Borden Institute, Textbooks of Military Medicine, PDF via Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base, accessed January 4, 2009. [3] http:/ / avalon. law. yale. edu/ 20th_century/ we005. asp [5] Die Erinnerungen, Franz Josef Strauss - Berlin 1989, p. 314 [6] Germany, the NPT, and the European Option (http:/ / www10. antenna. nl/ wise/ beyondbomb/ 4-2. html) (WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor) [7] Nassauer, O. (2001) Nuclear sharing: is it legal? (http:/ / www. ieer. org/ sdafiles/ vol_9/ 9-3/ nato. html) [8] Tagesspiegel: Ex-Minister: Atomwaffen fr Deutschland (http:/ / www. tagesspiegel. de/ politik/ div/ ;art771,2230467) January 27th, 2007 [9] Spiegel Online: "Spiegel" - Sarkozy bot Deutschland Beteiligung an Atomwaffen an (http:/ / www. spiegel. de/ politik/ deutschland/ 0,1518,505887,00. html) 15.th September 2007
(http://www.netiran.com/?fn=artd(1585)) (http://www.homelandsecurityus.net/nuclear.htm) (http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/euro.pdf)
External links
Germany, The NPT, and the European Option (http://www10.antenna.nl/wise/beyondbomb/4-2.html), Matthias Kntzel, WISE Nerve gases: history (http://www.espionageinfo.com/Mo-Ne/Nerve-Gas.html) at Espionageinfo.com
India
182
India
India
Nuclear program start date 1967 First nuclear weapon test First fusion weapon test Last nuclear test Largest yield test Total tests Peak stockpile Current stockpile Maximum missile range NPT signatory 18 May 1974 (Smiling Buddha) 11 May 1998 (declared) 13 May 1998 2060 kt total in Pokhran-II (yield is disputed) 6 80100 (2011 est.) 80100 (2011 est.) 2500 km (Agni II) No [] [] [2][] [1]
By type

India

183

India
184
Nuclear weapons
Background


India possesses nuclear weapons and maintains short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, nuclear-capable aircraft, surface ships, and submarines under development as possible delivery systems and platforms. Although it lacks an operational ballistic missile submarine, India has ambitions of possessing a nuclear triad in the near future when Arihant, the lead ship of India's Arihant class of nuclear-powered submarines formally joins the Indian Navy in 2012 after undergoing extensive sea-trials. Though India has not made any official statements about the size of its nuclear arsenal, recent estimates suggest that India has between 80 and 100 nuclear weapons,[] consistent with earlier estimates that it had produced enough weapons-grade plutonium for up to 75110 nuclear weapons.[3] Production of weapons-grade plutonium is believed to be taking place at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, which is home to the CIRUS reactor, acquired from Canada and shut down in 2010, to the indigenous Dhruva reactor, and to a plutonium separation facility.[] As of 1999, India was estimated to have 4200kg of separated reactor-grade plutonium from its power reactors, which is equivalent to roughly 1000 nuclear weapons.[4][5] India is not a signatory to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which India argues entrenches the status quo of the existing nuclear weapons states whilst preventing general nuclear disarmament.[6] India tested a nuclear device in 1974 (code-named "Smiling Buddha"), which it called a "peaceful nuclear explosion." The test
India used plutonium produced in the Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor, and raised concerns that nuclear technology supplied for peaceful purposes could be diverted to weapons purposes. This also stimulated the early work of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.[7] India performed further nuclear tests in 1998 (code-named "Operation Shakti"). India has signed and ratified both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
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History
As early as 26 June 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru, soon to be India's first Prime Minister, announced:
As long as the world is constituted as it is, every country will have to devise and use the latest devices for its protection. I have no doubt India will develop her scientific researches and I hope Indian scientists will use the atomic force for constructive purposes. But if India is threatened, [8] she will inevitably try to defend herself by all means at her disposal.
India's nuclear program started on March 1944 and its three-stage indigenous efforts in technology were established by dr. Homi Bhabha when he founded the nuclear research center, the Institute of Fundamental Research.[9][] India's loss of territory to China in a brief Himilayan border war in October 1962, provided the New Delhi government impetus for developing nuclear weapons as a means of deterring potential Chinese aggression.[10] India's first nuclear test occurred on 18 May 1974.[] Since then India has conducted another series of tests at the Pokhran test range in the state of Rajasthan in 1998. India has an extensive civil and military nuclear program, which includes at least 10 nuclear reactors, uranium mining and milling sites, heavy water production facilities, a uranium enrichment plant, fuel fabrication facilities, and extensive nuclear research capabilities. In 1998, as a response to the continuing tests, the United States and Japan imposed sanctions on India, which have since been lifted.[citation
needed]
Doctrine
India has a declared nuclear no-first-use policy and is in the process of developing a nuclear doctrine based on "credible minimum deterrence." In August 1999, the Indian government released a draft of Shakti I: a thermonuclear device detonated on 11 the doctrine[11]Wikipedia:Link rot which asserts that nuclear weapons May 1998 as part of the Pokhran-II tests. The [] are solely for deterrence and that India will pursue a policy of nuclear yield was reported to be 45 kt. "retaliation only". The document also maintains that India "will not be the first to initiate a nuclear first strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail" and that decisions to authorize the use of nuclear weapons would be made by the Prime Minister or his 'designated successor(s).'"[11] According to the NRDC, despite the escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan in 2001-2002, India remains committed to its nuclear no-first-use policy. Indian National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon signaled a significant shift from "No first use" to "no first use against non-nuclear weapon states" in a speech on the occasion of Golden Jubilee celebrations of National Defence College in New Delhi on 21 October 2010, a doctrine Menon said reflected India's "strategic culture, with its emphasis on minimal deterrence."[12][13]Wikipedia:Link rot
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Hardware
Command and control
India's Strategic Nuclear Command was formally established in 2003, with an Air Force officer, Air Marshal Asthana, as the Commander-in-Chief. The joint services SNC is the custodian of all of India's nuclear weapons, missiles and assets. It is also responsible for executing all aspects of India's nuclear policy. However, the civil leadership, in the form of the CCS (Cabinet Committee on Security) is the only body authorized to order a nuclear strike against another offending strike: In effect, it is the Prime Minister who has his finger "on the button."
Weapon type
Chemical weapons In 1992 India signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), stating that it did not have chemical weapons and the capacity or capability to manufacture chemical weapons. By doing this India became one of the original signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] in 1993,[14] and ratified it on 2 September 1996. According to India's ex-Army Chief General Sunderji, a country having the capability of making nuclear weapons does not need to have chemical weapons, since the dread of chemical weapons could be created only in those countries that do not have nuclear weapons. Others suggested that the fact that India has found chemical weapons dispensable highlighted its confidence in the conventional weapons system at its command. In June 1997, India declared its stock of chemical weapons (1,044 tonnes of sulphur mustard).[15][16] By the end of 2006, India had destroyed more than 75 percent of its chemical weapons/material stockpile and was granted extension for destroying (the remaining stocks by April 2009) and was expected to achieve 100 percent destruction within that timeframe.[15] India informed the United Nations in May, 2009 that it had destroyed its stockpile of chemical weapons in compliance with the international Chemical Weapons Convention. With this India has become third country after South Korea and Albania to do so.[17][18] This was cross-checked by inspectors of the United Nations. India has an advanced commercial chemical industry, and produces the bulk of its own chemicals for domestic consumption. It is also widely acknowledged that India has an extensive civilian chemical and pharmaceutical industry and annually exports considerable quantities of chemicals to countries such as the United Kingdom, United States, and Taiwan.[] Biological warfare India has a well-developed biotechnology infrastructure that includes numerous pharmaceutical production facilities bio-containment laboratories (including BSL-3 and BSL-4) for working with lethal pathogens. It also has highly qualified scientists with expertise in infectious diseases. Some of Indias facilities are being used to support research and development for BW defense purposes. India has ratified the BWC and pledges to abide by its obligations. There is no clear evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, that directly points toward an offensive BW program. New Delhi does possess the scientific capability and infrastructure to launch an offensive BW program, but has chosen not to do so. In terms of delivery, India also possesses the capability to produce aerosols and has numerous potential delivery systems ranging from crop dusters to sophisticated ballistic missiles.[] No information exists in the public domain suggesting interest by the Indian government in delivery of biological agents by these or any other means. To reiterate the latter point, in October 2002, Indian President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam asserted that "we [India] will not make biological weapons. It is cruel to human beings..."[]
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Weapon inventory
In 2005, it was estimated that India had between 40 and 50 warheads.[19] In November 2008, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimated that India has about 70 assembled nuclear warheads, with about 50 of them fully operational.[20] A report by David Albright, published by the Institute for Science and International Security in 2000, estimated that India at end of 1999 had 310 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, enough for 65 nuclear weapons. He also estimated that India had 4,200kg of reactor grade plutonium which is enough to build 1,000 nuclear weapons.[][] By the end of 2004, he estimates India had 445 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium which is enough for around 85 nuclear weapons, if 5kg is required each.[21] As of February 2011, the Federation of American Scientists estimated that India had a stockpile of 80-100 weapons.[22] Former Research and Analysis Wing official J.K. Sinha, claimed that India is capable of producing 130 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium per year from six "unsafeguarded" reactors not included in the nuclear deal between India and the United States.[23] On 24 July 2012, two U.S. scientists estimated that India has an arsenal of 80-100 nuclear weapons and has not converted its entire stockpile of 520kg of weapon grade plutonium into weapons. They also stated that the construction of a second plutonium producing reactor at Vishakapatnam and commissioning of the fast breeder reactor near Kalpakkam would significantly increase India's plutonium production capacity.[24]
Delivery systems
Below is the list of missiles currently in India's inventory or under development that can carry nuclear warheads. Information on the missiles is given below.
Agni II was India's first long range missile
Agni missile range.
India's nuclear capable missiles

Name Agni-I Agni-II Agni-III Agni-IV Agni-V Agni-VI Dhanush Nirbhay SRBM MRBM IRBM MRBM ICBM ICBM SRBM Subsonic Cruise Missile Class 700km 2,000km - 3,000km 5,000km 3,000km - 4,000km 5,000km - 5,800km Range Payload 1,000kg 500kg - 1,000kg 2,490kg 500kg - 1,500kg 1,500kg+ Status Operational Operational Inducted Induction by 2014-15 Induction by 2014-15
8,000km - 10,000km 1,000kg - 1,400kg Under development 350km 1,000km 500kg 1000kg Developed but not used Under development
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Brahmos I Brahmos II P-70 Ametist P-270 Moskit Popeye Prithvi-I Prithvi-II Prithvi-III Supersonic Cruise Missile 290km Hypersonic Cruise Missile 290km Anti-shipping Missile 65km 300kg 300kg 530kg 320kg 340kg 1000kg 500kg 500kg 150kg - 1000kg 150kg - 1000kg 1000kg 1000kg 150kg - 1,000kg Operational Under development Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Awaiting Arihant SSBN's Under trials Under development Under development Operational
Supersonic Cruise Missile 120km ASM SRBM SRBM SRBM 78km 150km 250km 350km 700km - 2,200km 3,500km 5,000km 6,000km 700km - 2,200km
Sagarika (K-15) SLBM K-4 mk. 1 K-4 mk. 2 K-5 Shaurya SLBM SLBM SLBM TBM
Ballistic missiles
Under former president Dr. Abdul Kalam India pursued the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) which was an Indian Ministry of Defense program for the development of a comprehensive range of missiles, including the intermediate range Agni missile (Surface to Surface), and short range missiles such as the Prithvi ballistic missile (Surface to Surface), Akash missile (Surface to Air), Trishul missile (Surface to Air) and Nag Missile (Anti Tank). Other projects such Indian Ballistic Missile Defense Program have derived from the IGMDP. In 2005, India became only the fourth country to have Anti Ballistic capability when India tested two systems the AAD and PAD.[25] India has methodically built an indigenous missile production capability, using its commercial space-launch program to develop the skills and infrastructure needed to support an offensive ballistic missile program. For example, during the 1980s, India conducted a series of space launches using the solid-fueled SLV-3 booster. Most of these launches put light satellites into near-earth orbit. Elements of the SLV-3 were subsequently incorporated into two new programs. In the first, the new polar-space launch vehicle (PSLV) was equipped with six SLV-3 motors strapped to the PSLV's first stage. The Agni IRBM technology demonstrator uses the SLV-3 booster as its first stage. Prithvi The Prithvi (Sanskrit: "Earth") I is mobile liquid-fueled 150 kilometer tactical missile currently deployed with army units. It is claimed that this missile is equipped only with various conventional warheads (which stay attached to the missile over the entire flight path). The missile is of particular interest to the United States (and potential buyers) in that has the capability of maneuvering in flight so as to follow one of several different pre-programmed trajectories. Based on the same design, a modified Prithvi, the Prithvi II, is essentially a longer-ranged version of the Prithvi I except that it has a 250-kilometer range and a lighter payload. It is suspected that any nuclear missions will be executed by the Prithvi II. Currently, the Prithvi II has completed development and is now in production. When fielded, it will be deployed with air force units for the purpose of deep target attacking maneuvers against objectives such as air fields. Prithvi I Army Version (150km range with a payload of 1,000kg) Prithvi II Air Force Version (250km range with a payload of 500kg) Prithvi III Naval Version (350km range with a payload of 500kg)
India The Prithvi missile project encompassed developing 3 variants for use by the Indian Army, Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy. The initial project framework of the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program outlines the variants in the following manner. in October 2009 India conducted 2 simultenous user trials of 350km extended range Prithvi II to be used for strategic purposes. Dhanush Dhanush (Sanskrit: Bow) is a naval variant of the Prithvi missile.[26] It can fire either the 250km or the 350km range missiles. Supposedly it is a customised version of the Prithvi and that the additional customizations in missile configuration are to certify it for seaworthiness. Dhanush has to be launched from a hydraulically stabilized launch pad. Its low range acts against it and thus it is seen a weapons either to be used to destroy an aircraft carrier or an enemy port. Indian Navy's K-15 Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missile is reported to be a variant of the Dhanush missile.[27] The ship-launched Dhanush Ballistic Missile was tested from INS Subhadra of the Sukanya class patrol craft in 2000. INS Subhadra is a vessel which was modified and the missile was launched from the reinforced helicopter deck. The 250km variant was tested but the tests were considered partially successful.[] In 2004, the missile was again tested from the INS Subhadra and was this time successful.[28] Then the following year in December the missile's 350km version was tested from the INS Rajput and hit the land based target.[] Agni The Agni (Sanskrit: Fire) missile system comprises six missiles: Agni I Agni II Agni III Agni IV Agni V Agni VI[]
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The Agni-I uses the SLV-3 booster (from India's space program) for its first stage and a liquid-fueled Prithvi for its second stage.[29] Nuclear-capable Agni-II missiles have a range of up to 3,000 kilometres (1,900mi) and can carry a payload of 1,000 kilograms (2,200lb).[30] Unlike the Agni-I, the Agni-II has a solid-fueled second stage.[31] In July 2006, India successfully test-fired an Agni-III,[32] a two-stage nuclear-capable ballistic missile with a range of 3,000km.[33] Both stages of the Agni-III utilize solid-fuel propellants; its range can be extended to 4,000 kilometres (2,500mi).[34] The missile is capable of carrying a nuclear payload within the range of 600 to 1,800 kilograms (1,300 to 4,000 lb) including decoys and other anti-ballistic counter-measures.[35]Wikipedia:Citing sources#What information to include India's DRDO is also working on a submarine-launched ballistic missile version of the Agni-III missile, known as the Agni-III SL. This missile is expected to provide India with a credible sea-based second strike capability. According to Indian defense sources, the Agni-III SL will have a range of 3,500 kilometres (2,200mi).[36] In addition, the 5,500-kilometre (3,400mi) range Agni-V ICBM was tested successfully on 19 April 2012.[37][38] Surya The report of Surya ICBM (Sanskrit: Sun) has not been confirmed by officials of the Indian government and have repeatedly denied the existence of the project. The Surya ICBM is an ICBM program that has been mentioned repeatedly in the Indian press .[] Surya (meaning Sun in Sanskrit and many other Indian languages) is the codename for the first Intercontinental Ballistic Missile that India is reported to be developing. The DRDO is believed to have begun the project in 1994.
India As the missile is yet to be developed, the specifications of the missile are not known and the entire program continues to remain highly speculative.[39] Estimates of the range of this missile vary from 5,000km[] to 10,000km.[40] It is believed to be a three-stage design, with the first two stages using solid propellants and the third-stage using liquid. In 2007, the Times of India reported that the DRDO is yet to reveal whether India's currently proposed ICBM will be called Agni-V (or Surya-1).[] As of 2009 it was reported that the government had not considered an 8,000-km range ICBM.[] Four decades of investments in a missile-related design, development, and manufacturing infrastructure have also made this sector less vulnerable to long-term disruption by technology denial regimes. More significantly, India's sophisticated civilian satellite launch capability makes it one of the few developing states theoretically capable of building an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).[41] Shaurya The Shaurya missile (Sanskrit: Valour) is a short-range surface-to-surface ballistic missile developed by DRDO of India for use by the Indian Army. It has a range of 600km and is capable of carrying a payload of one-tonne conventional or nuclear warhead. The Shaurya missile provides India with a significant second strike capability.[42] Shaurya Missile is considered a land version of the Sagarika. This missile is stored in a composite canister just like the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. The composite canister makes the missile much easier to store for long periods without maintenance as well as to handle and transport. It also houses the gas generator to eject the missile from the canister before its solid propellant motors take over to hurl it at the intended target. Shaurya missiles can remain hidden or camouflaged in underground silos from enemy surveillance or satellites till they are fired from the special storage-cum-launch canisters. DRDO Defence scientists admit that given Shaurya's limited range at present, either the silos will have to be constructed closer to India's borders or longer-range missiles will have to be developed. The Shaurya system will require some more tests before it becomes fully operational in two-three years. Moreover, defense scientists say the high-speed, two-stage Shaurya has high maneuverability which also makes it less vulnerable to existing anti-missile defense systems.[43] When Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Advanced Air Defence (AAD) and Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) are to be tested again, the Shaurya invulnerability to anti-missile systems will be tested. The DRDO scientists also have said that if Shaurya is successful and manages to avoid anti ballistic missile radars then the missile can even be used to improve the AAD and PAD systems. Sagarika Sagarika (Sanskrit: Wave / Born from the Ocean) is a nuclear capable submarine-launched ballistic missile with a range of 750km. This missile has a length of 8.5 meters, weighs seven tonnes and can carry a pay load of up to 500kg.[44] The development of this missile started in 1991. The first confirmation about the missile came in 1998.[45] The development of the underwater missile launcher known as the Project 78 (P78) was completed in 2001. This was handed over to the Indian Navy for trials. The missile was successfully test fired thrice. The Indian Navy plans to introduce the missile into service by the end of 2010. Sagarika missile is being integrated with the Arihant class submarine that is expected to begin sea trials by 2009.[46] Sagarika will form part of the triad in India's nuclear deterrence and will provide with retaliatory nuclear strike capability.[47] Sagarika has already been test-fired from an underwater pontoon, but now DRDO is planning a full-fledged test of the missile from a submarine and for this purpose may use the services of a Russian sub-marine.[] Eventually it could be introduced into as many as 5 ballistic missile submarines.
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Cruise missiles
Nirbhay Nirbhay (Sanskrit "Fearless") is a long range, subsonic cruise missile being developed in India. The missile will have a range of 1,000km and will arm three services, the Indian Army, Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force.[48] The Nirbhay will be able to be launched from multiple platforms on land, sea and air. The first test flight of the missile is expected in the year 2012. Nirbhay will be a terrain hugging, stealth missile[49] capable of delivering 24 different types of warheads depending on mission requirements and will use inertial navigation system for guidance.[50] There are plans to arm the IL-76MDs with the aerial version of the missile.[51] 3M-54 Klub India has acquired around 200 3M-54 Klub for arming Talwar class frigate, Shivalik class frigate, Kolkata class destroyer and Sindhughosh class submarine.[52] The Russian 3M-54 Klub is a multi-role missile P-70 Ametist cruise missile system developed by the Novator Design Bureau (OKB-8) with a range of 250km-300km and an average speed of .8 Mach with a maximum of 2.9 Mach.[53] India has both the Klub-N and Klub-S variant to be used for Ships and Submarines respectively.[54] Both the Klub-N and Klub-S have been tested successfully. India currently has the 3M-54E, 3M-54E1, 91RE1 and 91RE2 variants. In addition the Navy has plans to arm the Tu-142 and Tu-22M with an air-launched version. Due to Klub's longer range than BrahMos it may also be used in the Mirage 2000 and Su-30 MKI too. The Navy has shown interest in buying more Klubs which would be incorporated on to the S-1000 submarine if bought by India. India is also keen on other Former Soviet cruise missile such as the P-700 Granit and P-500 Bazalt. P-70 Ametist India has Soviet P-70 Ametist submarine-launched cruise missiles.[] The missile were mostly probably bought in the early 1990s and may be used today as canister-launched land-based cruise missiles instead of submarine-launched cruise missiles. The missiles can carry nuclear warheads and have a range of 5065km. Although they are extremely old and incompetent due to their low range and speed, there are still reports that they are kept in reserve and can still be used due to their upgrades in the late 1990s.[55] Moskit India has a number of operational Moskits.[] The P-270 Moskit is a Russian supersonic ramjet powered cruise missile capable of being launched from land and ships. India has most probably bought both land and ship variants which have a range of 120km. India bought around 200 Klub missiles and now it is believed that the Moskit have been kept in reserve but can still be used. Brahmos BrahMos is a supersonic cruise missile that can be launched from submarines, ships, aircraft or land. It is a joint venture between India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Russia's NPO Mashinostroeyenia who have together formed the BrahMos Aerospace Private Limited.[56] It travels at speeds of Mach 2.5 to 2.8 and is the world's fastest cruise missile. It is about three-and-a-half times faster than the U.S.A's
India has a number of Moskit supersonic nuclear capable cruise missile
India subsonic Harpoon cruise missile. A hypersonic version of the missile is also presently under development (Lab Tested with 5.26 Mach Speed). BrahMos claims to have the capability of attacking surface targets as low as 10 meters in altitude. It can gain a speed of Mach 2.8, and has a maximum range of 290km.[57] The ship-launched and land-based missiles can carry a 200kg warhead, whereas the aircraft-launched variant (BrahMos A) can carry a 300kg warhead. It has a two-stage propulsion system, with a solid-propellant rocket for initial acceleration and a liquid-fueled ramjet responsible for sustained supersonic cruise. Air-breathing ramjet propulsion is much more fuel-efficient than rocket propulsion, giving the BrahMos a longer range than a pure rocket-powered missile would achieve. The high speed of the BrahMos likely gives it better target-penetration characteristics than lighter subsonic cruise-missiles such as the Tomahawk. Being twice as heavy and almost four times faster than the Tomahawk, the BrahMos has almost 32 times the initial kinetic energy of a Tomahawk missile (although it pays for this by having only 3/5 the payload and a fraction of the range despite weighing twice as much, suggesting a different tactical paradigm to achieve the objective). Although BrahMos is primarily an anti-ship missile, it can also engage land based targets. It can be launched either in a vertical or inclined position and is capable of covering targets over a 360 degree horizon. The BrahMos missile has an identical configuration for land, sea, and sub-sea platforms. The air-launched version has a smaller booster and additional tail fins for added stability during launch. The BrahMos is currently being configured for aerial deployment with the Su-30MKI as its carrier. India has produced more than 110 Brahmos by March 2011 as per SIPRI, inducted 1 regiment of Brahmos Type-I GLCM with 67 missiles.
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Surface to air missile

Akash Akash (Sanskrit: Sky) is India's medium range surface-to-air missile defense system The missile can target aircraft up to 30km away, at altitudes up to 18,000 m.[58] Akash can be fired from both tracked and wheeled platforms.[59] Akash is said to be capable of both conventional and nuclear warheads, with a reported payload of 60kg.[60] A nuclear warhead could potentially give the missile the capability to destroy both aircraft and warheads from ballistic missiles. The missile is described as being able to strike several targets simultaneously, which could mean either separate, independently targetable warheads, or a sufficient blast to destroy a number of them.
Akash SAM
Along with India, a limited number of other countries including the US and Russia have developed operational multi-target handling surface-to-air missile systems capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.
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Delivery mechanisms
Nuclear submarines
According to some accounts, India plans to have as many as 25 nuclear submarines capable of carrying missiles with nuclear warheads.[citation needed] Currently, India has built one and is building two more nuclear submarines under the Arihant class submarine plan. India currently maintains six submarines of the Sindhughosh Class that can launch the nuclear-capable 3M-54 Klub cruise missiles. Former leasing of Soviet submarines In 1988 INS Chakra (Sanskrit: Wheel), a Charlie-class submarine was leased by the Indian Navy for three years from the Soviet Union, until 1991. The submarine was leased to India between 1988 and 1991 mainly for India to gain experience in the operations of a nuclear submarine. It was decommissioned in 1991. Arihant class submarine The Arihant class submarines (Sanskrit: Slayer of Enemies) are a class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines being constructed for the Indian Navy in the Shipbuilding Centre at Visakhapatnam under the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) Project.[61][62] A CIA report claimed that Russia provided technological aid to the naval nuclear propulsion program.[][] The submarines will be armed with ballistic missiles. The first of these, INS Arihant was launched on 26 July 2009. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh thanked Russia during the launch ceremony, expressing appreciation for the close strategic partnership with Russia.[63] The vessel, which will undergo sea-trials for up to two years, will then be equipped with an unknown number of K-15 Sagarika SLBMs.[64] The second and third submarines of the class may incorporate the Nirbhay as well. As of July 2007, the missiles Sagarika and Dhanush had undergone three successful tests each. INS Chakra (Russian submarine K-152 Nerpa)
Former leased Charlie-Class submarine
6 Sindhughosh Class submarines can fire nuclear capable cruise missile, 3M-54 Klub.
The INS Tabar and other Talwar class frigates are armed with the Nuclear capable 3M-54 Klub cruise missiles.
In 2000, negotiations between India and Russia were conducted into the leasing of two incomplete Akula class. The Akulas were to be delivered to the Indian Navy in 2008 on a lease of at least seven years and up to ten years, in which at the end of the lease, it has an option to buy them. The acquisition was to help the Indian Navy prepare for the introduction of the ATV. The cost to India of acquiring two Akula submarines and their support infrastructure along with training of the crews had been estimated at $2 billion.[65] The Indian version was reportedly armed with the 300km range 3M-54 Klub nuclear-capable missiles.[] Supposedly on 9 November 2008 one of the two submarines was conducting tests, when an accident on board killed 20 sailors but no damage occurred to the submarine. Though this deal fell apart for some time due to the Indians demanding an
India upgrade/improvement in some of its safety features, Russia's President Dmitry Medvedev on his official trip to New Delhi said that the deal was back on track and that "The talk is not about selling submarines into India's property, but about their rent by India's navy".[66] However, unlike the earlier deal the modified deal states that India can only rent and not buy the subs, but defence experts state that the so-called lease agreement is only to divert international attention and that it would be eventually modified and India would inevitably keep the subs. The first submarine will be named INS Chakra.[67] Home voyage under Indian control from the Russian port of Vladivostok to its Indian base Visakhapatnam commenced January, 2012.[68] INS Chakra was inducted into the Indian Navy on 4 April 2012.[69][70] Cruise missile submarines The Sindhughosh class submarines of the Indian Navy, the INS Sindhuraj (Sanskrit: King of the Ocean), INS Sindhuvir (Sanskrit: Warrior of the Ocean), INS Sindhuratna (Sanskrit: Gem of the Ocean), INS Sindhushastra (Sanskrit: Weapon of the Ocean), INS Sindhukesari (Sanskrit: Lion of the Ocean) and INS Sindhuvijay (Sanskrit: Conqueror of the Ocean) are capable of launching 3M-54 Klub and BrahMos nuclear-capable cruise missiles.[] India bought 10 Kilo class (in India known as Sindhughosh Class) submarine of which 6 have been refitted by the Russian Navy so that the they can launch cruise missiles such as the nuclear capable 3M-54 Klub. Amur class submarines Russia has also offered the advanced Amur class Submarine, known as the S1000. According to GlobalSecurity India is already building the S1000 cruise missile submarines in Mazagon Docks.[71] The Amur will be most probably fitted with P-700 Granit or the Klub cruise missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
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Frigates, destroyers and aircraft carriers

Other than submarines, India also maintains ships such as destroyers, modified patrol crafts and frigates which can launch nuclear capable ballistic and cruise missiles. Talwar class frigate and Shivalik class frigate are frigates of the Indian Navy that can fire nuclear capable cruise missiles. INS Tabar and INS Trishul are Talwar class vessel armed with supersonic nuclear 3M-54 Klub cruise missiles while INS Shivalik was the first vessel of the The Shivalik class frigates are armed with the Shivalik class to incorporate the 3M-54 Klub. Other vessels of the 3M-54 Klub and may also incorporate the nuclear Shivalik Class and Talwar Class are to be armed with the BrahMos and capable Nirbhay missile in the future. Seen here 3M-54 Klub missiles by 2009 and 2010 respectively. All these frigates is the INS Shivalik when under sea trials. are also equipped with Barak 1 missiles or other SAMs and harbour helicopters such as the HAL Dhruv. In years to come, the Nirbhay missile is also to be incorporated into Talwar class frigates and Shivalik class frigates. Rajput Class, Kolkata Class and Delhi Class are Destroyers of the Indian Navy that may be armed with nuclear capable missile-Nirbhay. In addition Kolkata Class will also incorporate the Russian nuclear 3M-54 Klub cruise missile.[52] The ship-launched Dhanush Ballistic Missile was tested from INS Subhadra of the Sukanya class patrol craft in 2000. INS Subhadra is a patrol vessel which was modified and the missile was launched from the reinforced helicopter deck. The 250km variant was tested but the tests were considered partially successful.[] In 2004, the missile was again tested from the INS Subhadra and was this time successful.[28] Then the following year in December the missile's 350km version was tested from the INS Rajput and hit the land based target.[]
India INS Vikramaditya Aircraft Carrier (formerly known as Admiral Gorshkov) was fitted with P-500 Bazalt nuclear capable cruise missiles of the range of 550km.[72] The Vikramaditya could still be armed with this after its refit. India is also a potential customer for a Slava class cruiser which also incorporates the P-500 Bazalt.
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Nuclear-capable aircraft
India currently has fourth generation jet fighters capable of launching nuclear weapons. Nuclear-capable aircraft are also seen as a less expensive way of dropping nuclear warheads as well as being as effective. The Sukhoi Su-30MKI,[73] Dassault Mirage 2000,[74] and MiG-29[75] serve in the Indian Air Force and are also seen as a means to deliver nuclear weapons. In addition India maintains SEPECAT Jaguar and MiG-27M which can be used to drop gravity bombs.[76] On the other hand, the Su-30MKI is capable of carrying nuclear weapons and is tailor-made for Indian specifications.[73] It is primarily an air superiority fighter with air-to-ground attack capabilities.[77] The MKI variant features several improvements over the basic K and MK variants and is classified as a 4.5 generation fighter.[78][79] Due to similar features and components, the MKI variant is often considered to be a customized Indian variant of the Sukhoi Su-35. The Mirage 2000Hs were heavily customised during the Kargil War and is the only other version, other than the French 2000N, to be able to be armed with nuclear weapons.
Indian Air Force Mirage 2000H.
IAF Sukhoi Su-30 MKI
Though the MiG-29 like the HAL Tejas after many test flights have not been tested to use nuclear weapons, they have the capacity to be armed with them. Both the HAL Tejas and Su-30MKI can travel excess of 3,000km without refueling; this allows India to attack targets far away in an effective manner only using planes rather than delivery systems such as the Agni. The HAL Tejas is India's only indigenous plane to be armed with nuclear weapons, thus making India less dependent on Russia. India has leased four Russian Tupolev Tu-22M3 bombers, which could carry air-launched cruise missiles. India has reportedly upgraded its Russian-built Tu-142 maritime patrol aircraft to carry air-launched cruise missiles.[80] India is expected to buy up to 200 Sukhoi PAK-FA stealth fighter jets, developed jointly by Russia and India.[81]
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Ballistic missile defense (BMD)

India has an active Anti-ballistic missile (ABM) development effort using indigenously developed and integrated radars and locally designed missiles.[82] In November 2006, India successfully conducted the PADE (Prithvi Air Defence Exercise) in which an Anti-ballistic missile, called the Prithvi Air Defense (PAD) an Exoatmospheric (outside the atmosphere) interceptor system intercepted a Prithvi-II ballistic missile. The PAD missile has the secondary stage of the Prithvi missile and can reach altitude of 80km. During the test, the target missile was intercepted at an 50km altitude.[83] India became the fourth nation in the world to acquire such a capability and the third nation to develop it through indigenous effort.[84] On 6 December 2007 the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) missile system was tested successfully.[85] This missile is an Endoatmospheric (inside the atmosphere) interceptor with an altitude of 30km. According to DRDO scientist V K Saraswat, the missiles will work in tandem to ensure a hit probability of 99.8 percent.[86] Induction of the system into services is expected to be in 2010. Two new anti ballistic missiles that can intercept IRBM/ICBMs are being developed. These high speed missiles (AD-1 and AD-2) are being developed to intercept ballistic missiles with the range of 5,000km.[87]
India's Advanced Air Defense (AAD) interceptor missile
India also has Russian S300 PMU-2 and it is used as an interceptor for ballistic missiles. India has also shown interest in the Russian S-400, the most advanced anti-ballistic missile. An indigenous nuclear tipped surface to air missile, Akash is used to destroy low range missiles and is capable of destroying various targets and is one of the few of its kind systems in the world.
International Response
India is not a signatory to either the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but did accede to the Partial Test Ban Treaty in October 1963. India is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and four of its 17 nuclear reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards. India announced its lack of intention to accede to the NPT as late as 1997 by voting against the paragraph of a General Assembly Resolution[88] which urged all non-signatories of the treaty to accede to it at the earliest possible date.[] India voted against the UN General Assembly resolution endorsing the CTBT, which was adopted on 10 September 1996. India objected to the lack of provision for universal nuclear disarmament "within a time-bound framework." India also demanded that the treaty ban laboratory simulations. In addition, India opposed the provision in Article XIV of the CTBT that requires India's ratification for the treaty to enter into force, which India argued was a violation of its sovereign right to choose whether it would sign the treaty. In early February 1997, Foreign Minister I.K.Gujral reiterated India's opposition to the treaty, saying that "India favors any step aimed at destroying nuclear weapons, but considers that the treaty in its current form is not comprehensive and bans only certain types of tests." In August 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) approved safeguards agreement with India under which the former will gradually gain access to India's civilian nuclear reactors.[89] In September 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group granted India a waiver allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other
India countries.[90] The implementation of this waiver makes India the only known country with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the NPT but is still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of the world.[91] Since the implementation of NSG waiver, India has signed nuclear deals with several countries including France,[92] United States,[93] Mongolia, Namibia,[94] and Kazakhstan[95] while the framework for similar deals with Canada and United Kingdom are also being prepared.[96][97]
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Agni-III ballistic missile
Brahmos, Indo-Russian cruise missile
Popeye, Israeli-built air to ground missile
Soviet-built Charlie I class cruise missile submarine INS Chakra of the Indian Navy
References
[1] For more readings and citations, see :Thermonuclear weapon yield estimations of the Operation Shakti [6] US wants India to sign NPT (http:/ / www. business-standard. com/ india/ news/ us-wants-india-to-sign-npt/ 357348/ ) Business Standard, 7 May 2009. [7] (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ india/ nuclear/ 2296_6267. html) [8] B. M. Udgaonkar, Indias nuclear capability, her security concerns and the recent tests (http:/ / www. ias. ac. in/ currsci/ jan25/ articles20. htm), Indian Academy of Sciences, January 1999. [11] Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine (http:/ / www. indianembassy. org/ policy/ CTBT/ nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999. html) [12] Speech by NSA Shri Shivshankar Menon at NDC on The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs: Web-site of Ministry of External Affairs (Govt. of India) (http:/ / www. mea. gov. in/ mystart. php?id=530116584) [13] NSA Shivshankar Menon at NDC (Speech) : india Blooms (http:/ / www. indiablooms. com/ NewsDetailsPage/ newsDetails211010n. php) [14] [pointer]=49 (http:/ / www. opcw. org/ about-opcw/ member-states/ status-of-participation-in-the-cwc/ ?tx_damfrontend_pi1) [15] Dominican Today - India to destroy chemical weapons stockpile by 2009 (http:/ / www. dominicantoday. com/ dr/ world/ 2007/ 12/ 30/ 26543/ India-to-destroy-chemical-weapons-stockpile-by-2009) [16] India declares its stock of chemical weapons (http:/ / www. highbeam. com/ doc/ 1P1-3987660. html) [17] Zee News - India destroys its chemical weapons stockpile (http:/ / zeenews. india. com/ news531700. html) [18] (http:/ / in. news. yahoo. com/ 43/ 20090514/ 812/ tnl-india-destroys-its-chemical-weapons. html) [19] Norris, Robert S. and Hans M. Kristensen [20] Norris, Robert S. and Hans M. Kristensen [21] Albright, David. "India's Military Plutonium Inventory, End 2004" (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20090902165001/ http:/ / www. isis-online. org/ global_stocks/ end2003/ india_military_plutonium. pdf). (Archived from the original at (http:/ / www. isis-online. org/ global_stocks/ end2003/ india_military_plutonium. pdf)). 7 May 2005. Archived on 2 September 2009. Retrieved 21 August 2011.
India
[22] Status of World Nuclear Forces (http:/ / www. fas. org/ programs/ ssp/ nukes/ nuclearweapons/ nukestatus. html), Federation of American Scientists, 21 February 2011. [23] India can make 50 nuclear warheads a year (http:/ / www. hindu. com/ 2006/ 06/ 19/ stories/ 2006061904331200. htm) (http:/ / www. india-defence. com/ reports/ 2106) [28] (http:/ / www. bharat-rakshak. com/ MISSILES/ Prithvi. html) [35] Facts about Indias Agni-III missile - Daily Times [38] http:/ / www. bbc. co. uk/ news/ world-asia-india-17738633 India test launches Agni-V long-range missile [52] (http:/ / www. bharat-rakshak. com/ NAVY/ Klub. html) [58] Asian tribune: Upgraded version of Akash test fired; By Hemanta Kumar Rout (http:/ / www. asiantribune. com/ oldsite/ show_news. php?id=12250) [59] Sharma, Ravi, Air Force to place order for Akash missile system (http:/ / www. hindu. com/ 2008/ 04/ 13/ stories/ 2008041359371000. htm). The Hindu, 13 April 2008. Retrieved 19 April 2008. [62] "Indian nuclear submarine", India Today, August 2007 edition [65] Project 971 Shuka-B Akula class (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ military/ world/ india/ s-akula. htm) www.globalsecurity.com [66] (http:/ / in. news. yahoo. com/ 137/ 20081215/ 738/ tnl-russia-mulls-nuclear-sub-lease-to-in. html) [69] http:/ / economictimes. indiatimes. com/ news/ politics/ nation/ ins-chakra-govt-inducts-8000-ton-russian-origin-akula-ii-class-nerpa-into-navy/ articleshow/ 12526102. cms Economic Times news article: INS Chakra: Govt inducts Russian-origin Akula II class Nerpa into Navy [70] http:/ / indiatoday. intoday. in/ story/ ins-chakra-inducted-into-indian-navy/ 1/ 182955. html India Today news article: INS Chakra formally inducted into Indian Navy [72] (http:/ / www. bharat-rakshak. com/ NAVY/ ships/ future/ 193-ins-vikramaditya. html) [73] (http:/ / www. janes. com/ defence/ air_forces/ news/ jawa/ jawa010108_1_n. shtml) [74] history [82] Interview: Vijay Kumar Saraswat Chief Controller of Research and Development, Indias DRDO (http:/ / www. defensenews. com/ aero/ story. php?id=2524130) [83] Prithvi Mission Milestone in Missile Defence (http:/ / mod. nic. in/ samachar/ dec15-06/ h1. htm). [84] Outlook India. India develops new anti-missile system (http:/ / www. outlookindia. com/ pti_news. asp?id=432771). 27 November 2006. [97] (http:/ / www. ptinews. com/ pti\ptisite. nsf/ 0/ 3AA1B3B19AE0CD276525754500564CCB?OpenDocument)
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External links
Indian Nuclear Weapons program (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaOrigin.html) A good article with very detailed information Nuclear Files.org (http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/post-cold-war/ india-pakistan/india-pakistan-conflict.htm) India's nuclear conflict with Pakistan- background and the current situation Nuclear Files.org (http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/basics/nuclear-stockpiles. htm) Current information on nuclear stockpiles in India Missile testing ranges of India (http://frontierindia.net/missile-testing-ranges-of-india/) Video interviews taken at the 2008 NPT PrepCom on the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act (http://npt-webcast.info/index.php?p=stichworte) Annotated bibliography for India's nuclear weapons program from the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues (http://alsos.wlu.edu/adv_rst.aspx?keyword=indian*nuclear*weapons*program&creator=&title=& media=all&genre=all&disc=all&level=all&sortby=relevance&results=10&period=15) The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (http://www.wilsoncenter. org/nuclear-history-documents/) The Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project contains a collection of primary source documents on Indian nuclear development. The National Security Archive's "Nuclear Vault" (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/index.htm) features a number of compilations of declassified U.S. government documents related to India's nuclear program.
Iran
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Iran
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Iran
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Iran is not known to currently possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and has signed treaties repudiating the possession of weapons of mass destruction including the Biological Weapons Convention,[] the Chemical Weapons Convention,[22] and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[] Iran has first-hand knowledge of WMD effectsover 100,000 Iranian troops and civilians were victims of chemical weapons during the 1980s IranIraq War.[1][2] On ideological grounds, a public and categorical religious decree (fatwa) against the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons has been issued by the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic Ali Khamenei along with other clerics,[][] though it is approved by some relatively minor clerics.[3] Iran has stated its uranium enrichment program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.[4][5] The IAEA has confirmed the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, but has also said it "needs to have confidence in the absence of possible military dimensions to Irans nuclear programme."[6][7] The IAEA has pointed out that Iran is not implementing the requirements of UN Security Council Resolutions and needs to cooperate to clarify outstanding issues and meet requirement to provide early design information on its nuclear facilities.[8] In a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, the United States Intelligence Community assessed that Iran had ended "nuclear weapon design and weaponization work" in 2003.[9] In 2009, U.S. intelligence assessed that Iranian intentions were unknown but that if Iran pursued a nuclear weapon it would be "unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013" and acknowledged "the possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015."[][10] Some European intelligence believes Iran has resumed its alleged nuclear weapons design work.[11] Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said he had seen no evidence of any nuclear weapons program in Iran,[12] while Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said Iran was getting closer to having the capability to produce nuclear weapons.[13][14] Iran has called for nuclear weapons states to disarm and for the Middle East to be a nuclear weapon free zone.[] After the IAEA voted in a rare non-consensus decision to find Iran in non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to report that non-compliance to the UN Security Council,[29][15] the Council demanded that Iran suspend its nuclear enrichment activities[16][17] and imposed sanctions against Iran[][][18][19] when Iran refused to do so.[] Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has argued that the sanctions are illegal.[20] The IAEA has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, but not the absence of undeclared activities.[] The Non-Aligned Movement has called on both sides to work through the IAEA for a solution.[] In November 2009, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted[21] a resolution against Iran which urged Iran to apply the modified Code 3.1 to its Safeguard Agreement,[] urged Iran to implement and ratify the Additional Protocol,[] and expressed "serious concern" that Iran had not cooperated on issues that needed "to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program."[] Iran said the "hasty and undue" resolution would "jeopardize the conducive environment vitally needed" for successful negotiations[] and lead to cooperation not exceeding its "legal obligations to the body".[22]
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Nuclear weapons
Overview
In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors, in a rare non-consensus decision with 12 abstentions,[23] recalled a previous Iranian "policy of concealment" regarding its enrichment program[] and found that Iran had violated its NPT Safeguards Agreement.[] Another IAEA report stated "there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities ... were related to a nuclear weapons program."[] Iran has claimed that the military threat posed by Israel and the United States is forcing it to restrict the release of information on its nuclear program.[24] Gawdat Bahgat of the National Defense University speculates that Iran may have a lack of confidence in the international community which was reinforced when many nations, under pressure from the United States, rejected or withdrew from signed commercial deals with the Iranian nuclear authority.[25] On 31 July 2006, the Security Council passed a resolution demanding Iran suspend its enrichment program.[] On 23 December 2006, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions against Iran,[] which were later tightened on 24 March 2007,[] because Iran refused to suspend enrichment. Iran's representative to the UN argued that the sanctions compelled Iran to abandon its rights under the NPT to peaceful nuclear technology.[] The Non-Aligned Movement called on both sides to work through the IAEA for a solution.[] US intelligence predicted in August 2005 that Iran could have the key ingredients for a nuclear weapon by 2015.[26] On 25 October 2007, the United States declared the Revolutionary Guards a "proliferator of weapons of mass destruction", and the Quds Force a "supporter of terrorism".[] Iran responded that "it is incongruent for a country [US] who itself is a producer of weapons of mass destruction to take such a decision."[] Mohamed ElBaradei, director of the IAEA at the time, said he had no evidence Iran was building nuclear weapons and accused US leaders of adding "fuel to the fire" with their rhetoric.[27] Speaking in Washington in November 2007, days before the IAEA was to publish its latest report, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz called for ElBaradei to be sacked, saying: "The policies followed by ElBaradei endanger world peace. His irresponsible attitude of sticking his head in the sand over Iran's nuclear programme should lead to his impeachment." Israel and some western governments fear Iran is using its nuclear programme as a covert means to develop weapons, while Iran says it is aimed solely at producing electricity. For its part in the conflict-ridden Middle East, Israel is a member of the IAEA, but it is not itself a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and is widely believed to currently be the only nuclear-armed state in the region.[28]
History
Irans nuclear program began as a result of the Cold War alliance between the United States and the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who emerged as an important American ally in the Persian Gulf.[] Under the Atoms for Peace program, Iran received basic nuclear research facilities from the United States. In return, Tehran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968. Fueled by high oil prices in the 1970s, Iran sought to purchase large-scale nuclear facilities from Western suppliers in order to develop nuclear power and fuel-cycle facilities with both civilian and potential military applications.[] In March 1974, the shah established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).[29] Sensing a heightened risk of nuclear proliferation, the United States convinced western allies to limit the export of nuclear fuel-cycle facilities to Iran. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whose revolution displaced the shah's monarchy in 1979 and ruled the newly-established Islamic Republic of Iran until his death in 1989, placed little emphasis on nuclear weapons development because it was viewed as a suspicious western innovation.[30] During that time, many of Irans top scientists fled the country while the United States organized an international campaign to block any nuclear assistance to Iran. Following the death of Ayotollah Khomeini, the leadership of President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Supreme Leader Ali Hosseini Khamenei sought to revive Irans overt nuclear civilian program and expand undeclared nuclear activities during the 1990s. According to a strategic dossier from International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran
Iran turned away from Western suppliers and obtained nuclear assistance from Russian and China in a number of key areas, including uranium mining, milling and conversation, as well as technology for heavy-water research reactors.[] However, Washington intervened with Moscow and Beijing to prevent Iran from fully acquiring its list of nuclear power and fuel-cycle facilities. The 1990s also saw Iran expand its furtive nuclear research into conversion, enrichment and plutonium separation. Most importantly, on the basis of additional centrifuge assistance from the A.Q. Khan network, Iran was able to begin the construction of pilot-scale and industrial-scale enrichment facilities at Natanz around 2000.[] Full exposure of Irans nuclear activities came in 2002, when an Iranian exiled opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) declared the Natanz project in August of that year. Since that time, international pressure on Iran has remained steady, hampering but not halting the countrys nuclear development.[] Iran remains legally bound to the NPT and states its support for the treaty. There are various estimates of when Iran might be able to produce a nuclear weapon, should it choose to do so: A 2005 assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded "if Iran threw caution to the wind, and sought a nuclear weapon capability as quickly as possible without regard for international reaction, it might be able to produce enough HEU for a single nuclear weapon by the end of this decade", assuming no technical problems. The report concludes, however, that it is unlikely that Iran would flatly ignore international reactions and develop nuclear weapons anyway.[] A 2005 US National Intelligence Estimate stated that Iran was ten years from making a nuclear weapon.[31] In 2006 Ernst Uhrlau, the head of German intelligence service, said Tehran would not be able to produce enough material for a nuclear bomb before 2010 and would only be able to make it into a weapon by about 2015.[32] A 2007 annual review the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London stated that "If and when Iran does have 3,000 centrifuges operating smoothly, the IISS estimates it would take an additional 9-11 months to produce 25kg of highly enriched uranium, enough for one implosion-type weapon. That day is still 23 years away at the earliest."[] The former head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, said on 24 May 2007 that Iran could take between 3 and 8 years to make a bomb if it went down that route.[] On 22 October 2007, Mohamed ElBaradei repeated that, even assuming Iran was trying to develop a nuclear bomb, they would require "between another three and eight years to succeed", an assessment shared by "all the intelligence services".[] In December 2007, the United States National Intelligence Estimate (representing the consensus view of all 16 American intelligence agencies) concluded with a "high level of confidence" that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and "with moderate confidence" that the program remains frozen as of mid-2007. The new estimate says that the enrichment program could still provide Iran with enough raw material to produce a nuclear weapon sometime by the middle of next decade, but that intelligence agencies "do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons" at some future date.[33][] Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said 70 percent of the U.S. report was "true and positive," but denied its allegations of Iran having had a nuclear weapons program before 2003. Russia has said there was no proof Iran has ever run a nuclear weapons program.[34] The former head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, stated that he had seen "maybe some studies about possible weaponization", but "no evidence" of "an active weaponization program" as of October 2007.[] Thomas Fingar, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council until December 2008, in reference to the 2007 Iran NIE and using intelligence to anticipate opportunities and shape the future, said intelligence has a "recently reinforced propensity to underscore, overstate, or 'hype' the findings in order to get people to pay attention" and that the 2007 NIE was intended to send the message "you do not have a lot of time but you appear to have a diplomatic or non-military option".[35] A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is the most authoritative written judgment concerning a national security issue prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence.[36] The U.S. Director of National Intelligence said in February 2009 that Iran would not realistically be able to a get a nuclear weapon until 2013, if it chose to develop one.,[] and that US intelligence does not know whether Iran intends to develop nuclear weapons, but believes Iran could at least be keeping the option to develop them
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Iran open.[37] Mossad Chief Meir Dagan was more cautious, saying recently that it would take the Iranians until 2014. German, French, and British intelligence say that under a worst case scenario it would take Iran a minimum of 18 months to develop a nuclear weapon if it chose to build one, and it would have to first purify its uranium and weaponize its uranium.[] An anonymous source in the German Foreign Intelligence Service (BND) whose rank was not provided has gone further and claimed Iran could produce a nuclear bomb and conduct an underground test in 6 months if it wanted to and further asserted that Iran had already mastered the full uranium enrichment cycle, and possessed enough centrifuges to produce weapons-grade uranium.[][38] Physicists say that if Iran were to choose to develop a nuclear weapon, it would have to withdraw from the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and expel International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors from the country.[39] George Friedman, head of the global intelligence company Stratfor, has said Iran is "decades away" from developing any credible nuclear-arms capacity.[] On 12 February 2010 US think tank expert David Albright, the head of the Institute for Science and International Security, said in a report that Iran was seeking to "make sufficient weapons-grade uranium". His claim was criticized by former chief U.N. weapons inspector Scott Ritter.[40] An IAEA report issued 8 November 2011 provided detailed information outlining the IAEA's concerns about the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program, noting that Iran had pursued a structured program or activities relevant to the development of nuclear weapons.[41]
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IAEA
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an autonomous international organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to inhibit its use for military purposes. On 6 March 2006, the IAEA Secretariat reported that "the Agency has not seen indications of diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices ... however, after three years of intensive verification, there remain uncertainties with regard to both the scope and the nature of Iran's nuclear programme".[] However, the inspectors did find some sensitive documents, including instructions and diagrams on how to make uranium into a sphere, which is only necessary to make nuclear weapons. Iran furnished the IAEA with copies, claiming not to have used the information for weapons work, which it had obtained along with other technology and parts in 1987 and the mid-1990s.[42] It is thought this material was sold to them by Abdul Qadeer Khan,[] though the documents did not have the necessary technical details to actually manufacture a bomb. On 18 December 2003, Iran voluntarily signed, but did not ratify or bring into force, an Additional Protocol that allows IAEA inspectors access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual-use equipment, certain military-owned workshops, and research and development locations.[] Iran agreed voluntarily to implement the Additional Protocol provisionally, however when the IAEA reported Iran's non-compliance to the United Nations Security Council on 4 February 2006 Iran withdrew from its voluntary adherence to the Additional Protocol.[] On 12 May 2006, claims that highly-enriched uranium (well over the 3.5% enriched level) was reported to have been found "at a site where Iran has denied such sensitive atomic work", appeared. "They have found particles of highly enriched uranium [HEU], but it is not clear if this is contamination from centrifuges that had been previously found [from imported material] or something new," said one diplomat close to the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These reports have not yet been officially confirmed by the IAEA (as of 1 June 2006).[][][] On 31 July 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution demanding that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment activities.[] In late 2006, "New traces of plutonium and enriched uranium potential material for atomic warheads have been found [by the IAEA] in a nuclear waste facility in Iran." However, "A senior U.N. official who was familiar with the report cautioned against reading too much into the findings of traces of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, saying Iran had explained both and they could plausibly be classified as byproducts of peaceful nuclear activities."[43] In 2007 these traces were determined to have come from leaking used highly enriched uranium fuel
Iran from the Tehran Research Reactor, which the U.S. supplied to Iran in 1967, and the matter was closed.[] In July 2007 the IAEA announced that Iran has agreed to allow inspectors to visit its Arak nuclear plant, and by August 2007 a plan for monitoring the Natanz uranium enrichment plant will have been finalised.[44] In August 2007 the IAEA announced that Iran has agreed to a plan to resolve key questions regarding its past nuclear activities. The IAEA described this as a "significant step forward".[45] In September 2007 the IAEA announced it has been able to verify that Iran's declared nuclear material has not been diverted from peaceful use. While the IAEA has been unable to verify some "important aspects" regarding the nature and scope of Iran's nuclear work, the agency and Iranian officials agreed on a plan to resolve all outstanding issues, Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei said at the time.[46] In an interview with Radio Audizioni Italiane the same month, ElBaradei remarked that "Iran does not constitute a certain and immediate threat for the international community".[47] In October 2007, ElBaradei amplified these remarks, telling Le Monde that, even if Iran did intend to develop a nuclear bomb, they would need "between another three and eight years to succeed". He went on to note that "all the intelligence services" agree with this assessment and that he wanted to "get people away from the idea that Iran will be a threat from tomorrow, and that we are faced right now with the issue of whether Iran should be bombed or allowed to have the bomb".[] In late October 2007, according to the International Herald Tribune, the former head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, stated that he had seen "no evidence" of Iran developing nuclear weapons. The IHT quoted ElBaredei as stating that, "We have information that there has been maybe some studies about possible weaponization," said Mohamed ElBaradei, who led the International Atomic Energy Agency. "That's why we have said that we cannot give Iran a pass right now, because there is still a lot of question marks." "But have we seen Iran having the nuclear material that can readily be used into a weapon? No. Have we seen an active weaponization program? No." The IHT report went on to say that "ElBaradei said he was worried about the growing rhetoric from the U.S., which he noted focused on Iran's alleged intentions to build a nuclear weapon rather than evidence the country was actively doing so. If there is actual evidence, ElBaradei said he would welcome seeing it."[] In November 2007 ElBaradei circulated a report to the upcoming meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors.[][48][49] Its findings conclude that Iran has made important strides towards clarifying its past activities, including provided access to documentation and officials involved in centrifuge design in the 1980s and 1990s. Answers provided by Iran regarding the past P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programs were found to be consistent with the IAEA's own findings. However, Iran has ignored the demands of the UN Security council, and has continued to enrich uranium in the past year. The IAEA is not able to conclusively confirm that Iran isn't currently enriching uranium for military purposes, as its inspections have been restricted to workshops previously declared as part of the civilian uranium enrichment program, and requests for access to certain military workshops have been denied; the report noted that "As a result, the agency's knowledge about Iran's current nuclear program is diminishing". The report also confirmed that Iran now possesses 3000 centrifuges, a 10-fold increase over the past year, though the feed rate is below the maximum for a facility of this design. Data regarding the P-2 centrifuge, which Ahmadinejad has claimed will quadruple production of enriched uranium, was provided only several days before the report was published; the IAEA plan to discuss this issue further in December. In response to the report the US has vowed to push for more sanctions, whilst Iran has called for an apology from the US.[50] In his final November 2009 statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei said the Agency continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, but that other issues of concern had reached a "dead end" unless Iran were to fully cooperate with the agency. ElBaradei stated it would be helpful if "we were able to share with Iran more of the material that is at the centre of these concerns", and also said it would be helpful if Iran fully implemented the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement and fully implemented
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Iran the Additional Protocol. ElBaradei said Iran's failure to report the existence of a new fuel enrichment facility until September 2009 was inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement. ElBaradei closed by saying international negotiations represented a "unique opportunity to address a humanitarian need and create space for negotiations".[51] On 18 February 2010 the IAEA released a new report on Iran's nuclear program. Ivan Oelrich and Ivanka Barzashka, writing in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, suggested "the media has seriously misrepresented the actual contents of the report" and that "in fact, no new information has been revealed." They wrote that there was "no independent assessment that Iran is engaged in weapons work" and that this was "hardly the first time that the agency has discussed potential evidence of Tehran's nuclear weapons research".[52] Iran's envoy to the UN atomic watchdog criticized Western powers for interpreting the IAEA report in an "exaggerated, selective and inaccurate" manner.[53] PressTV reported that the report verified the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran and that Iran started enriching uranium to a higher level in the presence of IAEA inspectors.[54] In an April 2010 interview with the BBC, former IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said Western nations were seeking harsher sanctions "out of frustration". "I don't think Iran is developing, or we have new information that Iran is developing, a nuclear weapon today .. there is a concern about Iran's future intentions, but even if you talk to MI6 or the CIA, they will tell you they are still four or five years away from a weapon. So, we have time to engage," he said. ElBaradei further said the building of trust between the parties would "not happen until the two sides sit around the negotiating table and address their grievances. Sooner or later that will happen."[55] Alleged weaponization studies Former IAEA Director General ElBaradei said in 2009 that the agency had been provided with "no credible evidence" that Iran is developing nuclear weapons,[] but the New York Times reported in January 2009 that the IAEA is investigating U.S. allegations Project 110 and Project 111 could be names for Iranian efforts for designing a nuclear warhead and making it work with an Iranian missile.[] "We are looking to those suppliers of information to help us on the question of authenticity, because that is really a major issue. It is not an issue that involves nuclear material; it's a question of allegations," ElBaradei further said.[56] ElBaradei has strongly denied reports that the agency had concluded Iran had developed technology needed to assemble a nuclear warhead,[57] when a November 2009 article in The Guardian said the allegations included Iran's weapon design activities using two point implosion designs.[58] The New York Times article cited classified US intelligence reports asserting that Professor Mohsen Fakhrizadeh is in charge of the projects, while Iranian officials assert these projects are a fiction made up by the United States.[] The article further reported that "while the international agency readily concedes that the evidence about the two projects remains murky, one of the documents it briefly displayed at a meeting of the agency's member countries in Vienna last year, from Mr. Fakrizadeh's projects, showed the chronology of a missile launching, ending with a warhead exploding about 650 yards above ground approximately the altitude from which the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was detonated."[] Gordon Oehler, who ran the CIA's nonproliferation center and served as deputy director of the presidential commission on weapons of mass destruction, wrote "if someone has a good idea for a missile program, and he has really good connections, he'll get that program through.. But that doesn't mean there is a master plan for a nuclear weapon."[] Outside experts note that the parts of the report made public lack many dates associated with Iran's alleged activities meaning it is possible Iran had a Project 110 at one time, but scrapped it as US intelligence insists.[59] The Washington Post reports that "nowhere are there construction orders, payment invoices, or more than a handful of names and locations possibly connected to the projects."[60] Former IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei said the Agency didn't have any information that nuclear material has been used and didn't have any information that any components of nuclear weapons had been manufactured.[56] Iran has asserted that the documents are a fabrication, while the IAEA has urged Iran to be more cooperative and Member States to provide more information about the allegations to be shared with Iran.[61]
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Iran In August 2009 an article in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz alleged that ElBaradei had "censored" evidence obtained by IAEA inspectors over the preceding few months.[62] ElBaradei has angrily rejected claims from Israel, France and the US that he had suppressed the internal IAEA report, saying all relevant and confirmed information had been presented to member states.[] ElBaradei said he and the Agency have repeatedly said the rumors of censorship were "totally baseless, totally groundless. All information that we have received that has been vetted, assessed in accordance with our standard practices, has been shared with the Board."[56] On 16 November 2009 the Director General provided a report to the Board of Governors. The report stated "there remain a number of outstanding issues which give rise to concerns, and which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme." "The Agency is still awaiting a reply from Iran to its request to meet relevant Iranian authorities in connection with these issues", the report said. The report further said, "it would be helpful if Member States which have provided documentation to the Agency would agree to share more of that documentation with Iran, as appropriate."[63][64] Russia has denied allegations of "continued Russian assistance to Iran's nuclear weapons program" as "totally groundless" and said the November 2009 IAEA report reaffirmed the absence of a military component in Iran's efforts in the nuclear field.[65] In December 2009, The Times claimed that a document from an unnamed Asian intelligence agency described the use of a neutron source which has no use other than in a nuclear weapon, and claimed the document appeared to be from an office in Iran's Defense Ministry and may have been from around 2007.[66][67] Norman Dombey, professor emeritus of theoretical physics at Sussex University, wrote in that "nothing in the published 'intelligence documents' shows Iran is close to having nuclear weapons" and argued that it is "unlikely that nuclear weapon projects would be distributed among several universities, or weapon parts marketed to research centres."[68] A senior U.N. official who saw the document said it may or may not be authentic, that it was unclear when the document was written, and that it was unclear whether any experiments had ever actually been performed.[69] The C.I.A. did not declare whether it believes the document was real, and European spy agencies also did not give any authentication to the document.[] Western intelligence agencies said that, if genuine, it was unclear whether the paper provided any new insights into the state of Iranian weapons research.[] "It's very troubling if real," said Thomas B. Cochran, a senior scientist in the nuclear program of the Natural Resources Defense Council.[] The Institute for Science and International Security, said that it "urges caution and further assessment" of the document and noted that "the document does not mention nuclear weapons .. and we have seen no evidence of an Iranian decision to build them."[] Anton Khlopkov, the founding director of the Center for Energy and Security Studies, said the media leak may be being used "as a pretext for inciting the campaign against Iran."[70] Former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov has also said after the public publications of the documents "Russia has no concrete information that Iran is planning to construct a weapon".[] Russia's representative to the IAEA, Alexander Zmeyevskiy, has noted that though the IAEA is in possession of these documents, the IAEA's findings "do not contain any conclusions about the presence of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran."[71] Iran pointed out the claims had not been verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency and argued that "some countries are angry that our people defend their nuclear rights."[72] "I think that some of the claims about our nuclear issue have turned into a repetitive and tasteless joke," Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said in response to the documents.[73]
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The Iranian stance

Iran states that the purpose of its nuclear program is the generation of power and that any other use would be a violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which it is a signatory, as well as being against Islamic religious principles. Iran claims that nuclear power is necessary for a booming population and rapidly-industrialising nation. It points to the fact that Iran's population has more than doubled in 20 years, the country regularly imports gasoline and electricity, and that burning fossil fuel in large amounts harms Iran's environment drastically. Additionally, Iran questions why it shouldn't be allowed to diversify its sources of energy, especially when there are
Iran fears of its oil fields eventually being depleted. It continues to argue that its valuable oil should be used for high value products and export, not simple electricity generation. Furthermore, Iran argues that nuclear power makes fairly good economic sense. Building reactors is expensive, but subsequent operating costs are low and stable, and increasingly competitive as fossil-fuel prices rise.[74] Iran also raises funding questions, claiming that developing the excess capacity in its oil industry would cost it $40 billion, not to speak of paying for the power plants. Harnessing nuclear power costs a fraction of this, considering Iran has abundant supplies of accessible uranium ore.[75] These claims have been echoed [76] by Scott Ritter, the former UN weapons inspector in Iraq. Roger Stern, of John Hopkin's Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering, agrees "Iran's claims to need nuclear power could be genuine".[77] Iran states it has a legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the NPT, and further says that it "has constantly complied with its obligations under the NPT and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency".[] Twelve other countries are known to operate uranium enrichment facilities. Iran states that "the failure of certain Nuclear- Weapon States to fulfill their international obligations continue to be a source of threat for the international community".[] Iran also states that "the only country that has ever used nuclear weapons still maintains a sizable arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads" and calls for a stop to the transfer of technology to non-NPT states.[] Iran has called for the development of a follow-up committee to ensure compliance with global nuclear disarmanent.[78] Iran and many other nations without nuclear weapons have said that the present situation whereby Nuclear Weapon States monopolise the right to possess nuclear weapons is "highly discriminatory", and they have pushed for steps to accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament.[] Iran has criticized the European Union because it believes it has taken no steps to reduce the danger of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.[] Iran has called on the state of Israel to sign the NPT, accept inspection of its nuclear facilities, and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.[] Iran has proposed that the Middle East be established as a proposed Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.[] On 3 December 2004, Iran's former president and an Islamic cleric, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani alluded to Iran's position on nuclear energy: God willing, we expect to soon join the club of the countries that have a nuclear industry, with all its branches, except the military one, in which we are not interested. We want to get what we're entitled to. I say unequivocally that for no price will we be willing to relinquish our legal and international right. I also say unequivocally to those who make false claims: Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons, but it will not give up its rights. Your provocation will not make us pursue nuclear weapons. We hope that you come to your senses soon and do not get the world involved in disputes and crises. On 14 November 2004, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator said that his country agreed to voluntarily and temporarily suspend the uranium enrichment program after pressure from the European Union on behalf of the United Kingdom, France and Germany, as a confidence-building measure for a reasonable period of time, with six months mentioned as a reference. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has publicly stated Iran is not developing nuclear weapons. On 9 August 2005 Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issued a fatwa that the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that Iran shall never acquire these weapons. The text of the fatwa has not been released although it was referenced in an official statement at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna.[] Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in a 2005 speech to the U.N. General Assembly said "We are concerned that once certain powerful states completely control nuclear energy resources and technology, they will deny access to other states and thus deepen the divide between powerful countries and the rest of the international community ... peaceful use of nuclear energy without possession of a nuclear fuel cycle is an empty proposition".[80] On 6 August 2005, Iran rejected a 34 page European Union proposal intended to help Iran build "a safe, economically viable and proliferation-proof civil nuclear power generation and research program." The Europeans,
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Iran with US agreement, intended to entice Iran into a binding commitment not to develop uranium enrichment capability by offering to provide fuel and other long-term support that would facilitate electricity generation with nuclear energy. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi rejected the proposal saying, "We had already announced that any plan has to recognize Iran's right to enrich uranium".[81] After the Iranian Revolution, Germany halted construction of the Bushehr reactor, the United States cut off supply of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, and Iran never received uranium from France which it asserted it was entitled to. Russia agreed not to provide an enrichment plant and terminated cooperation on several other nuclear-related technologies, including laser isotope separation; China terminated several nuclear projects (in return, in part for entry into force of a U.S.-China civil nuclear cooperation agreement); and Ukraine agreed not to provide the turbine for Bushehr. Iran argues that these experiences contribute to a perception that foreign nuclear supplies are potentially subject to being interrupted.[82] Iran resumed its uranium enrichment program in January 2006, prompting the IAEA to refer the issue to the UN Security Council. On 21 February 2006, Rooz, a news website run by Iranian exiles (the Fedayeen Khalq [People's Commandos] leftist terrorist group),[83] reported that Hojatoleslam Mohsen Gharavian, a student of Qom's fundamentalist cleric Mesbah Yazdi, spoke about the necessity of using nuclear weapons as a means to retaliate and announced that "based on religious law, everything depends on our purpose".[84] In an interview with the Islamic Republic News Agency the same day, Gharavian rejected these reports, saying "We do not seek nuclear weapons and the Islamic religion encourages coexistence along with peace and friendship...these websites have tried to misquote me."[] On 11 April 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced Iranian scientists working at the pilot facility at Natanz had successfully enriched uranium to the 3.5 percent level, using a small cascade of 164 gas centrifuges. In the televised address from the city of Mashhad he said, "I am officially announcing that Iran has joined the group of those countries which have nuclear technology".[] In May 2006 some members of the Iranian legislature ("Majlis" or Parliament) sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan threatening to withdraw from the NPT if Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear technology under the treaty was not protected.[85] On 21 February 2007, the same day the UN deadline to suspend nuclear activities expired, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made the following statement: "If they say that we should close down our fuel production facilities to resume talks, we say fine, but those who enter talks with us should also close down their nuclear fuel production activities". The White House's spokesperson Tony Snow rejected the offer and called it a "false offer".[86] Iran has said that U.N. Security Council sanctions aimed at curtailing its uranium-enrichment activities unfairly target its medical sector. "We have thousands of patients a month at our hospital alone .. If we can't help them, some will die. It's as simple as that," said an Iranian nuclear medicine specialist. An Iranian Jew from California claimed "I don't believe in these sanctions... They hurt normal people, not leaders. What is the use of that?" Vice President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Ghannadi framed the debate as a humanitarian issue, "This is about human beings. . . . When someone is sick, we should give medicine." Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that fuel obtained from Argentina in 1993 would run out by the end of 2010, and that it could produce the uranium itself or buy the uranium from abroad.[87] In February 2010, to refuel the Tehran Research Reactor which produces medical isotopes,[88] Iran began using a single cascade to enrich uranium "up to 19.8%",[89][90] to match the previously foreign supplied fuel.[] 20% is the upper threshold for low enriched uranium (LEU).[91] Though HEU enriched to levels exceeding 20% is considered technically usable in a nuclear explosive device,[92] this route is much less desirable because far more material is required to achieve a sustained nuclear chain reaction.[] HEU enriched to 90% and above is most typically used in a weapons development program.[][93] In an interview in October 2011, President Ahmadinejad of Iran said:
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Iran "We have already expressed our views about nuclear bombs. We said those who are seeking to build nuclear bombs or those who stockpile, they are politically and mentally retarded. We think they are stupid because the era of nuclear bombs is over. [Why] for example, should Iran continue its efforts and tolerate all international treasures only to build a nuclear bomb, or a few nuclear bombs that are useless? They can never be used!"[94] On 22 February 2012, in a meeting in Tehran with the director and officials of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and nuclear scientists, Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei said: "The Iranian nation has never pursued and will never pursue nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that the decision makers in the countries opposing us know well that Iran is not after nuclear weapons because the Islamic Republic, logically, religiously and theoretically, considers the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin and believes the proliferation of such weapons is senseless, destructive and dangerous."[95]
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The U.S. stance

The United States argues that Iran has violated both Article III and Article II of the NPT.[96] The IAEA Board of Governors, in a rare divided vote, found Iran in noncompliance with its NPT safeguards agreement for a 19852003 "policy of concealment"[] regarding its efforts to develop enrichment and reprocessing technologies.[29] The United States,[97] the IAEA[98] and others[99] consider these technologies to be of particular concern because they can be used to produce fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. The United States has argued that Iran's concealment of efforts to develop sensitive nuclear technology is prima facie evidence of Iran's intention to develop nuclear weapons, or at a minimum to develop a latent nuclear weapons capability. Others have noted that while possession of the technology "contributes to the latency of non-nuclear weapon states in their potential to acquire nuclear weapons" but that such latency is not necessarily evidence of intent to proceed toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons, since "intent is in the eye of the beholder".[100] The United States has also provided information to the IAEA on Iranian studies related to weapons design, activities, including a the intention of diverting a civilian nuclear energy program to the manufacture of weapons, based on a laptop computer reportedly linked to Iranian weapons programs. The United States has pointed to other information reported by the IAEA, including the "Green Salt" project, the possession of a document on manufacturing uranium metal hemispheres, and other links between Iran's military and its nuclear program, as further indications of a military intent to Iran's nuclear program.[101] The IAEA has said U.S. intelligence provided to it through 2007 has proven inaccurate or not led to significant discoveries inside Iran;[102] however, the US, and others have recently provided more intelligence to the agency.[39] In May 2003, The Swiss ambassador to Iran sent the State Department a two page document, reportedly approved by Ayatollah Khamanei, outlining a road map towards normalization of relations between the two states. The Iranians offered full transparency of its nuclear programme and withdrawal of support from Hamas and Hezbollah in exchange for security assurances and normalization of diplomatic relations. The Bush Administration did not respond to the proposal, as senior U.S. officials doubted its authenticity.[103][104] The United States acknowledges Iran's right to nuclear power, and has joined with the EU-3, Russia and China in offering nuclear and other economic and technological cooperation with Iran if it suspends uranium enrichment. This cooperation would include an assured supply of fuel for Iran's nuclear reactors.[105] A potential reason behind U.S. resistance to an Iranian nuclear program lies in Middle Eastern geopolitics. In essence, the US feels that it must guard against even the possibility of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. Some nuclear technology is dual-use; i.e. it can be used for peaceful energy generation, and to develop nuclear weapons, a situation that resulted in India's nuclear weapons program in the 1960s. A nuclear-armed Iran would dramatically change the balance of power in the Middle East, weakening US influence. It could also
Iran encourage other Middle Eastern nations to develop nuclear weapons of their own further reducing US influence in a critical region.[106] In 2003, the United States insisted that Tehran be "held accountable" for seeking to build nuclear arms in violation of its agreements.[107] In June 2005, the US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice required former IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei to either "toughen his stance on Iran" or fail to be chosen for a third term as IAEA head.[108] The IAEA has on some occasions criticised the stance of the U.S. on Iran's program.[109] The United States denounced Iran's successful enrichment of uranium to fuel grade in April 2006, with spokesman Scott McClellan saying, they "continue to show that Iran is moving in the wrong direction". In November 2006, Seymour Hersh described a classified draft assessment by the Central Intelligence Agency "challenging the White House's assumptions about how close Iran might be to building a nuclear bomb. He continued, "The CIA found no conclusive evidence, as yet, of a secret Iranian nuclear-weapons program running parallel to the civilian operations that Iran has declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency," adding that a current senior intelligence official confirmed the assessment.[110] On 25 February 2007, The Daily Telegraph reported that the United States Fifth Fleet, including the Nimitz-class supercarriers Eisenhower, Nimitz and Stennis "prepares to take on Iran".[111] Iran has been repeatedly threatened with a nuclear first strike by the United States. The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review made public in 2002 specifically envisioned the use of nuclear weapons on a first strike basis, even against non-nuclear armed states.[112] Investigative reporter Seymour Hersh has reported that the Bush administration has been planning the use of nuclear weapons against Iran[113] When specifically questioned about the potential use of nuclear weapons against Iran, President Bush claimed that "All options were on the table". According to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "the president of the United States directly threatened Iran with a preemptive nuclear strike. It is hard to read his reply in any other way."[114] In September 2007, Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, cautioned the IAEA not to interfere with international diplomacy over Iran's alleged weapons program. She said the IAEA's role should be limited to carrying out inspections and offering a "clear declaration and clear reporting on what the Iranians are doing; whether and when and if they are living up to the agreements they have signed." Former IAEA Director General ElBaradei called for less emphasis on additional UN sanctions and more emphasis on enhanced cooperation between the IAEA and Tehran. Iran has agreed with IAEA requests to answer unresolved questions about its nuclear program. ElBaradei often criticized what he called "war mongering," only to be told by Rice to mind his business.[115] In December 2007, the United States National Intelligence Estimate (which represents the consensus view of all 16 American spy agencies) concluded, with a "high level of confidence", that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and that the program remains frozen. The new estimate says that the enrichment program could still provide Iran with enough raw material to produce a nuclear weapon sometime by the middle of next decade but that intelligence agencies "do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons" at some future date. Senator Harry Reid, the majority leader, said he hoped the administration would "appropriately adjust its rhetoric and policy".[33][] In November 2008, it was reported that the US State Department had opened an Office of Iranian Affairs (OIA) overseen by Elizabeth Cheney, the daughter of Vice President Dick Cheney. The U.S. partially defined the office's mission as "to promote a democratic transition in the Islamic republic"[116] and to help "defeat" the Iranian regime.[117] Iran has argued the office was tasked with drawing up plans to overthrow its government. One Iranian reformer said after the office opened that many "partners are simply too afraid to work with us anymore", and that the office had "a chilling effect".[118] The US Congress has reportedly appropriated more than $120 million to fund the project.[119] Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh also revealed in July 2008 Congress also agreed to a $400-million funding request for a major escalation in covert operations inside Iran.[120]
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Iran On 2 February 2009, the thirtieth anniversary of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Iran launched its first domestically produced[] satellite Omid (meaning "Hope") in to space.Wikipedia:Link rot[121] Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad described the successful launching of the Omid data-processing satellite as a very big source of pride for Iran and said the project improved Iran's status in the world.[122] The United States claimed Iran's activities could be linked to the development of a military nuclear capability and that the activities were of "great concern".[123] The U.S. specifically said it would continue "to address the threats posed by Iran, including those related to its missile and nuclear programs."[124] Despite the U.S. saying it would use all elements of its national power to deal with Tehran's actions,[125] Iran said the launch was a step to remove the scientific monopoly certain world countries are trying to impose on the world.[126] Iraqi National Security Advisor Muwafaq al-Rubaie said Iraq was very pleased with the launch of Iran's peaceful data-processing national satellite.[127] In March 2009, Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote that U.S. policy must be thoroughly multilateral and suggested recognizing Iranian enrichment while getting Iran to agree to limits on its enrichment. "In return, some of the current sanctions in place would be suspended. In addition, Iran should be offered assured access to adequate supplies of nuclear fuel for the purpose of producing electricity. Normalization of political ties could be part of the equation," Haass said.[128] In October 2009, Ploughshares Fund President Joseph Cirincione outlined "five persistent myths about Iran's nuclear program": that Iran is on the verge of developing a nuclear weapon, that a military strike would knock out Iran's program, that "we can cripple Iran with sanctions", that a new government in Iran would abandon the nuclear program, and that Iran is the main nuclear threat in the Middle East.[129] In 2009, Independent U.S. Security Consultant Linton F. Brooks wrote that in an ideal future "Iran has abandoned its plans for nuclear weapons due to consistent international pressure under joint U.S.Russian leadership. Iran has implemented the Additional Protocol and developed commercial nuclear power under strict International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards using a fuel leasing approach with fuel supplied by Russia and spent fuel returned to Russia."[130] A 2009 U.S. congressional research paper says U.S. intelligence believes Iran ended "nuclear weapon design and weaponization work" in 2003.[] The intelligence consensus was affirmed by leaders of the U.S. intelligence community.[citation needed] Some advisors within the Obama administration reaffirmed the intelligence conclusions,[131] while other "top advisers" in the Obama administration "say they no longer believe" the key finding of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate".[132] Thomas Fingar, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council until December 2008, said that the original 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran "became contentious, in part, because the White House instructed the Intelligence Community to release an unclassified version of the report's key judgments but declined to take responsibility for ordering its release."[133] Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, the chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said in January 2010 that there is no evidence that Iran has made a decision to build a nuclear weapon and that the key findings of a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate are all still correct.[134] On 20 July 2011, Frederick Fleitz, a former CIA analyst and House Intelligence Committee staff member, took issue with a February 2011 revision of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear weapons program in a Wall Street Journal op-ed titled "America's Intelligence Denial on Iran [135]." In the op-ed, Fleitz claimed the new estimate had serious problems and underplayed the threat from Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons program much as the 2007 version did. However, Fleitz stated that he was not permitted by CIA censors to discuss his specific concerns about the estimate. Fleitz also claimed the estimate had a four-member outside review board that he viewed as biased since three of the reviewers held the same ideological and political views and two of them were from the same Washington DC think tank. He noted that the CIA prevented him from releasing the names of the outside reviewers of the 2011 Iran estimate.
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Iran Several high U.S. military and intelligence officials have stated that the effects of an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities would not be preventive. Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta said in December 2011, and Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, director of National Intelligence, said in February 2012 that an Israeli attack would only delay Iran's program by one or two years. General Michael V. Hayden, former CIA Director, said in January 2012 that Israel was not able to inflict significant damage on Iran's nuclear sites. He said, "They only have the ability to make this worse."[] In February 2012, Admiral William J. Fallon, who retired in 2008 as head of U.S. Central Command, said, "No one that I'm aware of thinks that there's any real positive outcome of a military strike or some kind of conflict." He advocated negotiating with Iran and deterring Iran from aggressive actions and said, "Let's not precipitate something."[][] General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in August 2012 that a unilateral Israeli attack on Iran would delay but not destroy Iran's nuclear program and that he did not wish to be complicit in such an attack. He also stated that sanctions were having an effect and should be given time to work, and that a premature attack might damage the 'international coalition' against Iran.[] Former Defense Secretary and former CIA Director Robert Gates stated in October 2012 that sanctions were beginning to have an effect and that "the results of an American or Israeli military strike on Iran could, in my view, prove catastrophic, haunting us for generations in that part of the world."[]
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Other international responses

The claims and counter claims have put an immense amount of pressure on Iran to reveal all aspects of its nuclear program to date. Iran has been slow to respond, claiming the pressure is solely an attempt by the US government to prevent it from obtaining nuclear technology. United Nations In 2009, the United Nations built a seismic monitoring station in Turkmenistan near its border with Iran, to detect tremors from nuclear explosions.[citation needed] The UN Security Council has demanded Iran freeze all forms of uranium enrichment.[] Iran has argued these demands unfairly compel it to abandon its rights under the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty to peaceful nuclear technology for civilian energy purposes.[] On 29 December 2009, Zongo Saidou, a sanctions advisor for the U.N., said that as far as he knew, none of the U.N.'s member nations had alerted the sanctions committee about allegations of sales of uranium to Iran from Kazakhstan. "We don't have any official information yet regarding this kind of exchange between the two countries," Saidou said. "I don't have any information; I don't have any proof," Saidou said.[136] An intelligence report from an unknown country alleged that rogue employees of Kazakhstan were prepared to sell Iran 1,350 tons of purified uranium ore in violation of UN Security Council sanctions.[137] Russia said it had no knowledge of an alleged Iranian plan to import purified uranium ore from Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan denied the reports.[138] "Such fabrications of news are part of the psychological warfare (against Iran) to serve the political interests of the hegemonic powers," Iran said.[139] Askar Abdrahmanov, the official representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, said "the references to the anonymous sources and unknown documents show groundlessness of these insinuations."[140] China The Chinese Foreign Ministry supports the peaceful resolution of the Iran nuclear issue through diplomacy and negotiations. In May 2006 Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao stated "As a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran enjoys the right to peaceful use of nuclear power, but it should also fulfil its corresponding responsibility and commitment". He added "It is urgently needed that Iran should fully cooperate with the IAEA and regain the confidence of the international community in its nuclear program".[] In April 2008, several news agencies reported that China had supplied the IAEA with intelligence on Iran's nuclear program following a report by Associated Press reporter George Jahn based on anonymous diplomatic sources.[39] Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu described these reports as "completely groundless and out of ulterior motives".[]
Iran In January 2010, China reiterated its calls for diplomatic efforts on the Iran nuclear issue over sanctions. "Dialogue and negotiations are the right ways of properly solving the Iran nuclear issue, and there is still room for diplomatic efforts," said Chinese spokesperson Jiang Yu. "We hope the relevant parties take more flexible and pragmatic measures and step up diplomatic efforts in a bid to resume talks as soon as possible," said Jiang.[141] When speaking about Iran's nuclear program and China's foreign policy in the Middle East, Yin Gang of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has said that "China will not stop Israel if it decides to attack Iran."[142] In March 2012, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said that "China is opposed to any country in the Middle East, including Iran, developing and possessing nuclear weapons.", adding that Iran nonetheless has the right to pursue nuclear activities for peaceful purposes.[143] France On 16 February 2006 French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy said "No civilian nuclear programme can explain the Iranian nuclear programme. It is a clandestine military nuclear programme."[] In January 2007, former French President Jacques Chirac, speaking "off the record" to reporters from The New York Times, indicated that if Iran possessed a nuclear weapon, the weapon could not be used. Chirac alluded to mutually assured destruction when he stated:[] "Where will it drop it, this bomb? On Israel? It would not have gone 200 meters into the atmosphere before Tehran would be razed." Russia In 2005, Russian Advisor to Minister of Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev asserted that "neither the signing by Iran of the NPT, the adoption of the Additional Protocol (which provides for the right of inspection of any facility at any time with no prior notice), placement of nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, nor Russia's and Iran's commitments to repatriate spent nuclear fuel to Russia is seen as a good enough argument by the United States." Ryabev argued that "at the same time, such requirements are not imposed on, for example, Brazil, which has been developing its nuclear power industry and nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment."[144] On 5 December 2007 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said he had seen no evidence of any nuclear weapons program in Iran, no matter how old.[] On 16 October 2007 Vladimir Putin visited Tehran, Iran to participate in the Second Caspian Summit, where he met with Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.[145] At a press conference after the summit Putin said that "Iran has the right to develop their peaceful nuclear programs without any restrictions".[146] In 2009, Russian Major-General Pavel S. Zolotarev argued Iran's security could be partially be assured by supplying Iran with modern missile and air defense systems and offering for Iran to take part in the work of one of the data exchange centers in exchange for "concrete non-proliferation obligations".[147] In May 2009, the EastWest Institute released a joint U.S.-Russian Threat Assessment on Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential. The report concluded that there was "no IRBM/ICBM threat from Iran and that such a threat, even if it were to emerge, is not imminent." The report said there was no specific evidence that Iran was seeking the ability to attack Europe and that "it is indeed difficult to imagine the circumstances in which Iran would do so." The report said if Iran did pursue this capability, it would need six to eight years to develop a missile capable of carrying a 1,000 kilogram warhead 2,000 kilometers. The report said Iran ending "IAEA containment and surveillance of the nuclear material and all installed cascades at the Fuel Enrichment Plan" might serve as an early warning of Iranian intentions.[148] In December 2009, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that the Iran nuclear issue would be resolved by diplomatic methods exclusively. "It is absolutely clear that the problem can be settled exclusively by political and diplomatic methods and any other scenarios, especially use-of-force scenarios, are completely unacceptable," Lavrov said.[149] Yevgeny Primakov, a former Russian prime minister considered the doyen of Moscow's Middle East
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Iran experts, said he did not believe that Iran had made a decision to acquire nuclear weapons. Russia has no concrete information that Iran is planning to construct a weapon. It may be more like Japan, which has nuclear readiness but does not have a bomb," Primakov said.[] In February 2012, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said that Russia opposes Iran developing nuclear-weapons capability. "Russia is not interested in Iran becoming a nuclear power. It would lead to greater risks to international stability.", Putin said.[150] United Kingdom The United Kingdom is part of the EU3+3 (UK, France, Germany, US, China and Russia) group of countries that are engaged in ongoing discussions with Iran.[151] The UK is therefore one of the countries that has stated that Iran would be provided with enriched fuel and support to develop a modern nuclear power program if it, in the words of the Foreign Office spokesperson "suspends all enrichment related activities, answer all the outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme and implement the additional protocol agreed with the IAEA".[152] The UK (with China, France, Germany and Russia) put forward the three Security Council resolutions that have been passed in the UN. On 8 May 2006, Former Deputy Commander-in-Chief of British Land Forces, General Sir Hugh Beach, former Cabinet Ministers, scientists and campaigners joined a delegation to Downing Street opposing military intervention in Iran. The delegation delivered two letters to Prime Minister Tony Blair from 1,800 physicists warning that the military intervention and the use of nuclear weapons would have disastrous consequences for the security of Britain and the rest of world. The letters carried the signatures of academics, politicians and scientists including some of 5 physicists who are Nobel Laureates. CASMII delegation [153] Israel Israel, which is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and which is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons,[154] has frequently claimed that Iran is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program.[155] Arguing an "existential threat from Iran", Israel has issued several veiled and explicit threats to attack Iran.[156][157][158] Mike Mullen, former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, has cautioned that an Israeli air attack on Iran would be high-risk and warned against Israel striking Iran.[159] George Friedman, head of the global intelligence company Stratfor, has said Iran is "decades away" from developing any credible nuclear-arms capacity and that an attack on Iran would have grave repercussions for the global economy.[] If Iran ever did develop nuclear weapons, Israeli academic Avner Cohen has observed "that the prospect of a deliberate Iranian first nuclear strike on Israel, an out-of the-blue scenario, is virtually nonexistent... [T]he chances of Iran or for that matter any other nuclear power unleashing a nuclear strike against Israel, which has nuclear capabilities itself, strike me as close to zero."[] Walter Pincus of the Washington Post has written that Israel's stance on nuclear arms complicates efforts against Iran.[160] Gawdat Bahgat of the National Defense University believes Iran's nuclear program is partially formed on the potential threat of a nuclear Israel.[25] Iran and the Arab League have proposed the that the Middle East be established as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.[][] Israel said in May 2010 it would not consider taking part in nuclear weapon-free zone discussions or joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.[161] The UN Security Council has also pushed for a nuclear-weapon free zone in the Middle East, and has urged all countries to sign and adhere the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.[162] In May 2010, Israel reportedly deployed Dolphin class submarines with nuclear missiles capable of reaching any target in Iran in the Persian Gulf. Their reported missions were to deter Iran, gather intelligence, and to potentially land Mossad agents on the Iranian coast.[163]
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Netherlands
According to a Dutch newspaper, the Netherlands had launched an operation to infiltrate and sabotage the Iranian weapons industry, but ended the operation due to increasing fears of an American or Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities.[164]
Islamic world
The A.Q. Khan network, established to procure equipment and material for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program (gas-centrifuge based programme), also supplied Iran with critical technology for its uranium enrichment program, and helped "put Iran on a fast track toward becoming a nuclear weapons power."[165] The 2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll, Survey of the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, College Park conducted in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the UAE in March 2008 noted the following as a key finding.[] "In contrast with the fears of many Arab governments, the Arab public does not appear to see Iran as a major threat. Most believe that Iran has the right to its nuclear program and do not support international pressure to force it to curtail its program. A plurality of Arabs (44%) believes that if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, the outcome would be more positive for the region than negative."
World map with List of countries with nuclear weaponsnuclear weapons development status represented by color. Five "nuclear weapons states" from the NPTOther states known to possess nuclear weaponsStates formerly possessing nuclear weaponsStates suspected of being in the process of developing nuclear weapons and/or nuclear programsStates which at one point had nuclear weapons and/or nuclear weapons research programsStates that possess nuclear weapons, but have not widely adopted them
Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim-majority nation and a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council abstained from a vote in March 2008 on a U.N. resolution to impose a third set of sanctions on Iran.[166] It was the only country out of the 10 non-permanent members to abstain. Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono speaking at a joint news conference with Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tehran in March 2008 said[167] "Iran's nuclear program is of a peaceful nature and must not be politicized" Pakistan, which has the second largest Muslim population in the world is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and already possesses nuclear weapons. On 12 May 2006 AP published an interview with Pakistan's former Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan Army General Mirza Aslam Beg In the AP interview, Beg detailed nearly 20 years of Iranian approaches to obtain conventional arms and then technology for nuclear weapons. He described an Iranian visit in 1990, when he was Chief of Army Staff. They didn't want the technology. They asked: 'Can we have a bomb?' My answer was: By all means you can have it but you must make it yourself. Nobody gave it to us. Beg said he is sure Iran has had enough time to develop them. But he insists the Pakistani government didn't help, even though he says former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto once told him the Iranians offered more than $4 billion for the technology. [168] In an article in 2005 about nuclear proliferation he stated "I would not like my future generations to live in the neighborhood of "nuclear capable Israel.""
Iran "Countries acquire the (nuclear) capability on their own, as we have done it. Iran will do the same, because they are threatened by Israel."[169] The San Francisco Chronicle reported on 31 October 2003, that Grand Ayatollahs, like Ayatollah Yousef Sanei, and Iranian clerics led by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have repeatedly declared that Islam forbids the development and use of all weapons of mass destruction. SFGate.com quoted Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as saying: "The Islamic Republic of Iran, based on its fundamental religious and legal beliefs, would never resort to the use of weapons of mass destruction. In contrast to the propaganda of our enemies, fundamentally we are against any production of weapons of mass destruction in any form."[] On 21 April 2006, at a Hamas rally in Damascus, Anwar Raja, the Lebanon based representative of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a party that achieved 4.25% of the votes and holds 3 out the 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council following the election declared: "The Muslim, Iranian, fighting people now possess nuclear capabilities. My brother, the Iranian representative sitting here, let me tell you that we, the Palestinian people, are in favour of Iran having a nuclear bomb, not just energy for peaceful purposes."[] On 3 May 2006 Iraqi Shia cleric Ayatollah Ahmad Husseini Al Baghdadi, who opposes the presence of US forces in Iraq and is an advocate of violent jihad was interviewed on Syrian TV. In his interview he said:[170] "How can they face Iran? How come Israel has 50 nuclear bombs? Why are they selective? Why shouldn't an Islamic or Arab country have a nuclear bomb? I am not referring to the Iranian program, which the Iranians say is for peaceful purposes. I am talking about a nuclear bomb." "This Arab Islamic nation must obtain a nuclear bomb. Without a nuclear bomb, we will continue to be oppressed," The Baku declaration A declaration signed on 20 June 2006 by the foreign ministers of 56 nations of the 57-member Organisation of the Islamic Conference stated that "the only way to resolve Iran's nuclear issue is to resume negotiations without any preconditions and to enhance co-operation with the involvement of all relevant parties". Qatar and Arab vote against the U.N. Security Council resolution 31 July 2006: The UN Security Council gives until 31 August 2006 for Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment and related activities or face the prospect of sanctions.[171] The draft passed by a vote of 141 (Qatar, which represents Arab states on the council, opposing). The same day, Iran's U.N. Ambassador Javad Zarif qualified the resolution as "arbitrary" and illegal because the NTP protocol explicitly guarantees under international law Iran's right to pursue nuclear activities for peaceful purposes. In response to today's vote at the UN, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that his country will revise his position vis--vis the economic/incentive package offered previously by the G-6 (5 permanent Security council members plus Germany.)[172] In December 2006, the Gulf Cooperation Council called for a nuclear weapons free Middle East and recognition of the right of a country to expertise in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.[173]
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The Non-Aligned Movement

The Non-Aligned Movement has said that the present situation whereby Nuclear Weapon States monopolise the right to possess nuclear weapons is "highly discriminatory", and they have pushed for steps to accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament.[] On 16 September 2006 in Havana, Cuba, all of the 118 Non-Aligned Movement member countries, at the summit level, declared supporting Iran's nuclear program for civilian purposes in their final written statement.[174] That is a clear majority of the 192 countries comprising the entire United Nations, which comprise 55% of the world population. On 11 September 2007 the Non-Aligned Movement rejected any "interference" in Iran's nuclear transparency deal with U.N. inspectors by Western countries through the UN Security Council.[] On 30 July 2008 the Non-Aligned Movement welcomed the continuing cooperation of Iran with the IAEA and reaffirmed Iran's right to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The movement further called for the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East and called for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument which prohibits threats of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.[175]
Biological weapons
Iran ratified the Biological Weapons Convention on 22 August 1973.[] Iran has advanced biology and genetic engineering research programs supporting an industry that produces world-class vaccines for both domestic use and export.[] The dual-use nature of these facilities means that Iran, like any country with advanced biological research programs, could easily produce biological warfare agents. A 2005 report from the United States Department of State claimed that Iran began work on offensive biological weapons during the IranIraq War, and that their large legitimate bio-technological and bio-medical industry "could easily hide pilot to industrial-scale production capabilities for a potential BW program, and could mask procurement of BW-related process equipment". The report further said that "available information about Iranian activities indicates a maturing offensive program with a rapidly evolving capability that may soon include the ability to deliver these weapons by a variety of means".[176] According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Iran is known to possess cultures of the many biological agents for legitimate scientific purposes which have been weaponised by other nations in the past, or could theoretically be weaponised. Although they do not allege that Iran has attempted to weaponise them, Iran possesses sufficient biological facilities to potentially do so.[]
Iran
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Chemical weapons
Iran has experienced attack by chemical warfare (CW) on the battlefield and suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties, both civilian and military, in such attacks during the 198088 IranIraq War. As a result, Iran has promulgated a very public stance against the use of chemical weapons, making numerous vitriolic comments against Iraq's use of such weapons in international forums. Iran is not known to have resorted to using chemical weapons in retaliation for Iraqi chemical weapons attacks during the IranIraq War, though it would have been Iranian soldier with gas mask under Chemical bombardment by Iraqi forces in the legally entitled to do so under the battlefield during the IranIraq War. then-existing international treaties on the use of chemical weapons which only prohibited the first use of such weapons. Following its experiences during the IranIraq War, Iran signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on 13 January 1993 and ratified it on 3 November 1997. In the official declaration submitted to OPCW Iranian government admitted that it had produced mustard gas in 1980s but that ceased the offensive program and destroyed the stockpiles of operational weapons after the end of war with Iraq.[177] A U.S. Central Intelligence Agency report dated January 2001 speculated that Iran had manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons including blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents, and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them. It further claimed that during the first half of 2001, Iran continued to seek production technology, training, expertise, equipment, and chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could be used to help Iran reach its goal of having indigenous nerve agent production capability.[] However the certainty of this assessment declined and in 2007 the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency limited its public assessment to just noting that "Iran has a large and growing commercial chemical industry that could be used to support a chemical agent mobilization capability."[178] Iran is a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans chemical weapons, delivery systems, and production facilities.[22] Iran has reiterated its commitment to the CWC and its full support for the work of the OPCW, in particular in view of the considerable suffering these weapons have caused to the Iranian people.[179] Iran has not made any declaration of a weapons stockpile under the treaty.[180]
Delivery systems
Missiles
A Shahab-4 with a range of 2,000km and a payload of 1,000kg is believed to be under development. Iran has stated the Shahab-3 is the last of its war missiles and the Shahab-4 is being developed to give the country the capability of launching communications and surveillance satellites. A Shahab-5, an intercontinental ballistic missile with a 10,000km range, has been alleged but not proven to be under development.[] Iran has 12 X-55 long range cruise missiles purchased without nuclear warheads from Ukraine in 2001. The X-55 has a range of 2,500 to 3,000 kilometers.[] Iran's most advanced missile, the Fajr-3, has an unknown range but is estimated to be 2,500km. The missile is radar evading and can strike targets simultaneously using multiple warheads.[181]
Iran On 2 November 2006, Iran fired unarmed missiles to begin 10 days of military war games. Iranian state television reported "dozens of missiles were fired including Shahab-2 and Shahab-3 missiles. The missiles had ranges from 300 km to up to 2,000km...Iranian experts have made some changes to Shahab-3 missiles installing cluster warheads in them with the capacity to carry 1,400 bombs." These launches come after some United States-led military exercises in the Persian Gulf on 30 October 2006, meant to train for blocking the transport of weapons of mass destruction.[182] The Sejil is a two-stage, solid-propellant, surface-to-surface missile (SSM) produced by Iran with a reported 1,930km (1,200mi) range. A successful test launch took place on 12 November 2008.[183] According to Jane's Information Group, details of the design other than the number of stages and that it uses solid fuel have not been released. Uzi Ruben, former director of Israel's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, indicated that, "Unlike other Iranian missiles, the Sajil bears no resemblance to any North Korean, Russian, Chinese or Pakistani (missile technology). It demonstrates a significant leap in Iran's missile capabilities." Rubin went on to state that the Sejil-1 " ... places Iran in the realm of multiple-stage missiles, which means that they are on the way to having intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities ..."[184] As a weapon, the Sejil-1 presents much more challenge to Iran's potential enemies, as solid-fuel missiles can be launched with much less notice than liquid-fueled missiles, making them more difficult to strike prior to launch.[185] Sejil-2 is an upgraded version of the Sejil. The Sejil-2 two-stage solid-fuel missile has a 2,000km range and was first test fired on 20 May 2009.[186] The Sejil-2 surface-to-surface medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) was first tested eight months prior to the actual test launch, which took place in the central Iranian province of Semnan.[187] Improvements include better navigation system, better targeting system, more payload, longer range, faster lift-off, longer storage time, quicker launch, and lower detection possibility.[188]
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Iran's Nuclear Capable Missiles

Name/Designation Class Range (varies with payload weight) Payload Status
Fajr-3 Shahab-2 Shahab-3 Shahab-4 Sejil-1 Sejil-2
MRBM 2,000km SRBM 3002,000km
Unknown
Operational
6,3706,500kg Operational 990kg 1,000kg Unknown Unknown Operational Under Development Operational Operational
MRBM 2,100km MRBM 2,000km MRBM 1,930km MRBM 2,000km
Aircraft
Any aircraft could potentially be used to host some form of WMD distribution system. Iran has a varied air force with planes purchased from many countries, including the United States. Due to sanctions, the Iranian government has encouraged production of domestically manufactured planes and, since 2002, has built its own transport aircraft, fighters, and gunship helicopters.
References
[1] [2] [5] [8] "Nuclear proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran", Gawdat Bahgat, Iranian Studies Journal, vol. 39(3), September 2006 Center for Documents of The Imposed War, Tehran. ( ) Tehran Times: Iran wants new nuclear fuel talks (http:/ / www. tehrantimes. com/ index_View. asp?code=207020) International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (http:/ / www. iaea. org/ Publications/ Documents/ Board/ 2010/ gov2010-28. pdf), GOV/2010/28, 31 May 2010.
Iran
[9] Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities (http:/ / www. dni. gov/ press_releases/ 20071203_release. pdf), National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007. [10] Dennis Blair: Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2009) (http:/ / intelligence. senate. gov/ 090212/ blair. pdf)
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We judge in fall 2003 Tehran halted its nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities and that the halt lasted at least several years... Although we do not know whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons, we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop them... develop nuclear weapons, we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop them.
[16] Resolution 1696 (2006) (http:/ / daccessdds. un. org/ doc/ UNDOC/ GEN/ N06/ 450/ 22/ PDF/ N0645022. pdf?OpenElement) [21] France24: UN atomic watchdog censures Iran: diplomats (http:/ / www. france24. com/ en/ node/ 4935014)
Of the 35-member board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 25 countries voted in favour of the resolution, diplomats said. Three countries Venezula, Malaysia and Cuba voted against the resolution. Six countries Afghanistan, Brazil, Egypt, Pakistan, South Africa and Turkey abstained. One country, Azerbaijan, was absent from the vote.
[24] Iran Defends Nuclear Secrecy (http:/ / www. nti. org/ d_newswire/ issues/ 2007_4_2. html#Iran) [25] " Nuclear proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran (http:/ / taylorandfrancis. metapress. com/ index/ L368854758H065M1. pdf)", Gawdat Bahgat, Iranian Studies Journal, vol. 39(3), September 2006 [27] No evidence Iran is making nukes: ElBaradei (http:/ / www. news. com. au/ heraldsun/ story/ 0,21985,22664498-5005961,00. html) [32] Iran could have nuclear bomb by 2015 (http:/ / uk. reuters. com/ article/ worldNews/ idUKL242351720061024) Reuters 24 October 2006 [33] U.S. Says Iran Ended Atomic Arms Work (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2007/ 12/ 03/ world/ middleeast/ 03cnd-iran. html?_r=1& hp& oref=slogin) New York Times 3 December 2007 [37] France24: US intelligence unsure of Iran's nuclear weapons intentions: chief (http:/ / www. france24. com/ en/ 20090212-us-intelligence-unsure-irans-nuclear-weapons-intentions-chief) [38] Iran could 'set off a uranium bomb within 6 months' German media (http:/ / en. rian. ru/ world/ 20090716/ 155542118. html) RIA Novosti. 16 July 2009 [42] Iran made 15-page document available to IAEA inspectors (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ library/ news/ iran/ 2007/ iran-070224-irna01. htm), GlobalSecurity.org, 24 February 2006 [47] Tehran not an 'immediate threat' (http:/ / www. dailytimes. com. pk/ default. asp?page=2007\09\22\story_22-9-2007_pg4_14) Daily Times 22 September 2007 [56] International Atomic Energy Agency: Transcript of the IAEA Director General's Remarks at the Joint Press Conference with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, 4 October 2009 (http:/ / www. iaea. org/ NewsCenter/ Transcripts/ 2009/ transcript051009. pdf) [58] Iran tested advanced nuclear warhead design secret report (http:/ / www. guardian. co. uk/ world/ 2009/ nov/ 05/ iran-tested-nuclear-warhead-design), Julian Borger, guardian.co.uk, 5 November 2009 [59] Christian Science Monitor: Iran's nuclear disclosures: why they matter (http:/ / www. csmonitor. com/ 2009/ 1017/ p19s01-usfp. html) [69] Forbes: US sees Iran edging closer to nuclear arms knowhow (http:/ / www. forbes. com/ feeds/ ap/ 2009/ 12/ 16/ general-us-us-iran_7218153. html) [75] Saghand Mining Department Website (http:/ / www. aeoi. org. ir/ newweb/ Fuel/ Saghand/ Saghand. htm) [76] http:/ / www. campaigniran. org/ casmii/ index. php?q=node/ 1493 [77] Roger Stern, The Iranian petroleum crisis and United States national security (http:/ / www. pnas. org_cgi_doi_10. 1073_pnas. 06039031), International Journal of Economic Sciences, PNAS, Vol.104, No.1, 2007, pp. 377382. 04 [79] (http:/ / memritv. org/ Transcript. asp?P1=399) [82] "Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges (2009). (page 37) (http:/ / books. nap. edu/ openbook/ 12477/ png/ 37. png), (page 38) (http:/ / books. nap. edu/ openbook/ 12477/ png/ 38. png). Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board (NRSB) [83] "Terrorist Organization Profile: Fedayeen Khalq (People's Commandos)" by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism http:/ / www. start. umd. edu/ start/ data_collections/ tops/ terrorist_organization_profile. asp?id=4018 [89] International Atomic Energy Agency: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (http:/ / www. iaea. org/ Publications/ Documents/ Board/ 2010/ gov2010-10. pdf). 18 February 2010. [91] International Atomic Energy Agency: Research Reactor Spent Fuel Status (http:/ / www-pub. iaea. org/ MTCD/ publications/ PDF/ csp_004c/ PDFfiles/ 003. pdf)
Strictly speaking, fuels enriched to 20% 235U are classified as HEU. Since many facilities with LEU cite a nominal enrichment of 20%, we have modified the definition of LEU to be 20% U for the purposes of RRSFDB. Since any fuel with exactly 20% enrichment before irradiation will have <20% enrichment after significant burnup, this does not violate the accepted definition.
Iran
[92] Definition of Weapons-Usable Uranium-233 (http:/ / www. ornl. gov/ sci/ radiation_transport_criticality/ HopperPubs/ DefWeaponsUsableU-233ORNLTM13517. pdf), C.W. Forsberg et al., ORNL/TM-13517, March 1998 [93] American Institute of Physics: The gas centrifuge and nuclear weapons proliferation (http:/ / scitation. aip. org/ getabs/ servlet/ GetabsServlet?prog=normal& id=PHTOAD000061000009000040000001& idtype=cvips& gifs=yes)
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The most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is the production of fissile material
[94] CNN news. Fareed Zakaria interviews Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Published October 22nd, 2011. Retrieved: February 24th 2012. (http:/ / globalpublicsquare. blogs. cnn. com/ 2011/ 10/ 22/ ahmadinejad-on-gadhafi-syria-alleged-plot-nuclear-weapons-and-americas-role/ ) [95] Press TV. Title: Iran will never seek nuclear weapons. Published: Wed Feb 22, 2012. Retrieved: February 24th 2012. (http:/ / www. presstv. ir/ detail/ 228014. html) [96] Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (http:/ / www. state. gov/ t/ vci/ rls/ rpt/ 51977. htm#chapter6) [97] Promoting Expanded and Responsible Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (http:/ / www. state. gov/ t/ isn/ rls/ other/ 83210. htm) [99] See paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines (http:/ / www. nuclearsuppliersgroup. org/ PDF/ infcirc254r8p1-060320. pdf) [101] Statement by Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, 13 September 2006 (http:/ / vienna. usmission. gov/ sp_iaea_board. html) [103] Steve Coll, 'Will Iran Get That Bomb?', review of Parsi in New York Review of Books, 24 May 2012, pp.34-36, p.35. [105] Letter dated 13 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (http:/ / daccessdds. un. org/ doc/ UNDOC/ GEN/ N06/ 429/ 12/ PDF/ N0642912. pdf?OpenElement) [110] Annals of National Security: The Next Act (http:/ / www. newyorker. com/ printables/ fact/ 061127fa_fact) [111] The Daily Telegraph: American armada prepares to take on Iran (http:/ / www. telegraph. co. uk/ news/ main. jhtml;jsessionid=3HEC3P3EVSP2FQFIQMFCFFOAVCBQYIV0?xml=/ news/ 2007/ 02/ 24/ wiran24. xml) [114] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen [128] United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Statement of Richard N. Haass (March 2009) (http:/ / foreign. senate. gov/ testimony/ 2009/ HaassTestimony090303a. pdf) [130] Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop (2009) (page 3) (http:/ / books. nap. edu/ openbook/ 12590/ png/ 3. png), Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC). [132] U.S. Sees an Opportunity to Press Iran on Nuclear Fuel (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2010/ 01/ 03/ world/ middleeast/ 03iran. html?pagewanted=print) By DAVID E. SANGER and WILLIAM J. BROAD, 3 January 2010 [134] National Public Radio: Quotes from Payvand News of Iran News, photos, topics, and quotes (http:/ / topics. npr. org/ quote/ 0bHDgsgcS8b1l) [135] http:/ / online. wsj. com/ article/ SB10001424052702303661904576453800512114910. html [140] Kazakhstan Today: IAEA did not receive information of uranium deliveries by Kazakhstan to Iran (http:/ / eng. gazeta. kz/ art. asp?aid=141738) [142] Melman, Yossi. "'China will not stop Israel if it decides to attack Iran'." (http:/ / www. haaretz. com/ print-edition/ features/ china-will-not-stop-israel-if-it-decides-to-attack-iran-1. 385950) Haaretz Newspaper, 22 September 2011. [144] Strengthening U.S-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation (2005) Development, Security, and Cooperation (DSC) (page 57) (http:/ / books. nap. edu/ openbook/ 0309096693/ gifmid/ 57. gif). The National Academies Press. [145] Putin Positive on Second Caspian Summit Results, Meets With Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (http:/ / president. kremlin. ru/ text/ news/ 2007/ 10/ 148432. shtml), 16 October 2007, Kremlin.ru [146] Answer to a Question at the Joint Press Conference Following the Second Caspian Summit (http:/ / president. kremlin. ru/ eng/ speeches/ 2007/ 10/ 16/ 2020_type82914type82915_148460. shtml), 16 October 2007, Tehran, Kremlin.ru [147] Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop (2009). (http:/ / books. nap. edu/ openbook/ 12590/ png/ 235. png) (Page 235)] Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) [153] http:/ / www. payvand. com/ news/ 06/ may/ 1113. html [155] Haaretz: Rabin's long memory and the NIE report on Iran (https:/ / conf. haaretz. co. il/ hasen/ pages/ ShArtStEng. jhtml?itemNo=935807& contrassID=25& subContrassID=0& title='Rabin's long memory and the NIE report on Iran'& dyn_server=172. 20. 5. 5) [168] http:/ / news. yahoo. com/ s/ ap/ 20060512/ ap_on_re_as/ iran_pakistan_nuclear [171] (http:/ / news. yahoo. com/ s/ afp/ 20060801/ ts_afp/ irannuclearpolitics_060801153716;_ylt=AvEzqtNKnfGOKngP08lDX1pSw60A;_ylu=X3oDMTBiMW04NW9mBHNlYwMlJVRPUCUl) [176] Bureau of Verification and Compliance, U.S. Department of State, "Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments" (30 August 2005). [177] Iranian Use of Chemical Weapons: A Critical Analysis of Past Allegations (http:/ / cns. miis. edu/ archive/ cns/ programs/ dc/ briefs/ 030701. htm) [181] (http:/ / www. missiledefenseadvocacy. org/ index/ Iran2006. html) [182] (http:/ / www. cnn. com/ 2006/ WORLD/ meast/ 11/ 02/ iran. manoeuvres. reut/ index. html?section=cnn_latest)
Iran
222
External links
Annotated Google map of Iranian nuclear sites (http://www.communitywalk.com/map/3078) In Focus : IAEA and Iran (http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml) Q & A with Director General of the IAEA on Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency, 22 February 2008, Video (http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Multimedia/Videos/DG/QandA220208/index.html) (5 min 43 s), Transcript (http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Transcripts/2008/transcr220208.html). Report by the Director General of IAEA: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (http:// www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IAEA_Iran_Report_22Feb2008.pdf), 22 February 2008, GOV/2008/4. Technical Addendum to the Joint Threat Assessment on the Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential: A Technical Assessment of Iran's Ballistic Missile Program (http://docs.ewi.info/JTA_TA_Program.pdf), by Theodore Postol, 6 May 2009. Analysis Towards Transatlantic Cooperation in Meeting the Iranian Nuclear Challenge (http://www.ifri.org/downloads/ Prolif_Paper_Perkovich.pdf) analysis by George Perkovich, IFRI Proliferation Papers n14, 2005 Iran's Nuclear History (http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1015.html), Prof. Mohammad Sahimi, Chairman of Chemical and Petroleum Engineering at the University of Southern California, and member of the Union of Concerned Scientists, 2 October 2003 Iran's Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities: A Pattern of Peaceful Intent? (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/ library/report/2005/iran-fuel-cycle-brief_dos_2005.pdf)PDF(2.36MB), US State Department, September 2005presentation of US position. Satellite photography and quotes from Iranian leaders are documented and analyzed. Iran as a Pioneer Case for Multilateral Nuclear Arrangements (http://mit.edu/stgs/irancrisis.html). Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Europe's Iran Policy: Breaking out of the Spiral of Mistrust (http://en.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/ _c-476/_nr-1320/i.html) by Prof. Volker Perthes, head of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin Iran needs nuclear energy, not weapons (http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:Wv7d_FdiMH0J:mondediplo. com/2005/11/02iran), Le Monde diplomatique, November 2005 questions whether Iran's nuclear program was really clandestine as commonly claimed. Forced to Fuel (http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1294/) (Harvard Int'l Law Review, Vol. 26 No. 4 Winter 2005) lays out the case for nuclear energy in Iran, by Prof. Muhammad Sahimi. If Iran Gets Nukes (http://www.antiwar.com/orig/bayyenat.php?articleid=8401) by Abolghasem Bayyena, Antiwar.com, 17 January 2006 Gareth Porter, The Iranian Nuke Forgeries: CIA Determines Documents were Fabricated, CounterPunch, 29 December 2009, (http://www.counterpunch.org/porter12292009.html). Rethinking U.S. Policy Toward Iran (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jayshree-bajoria/ us-policy-iran_b_977710.html), Jayshree Bajoria| Huffington Post| 23 September 2011 Political statements Iran's Continuing Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction (http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/33909.htm) Testimony by John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, Washington DC, 24 June 2004 Iranian Response to UN Security Council Resolution (http://www.un.int/iran/statements/securitycouncil/ articles/69.pdf) Ambassador Javad Zarif's statement to the UN Security Counsel in response to the resolution requiring Iran to suspend enrichment, 31 July 2006.
Iran Video-Interviews with Ali Asghar Soltanieh (Amb. Iran) during the NPT PrepCom 2008 (http://npt-webcast. info/index.php?p=stichworte/) Organizations CASMII The Campaign Against Sanctions and Military Intervention in Iran (http://www.campaigniran.org)
223
Iraq
Colin Powell holding a model vial of anthrax while giving a presentation to the United Nations Security Council
By type

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Iraq

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During the regime of Saddam Hussein, Iraq was believed to have weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Hussein was internationally known for his use of chemical weapons in the 1980s against Iranian and Kurdish civilians during and after the IranIraq War. It is also known that in the 1980s he pursued an extensive biological weapons program and a nuclear weapons program, though no nuclear bomb was built. [citation needed] After the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, the United Nations located and destroyed large quantities of Iraqi chemical weapons and related equipment and materials throughout the early 1990s, with varying degrees of Iraqi cooperation and obstruction.[1] In response to diminishing Iraqi cooperation with UNSCOM, the United States called for withdrawal of all UN and IAEA inspectors in 1998, resulting in Operation Desert Fox. The United States and the UK asserted that Saddam Hussein still possessed large hidden stockpiles of WMD in 2003, and that he was clandestinely procuring and producing more. Inspections by the UN to resolve the status of unresolved disarmament questions restarted from November 2002 until March 2003,[2] under UN Security Council Resolution 1441, which demanded Saddam give "immediate, unconditional and active cooperation" with UN and IAEA inspections, shortly before his country was attacked.[3] During the lead-up to war in March 2003, United Nations weapons inspector Hans Blix had found no stockpiles of WMD and had made significant progress toward resolving open issues of disarmament noting "proactive" but not always the "immediate" Iraqi cooperation as called for by UN Security Council Resolution 1441. He concluded that it would take but months to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks.[4] The United States asserted this was a breach of Resolution 1441 but failed to convince the UN Security Council to pass a new resolution authorizing the
Iraq use of force due to lack of evidence.[5][6][7] Despite being unable to get a new resolution authorizing force and citing section 3 of the Joint Resolution passed by the U.S. Congress,[8] President George W. Bush asserted peaceful measures could not disarm Iraq of the weapons he alleged it to have and launched a second Gulf War,[9] despite multiple dissenting opinions[10] and questions of integrity[11][12][13] about the underlying intelligence.[14] Later U.S.-led inspections agreed that Iraq had earlier abandoned its WMD programs, but asserted Iraq had an intention to pursue those programs if UN sanctions were ever lifted.[15] Bush later said that the biggest regret of his presidency was "the intelligence failure" in Iraq,[16] while the Senate Intelligence Committee found in 2008 that his administration "misrepresented the intelligence and the threat from Iraq".[17] A key CIA informant in Iraq admitted that he lied about his allegations, "then watched in shock as it was used to justify the war".[18] In 2012, Britain will help the Iraqi government dispose of what is left of Saddam's chemical weapons. The teams will work to safely destroy remnants of munitions and chemical warfare agents left over from Saddam's regime.[19]
225
Program development 1960s - 1980s

Iraq
Nuclear program start date 1959 First nuclear weapon test First fusion weapon test Last nuclear test Largest yield test Total tests Peak stockpile Current stockpile None None None None None None None; programme was infiltrated, abandoned, destroyed by Israel and Iran in 1989. Officially program ended in 1990. Al-Hussein (400km) Yes
Maximum missile range NPT signatory
Iraq
226 1959 August 17 USSR and Iraq wrote an agreement about building a nuclear power plant and established a nuclear program as part of their mutual understanding.[20] 1968 a Soviet supplied IRT-2000 research reactor together with a number of other facilities that could be used for radioisotope production was built close to Baghdad.[21][22] 1975 Saddam Hussein arrived in Moscow and asked about building an advanced model of an atomic power station. Moscow would approve only if the station was regulated by the International Atomic Energy Agency, but Iraq refused. Yet an agreement of co-operation was signed on April 15, which superseded the one from 1959.[23]
Baghdad Nuclear Research Facility - 10 March 1991. The Tuwaythah Nuclear Research Facility, Baghdad, Post-strike.
After 6 months Paris agreed to sell 72kg of 93% Uranium[] and built a nuclear power plant without International Atomic Energy Agency control at a price of $3 billion. In the early 1970s, Saddam Hussein ordered the creation of a clandestine nuclear weapons program.[24] Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs were assisted by a wide variety of firms and governments in the 1970s and 1980s.[25][26][27][][28] As part of Project 922, German firms such as Karl Kobe helped build Iraqi chemical weapons facilities such as laboratories, bunkers, an administrative building, and first production buildings in the early 1980s under the cover of a pesticide plant. Other German firms sent 1,027 tons of precursors of mustard gas, sarin, tabun, and tear gasses in all. This work allowed Iraq to produce 150 tons of mustard agent and 60 tons of Tabun in 1983 and 1984 respectively, continuing throughout the decade. Five other German firms supplied equipment to manufacture botulin toxin and mycotoxin for germ warfare. In 1988, German engineers presented centrifuge data that helped Iraq expand its nuclear weapons program. Laboratory equipment and other information was provided, involving many German engineers. All told, 52% of Iraq's international chemical weapon equipment was of German origin. The State Establishment for Pesticide Production (SEPP) ordered culture media and incubators from Germany's Water Engineering Trading.[29]
Western help with Iraq's WMD program

France built Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in the late 1970s. Israel claimed that Iraq was nearing production of nuclear weapons, and destroyed the French-built reactor in 1981. Meanwhile, Israel's Mossad ran a secret and clandestine operations to either infiltrate Iraqi nuclear program and removed or killed its associated personalities. In 1980, Egyptian born-Iraqi nuclear scientist dr. Yahya El Mashad, head of the Iraqi nuclear program, was assassinated by Mossad. In 1983, a similar operation was undertaken when it was reported that Abdul Rasul, head of Iraqi Osirak reactor, was poisoned in Paris during a lunch, delegated by French officials.[citation needed] Later, a French company built a turnkey factory which helped make nuclear fuel. France also provided glass-lined reactors, tanks, vessels, and columns used for the production of chemical weapons. Around 21% of Iraqs international chemical weapon equipment was of French origin. Strains of dual-use biological material also helped advance Iraqs biological warfare program. Italy gave Iraq plutonium extraction facilities that advanced Iraqs nuclear weapon program along with 75,000 shells and rockets designed for chemical weapons. Between 1979 and 1982 Italy gave depleted, natural, and low-enriched uranium. Swiss companies aided in Iraqs nuclear weapons development in the form of specialized presses, milling machines, grinding machines, electrical discharge machines, and equipment for processing uranium to nuclear weapon grade. Brazil secretly aided the Iraqi nuclear weapon program by supplying natural uranium dioxide between 1981 and 1982 without notifying the IAEA. About 100 tons of mustard gas also came from Brazil.[citation
needed]
Iraq The United States exported support for Iraq during the IranIraq war over $500 million worth of dual use exports to Iraq that were approved by the Commerce department. Among them were advanced computers, some of which were used in Iraq's nuclear program.[30] The non-profit American Type Culture Collection and the Centers for Disease Control sold or sent biological samples of anthrax, West Nile virus and botulism to Iraq up until 1989, which Iraq claimed it needed for medical research. A number of these materials were used for Iraq's biological weapons research program, while others were used for vaccine development.[31] For example, the Iraqi military settled on the American Type Culture Collection strain 14578 as the exclusive anthrax strain for use as a biological weapon, according to Charles Duelfer.[32] In the late 1980s, the British government secretly gave the arms company Matrix Churchill permission to supply parts for Saddam Hussein's weapons program, while British Industry supplied Gerald Bull as he developed the Iraqi supergun. In March 1990, a case of nuclear triggers bound for Iraq, were seized at Heathrow Airport. The Scott Report uncovered much of the secrecy that had surrounded the Arms-to-Iraq affair when it became known.[33] The British government also financed a chlorine factory that was intended to be used for manufacturing mustard gas.[34] Many other countries contributed as well; since Iraq's nuclear program in the early 1980s was officially viewed internationally as for energy production, not weapons, there were no UN prohibitions against it. An Austrian company gave Iraq calutrons for enriching uranium. The nation also provided heat exchangers, tanks, condensers, and columns for the Iraqi chemical weapons infrastructure, which can hardly be said to be for energy. Singapore gave 4,515 tons of precursors for VX, sarin, tabun, and mustard gases to Iraq. The Dutch gave 4,261 tons of precursors for sarin, tabun, mustard, and tear gases to Iraq. Egypt gave 2,400 tons of tabun and sarin precursors to Iraq and 28,500 tons of weapons designed for carrying chemical munitions. India gave 2,343 tons of precursors to VX, tabun, Sarin, and mustard gases. Luxembourg gave Iraq 650 tons of mustard gas precursors. Spain gave Iraq 57,500 munitions designed for carrying chemical weapons. In addition, they provided reactors, condensers, columns and tanks for Iraqs chemical warfare program, 4.4% of the international sales. China provided 45,000 munitions designed for chemical warfare. Portugal provided yellowcake between 1980 and 1982. Niger provided yellowcake in 1981.[35]
227
IranIraq War
In 1980 the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency filed a report stating that Iraq had been actively acquiring chemical weapons capacities for several years, which later proved to be accurate.[36] In November 1980, two months into the IranIraq War, the first reported use of chemical weapons took place when Tehran radio reported a poison gas attack on Susangerd by Iraqi forces.[37] The United Nations reported many similar attacks occurred the following year, leading Iran to develop and deploy a mustard gas capability. By 1984, Iraq was using poison gas with great effectiveness against Iranian "human wave" UN weapons inspectors in Iran for Survey use of chemical weapons attacks.Wikipedia:Verifiability Chemical weapons by Iraqi Army were used extensively against Iran during the IranIraq War.[38][39] On January 14, 1991, the Defense Intelligence Agency said an Iraqi agent described, in medically accurate terms, military smallpox casualties he said he saw in 1985 or 1986. Two weeks later, the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center reported that eight of 69 Iraqi prisoners of war whose blood was tested showed a current immunity to smallpox, which had not occurred naturally in Iraq since 1971; the same prisoners had also been inoculated for anthrax. The assumption being that Iraq
Iraq used both smallpox and anthrax during this war[] All of this occurring while Iraq was a party to the Geneva Protocol on September 8, 1931, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on October 29, 1969, signed the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, but did not ratify until June 11, 1991. Iraq has not signed to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Washington Post reported that in 1984 the CIA secretly started providing intelligence to the Iraqi army during the Iran-Iraq War. This included information to target chemical weapons strikes. The same year it was confirmed beyond doubt by European doctors and UN expert missions that Iraq was employing chemical weapons against the Iranians.[40] Most of these occurred during the IranIraq War, but WMDs were used at least once to crush the popular uprisings against Kurds in 1991.[] Chemical weapons were used extensively, with more than 100,000 Iranian soldiers as victims of Saddam Hussein's chemical weapons during the eight-year war with Iraq,[41] Iran today is the world's second-most afflicted country by weapons of mass destruction, only after Japan. The official estimate does not include the civilian population contaminated in bordering towns or the children and relatives of veterans, many of whom have developed blood, lung and skin complications, according to the Organization for Veterans. Nerve gas agents killed about 20,000 Iranian soldiers immediately, according to official reports. Of the 90,000 survivors, some 5,000 seek medical treatment regularly and about 1,000 are still hospitalized with severe, chronic conditions.[citation needed] Many others were hit by mustard gas. Despite the removal of Saddam and his regime by American forces, there is deep resentment and anger in Iran that it was Western nations that helped Iraq develop and direct its chemical weapons arsenal in the first place and that the world did nothing to punish Iraq for its use of chemical weapons throughout the war.[citation needed] For example, the United States and the UK blocked condemnation of Iraq's known chemical weapons attacks at the UN Security Council. No resolution was passed during the war that specifically criticized Iraq's use of chemical weapons, despite the wishes of the majority to condemn this use. On March 21, 1986 the United Nation Security Council recognized that "chemical weapons on many occasions have been used by Iraqi forces against Iranian forces"; this statement was opposed by the United States, the sole country to vote against it in the Security Council (the UK abstained).[42] On March 23, 1988 western media sources reported from Halabja in Iraqi Kurdistan, that several days before Iraq had launched a large scale chemical assault on the town. Later estimates were that 7,000 people had been killed and 20,000 wounded. The Halabja poison gas attack caused an international outcry against the Iraqis. Later that year the U.S. Senate unanimously passed[citation needed] the Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988, cutting off all U.S. assistance to Iraq and stopping U.S. imports of Iraqi oil. The Reagan administration opposed the bill, calling it premature, and eventually prevented it from taking effect, partly due to a mistaken DIA assessment which blamed Iran for the attack. At the time of the attack the town was held by Iranian troops and Iraqi Kurdish guerrillas allied with Tehran.[43] The Iraqis blamed the Halabja attack on Iranian forces. This was still the position of Saddam Hussein in his December 2003 captivity.[citation needed] On August 21, 2006, the trial of Saddam Hussein and six codefendants, including Hassan al-Majid ("Chemical Ali"), opened on charges of genocide against the Kurds. While this trial does not cover the Halabja attack, it does cover attacks on other villages during the Iraqi "Anfal" operation alleged to have included bombing with chemical weapons.[44]
228
Chemical weapon attacks
Iraq
229
Location Haij Umran Panjwin Majnoon Island al-Basrah Hawizah Marsh al-Faw Um ar-Rasas al-Basrah Sumar/Mehran Halabjah al-Faw Fish Lake Majnoon Islands
Weapon Used Mustard Mustard Mustard Tabun Mustard & Tabun Mustard & Tabun Mustard Mustard & Tabun
Date August 1983
Casualties fewer than 100 Iranian/Kurdish
OctoberNovember 1983 3,001 Iranian/Kurdish FebruaryMarch 1984 March 1984 March 1985 February 1986 December 1986 April 1987 2,500 Iranians 50-100 Iranians 3,000 Iranians 8,000 to 10,000 Iranians 1,000s Iranians 5,000 Iranians 3,000 Iranians 7,000s Kurdish/Iranian 1,000s Iranians 100s or 1,000s Iranians 100s or 1,000s Iranians 100s or 1,000s Iranians Unknown
Mustard & nerve agent October 1987 Mustard & nerve agent March 1988 Mustard & nerve agent April 1988 Mustard & nerve agent May 1988 Mustard & nerve agent June 1988
South-central border Mustard & nerve agent July 1988 an-Najaf Karbala area Nerve agent & CS March 1991
(Source:[])
The 1991 Persian Gulf War

On August 2, 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and was widely condemned internationally.[45] The policy of the United States on Hussein's government changed rapidly, as it was feared Saddam intended to attack other oil-rich nations in the region such as Saudi Arabia.[citation needed] As stories of atrocities from the occupation of Kuwait spread, older atrocities and his WMD arsenal were also given attention.[citation needed] Iraq's nuclear weapons program suffered a serious setback in 1981 when the Osiraq reactor, which would have been capable of breeding weapons-useable nuclear material, was bombed by Israel before it could be commissioned.[] David Albright and Mark Hibbs, writing for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, concur with this view: there were far too many technological challenges unsolved, they say.[46] An international coalition of nations, led by the United States, liberated Kuwait in 1991.[47] In the terms of the UN ceasefire set out in Security Council Resolution 686, and in Resolution 687, Iraq was forbidden from developing, possessing or using chemical, biological and nuclear weapons by resolution 686. Also proscribed by the treaty were missiles with a range of more than 150 kilometres. The UN Special Commission on weapons (UNSCOM) was created to carry out weapons inspections in Iraq, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was to verify the destruction of Iraq's nuclear program.[48][49]
Between Persian Gulf Wars

UNSCOM inspections 1991-1998
The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) was set up after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait to inspect Iraqi weapons facilities. It was headed first by Rolf Ekus and later by Richard Butler. During several visits to Iraq by UNSCOM, weapons inspectors interviewed British-educated Iraqi biologist Rihab Rashid Taha. According to a 1999 report from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, the normally mild-mannered Taha exploded into violent rages whenever UNSCOM questioned her about al-Hakam, shouting, screaming and, on one occasion, smashing a
Iraq chair, while insisting that al-Hakam was a chicken-feed plant.[50] "There were a few things that were peculiar about this animal-feed production plant", Charles Duelfer, UNSCOM's deputy executive chairman, later told reporters, "beginning with the extensive air defenses surrounding it." The facility was destroyed by UNSCOM in 1996.[51] In 1995, UNSCOM's principal weapons inspector, Dr. Rod Barton from Australia, showed Taha documents obtained by UNSCOM that showed the Iraqi government had just purchased 10 tons of growth medium from a British company called Oxoid. Growth media is a mixture of sugars, proteins and minerals that provides nutrients for microorganisms to grow. It can be used in hospitals and microbiology/molecular biology research laboratories. In hospitals, swabs from patients are placed in dishes containing growth medium for diagnostic purposes. Iraq's hospital consumption of growth medium was just 200kg a year; yet in 1988, Iraq imported 39 tons of it. Shown this evidence by UNSCOM, Taha admitted to the inspectors that she had grown 19,000 litres of botulinum toxin;[52] 8,000 litres of anthrax; 2,000 litres of aflatoxins, which can cause liver failure; Clostridium perfringens, a bacterium that can cause gas gangrene; and ricin. She also admitted conducting research into cholera, salmonella, foot and mouth disease, and camel pox, a disease that uses the same growth techniques as smallpox, but which is safer for researchers to work with. It was because of the discovery of Taha's work with camel pox that the U.S. and British intelligence services feared Saddam Hussein may have been planning to weaponize the smallpox virus. Iraq had a smallpox outbreak in 1971 and the Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) believed the Iraqi government retained contaminated material.[] UNSCOM also learned that, in August 1990, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Taha's team was ordered to set up a program to weaponize the biological agents. By January 1991, a team of 100 scientists and support staff had filled 157 bombs and 16 missile warheads with botulin toxin, and 50 bombs and five missile warheads with anthrax. In an interview with the BBC, Taha denied the Iraqi government had weaponized the bacteria. "We never intended to use it", she told journalist Jane Corbin of the BBC's Panorama program. "We never wanted to cause harm or damage to anybody." However, UNSCOM found the munitions dumped in a river near al-Hakam. UNSCOM also discovered that Taha's team had conducted inhalation experiments on donkeys from England and on beagles from Germany. The inspectors seized photographs showing beagles having convulsions inside sealed containers.[citation needed] The inspectors feared that Taha's team had experimented on human beings. During one inspection, they discovered two primate-sized inhalation chambers, one measuring 5 cubic meters, though there was no evidence the Iraqis had used large primates in their experiments. According to former weapons inspector Scott Ritter in his 1999 book Endgame: Solving the Iraq Crisis, UNSCOM learned that, between July 1 and August 15, 1995, 50 prisoners from the Abu Ghraib prison were transferred to a military post in al-Haditha, in the northwest of Iraq.[citation needed] Iraqi opposition groups say that scientists sprayed the prisoners with anthrax, though no evidence was produced to support these allegations. During one experiment, the inspectors were told, 12 prisoners were tied to posts while shells loaded with anthrax were blown up nearby. Ritter's team demanded to see documents from Abu Ghraib prison showing a prisoner count. Ritter writes that they discovered the records for July and August 1995 were missing. Asked to explain the missing documents, the Iraqi government charged that Ritter was working for the CIA and refused UNSCOM access to certain sites like Baath Party headquarters.[53] Although Ekus has said that he resisted attempts at such espionage, many allegations have since been made against the agency commission under Butler, charges which Butler has denied.[54][55] In April 1991 Iraq provided its first of what would be several declarations of its chemical weapons programs.[] Subsequent declarations submitted by Iraq in June 1992 , March 1995, June 1996 came only after pressure from UNSCOM.[] In February 1998 , UNSCOM unanimously determined that after seven years of attempts to establish the extent of Iraqs chemical weapons programs, that Iraq had still not given the Commission sufficient information for them to conclude that Iraq had undertaken all the disarmament steps required by the UNSC resolutions concerning chemical weapons.[] In August 1991 Iraq had declared to the UNSCOM biological inspection team that it did indeed have a biological weapons program but that it was for defensive purposes.[] Iraq then provided its first biological weapons declaration
230
Iraq shortly after. After UNSCOM determined such declarations to be incomplete, more pressure was placed on Iraq to declare fully and completely.[] A second disclosure of the biological weapons came in March 1995. After UNSCOM's investigations and the discovery of inreffutable evidence, Iraq was forced to admit for the first time the existence of an offensive biological weapons program.[] But Iraq still denied weaponization. Further UNSCOM pressure resulted in a third prohibited biological weapons disclosure from Iraq in August 1995. Only after General Hussein Kamel al-Majid, Minister of Industry and Minerals and former Director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation, with responsibility for all of Iraq's weapons programs, fled Iraq for Jordan, Iraq was forced to reveal that its biological warfare program was much more extensive than was previously admitted and that the program included weaponization.[] At this time Iraq admitted that it had achieved the ability to produce longer-range missiles than had previously been admitted to.[] At this point Iraq provides UNSCOM and IAEA with more documentation that turns out Hussein Kamel al-Majid had hidden on chicken farm. These documents gave further revelation to Iraqs development of VX gas and its attempts to develop a nuclear weapon.[] More declarations would follow in June 1996 and September 1997. However, in April and July 1998, the biological weapons team and UNSCOM Executive Chairman assessed that Iraqs declarations were as yet unverifiable and incomplete and inadequate, seven years after the first declarations were given in 1991.[] In August 1998, Ritter resigned his position as UN weapons inspector and sharply criticized the Clinton administration and the UN Security Council for not being vigorous enough about insisting that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction be destroyed. Ritter also accused UN Secretary General Kofi Annan of assisting Iraqi efforts at impeding UNSCOM's work. "Iraq is not disarming", Ritter said on August 27, 1998, and in a second statement, "Iraq retains the capability to launch a chemical strike." In 1998 the UNSCOM weapons inspectors left Iraq. There is considerable debate about whether they were "withdrawn", "expelled" from the country by Iraqi officials (as alleged by George W. Bush in his "axis of evil" speech), or they chose to leave because they felt their hands were tied sufficiently to see the mission as hopeless. According to Butler himself in his book Saddam Defiant, it was U.S. Ambassador Peter Burleigh, acting on instructions from Washington, who suggested Butler pull his team from Iraq in order to protect them from the forthcoming U.S. and British airstrikes[citation needed] which eventually took place from December 1619, 1998.
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Between inspections: 1998-2002

In August, 1998, absent effective monitoring, Scott Ritter remarked that Iraq could "reconstitute chemical biological weapons, long-range ballistic missiles to deliver these weapons, and even certain aspects of their nuclear weaponization program."[56] Ritter later accused some UNSCOM personnel of spying, and he strongly criticized the Bill Clinton administration for misusing the commission's resources to eavesdrop on the Iraqi military.[57] In June, 1999, Ritter responded to an interviewer, saying: "When you ask the question, 'Does Iraq possess militarily viable biological or chemical weapons?' the answer is no! It is a resounding NO. Can Iraq produce today chemical weapons on a meaningful scale? No! Can Iraq produce biological weapons on a meaningful scale? No! Ballistic missiles? No! It is 'no' across the board. So from a qualitative standpoint, Iraq has been disarmed. Iraq today possesses no meaningful weapons of mass destruction capability."[58] In June 2000, he penned a piece for Arms Control Today entiled The Case for Iraq's Qualitative Disarmament.[59] 2001 saw the theatrical release of his documentary on the UNSCOM weapons inspections in Iraq, In Shifting Sands: The Truth About Unscom and the Disarming of Iraq. The film was funded by an Iraqi-American businessman who, unknown to Ritter, had received Oil-for-Food coupons from the Iraqi regime.[60] In 2002, Scott Ritter stated that, as of 1998, 9095% of Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities, and long-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons, had been verified as destroyed. Technical 100% verification was not possible, said Ritter, not because Iraq still had any hidden weapons, but because Iraq had preemptively destroyed some stockpiles and claimed they had never existed. Many people were surprised by Ritter's
Iraq turnaround in his view of Iraq during a period when no inspections were made.[61] During the 20022003 build-up to war Ritter criticized the Bush administration and maintained that it had provided no credible evidence that Iraq had reconstituted a significant WMD capability. In an interview with Time in September 2002 Ritter said there were attempts to use UNSCOM for spying on Iraq.[62] In doing so, he was merely confirming what had been known since 1999: according to the New York Times for Jan. 8, 1999, , "In March [1998], in a last-ditch attempt to uncover Saddam Hussein's covert weapons and intelligence networks, the United States used the United Nations inspection team to send an American spy into Baghdad to install a highly sophisticated electronic eavesdropping system."[63][64] UNSCOM encountered various difficulties and a lack of cooperation by the Iraqi government. In 1998, UNSCOM was withdrawn at the request of the United States before Operation Desert Fox. Despite this, UNSCOM's own estimate was that 90-95% of Iraqi WMDs had been successfully destroyed before its 1998 withdrawal. After that Iraq remained without any outside weapons inspectors for four years. During this time speculations arose that Iraq had actively resumed its WMD programmes. In particular, various figures in the George W. Bush administration as well as Congress went so far as to express concern about nuclear weapons. There is dispute about whether Iraq still had WMD programs after 1998 and whether its cooperation with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was complete. Chief weapons inspector Hans Blix said in January 2003 that "access has been provided to all sites we have wanted to inspect" and Iraq had "cooperated rather well" in that regard, although "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance of the disarmament."[65] On March 7, in an address to the Security Council, Hans Blix stated: "Against this background, the question is now asked whether Iraq has cooperated "immediately, unconditionally and actively" with UNMOVIC, as is required under paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002)... while the numerous initiatives, which are now taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some long-standing open disarmament issues, can be seen as "active", or even "proactive", these initiatives 34 months into the new resolution cannot be said to constitute "immediate" cooperation. Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance." Some U.S. officials understood this contradictory statement as a declaration of noncompliance. There were no weapon inspections in Iraq for nearly four years after the UN departed from Iraq in 1998, and Iraq asserted that they would never be invited back.[66] In addition, Saddam had issued a secret order that Iraq did not have to abide by any UN Resolution since in his view the United States had broken international law.[67] In 2001 Saddam stated that "we are not at all seeking to build up weapons or look for the most harmful weapons . . . however, we will never hesitate to possess the weapons to defend Iraq and the Arab nation".[68] The International Institute for Strategic Studies in Britain published in September 2002 a review of Iraq's military capability, and concluded that Iraq could assemble nuclear weapons within months if fissile material from foreign sources were obtained.[69] However, it concluded that without such foreign sources, it would take years at a bare minimum. The numbers were viewed as overly optimistic by many critics (such as the Federation of American Scientists and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists).[citation needed]
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2003 Iraq War

Possession of WMDs was cited by the United States as the primary motivation instigating the Iraq War.
Prelude
In late 2002 Saddam Hussein, in a letter to Hans Blix, invited UN weapons inspectors back into the country. Subsequently the Security Council issued resolution 1441 authorizing new inspections in Iraq. The carefully worded UN resolution put the burden on Iraq, not UN inspectors, to prove that they no longer had weapons of mass destruction. The United States claimed that Iraq's latest weapons declaration left materials and munitions unaccounted for; the Iraqis claimed that all such material had been destroyed, something which had been stated years earlier by Iraq's highest ranking defector, Hussein Kamel al-Majid. According to reports from the previous UN inspection agency, UNSCOM, Iraq produced 600 metric tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, VX and
Iraq sarin, and nearly 25,000 rockets and 15,000 artillery shells, with chemical agents, that are still unaccounted for. In fact, in 1995, Iraq told the United Nations that it had produced at least 30,000 liters of biological agents, including anthrax and other toxins it could put on missiles, but that all of it had been destroyed.[citation needed] In January 2003, United Nations weapons inspectors reported that they had found no indication that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons or an active program. Some former UNSCOM inspectors disagree about whether the United States could know for certain whether or not Iraq had renewed production of weapons of mass destruction. Robert Gallucci said, "If Iraq had [uranium or plutonium], a fair assessment would be they could fabricate a nuclear weapon, and there's no reason for us to assume we'd find out if they had." Similarly, former inspector Jonathan Tucker said, "Nobody really knows what Iraq has. You really can't tell from a satellite image what's going on inside a factory." However, Hans Blix said in late January 2003 that Iraq had "not genuinely accepted UN resolutions demanding that it disarm."[70] He claimed there were some materials which had not been accounted for. Since sites had been found which evidenced the destruction of chemical weaponry, UNSCOM was actively working with Iraq on methods to ascertain for certain whether the amounts destroyed matched up with the amounts that Iraq had produced.[71][72] In the next quarterly report, after the war, the total amount of proscribed items destroyed by UNMOVIC in Iraq can be gathered.[73] Those include: 50 deployed Al-Samoud 2 missiles Various equipment, including vehicles, engines and warheads, related to the AS2 missiles 2 large propellant casting chambers 14 155mm shells filled with mustard gas, the mustard gas totaling approximately 49 litres and still at high purity Approximately 500 ml of thiodiglycol Some 122mm chemical warheads Some chemical equipment 224.6kg of expired growth media
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Scott Ritter argued that the WMDs Saddam had in his possession all those years ago, if retained, would have long since turned to harmless substances. He stated that Iraqi Sarin and tabun have a shelf life of approximately five years, VX lasts a bit longer (but not much longer), and finally he said botulinum toxin and liquid anthrax last about three years.[74][]
Iraq
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Legal justification
On March 17, 2003, Lord Goldsmith, Attorney General of the UK, set out his government's legal justification for an invasion of Iraq. He said that Security Council resolution 678 authorised force against Iraq, which was suspended but not terminated by resolution 687, which imposed continuing obligations on Iraq to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction. A material breach of resolution 687 would revive the authority to use force under resolution 678. In resolution 1441 the Security Council determined that Iraq was in material breach of resolution 687 because it had not fully carried out its obligations to disarm. Although resolution 1441 had President George W. Bush addresses the nation from the Oval Office, given Iraq a final chance to comply, UK Attorney March 19, 2003, to announce the beginning of Operation Iraqi General Goldsmith wrote "it is plain that Iraq has failed [75] Freedom. "The people of the United States and our friends and so to comply". Most member governments of the allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the United Nations Security Council made clear that after peace with weapons of mass murder." The Senate committee found that many of the administration's pre-war statements about Iraqi resolution 1441 there still was no authorization for the WMD were not supported by the underlying intelligence. use of force. Indeed, at the time 1441 was passed, both the U.S. and UK representatives stated explicitly that 1441 contained no provision for military action. As the New York Times noted about the negotiations, 'There's no 'automaticity' and this is a two-stage process, and in that regard we have met the principal concerns that have been expressed for the resolution, [stated then U.S. Ambassador Negroponte] Whatever violation there is, or is judged to exist, will be dealt with in the council, and the council will have an opportunity to consider the matter before any other action is taken.[76] The British ambassador to the UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock concurred, We heard loud and clear during the negotiations the concerns about "automaticity" and "hidden triggers" - the concern that on a decision so crucial we should not rush into military action; that on a decision so crucial any Iraqi violations should be discussed by the Council. Let me be equally clear in response, as one of the co-sponsors of the text we have adopted: there is no "automaticity" in this Resolution.[77] The UN itself never had the chance to declare that Iraq had failed to take its "final opportunity" to comply as the U.S. invasion made it a moot point. American President George W. Bush stated that Saddam Hussein had 48 hours to step down and leave Iraq.[78] As the deadline approached, the United States announced that forces would be sent to verify his disarmament and a transition to a new government.[citation needed]
Coalition expanded intelligence

On May 30, 2003, Paul Wolfowitz stated in an interview with Vanity Fair magazine that the issue of weapons of mass destruction was the point of greatest agreement among Bush's team among the reasons to remove Saddam Hussein from power. He said, "The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy, we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on, which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason, but, there have always been three fundamental concerns. One is weapons of mass destruction, the second is support for terrorism, the third is the criminal treatment of the Iraqi people. Actually I guess you could say there's a fourth overriding one which is the connection between the first two."[79] In an interview with BBC in June 2004, David Kay, former head of the Iraq Survey Group, made the following comment:
Iraq "Anyone out there holding as I gather Prime Minister Blair has recently said the prospect that, in fact, the Iraq Survey Group is going to unmask actual weapons of mass destruction, [is] really delusional." In 2002, Scott Ritter, a former UNSCOM weapons inspector heavily criticized the Bush administration and media outlets for using the testimony of alleged former Iraqi nuclear scientist Khidir Hamza, who defected from Iraq in 1994, as a rationale for invading Iraq; We seized the entire records of the Iraqi Nuclear program, especially the administrative records. We got a name of everybody, where they worked, what they did, and the top of the list, Saddam's "Bombmaker" [which was the title of Hamza's book, and earned the nickname afterwards] was a man named Jafar Dhia Jafar, not Khidir Hamza, and if you go down the list of the senior administrative personnel you will not find Hamza's name in there. In fact, we didn't find his name at all. Because in 1990, he didn't work for the Iraqi nuclear program. He had no knowledge of it because he worked as a kickback specialist for Hussein Kamel in the Presidential Palace. He goes into northern Iraq and meets up with Ahmad Chalabi. He walks in and says, I'm Saddam's "Bombmaker". So they call the CIA and they say, "We know who you are, you're not Saddam's 'Bombmaker', go sell your story to someone else." And he was released, he was rejected by all intelligence services at the time, he's a fraud. And here we are, someone who the CIA knows is a fraud, the US Government knows is a fraud, is allowed to sit in front of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and give testimony as a expert witness. I got a problem with that, I got a problem with the American media, and I've told them over and over and over again that this man is a documentable fraud, a fake, and yet they allow him to go on CNN, MSNBC, CNBC, and testify as if he actually knows what he is talking about.[80] On June 4, 2003, U.S. Senator Pat Roberts announced that the U.S. Select Committee on Intelligence that he chaired would, as a part of its ongoing oversight of the intelligence community, conduct a Review of intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. On July 9, 2004, the Committee released the Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq. On July 17, 2003, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair said in an address to the U.S. Congress, that history would forgive the United States and United Kingdom, even if they were wrong about weapons of mass destruction. He still maintained that "with every fiber of instinct and conviction" Iraq did have weapons of mass destruction. On February 3, 2004, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw announced an independent inquiry, to be chaired by Lord Butler of Brockwell, to examine the reliability of British intelligence relating to alleged weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.[81] The Butler Review was published July 14, 2004. In the buildup to the 2003 war, the New York Times published a number of stories claiming to prove that Iraq possessed WMD. One story in particular, written by Judith Miller helped persuade the American public that Iraq had WMD: in September 2002 she wrote about an intercepted shipment of aluminum tubes which the NYT said were to be used to develop nuclear material.[citation needed] It is now generally understood that they were not intended (or well suited) for that purpose but rather for artillery rockets.[citation needed] The story was followed up with television appearances by Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice all pointing to the story as part of the basis for taking military action against Iraq. Miller's sources
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Presentation slide used by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell at the UN Security Council in the lead up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq
Iraq were introduced to her by Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi exile favorable to a U.S. invasion of Iraq.[citation needed] Miller is also listed as a speaker for The Middle East Forum, an organization which openly declared support for an invasion.[citation needed] In May 2004 the New York Times published an editorial which stated that its journalism in the build up to war had sometimes been lax. It appears that in the cases where Iraqi exiles were used for the stories about WMD were either ignorant as to the real status of Iraq's WMD or lied to journalists to achieve their own ends.[citation needed] Despite the intelligence lapse, Bush stood by his decision to invade Iraq stating: But what wasn't wrong was Saddam Hussein had invaded a country, he had used weapons of mass destruction, he had the capability of making weapons of mass destruction, he was firing at our pilots. He was a state sponsor of terror. Removing Saddam Hussein was the right thing for world peace and the security of our country. In a speech before the World Affairs Council of Charlotte, NC, on April 7, 2006, President Bush stated that he "fully understood that the intelligence was wrong, and [he was] just as disappointed as everybody else" when U.S. troops failed to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.[82] Intelligence shortly before the 2003 invasion of Iraq was heavily used as support arguments in favor of military intervention, with the October 2002 C.I.A. report on Iraqi WMDs considered to be the most reliable one available at that time.[83] "According to the CIA's report, all U.S. intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons. There is little question that Saddam Hussein wants to develop nuclear weapons." Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) - Congressional Record, October 9, 2002[84] On May 29, 2003, Andrew Gilligan appears on the BBC's Today program early in the morning. Among the contentions he makes in his report are that the government "ordered (the September Dossier, a British Government dossier on WMD) to be sexed up, to be made more exciting, and ordered more facts to be...discovered." The broadcast is not repeated.[85] On May 27, 2003, a secret Defense Intelligence Agency fact-finding mission in Iraq reported unanimously to intelligence officials in Washington that two trailers captured in Iraq by Kurdish troops "had nothing to do with biological weapons." The trailers had been a key part of the argument for the 2003 invasion; Secretary of State Colin Powell had told the United Nations Security Council, "We have firsthand descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails. We know what the fermenters look like. We know what the tanks, pumps, compressors and other parts look like." The Pentagon team had been sent to investigate the trailers after the invasion. The team of experts unanimously found "no connection to anything biological"; one of the experts told reporters that they privately called the trailers "the biggest sand toilets in the world." The report was classified, and the next day, the CIA publicly released the assessment of its Washington analysts that the trailers were "mobile biological weapons production." The White House continued to refer to the trailers as mobile biological laboratories throughout the year, and the Pentagon field report remained classified. It is still classified, but a Washington Post report of April 12, 2006 disclosed some of the details of the report. According to the Post: A spokesman for the DIA asserted that the team's findings were neither ignored nor suppressed, but were incorporated in the work of the Iraqi Survey Group, which led the official search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. The survey group's final report in September 2004 15 months after the technical report was written said the trailers were "impractical" for biological weapons production and were "almost certainly intended" for manufacturing hydrogen for weather balloons.[86] "[No] one in this country probably was more surprised than I when weapons of mass destruction were not used against our troops as they moved toward Baghdad." General Tommy Franks December 2, 2005.[87] On February 6, 2004, U.S. President George W. Bush named an Iraq Intelligence Commission, chaired by Charles Robb and Laurence Silberman, to investigate U.S. intelligence, specifically regarding the 2003 invasion of Iraq and
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Iraq Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. On February 8, 2004, Dr Hans Blix, in an interview on BBC TV, accused the U.S. and UK governments of dramatising the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, in order to strengthen the case for the 2003 war against the government of Saddam Hussein.
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Iraq Survey Group

On May 30, 2003, The U.S. Department of Defense briefed the media that it was ready to formally begin the work of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), a fact finding mission from the coalition of the Iraq occupation into the WMD programs developed by Iraq, taking over from the British-American 75th Exploitation Task Force. On October 6, 2004, the head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), Charles Duelfer, announced to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee that the group found no evidence that Iraq under Saddam Hussein had produced and stockpiled any weapons of mass destruction since 1991, when UN sanctions were imposed.[88] Various nuclear facilities, including the Baghdad Nuclear Research Facility and Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, were found looted in the month following the invasion. (Gellman, May 3, 2003) On June 20, 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that tons of uranium, as well as other radioactive materials such as thorium, had been recovered, and that the vast majority had remained on site. There were several reports of radiation sickness in the area. It has been suggested that the documents and suspected weapons sites were looted and burned in Iraq by looters in the final days of the war.[89] On May 2, 2004, a shell containing mustard gas was found in the middle of a street west of Baghdad. The Iraq Survey Group investigation reported that it had been previously "stored improperly", and thus the gas was "ineffective" as a useful chemical agent. Officials from the Defense Department commented that they were not certain if use was to be made of the device as a bomb.[] On May 16, 2004, a 152mm artillery shell was used as an improvised bomb.[39] The shell exploded and two U.S. soldiers were treated for minor exposure to a nerve agent (nausea and dilated pupils). On May 18 it was reported by U.S. Department of Defense intelligence officials that tests showed the two-chambered shell contained the chemical agent sarin, the shell being "likely" to have contained three to four liters of the substance (in the form of its two unmixed precursor chemicals prior to the aforementioned explosion that had not effectively mixed them).[] Former U.S. weapons inspector David Kay told the Associated Press that "he doubted the shell or the nerve agent came from a hidden stockpile, although he didn't rule out that possibility." Kay also considered it possible that the shell was "an old relic overlooked when Saddam said he had destroyed such weapons in the mid-1990s."[] It is likely that the insurgents who planted the bomb did not know it contained sarin, according to Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, and another U.S. official confirmed that the shell did not have the markings of a chemical agent.[] The Iraq Survey Group later concluded that the shell "probably originated with a batch that was stored in a Al Muthanna CW complex basement during the late 1980s for the purpose of leakage testing."[39] In a July 2, 2004, article published by The Associated Press and Fox News, it was reported that sarin gas warheads dating back to the last IranIraq War were found in South Central Iraq by Polish Allies. The Polish troops secured munitions on June 23, 2004,[90] but it turned out that the warheads did not in fact contain sarin gas but "were all empty and tested negative for any type of chemicals"and it transpired that the Poles had bought the shells for $5,000 each.[91] The United States abandoned its search for WMDs in Iraq on January 12, 2005. On September 30, 2004, the U.S. Iraq Survey Group Final Report concluded that "ISG has not found evidence that Saddam Husayn (sic) possessed WMD stocks in 2003, but the available evidence from its investigationincluding detainee interviews and document exploitationleaves open the possibility that some weapons existed in Iraq although not of a militarily significant capability."[92] Among the key findings of the final ISG report were: 1. "Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of [Iraq's WMD] policy. All senior level Iraqi officials considered Iran to be Iraqs principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also considerations, but secondary."[]
Iraq 2. "Saddam did not consider the United States a natural adversary, as he did Iran and Israel, and he hoped that Iraq might again enjoy improved relations with the United States, according to Tariq Aziz and the presidential secretary."[] 3. Evidence of the maturity and significance of the pre-1991 Iraqi Nuclear Program but found that Iraq's ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively decayed after that date; 4. Concealment of nuclear program in its entirety, as with Iraq's BW program. Aggressive UN inspections after Desert Storm forced Saddam to admit the existence of the program and destroy or surrender components of the program; 5. After Desert Storm, Iraq concealed key elements of its program and preserved what it could of the professional capabilities of its nuclear scientific community; 6. Saddam's ambitions in the nuclear area were secondary to his prime objective of ending UN sanctions; and 7. A limited number of post-1995 activities would have aided the reconstitution of the nuclear weapons program once sanctions were lifted. The report found that "The ISG has not found evidence that Saddam possessed WMD stocks in 2003, but [there is] the possibility that some weapons existed in Iraq, although not of a militarily significant capability." It also concluded that there was a possible intent to restart all banned weapons programs as soon as multilateral sanctions against it had been dropped, with Hussein pursuing WMD proliferation in the future: "There is an extensive, yet fragmentary and circumstantial, body of evidence suggesting that Saddam pursued a strategy to maintain a capability to return to WMD after sanctions were lifted..."[93] No senior Iraqi official interviewed by the ISG believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever. After he was captured by U.S. forces in Baghdad in 2003, Dr. Mahdi Obeidi, who ran Saddam's nuclear centrifuge program until 1997, handed over blueprints for a nuclear centrifuge along with some actual centrifuge components, stored at his home buried in the front yard awaiting orders from Baghdad to proceed. He said, "I had to maintain the program to the bitter end." In his book, "The Bomb in My Garden", the Iraqi physicist explains that his nuclear stash was the key that could have unlocked and restarted Saddam's bombmaking program. However, it would require a massive investment and a re-creation of thousands of centrifuges in order to reconstitute a full centrifugal enrichment program. On October 3, 2003, the world digests David Kay's Iraq Survey Group report that finds no stockpiles of WMD in Iraq, although it states the government intended to develop more weapons with additional capabilities. Weapons inspectors in Iraq do find some "biological laboratories" and a collection of "reference strains", including a strain of botulinum bacteria, "ought to have been declared to the UN." Kay testifies that Iraq had not fully complied with UN inspections. In some cases, equipment and materials subject to UN monitoring had been kept hidden from UN inspectors. "So there was a WMD program. It was going ahead. It was rudimentary in many areas", Kay would say in a later interview.[] In other cases, Iraq had simply lied to the UN in its weapons programs.[94] The U.S.-sponsored search for WMD had at this point cost $300 million and was projected to cost around $600 million more. In David Kay's statement on the interim report of the ISG[95] the following paragraphs are found: "We have not yet found stocks of weapons, but we are not yet at the point where we can say definitively either that such weapon stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war and our only task is to find where they have gone. We are actively engaged in searching for such weapons based on information being supplied to us by Iraqis." "With regard to delivery systems, the ISG team has discovered sufficient evidence to date to conclude that the Iraqi regime was committed to delivery system improvements that would have, if OIF had not occurred, dramatically breached UN restrictions placed on Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf War." "ISG has gathered testimony from missile designers at Al Kindi State Company that Iraq has reinitiated work on converting SA-2 Surface-to-Air Missiles into ballistic missiles with a range goal of about 250km. Engineering work was reportedly underway in early 2003, despite the presence of UNMOVIC. This program was not declared to the UN."
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Iraq "ISG has developed multiple sources of testimony, which is corroborated in part by a captured document, that Iraq undertook a program aimed at increasing the HY-2's range and permitting its use as a land-attack missile. These efforts extended the HY-2's range from its original 100km to 150180km. Ten modified missiles were delivered to the military prior to OIF and two of these were fired from Umm Qasr during OIF one was shot down and one hit Kuwait." Another notable statement is the following: "We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002." The phrase 'WMD-related program activities' was later used in George Bush's state of the union speech. Bush's critics derided Bush for unclear wording and trying to "lower the bar" on confirming his pre-war WMD-claims. In a January 26, 2004 interview with Tom Brokaw of NBC news, Mr. Kay described Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs as being in a "rudimentary" stage. He also stated that "What we did find, and as others are investigating it, we found a lot of terrorist groups and individuals that passed through Iraq."[96] In responding to a question by Mr. Brokaw as to whether Iraq was a "gathering threat" as President Bush had asserted before the invasion, Mr. Kay answered: Tom, an imminent threat is a political judgment. Its not a technical judgment. I think Baghdad was actually becoming more dangerous in the last two years than even we realized. Saddam was not controlling the society any longer. In the marketplace of terrorism and of WMD, Iraq well could have been that supplier if the war had not intervened. In June 2004, the United States removed 2 tons of low-enriched uranium from Iraq, sufficient raw material for a single nuclear weapon.[97] Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, several reported finds of chemical weapons were announced. During the invasion itself, there were half a dozen incidents in which the U.S. military announced that it had found chemical weapons. All of these claims were based on field reports, and were later retracted. After the war, many cases most notably on April 7, 2003 when several large drums tested positive continued to be reported in the same way. Another such post-war case occurred on January 9, 2004, when Icelandic munitions experts and Danish military engineers discovered 36 120-mm mortar rounds containing liquid buried in Southern Iraq. While initial tests suggested that the rounds contained a blister agent, a chemical weapon banned by the Geneva Convention,[citation needed] subsequent analysis by American and Danish experts showed that no chemical agent was present.[98] It appears that the rounds have been buried, and most probably forgotten, since the IranIraq War. Some of the munitions were in an advanced state of decay and most of the weaponry would likely have been unusable. Demetrius Perricos, then head of UNMOVIC, stated that the Kay report contained little information not already known by UNMOVIC.[99] Many organizations, such as the journal Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, have claimed that Kay's report is a "worst case analysis"[100] Beginning in 2003, the ISG had uncovered remnants of Iraq's 1980s-era WMD programs. On June 21, 2006 Rick Santorum claimed that "we have found weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, chemical weapons", citing a declassified June 6 letter to Pete Hoekstra saying that since the 2003 invasion, a total of "approximately 500 weapons munitions which contain degraded mustard or sarin nerve agent" had been found scattered throughout the country.[101][102] The Washington Post reported that "the U.S. military announced in 2004 in Iraq that several crates of the old shells had been uncovered and that they contained a blister agent that was no longer active." It said the shells "had been buried near the Iranian border, and then long forgotten, by Iraqi troops during their eight-year war with Iran, which ended in 1988."[103] On July 2008, 550 metric tonnes of "yellowcake" the last major remnant of Saddam Hussein's nuclear program, a huge stockpile of concentrated natural uranium, arrived in Montreal as part of a top-secret U.S. operation. This transport of the seed material for higher-grade nuclear enrichment, included a two-week airlift from Baghdad and a
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Iraq voyage across two oceans. The Iraqi government sold the yellowcake to a Canadian uranium producer, Cameco Corp., in a transaction the official described as worth "tens of millions of dollars."[104]
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Captured documents
Operation Iraqi Freedom documents refers to some 48,000 boxes of documents, audiotapes and videotapes that were captured by the U.S. military during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Many of these documents seem to make clear that Saddam's regime had given up on seeking a WMD capability by the mid-1990s. Associated Press reported, "Repeatedly in the transcripts, Saddam and his lieutenants remind each other that Iraq destroyed its chemical and biological weapons in the early 1990s, and shut down those programs and the nuclear-bomb program, which had never produced a weapon." At one 1996 presidential meeting, top weapons program official Amer Mohammed Rashid, describes his conversation with UN weapons inspector Rolf Ekeus: "We don't have anything to hide, so we're giving you all the details." At another meeting Saddam told his deputies, "We cooperated with the resolutions 100 percent and you all know that, and the 5 percent they claim we have not executed could take them 10 years to (verify). Don't think for a minute that we still have WMD. We have nothing."[105] U.S. Congressman Peter Hoekstra called for the U.S. government to put the remaining documents on the Internet so Arabic speakers around the world can help translate the documents.[106]
Chemical Weapons Recovered

On June 21, 2006 the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence released key points from a classified report from the National Ground Intelligence Center on the recovery of a small number of degraded chemical munitions in Iraq. The report stated that "Coalition forces have recovered approximately 500 weapons munitions which contain degraded mustard or sarin nerve agent." However, all are thought to be pre-Gulf War munitions.[107] These munitions meet the technical definition of weapons of mass destruction, according to the commander of the National Ground Intelligence Center. "These are chemical weapons as defined under the Chemical Weapons Convention, and yes ... they do constitute weapons of mass destruction," Army Col. John Chu told the House Armed Services Committee. The munitions addressed in the report were produced in the 1980s, Maples said. Badly corroded, they could not currently be used as originally intended, though agent remaining in the weapons would be very valuable to terrorists and insurgents, Maples said.[108]
2009 Declaration
Iraq became a member state of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2009, declaring "two bunkers with filled and unfilled chemical weapons munitions, some precursors, as well as five former chemical weapons production facilities" according to OPCW Director General Rogelio Pfirter.[109] No plans were announced at that time for the destruction of the material, although it was noted that the bunkers were damaged in the 2003 war and even inspection of the site must be carefully planned. The declaration contained no surprises, OPCW spokesman Michael Luhan indicated.[109] The production facilities were "put out of commission" by airstrikes during the 1991 conflict, while U.N. personnel afterward secured the chemical munitions in the bunkers. Luhan stated at the time: "These are legacy weapons, remnants." He declined to discuss how many weapons were stored in the bunkers or what materials they contained. The weapons were not believed to be in a usable state.[109]
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Media perception
In a study published in 2005,[110] a group of researchers assessed the effects reports and retractions in the media had on peoples memory regarding the search for WMD in Iraq during the 2003 Iraq War. The study focused on populations in two coalition countries (Australia and USA) and one opposed to the war (Germany). Results showed that US citizens generally did not correct initial misconceptions regarding WMD, even following disconfirmation; Australian and German citizens were more responsive to retractions. Dependence on the initial source of information led to a substantial minority of Americans exhibiting false memory that WMD were indeed discovered, while they were not. This led to three conclusions: 1. The repetition of tentative news stories, even if they are subsequently disconfirmed, can assist in the creation of false memories in a substantial proportion of people. 2. Once information is published, its subsequent correction does not alter people's beliefs unless they are suspicious about the motives underlying the events the news stories are about. 3. When people ignore corrections, they do so irrespective of how certain they are that the corrections occurred. A poll conducted between June and September 2003 asked people whether they thought evidence of WMD had been discovered in Iraq since the war ended. They were also asked which media sources they relied upon. Those who obtained their news primarily from Fox News were three times as likely to believe that evidence of WMD had been discovered in Iraq than those who relied on PBS and NPR for their news, and one third more likely than those who primarily watched CBS.
Media source Respondents believing evidence of WMD had been found in Iraq Fox CBS NBC CNN ABC Print media PBSNPR 33% 23% 20% 20% 19% 17% 11%
Based on a series of polls taken from JuneSeptember 2003.[111]
References
[1] Cleminson, Ronald. What Happened to Saddam's Weapons of Mass Destruction? (http:/ / www. armscontrol. org/ act/ 2003_09/ Cleminson_09) Arms Control Association. September 2003 [8] Text of Joint Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force on Iraq, Joint Resolution on Iraq (http:/ / www. pbs. org/ newshour/ bb/ middle_east/ july-dec02/ joint_resolution_10-11-02. html), October 11, 2002 [13] Kranish, Michael."Bush staff was warned on Iraq data: State Dept. called uranium link 'dubious'." The Boston Globe July 19, 2003.
State Department warned the White House nine months ago that it was "highly dubious" that Iraq had sought to acquire uranium for nuclear weapons from Africa, and also questioned whether the regime had pursued special aluminum tubes for the same purpose, according to excerpts from an intelligence document the White House made public yesterday
[18] Chulov, Martin and Pidd, Helen (2011-02-15) Defector admits to WMD lies that triggered Iraq war (http:/ / www. guardian. co. uk/ world/ 2011/ feb/ 15/ defector-admits-wmd-lies-iraq-war), The Guardian [19] Britain to help destroy chemical weapons (http:/ / news. yahoo. com/ uk-experts-help-iraq-destroy-chemical-residues-144204378. html), Associated Press [30] Timmerman, Kenneth R. The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq. New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991. [32] Duelfer, Charles. Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (http:/ / www. foia. cia. gov/ duelfer/ Iraqs_WMD_Vol3. pdf), 30 September 2004, Vol 3, "Biological Warfare", p.21. [33] Hidden assets, History Today; March 1994
Iraq
[54] (http:/ / www. ipacademy. org/ Publications/ Articles/ Malone/ PublArtiMaloUNNS_Print. htm) [59] The Case for Iraq's Qualitative Disarmament (http:/ / www. armscontrol. org/ act/ 2000_06/ iraqjun. asp) Arms Control Association June 2000 [60] The Iraqi Threat: How Real Is It? (http:/ / www. northcountrypublicradio. org/ news/ ritter. html) North Country Public Radio October 7, 2002 [105] Documents Show Saddam's WMD Frustrations (http:/ / www. sfgate. com/ cgi-bin/ article. cgi?f=/ n/ a/ 2006/ 03/ 21/ international/ i110439S02. DTL) Associated PressMarch 21, 2006 [109] India Completes Chemical Weapons Disposal; Iraq Declares Stockpile (http:/ / www. globalsecuritynewswire. org/ gsn/ nw_20090427_8248. php), Chris Schneidmiller, Global Security Newswire, April 27, 2009 [111] Misperceptions, the Media and the Iraq War (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20060210232719/ www. pipa. org/ OnlineReports/ Iraq/ IraqMedia_Oct03/ IraqMedia_Oct03_rpt. pdf), PIPA, 2 October 2003
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External links
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports regarding Iraq (http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/ search.tkl?q=iraq&search_crit=subject&search=Search&date1=Anytime&date2=Anytime&type=form) WMD theories and conspiracies (http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=10101) Prospect magazine LookSmart - Iraq WMD Controversy (http://search.looksmart.com/p/browse/us1/us317836/us317911/ us53828/us56177/us70842/us527912/us10101686/us290330/us10151623/us10152821/) directory category Washington Post article by Arthur Keller a former CIA case worker who worked on trying to find WMDs in Iraq (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/07/AR2007120701619_pf.html) Richard S. Tracey, Trapped by a Mindset: The Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure (http://www.airpower.maxwell. af.mil/airchronicles/cc/tracey.html), 23 January 2007, Air & Space Power Journal. Teaser of upcoming documentary film Land of Confusion (http://www.zerechakfilms.com) featuring Pennsylvania Army National Guard Soldiers assigned to the Iraq Survey Group in 2004-05. Annotated bibliography for the Iraqi nuclear weapons program from the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues (http://alsos.wlu.edu/qsearch.aspx?browse=warfare/Iraqi%Nuclear%Weapons%Program)
Israel
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Israel
By type

Israel
244

Israel is widely believed to possess weapons of mass destruction, and to be one of four nuclear-armed countries not recognized as a Nuclear Weapons State by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[1] The US Congress Office of Technology Assessment has recorded Israel as a country generally reported as having undeclared chemical warfare capabilities, and an offensive biological warfare program.[] Officially Israel neither confirms nor denies possessing nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons
It is believed that Israel had possessed an operational nuclear weapons capability by 1967, with the mass production of nuclear warheads occurring immediately after the Six-Day War.[] Although no official statistics exist, it has been estimated that Israel possesses from 75 to as many as 400 nuclear weapons, which are reported to include thermonuclear weapons in the megaton range.[2][3][4] Israel is also reported to possess a wide range of different systems, including neutron bombs, tactical nuclear weapons, and suitcase nukes.[5] Israel is believed to manufacture its nuclear weapons at the Negev Nuclear Research Center. Delivery mechanisms include Jericho intercontinental ballistic missiles, with a range of 11,500km, and which are believed to provide a second-strike option. Israel's nuclear-capable ballistic missiles are believed to be buried so far underground that they would survive a nuclear attack.[][6] Additionally, Israel is believed to have an offshore nuclear second-strike capability, using submarine-launched nuclear-capable cruise missiles, which can be launched from the Israeli Navy's Dolphin-class submarines.[7] Although the Israeli Air Force lacks strategic bombers, its F-15I and F-16I Sufa fighter aircraft are capable of delivering nuclear weapons at strategic distances using their Aerial refueling fleet of modified Boeing 707's.[8] The Israeli government maintains a policy of deliberate ambiguity on whether it has nuclear weapons, saying only that it would "not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East."[9] Former International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei regarded Israel as a state possessing nuclear weapons.[10] Much of what is known about Israel's nuclear program comes from revelations in 1986 by Mordechai Vanunu, a technician at the Negev Nuclear Research Center who served an 18-year prison sentence as a result. Israel has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but supports establishment of a Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction.[11]
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Chemical weapons
Israel has signed but not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).[12] There are speculations that a chemical weapons program might be located at the Israel Institute for Biological Research (IIBR[13]) in Ness Ziona.[14] 190 liters of dimethyl methylphosphonate, a CWC schedule 2 chemical used in the synthesis of sarin nerve gas, was discovered in the cargo of El Al Flight 1862 after it crashed in 1992 en route to Tel Aviv. Israel insisted the material was non-toxic, was to have been used to test filters that protect against chemical weapons, and that it had been clearly listed on the cargo manifest in accordance with international regulations. The shipment was from a U.S. chemical plant to the IIBR under a U.S. Department of Commerce license.[15] In 1993, the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment WMD proliferation assessment recorded Israel as a country generally reported as having undeclared offensive chemical warfare capabilities.[] Former US deputy assistant secretary of defense responsible for chemical and biological defense, Bill Richardson, said in 1998 "I have no doubt that Israel has worked on both chemical and biological offensive things for a long time... There's no doubt they've had stuff for years."[16] Israel is not well prepared to defend against a chemical weapons attack, as could occur with the transfer of Syria's chemical weapons to Hezbollah.[17] However IDF CoS Benny Gantz has warned that an Israeli strike to prevent this could result in a "wider conflict".[18]
Biological weapons
Israel is believed to have developed an offensive biological warfare capability.[] The US Congress Office of Technology Assessment records Israel as a country possessing a long-term, undeclared biological warfare program.[] Israel is not a signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).[19] It is assumed that the Israel Institute for Biological Research in Ness Ziona develops vaccines and antidotes for chemical and biological warfare.[20] It has not been possible to conclude whether Israel currently maintains an offensive biological weapons program; it is speculated that Israel retains an active ability to produce and disseminate biological weapons.[21]
References
[2] http:/ / www. csis. org/ media/ csis/ pubs/ 090316_israelistrikeiran. pdf [3] Brower, Kenneth S., A Propensity for Conflict: Potential Scenarios and Outcomes of War in the Middle East, Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report no. 14, (February 1997), 14-15. [5] Hersh, Seymour M. The Samson Option. New York: Random House, 1991. ISBN 0-394-57006-5 p.220 [6] http:/ / www. scribd. com/ doc/ 6088311/ Missile-Survey-Ballistic-and-Cruise-Missiles-of-Foreign-Countries [8] http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ military/ world/ israel/ iaf. htm [12] United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (http:/ / treaties. un. org/ Pages/ ViewDetails. aspx?src=TREATY& mtdsg_no=XXVI-3& chapter=26& lang=en). Accessed 14 January 2009. [13] . [17] Harel, Amos. "Israel is unprepared to face the threat of Syria's chemical weapons." (http:/ / www. haaretz. com/ blogs/ east-side-story/ israel-is-unprepared-to-face-the-threat-of-syria-s-chemical-weapons. premium-1. 453122?localLinksEnabled=false) Haaretz Newspaper, 23 July 2012. [18] Cohen, Gili. "Attack on Syrian chemical stockpiles could lead to 'broader campaign,' says IDF Chief of Staff." (http:/ / www. haaretz. com/ news/ diplomacy-defense/ attack-on-syrian-chemical-stockpiles-could-lead-to-broader-campaign-says-idf-chief-of-staff. premium-1. 453345?localLinksEnabled=false) Haaretz Newspaper, 24 July 2012.
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Literature
John Douglas-Gray's thriller 'The Novak Legacy.'
External links
Israel Crosses the Threshold, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 189 (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/index.htm), by Avner Cohen and William Burr, April 28, 2006 (originally published at Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2006 (http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=mj06cohen)) Bibliography of Israeli Nuclear Science Publications (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/ nuke/biblio.pdf) by Mark Gorwitz, June 2005 Israeli Nuclear Forces (http://bos.sagepub.com/content/58/5/73.full), 2002, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2002 The Bomb That Never Is (http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2000/mj00/mj00cohen.html), by Avner Cohen, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2000, Vol 56, No. 3 pp.2223 Israel and the Bomb (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/) (Columbia University press, 1998), including declassified documents. Obsessive secrecy undermines democracy (http://www.fas.org/news/israel/000808-israel-1.htm) By Reuven Pedatzur Ha'aretz. Tuesday, August 8, 2000Cohen published "Israel and the Bomb" in the United States, and a Hebrew translation of the book has appeared here. In the eyes of the defense establishment, Cohen has committed a double sin. Fighting to preserve the tattered veil of secrecy (http://www.fas.org/news/israel/000806-eye-haaretz.htm) By Ronen Bergman The publication of Dr. Avner Cohen's book and of the Vanunu trial transcripts set off alarm bells for the Defense Ministry's chief of security, who is striving to protect the traditional opacity regarding Israel's nuclear affairs. Blast, from the past to the present (http://www.fas.org/news/israel/000728-israel-1.htm) By Yirmiyahu Yovel Ha'aretz. 28 July 2000If, in the context of the peace agreements and talks with the United States, Israel were to confirm its nuclear capability - while committing itself to no nuclear testing and pledging to build its defense system on conventional weapons as in the past - maybe then it might achieve at least de facto recognition, if not international legitimacy, for its nuclear weaponry, to be used only as a "last resort" and a tool for safeguarding peace after Israel withdraws. The Third Temple's Holy Of Holies: Israel's Nuclear Weapons (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/ farr.htm) Warner D. Farr, LTC, U.S. Army, September 1999 Israel: Plutonium Production (http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/israel/plut.html) The Risk Report Volume 2 Number 4 (JulyAugust 1996). Israel: Uranium Processing and Enrichment (http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/israel/uranium.html) The Risk Report Volume 2 Number 4 (JulyAugust 1996). Israel The Nuclear Potential of Individual Countries Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (http:// www.fas.org/irp/threat/svr_nuke.htm#israel) Problems of Extension Appendix 2 Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service 6 April 1995 The Samson Option. Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (http://www.amazon.com/exec/ obidos/ASIN/0394570065/) Seymour M Hersh, [New York: Random House, 1991]
Japan
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Japan
By type

Japan
248

Beginning in the mid-1930s, the nation of Japan conducted numerous attempts to acquire and develop weapons of mass destruction. The 1943 Battle of Changde saw Japanese use of both bioweapons and chemical weapons, and the Japanese conducted a serious, though futile, nuclear weapon program. After the end of World War II the nation was forced to cease all production and abandoned their experiments.
Bioweapons
During the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and World War II, Unit 731 and other Special Research Units of the Imperial Japanese Army conducted human experimentation on thousands, mostly Chinese, Korean, Russian, American and other nationalities as well as some Japanese criminals from the Japanese mainlands.[1] In military campaigns, the Japanese army used biological weapons on Chinese soldiers and civilians. This employment was largely viewed as ineffective, due to inefficient delivery systems. However, information has surfaced in the last decade, which alleges a more active Japanese usage. For example, firsthand accounts testify the Japanese infected civilians through the distribution of plague-infested foodstuffs, such as dumplings and vegetables. There are also reports of contaminated water supplies. Such estimates report over 580,000 victims, largely due to plague and cholera outbreaks. In addition, repeated seasonal outbreaks after the conclusion of the war bring the death toll much higher. During Changde chemical weapon attack attacks, the Japanese also employed biological warfare by intentionally spreading cholera, dysentery, typhoid, bubonic plague, and anthrax. Other battles include Kaimingye germ weapon attack.
Chemical weapons
The Japanese used mustard gas and the blister agent Lewisite, against Chinese troops and guerillas in China, amongst others during the Changde chemical weapon attack. Experiments involving chemical weapons were conducted on live prisoners (Unit 516). As of 2005, 60 years after the end of the war, canisters that were abandoned by Japan in their hasty retreat are still being dug up in construction sites, causing injuries and allegedly even deaths. In December 1993, Japan signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, ratified it in 1995 and was thus a state party upon entering into force in 1997.[2] However, JSDF possess chemical weapons facilities and some samples for protection which it said JGSDF Central NBC protection Troop.Wikipedia:Please clarify In 1995, JGSDF admitted possession of sarin for samples.[citation needed]
Japan
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Nuclear weapons
A Japanese program to develop nuclear weapons was conducted during World War II. Like the German nuclear weapons program, it suffered from an array of problems, and was ultimately unable to progress beyond the laboratory stage before the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Japanese surrender in August 1945. The postwar Constitution forbids the establishment of offensive military forces, and in 1967 it adopted the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, ruling out the production, possession, or introduction of nuclear weapons. While there are currently no known plans in Japan to produce nuclear weapons, it has been argued that Japan has the technology, raw materials, and the capital to produce nuclear weapons within one year if necessary, and some analysts consider it a de facto nuclear state for this reason.[3] For this reason Japan is often said to be a "screwdriver's turn"[4][5] away from possessing nuclear weapons.
References
[1] AII POW-MIA Unit 731 (http:/ / www. aiipowmia. com/ 731/ 731caveat. html)
Netherlands
By type

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Brazil Bulgaria Burma Canada PRC France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel
Netherlands

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Japan Libya Mexico Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Sweden Syria ROC (Taiwan) Ukraine United Kingdom United States Proliferation

Although the Netherlands does not have weapons of mass destruction made by itself, the country participates in the NATO nuclear weapons sharing arrangements and trains for delivering U.S. nuclear weapons, i.e., it has weapons of mass destruction made by another country. The Netherlands is also one of the producers of components that can be used for creating deadly agents, chemical weapons and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. Several Dutch companies provided Iraq with components for these weapons. The Netherlands ratified the Geneva Protocol on 31 October 1930. It also ratified the Biological Weapons Convention on 10 April 1972 and the Chemical Weapons Convention on 30 June 1995.
United States-NATO nuclear weapons sharing

The Netherlands ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 2 May 1975. In the past (1960's till 1990's) the Netherlands took part in deployments of NATO nuclear artillery shells for its self-propelled howitzers and missile artillery units. These 8inch shells and warheads for Honest John and later Lance missiles were stored at the special ammunition storages 't Harde and Havelterberg. They are not operational anymore. Until 2006 Royal Netherlands Navy P-3 Orion aircraft and their predecessors the P-2 Neptunes, based at former Airbase Valkenburg near Leiden and Curaao in the Caribbean were assigned U.S. Navy Nuclear Depth Bombs (NDB) for use in anti-submarine warfare. These weapons were originally the Mk 101 Lulu yielding 11 kT, and a later replacement the Mk-57 (also referred to as the B-57).
Netherlands The NDBs were stored under U.S. Marine guard at RAF St. Mawgan, Cornwall, UK, with 60 similar weapons stored there for RAF Shackleton and Nimrod aircraft. The storage arrangements were agreed between the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and President Johnson in 1965 in a secret memorandum now declassified in the UK archives. At present (2008) the USAF still provides 22 tactical B61 nuclear bombs for use by the Netherlands under the NATO nuclear weapons sharing agreement. These weapons are stored at Volkel Air Base and in time of war they may be delivered by Royal Netherlands Air Force F-16 warplanes.[1] Many countriesWikipedia:Avoid weasel words believe this violates Articles I and II of the NPT, where the Netherlands has committed:[citation needed] "... not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly ... or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices ...". The U.S. insists its forces control the weapons and that no transfer of the nuclear bombs or control over them is intended "unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which the [NPT] treaty would no longer be controlling", so there is no breach of the NPT.[]
251
Dutch production of CW precursor chemicals

Alongside other companies from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the United States, Belgium, Spain, India, and Brazil, Dutch companies provided Iraq with the chemicals used as precursors to produce chemical weapons for use against Iran in the IranIraq War. 2000 Iranians who suffered from chemical warfare during the IranIraq War (19801988) submitted an indictment some years ago with a Tehran court against nine companies that had provided Saddam Hussein with these chemicals. 455 American and European companies provided aid to Iraq during its war with Iran and two thirds of the companies were German. The United Nations published a 12,000-page report about the conflict and named the entire suite of companies involved.[citation needed]
Poison gas experiments

On February 20, 2008, it was revealed that the Netherlands had conducted chemical warfare experiments with nerve gas in the early 1950s. These experiments were conducted by the TNO organization, on request of the Defense Department. They consisted of the use of sarin, tabun, soman, and a modified French gas called Stof X (Substance X), which was more poisonous than sarin. The experiments were carried out on animals in the village of Harskamp and at the island Vlieland on the Vliehors bombing range.[2] After 1956, there were only experiments conducted jointly with France and Belgium in the desert of Algeria, which utilized 6 kilograms of Stof X. The reason behind these experiments was the fear of an attack by the Soviet Union.[3]
Netherlands
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Notes
[2] UNIQ-nowiki-0-6a261ad2651cd843-QINU [3] NRC newspaper, 19 feb. 2008 (http:/ / www. bndestem. nl/ algemeen/ binnenland/ nederland-deed-in-jaren-50-proeven-met-gifgas-1. 581237)
References
Norris, Robert S.; Andrew Burrows, Richard Fieldhouse (1994). Vol.5. British, French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear Weapons Databook. Oxford: Westview Press. ISBN0-8133-1612-X. UK-U.S. Memorandum of Understanding of Use of Nuclear Weapons. 1965. DEFE 24/691-E28, Contained in an exchange of letters between Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Pres Lyndon B.Johnson, declassified 2002, and now in the UK National Archives, London filed as DEFE 24/691-E28 To Dutch Navy weapons sharing and storage Radiator. Southern Region CND. April 1984
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North Korea
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Nuclear program start date 1957 First nuclear weapon test Last nuclear test Largest yield test October 9, 2006 February 12, 2013 6~40 kt [] (The yield is disputed. The North-Korean government never announced the exact yield. ) 3, possibly 5 [][1] []
Total tests Current stockpile Maximum missile range NPT signatory
12-27 nuclear weapons equivalents (ISIS mid-range estimate) 4,000 km (BM25 Musudan) Yes, but withdrew in 2003
By type

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Brazil Bulgaria Burma Canada
North Korea

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PRC France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Mexico Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Sweden Syria ROC (Taiwan) Ukraine United Kingdom United States Proliferation

Nuclear weapons
Background

History Warfare Arms race Design Testing
North Korea

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Effects Delivery Espionage Proliferation Arsenals Terrorism Opposition

North Korea and weapons of mass destruction
North Korea
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Events Missile tests 1993 1998 2006 2009 Nuclear tests 2006 2009 2013 Weapons Taepodong-1 Taepodong-2 See also Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground Ryanggang explosion Yongbyon Korean People's Army Songun
North Korea (officially the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK) declared in 2009 that it had developed a nuclear weapon, and is widely believed to possess a small stockpile of relatively simple nuclear weapons. The CIA assesses that North Korea also has a substantial arsenal of chemical weapons. North Korea was a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but withdrew in 2003, citing the failure of the United States to fulfill its end of the Agreed Framework, a 1994 agreement between the states to limit North Korea's nuclear ambitions, begin normalization of relations, and help North Korea supply some energy needs through nuclear reactors. The IAEA has met with Ri Je Son, The Director General of the General Department of Atomic Energy (GDAE) of DPRK, to discuss nuclear matters.[2][3] Ri Je Son was also mentioned in this role in 2002 in a United Nations article.[4] On October 9, 2006, the North Korean government issued an announcement that it had successfully conducted a nuclear test for the first time. Both the United States Geological Survey and Japanese seismological authorities detected an earthquake with a preliminary estimated magnitude of 4.3 in North Korea, corroborating some aspects of the North Korean claims.[] On January 6, 2007, the North Korean government further confirmed that it had nuclear weapons.[] In April 2009, reports surfaced that North Korea has become a "fully fledged nuclear power", an opinion shared by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei.[5] On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted another nuclear test, which is believed to have been the cause of a magnitude 4.7 seismic event.[] Although there is no official information about the test's location, it is believed that it happened at the site of the first nuclear test at Mantapsan, Kilju County, in the north-eastern part of North Korea.[6] By 2016, North Korea could have 14 to 48 "nuclear weapon equivalents." (For uranium weapons, each weapon is assumed to contain 20 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium.)[] On February 11, 2013, the USGS detected a magnitude 5.1 seismic disturbance,[7] reported to be a third underground nuclear test.[8] North Korea has officially reported it as a successful nuclear test with a lighter warhead, and yet delivers more force than before without mentioning the exact yield. South Korean sources put the yield estimation at 6 to 7kt of TNT However, the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources, a state-run geology research institute in Germany, estimated the yield at 40 kilotons.[][9] while South Korean sources later revised the yield to 6-9 kilotons using the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organizations calculation method.[] The Korea Institute of Geosciences and Mineral Resources estimated the yield as 7.7-7.8 kilotons.[10]
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Chronology of events
Korean War
Korea has been a divided country since 1945, when it was liberated from the defeated Japan after World War II. The Korean War was fought from June 25, 1950, until an Armistice Agreement was signed on July 27, 1953. As part of the Armistice, both sides, including U.S. forces, conduct military patrols within the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).[11] The United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) serves the purpose of regulating and supervising the conditions of the Armistice agreement.[12] During the Korean War, North Korea was dependent on military assistance from both the Soviet Union and China. USSR and China were not just assistants in military, and continued to be pivotal trading partners and diplomatic pillars to North Korea until the 1990s. The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of communism in Europe caused significant change with Moscow and Pyongyangs relations. This divide was further widened when Russia entered into diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1990. China was also growing closer and friendlier with Seoul. North Koreas ties with China also decreased. China ultimately established diplomatic relations with South Korea in August 1992. These diplomatic losses coupled with future sanctions from countries such as the United States continue to isolate North Korea from the rest of the world.[13] In September 1956 the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Radford told the U.S. Department of State that the U.S. military intention was to introduce atomic weapons into Korea. From January 1957 the U.S. National Security Council considered, on President Eisenhower's instruction, and then agreed this. However, paragraph 13(d) of the Korean Armistice Agreement mandated that both sides should not introduce new types of weapons into Korea, so preventing the introduction of nuclear weapons and missiles. The U.S. decided to unilaterally abrogate paragraph 13(d), breaking the Armistice Agreement, despite concerns by United Nations allies.[][] At a June 21, 1957, meeting of the Military Armistice Commission the U.S. informed the North Korean representatives that the U.N. Command no longer considered itself bound by paragraph 13(d) of the armistice.[] In August 1957 NSC 5702/2[14] permitting the deployment of nuclear weapons in Korea was approved.[] In January 1958 nuclear armed Honest John missiles and 280mm atomic cannons were deployed to South Korea,[] a year later adding nuclear armed Matador cruise missiles with the range to reach China and the Soviet Union.[][] North Korea denounced the abrogation of paragraph 13(d) as an attempt to wreck the armistice agreement and turn Korea into a U.S. atomic warfare zone. At the U.N. General Assembly in November 1957 the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia condemned the decision of the United Nations Command to introduce nuclear weapons into Korea.[] North Korea responded militarily by digging massive underground fortifications resistant to nuclear attack, and forward deployment of its conventional forces so that the use of nuclear weapons against it would endanger South Korean and U.S. forces as well.[] In 1963 North Korea asked the Soviet Union for help in developing nuclear weapons, but was refused. However, instead the Soviet Union agreed to help North Korea develop a peaceful nuclear energy program, including the training of nuclear scientists. China later, after its nuclear tests, similarly rejected North Korean requests for help with developing nuclear weapons.[] Tensions between North and South have run high on numerous occasions since 1953. The deployment of the U.S. Army's Second Infantry Division on the Korean peninsula and the American military presence at the DMZ are publicly regarded by North Korea as an occupying army. In several areas, North Korean and American/South Korean forces operate in extreme proximity to the border, adding to tension. This tension has led to numerous clashes, including the Axe Murder Incident of 1976. In the early 1960s security concerns in the region and an apparent Soviet dismissal of these concerns hastened the DPRK's efforts to acquire the technology to produce nuclear weapons. In the wake of the student-led April 19 movement in 1960 that overthrew the South Korean president Rhee Syngman and the May 16, 1961, military coup d'tat that brought General Park Chung-hee to power in the south, North Korea sought a mutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union and China.
North Korea Soviet leaders reportedly did not even consider such a pact necessary, despite the military posture of the anti-communist Park regime, as long as the Soviets improved relations with the United States.[15] Perhaps the two most important factors in North Korea's attempts to obtain nuclear weapons and become militarily self-reliant were the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 and the prospect of a U.S.JapanROK alliance following the 1965 establishment of diplomatic relations between the ROK and Japan. Kim Il-sung reportedly did not trust that the Soviets would live up to the conditions of the mutual defense pact and guarantee North Korea's security since they betrayed Castro by withdrawing nuclear missiles in an effort to improve relations with the United States. As a North Korean official explained to Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in 1965, "the Korean leaders were distrustful of the CPSU and the Soviet government, they could not count on that the Soviet government would keep the obligations related to the defense of Korea it assumed in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, Kim Il-sung said, and therefore they were compelled to keep an army of 700,000 and a police force of 200,000." In explaining the cause of such mistrust, the official claimed that "the Soviet Union had betrayed Cuba at the time of the Caribbean crisis."[16] However, as recently declassified Russian, Hungarian, and East German materials confirm, no communist governments were willing to share the technology with the North Koreans, out of fear that they would share the technology with China.[17] With the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korean leaders recognized the need for a new security relationship with a major power since Pyongyang could not afford to maintain its military posture. North Korean leaders therefore sought to forge a new relationship with the United States, the only power strong enough to step into the vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union. From the early 1990s, throughout the first nuclear crisis, North Korea sought a non-aggression pact with the United States. The U.S. rejected North Korean calls for bilateral talks concerning a non-aggression pact, and stated that only six-party talks that also include the People's Republic of China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea are acceptable. The American stance was that North Korea had violated prior bilateral agreements, thus such forums lacked accountability. Conversely, North Korea refused to speak in the context of six-party talks, stating that it would only accept bilateral talks with the United States. This led to a diplomatic stalemate. On October 9, 2006, the North Korean government issued an announcement that it had successfully conducted a nuclear test for the first time. Both the United States Geological Survey and Japanese seismological authorities detected an earthquake with a preliminary estimated magnitude of 4.3 in North Korea, corroborating some aspects of the North Korean claims.[] On November 19, 2006, North Korea's Minju Joson newspaper accused South Korea of building up arms in order to attack the country, claiming that "the South Korean military is openly clamoring that the development and introduction of new weapons are to target the North." North Korea accused South Korea of conspiring with the United States to attack it, an accusation made frequently by the North and routinely denied by the United States.[18] The United Nations Security Council condemned the test in Resolution 1874. On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted a second test of a nuclear weapon at the same location as the original test (not confirmed). The test weapon was of the same magnitude as the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in the 2nd World War, (confirmed South Korea and Russia). At the same time of the test North Korea tested two short range missiles (reported a South Korean News Network YTN not officially confirmed). In July 2011, Abdul Qadeer Khan, the key figure in Pakistan's nuclear weapons development, allegedly claimed that North Korea had gained access to Pakistan's nuclear technology in the late 1990s by paying bribes to Pakistan's senior military officials, a claim Pakistan's senior officials disputed. Khan stated that he had personally helped transfer $3 million in gratuities to senior Pakistan's military officers, though he never provided any proofs to his claims.[19] North Korea is not a member state of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CNTBTO).[20]
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North Korea United States relations

After the loss of partners in the former USSR and China, North Korea looked to strengthen ties with the United States, but was ultimately unsuccessful. Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, the U.S. government agreed to facilitate the supply of two light water reactors to North Korea (which were never completed).[21][22] Such reactors are considered "more proliferation-resistant than North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors,"[23] but not "proliferation proof."[24] The Swiss based company ABB in 2000 signed a $200 million contract to deliver equipment and services for two nuclear power stations at Kumho, on North Korea's east coast. Donald Rumsfeld, who later became the U.S. Secretary of Defence, was on the board of ABB when it won this deal, but a Pentagon spokeswoman, Victoria Clark, said that Rumsfeld did not recall it being brought before the board at any time.[25] Even though U.S. President George W. Bush had named North Korea as part of an "Axis of evil" following the September 11, 2001 attacks, U.S. officials stated that the United States was not planning any immediate military action. On January 21, 2004, Siegfried S. Hecker, an American delegate, was sent to observe the situation. During the visit, North Korea continued to show interest in resuming six-party talks. Furthermore, the reprocessing plant was running at the time of the visit. North Korean Vice Minister Kim expressed concern over inviting the delegate over. During the visit North Korea admitted to repurposing plutonium so that they could be used for creating nuclear weaponry (see Nuclear Deterrence). However, after the delegate requested later discussions, the Vice Minister had to decline. The Agreed Framework pact with the United States was created to ensure that two light reactors were shipped to North Korea. However, because America persuaded the KEBO board to stop shipments of oil, the pact was terminated. Furthermore, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. During the delegation Vice Minister Kim also stated the need for haste, suggesting that time spent without negotiation would be time North Korea could spend repurposing more plutonium. The delegates visit ended with Vice Minister Kim asking whether or not the United States would refrain from action if repurposing was finished. The delegate suggested that the visit allowed the United States to confirm North Koreas nuclear capabilities.[26] According to John Feffer, co-director of the Foreign Policy in Focus, in 2006 The primary problem is that the current U.S. administration fundamentally doesnt want an agreement with North Korea. The Bush administration considers the 1994 Agreed Framework to have been a flawed agreement. It doesnt want be saddled with a similar agreement, for if it did sign one, it would then be open to charges of "appeasing" Pyongyang. The Vice President has summed up the approach as: "We dont negotiate with evil, we defeat evil."[27] Diplomatic efforts at resolving the North Korean situation are complicated by the different goals and interests of the nations of the region. While none of the parties desire a North Korea with nuclear weapons,[28] Japan and South Korea are especially concerned about North Korean counter-strikes following possible military action against North Korea. The People's Republic of China and South Korea are also very worried about the economic and social consequences should this situation cause the North Korean government to collapse. The Obama administration has demonstrated more willingness to negotiate with North Korea than the previous administration and has indicated that de-nuclearizing the Korean peninsula is a priority.[29] Recent bilateral activities between the United States and North Korea have included an April 2011 visit by former President Jimmy Carter, a July 2011 meeting between U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth and North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan, and a February 2012 bilateral meeting in Beijing that resulted in an agreement to halt uranium enrichment in exchange for U.S. food aid (which has now been cancelled due to North Korea's April 2012 long-range missile test).[30] Additionally, the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance Report[31] declared a rebalancing of national security and military focus towards the Asia-Pacific region with special mention of North Korea:
North Korea "We will maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula by effectively working with allies and other regional states to deter and defend against provocation from North Korea, which is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program."[31] In February 2012, North Korea announced that it would suspend uranium enrichment at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center and not conduct any further tests of nuclear weapons while productive negotiations involving the United States continue. This agreement included a moratorium on long-range missiles tests. Additionally, North Korea agreed to allow IAEA inspectors to monitor operations at Yongbyon. The United States reaffirmed that it had no hostile intent toward the DPRK and was prepared to improve bilateral relationships, and agreed to ship humanitarian food aid to North Korea.[][32][33] The United States called the move "important, if limited," but said it would proceed cautiously and that talks would resume only after North Korea made steps toward fulfilling its promise.[] However, after North Korea conducted a provocative long-range missile test in April 2012 that ended in failure, the United States decided not to proceed with the promised food aid.[34] The United States has on occasion turned a blind eye to relations between Egypt and North Korea. North Korea and Egypt have been trading partners for years, to the point where Egypt has had assistance in creating missiles and munitions.[35]
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Nuclear deterrence
Former South Korean Government sources Wikipedia:Avoid weasel words, as well as some scholars and analysts, have argued that North Korea is using nuclear weapons primarily as a political tool to begin re-establishing normal relations with the U.S., Japan and South Korea, and to end the long-standing economic embargo against North Korea.[36] They point out that the threat of nuclear weapons is the only thing that has brought the U.S., Japan and South Korea into serious negotiations. In a lecture in 1993, Bruce Cumings asserted that based on information gathered by the CIA, the activity around the Yongbyon facility may have been done expressly to draw the attention of U.S. satellites. He also pointed out that the CIA had not claimed North Korea had nuclear weapons, but that they had enough material to create such weapons should they choose to do so. Others argue that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons for the same reason most other countries develop themnamely to give their nation a sense of power in the world, enabling them to further their goals without fear of reprisal. Further to this argument is the observation that many parties have a vested interest in the claim that North Korea has nuclear weapons. For North Korea, it has been a bargaining tool for opening diplomatic discussions. The nuclear development program can be manipulated in exchange for foreign aid. Nuclear posturing has also been seen as a threat that could force the re-unification of the Korean peninsula. The Grand National Party, currently the ruling party in South Korea, have stated that they will not return to the Sunshine policy before North Korea gives up their nuclear weapons. South Korean newspapers have warned that North Korea's nuclear arsenal could destroy South Korea's conventional forces, and that the strategic military balance has irrevocably shifted in the aftermath of North Korea's nuclear test. Finally, the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea has fed South Korea's perceived need for a larger standing army and defence force. During the 2004 visit by the U.S delegate, discussions with Ambassador Li and Vice Minister Kim in Pyongyang, the two stressed that North Korea is in possession of a nuclear deterrent and that U.S actions have caused them to strengthen the deterrent. This was done in both quality and quantity. According to Hecker, in order to make a deterrent it is required that a state have the following three things: 1.) The ability to make plutonium metal 2.) The ability to design and build a nuclear device 3.) The ability to integrate the nuclear device into a delivery system. The delegate reports confirming only the first requirement.[37] Some LDP politicians in Japan have openly expressed a desire to change Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which prohibits the use of force as a tool for resolving international disputes. This desire has become increasingly relevant given the ability of North Korea's Rodong-1 missile to strike Tokyo, and it has gained increasing support as a result. Some estimates have claimed that as many as 3 of the 200 Rodong-1 missiles currently deployed may be
North Korea fitted with nuclear warheads.[38] Further fears about North Korea's ability to generate weapons-grade fissile materials in its projected civilian nuclear reactors have led to the consideration of the threat posed by the entire Rodong-1 missile fleet being armed with nuclear warheads and targeted on the Japanese home islands. (The missiles are able to cover 90% of Japanese territory. Moreover, their accuracy is so poor that they are only valid delivery systems when targeted on very large military installations or cities.) Because it is impossible to be certain of shooting down every ballistic missile, it is preferable to ensure that the weapons cannot be manufactured in the first place. An attack on a plutonium production reactor, such as that carried out by the Israelis on the Iraqi reactor complex at Osirak (Operation Opera), may prevent or delay later nuclear attacks, though such an act could be seen as an act of war and subject to retaliation (albeit with conventional weaponry). Perhaps because of this both the Clinton and Bush administrations did not attempt an attack on North Korean nuclear facilities. Other avenues leading to the same result have failed: during the 2006 negotiations, North Korea rejected the suggestion that it demolish its two larger reactors. On March 17, 2007, North Korea told delegates at international nuclear talks that it is preparing to shut down its main nuclear facility. The agreement was reached following a series of six-party talks, involving North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan and the U.S. begun in 2003. According to the agreement, a list of its nuclear programs will be submitted and the nuclear facility will be disabled in exchange for fuel aid and normalization talks with the U.S. and Japan.[39] This had been delayed from April due to a dispute with the United States over Banco Delta Asia, but on July 14, International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors confirm the shutdown of North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear reactor.[40] North Korea's ability to fulfill its energy needs has been deteriorating since the 1990s. Although North Korea's indigenous nuclear power-generating capacity is insignificant, the two light-water moderated plants would be an important source of electricity in a nation with scant resources. Donald Rumsfeld demonstrated the severe lack of electricity for the entire nation in a photograph released in October 2006.[41]
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Reactivation
During 2008 tensions resurfaced between North Korea and the U.S. due to disagreements over the six-party talks disarmament process. According to one account, the talks began to break down after the United States insisted on more intrusive verification measures than North Korea was prepared to accept.[42] On October 8, 2008, IAEA inspectors were forbidden by the North Korean government to conduct further inspections of the site. But two days later, the U.S. removed North Korea from the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list and the Yongbyon deactivation process was expected to resume.[43] On April 25, 2009, however, the North Korean government announced that the country's nuclear facilities have been reactivated,[44] and that spent fuel reprocessing for arms-grade plutonium has been restored.[45] On May 25, 2009, North Korea confirmed to have performed a USGS image of the earthquake caused by the nuclear test. "successful" underground nuclear test. It was the second such test and it was said to be much more powerful than the first. The same day a successful short range missile test was also conducted. The confirmation came little more than an hour after the U.S. Geological Survey reported a magnitude 4.7 seismic disturbance on the proximity of the site of North Korea's first nuclear test conducted in October 2006, other agencies such as the International Data Center of the CTBTO, and the Japanese Meteorological Center, also registered the seismic variations. North Korea's Korean Central News Agency
North Korea said the test was conducted as part of the measures to bolster up its nuclear deterrent for self-defense in every way.[46]
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Hardware
Plutonium North Korea has had two operating reactors, both located at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. The older reactor is a Russian supplied IRT-2000 research reactor completed in 1967.[47] Uranium irradiated in this reactor was used in North Korea's first plutonium separation experiments in 1975.[48] Nevertheless, the primary purpose of the reactor is not to produce plutonium and North Korea has had trouble acquiring enough fuel for constant operation. The U.S. Department of Energy estimated that this reactor could have been used to produce up to 12kg of plutonium, though the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee said that the amount was no more than a few hundred grams.[49] North Korea's main reactor, where practically all of its plutonium has been produced, is a 5MWe gas-graphite moderated Magnox type reactor. A full core 5 MWe experimental reactor at Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific consists of 8,000 fuel rods and can yield a maximum of 2729kg of plutonium if Research Center left in the reactor for optimal burnup.[50] The North Korean Plutonium Stock, Mid-2006, it is estimated to be able to produce 0.9 grams of plutonium per thermal megawatt every day of its operations. The material required to make a single bomb is approximately four to eight kilograms.[51] Often, North Korea has unloaded the reactor before reaching the maximum burnup level. There are three known cores which were unloaded in 1994 (under IAEA supervision in accordance with the Agreed Framework), 2005, and 2007. In 1989, the 5MWe reactor was shut down for a period of seventy to a hundred days. In this time it is estimated that up to fifteen kilograms of plutonium could have been extracted. In 1994, North Korea unloaded its reactors again. The International Atomic Energy Agency had these under full surveillance until later being denied the ability to observe North Korean power plants.[52] Under normal operation, the reactor can produce about 6kg of plutonium per year although the reactor would need to be shut down and the fuel rods extracted to begin the plutonium separation process. Hence, plutonium separation takes place in campaigns. Reprocessing (also known as separation) is known to have taken place in 2003 for the first core and 2005 for the second core. North Korea also had two additional graphite moderated reactors being built, but that have since become unsalvageable since maintenance of their construction sites was not allowed under the Agreed Framework. The first of these two partially constructed reactors was also in the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. It was to be 50MWe and able to produce 60kg of plutonium per year, enough for approximately 10 weapons. The second partially constructed reactor was in nearby Taechon. It was to be 200 MWe and able to produce roughly 220kg of plutonium annually, enough for approximately 40 weapons.[53] On March 12, 1993, North Korea said that it planned to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and refused to allow inspectors access to its nuclear sites. By 1994, the United States believed that North Korea had enough reprocessed plutonium to produce about 10 bombs with the amount of plutonium increasing.[54] Faced with diplomatic pressure after UN Security Council Resolution 825 and the threat of American military air strikes against the reactor, North Korea agreed to dismantle its plutonium program as part of the Agreed Framework in which South Korea and the United States would provide North Korea with light water reactors and fuel oil until those reactors could be completed. Because the light water reactors would require enriched uranium to be imported from outside
North Korea North Korea, the amount of reactor fuel and waste could be more easily tracked, making it more difficult to divert nuclear waste to be reprocessed into plutonium. However, with bureaucratic red tape and political obstacles from the North Korea, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), established to advance the implementation of the Agreed Framework, had failed to build the promised light water reactors because the United States failed to uphold their end of the agreement by providing energy aid, and in late 2002, North Korea returned to using its old reactors. In 2006, there were eight sites identified as potential test explosion sites for current (and future) tests according to a statement by the South Korean Parliament. These sites are distinguished from a number of other nuclear materials production facilities in that they are thought to be most closely identified with a military, or potentially military purpose:[55] 1. Hamgyong Bukdo (North Hamgyong) Province 2 Sites: Chungjinsi Nuclear fuel storage site, military base & unidentified underground facility Kiljugun Extensive military buildup with motorized troop formations and construction of new advanced underground facility Site of May 25, 2009, Nuclear Test. Phunggyere Site of October 9, 2006, Nuclear Test 2. Chagangdo Province 1 Site: Kanggyesi Production center of North Korea's advanced equipment and munitions since 1956. Also, extensive intelligence of highly advanced underground facility. 3. Pyongan Bukdo (North Pyongan) Province 4 Sites: Yongbyonsi 2 Sites Location of Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, and the facility's Experimental Test Explosion facility and two unidentified underground facilities. In addition, there is a gas-graphite reactor, HE test site, nuclear fuel fabrication site, nuclear waste storage site Kusungsi Between 1997 and September 2002, approximately 70 test explosions of North Korean munitions took place. Also, existence of underground facility Taechongun 200MWe Nuclear Energy Plant construction site. Location of unidentified underground facility and nuclear arms/energy related facilities known to exist 4. Pyongan Namdo (South Pyongan) Province 1 Site: Pyongsungsi Location of National Science Academy and extensive underground facility whose purpose is not known. Enriched uranium and foreign assistance With the abandonment of its plutonium program, U.S. officials claimed North Korea began an enriched uranium program. Prime minister Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, allegedly, through Pakistan's former top scientist, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, supplied key data, stored in CDs, on uranium enrichment and information to North Korea in exchange for missile technology around 19901996, according to U.S. intelligence officials. President Pervez Musharraf and Prime minister Shaukat Aziz acknowledged in 2005 that Khan had provided centrifuges and their designs to North Korea.[56] On May 30, 2008, ABC News reported that Khan, who previously confessed to his involvement with Iran and North Korea, now denies involvement with the spread of nuclear arms to those countries. He claimed in an interview with ABC News that the Pakistan Government, under Shaukat Aziz, and President Pervez Musharraf forced him to be a "scapegoat" for the "national interest". He also denied ever traveling to Iran or Libya, and claimed that North Korea's nuclear program was well advanced before his visit.[57] This program was publicized in October 2002 when the United States asked North Korean officials about the program.[58] Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea explicitly agreed to freeze plutonium programs (specifically, its "graphite moderated reactors and related facilities"). The agreement also committed North Korea to implement the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, in which both Koreas committed not to have enrichment or reprocessing facilities. The United States argued North Korea violated its commitment not to have enrichment facilities.
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North Korea In December 2002, the United States persuaded the KEDO Board to suspend fuel oil shipments, which led to the end of the Agreed Framework. North Korea responded by announcing plans to reactivate a dormant nuclear fuel processing program and power plant north of Pyongyang. North Korea soon thereafter expelled United Nations inspectors and withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 2007, reports emanating from Washington suggested that the 2002 CIA reports indicating that North Korea was developing uranium enrichment technology had overstated or misread the intelligence. U.S. officials were no longer making this a major issue in the six-party talks.[][][]
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Nuclear fusion claims

In May 2010, the Rodong Sinmun announced in an article that North Korea had successfully carried out a nuclear fusion reaction. The aforementioned article, referring to the alleged test as "a great event that demonstrated the rapidly developing cutting-edge science and technology of the DPRK", also makes mention of efforts by North Korean scientists to develop "safe and environment-friendly new energy", and made no mention of plans to use fusion technology in its nuclear weapons program.[59] This claim has been greeted with skepticism, as no country has successfully mastered nuclear fusion, despite decades of advanced research work around the world. In 2013, the South Korean Defense Ministry speculated that North Korea may be trying to develop a "hydrogen bomb" and such a device may be North Korea's next weapons test.[60][61]
Biological and chemical weapons

North Korea acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987, and the Geneva Protocol on January 4, 1989, but has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. The country is believed to possess a substantial arsenal of chemical weapons. It reportedly acquired the technology necessary to produce tabun and mustard gas as early as the 1950s.[62] In 1945, during World War II, North Korea gained technologies, chemical agents and protection against them from the Soviet Union and China. North Korea itself holds a plethora of natural raw resources, and the years up to 1959 were filled with swift development in North Koreas chemical industry.[citation needed] Since 1989 North Korea has been believed to have the capability to indigenously produce nerve, blister, choking and blood chemical agents in bulk. Furthermore, North Korea has spent substantial resources in defensive measures such as extensive training in the use of gas masks, suits, detectors and decontamination systems for both the civilian populace and the military. North Korea maintains at least eight industrial facilities that are capable of creating biochemical weaponry. The United States estimates North Koreas stockpile of chemical weaponry from at least a few hundred tons, to at most a few thousand tons.[63] Using a study by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, it was confirmed that there was a stockpile of biological and chemical weaponry.[64] South Korea estimates North Korea to have roughly 5,000 tons worth of biological and chemical weapons. The South Korean government further estimated production capability, with a low of 4,500 tons in peacetime, and a high of 12,000 tons in wartime. However, during the 1990s, natural disasters and increasing economic restrictions hindered North Koreas ability to manufacture biochemical weapons. Under emergency situations, North Korea may be able to create up to 20,000 tons of chemical agents annually. The range of chemical weapons North Korea had been capable of producing during the nineties was said to hold a plethora of weapons, such as: adamsite (DM), chloroacetophenone (CN), chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS), hydrogen cyanide (AC), mustard-family (H or HD), phosgene (CG and CX), sarin (GB), soman (GD), tabun (GA), and V-agents (VM and VX). The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea likely concentrated on weapons such as mustard, phosgene, sarin, and V-agents for operational and technical reasons. North Korea may have also began the production of binary agents. Binary agents are toxic only when the two chemicals (normally physically separated) are combined. By creating binary agents, North Korea can increase their safety when handling hazardous material.[] Deployment of chemical and biological weapons is fairly simple and can be fired from artillery, dropped from aircraft, sneaked in food, or fired from any other delivery system.[] North Korean military units
North Korea conduct regular nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) training exercises in a chemical environment. North Korean chemical and biological warfare units are equipped with decontamination and detection equipment.[] In 2010, it was reported that North Korea has chemical weapons, which could cause millions of casualties in South Korea, where gas masks are only provided to the military and top government officials.[65]
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Delivery systems
History
In the 1960s, DPRK first received shipments of short-range ballistic missiles from its main ally, the Soviet Union. The first weapons of this kind to be delivered were the tactical FROG-series.[] In the late 1970s or early 1980s, the DPRK received several longer range Scud-B missiles from Egypt (which in turn received those missiles from the USSR, Bulgaria and Poland). The USSR had refused to supply Scuds to North Korea.[] A local production basis was established, and the first modified copy was named Hwasong-5. With time, more advanced types of missiles were developed. Eventually North Korea equipped itself with ballistic missiles, capable of reaching Japan.
Testing
Early 2000s North Korea's ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction to a hypothetical target is somewhat limited by its missile technology. As of 2005, North Korea's total range with its Nodong missiles estimated as 900km with a 1000kg payload,[] enough to reach South Korea, and parts of Japan, Russia and China. It is not known if this missile is capable of carrying the nuclear weapons North Korea may have developed. The BM25 Musudan is a North Korean designed intermediate-range ballistic missile with range capabilities of up to 1,550 miles (2,490km), and could carry a nuclear warhead. As of 2010, Western sources had no indication that the missile system had ever been tested, or was operational.[][66] North Korea has also developed the Taepodong-1 missile, which has a range of 2,500km, but it is unlikely to have been deployed.[] With the development of the Taepodong-2 missile, with an expected range of 5,0006,000km,[67] North Korea could hypothetically deliver a warhead to almost all countries in Southeast Asia, as well as the western side of North America. The Taepodong-2 missile was unsuccessfully tested on July 4, 2006. U.S. intelligence estimates that the weapon will not be operational for another 11 years. The Taepodong-2 could theoretically hit the western United States and other U.S. interests in the Western hemisphere. The current model of the Taepodong-2 could not carry nuclear warheads to the United States. Former CIA director George Tenet has claimed that, with a light payload, Taepodong-2 could reach western parts of Continental United States, though with low accuracy.[citation needed] A few Taepodong-2 missiles may exist, but launch procedures are lengthy and visible.[] 2009 On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched the Unha-2 space booster (allegedly based on the long-range Taepodong-2). Although the launch was more successful than the 2006 test, the third stage still failed to separate properly. A missile test or a satellite attempt, the launch still violates the UN Security Council's decision. Because the Unha-2's first stage engine is the Musudan (Nodong-B / Taepodong-X),[68] North Korea claims they have demonstrated the 4000km range and reliability of its new Musudan missile. This means North Korea may be able to develop/deploy mobile ICBMs, which can survive a U.S. first strike, within 710 years.[69] On July 2, 2009, North Korea test fired a series of at least four surface-to-ship cruise missiles into the Sea of Japan (East Sea). Two days later, on July 4, they proceeded to test fire a further seven Scud-type ballistic missiles into the same sea.[] The tests are seen by world powers as a symbol of defiance to the United Nations set over North Korea
North Korea after their nuclear test on May 25, 2009.[] These launches come only a week after U.S. President Barack Obama extended U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea.[] This is also a response to the UN's sanctions that were imposed in June 2009, after Pyongyang's atomic test in May 2009, as well as the new UN resolution that any nation can inspect a North Korean vessel that the investigating nation believes is carrying weaponry.[] It has been suggested that the test firing of missiles is an act of defiance against the United States national holiday, Independence Day.[] Japan Ministry of Defense's analyst Takesada points out that North Korea's desire of unification is similar to North Vietnam, and warns of the possibility of North Korea's compulsory merger with South Korea by threats of nuclear weapons, taking advantage of any possible decrease in the U.S. military presence in South Korea, after North Korea deploys several hundred mobile ICBMs aimed at the U.S.[70]
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Delivery Systems
There is no evidence that North Korea has been able to miniaturize a nuclear warhead for use on a ballistic missile. A 2012 display of missiles purporting to be ICBMs were declared fakes by Western analysts, and indicated North Korea was a long way from having a credible ICBM.[71] Successfully tested KN-1 a short-range anti-ship cruise missile. Its range is estimated to be around 160 kilometers, and is most probably an improved version of the Soviet Termit missile (NATO codename "Styx"). KN-2 Toksa a short-range, solid-fueled, highly accurate mobile missile, modified copy of the Soviet OTR-21. Unknown number in service, apparently deployed either in the late 1990s or early 2000s (decade). Hwasong-5 initial Scud modification. Road-mobile, liquid-fueled missile, with an estimated range of 330km. It has been tested successfully. It is believed that North Korea has deployed some 150200 such missiles on mobile launchers. Hwasong-6 later Scud modification. Similar to the Hwasong-5, yet with an increased range (550700km) and a smaller warhead (600750kg). Apparently this is the most widely deployed North Korean missile, with at least 400 missiles in use. Nodong-1 larger and more advanced Scud modification. Liquid-fueled, road-mobile missile with a 650kg warhead. First production variants had inertial guidance, later variants featured GPS guidance, which improves CEP accuracy to 190250 m.[72] Range is estimated to be between 1,300 and 1,600km. Taepodong-1 two-stage Scud-derived missile. Has been tested with a satellite payload in 1998. The satellite failed, but the missile apparently flew without significant problems, therefore it is North Korea's longest-ranged operational missile with its 2,500km maximum range. According to some analysts, the Taepodong-1 could have an intercontinental range of nearly 6,000km with a third stage and a payload of less than 100kg.[73][74] Musudan-1 a modified copy of the Soviet R-27 Zyb SLBM. It was tested successfully as the first or second stage of Unha. Despite the failure of the satellite, the first and second stages of the missile apparently flew without any problems. The missile, also known under the names Nodong-B, Taepodong-X and BM25, has a range of 4,000 kilometers. Unha 3 After a failed first launch, the second launch of this space launch vehicle took place on December 12, 2012, at 09:51am local time and placed an object into orbit. Untested / failed Taepodong-2 North Korea's domestic ICBM attempt. First test occurred in 2006, when the missile failed 40 seconds after launch. On April 5, 2009, a space booster variant was launched with a satellite on board. As in 1998, the satellite itself failed to reach orbit, but the missile flew several thousand kilometers before falling in the Pacific Ocean. Estimates of the range vary widely from 4,500 to 10,000 kilometers (most estimates put the range at about 6,700km).
North Korea The Unha 3 rocket was launched on April 13, 2012, at 7:39am local time but disintegrated approximately ninety seconds after launch. North Korea claims that the satellite was to monitor weather, crops and forestation.[75]
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International Response
Exports
In April 2009 the United Nations named the Korea Mining and Development Trading Corporation (aka KOMID) as North Korea's primary arms dealer and main exporter of equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. The UN lists KOMID as based in Central District Pyongyang.[76] However it also has offices in Beijing and sales offices worldwide which facilitate weapons sales and seek new customers for North Korean weapons.[77] KOMID has sold missile technology to Iran[78] and has done deals for missile related technology with the Taiwanese.[79] KOMID representatives were also involved in a North Korean deal to mass produce Kornet anti-tank guided missiles for Syria[80] and KOMID has also been responsible for the sale of equipment, including missile technologies, gunboats, and multiple rocket artilleries, worth a total of over $100 million, to Africa, South America and the Middle East.[81] North Korea's military has also used the company Hap Heng to sell weapons overseas. Hap Heng was based in Macau in the 1990s to handle sales of weapons and missile and nuclear technology to nations such as Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan's medium-range ballistic missile, the Ghauri, is considered to be a copy of North Korea's Rodong 1. Even in 1999, intelligence sources said North Korea had sold missile components to Iran.[82] Listed directors of Hap Heng include Kim Song in and Ko Myong Hun.[83] Ko Myong Hun is now a listed diplomat in Beijing[84] and may be involved in the work of KOMID.[85] A UN sanctions committee report stated that North Korea operates an international smuggling network for nuclear and ballistic missile technology, including to Burma, Syria, and Iran.[86] Export partners These are countries which allegedly operate North Korean ballistic missiles, allegedly bought such or received assistance for establishing local production. Pakistan North Korean entities continued to provide assistance to Pakistan's ballistic missile program during the first half of 1999 in return for nuclear weapons technology [87]. Such assistance is critical for Islamabad's efforts to produce ballistic missiles. In April 1998, Pakistan flight-tested the Ghauri MRBM, which is based on North Korea's Nodong missile. Also in April 1998, the U.S. imposed sanctions against Pakistani and North Korean entities for their role in transferring Missile Technology Control Regime Category I ballistic missile-related technology.[88] Cuba No confirmed information for North Korea shipping Hwasong-6 missiles to Cuba.[89] Egypt Egypt has received technologies and assistance for making both the Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6, and may have as well provided guidance systems or information on longer-range missiles to North Korea from its Condor program. Ethiopia Unconfirmed information for possessing Hwasong-5 missiles.[90] Iran
North Korea One of the first buyers of North Korean missiles. Iran has established local production for the Hwasong-5 (Shahab-1), Hwasong-6 (Shahab-2) and the Rodong-1 (Shahab-3). Also possesses some 18 land-based BM25 missiles.[91] North Korean weapons sales to Iran are estimated to total $2 billion annually.[92] Libya Libya during the reign of Muammar Gaddafi had been known to receive technological assistance, blueprints and missile parts from North Korea.[93] Nigeria In January 2004, the Nigerian government announced that North Korea agreed to sell it missile technology, but a month later Nigeria rejected the agreement under U.S. pressure.[94] Republic of the Congo There is some (although unconfirmed) information, that the Republic of the Congo has acquired Hwasong-5 missiles.[90] Sudan There is some information that Syria shipped some of its North Korean designed Scud missiles to Sudan in 2004.[95] Syria Uses two types of North Korean missiles the Hwasong-6 and Rodong-1.[95] United Arab Emirates 25 Hwasong-5s purchased from North Korea in 1989. The Military of the United Arab Emirates were not satisfied with the quality of the missiles, and they were kept in storage.[96] Viet Nam Acquired Hwasong-5/6 missiles in 1998. Yemen Known to have bought Hwasong-5 missiles from the DPRK in the 1990s a total of 15 missiles, 15 TELs with 15 HE warheads.[97]
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References
[1] to be published [2] http:/ / www. iaea. org/ About/ Policy/ GC/ GC56/ GC56Documents/ English/ gc56-11_en. pdf [3] Nuke agency wary of N. Korea's invitation - Washington Times (http:/ / www. washingtontimes. com/ news/ 2012/ apr/ 4/ nuke-agency-wary-of-n-koreas-invitation/ ) [4] United Nations News Centre - DPR of Korea informs IAEA of intent to lift 'freeze' on nuclear power plants (http:/ / www. un. org/ apps/ news/ story. asp?NewsID=5644& Cr=dprk& Cr1=#. UMo74nekzTw) [15] See Materials on the Discussions with the Delegation of the CC KWP, June 17, 1960, from the personal collection of V.P. Tkachenko, published in The Korean Peninsula and Russian Interests (Moscow: Vostochnaya Literatura, 2000) p. 20. [16] Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, January 8, 1965. Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1965, 73. doboz, IV-100, 001819/1965. [17] See for example The History of North Korean Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons and Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Capability, Cold War International History Project e-Dossier No. 14, May 17, 2005. [19] Washington Post, "North 'bribed its way to nuclear statehood'", Japan Times, July 8, 2011, p. 4. [21] The U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework at a Glance (http:/ / www. armscontrol. org/ factsheets/ agreedframework), Fact Sheet, Arms Control Association. [22] (http:/ / www. guardian. co. uk/ world/ 2003/ may/ 09/ nuclear. northkorea), additional text. [24] (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 1/ hi/ world/ asia-pacific/ 1908571. stm), additional text. [28] The Six-Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program - Council on Foreign Relations (http:/ / www. cfr. org/ proliferation/ six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program/ p13593#p4) [29] Wooksik, C. (April 16, 2010). Nuclear Posture Review And North Korea (http:/ / www. nautilus. org/ publications/ essays/ napsnet/ forum/ 2009-2010/ 10023Cheong. html). Retrieved January 2012, from Nautilus Institute For Security and Stability.
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[30] Kimball, D., & Crail, P. (October 1, 2011) Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy (http:/ / www. armscontrol. org/ factsheets/ dprkchron). Retrieved October 4, 2011, from The Arms Control Association. [31] http:/ / www. defense. gov/ news/ Defense_Strategic_Guidance. pdf [39] N. Korea Plans to Shut Down Nuke Facility (http:/ / newsmax. com/ archives/ articles/ 2007/ 3/ 16/ 154255. shtml). March 17, 2007. [42] Glenn Kessler, Far-Reaching U.S. Plan Impaired N. Korea Deal (http:/ / www. washingtonpost. com/ wp-dyn/ content/ story/ 2008/ 09/ 26/ ST2008092600020. html): Demands Began to Undo Nuclear Accord, The Washington Post, p. A20, September 26, 2008. [47] Joo, Seung-Hoo (2000). Gorbachev's foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula, 19851991: power and reform. E. Mellen Press. p. 205. ISBN 978-0-7734-7817-6. [48] Albright, David; Berkhout, Frans; Walker, William (1997). Plutonium and highly enriched uranium, 1996: world inventories, capabilities, and policies. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. p. 303. ISBN 978-0-19-828009-5. [49] The North Korean Plutonium Stock, February 2007 (http:/ / www. isis-online. org/ publications/ dprk/ DPRKplutoniumFEB. pdf), By David Albright and Paul Brannan, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), February 20, 2007. [50] Albright, David; Brannan, Paul (June 26, 2006) (http:/ / docs. google. com/ gview?a=v& q=cache:wGkjyeC74ZAJ:www. isis-online. org/ publications/ dprk/ dprkplutonium. pdf+ 8000+ fuel+ rods+ 27+ 29+ kg+ plutonium& hl=en& gl=uk& pid=bl& srcid=ADGEESiEpLQFX_EwxvBe1hzu7oFxYV_G9wGdWcvwYfzQTShQHy-CyCmLFbGYMvM6TYG5GH5nFFMZQgzIGHd0tDhGb5hhBCMZt8d92xyFdqO sig=AFQjCNE1josvTXYwm2uJfhVb51vboNGzOQ) [53] Busch, Nathan E. (2004). No end in sight: the continuing menace of nuclear proliferation. University Press of Kentucky. p. 251. ISBN 978-0-8131-2323-3. [54] Bodansky, Yossef; Forrest, Vaughn S. (August 11, 1994). Pyongyang and the US nuclear gambit (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ library/ congress/ 1994_r/ bod3. htm). Congressional Documents. GlobalSecurity.org. [59] May 12, 2010, AFP, North Korea claims nuclear fusion success (http:/ / www. theaustralian. com. au/ news/ world/ north-korea-claims-nuclear-fusion-success/ story-e6frg6so-1225865505827), The Australian [65] N. Korea threat beyond neighbor - Omaha.com (http:/ / www. omaha. com/ article/ 20101128/ NEWS01/ 711289876) [66] http:/ / www. isis-online. org/ publications/ dprk/ DPRKplutoniumFEB. pdf [68] http:/ / www21. tok2. com/ home/ tokorozawa/ faq/ faq24e23. jpg [74] Pekdosan-1 ("Taepodong-1") (http:/ / space. skyrocket. de/ doc_lau/ pekdosan-1. htm), skyrocket.de [81] KOMID's $100 million sales (http:/ / www. free-lebanon. com/ lfpNews/ 2009/ June/ June3/ June3d/ June3d. html) [87] http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ south_asia/ 3467219. stm [89] Hwasong-6 (http:/ / www. aeronautics. ru/ archive/ wmd/ ballistic/ ballistic/ hwasong6-01. htm) [90] Hwasong-5 information (http:/ / www. aeronautics. ru/ archive/ wmd/ ballistic/ ballistic/ hwasong5-01. htm) [91] The Global Range of Iran's Ballistic Missile Program (http:/ / jcpa. org/ brief/ brief005-26. htm), Jerusalem Center for public affairs [92] The Chosun Ilbo, "North Korea Earning $2 Billion a Year in Arms Deals with Iran", July 16, 2009. [94] North Korea Missile Milestones 19692005 (http:/ / www. wisconsinproject. org/ countries/ nkorea/ north-korea-miles. html) [95] NTI Country overviews:Syria (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ Syria/ Missile/ 4126_4337. html) [96] Bermudez, Joseph S. (1999). "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK: First Ballistic Missiles, 19791989". James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Retrieved February 14, 2008. [97] (http:/ / yaleglobal. yale. edu/ display. article?id=1546)
External links
Federation of American Scientists guide to North Korean chemical weapons (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/ dprk/cw/) Jonathan D. Pollack, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapon Development: Implications for Future Policy" (http:// www.ifri.org/downloads/pp33pollack.pdf) Proliferation Papers, Paris, Ifri, Spring 2010 North Korea's missile arsenal (http://www.spacewar.com/2005/050601033447.58xh4pkp.html) Key facts (based on South Korean defense ministry data); AFP, June 1, 2005 North Korea: Problems, Perceptions and Proposals (http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/ northkorea.pdf) Oxford Research Group, April 2004 Second nuclear test conducted by North Korea on May 25, 2009 (http://npsglobal.org/eng/index.php/ analysis-mainmenu-29/articles-by-geo-profile/geo-profiles/147-articles/ 569-second-nuclear-test-conducted-by-north-korea-on-25-may-2009-martin-kalinowski.html) Nuclear Files.org (http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/proliferation/ north-korea/) Information on the North Korean nuclear program including links to source documents (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,20548721-601,00.html)Wikipedia:Link rot
North Korea Annotated bibliography for the North Korean nuclear weapons program from the Alsos Digital Library (http:// alsos.wlu.edu/qsearch.aspx?browse=warfare/North+Korean+Nuclear+Weapons+Program) A.Q. Khan hand in North Korea bomb (http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID=1057723), by Venkatesan Vembu, Daily News & Analysis, October 10, 2006 The February 13 Action Plan and the Prospects for the North Korean Nuclear Issue (http://www.ifri.org/ downloads/Proliferation_Paper_Michishita.pdf) analysis by Narushige Michishita, IFRI Proliferation Papers n 17, 2007 North Korean International Documentation Project (http://www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp) Contains primary source documents related to the DPRK's efforts to obtain nuclear technology dating back to the mid 1960s TIME Archives (http://www.time.com/time/archive/collections/0,21428,c_north_korean_nukes,00.shtml) A Collection of stories regarding North Korea's Nuclear Program Chung Min Lee, "The Evolution of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Implications for Iran" (http://www.ifri. org/downloads/Prolif_Chung_Min_Lee_NK.pdf), Proliferation Papers, Paris, Ifri, Winter 2009 Norris, Robert S. and Kristensen, Hans M., "North Koreas nuclear program, 2005" (http://thebulletin.metapress. com/content/hn1576020176wg02/fulltext.pdf)Wikipedia:Link rot, "The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (http:/ /www.thebulletin.org/), May/June 2005 The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (http://www.wilsoncenter. org/nuclear-history-documents/) The Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project contains primary source material relating to North Korea's nuclear weapon program. Normalizing Japan: Supporter, Nuisance, or Wielder of Power in the North Korean Nuclear Talks (http://dx.doi. org/10.1525/as.2009.49.5.831) An analysis of Japan's role in the Six-Party Talks by Linus Hagstrm. Critiquing the Idea of Japanese Exceptionalism: Japan and the Coordination of North Korea Policy (http://www. ingentaconnect.com/content/brill/eeas/2008/00000007/00000001/art00007) An analysis of Japan's role in the nuclear talks prior to the commencement of the Six-Party Talks. Also by Linus Hagstrm. North Korea: Economic Sanctions (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31696.pdf) Chronology of U.S. North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy (http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ dprkchron) North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy (https://opencrs.com/document/RL33590/) Congressional Research Service. IISS North Koreas Ballistic Missile Programme (http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/ north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses/north-koreas-ballistic-missile-programme/ )
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Pakistan
Nuclear program start date First nuclear weapon test First fusion weapon test Last nuclear test Largest yield test
January 20, 1972 May 28, 1998 (Chagai-I) N/A [][] []
May 30, 1998 (Chagai-II) 2540kt in 1998 [][][][1] (PAEC claim) [] 6 detonations 100-110 warheads [] (2011 estimate) 100-110 warheads [] []
Total tests Peak stockpile
Current stockpile Maximum missile range NPT signatory
2,500km (Shaheen-II) No
By type
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Nuclear weapons
Background


Pakistan began focusing on nuclear weapons development in January 1972 under the leadership of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who delegated the program to the Chairman of PAEC Munir Ahmad Khan. In 1976, Abdul Qadeer Khan also joined the nuclear weapons program, and, with Zahid Ali Akbar, headed the Kahuta Project, while the rest of the program being run in PAEC and comprising over twenty laboratories and projects was headed by Munir Ahmad Khan.[2] This program would reach fruition under President General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, then-Chief of Army Staff. Pakistan's nuclear weapons development was in response to neighboring India's development of nuclear weapons. Bhutto called a meeting of senior academic scientists and engineers on 20January 1972, in Multan, which came to known as "Multan meeting".[citation needed] Bhutto was the main architect of this programme and it was here that Bhutto orchestrated nuclear weapons programme and rallied Pakistan's academic scientists to build the atomic bomb for national survival.[]Wikipedia:Link rot At the Multan meeting, Bhutto also appointed nuclear engineer, Munir Ahmad Khan, as chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), who, until then, had been working as Director at the Nuclear Power and Reactor Division of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in Vienna, Austria. In December 1972, Abdus Salam led the establishment of Theoretical Physics Group (TPG) as he called scientists working at ICTP to report to Munir Ahmad Khan. This marked the
Pakistan beginning of Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear detterence capability. Following India's surprise nuclear test, codenamed Smiling Buddha in 1974, the first confirmed nuclear test by a nation outside the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council, the goal to develop nuclear weapons received considerable impetus.[] Finally, on 28 May 1998, a few weeks after India's second nuclear test (Operation Shakti), Pakistan detonated five nuclear devices in the Ras Koh Hills in the Chagai district, Balochistan. This operation was named Chagai-I by Pakistan, the underground iron-steel tunnel having been long-constructed by provincial Martial Law Administrator General Rahimuddin Khan during the 1980s. The last test of Pakistan was conducted at the sandy Kharan Desert under a codename Chagai-II, also in Balochistan, on May 30, 1998. Pakistan's fissile material production takes place at Nilore, Kahuta, and Khushab/Jauharabad, where weapons-grade plutonium is made by the scientists. Pakistan thus became the 7th country in the world to successfully develop and test nuclear weapons.[]
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History of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program

Nuclear development and non-weapon policy
The uneasy relationships with India, Afghanistan, the former Soviet Union, and the energy shortage explains its nuclear policy to become a nuclear power as part of its defence strategy.[] On 8 December 1953, Pakistan media press welcomed the U.S. Atoms for Peace initiatives, followed by the establishment of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission in 1956.[] In 1953, Foreign minister Sir Zafarullah Khan publicly stated that "Pakistan does not have a policy towards the atom bombs".[] Following the announcement, on 11 August 1955, U.S. and Pakistan reached an understanding concerning the peaceful and industrial use of nuclear energy which also includes a $350,000 worth pool-type reactor.[] Before 1971, Pakistan's nuclear development was peaceful but an effective deterrent against India, as Benazir Bhutto maintained in 1995.[] Pakistan followed a strict non-nuclear weapon policy since 1956 until 1971, and major proposals were made in 1960s by several officials and senior scientists but PAEC under its chairman Ishrat Hussain Usmani made no efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle for the purposes of active nuclear weapons programme.[] After the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, Foreign minister (later Prime minister) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto aggressively began the advocating the option of "nuclear weapons programmes" but such attempts were dismissed by Finance minister Muhammad Shoaib and chairman I.H. Usmani.[] Pakistani scientists and engineers' working at IAEA became aware of advancing Indian nuclear program towards making the bombs. Therefore, On October 1965, Munir Ahmad Khan, director at the Nuclear Power and Reactor Division of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), met with Bhutto on emergency basis in Vienna, revealing the facts about the Indian nuclear programme and a weapon production facility in Trombay. At this meeting Munir Khan concluded: "a (nuclear) India would further undermine and threaten Pakistan's security, and for her survival, Pakistan needed a nuclear deterrent...".[citation needed] Understanding the sensitivity of the issue, Bhutto arranged a meeting with President Ayub Khan December 11, 1965 at Dorchester Hotel in London. Munir Khan pointed out to the President that Pakistan must acquire the necessary facilities that would give the country a nuclear weapon capability, which were available free of safeguards and at an affordable cost, and there were no restrictions on nuclear technology, that it was freely available, and that India was moving forward in deploying it, as Munir Khan maintained.[citation needed] When asked about the economics of such programme, Munir Ahmad Khan estimated the cost of nuclear technology at that time. Because things were less expensive, the then costs were not more than $150 million, after hearing the proposal President Ayub Khan swiftly denied the proposal and quoted: "Pakistan was too poor to spend that much money. Moreover, President Ayub Khan mentioned that if Pakistan ever needed the (atom) bomb, Pakistan could somehow acquire it off the shelf..".[citation
needed]
Although Pakistan began the development of nuclear weapons in 1972, Pakistan responded to India's 1974 nuclear test (see Smiling Buddha) with a number of proposals to prevent a nuclear competition in South Asia.[] On many different occasions, India rejected the offer.[]
Pakistan
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Nuclear energy development

Pakistan's nuclear energy programme was established and started in 1956 following the establishment of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). Pakistan became a participant in U.S President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace Program." PAEC's first chairman was Dr. Nazir Ahmad.[citation needed] In 1961, the PAEC set up a Mineral Center at Lahore and a similar multidisciplinary Center was set up in Dhaka, in the then East Pakistan. With these two centers, the basic research work started.[citation needed] The first thing that was to be undertaken was the search for Uranium. This continued for about 3 years from 1960 to 1963. Uranium deposits were discovered in the Dera Ghazi Khan district and the first-ever national award was given to the PAEC. Mining of uranium began in the same year. Dr. Abdus Salam and Dr. Ishrat Hussain Usmani also sent a large number of scientists to pursue doctorate degrees in the field of Nuclear Technology and Nuclear reactor technology. In December 1965, then-Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited Vienna where he met IAEA nuclear engineer, Munir Ahmad Khan. At a Vienna meeting on December, Munir A. Khan informed Bhutto about the status of Indian nuclear program.[citation needed] The next landmark under Dr. Abdus Salam was the establishment of PINSTECH Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology, at Nilore near Islamabad. The principal facility there was a 5MWe research reactor, commissioned in 1965 and consisting of the PARR-I, which was upgraded to 10 MWe by Nuclear Engineering Division under Munir Ahmad Khan in 1990.[] A second Atomic Research Reactor, known as PARR-II, was a Pool-type, light-water, 27-30kWe, training reactor that went critical in 1989 under Munir Ahmad Khan.[] The PARR-II reactor was built and provided by PAEC under the IAEA safeguards as IAEA had funded this mega project.[] The PARR-I reactor was, under the agreement signed by PAEC and ANL, provided by the United States Government in 1965, and scientists from PAEC and ANL had led the construction.[] Canada build Pakistan's first civil-purpose nuclear power plant.[citation needed] The Ayub Khan Military Government made then-Science Advisors to the Government Abdus Salam as the head of the IAEA delegation. Abdus Salam began lobbying for commercial nuclear power plants, and tirelessly advocated for nuclear power in Pakistan.[3] In 1965, Salam's efforts finally paid off, and a Canadian firm signed a deal to provide 137MWe CANDU reactor in Paradise Point, Karachi. The construction began in 1966 as PAEC its general contractor as GE Canada provided nuclear materials and financial assistance. Its project director was Parvez Butt, a nuclear engineer, and its construction completed in 1972. Known as KANUPP-I, it was inaugurated by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as President, and began its operations in November 1972. Currently, Pakistan Government is planning to build another 400MWe commercial nuclear power plant. Having known as KANUPP-II, the PAEC completed its feasibility studies in 2009. However, the work is put on hold since 2009. The PAEC in 1970 began work on a pilot-scale plant at Dera Ghazi Khan for the concentration of uranium ores. The plant had a capacity of 10,000pounds a day.[4] In 1989, Munir Ahmad Khan signed a Nuclear cooperation deal and, since 2000, Pakistan is developing two more nuclear power plants with the an agreement signed with China. Both these plants are of 300MW capacity and are being built at Chashma city of Punjab Province called CHASNUPP-I, began producing electricity in 2000, and CHASNUPP-II, began its operation in fall of 2011. In 2011, the Board of Governors of International Atomic Energy Agency gave approval of Sino-Pak Nuclear Deal, allowing Pakistan legally to build 300MWe CHASNUPP-III and CHASNUPP-VI reactors.[5]
Development of nuclear weapons

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 led to Pakistan losing roughly 56,000 square miles (150,000km2) of territory as well as losing millions of its citizens to the newly created state of Bangladesh.[6] It was a psychological setback for Pakistanis; Pakistan had lost its geo-political, strategic, and economic influence in South-Asia.[6] Furthermore, Pakistan had failed to gather any moral support from its key allies, the United States and the People's Republic of China.[] The 1971 war with India was a crushing defeat for Pakistan, and China failed to provide any significant assistance to Pakistan.[] Isolated internationally, Pakistan seemed to be in great mortal danger, and quite obviously
Pakistan could rely on no one but itself.[] At United Nations Security Council meeting, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto drew comparisons with the Treaty of Versailles which Germany was forced to sign in 1919. There, Bhutto vowed never to allow a repeat. Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was "obsessed" with India's nuclear program,[7] that is why Bhutto immediately came up with the idea of obtaining nuclear weapons to prevent Pakistan from signing another 'Treaty of Versailles' as it did in 1971. In 1969, after a long negotiation, the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) signed a formal agreement to supply Pakistan with a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant capable of extracting 360g of weapons-grade plutonium annually.[] The PAEC selected a team five senior scientists, including geophysicist dr. Ahsan Mubarak,[] were sent to Sellafield to receive technical training.[] Later, the team under Ahsan Mubarak advised the government to not to acquire the whole reprocessing plant, but key parts important to build the weapons, while the plant would be built indigenously.[] At the Multan meeting on January 20, 1972, Bhutto stated, "What Raziuddin Siddiqui, a Pakistani, contributed for the United States during the Manhattan Project, could also be done by scientists in Pakistan, for their own people."[] Raziuddin Siddiqui was a Pakistani theoretical physicist who, in the early 1940s, worked on both the British nuclear program and the US nuclear program.[8] Although a few Pakistanis worked on the Manhattan Project who were also willing to return and do the same for their native Pakistan, Prime Minister Bhutto still needed to recruit and bring in other Pakistani nuclear scientists and engineers who never worked in the United States. This is where Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a German educated metallurgical engineer, came into the picture. Some of the initial funding came from oil-rich Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia. In later years, some funding for the continuation of the nuclear development programme came from the large British Pakistani population. In December 1972, Science Advisor to the President, Dr. Abdus Salam had called theoretical physicists from the ICTP to report of Munir Ahmad Khan, Chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. This marked the beginning of the "Theoretical Physics Group" (TPG).[9] Later, Pakistani theoretical physicists at Institute of Theoretical Physics of Quaid-e-Azam University also joined the TPG headed by Salam.[] The TPG, which directly reported to Abdus Salam in PAEC, was assigned to do research in the development of nuclear weapon devices, and conduct mathematical calculations on complex hydrodynamical phenomenons and the fast neutron calculations.[] Professor Salam also had done the groundbreaking work of the "Theoretical Physics Group", which was initially headed by Salam until in 1974 when he left the country in protest.[] The TPG division at PAEC closely collaborated and completed its physics and mathematical calculations on fast-neutron calculations with the Mathematics Group led by Raziuddin Siddiqui and others, a division which contained the pure mathematicians.[] On other side, Munir Ahmad Khan began to work on indigenous development of nuclear fuel cycle and the weapons programme. Munir Ahmad Khan, with his lifelong friend Abdus Salam, had done a groundbreaking work in the nuclear development, and after Salam's departure from Pakistan, scientists and engineers who were researching under Salam, began to report to directly to Munir Ahmad Khan.[10] In 1974, Munir Ahmad Khan, days after Operation Smiling Buddha, launched the extensive plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment programme, and the research facilities were expanded throughout the country.[11] In 1965,[12] amidst skirmishes that led up to the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto announced:
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If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass and leaves for a thousand years, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. The Christians [13][14] have the bomb, the Jews have the bomb and now the Hindus have the bomb. Why not the Muslims too have the bomb?
In 1983, Khan was convicted in absentia by the Court of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, for stealing the blueprints, though the conviction was overturned on a legal technicality.[] A.Q. Khan then established a proliferation network through Dubai to smuggle URENCO nuclear technology to Khan Research Laboratories. He then established Pakistan's gas-centrifuge program based on the URENCO's Zippe-type centrifuge.[][][][15][16] Through the late 1970s, Pakistan's program acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan was a German-trained
Pakistan metallurgist who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had acquired through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. He was put in charge of building, equipping and operating Pakistan's Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan's direction, Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities.[]
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It took only two weeks and three days for Pakistan to master the field... and (detonate) the nuclear devices of our own...
[]
Benazir Bhutto, on first nuclear tests on May 1998,
A new directorate, known as Directorate of Technical Development (DTD) under Dr. Zaman Sheikh and Hafeez Qureshi, was established in March 1974 by Munir Ahmad Khan. The DTD was tasked to manufacture chemical explosive lenses, trigger mechanism, and tampers used in atomic weapon. The DTD was later charged with testing Pakistan's first implosion design in 1978, which was later improved and tested on 11 March 1983 when PAEC carried out Pakistan's first successful cold test of a nuclear device, codename Kirana-I. Between 1983 and 1990, PAEC carried out 24 more cold tests of various nuclear weapon designs. DTD had also manufactured a miniaturized weapon design by 1987 that could be delivered by all Pakistan Air Force fighter aircraft.[17] Also, Dr. Ishrat Hussain Usmanis contribution to the nuclear energy programme, is also fundamental to the development of atomic energy for civilian purposes as he, with efforts led by Salam, established PINSTECH, that subsequently developed into Pakistans premier nuclear research institution.[] In addition to sending hundreds of young Pakistanis abroad for training, he laid the foundations of the Muslim worlds first nuclear power reactor KANUPP, which was inaugurated by Munir Ahmad Khan in 1972. Thus, Usmani laid solid groundwork for the civilian nuclear programme.[citation needed] Scientists and engineers under Munir Ahmad Khan developed the nuclear capability for Pakistan within early 1980s, and under his leadership the PAEC had carried a cold test of nuclear device at Kirana Hills, evidently made from non-weaponized plutonium. Former chairman of the PAEC, Munir Ahmad Khan was credited as one of the pioneers of Pakistan's atomic bomb by a recent study from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London's dossier on Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.[]
Policy
Pakistan acceded to the Geneva Protocol on 15 April 1960. As for its Biological warfare capability, Pakistan is not widely suspected of either producing biological weapons or having an offensive biological programme.[] However, the country is reported to have well developed bio-technological facilities and laboratories, devoted entirely to the medical research and applied health sciences.[] In 1972, Pakistan signed and ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1974.[] Since then Pakistan has been a vocal and staunch supporter for the success of the BTWC. During the various BTWC Review Conferences, Pakistan's representatives have urged more robust participation from state signatories, invited new states to join the treaty, and, as part of the non-aligned group of countries, have made the case for guarantees for states' rights to engage in peaceful exchanges of biological and toxin materials for purposes of scientific research.[] Pakistan is not known to have an offensive chemical weapons programme, and in 1993 Pakistan signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and has committed itself to refrain from developing, manufacturing, stockpiling, or using chemical weapons.[] In 1999, Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan and Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India signed the Lahore Declaration, agreeing to a bilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. This initiative was taken after an year past of both countries publicly tested nuclear devices (See Pokhran-II, Chagai-I and II). However, Pakistan is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) and, consequently, not bound by any of its provisions.
Pakistan Since early 1980s, Pakistan's nuclear proliferation activities have not been without controversy. However, since the arrest of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Government has taken concrete steps to ensure that Nuclear proliferation is not repeated and have assured the IAEA about the transparency of Pakistan's upcoming Chashma Nuclear Power Complex series of Nuclear Power Plants. In November 2006, The International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors approved an agreement with the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission to apply safeguards to new nuclear power plants to be built in the country with Chinese assistance.[18]
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Protection
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton informed that Pakistan has dispersed its nuclear weapons throughout the country, increasing the security so that they could not fall into terrorist hands. Her comments came as new satellite images released by the ISIS suggested Pakistan is increasing its capacity to produce plutonium, a fuel for atomic bombs. The institute has also claimed that Pakistan has built two more nuclear reactors at Khoshab increasing the number of plutonium producing reactors to three.[19] In May 2009, during the anniversary of Pakistan's first nuclear weapons test, former Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif claimed that Pakistans nuclear security is the strongest in the world.[20] According to Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan's nuclear safety program and nuclear security program is the strongest program in the world and there is no such capability in any other country for radical elements to steal or possess nuclear weapons.[21]
Modernisation and expansion

Pakistan is increasing its capacity to produce plutonium at its Khushab nuclear facility, a Washington-based science think tank has reported.[22] Estimated Pakistan's nuclear arsenals are probably in the neighborhood of more than 200 by the end of 2009. The sixth nuclear test (codename: Chagai-II) on May 30, 1998, at Kharan was a quiet successful test of a sophisticated, compact, but "powerful plutonium bomb" designed to be carried by aircraft, vessels, and missiles. The Pakistanis are believed to be spiking their plutonium based nuclear weapons with tritium. Only a few grams of tritium can result in an increase of the explosive yield by 300% to 400%."[] Citing new satellite images of the facility, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) said the imagery suggests construction of the second Khushab reactor is "likely finished and that the roof beams are being placed on top of the third Khushab reactor hall".[23] A third and a fourth[24] reactor and ancillary buildings are observed to be under construction at the Khushab site. In an opinion published in The Hindu, former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran wrote that Pakistan's expanding nuclear capability is "no longer driven solely by its oft-cited fears of India" but by the "paranoia about U.S. attacks on its strategic assets.[][] Noting recent changes in Pakistan's nuclear doctrine, Saran said "the Pakistan military and civilian elite is convinced that the United States has also become a dangerous adversary, which seeks to disable, disarm or take forcible possession of Pakistan's nuclear arsenals and its status as nuclear power."[]
Bilateral arms control proposals and confidence building measures

Pakistan has over the years proposed a number of bilateral or regional non-proliferation steps to India, including:[25] A joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons, in 1978.[26] South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, in 1978.[27] Mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of each other's nuclear facilities, in 1979.[28] Simultaneous adherence to the NPT by India and Pakistan, in 1979.[29] A bilateral or regional nuclear test-ban treaty, in 1987.[30] A South Asia Zero-Missile Zone, in 1994.[31]
India rejected all six proposals.[32][33]
Pakistan However, India and Pakistan reached three bilateral agreements on nuclear issues. In 1989, they agreed not to attack each other's nuclear facilities.[34] Since then they have been regularly exchanging lists of nuclear facilities on January 1 of each year.[35] Another bilateral agreement was signed in March 2005 where both nations would alert the other on ballistic missile tests.[36] In June 2004, the two countries signed an agreement to set up and maintain a hotline to warn each other of any accident that could be mistaken for a nuclear attack. These were deemed essential risk reduction measures in view of the seemingly unending state of misgiving and tension between the two countries, and the extremely short response time available to them to any perceived attack. None of these agreements limits the nuclear weapons programs of either country in any way.[37]
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Disarmament policy
Pakistan has blocked negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty as it continues to produce fissile material for weapons.[38][39] In a recent statement at the Conference on Disarmament, Pakistan laid out its nuclear disarmament policy and what it sees as the proper goals and requirements for meaningful negotiations: A commitment by all states to complete verifiable nuclear disarmament; Eliminate the discrimination in the current non-proliferation regime; Normalize the relationship of the three ex-NPT nuclear weapon states with those who are NPT signatories; Address new issues like access to weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors; Non-discriminatory rules ensuring every states right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy; Universal, non-discriminatory and legally binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states; A need to address the issue of missiles, including development and deployment of Anti-ballistic missile systems; Strengthen existing international instruments to prevent the militarization of outer space, including development of ASATs; Tackle the growth in armed forces and the accumulation and sophistication of conventional tactical weapons. Revitalise the UN disarmament machinery to address international security, disarmament and proliferation challenges.[citation needed] Pakistan has repeatedly stressed at international forums like the Conference on Disarmament that it will give up its nuclear weapons only when other nuclear armed states do so, and when disarmament is universal and verifiable. It rejects any unilateral disarmament on its part.[40]
Infrastructure
Uranium infrastructure
Pakistan's uranium infrastructure is based on the use of gas centrifuges to produce Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) at the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) at Kahuta.[] Responding to India's nuclear test In 1974, Munir Khan launched the uranium program, codename Project-706 under the aegis of the PAEC. The uranium division at PAEC undertook research on several methods of enrichment, including gaseous diffusion, jet nozzle and laser enrichment techniques, as well as centrifuges.[] Abdul Qadeer Khan officially joined this program in 1976, bringing with him centrifuge designs he mastered in URENCO, the Dutch firm where he had worked as a senior scientist. Later, the government separated the program from PAEC and moved the program to Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL), with A.Q. Khan as its senior scientist. To acquire the necessary equipment and material for this program, Khan developed an illicit procurement network, which was later used to provide enrichment technology to Libya, North Korea, and Iran.[41] The Uranium program proved to be a difficult, challenging and most enduring approach.[] Commenting on the difficulty, one mathematician who worked with A.Q. Khan quoted in the book "Eating grass" that "hydrodynamical problem in centrifuge was simply stated, but extremely difficult to evaluate, not only in order of magnitude but in detailing also."[] Many of Khan's fellow theorists were unsure about the feasibility of the
Pakistan enriched uranium on time despite A.Q. Khan's strong advocacy.[] One scientist recalled his memories in Eating Grass: "No one in the world has used the [gas] centrifuge method to produce military-grade uranium.... This was not going to work. He [A.Q. Khan] was simply wasting time."[] Despite A.Q. Khan had difficulty getting his peers listening to him, Khan aggressively continued his research and the program was made feasible by Pakistan in shortest time possible.[] His efforts won him the praise from country's elite politicians and the military science circles, and he was now debuted as the "father of the uranium" bomb.[] On May 28, 1998, it was the KRL's HEU that ultimately created the nuclear chain reaction which led the successful detonated of boosted fission devices in an scientific experiment codenamed as: Chagai-I.[]
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Plutonium infrastructure
As opposed to uranium, the parallel plutonium programme is indigenous, locally developed and culminated under watchful eyes of PAEC Chairman Munir Ahmad Khan.[] Since 1972, earlier efforts were directed towards plutonium and necessary infrastructure was built by Bhutto as early as 1970s.[] Contrary to popular perception, the plutonium program did not forego and pursued it along with the uranium route.[] Despite many setbacks and international embargo, PAEC swiftly continued its research on plutonium and directed a separated electromagnetic isotope separation program alongside with enrichment.[] In the end of 1970s, the PAEC began to pursue Plutonium production capabilities. Consequently Pakistan built the 40-50 MW (megawatt, thermal) Khushab Reactor Complex at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the nuclear reactor was operational. The Khushab reactor project was initiated in 1986 by PAEC Chairman Munir Ahmad Khan, who informed the world that the reactor was totally indigenous, i.e. that it was designed and built by Pakistani scientists and engineers. Various Pakistani industries contributed in 82% of the reactor's construction. The Project-Director for this project was Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood. According to public statements made by the U.S. Government officials, this heavy-water reactor can produce up to 8 to 10kg of plutonium per year with increase in the production by the development of newer facilities,[] sufficient for at least one nuclear weapon.[42] The reactor could also produce H3 if it were loaded with Li6, although this is unnecessary for the purposes of nuclear weapons, because modern nuclear weapon designs use 6Li directly. According to J. Cirincione of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Khushab's Plutonium production capacity has allowed Pakistan to develop lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver to any place in the range of the ballistic missiles.[citation needed] The Plutonium electromagnetic separation takes place at the New Laboratories, a reprocessing plant, which was completed by 1981 by PAEC and is next to the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) near Islamabad, which is not subject to IAEA inspections and safeguards. In late 2006, the Institute for Science and International Security released intelligence reports and imagery showing the construction of a new plutonium reactor at the Khushab nuclear site. The reactor is deemed to be large enough to produce enough plutonium to facilitate the creation of as many as "40 to 50 nuclear weapons a year."[43][44][45] The New York Times carried the story with the insight that this would be Pakistan's third plutonium reactor,[46] signaling a shift to dual-stream development, with Plutonium-based devices supplementing the nation's existing HEU stream to atomic warheads. On 30 May 1998, Pakistan proved its plutonium capability in a scientific experiment and sixth nuclear test: codename Chagai-II.[]
Pakistan
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Stockpile
Estimates of Pakistan's stockpile of nuclear warheads vary. The most recent analysis, published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 2010, estimates that Pakistan has 70-90 nuclear warheads.[47] In 2001, the U.S.-based Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimated that Pakistan had built 2448 HEU-based nuclear warheads with HEU reserves for 30-52 additional warheads.[48][49] In 2003, the U.S. Navy Center for Contemporary Conflict estimated that Pakistan possessed between 35 and 95 nuclear warheads, with a median of 60.[50] In 2003, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace estimated a stockpile of approximately 50 weapons. By contrast, in 2000, U.S. military and intelligence sources estimated that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal may be as large as 100 warheads.[51] The actual size of Pakistan's nuclear stockpile is hard for experts to gauge owing to the extreme secrecy which surrounds the program in Pakistan. However, in 2007, retired Pakistan Army's Brigadier-General Feroz Khan, previously second in command at the Strategic Arms Division of Pakistans' Military told a Pakistani newspaper that Pakistan had "about 80 to 120 genuine warheads."[52][53] Pakistan tested plutonium capability in the sixth nuclear test, codename Chagai-II, on 30 May 1998 at Kharan Desert. In this test the most compact and sophisticated design, made to be carried by small delivery vehicles such as MIRV and cruise missiles, was tested. [citation needed] The critical mass of a bare mass sphere of 90% enriched uranium-235 is 52kg. Correspondingly, the critical mass of a bare mass sphere of plutonium-239 is 810kg. The bomb that destroyed Hiroshima used 60kg of U-235 while the Nagasaki Pu bomb used only 6kg of Pu-239. Since all Pakistani bomb designs are implosion-type weapons, they will typically use between 1525kg of U-235 for their cores. Reducing the amount of U-235 in cores from 60kg in gun-type devices to 25kg in implosion devices is only possible by using good neutron reflector/tamper material such as beryllium metal, which increases the weight of the bomb. And the uranium, like plutonium, is only usable in the core of a bomb in metallic form. However, only 24kg of plutonium is needed for the same device that would need 2025kg of U-235. Additionally, a few grams of tritium (a by-product of plutonium production reactors and thermonuclear fuel) can increase the overall yield of the bombs by a factor of three to four. The sixth Pakistan nuclear test, codename Chagai-II, (May 30, 1998) at Kharan Desert was a successful test of a sophisticated, compact, but powerful bomb designed to be carried by missiles. The Pakistanis are believed to be spiking their plutonium based nuclear weapons with tritium. Only a few grams of tritium can result in an increase of the explosive yield by 300% to 400%.[]
Pakistani Missiles on display at the IDEAS 2008 defence exhibition in Karachi, Pakistan.
A truck-mounted launch system (TEL) armed with 4 Babur cruise missiles on display at the IDEAS 2008 defence exhibition in Karachi, Pakistan.
Truck-mounted Missiles on display at the IDEAS 2008 defence exhibition in Karachi, Pakistan.
Pakistan A whole range and variety of weapons using Pu-239 can be easily built, both for aircraft delivery and especially for missiles (in which U-235 cannot be used). So if Pakistan wants to be a nuclear power with an operational weapon capability, both first and second strike, based on assured strike platforms like ballistic and cruise missiles (unlike aircraft), the only solution is with plutonium, which has been the first choice of every country that built a nuclear arsenal. As for Pakistan's plutonium capability, it has always been there, from the early 1970s onwards. However, there were only two logistic problems faced by PAEC. One was that Pakistan did not want to be an irresponsible state and the PAEC did not divert spent fuel from the safeguarded KANUPP for reprocessing at the New Labs. This was enough to build a whole arsenal of nuclear weapons straight away. The PAEC built its own plutonium and tritium production reactor at Khushab, known as Khushab-I reactor, beginning in 1985. The second one was allocation of resources. Ultra-centrifugation for obtaining U-235 cannot be done simply by putting natural uranium through the centrifuges. It requires the complete mastery over the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, beginning at uranium mining and refining, production of uranium ore or yellow cake, conversion of ore into uranium dioxide (UO2) (which is used to make nuclear fuel for natural uranium reactors like Khushab and KANUPP), conversion of UO2 into uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) and then into the feedstock for enrichment (UF6). The complete mastery of fluorine chemistry and production of highly toxic and corrosive hydrofluoric acid and other fluorine compounds is required. The UF6 is pumped into the centrifuges for enrichment. The process is then repeated in reverse until UF4 is produced, leading to the production of uranium metal, the form in which U-235 is used in a bomb. It is estimated that there are approximately 10,000-20,000 centrifuges in Kahuta. This means that with P2 machines, they would be producing between 75100kg of HEU since 1986, when full production of weapons-grade HEU began. Also the production of HEU was voluntarily capped by Pakistan between 1991 and 1997, and the five nuclear tests of 28 May 1998 also consumed HEU. So it is safe to assume that between 1986 and 2005 (prior to the 2005 earthquake), KRL produced 1500kg of HEU. Accounting for losses in the production of weapons, it can be assumed that each weapon would need 20kg of HEU; sufficient for 75 bombs as in 2005. Pakistan's first nuclear tests were made in May 1998, when six warheads were tested under codename Chagai-I and Chagai-II. It is reported that the yields from these tests were 12kt, 30 to 36kt and four low-yield (below 1kt) tests. From these tests Pakistan can be estimated to have developed operational warheads of 20 to 25kt and 150kt in the shape of low weight compact designs and may have 300500kt[] large-size warheads. The low-yield weapons are probably in nuclear bombs carried on fighter-bombers such as the Dassault Mirage III and fitted to Pakistan's short-range ballistic missiles, while the higher-yield warheads are probably fitted to the Shaheen series and Ghauri series ballistic missiles.[]
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Second strike capability

According to a US congressional report, Pakistan has addressed issues of survivability in a possible nuclear conflict through second strike capability. Pakistan has been dealing with efforts to develop new weapons and at the same time, have a strategy for surviving a nuclear war. Pakistan has built hard and deeply buried storage and launch facilities to retain a second strike capability in a nuclear war.[54] In January 2000, two years past after the atomic tests, the NIE officials stated that the intelligence gathering figures "overstated the capabilities of India's homegrown arsenal and understate those of Pakistan".[] The US CENTCOM commander, General Anthony Zinni, a friend of Musharraf,[] told the NBC that longtime assumptions, that "India had an edge in the South Asian strategic balance of power, were questionable at best. Don't assume that the Pakistan's nuclear capability is inferior to the Indians", General Zinni quoted to NBC.[] It was confirmed that Pakistan has built Soviet-style road-mobile missiles, state-of-the-art air defences around strategic sites, and other concealment measures. In 1998, Pakistan had 'at least six secret locations' and since then it is believed Pakistan may have many more such secret sites. In 2008, the United States admitted that it did not know
Pakistan where all of Pakistans nuclear sites are located. Pakistani defence officials have continued to rebuff and deflect American requests for more details about the location and security of the countrys nuclear sites.[55]
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MIRV capability
Pakistani engineers are also said to be in the advance stages of developing MIRV technology for its missiles. This would allow the military to fit several warheads on the same ballistic missile and then launch them at separate targets.[56]
Personnel
In 2010, Russian foreign ministry official Yuriy Korolev stated that there are somewhere between 120,000 to 130,000 people directly involved in Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs, a figure considered extremely large for a developing country.[57]
Foreign assistance
Historically, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been repeatedly charged with allegedly transferring missile and related materials to Pakistan.[] Despite China strongly dismissing the charges and accusations, the United States alleged China to have played a major role in the establishment of Pakistan's atomic bomb development infrastructure.[] China has consistently maintained that it has not sold any weapon parts or components to Pakistan or anyone else.[] On August 2001, it was reported that US officials confronted China numerous times over this issue and pointed out "rather bluntly"[] to Chinese officials that the evidences from intelligence sources was "powerful."[] But they had been rebuffed by the Chinese, who have retorted by referring to the U.S. support for Taiwan's military build-up which Beijing says is directed against it.[] The former U.S. officials have also disclosed that China had allegedly transferred technology to Pakistan and conducting putative test for it in 1980.[58] However, senior scientists and officials strongly dismissed the U.S. disclosure, and in 1998 interview given to Kamran Khan, Abdul Qadeer Khan maintained to the fact that, "due to its sensitivity, no country allows another country to use their tests site to explode the devices," although the UK conducted such tests in Australia and the United States.[] His statement was also traced by Samar Mubarakmand who acknowledged that cold tests were carried out, under codename Kirana-I, in a test site which was built by the Corps of Engineers under the guidance of the PAEC.[][59] According to a 2001 Department of Defense report, China has supplied Pakistan with nuclear materials and has provided critical technical assistance in the construction of Pakistan's nuclear weapons development facilities, in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which China is a signatory.[60][61] In 2001 visit to India, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Li Peng rejected all the accusations against China to Indian media and strongly maintained on the ground that "his country was not giving any nuclear arms to Pakistan nor transferring related-technology to it."[] Talking to a media correspondents and Indian parliamentarians, Li Peng frankly quoted: "We do not help Pakistan in its atomic bomb projects. Pakistan is a friendly country with whom we have good economic and political relations."[] In 1986, it was reported that both countries have signed a mutual treaty of peaceful use of civil nuclear technology agreement in which China would supply Pakistan a civil-purpose nuclear power plant. A grand ceremony was held in Beijing where Pakistan's then-Foreign Minister Yakub Khan signed on behalf of Pakistan in the presence of PAEC chairman Munir Ahmad Khan and Chinese Prime Minister. Therefore, in 1989, Pakistan reached agreement with China for the supply of a 300MW commercial CHASHNUPP-1 nuclear power plant. In February, 1990, President Franois Mitterrand of France visited Pakistan and announced that France had agreed to supply a 900 MWe commercial nuclear power plant to Pakistan. However, after the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was dismissed in August, 1990, the French nuclear power plant deal went into cold storage and the agreement could not be implemented due to financial constraints and the Pakistani government's apathy. Also in February 1990, Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, V.P. Yakunin, said that the USSR was considering a request from Pakistan for the
Pakistan supply of a nuclear power plant. The Soviet and French civilian nuclear power plant was on its way during 1990s. However, Bob Oakley, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, expressed U.S. displeasure at the recent agreement made between France and Pakistan for the sale of a nuclear power plant.[62] After the U.S. concerns the civilian-nuclear technology agreements were cancelled by France and Soviet Union. Declassified documents from 1982, released in 2012 under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, said that U.S. intelligence detected that Pakistan was seeking suspicious procurements from Belgium, Finland, Japan, Sweden and Turkey.[63]
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Doctrine
Pakistan refuses to adopt a "no-first-use" doctrine, indicating that it would strike India with atomic weapons even if India did not use such weapons first. Pakistans asymmetric nuclear posture has significant influence on India's decision ability to retaliate, as shown in 2001 and 2008 crises, when Pakistan-based terror organization carried out deadly attacks on Indian soil, only to be met with a relatively subdued response from India. A former Indian Chief of Army Staff, General Shankar Roychowdhury, stated that "Pakistan's threat of nuclear first-use deterred India from seriously considering conventional military strikes."[] India is Pakistan's primary geographic neighbor and primary strategic competitor, helping drive Pakistans conventional warfare capability and nuclear weapons development: The two countries share an 1800 mile border and have suffered a violent historyfour wars in less than seven decades. The past three decades have seen India's economy eclipse that of Pakistan's, allowing the former to outpace the latter in defense expenditure at a decreasing share of GDP. In comparison to population, India is more powerful than Pakistan by almost every metric of military, economic, and political powerand the gap continues to grow,"[] a Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs report claims.
Theory of deterrence
The theory of "N-deterrence" has been frequently being interpreted by the various government-in-time of effect of Pakistan. Although the nuclear deterrence theory was officially adopted in 1998 as part of Pakistan's defence theory,[] on the other hand, the theory has had been interpreted by the government since in 1972. The relative weakness in defense warfare is highlighted in Pakistan's nuclear posture, which Pakistan considers its primary deterrent from Indian conventional offensives or nuclear attack. Nuclear theorist Brigadier-General Feroz Hassan Khan adds: "The cohesive orders and situations of Pakistan unified combatant commands are akin to NATO's position in the Cold War. But, there are geographic gaps and corridors similar to those that existed in Europe that are vulnerable to exploitation by mechanized Indian Army... With its relatively smaller conventional force, and lacking adequate technical means, especially in early warning and surveillance, Pakistan relies on a more proactive nuclear defense policy."[] Indian political scientist Vipin Narang, however, argues that Pakistan's asymmetric escalation posture, or the rapid first use of nuclear weapons against conventional attacks to deter their outbreak, increases instability in South Asia. Narang supports his arguments by noting to the fact that since India's assured retaliation nuclear posture has not deterred these provocations, Pakistan's passive nuclear posture has neutralized India's conventional options for now; limited retaliation would be militarily futile, and more significant conventional retaliation is simply off the table."[] The strategists in Pakistan Armed Forces has ceded nuclear assets and a degree of nuclear launch code authority to lower-level officers to ensure weapon usability in a "fog of war" scenario, making credible its deterrence doctrine.[] On further military perspective, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), has retrospectively contended that "theory of defense is not view to enter into a "nuclear race", but to follow a policy of "peaceful co-existence" in the region, it cannot remain oblivious to the developments in South Asia."[] The Pakistan Government officials and strategists have consistently emphasized that nuclear deterrence is intended by maintaining a balance to safeguard its sovereignty and ensure peace in the region.[64]
Pakistan Pakistan's motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons development program is never to allow another invasion of Pakistan.[65] President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq allegedly told the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1987 that, "If your forces cross our borders by an inch, we are going to annihilate your cities."[] Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the U.S. Defense Department report cited above, "Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Pakistan has responded to the report by stating that the United States itself has not ratified the CTBT. Consequently, not all of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani officials have stated that signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan's best interest, but that Pakistan will do so only after developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed any connection with India's decision." The Congressional Research Service, in a report published on July 23, 2012, said that in addition to expanding its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan could broaden the circumstances under which it would be willing to use nuclear weapons.[66] Pakistan's motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons development program is never to allow another invasion of Pakistan.[67]
285
Nuclear Command and Control

The government institutional organization authorized to make critical decisions about Pakistan's nuclear posturing is the NCA.[] The NCA has its genesis since 1970s[] and has been constitutionally established in February 2000.[] The NCA is composed of two civic-military committees that advises and console both Prime minister and the President of Pakistan, on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons; it is also responsible for war-time command and control. In 2001, Pakistan further consolidated its nuclear weapons infrastructure by placing the Khan Research Laboratories and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission under the control of one Nuclear Defense Complex. In November 2009, Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari announced that he will be replaced by Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani as the chairman of NCA.[68] The NCA consists of the Employment Control Committee (ECC) and the Development Control Committee (DCC), both now chaired by the Prime Minister.[] The Foreign minister and Economic Minister serves as a deputy chairmen of the ECC, the body which defines nuclear strategy, including the deployment and employment of strategic forces, and would advise the prime minister on nuclear use. The committee includes key senior cabinet ministers as well as the respective military chiefs of staff.[] The ECC reviews presentations on strategic threat perceptions, monitors the progress of weapons development, and decides on responses to emerging threats.[] It also establishes guidelines for effective command-and-control practices to safeguard against the accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons.[] The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee is the deputy chairman of the Development Control Committee (DCC), the body responsible for weapons development and oversight which includes the nation's military and scientific, but not its political, leadership.[] Through DCC, the senior civilian scientists maintains a tight control of scientific and ethical research; the DCC exercises technical, financial and administrative control over all strategic organisations, including national laboratories and scientific research and development organisations associated with the development and modernisation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.[] Functioning through the SPD, the DCC oversees the systematic progress of weapon systems to fulfil the force goals set by the committee.[] Under the Nuclear Command Authority, its secretariat, Strategic Plans Division (SPD), is responsible for the physical protection and to ensure security of all aspects of country's nuclear arsenals.[] The SPD functions under the joint chiefs of staff committee at the Joint Headquarters (JS HQ) and reports directly to the Prime Minister.[] The comprehensive nuclear force planning is integrated with conventional war planning at the National Security Council (NSC).[] According to the officials of Pakistan's military science circles, it is the high-profile civic-military committee consisting the Cabinet ministers, President, Prime minister and the four services chiefs, all of whom who reserves the right to order the deployment and the operational use of the nuclear weapons.[] The final and executive
Pakistan political decisions on nuclear arsenals deployments, operational use, and nuclear weapons politics are made during the sessions of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, which is chaired by the Prime minister.[] It is this DCC Council where the final political guideles, discussions and the nuclear arsenals operational deployments are approved by the Prime minister.[] The DCC reaffirmed its policies on development of nuclear energy and arsenals through the country's media.[]
286
U.S. assistance for arsenal security

From the end of 2001 the United States has provided material assistance to aid Pakistan in guarding its nuclear material, warheads and laboratories. The cost of the program has been almost $100 million. Specifically the USA has provided helicopters, night-vision goggles and nuclear detection equipment.[69] Pakistan turned down the offer of Permissive Action Link (PAL) technology, a sophisticated "weapon release" program which initiates use via specific checks and balances, possibly because it feared the secret implanting of "dead switches". But Pakistan is since believed to have developed and implemented its own version of PAL and U.S. military officials have stated they believe Pakistan's nuclear arsenals to be well secured.[70][71] Security concerns of the United States Since 2004 the United States government has reportedly been concerned about the safety of Pakistani nuclear facilities and weapons. Press reports have suggested that the United States has contingency plans to send in special forces to help "secure the Pakistani nuclear arsenal".[72][73] Lisa Curtis of The Heritage Foundation giving testimony before the United States House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade concluded that "preventing Pakistan's nuclear weapons and technology from falling into the hands of terrorists should be a top priority for the U.S."[74] However Pakistan's government has ridiculed claims that the weapons are not secure.[72] A report published by The Times in early 2010 states that the U.S. is training an elite unit to recover Pakistani nuclear weapons or materials should they be seized by militants, possibly from within the Pakistani nuclear security organization. This was done in the context of growing Anti-Americanism in the Pakistani Armed Forces, multiple attacks on sensitive installations over the previous 2 years and rising tensions. According to former U.S. intelligence official Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, U.S. concerns are justified because militants have struck at several Pakistani military facilities and bases since 2007. According to this report, the United States does not know the locations of all Pakistani nuclear sites and has been denied access to most of them.[75] However, during a visit to Pakistan in January 2010, the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates denied that the United States had plans to take over Pakistan's nuclear weapons.[76] A study by Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University titled 'Securing the Bomb 2010', found that Pakistan's stockpile "faces a greater threat from Islamic extremists seeking nuclear weapons than any other nuclear stockpile on earth".[77] According to Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former investigator with the CIA and the US department of energy there is "a greater possibility of a nuclear meltdown in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world. The region has more violent extremists than any other, the country is unstable, and its arsenal of nuclear weapons is expanding."[78] Nuclear weapons expert David Albright author of 'Peddling Peril' has also expressed concerns that Pakistan's stockpile may not be secure despite assurances by both Pakistan and U.S. government. He stated Pakistan "has had many leaks from its program of classified information and sensitive nuclear equipment, and so you have to worry that it could be acquired in Pakistan,"[79] A 2010 study by the Congressional Research Service titled 'Pakistans Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues' noted that even though Pakistan had taken several steps to enhance Nuclear security in recent years 'Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question.'[80] In April 2011, IAEA's deputy director general Denis Flory declared Pakistan's nuclear programme safe and secure.[81][82] According to the IAEA, Pakistan is currently contributing more than $1.16 million in IAEA's Nuclear
Pakistan Security Fund, making Pakistan as 10th largest contributor.[83] In response to a November 2011 article in The Atlantic written by Jeffrey Goldberg highlighting concerns about the safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, the Pakistani Government announced that it would train an additional 8,000 people to protect the country's nuclear arsenal. At the same time, the Pakistani Government also denounced the article. Training will be completed no later than 2013.[84] But on the other hand, Pakistan consistently maintains that it has tightened the security over the several years.[] In 2010, the Chairman Joint Chiefs General Tariq Majid exhorted to the world delegation at the National Defence University that, "World must accept Pakistan as nuclear power."[] While dismissing all the concerns on the safety of country's nuclear arsenal, General Majid maintains to the fact: "We are shouldering our responsibility with utmost vigilance and confidence. We have put in place a very robust regime that includes "multilayered mechanisms" and processes to secure our strategic assets, and have provided maximum transparency on our practices. We have reassured the international community on this issue over and over again and our track record since the time our atomic bomb programme was made overt has been unblemished".[]
287
National Security Council

Defence Committee of Cabinet (DCC) National Command Authority (NCA) Ministry of Defence (MoD) Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) Strategic Plans Division (SPD) - also known as the Strategic Planning Directorate[85] Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) Development Control Committee (DCC) Employment Control Committee (ECC) Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU)
Strategic combat commands Air Force Strategic Command (AFSC) Army Strategic Forces Command (ASFC) Naval Strategic Forces Command (NSFC)
Weapons development agencies

National Engineering & Scientific Commission (NESCOM)
National Development Complex (NDC), Islamabad Project Management Organization (PMO), Khanpur Air Weapon Complex (AWC), Hasanabdal Maritime Technologies Complex (MTC), Karachi
Pakistan
288
Ministry of Defense Production

Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), Wah Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), Kamra Defense Science and Technology Organization (DESTO), Chattar
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)

Directorate of Technical Development Directorate of Technical Equipment Directorate of Technical Procurement Directorate of Science & Engineering Services Institute of Nuclear Power, Islamabad Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science & Technology (PINSTECH) New Laboratories, Rawalpindi Pilot Reprocessing Plant PARR-1 and PARR-2 Nuclear Research Reactors Center for Nuclear Studies (CNS), Islamabad Computer Training Center (CTC), Islamabad Nuclear Track Detection Center (Solid State Nuclear Track Detection Center) Khushab Reactor, Khushab Atomic Energy Minerals Centre, Lahore Hard Rock Division, Peshawar Mineral Sands Program, Karachi Baghalchur Uranium Mine, Baghalchur Dera Ghazi Khan Uranium Mine, Dera Ghazi Khan Issa Khel/Kubul Kel Uranium Mines and Mills, Mianwali Multan Heavy Water Production Facility, Multan, Punjab Uranium Conversion Facility, Islamabad Golra Ultracentrifuge Plant, Golra Sihala Ultracentrifuge Plant, Sihala Directorate of Quality Assurance,Islamabad New Labs Nilore,Islamabad
Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission (SUPARCO)

Aerospace Institute, Islamabad. Computer Center, Karachi. Control System Laboratories. Sonmian Satellite Launch Center, Sonmiani Beach. Instrumentation Laboratories, Karachi. Material Research Division. Quality Control and Assurance Unit. Rocket Bodies Manufacturing Unit. Solid Composite Propellant Unit. Liquid Composite Propellant Unit Space and Atmospheric Research Center (space Center), Karachi
Static Test Unit, Karachi Tilla Satellite Launch Center, Tilla, Punjab
Pakistan
289
Ministry of Industries & Production

State Engineering Corporation (SEC) Heavy Mechanical Complex Ltd. (HMC) Pakistan Steel Mills Limited, Karachi.
Delivery systems
Land systems
As of 2011, Pakistan possesses a wide variety of nuclear capable medium range ballistic missiles with ranges up to 2500km.[86] Pakistan also possesses nuclear tipped Babur cruise missiles with ranges up to 700km. In April 2012, Pakistan launched a Hatf-4 Shaheen-1A, said to be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead designed to evade missile-defense systems.[87] The Babur cruise missile range can also be extended to 1000km or more. These land-based missiles are controlled by Army Strategic Forces Command of Pakistan Army. Pakistan is also believed to be developing tactical nuclear weapons for use on the battlefield with ranges up to 60km such as the Nasr missile. According to Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Non-proliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, citing a Pakistani news article,[88] Pakistan is developing its own equivalent to the Davy Crockett launcher with miniaturized warhead that may be similar to the W54.[89]
Aerial systems
The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) is believed to have practiced "toss-bombing" in the 1980s and 1990s, a method of launching weapons from fighter-bombers which can also be used to deliver nuclear warheads.[citation needed] The PAF has two dedicated units (No. 16 Black Panthers and No. 26 Black Spiders) operating 18 aircraft in each squadron (36 aircraft total) of the JF-17 Thunder, believed to be the preferred vehicle for delivery of nuclear weapons.[90] These units are major part of the Air Force Strategic Command, a command responsible for nuclear response. The PAF also operates a fleet of F-16 fighters, of which 18 were delivered in 2012 and confirmed by General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. With a third squadron being raised, this would bring the total number of dedicated nuclear capable aircraft to a total of 54.[91] The PAF also possesses the Ra'ad air-launched cruise missile which has a range of 350km and can carry a nuclear warhead with a yield of between 10kt to 35kt.[92] It has also been reported that an air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) with a range of 350km has been developed by Pakistan, designated Hatf8 and named Ra'ad ALCM, which may theoretically be armed with a nuclear warhead. It was reported to have been test-fired by a Mirage III fighter and, according to one Western official, is believed to be capable of penetrating some air defence/missile defence systems.[]
Naval systems
The Pakistan's Navy was first publicly reported to be considering deployment of nuclear weapons on submarines in February 2001. Later in 2003 it was stated by Admiral Shahid Karimullah, then Chief of Naval Staff, that there were no plans for deploying nuclear weapons on submarines but if "forced to" they would be. In 2004, Pakistan Navy established the Naval Strategic Forces Command and made it responsible for countering and battling naval-based weapons of mass destruction. It is believed by most experts that Pakistan is developing a sea-based variant of the Hatf VII Babur, which is a nuclear-capable ground-launched cruise missile.[] With a stockpile of plutonium, Pakistan would be able to produce a variety of miniature nuclear warheads which would allow it to nuclear-tip the C-802 and C-803 anti-ship missiles as well as being able to develop nuclear torpedoes, nuclear depth bombs and nuclear naval mines.[citation needed]
Pakistan
290
Future delivery systems

Nuclear submarine
In response to INS Arihant, India's first nuclear submarine, the Pakistan Navy pushed forward a proposal to build its own nuclear submarine as a direct response to the Indian nuclear submarine program.[93][94][] Many U.S. military experts believe that Pakistan has the capability of building a nuclear submarine and is ready to build such a fleet, but Pakistan's Navy has cautiously monitored the status of Indias development of nuclear submarines, and has reserved the right to take appropriate measures in response.[] Finally in 2012, the Navy announced it would start work on and construction of a nuclear submarine to better meet the Indian Navy's nuclear threat.[] According to the Navy, the nuclear submarine is an ambitious project, and will be designed and built indigenously. However, the Navy stressed that "the project completion and trials would take anywhere from between 5 to 8 years to build the nuclear submarine after which Pakistan would join the list of countries that has a nuclear submarine."[]
References
[1] Approximating and calculating the exact, accurate and precise yields are difficult to calculate. Even under very controlled conditions, precise yields can be very hard to determine, and for less controlled conditions the margins of error can be quite large. There are number of different ways that the yields can be determined, including calculations based on blast size, blast brightness, seismographic data, and the strength of the shock wave. The Pakistan Government authorities puts up the yield range from 20-~40kt (as noted by Carey Sublette of the Nuclear Weapon Archives in her report. The explosion measured 5.54 degrees on the Richter Scale, the PAEC provided the data as public domain in the KNET sources. [3] Duff, Michael (2007). Salam + 50: proceedings of the conference, Abdus Salam and Pakistan. London, United Kingdom: Imperial College Press. pp. 42. [6] , Chapter 3, pp 87. [10] Shahidur Rehman, Long Road to Chagai, Professor Abdus Salam and Pakistan's Fission Weapons Programme, pp51-89, Printwise publications, Islamabad, 1999 [11] Munir Ahmad Khan, How Pakistan made its nuclear fuel cycle, The Nation, (Islamabad) February 7 and 9, 1998. [12] Bhutto on Nuclear weapons (http:/ / www. nuclearweaponarchive. org/ Pakistan/ PakOrigin. html) [15] http:/ / www. expressindia. com/ latest-news/ Lankan-Muslims-in-Dubai-supplied-Nmaterials-to-Pak-A-Q-Khan/ 514870/ [24] ISIS Online Jan 15 2011 (http:/ / isis-online. org/ isis-reports/ detail/ pakistan-appears-to-be-building-a-fourth-military-reactor-at-the-khushab-nu/ 12) [25] http:/ / www. nuclearfiles. org/ menu/ key-issues/ nuclear-weapons/ history/ post-cold-war/ india-pakistan/ background_information/ pakistan_nuclear_weapons_print. htm [26] http:/ / www. stimson. org/ images/ uploads/ research-pdfs/ PAKISTAN_ISRAEL. pdf [27] http:/ / www. worldlii. org/ int/ other/ UNGARsn/ 1979/ 100. pdf [28] http:/ / books. google. co. uk/ books?id=eOgj3HHDnJkC& pg=PA145& lpg=PA145& dq=Mutual+ inspections+ by+ India+ and+ Pakistan+ of+ each+ others+ nuclear+ facilities+ 1979& source=bl& ots=qyIbzBS7wt& sig=Eeq_2Q3CUSxWKJVJnsn5rKK21LI& hl=en& sa=X& ei=4M-qUMecE8iq0QW61YC4Bg& ved=0CC0Q6AEwAw#v=onepage& q=Mutual%20inspections%20by%20India%20and%20Pakistan%20of%20each%20others%20nuclear%20facilities%201979& f=false [29] http:/ / www. acronym. org. uk/ sppak. htm [30] http:/ / www. apnewsarchive. com/ 1987/ Pakistan-Prime-Minister-Urges-India-To-Accept-Bilateral-Nuclear-Test-Ban-Pact/ id-1a52fa098629fd045872b95bfd5f59b8 [31] http:/ / books. google. co. uk/ books?id=2jypQ7XYvTIC& pg=PA123& lpg=PA123& dq=south+ asia+ zero+ missile+ zone& source=bl& ots=AO-F2i5eDC& sig=rkIKnypMEYFdsKHb0k5I4Xb0vHo& hl=en& sa=X& ei=3s6qUPrcJ-bH0QWIxoDIAg& ved=0CEYQ6AEwBw#v=onepage& q=south%20asia%20zero%20missile%20zone& f=false [32] http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ pakistan/ nuke-chron. htm [33] http:/ / ipripak. org/ papers/ india-pakistan. shtml [34] http:/ / dawn. com/ 2011/ 12/ 27/ pakistan-and-india-resume-conventional-cbm-talks/ [35] http:/ / dawn. com/ 2011/ 01/ 01/ pakistan-india-exchange-lists-of-nuclear-installations/ [36] http:/ / www. armscontrol. org/ act/ 2005_11/ NOV-IndiaPak [37] http:/ / www. washingtonpost. com/ wp-dyn/ articles/ A55542-2004Jun20. html [40] http:/ / library. fes. de/ pdf-files/ iez/ global/ 05652. pdf [42] Key Issues: Nuclear Energy: Issues: IAEA: World Plutonium Inventories (http:/ / www. nuclearfiles. org/ menu/ key-issues/ nuclear-energy/ issues/ world-plutonium-inventories-ong. htm) [43] BBC NEWS | World | South Asia | Pakistan nuclear report disputed (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 1/ hi/ world/ south_asia/ 5251936. stm)
Pakistan
[44] Pakistan Expanding Nuclear Program - washingtonpost.com (http:/ / www. washingtonpost. com/ wp-dyn/ content/ article/ 2006/ 07/ 23/ AR2006072300737. html) [45] BBC NEWS | World | South Asia | Pakistan 'building new reactor' (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 1/ hi/ world/ south_asia/ 5209894. stm) [46] U.S. Group Says Pakistan Is Building New Reactor - New York Times (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2007/ 06/ 23/ world/ asia/ 23pakistan. html) [47] Global nuclear weapons inventories, 19452010 (http:/ / thebulletin. metapress. com/ content/ e32v5535wk255382/ fulltext. pdf), Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August, 2010. [48] Federation of American Scientists (http:/ / www. fas. org/ nuke/ guide/ pakistan/ nuke/ index. html) [49] Center for Defense Information (http:/ / www. cdi. org/ issues/ nukef& f/ database/ panukes. html) [51] Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal Underestimated, Reports Say (http:/ / www. fas. org/ news/ pakistan/ 2000/ e20000609pakistan. htm) [52] Impact of US wargames on Pakistan N-arms negative -DAWN - Top Stories; 3 December 2007 (http:/ / www. dawn. com/ 2007/ 12/ 03/ top7. htm) [53] Calculating the Risks in Pakistan - washingtonpost.com (http:/ / www. washingtonpost. com/ wp-dyn/ content/ article/ 2007/ 12/ 01/ AR2007120101618. html) [58] China tested N-weapons for Pak: US insider The Times of India 6 September 2008 [63] http:/ / www. google. com/ hostednews/ afp/ article/ ALeqM5hzs08xWI6PIZl93fhPsO2d2fHrqg?docId=CNG. 9105d2b2a4f1022f1f467afd59b97c31. 31 [70] New York Times/18 November 2007 (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2007/ 11/ 18/ washington/ 18nuke. html) [72] Are Pakistan's nuclear weapons safe? (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ south_asia/ 7190033. stm), BBC, 2008-01-23 [73] Obamas Worst Pakistan Nightmare (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2009/ 01/ 11/ magazine/ 11pakistan-t. html), The New York Times, 2009-01-11 [74] U.S. Policy and Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Containing Threats and Encouraging Regional Security (http:/ / www. heritage. org/ Research/ asiaandthepacific/ tst062707. cfm), The Heritage Foundation, 2007-07-06 [75] Elite US troops ready to combat Pakistani nuclear hijacks (http:/ / www. timesonline. co. uk/ tol/ news/ world/ asia/ article6991056. ece), The Times, 2010-01-17 [76] Elisabeth Bumiller, "Gates Sees Fallout From Troubled Ties With Pakistan", published by The New York Times on 23 January 2010, URL: http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2010/ 01/ 24/ world/ asia/ 24military. html. Retrieved 24 January 2010. [77] Pakistan nuclear weapons at risk of theft by terrorists, US study warns (http:/ / www. guardian. co. uk/ world/ 2010/ apr/ 12/ pakistan-nuclear-weapons-security-fears), The Guardian, 2010-04-12 [78] Could terrorists get hold of a nuclear bomb? (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ americas/ 8615484. stm), BBC, 2010-04-12 [79] Official: Terrorists seek nuclear material, but lack ability to use it (http:/ / www. cnn. com/ 2010/ US/ 04/ 13/ nuclear. terrorists/ ), CNN, 2010-04-13 [80] Pakistans Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues (http:/ / www. fas. org/ sgp/ crs/ nuke/ RL34248. pdf), Congressional Research Service, 2010-02-23 [81] Tehran Times: IAEA declares Pakistan nuclear program safe (http:/ / www. tehrantimes. com/ index_View. asp?code=239445) [82] IAEA declared Pakistan's Nuke programme safe and secure (http:/ / www. dawn. com/ 2011/ 04/ 25/ iaea-declares-pakistan-nuclear-program-safe. html) [83] IAEA terms Pakistan's programme, safe and secure (http:/ / www. thenews. com. pk/ NewsDetail. aspx?ID=14703) [84] http:/ / www. theatlantic. com/ international/ archive/ 2011/ 11/ pakistan-announces-move-to-increase-nuclear-security/ 248002 [90] http:/ / www. app. com. pk/ en_/ index. php?option=com_content& task=view& id=96657& Itemid=2 [91] http:/ / tribune. com. pk/ story/ 338584/ boosting-air-defence-f-16s-replace-americans-at-jacobabad-airbase/ [92] http:/ / www. missilethreat. com/ cruise/ id. 144/ cruise_detail. asp [93] http:/ / idrw. org/ ?p=8896 [94] http:/ / www. defensenews. com/ article/ 20120211/ DEFREG03/ 302110003/ Pakistani-Navy-Develop-Nuclear-Powered-Submarines-Reports?odyssey=mod|newswell|text|World
291
External links
BCCI May have funded Bomb (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 0,9171,973732-4,00.html) The Islamic Bomb (http://www.paktoday.com/islamic.htm) - Tashbih Sayyed US Report: China Gifted Nuclear Bomb and Pakistan Stole the Technology (http://www. theworldreporter.com/2009/11/us-report-china-gifted-nuclear-bomb-and.html) The South Asian Strategic Stability Institute Weapons Related Datasets (http://www.sassu.org.uk/html/ datasets.htm)
Pakistan Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) Military and Weapons Section (http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/pages/ viewpage.action?pageId=666) China,Pakistan and the Bomb The Declassified File on U.S. Policy, 1977-1997 (http://www.gwu.edu/ ~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB114/index.htm)-----National Security Archives. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html Nuclear Notebook: Pakistan's nuclear program, 2005 (http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/ 485jr988wv3v1551/?p=4d33abb9f91049f1854709f83cdbc44d&pi=19), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (http:// thebulletin.org), Jan/Feb 2002. Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program - The Beginning (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakOrigin. html) Nuclear Files.org (http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/post-cold-war/ india-pakistan/india-pakistan-conflict.htm) Pakistan's nuclear conflict with India- background and the current situation Nuclear Files.org (http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/basics/nuclear-stockpiles. htm) Current information on nuclear stockpiles in Pakistan Ideas Pakistan - International Defense Exhibition at Karachi, Pakistan (http://www.ideaspakistan.com/) Defense Export Promotion Organization - Ministry of Defense (http://www.depo.org.pk/) Time line of Pakistan's nuclear weapon development and tests (http://www.cssforum.com.pk/ compulsory-subjects/everyday-science/6253-history-pakistans-pride-nuclear-development-history-pakistan. html) - Pakistani & Indian Missile Forces (http://www.atomicarchive.com/Reports/India/Missiles.shtml) (Tarmuk missile mentioned here) - Annotated bibliography on Pakistan's nuclear weapons from the Alsos Digital Library (http://alsos.wlu.edu/ qsearch.aspx?browse=warfare/Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Program) The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (http://www.wilsoncenter. org/nuclear-history-documents/) The Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project contains a collection of primary source documents on Pakistani nuclear development.
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Poland
293
Poland
By type

Poland
294

Poland is currently not known or believed to possess weapons of mass destruction. During the Cold War, Soviet nuclear warheads were stockpiled in Poland and designated to deploy within the People's Army of Poland. Poland was also working with Russia to help eliminate the large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons developed by the Warsaw Pact countries. Poland ratified the Geneva Protocol on 4 February 1929.
Chemical weapons
Poland ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention on 23 August 1995 and did not declare any offensive program or chemical weapons stockpiles. In 2004 during the G8 Summit the Polish-Russian agreement in the sphere of chemical weapons destruction was reached. The chemical weapons agreement will assist Russia in disposing of its lewisite stockpiles.
Biological weapons
Poland ratified the Biological Weapons Convention on 25 January 1973 and is not known to have conducted any activity prohibited by the BWC.
Nuclear
Poland itself has never possessed nuclear weapons, but as the part of Warsaw Pact was equipped with aircraft (such as MiG-21, Su-7 and Su-22), as well as short range ballistic missiles (such as R-300 Elbrus, 9K52 Luna-M and OTR-21 Tochka) that could be used to deliver Soviet nuclear weapons, which would be provided in time of war.[1] Since the end of the World War II the Soviet Union maintained large amounts of troops on Polish territory, these troops were equipped with nuclear weapons. In 1991 Poland announced they would remove the nuclear capable delivery systems from their weapons inventory. They decided to keep about 40 of the OTR-21 Tochka systems armed with conventional warheads for self-defense.[] These launchers have now been completely retired. In the 1970s there was an idea to develop a hydrogen bomb which was kept secret from the Soviet Union, however it was scrapped very quickly.
References
[1] Luczak 1996, pp. 1921.
Luczak, Wojciech (July 1996). "Poland's Atomic Adventure". Air International 51 (1): pp. 1821. ISSN 0306-5634 (http://www.worldcat.org/issn/0306-5634).
Romania
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Romania
By type

Romania
296

In the 1980s, during the rule of Nicolae Ceauescu, Romania had a secret program intended to develop nuclear weapons, violating its ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty from 1970.[1] The program was dismantled after the 1989 Romanian Revolution and currently, Romania is considered free of weapons of mass destruction, using nuclear power just for civilian purposes.[1]
Nuclear program
While Romania had a nuclear research program since 1949, for the first decades, it focused on the usage of radioactive isotopes in medicine and industry. The military program was started in 1978, together with the program for the first power plant. The WMD research program (Programul Dunrea - Danube Program) was conducted at the Mgurele Nuclear Research Institute, under the strict supervision of the Securitate.[2] According to Mihai Blnescu, the former director of the research institute, the program had three departments: one which dealt with the development of nuclear weapons, one for the development of medium-range missiles and a third which dealt with chemical and biological weapons.[2] The defection of Securitate general Ion Mihai Pacepa was, according to Lucia Hossu Longin, at least in part related to the order given to him by Ceauescu, to obtain the technology for a certain element needed in the development of nuclear weapons.[3] In July 1989, the Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn accused Romania of posing military threats to Hungary, through its nuclear program and a medium-range missiles development program. Horn claimed that high-level Romanian officials announced that Romania is capable of building such weapons, but the Romanian Government denied such claims.[4]
Anti-nuclear rallies
Despite of this secret program, Ceauescu's government did organize massive rallies against nuclear proliferation. For instance, at one such rally in December 1981, he addressed a crowd of 300,000 arguing that people in both East and West should "stop those who are preparing atomic war."[5] He also urged the US and USSR to end the arms race which led to the placement of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, arguing that only by stopping this race could "humanity ... be saved from a catastrophe".[6] In 1989, Ceauescu claimed that Romania had the technology to build nuclear weapons, but that he remained "firmly resolved to fight against nuclear weapons".[7]
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Deals with other countries

Romania was also involved on the black market of nuclear technology and materials: after 1989, it was revealed that in 1986, the Ceauescu Government improperly diverted a supply of 14 tonnes[8] of heavy water originating in Norway to India.[9] Heavy water is an important ingredient in the creation of nuclear weapons and the shipment to India was another violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
After the 1989 Revolution

After the 1989 Romanian Revolution, Romania announced the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it had 100 mg of plutonium separated in 1985 at the Piteti Nuclear Research Institute and it allowed the IAEA full access to its facilities for inspection and monitoring of other violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[1] According to a 1992 article in Nucleonics Week, the plutonium was made using a TRIGA research reactor, given to Romania by the United States in the 1970s.[1] In 2003, Romania handed over to the IAEA 15 kg of highly enriched uranium fuel for the research reactor.[1]
References
[1] Tracking Nuclear ProliferationRomania (http:/ / www. pbs. org/ newshour/ indepth_coverage/ military/ proliferation/ countries/ romania. html) at PBS, May 2, 2005 [2] "'Baietelul' lui Ceausescu, mort in fasa" (http:/ / www. evz. ro/ articole/ detalii-articol/ 513785/ Baietelul-lui-Ceausescu-mort-in-fasa/ ), Evenimentul Zilei, 10 December 2002 [3] "Pacepa a fugit din ar pentru c Ceauescu l-a obligat s obin un element pentru fabricarea bombei atomice, spune L. Hossu Longin" (http:/ / www. realitatea. net/ pacepa-a-fugit-din-tara-pentru-ca-ceausescu-l-a-obligat-sa-obtina-un-element-pentru-fabricarea-bombei-atomice--spune-l--hossu-longin_555512. html), Realitatea TV, July 5, 2009 [4] Hungary Accuses Rumania of Military Threats" (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 1989/ 07/ 11/ world/ hungarian-accuses-rumania-of-military-threats. html?scp=1& sq=rumania& st=nyt), The New York Times, July 11, 1989 [5] "300,000 in Romania Protest Nuclear Weapons", The Washington Post, December 6, 1981, p. A19 [6] "End the arms race, Romanian leader says", Pittsburgh Post-Gazette October 16, 1984, p. 12 [7] "Romanian Nuclear Claim", San Jose Mercury News, April 16, 1989, Page 19A [8] "India is pressed on atom project" (http:/ / query. nytimes. com/ gst/ fullpage. html?res=9E0CE3DD143FF931A25751C0A964958260& sec=& spon=& pagewanted=all), New York Times, February 12, 1992 [9] "Romania Is Reported in Nuclear Deal With India" (http:/ / query. nytimes. com/ gst/ fullpage. html?res=9C0CE0DA153EF933A05757C0A966958260& scp=1& sq=romania nuclear& st=cse), New York Times, April 30, 1990
http://adevarul.ro/cultura/istorie/ceausescusi-programul-nuclear-romaniei-1_510eb9c04b62ed5875d0aaba/ index.html
Russia
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Russia
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/Russian Federation
First nuclear weapon test First fusion weapon test Last nuclear test Largest yield test Total tests Peak stockpile Current stockpile Maximum missile range NPT signatory
August 29, 1949 August 12, 1953 24 October 1990 50Mt (210PJ) (30 October 1961) 715 detonations 30,000 warheads (1986) 9,000' total (2012 est.) [1]
Intercontinental up to 16,000 kilometers Yes (1968, one of five recognized powers)
By type

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Brazil Bulgaria
Russia

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Burma Canada PRC France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Mexico Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Sweden Syria ROC (Taiwan) Ukraine United Kingdom United States Proliferation

According to the Federation of American Scientists, a renowned organization for assessing nuclear weapon stockpiles, Russia possesses the largest stockpile of weapons of mass destruction in the world.[2] The organization also claims that Russia has 4,650 active nuclear warheads, while the U.S. has 2,468.[1] Other sources however say that the U.S. has more nuclear warheads and the actual numbers remain a subject of estimations and ongoing constant discussion depending on their respective source. In addition to nuclear weapons, Russia declared an arsenal of 39,967 tons of chemical weapons in 1997,[] of which 57% have been destroyed.[3][] The Soviet Union ratified the Geneva Protocol on January 22, 1975 with reservations. The reservations were later dropped on January 18, 2001. Russia is also party to the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Russia
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Nuclear weapons
History
Post-Soviet Era At the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Soviet nuclear weapons were deployed in four of the new republics: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. In May 1992, these four states signed the Lisbon Protocol, agreeing to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with Russia the successor to the Soviet Union as a nuclear state, and the other three states joining as non-nuclear states.
Nuclear arsenal of Russia

The exact numbers of nuclear warheads remain a subject of estimations and ongoing constant discussion depending on their respective source. The Federation of American Scientists estimates that Russia possesses 4,650 active nuclear warheads, while the U.S. has 2,468.[1] Alexander Khramchikhin, an analyst at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis said Russia has 3,100 nuclear warheads while the U.S. has some 5,700.[4] According to 2011 data from the New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms facts sheet, the United States has the largest number of deployed nuclear weapons in the world, 300 more than Russia.[5] Mid-2007 Russia was estimated to have around 3,281 active strategic nuclear warheads in its arsenal.[6] Russia also has a large number of tactical nuclear weapons, although there are no treaty requirements for it to publish data on these weapons so the exact numbers are unknown.[7] An estimate by Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris estimate Russia has approximately 2,000 deployed tactical warheads.[8] Strategic nuclear forces of Russia include:[6] 1. Land based Strategic Rocket Forces: 489 missiles carrying up to 1,788 warheads; they employ immobile (silos), like SS-18 Satan, and mobile delivery systems, like SS-27 Topol M. 2. Sea based Strategic Fleet: 12 submarines carrying up to 609 warheads; they should be able to employ, in a near future, delivery systems like SS-N-30 Bulava. 3. Strategic Aviation: 79 bombers carrying up to 884 cruise missiles. As of July 2009, Russia's strategic arsenal reportedly shrunk to 2,723 warheads, including: 367 ICBMs with 1,248 warheads, 13 SSBNs with 591 warheads and 76 bombers with 884 warheads.[9]
Doctrine of limited nuclear war

According to a Russian military doctrine stated in 2003, tactical nuclear weapons of the Strategic Deterrence Forces could be used to "prevent political pressure against Russia and her allies (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan)." Thus, the Russian leadership "is officially contemplating a limited nuclear war".[10]
After the Korean War, the Soviet Union transferred nuclear technology and weapons to the People's Republic of China as an adversary of the United States and NATO. According to Ion Mihai Pacepa, "Khrushchevs nuclear-proliferation process started with Communist China in April 1955, when the new ruler in the Kremlin consented to supply Beijing a sample atomic bomb and to help with its mass production. Subsequently, the Soviet Union built all the essentials of Chinas new military nuclear industry."[11] Russia is one of the five "Nuclear Weapons States" (NWS) under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which Russia ratified (as the Soviet Union) in 1968. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, a number of Soviet-era nuclear warheads remained on the territories of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Under the terms of the Lisbon Protocol to the NPT, and following the 1995 Trilateral Agreement between Russia, Belarus, and the USA, these were transferred to Russia, leaving Russia as the sole inheritor of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. It is estimated that the Soviet Union had approximately
Russia 45,000 nuclear weapons stockpiled at the time of its collapse. The collapse of the Soviet Union allowed for a warming of relations with NATO. Fears of a nuclear holocaust lessened. In September 1997, the former secretary of the Russian Security Council Alexander Lebed claimed 100 "suitcase sized" nuclear weapons were unaccounted for. He said he was attempting to inventory the weapons when he was fired by President Boris Yeltsin in October 1996.[12] In 2005, Sergey Sinchenko, a legislator from the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, said 250 nuclear weapons were unaccounted for. When comparing documents of nuclear weapons transferred from Ukraine to weapons received by Russia, there was a 250-weapon discrepancy.[13] Indeed, several US politicians have expressed worries and promised legislation addressing the threat.[14] In 2002, the United States and Russia agreed to reduce their stockpiles to not more than 2,200 warheads each in the SORT treaty. In 2003, the US rejected Russian proposals to further reduce each nation's nuclear stockpiles to 1,500. Russia, in turn, refused to discuss reduction of tactical nuclear weapons.[10] Russia is actively producing and developing new nuclear weapons. Since 1997 it manufactures Topol-M (SS-27) ICBMs. There were allegations that Russia contributed to North Korean nuclear program, selling it the equipment for the safe storage and transportation of nuclear materials.[15] Nevertheless, Russia condemned Korean nuclear tests since then.[16] According to high-ranking Russian SVR defector Sergei Tretyakov, a businessman told him that he keeps his own nuclear bomb at his dacha outside Moscow.[17]
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Nuclear sabotage allegations from Russia

The highest-ranking GRU defector Stanislav Lunev described alleged Soviet plans for using tactical nuclear weapons for sabotage against the United States in the event of war. He described Soviet-made suitcase nukes identified as RA-115s (or RA-115-01s for submersible weapons) which weigh from fifty to sixty pounds. These portable bombs can last for many years if wired to an electric source. In case there is a loss of power, there is a battery backup. If the battery runs low, the weapon has a transmitter that sends a coded message either by satellite or directly to a GRU post at a Russian embassy or consulate..[18] Lunev was personally looking for hiding places for weapons caches in the Shenandoah Valley area.[18] He said that "it is surprisingly easy to smuggle nuclear weapons into the US" either across the Mexican border or using a small transport missile that can slip though undetected when launched from a Russian airplane.[18] US Congressman Curt Weldon supported claims by Lunev, but "Weldon said later the FBI discredited Lunev, saying that he exaggerated things." [19] Searches of the areas identified by Lunev who admits he never planted any weapons in the US have been conducted, "but law-enforcement officials have never found such weapons caches, with or without portable nuclear weapons." in the US.[20]
Biological weapons
Soviet program of biological weapons was initially developed by the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union (between 1945 and 1973).[21] The Soviet Union signed the Biological Weapons Convention on April 10, 1972 and ratified the treaty on March 26, 1975. Since then, the program of Biological weapons was run primarily by the "civilian" Biopreparat agency, although it also included numerous facilities run by the Soviet Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Chemical Industry, Ministry of Health, and Soviet Academy of Sciences.[21] According to Ken Alibek, who was deputy-director of Biopreparat, the Soviet biological weapons agency, and who defected to the USA in 1992, weapons were developed in labs in isolated areas of the Soviet Union including mobilization facilities at Omutininsk, Penza and Pokrov and research facilities at Moscow, Stirzhi and Vladimir. These weapons were tested at several facilities most often at "Rebirth Island" (Vozrozhdeniya) in the Aral Sea by
Russia firing the weapons into the air above monkeys tied to posts, the monkeys would then be monitored to determine the effects. According to Alibek, although Soviet offensive program was officially ended in 1992, Russia may be still involved in the activities prohibited by BWC.[21] In 1993, the story about the Sverdlovsk anthrax leak was published in Russia. The incident occurred when spores of anthrax were accidentally released from a military facility in the city of Sverdlovsk (formerly, and now again, Yekaterinburg) 900 miles east of Moscow on April 2, 1979. The ensuing outbreak of the disease resulted in 94 people becoming infected, 64 of whom died over a period of six weeks.[21]
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Chemical weapons
Russia signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 13, 1993, and ratified it on November 5, 1997. Russia declared an arsenal of 39,967 tons of chemical weapons in 1997 consisting of: blister agents: Lewisite, mustard, Lewisite-mustard-mix (HL) nerve agents: Sarin, Soman, VX Ratification was followed by three years of inaction on chemical weapons destruction because of the August 1998 Russian financial crisis. Russia met its treaty obligations by destroying 1% of its chemical agents by the Chemical Weapons Convention's 2002 deadline,[22] but requested technical and financial assistance and extensions on the deadlines of 2004 and 2007 due to the environmental challenges of chemical disposal. This extension procedure spelled out in the treaty has been utilized by other countries, including the United States. The extended deadline for complete destruction (April 2012) was not met.[3] As of October 2011, Russia has destroyed 57% of its stockpile. Russia also destroyed all of its declared Category 2 (10,616 MTs) and Category 3 chemicals.[] Russia has stored its chemical weapons (or the required chemicals) which it declared within the CWC at 8 locations: in Gorny (Saratov Oblast) (2.9% of the declared stockpile by mass) and Kambarka (Udmurt Republic) (15.9%) stockpiles already have been destroyed. In Shchuchye (Kurgan Oblast) (13.6%), Maradykovsky (Kirov Oblast) (17.4%) and Leonidovka (Penza Oblast) (17.2%) destruction takes place, while installations are under construction in Pochep (Bryansk Oblast) (18.8%) and Kizner (Udmurt Republic) (14.2%).[]
Novichok agents
In addition to the chemical weapons declared under the convention, Russia is expected to be in possession of a series of nerve agents developed in the 1970s and 1980s, some of which are one order of magnitude more lethal (based on LD50 exposure testing) than VX (the agent with the lowest LD50 in the US arsenal).[23] The agents are termed Novichok (newcomer) agents.
Proliferation
Russia has 3 factories for destruction of its chemical weapons arsenal: Gorny in Saratov Oblast, Kambarka in Udmurtia and the latest one Pochep in the Bryansk Oblast 70km from the border with Ukraine, built with funds from Italy in accordance with the agreement signed between the two countries.[24][25]
Russia
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References
[1] Federation of American Scientists :: Status of World Nuclear Forces (http:/ / www. fas. org/ programs/ ssp/ nukes/ nuclearweapons/ nukestatus. html) [3] Global Campaign to Destroy Chemical Weapons Passes 60 Percent Mark (http:/ / www. opcw. org/ nc/ news/ article/ global-campaign-to-destroy-chemical-weapons-passes-60-percent-mark/ ). OPCW. 8 July 2010 (Accessed 19 August 2010) [4] What the Russian papers say | What Russian papers say | RIA Novosti (http:/ / en. rian. ru/ papers/ 20090514/ 155022873. html) [6] Russia's nuclear capabilities (http:/ / www. telegraph. co. uk/ news/ main. jhtml?xml=/ news/ 2007/ 06/ 04/ wputin204. xml) by Adrian Blomfield, Telegraph, 5 June 2007 [7] Russia profile (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ Russia/ index. html) Nuclear Threat Initiative [8] Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, "Russian nuclear forces, 2012," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. (http:/ / bos. sagepub. com/ content/ 68/ 2/ 87. abstract) [9] Russian strategic nuclear forces (November 2009) (http:/ / www. russianforces. org/ current/ ) [10] Russia's Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century Environment (http:/ / ifri. org/ files/ Securite_defense/ prolif_paper_Trenin. pdf) - analysis by Dmitri Trenin, IFRI Proliferation Papers n13, 2005 [11] Tyrants and the Bomb (http:/ / article. nationalreview. com/ ?q=YmU3NjM4ZTg3NjViMTUyNWJmYWYzMDE4ZmRhOTQxZmI=) - by Ion Mihai Pacepa, National Review, October 17, 2006 [12] Russian Officials Deny Claims Of Missing Nuclear Weapons (http:/ / www. armscontrol. org/ act/ 1997_09/ lebedsept) [13] Russian and Ukrainian Officials Deny New Allegations That Nuclear Warheads Were Lost in the 1990s (http:/ / www. wmdinsights. com/ I5/ R4_RussiaAndUkranian. htm) [14] Nuclear Dangers: Fear Increases of Terrorists Getting Hands on 'Loose' Warheads as Security Slips (http:/ / belfercenter. ksg. harvard. edu/ publication/ 1010/ nuclear_dangers. html?breadcrumb=/ ) [15] Russia secretly offered North Korea nuclear technology (http:/ / www. telegraph. co. uk/ news/ main. jhtml?xml=/ news/ 2006/ 07/ 09/ wkorea09. xml& sSheet=/ news/ 2006/ 07/ 09/ ixnews. html) - by a Special Correspondent in Pyongyang and Michael Hirst, Telegraph, September 7, 2006. [16] Russia expresses serious concern over DPRK nuke issue (http:/ / news. xinhuanet. com/ english/ 2009-05/ 28/ content_11446860. htm) [17] Pete Earley, "Comrade J: The Untold Secrets of Russia's Master Spy in America After the End of the Cold War", Penguin Books, 2007, ISBN 978-0-399-15439-3, pages 114-121. [18] Stanislav Lunev. Through the Eyes of the Enemy: The Autobiography of Stanislav Lunev, Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1998. ISBN 0-89526-390-4. [19] Nicholas Horrock, "FBI focusing on portable nuke threat" (http:/ / www. upi. com/ NewsTrack/ Top_News/ 2001/ 12/ 20/ fbi_focusing_on_portable_nuke_threat/ 9007/ ), UPI (20 December 2001). [20] Steve Goldstein and Chris Mondics, "Some Weldon-backed allegations unconfirmed; Among them: A plot to crash planes into a reactor, and missing suitcase-size Soviet atomic weapons." Philadelphia Inquirer (15 March 2006) A7. [21] Alibek, K. and S. Handelman. Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran it. Delta (2000) ISBN 0-385-33496-6 [22] News (http:/ / www. opcw. org/ html/ global/ ra_frameset. html) [23] Tucker, J. B.; War of Nerves; Anchor Books; New York; 2006; pp 232-233. [24] "Russia opens new chemical weapons destruction plant", RIA Novosti, November 2010 (http:/ / en. rian. ru/ mlitary_news/ 20101128/ 161528556. html) [25] "Italy to help Russia destroy chemical weapons" (http:/ / en. rian. ru/ russia/ 20080326/ 102271498. html)
External links
Video archive of the Soviet Union's Nuclear Testing (http://sonicbomb.com/modules. php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=110) at sonicbomb.com (http://www.sonicbomb. com) New Video: A World Without Nuclear Weapons (http://www.ploughshares.org/moment/ video?p=423) Abolishing Weapons of Mass Destruction: Addressing Cold War and Other Wartime Legacies in the Twenty-First Century By Mikhail S. Gorbachev (http://www.opcw.org/synthesis/ html/s6/p4prt.html) Russia's Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century Environment (http://www.ifri.org/downloads/ prolif_paper_Trenin.pdf) - analysis by Dmitri Trenin, IFRI Proliferation Papers n13, 2005 Nuclear Threat Initiative on Russia (http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Russia/index.html) by National Journal
Russia UK statement on the chemical weapons convention - Link is not available now (http://www.ukinindia.com/ press/general/gen_805.asp) 1999 Nuclear stockpile estimate (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/summary.htm) Nuclear Notebook: Russian nuclear forces, 2006 (http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/ p65l757657634078/?p=2114f00338444b71903d97f57d88c181&pi=0), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (http:// thebulletin.org), March/April 2006. Nuclear Files.org (http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/basics/nuclear-stockpiles. htm) Current information on nuclear stockpiles in Russia Chemical Weapons in Russia: History, Ecology, Politics (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/cbw/ jptac008_l94001.htm) by Lev Fedorov, Moscow, Center of Ecological Policy of Russia, 27 July 1994 Russian Nuclear Weapons (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RrOB0GM4rcY)
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Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is not known to have a nuclear weapons program. From an official and public standpoint, Saudi Arabia has been an opponent of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, having signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and is a member of the coalition of countries demanding a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East.[1][2] Studies of nuclear proliferation have not identified Saudi Arabia as a country of concern.[3]
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Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Brazil
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Bulgaria Burma Canada PRC France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Mexico Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Sweden Syria ROC (Taiwan) Ukraine United Kingdom United States Proliferation

However, over the years there have been media reports of Saudi Arabia's intent to purchase a nuclear weapon from an outside source. In 2003, a leaked strategy paper laid out three possible options for the Saudi government: to acquire a nuclear deterrent, to ally with and become protected by an existing nuclear nation, or to try to reach agreement on having a nuclear-free Middle East. UN officials and weapon specialists have suggested this review was prompted by a distancing of relations with the US, concerns over Iran's nuclear program, and the lack of international pressure on Israel to give up its nuclear weapons.[4]
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Nuclear program
Saudi Arabia has denied manufacturing the nuclear weapons under its peaceful civilian nuclear program, the country has allegedly allotted financial funds for its nuclear program, and as well received scientific assistance from various counties, including United States and Pakistan, the two nuclear triads. [citation needed] According to Western media reports,[citation needed] Saudi Arabia also facilitated funds for nuclear programs in the Arab world and was also behind providing financial assistance to boost the physics experiments necessary for developing the nuclear weapons.
Nuclear Deal with United States

In May 2008, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU), as part of the United States' vintage Atoms for Peace program, to boost Saudi efforts for a civilian nuclear program.[5]
Pakistan's involvement
Historically, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have extremely cordial relations which sometimes attributed as special relationship.[] Many in Pakistan's political scientists and historians have summed up that Saudi interests in nuclear technology began in 1970s after Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto introduced Pakistan's leading theoretical physicists (who went on to join the King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals), and took the discussion where Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto pointed out the advancements made in the Israeli and the Indian nuclear programme to intimidate the Muslim world, with the Saudi royal government in 1974 after the royal family paid a visit to Pakistan in 1974, as part of 2nd OIC conference, Lahore.[] It is widely believed that Saudi Arabia has been a sole financier of Pakistan's own integrated atomic bomb project since 1974, a programme founded by former prime minister Zulfi Bhutto.[][] In 1980s, Chief Martial Law Administrator and President General Zia-ul-Haq paid a state visit to Saudi Arabia where he unofficially told the King that: "Our achievements are yours".[] This cooperation was allegedly enhanced by socialist prime minister Benazir Bhutto in 1995 and in 1998, the conservative Prime minister Nawaz Sharif took Saudi Arabia in confidence before ordering the nuclear tests (see the codenames Chagai-I and Chagai-II) in Weapon-testing labs-III (WTL) in Chagai remote site in Balochistan Province of Pakistan.[] In June 1998, the Prime Minister paid a farewell visit to King Fahd and publicly thanked Saudi government for supporting the country after conducting the tests.[] Soon, the Saudi Minister of Defense Prince Sultan traveled with the Prime minister Sharif where he toured a classified institute, the Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) where the leading scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan briefed the Prince and the Prime minister Sharif also, on nuclear physics and the sensitive issues involving the weapon-grade explosives.[] Since 1998, the Western diplomats and intelligence agencies have long been rumored to have an agreement whereby Pakistan (would) sell Saudi Arabia warheads and its locally developed nuclear technology if security in the Gulf deteriorate, although both countries sharply denied the existence of such agreement between them.[] In 2003 it was reported that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia had entered a secret agreement on "nuclear cooperation" providing Saudi Arabia with nuclear weapons technology in return for access to cheap oil for Pakistan.[6] In March 2006, the German magazine Cicero reported that Saudi Arabia had since 2003 received assistance from Pakistan to acquire nuclear missiles and warheads. Satellite photos allegedly reveal an underground city and nuclear silos with Ghauri rockets in Al-Sulaiyil, south of the capital Riyadh.[7] Pakistan has denied aiding Saudi Arabia in any nuclear ambitions.[8]
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Chinese-Saudi atomic collaboration

On January 2012, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao signed a mutual cooperation deal on nuclear energy with King Abdullah, while Premier Jaobao's visit to Middle East.[9][] The details of such cooperation were not fully provided by government-control Saudi Press Agency, but according to Hashim Yamani, president of the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy, the kingdom has planned 16 commercial nuclear power reactors by 2030.[] According to Iranian expert Afshin Molavi of New America Foundation, the Saudi-China relationship is a strategic relationship, as compare to China-Iran relations, in which the relations [of China and Iran] are a transactional one, Molavi commented.[]
Saudi financing of Iraqi nuclear program

In 1994, Muhammad Khilewi, the second-in-command of the Saudi mission to the United Nations, applied for asylum in the United States. He provided a packet of 10,000 documents[citation needed] that alleged long time Saudi support of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. According to these documents, during the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, the Saudis supported the Iraqi nuclear program with $5 billion on the condition that successful nuclear technology and possibly even nuclear weapons would be transferred to Saudi Arabia.[10] Khilewi obtained asylum in the US, with the consent of Saudi Arabia. The allegations have not been confirmed by any other source, and US officials have stated that they have no evidence of Saudi assistance to Iraqi nuclear development.[11] Saudi officials denied the allegations.[12] Furthermore, senior Clinton administration officials who were responsible for Mideast affairs at the time Khilewi sought asylum, including Robert Pelletreau of the State Department and Bruce Riedel of the National Security Council, said they found nothing in Khilewi's debriefings to back up the Media reports about a Saudi nuclear program. "There was nothing there," Pelletreau said. (Vartan 2005)
Nuclear sharing with Arab states of the Persian Gulf nuclear programs
Furthermore, the Arab States of the Persian Gulf plan to start their own joint civilian nuclear program, which has raised fears of proliferation.[citation needed] In March 2007, foreign ministers of the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council met in Saudi Arabia to discuss progress in plans agreed in December 2006, for a joint civilian nuclear program.[13]
Recent developments
In 2011, Prince Turki al-Faisal, who has served as the Saudi intelligence chief and as ambassador to the United States has suggested that the kingdom might consider producing nuclear weapons if it found itself between the atomic arsenals in Iran and Israel.[14] In 2012, it was confirmed that Saudi Arabia would launch its own nuclear weapons program immediately if Iran successfully developed nuclear weapons. In such an eventuality, Saudi Arabia would start work on a new ballistic missile platform, purchase nuclear warheads from overseas and aim to source uranium to develop weapons-grade material. Officials in the West believe Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have an understanding in which Islamabad would supply the kingdom with warheads if security in the Gulf was threatened. A Western official told The Times that Riyadh could have the nuclear warheads in a matter of days of approaching Islamabad. Pakistan's ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Mohammed Naeem Khan was quoted as saying that "Pakistan considers the security of Saudi Arabia not just as a diplomatic or an internal matter but as a personal matter." Naeem also said that the Saudi leadership considered Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to be one country. Any threats to Saudi Arabia is also a threat to Pakistan.[15] Other vendors were also likely to enter into a bidding war if Riyadh indicated that it was seeking nuclear warheads. Both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have denied the existence of any such agreement.[16] Western intelligence sources have told The Guardian that the Saudi monarchy has paid for up to 60% of the Pakistan's atomic bomb projects and in
Saudi Arabia return has the option to buy five to six nuclear warheads off the shelf.[17]
308
Missile capability
In 1987 it was reported that Saudi Arabia purchased between 50 and 60 Chinese-made CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles equipped with a high explosive warhead, which have a range of 2,800km with a payload of either 2,150 or 2,500kg together with between 10 and 15 transport vehicle systems.[18]
References
[1] Parties to the NPT (http:/ / disarmament. un. org/ TreatyStatus. nsf/ NPT (in alphabetical order)?OpenView& Start=1. 145) [2] Akaki Dvali. Center for Nonproliferation Studies (nti.org) (March 2004). Will Saudi Arabia Acquire Nuclear Weapons? (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ e3_40a. html); Arnaud de Borchgrave. Washington Times (22 October 2003) [3] Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), US Congress, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 12/93), p. 239 [4] The Guardian (18 September 2003). Saudis consider nuclear bomb (http:/ / www. guardian. co. uk/ saudi/ story/ 0,11599,1044402,00. html) [5] reportonbusiness.com: Purchase this article (http:/ / www. theglobeandmail. com/ servlet/ story/ RTGAM. 20080516. wsaudioil0516/ BNStory/ Business) [6] Pakistan, Saudi Arabia in secret nuke pact (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ org/ news/ 2003/ 031022-pakistan_saudi-arabia. htm) [7] "Saudia [sic] Arabia working on secret nuclear program with Pakistan help report ", AFX News (http:/ / www. forbes. com/ feeds/ afx/ 2006/ 03/ 28/ afx2629000. html) [8] " Pakistan rejects report on N-help to Saudis (http:/ / www. dailytimes. com. pk/ default. asp?page=2006\03\30\story_30-3-2006_pg1_4)", Daily Times (Pakistan), (30 March 2006). [10] Saudi Arabia Special Weapons (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ saudi/ index. html) [11] http:/ / cns. miis. edu/ research/ wmdme/ saudi. htm#1 Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies [12] Akaki Dvali. Center for Nonproliferation Studies (nti.org) (March 2004). Will Saudi Arabia Acquire Nuclear Weapons? (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ e3_40a. html); Arnaud de Borchgrave. Washington Times (22 October 2003) [13] Saudi defends Gulf Arab atom plans, criticizes Iran | International | Reuters (http:/ / www. reuters. com/ article/ worldNews/ idUSL0521283720070305) [15] http:/ / worldnews. msnbc. msn. com/ _news/ 2012/ 02/ 10/ 10369793-report-saudi-arabia-to-buy-nukes-if-iran-tests-a-bomb [18] http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20080524155801/ http:/ / www. missilethreat. com/ missilesoftheworld/ id. 3/ missile_detail. asp
External links
King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (http://www.energy.gov.sa/) (Arabic) (K.A.CARE is a city that aims to develop nuclear energy in Saudi Arabia)
South Africa
309
South Africa
South Africa
Nuclear program start date 1967[] First nuclear weapon test Possible, 22 September 1979 (See Vela Incident) Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown 6 None; the programme was voluntarily dismantled in 1989. 1,300 kilometres (810mi) (English Electric Canberra) Yes
First fusion weapon test Last nuclear test Largest yield test Total tests Peak stockpile Current stockpile Maximum missile range NPT signatory
From the 1960s to the 1980s, South Africa pursued research into weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Six nuclear weapons were assembled.[1] Before the anticipated changeover to a majority-elected African National Congress government in the 1990s, the South African government dismantled all of its nuclear weapons, the first nation in the world which voluntarily gave up all nuclear arms it had developed itself. The country has been a signatory of the Biological Weapons Convention since 1975, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty since 1991, and the Chemical Weapons Convention since 1995.
Nuclear weapons
South Africa
310
By type

South Africa
311

Nuclear weapons
Background


The Republic of South Africa's ambitions to develop nuclear weapons began in 1948 after giving commission to South African Atomic Energy Corporation (SAAEC), the forerunner corporation to oversee nation's uranium mining and industrial trade.[] In 1957, South Africa reached an understanding with the United States after signing a 50-year collaboration under the U.S.-sanctioned programme, the Atoms for Peace.[] The treaty concluded the South African acquisition of a single nuclear research reactor and an accompanying supply of the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel, located in Pelindaba.[] In 1965, the American subsidiary, the Allis-Chalmers Corporation, delivered the 20MW research nuclear reactor, SAFARI-1, along with ~90% HEU fuel to South African nuclear authority.[] In 1967, South
South Africa Africa decided to pursue the plutonium capability and constructed its own reactor, SAFARI-2 reactor also at the Pelindaba, that went critical using 606kg of 2% HEU fuel, and 5.4 tonnes of heavy water, both supplied by the United States.[] The SAFARI-2 reactor was intended to be moderated by heavy water, fueled by natural uranium while the reactor's cooling system used molten sodium.[] However in 1969, the project was abandoned by the South African government because the reactor was draining resources from the uranium enrichment program that was initiated in 1967.[] South Africa began focusing on the success of its uranium enrichment programme which was seen by its scientists as easier compared to plutonium.[] South Africa was able to mine uranium ore domestically, and used aerodynamic nozzle enrichment techniques to produce weapons-grade material. South Africa is suspected of having received technical assistance from various sources, including assistance from Israel in building its first nuclear device. In 1969, a pair of senior South African scientists met with Sltan Mahmoud, a nuclear engineer from Pakistan at the University of Birmingham, to conduct studies, research and independent experiments on uranium enrichment.[] The South African and Pakistan scientists studied the use of aerodynamic-jet nozzle process to enrich the fuel at the University of Birmingham, later building their nations programs in 1970s.[] However it is not clear how much knowledge they gained and to what extent they cooperated.[] South Africa gained sufficient experience with the nuclear technology to capitalize on the promotion of the U.S. government's Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) program.[] Finally in 1971, South African minister of mines Carl de Wet gave approval of the country's own PNE programme with the publicly stated objective of using PNEs in the mining industry. The date when the South African PNE programme transformed into a weapons program is a matter of some dispute.[] South Africa developed a small finite deterrence arsenal of gun-type fission weapons in the 1980s. Six were constructed and another was under construction at the time the program ended.[2]
312
Testing the first device

The South African Atomic Energy Board (AEB) selected a test site in the Kalahari Desert at the Vastrap weapons range north of Upington. Two test shafts were completed in 1976 and 1977. One shaft was 385 metres deep, the other, 216 metres. In 1977, the AEB established its own high-security weapons research and development facilities at Pelindaba, and during that year the program was transferred from Somchem to Pelindaba. In mid-1977, the AEB produced a gun-type devicewithout a highly enriched uranium (HEU) core. Although the Y-Plant was operating, it had not yet produced enough weapons-grade uranium for a device. As has happened in programmes in other nations, the development of the devices had outpaced the production of the fissile material. Atomic Energy Commission officials say that a "cold test" (a test without uranium-235) was planned for August 1977. An Armscor official who was not involved at the time said that the test would have been a fully instrumented underground test, with a dummy core. Its major purpose was to test the logistical plans for an actual detonation. How that test was cancelled has been well publicised. Soviet intelligence detected test preparations and in early August alerted the United States; U.S. intelligence confirmed the existence of the test site with an overflight of a Lockheed SR-71 spy plane.[3] On 28 August, the Washington Post quoted a U.S. official: "I'd say we were 99 percent certain that the construction was preparation for an atomic test."[4] The Soviet and Western governments were convinced that South Africa was preparing for a full-scale nuclear test. During the next two weeks in August, the Western nations pressed South Africa not to test. The French foreign minister warned on 22 August of "grave consequences" for French-South African relations. Although he did not elaborate, his statement implied that France was willing to cancel its contract to provide South Africa with the Koeberg nuclear power reactors. it had killed people so much In 1993 Wynand de Villiers said that when the test site was exposed, he ordered its immediate shutdown. The site was abandoned and the holes sealed. One of the shafts was temporarily reopened in 1988 in preparation for another test, which did not take place; the move was intended to strengthen South Africa's bargaining position during negotiations to end the war with Angola and Cuba.[]
South Africa
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Viable delivery
The warheads were originally configured to be delivered from one of several aircraft types then in service with the South African Air Force (SAAF), including the Canberra B12 and the Blackburn Buccaneer. Concerns about the vulnerability of the aircraft to the Cuban anti-aircraft defence network in Angola subsequently led the SADF to investigate missile-based delivery systems.[5] The missiles were to be based on the RSA-3 and RSA-4 launchers that had already been built and tested for the South African space programme. Three rockets had already been launched into suborbital trajectories in the late 1980s in support of development of the RSA-3 launched Greensat Orbital Management System (for commercial satellite applications of vehicle tracking and regional planning). Following the decision in 1989 to cancel the nuclear weapons program, the missile programs were allowed to continue until 1992, when military funding ended, and all ballistic missile work was stopped by RSA-3 3 stage LEO rocket mid-1993. In order to join the Missile Technology Control Regime the government had to allow American supervision of the destruction of key facilities applicable to both the long range missile and the space launch programmes.[6]
SAAF Canberra B12 with inertial navigation and special sensors package over Transvaal
Alleged collaboration with Israel

David Albright and Chris McGreal have claimed that South African projects to develop nuclear weapons during the 1970s and 1980s were undertaken with some cooperation from Israel.[][7][8] The United Nations Security Council Resolution 418 of 4 November 1977 introduced a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, also requiring all states to refrain from "any co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons".[9] According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, in 1977 Israel traded 30grams of tritium for 50 tonnes of South African uranium[citation needed] and in the mid-1980s assisted with the development of the RSA-3 and RSA-4 ballistic missiles, which are similar to Israeli Shavit and Jericho missiles.[] Also in 1977, according to foreign press reports, it was suspected that South Africa signed a pact with Israel that included the transfer of military technology and the manufacture of at least six nuclear bombs.[] In September 1979, a US Vela satellite detected a double flash over the Indian Ocean that was suspected, but never confirmed to be a nuclear test, despite extensive air sampling by WC-135 aircraft of the United States Air Force. If the Vela Incident was a nuclear test, South Africa is one of the countries, possibly in collaboration with Israel, that is suspected of carrying it out. No official confirmation of it being a nuclear test has been made by South Africa, and expert agenciesWikipedia:Avoid weasel words have disagreed on their assessments. In 1997, South African Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad stated that South Africa had conducted a test, but later retracted his statement as being a report of rumours.[10] In February 1994, Commodore Dieter Gerhardt, the convicted Soviet spy and former commander of South Africa's Simon's Town naval base was reported to have said: "Although I was not directly involved in planning or carrying out the operation, I learned unofficially that the flash was produced by an Israeli-South African test code-named Operation Phoenix. The explosion was clean and was not supposed to be detected. But they were not as smart as they thought, and the weather changed so the Americans were able to pick it up."[11][12] In 2000, Dieter Gerhardt claimed that Israel agreed in 1974 to arm eight Jericho II missiles with "special warheads" for South Africa.[13]
South Africa In 2010, The Guardian released South African government documents that it alleged confirmed the existence of Israel's nuclear arsenal. According to The Guardian, the documents were associated with an Israeli offer to sell South Africa nuclear weapons in 1975.[14][15] Israel categorically denied these allegations and said that the documents do not indicate any offer for a sale of nuclear weapons. Israeli President Shimon Peres said that The Guardian article was based on "selective interpretation... and not on concrete facts."[16] Avner Cohen, author of Israel and the Bomb and the forthcoming The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb, said "Nothing in the documents suggests there was an actual offer by Israel to sell nuclear weapons to the regime in Pretoria."[17]
314
Dismantling
South African forces feared the threat of a "domino effect" in favour of Communism, represented in southern Africa by Cuban proxy forces in Angola and threatening Namibia. In 1988 South Africa signed the Tripartite Accord with Cuba and Angola, which led to the withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops from Angola and independence for Namibia. The pre-emptive elimination of nuclear weapons would "make a 'significant contribution...toward peace, stability and progress,'" improving South Africa's relations with and restoring their credibility in regional and international politics. South Africa stood down its nuclear weapons programme in 1989. All the bombs (six constructed and one under construction) were dismantled and South Africa acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty when South African Ambassador to the United States Harry Schwarz signed the treaty in 1991. On 19 August 1994, after completing its inspection, the IAEA confirmed that one partially completed and six fully completed nuclear weapons had been dismantled. As a result, the IAEA was satisfied that South Africa's nuclear programme had been converted to peaceful applications. Following this, South Africa joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a full member on 5 April 1995. South Africa played a leading role in the establishment of the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Pelindaba) in 1996, becoming one of the first members in 1997. South Africa also signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996 and ratified it in 1999. The Treaty of Pelindaba came into effect on 15 July 2009 once it had been ratified by 28 countries.[18] This treaty requires that parties will not engage in the research, development, manufacture, stockpiling acquisition, testing, possession, control or stationing of nuclear explosive devices in the territory of parties to the Treaty and the dumping of radioactive wastes in the African zone by Treaty parties. The African Commission on Nuclear Energy, in order to verify compliance with the treaty, has been established and will be headquartered in South Africa.[19]
Timeline of South African nuclear weapons programme[20]

Year Activity
1950s and 1960s Scientific work on the feasibility of peaceful nuclear explosives and support to nuclear power production efforts 1969 1970 1971 1973 1974 1977 1978 1979 1982 Atomic Energy Board forms group to evaluate technical and economic aspects of nuclear explosives Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) releases report identifying uses for nuclear explosives R&D approval granted for "peaceful use of nuclear explosives" AEC prioritises work on a gun-type design Work on a nuclear device and the Vastrap test site are authorised AEC completes bomb assembly for "cold" test First HEU produced; Armscor assumes control of weapons programme Vela Incident; First bomb with HEU core produced by AEC First deliverable bomb built; work on weapons safety
South Africa
315
Three-phase nuclear strategy reviewed First production bomb built; seven produced, with an eighth under construction Armscor prepares Vastrap for a nuclear test Nuclear weapons dismantled Accedes to NPT
1985 1987 1988 1989 1991
Biological and chemical weapons

In October 1998, the report of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission included a chapter on Project Coast, a clandestine government chemical and biological warfare program conducted during the 1980s and 1990s. Project Coast started in 1983, ostensibly to produce equipment for defensive purposes, including masks and protective suits. Despite vehement assertions to the contrary, some testimony appeared to show that the programme went well beyond defensive purposes.
Notes
[5] http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=M7wIryQK6UkC& pg=PA10 [6] Jericho (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20100529204936/ http:/ / www. astronautix. com/ lvfam/ jericho. htm) [11] South Africa and the affordable bomb (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=VAwAAAAAMBAJ& pg=PA1& source=gbs_toc_pages& cad=0_1#PPA37,M1), David Albright, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (http:/ / thebulletin. org) Jul 1994, pp 37. [12] Proliferation: A flash from the past (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=vgwAAAAAMBAJ& pg=PA15) David Albright, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (http:/ / thebulletin. org) Nov 1997, pp. 15 [18] disarmament.un.org - Pelindaba Treaty - View chronological order by deposit (http:/ / disarmament. un. org/ TreatyStatus. nsf/ Pelindaba Treaty (in chronological order by deposit)?Open)
References
Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, Miriam Rajkumar. Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 2005.
External links
Birth and Death of the South African Nuclear Weapons Programme (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/ nuke/stumpf.htm), Waldo Stumpf, Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa, October 1995 South Africa and the nuclear option (http://web.archive.org/web/20091026074007/http://geocities.com/ sadf_scrapbook/sanuc.htm), Marcus Duvenhage, 1998 Out of South Africa: Pretorias Nuclear Weapons Experience (http://acdis.illinois.edu/publications/207/ publication-OutofSouthAfricaPretoria39sNuclearWeaponsExperience.html) (in pdf), Lt. Col. Roy E. Horton, ACDIS Occasional Paper, Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois, August 2000 Out of (South) Africa: Pretorias Nuclear Weapons Experience (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/ ocp27.htm), Roy E. Horton, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 1999 Nuclear Files.org guide to proliferation South Africa (http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/ nuclear-weapons/issues/proliferation/south-africa/index.htm) The Nuclear Weapon Archive account of South Africa (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Safrica/index.html) Israel conducted nuclear experiment in 1979 (http://www.zaman.com/?bl=hotnews&alt=&trh=20060519& hn=33254) South Africa's Nuclear Autopsy: The Risk Report (http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/safrica/ autopsy.html), Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, 1996
South Africa Nuclear verification in South Africa (http://www.fas.org/news/safrica/baeckmann.html), Adolf von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon and Demetrius Perricos, IAEA Bulletin Volume 37 Number 1 Annotated bibliography for the South African Nuclear Program from the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues (http://alsos.wlu.edu/adv_rst.aspx?keyword=south*african*nuclear*program&creator=&title=&media=all& genre=all&disc=all&level=all&sortby=relevance&results=10&period=15) South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Storage Vault (http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/ south-africas-nuclear-weapons-storage-vault/) Israel and the South African Bomb (http://qcpages.qc.edu/Political_Science/profmat/Israel and the South African bomb.pdf) The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (http://www.wilsoncenter. org/nuclear-history-documents/) The Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project conatins primary source material on South Africa's nuclear weapons program.
316
Syria
By type

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Brazil Bulgaria Burma Canada PRC France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Mexico
Syria

317
Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Sweden Syria ROC (Taiwan) Ukraine United Kingdom United States Proliferation

Syria has allegedly researched, and manufactured weapons of mass destruction.
History
On July 23, 2012 Syria admitted to possessing a stockpile of chemical weapons which it claims are reserved for national defense against foreign countries.[1] During the Syrian civil war in August 2012, the Syrian military restarted chemical weapons testing at a base on the outskirts of Aleppo.[][2] Chemical weapons were a major point of discussion between the Syrian government and world leaders, with military intervention being considered by the West as a potential consequence of the use of such weapons.[3]
Chemical Weapons
Western non-governmental organizations have stated they believe Syria has an active chemical weapons program.[4][5][6][7] Syria is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, though it denied that it had chemical weapons[8] until admitting it possessed such weapons in 2012.[9] Syria is one of six states that have not signed and eight that have not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention.[10] Syria reportedly manufactures Sarin, Tabun, VX, and mustard gas types of chemical weapons.[11] Independent assessments indicate that Syrian production could be up to a combined total of a few hundred tons of chemical agent per year.[12]
Syria
318
Facilities
Syrian chemical weapons production facilities have been identified by Western nonproliferation experts at approximately 5 sites, plus one suspected weapons base:[] al-Safira (Scud missile base) Hama (Scud missile base) Homs Latakia Palmyra
2007 explosion
In July 2007, a Syrian arms depot exploded, killing at least 15 Syrians. Jane's Defence Weekly, a U.S. magazine reporting on military and corporate affairs, believed that the explosion happened when Iranian and Syrian military personnel attempted to fit a Scud missile with a mustard gas warhead. Syria stated that the blast was accidental and not chemical related.[13]
Syrian civil war

In July 2012, a spokesman for the foreign ministry indicated that it would use chemical and biological weapons if Syria were attacked by foreign powers during the Syrian civil war. The same spokesman also said that Syria would never use these weapons against Syrian citizens.[9] It later emerged that the Syrian military had restarted testing of chemical weapons at a base on the outskirts of Aleppo in August.[14][15] Major-General Adnan Sillu subsequently stated that prior to his defection, he had been involved in high level talks in which the Syrian government came up with plans to use chemical weapons upon both civilians and opposition forces in important areas, mentioning Aleppo specifically.[16] In early December 2012, Captain Abdul-Salam Abdul-Razzaq, a Syrian army defector who was part of the al-Assad military's "Chemical Weapons Department", said "the regime has already used this kind of weapon, albeit in a limited manner, namely in Baba Amr last year. The regime also threatened to use chemical weapons in al-Zabadani, distributing gas masks and radiation suits to its troops."[17] On 28 September 2012, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta stated that the Syrian regime had moved its chemical weapons in order to "secure" them.[18] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Russia had helped establish contact between the United States and Syria, through which Syria had provided "explanations and assurances" of the security of its chemical weapons facilities.[] In early December 2012, U.S. President Barack Obama expressed "increased concern" over the Syrian government's apparent preparation of its chemical weapons for use, a concern echoed by British Foreign Secretary William Hague. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned that such use was a "red line" that would lead to U.S. action.[19][20] On 22 December 2012, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Syria had consolidated chemical weapons into one or two places to prevent rebels capturing them, and that recent moves that had alarmed Western governments were part of this consolidation.[][] A Syrian defector who worked inside the chemical weapons network has alleged that two senior Syrian officers moved about 100 kg. of chemical weapons materials from a secret military base in Nasiriyah in January 2012. The Syrian source also described construction of special trucks, which could transport and mix the weapons. These mobile mixers were constructed inside Mercedes or Volvo trucks that were similar to refrigerator trucks. Inside were storage tanks, pipes and a motor to drive the mixing machinery, the defector said.[21] There have been multiple unconfirmed reports of chemical weapons use in Syria, possibly 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate which is generally non-fatal.[22][23] However in response to these reports U.S. National Security Council spokesman stated "The reporting we have seen from media sources regarding alleged chemical weapons incidents in Syria has not been consistent with what we believe to be true about the Syrian chemical weapons program".[] In December
Syria 2012, Syrian forces, following the advice of Russian military advisers, concentrated their stockpiles of chemical weapons into two to four main storage areas for reasons of security and safety. [24] [25] On 19 March 2013, the Syrian government and Syrian rebels accused one another of using chemical weapons in an attack in the province of Aleppo.[][] Syrian state television and the government of Russia both blame the rebels for the chemical weapon attack.[][] Reports indicated between 15 and 40 deaths.[] An unnamed Reuters photographer described the gas as having a "chlorine like smell" and said that he saw victims suffocating.[] Rebels allege that a SCUD missile was used to deliver the agent, while the Syrian Information Minister blamed the rebels for the attack;[26][27][] neither side presented clear evidence for its claims.[] According to a spokesman for the Free Syrian Army, the attack occurred in rebel territory,[28] though Reuters photographs showed images of Syrian government soldiers injured in the attack.[][] Senior American officials said that the Syrian rebels do not have the capability to launch chemical weapons, and were skeptical that weapons had been used.[][]
319
Biological Weapons
The site at Cerin is also associated with an active biological weapons research and production program. According to NATO Consultant Dr Jill Dekker, Syria has worked on: anthrax, plague, tularemia, botulinium, smallpox, aflotoxin, cholera, ricin and camelpox, and has used Russian help in installing anthrax in missile warheads. She also stated "they view their bio-chemical arsenal as part of a normal weapons program".[29]
Nuclear Program
Syria
Nuclear program start date First nuclear weapon test First fusion weapon test Last nuclear test Largest yield test Total tests Peak stockpile Current stockpile Maximum missile range
1979
[30]
None None None None None None None Scud-D (700km)
Syria
320
NPT signatory Yes
Syria is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and maintains a civil nuclear program. On September 6, 2007, Israel unilaterally bombed a site in Syria which it believed had hosted a nuclear reactor under construction. U.S. intelligence officials claimed low confidence that the site was meant for weapons development.[31] Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has said the site in discussion was just "a military site under construction"[32] and that Syria's goal is a nuclear-free Middle East.[33] Syria allowed the IAEA to visit the site on June 23, 2008, taking environmental samples that revealed the presence of man-made uranium and other materials consistent with a reactor. On May 24, 2011, IAEA Director General Amano released a report which assessed that the destroyed facility was a reactor, and the IAEA Board of Governors voted 17-6 (with 11 abstentions) to report this as non-compliance to the UN Security Council.
Open nuclear programs

Syria is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has repeatedly attempted to purchase small research type nuclear reactors from China, Russia, Argentina, or other countries. Despite these purchases being openly disclosed and IAEA monitored, international pressure has caused all these reactor purchases to be cancelled. Syria has open and IAEA monitored nuclear research programs including a Chinese made non-reactor miniature neutron source.[30] On November 26, 2008 the IAEA Board of Governors approved technical aid for Syria despite Western allegations that the country had a secret atomic program that could eventually be used to make weapons. China, Russia and developing nations, criticized Western "political interference" that they said undermined the IAEA's programme to foster civilian atomic energy development.[34] The top U.N. nuclear official also strongly rebuked Western powers for trying to deny the request, saying this shouldn't be done without evidence and merely on the existence of an investigation.[35]
Alleged nuclear reactor

Bombing of alleged reactor On September 6, 2007, Israel bombed an officially unidentified site in Syria which it believed had been a nuclear reactor under construction.[36] It was further claimed that the nuclear reactor was not yet operational and no nuclear material had been introduced into it.[37] Top U.S. intelligence officials claimed low confidence that the site was meant for weapons development, noting that there was no reprocessing facility at the site.[31] Western press reports asserted that the Israeli air strike followed a Satellite photo of the destroyed site shipment delivery to Syria by a North Korean freighter, and that North Korea was suspected to be supplying a reactor to Syria for a nuclear weapons program.[38] On October 24, 2007 the Institute for Science and International Security released a report which identified a site in eastern Syria's Deir ez-Zor Governorate province as the suspected reactor. The report speculated about similarities between the Syrian building and North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, but said that it was too early to make a definitive
Syria comparison.[39] On October 25, 2007, Western media said the main building and any debris from it following the air strike had been completely dismantled and removed by the Syrians.[40] After refusing to comment on the reports for six months, the Bush administration briefed Congress and the IAEA on April 24, 2008, saying that the U.S. Government was "convinced" that Syria had been building a "covert nuclear reactor" that was "not intended for peaceful purposes."[41] The briefing included releases of satellite photographs of the bombed site and overhead and ground level intelligence photographs of the site under construction, including the alleged reactor vessel steel shell before concrete was poured and of the alleged reactor head structure.[42] Reaction to allegations On June 23, 2008, IAEA inspectors were allowed to visit the Dair Alzour site (also referred to as Al Kibar), and take samples of the debris. On November 19, 2008 an IAEA report stated that "a significant number of natural uranium particles" produced as a result of chemical processing were found at the Al Kibar site;[43] however, the IAEA did not find sufficient evidence to prove Syria is developing Intelligence photo of the alleged reactor head and nuclear weapons.[44] Some American nuclear experts have speculated fuel channels under construction about similarities between the alleged Syrian reactor and North Korea's Yongybon reactor[] but IAEA Director General ElBaradei has pointed out that "there was uranium but it doesn't mean there was a reactor".[45] ElBaradei has shown dissatisfaction with the United States and Israel for only providing the IAEA with photos of the bombed facility in Syria,[46] and has also urged caution against prematurely judging Syria's atomic program by reminding diplomats about false U.S. claims that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction.[47] Russia, China, Iran, and non-aligned countries have also supported giving Syria nuclear guidance despite pressure from the United States.[47] Joseph Cirincione, an expert on nuclear proliferation and head of the Washington-based Ploughshares Fund, commented "we should learn first from the past and be very cautious about any intelligence from the US about other country's weapons."[48] Syria has denounced "the fabrication and forging of facts" in regards to the incident.[49] IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei criticized the strikes and deplored that information regarding the matter had not been shared with his agency earlier.[31] Syria has declined to let the IAEA visit other military sites the United States recently made allegations about, arguing it fears that too much openness on its part would encourage the U.S. to push for years of relentless international scrutiny.[50] Syria has said it will voluntarily cooperate with the IAEA further if it isn't "at the expense of disclosing our military sites or causing a threat to our national security."[51] The Non-Aligned Movement has called for the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East and called for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument which prohibits threats of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.[52] The Gulf Cooperation Council has also appealed for a nuclear weapons free Middle East and recognition of the right of a country to expertise in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.[53] The IAEA has also approved a resolution urging all Middle East nations to renounce atomic bombs.[54]
321
Intelligence photo of the alleged reactor vessel under construction
Syria
322
IAEA non-compliance finding

For nearly three years, Syria refused the IAEA requests for further information on or access to the Dair Alzour site. On May 24, 2011, IAEA Director General Amano released a report concluding that the destroyed building was "very likely" a nuclear reactor, which Syria was required to declare under its NPT safeguards agreement.[55] On June 9, 2011, the IAEA Board of Governors found that this constituted non-compliance, and reported that non-compliance to the UN Security Council.[56] The vote was 17-6, with 11 abstentions.[57]
Delivery systems
In addition to potential aircraft and artillery delivery systems, Syria has several hundred Scud model B, C, and D missiles and SS-21 missiles.
International Partnerships
United States diplomatic cables revealed that two Indian firms aided Syrian chemical and biological weapons makers in trying to obtain Australia Group-controlled equipment.[][] One cable stated that India "has a general obligation as a Chemical Weapons Convention State Party to never, under any circumstances, assist anyone in the development of chemical weapons".[] In 2012, Iranian and North Korean officials and scientists were brought to bases and testing areas to aid in the development and use of chemical weapons.[]
References
[4] Syria Special Weapons Guide (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ syria/ index. html) at globalsecurity.org (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org), accessed October 24, 2007. [5] Syria Profile (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ Syria/ index_2066. html) at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (http:/ / www. nti. org), accessed October 24, 2007. [6] Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities (http:/ / www2. foi. se/ rapp/ foir1290. pdf), Syria Magnus Normark, Anders Lindblad, Anders Norqvist, Bjrn Sandstrm, Louise Waldenstrm, Swedish Defense Research Agency report FOI-R--1290--SE, June 2004, ISSN 1650-1942 [8] BBC: Syria denounces US 'lies' (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ low/ middle_east/ 2950321. stm) [9] Syria says it will use chemical weapons if attacked (http:/ / www. usatoday. com/ news/ world/ story/ 2012-07-23/ Syria-violence-rebels/ 56425402/ 1) Associated Press 23 July 2012 [11] Syria Chemical Weapons (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ syria/ cw. htm) at globalsecurity.org (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org), accessed October 24, 2007. [12] http:/ / pqasb. pqarchiver. com/ jpost/ access/ 1336965581. html?dids=1336965581:1336965581& FMT=ABS& FMTS=ABS:FT& date=Sep+ 11%2C+ 2007& author=YAAKOV+ KATZ& pub=Jerusalem+ Post& desc=Ministry+ holds+ off+ on+ gas+ mask+ distribution. + Fears+ move+ could+ be+ interpreted+ as+ preparation+ for+ war& pqatl=google [13] The Sunday Herald: HOW CLOSE WERE WE TO A THIRD WORLD WAR? What really happened when (http:/ / findarticles. com/ p/ articles/ mi_qn4156/ is_20071021/ ai_n21061036) [24] http:/ / www. aljazeera. com/ news/ middleeast/ 2012/ 12/ 201212221532021654. html Syria 'secures chemical weapons stockpile' 23 Dec 2012 [25] http:/ / blogs. aljazeera. com/ topic/ syria/ israel-vows-syria-strike-any-sign-chemical-arms-transfer Israel vows Syria strike at any sign of chemical arms transfer January 28, 2013 [26] http:/ / www. cbsnews. com/ 8301-202_162-57575054/ syria-rebels-and-regime-blame-each-other-for-1st-alleged-chemical-weapons-attack/ Syria rebels and regime blame each other for the first alleged chemical weapons attack on 19 March 2013 [27] http:/ / www. npr. org/ blogs/ thetwo-way/ 2013/ 03/ 19/ 174717836/ dueling-claims-in-syria-after-unconfirmed-reports-about-chemical-weapons Dueling Claims In Syria After Unconfirmed Reports About Chemical Weapons March 19, 2013 [28] http:/ / edition. cnn. com/ 2013/ 03/ 19/ world/ meast/ syria-civil-war/ index. html?hpt=hp_t1 [30] Syria - Nuclear Weapons Programs (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ syria/ nuke. htm) at globalsecurity.org (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org), accessed October 24, 2007. [31] IAEA slams U.S. for withholding data on alleged Syrian nuclear reactor (http:/ / www. haaretz. com/ hasen/ spages/ 978043. html) [32] AFP (04/27/2008): Syria president denies building nuclear reactor (http:/ / afp. google. com/ article/ ALeqM5hgqNioVGXjfzPSB-qnEf2bkWg_6A) [33] Daiji Sadamori, Assad: Syria Not Seeking to be Nuclear State, Asahi Shimbun, 27 October 2006
Syria
[34] METimes: IAEA seeks compromise over Syrian nuclear aid issue: diplomats (http:/ / www. metimes. com/ Politics/ 2008/ 11/ 25/ iaea_seeks_compromise_over_syrian_nuclear_aid_issue_diplomats/ afp/ ) [35] Nuclear Threat Initiative: ElBaradei Lashes Critics of Syrian Nuclear Aid Request (http:/ / www. globalsecuritynewswire. org/ gsn/ nw_20081125_8832. php) [36] 6 September 2007 Air strike (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ military/ world/ war/ 070906-airstrike. htm) at globalsecurity.org (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org), accessed October 24, 2007. [37] IAEA: Statement by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei regarding Syria (http:/ / www. iaea. org/ NewsCenter/ PressRelease/ 2008/ prn200806. html) [38] N. Korea, Syria May Be at Work on Nuclear Facility (http:/ / www. washingtonpost. com/ wp-dyn/ content/ article/ 2007/ 09/ 12/ AR2007091202430. html), Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, Thursday, September 13, 2007; Page A12 [39] SUSPECT REACTOR CONSTRUCTION SITE IN EASTERN SYRIA: THE SITE OF THE SEPTEMBER 6 ISRAELI RAID? (http:/ / www. isis-online. org/ publications/ SuspectSite_24October2007. pdf), David Albright and Paul Brannan, October 23, 2007 [40] Photos Show Cleansing of Suspect Syrian Site (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2007/ 10/ 26/ world/ middleeast/ 26syria. html?hp), William J. Broad and Mark Mazzetti, New York Times, accessed October 25, 2007. [41] Statement by the Press Secretary (http:/ / georgewbush-whitehouse. archives. gov/ news/ releases/ 2008/ 04/ 20080424-14. html) [42] Cryptome: Syrian Alleged and North Korean Reactor Photos (http:/ / cryptome. org/ syrian/ syrian-site. htm) [43] IAEA: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic (November 19, 2008) (http:/ / www. isis-online. org/ publications/ syria/ IAEA_Report_Syria_19Nov2008. pdf) [44] Xinhua: IAEA finds insufficient evidence for Syria's nuclear weapons development (http:/ / news. xinhuanet. com/ english/ 2008-11/ 20/ content_10383764. htm) [45] BBC: Syria nuclear clues 'not damning' (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ middle_east/ 7733839. stm) [46] Xinhua News: "IAEA chief: Report on Syrian nuclear plans needs more time" (http:/ / news. xinhuanet. com/ english/ 2008-09/ 26/ content_10116966. htm) [47] Star Tribune: UN nuclear agency chief urges caution against Syria by recalling false claims against Iraq (http:/ / www. startribune. com/ world/ 35055019. html?elr=KArks:DCiUBcy7hUiD3aPc:_Yyc:aUU) [48] The Guardian: US claims North Korea helped build Syria reactor plant (http:/ / www. guardian. co. uk/ world/ 2008/ apr/ 25/ usa. nuclear?gusrc=rss& feed=networkfront) [49] Syria rejects U.S. allegations on existence of nuclear activities (http:/ / news. xinhuanet. com/ english/ 2008-04/ 25/ content_8050478. htm) [50] Diplomats: Syria to Block IAEA From Probing Suspected Nuclear Sites (http:/ / www. foxnews. com/ story/ 0,2933,362782,00. html) [51] BBC: Syria rebuffs nuclear inspectors (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ middle_east/ 7652104. stm) [52] XV Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement (July 2008): Statement on the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Issue (http:/ / www. iaea. org/ Publications/ Documents/ Infcircs/ 2008/ infcirc733. pdf) [53] The Closing Statement Of the Twenty-Seventh Session of the Supreme Council of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (December 2006) (http:/ / library. gcc-sg. org/ English/ Books/ sessions/ cs027. html) [54] International Herald Tribune: IAEA calls for non-nuclear Mideast in heated vote (http:/ / www. iht. com/ articles/ reuters/ 2008/ 10/ 04/ africa/ OUKWD-UK-NUCLEAR-IAEA-ISRAEL. php) [55] GOV/2011/30 (http:/ / isis-online. org/ uploads/ isis-reports/ documents/ Syria_24May2011. pdf), Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic, Report by the Director General, May 24, 2011. [56] GOV/2011/41 (http:/ / www. iaea. org/ Publications/ Documents/ Board/ 2011/ gov2011-41. pdf), Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic, Resolution adopted by the Board of Governors on 9 June 2011. [57] IAEA Refers Syria To Security Council (http:/ / www. voanews. com/ policy/ editorials/ IAEA-Refers-Syria-To-Security-Council-124079309. html), Voice of America Editorial, June 17, 2011.
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External links
Syria Special Weapons Guide (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/syria/index. html) at globalsecurity.org (http://www.globalsecurity.org) Syria Profile (http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Syria/index_2066.html) at Nuclear Threat Initiative (http://www.nti.org)
Taiwan
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Taiwan
By type

Taiwan
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The Republic of China (Taiwan) denies having any weapons of mass destruction. There is no evidence of Republic of China possessing any chemical or nuclear weapons though it has in the past pursued nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons
Research program
The development of nuclear weapons by the Republic of China has been a contentious issue, as it has been cited by the PRC as a reason to attack Taiwan.[citation needed] The U.S., hoping to avoid escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait, has continually opposed arming the Republic of China with nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Republic of China adheres to the principles of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has stated that it does not intend to produce nuclear weapons. Past nuclear research by the ROC makes it a "threshold" nuclear state. In 1967, a nuclear weapons program began under the auspices of the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER) at the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology. The Republic of China was able to acquire nuclear technology from abroad (including a research reactor from Canada and low-grade plutonium from the United States) allegedly for a civilian energy system, but in actuality to develop fuel for nuclear weapons.[1] During the 1970s, the Republic of China had an active program to produce plutonium using heavy water reactors. However, after the International Atomic Energy Agency found evidence of the Republic of China's efforts to produce weapons-grade plutonium, Taipei agreed in September 1976 under U.S. pressure to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. A study by the Mitre Corporation in 1977 included Taiwan in a list of "insecure" nuclear threshold statesstates with the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons and the security motivations to seriously contemplate such an option. The other states were Israel, South Africa, South Korea, and Yugoslavia.[2] U.S. intelligence believed that the Republic of China also had designed devices suitable for nuclear testing.[3] A secret program was revealed when Colonel Chang Hsien-yi, deputy director of nuclear research at INER, who was secretly working for the CIA, defected to the U.S. in December 1987 and produced a cache of incriminating documents. General Hau Pei-tsun claimed that scientists in Taiwan had already produced a controlled nuclear reaction. Under pressure from the U.S., the program was halted. During the 19951996 Taiwan Strait crisis, then Republic of China President Lee Teng-hui proposed to reactivate the program, but was forced to back down a few days later after drawing intense criticism.
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Current status
There is no evidence that the ROC possesses any nuclear weapons or any programs to produce them, although it does have the general technological ability to develop the ability to enrich uranium or process plutonium. The Republic of China's nuclear power plants use imported enriched uranium and are subject to International Atomic Energy Agency inspection. The People's Republic of China has announced that any Republic of China possession of nuclear weapons is grounds for an immediate attack. Attempts by ROC officials to form a dialogue with the PRC on the subject of weapons of mass destructions have been rebuffed.
Chemical weapons
The Republic of China may be in possession of small quantities of sarin. However, the Republic of China government has stated that any such materials are only for defensive research purposes and that it does not have any intention of producing offensive chemical weapons.
Missile Technology
In response to former Defense Minister Tsai Ming-hsien's announcement that the RoC has developed medium range missiles, the MND said that he "should be more conscious of national security".[4]
Ratification of international treaties

The Republic of China ratified the Geneva Protocol on August 7, 1929 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Following UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971) the United Nations does not recognize the Republic of China as a legitimate political entity, and as such does not recognize any right that the ROC has to join international multilateral treaties. Because of its controversial political status, the ROC has not been allowed to join either the Biological Weapons Convention nor the Chemical Weapons Convention, but it has stated that it will abide by both treaties nevertheless. In addition, it has stated that it will continue to abide by the NPT, notwithstanding controversy over its political status.
References
[2] Report of the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group, Nuclear Power Issues and Choices (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977), p. 284. [4] "MND declines to confirm whether Taiwan has medium-range missile." (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ library/ news/ taiwan/ 2013/ taiwan-130316-cna01. htm)
External links
Deployments by country, 1951-1977 (http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/d661v3675t623824/ ?p=fd7c304a0d2d48d5aa1a3d183bb72716&pi=1) The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (http://thebulletin.org), Nov/Dec 1999 United States Secretly Deployed Nuclear Bombs In 27 Countries and Territories During Cold War (http://www. gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/19991020/)
Ukraine
327
Ukraine
By type

Ukraine
328

Ukraine
This article is part of the series: Politics and government of Ukraine
Other countries Atlas Politics portal
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the newly independent Ukraine had on its territory what was the third largest strategic nuclear weapons arsenal in the world. It was larger than those of Britain, France, and China combined. On June 1, 1996 Ukraine became a non-nuclear nation when it sent last of its 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantling.[1] The first shipment of nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia (by train) was in March 1994.[2]
History
Ukraine had 220 strategic weapon carriers on its territory, including 130 RS-18 (SS- 19), 46 sophisticated RS-22 missiles, and 44 strategic bombers carrying 1,068 long-range cruise missiles. In November 1993, the Ukrainian parliament adopted a resolution On the Ratification of the Treaty Between the USSR and USA On the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons of June 7, 1991 and the Lisbon Protocol to the Treaty of May 23, 1992. The next stage was the signing on January 14, 1994 of the Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of Ukraine, Russia, and the United States under which Ukraine was to destroy all nuclear weapons on its territory, including strategic offensive weapons. Ukraine, Washington and Moscow reached an agreement in January that allowed for the dismantling of Ukraine's 176 Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs) ahead of Kiev's formal ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[3][4] France and China provided unilateral security assurances in the form of diplomatic notes. The missiles130 SS-19s and 46 SS-24scarried about 1,800 nuclear warheads altogether.
Ukraine Before voting on accession, Ukraine demanded from Russia, the USA, France and the United Kingdom a written statement that these powers undertook to extend the security guarantees to Ukraine. Instead security assurances to Ukraine (Ukraine published the documents as guarantees given to Ukraine[5]) were given on 5 December 1994 at a formal ceremony in Budapest (known as the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances[6]), may be summarized as follows: Russia, the UK and the USA undertake to respect Ukraine's borders in accordance with the principles of the 1975 CSCE Final Act, to abstain from the use or threat of force against Ukraine, to support Ukraine where an attempt is made to place pressure on it by economic coercion, and to bring any incident of aggression by a nuclear power before the UN Security Council. Ukraine was scheduled to submit its instruments of accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear state and formally enter into START at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe summit in Budapest in December 1994. The Rada resolution on accession to the NPT, however, was ambiguous as to whether Ukraine was acceding as a nuclear or non-nuclear state, which was unacceptable to the Russians. The compromise reached after intense negotiations was to attach a diplomatic note from the President of Ukraine to the Rada resolution stipulating that Ukraine was acceding as a non-nuclear state. The Trilateral Statement: Signed in Moscow, 14 January 1994 by the presidents of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine: Bill Clinton, Boris Yeltsin, and Leonid Kravchuk. Details the procedures to transfer Ukrainian nuclear warheads to Russia and associated compensation and security assurances. Sets out simultaneous actions to transfer SS-19 and SS-24 warheads from Ukraine to Russia for dismantling and to provide compensation to Ukraine in the form of fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations. It also provides economic support and technical aid from the United States to assist with dismantling the strategic nuclear arms, as well as security assurances to Ukraine from both the United States and Russia, once START I enters into force and Ukraine becomes a non-nuclear weapon state party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Between March 1994 and June 1996, about 2,000 nuclear munitions of strategic weapon systems were removed from Ukraine to Russia for disassembly. In all, considering tactical weapons, about 5,000 nuclear munitions were moved to Russia in almost 100 trains. In a joint statement on December 4, 2009 the presidents of the United States and Russia, Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, confirmed the assurances of security to Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus given on the heels of these countries' consent in 1994 to give up their nuclear weapons.[7]
329
References
[1] Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (http:/ / www. amazon. co. uk/ dp/ 0773520872) by T. V. Paul, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000, ISBN 978-0-7735-2087-5, page 117 [2] Estimated Russian (CIS) nuclear stockpile, September 1994 (http:/ / books. google. nl/ books?id=bAwAAAAAMBAJ& pg=PA61& dq=March+ 1994+ + from+ Ukraine+ to+ Russia+ for& client=firefox-a#v=onepage& q=March 1994 from Ukraine to Russia for& f=false), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (September/October 1994 - page 61) [5] Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition (http:/ / books. google. nl/ books?id=LNvTSDQXFXgC& pg=PA91& dq=Budapest+ Memorandum+ on+ Security+ Assurances& lr=& client=firefox-a#v=onepage& q=Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances& f=false) by Roman Solchanyk, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, ISBN 978-0-7425-1018-0, page 92 [6] United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership (http:/ / merln. ndu. edu/ archivepdf/ EUR/ State/ 113366. pdf), U.S. Department of State (December 19, 2008) [7] Western Information Agency: USA, Russia confirm guarantees of security to Ukraine (http:/ / www. kyivpost. com/ news/ nation/ detail/ 54421/ ), Kyiv Post (December 4, 2009)
Ukraine
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External links
wikisource:Memorandum on Security Assurances Budapest,5 December 1994 wikisource:Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Ukraine's Nuclear Ambitions: Reminiscences of the Past (http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/7/533.html) 13-04-2004 Remarks at a nuclear agreements signing ceremony in Budapest (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2889/ is_n49_v30/ai_16351681/) The Trilateral Process: Washington, Kyiv, Moscow and the Removal of Soviet Nuclear Weapons from Ukraine (http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1416&fuseaction=topics.event_summary& event_id=505958) March 9, 2009 TREATIES ON THE REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS (START I & START II) (http://www. europarl.europa.eu/workingpapers/poli/w23/start_en.htm) Key Arms Control Treaties and Agreements (1963-1995) (http://152.152.95.200/docu/facts/kacta.htm) Ukraine's last missile silo destroyed (http://www.virsky.com/nukes.htm)
United Kingdom
331
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Nuclear program start date First nuclear weapon test First fusion weapon test Last nuclear test Largest yield test Total tests Peak stockpile Current stockpile Maximum missile range NPT signatory
10 April 1940 3 October 1952 15 May 1957 26 November 1991 3Mt (13PJ) (28 April 1958) 45 detonations 520warheads (1970s) 225 warheads [1]
13,000km (7,000nmi or 8,100mi) Yes (1968, one of five recognised powers)
By type

Albania
United Kingdom

332
Algeria Argentina Australia Brazil Bulgaria Burma Canada PRC France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Mexico Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Sweden Syria ROC (Taiwan) Ukraine United Kingdom United States Proliferation

United Kingdom
333
Nuclear weapons
Background


The United Kingdom possesses, or has possessed, a variety of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The United Kingdom is one of the five official nuclear weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has an independent nuclear deterrent. The UK has been estimated to have a stockpile of approximately 160 active nuclear warheads and 225 nuclear warheads in total.[2] The United Kingdom renounced the use of chemical and biological weapons in 1956 and subsequently destroyed its general stocks.
United Kingdom
334
Nuclear weapons
The United Kingdom has four Vanguard class submarines armed with nuclear-tipped Trident missiles. The principle of operation is based on maintaining deterrent effect by always having at least one submarine at sea, and was designed during the Cold War period. One submarine is normally undergoing maintenance and the remaining two are in port or on training exercises. Each submarine carries up to sixteen Trident II D-5 missiles, which can each carry up to twelve warheads, for a maximum of 192 warheads per sub. However, the British government announced in 1998 that each submarine would carry only 48 warheads (halving the limit specified by the previous government), which is an average of three per missile. However one or two missiles per submarine are probably armed with fewer warheads for "sub-strategic" use causing others to be armed with more.
The British-designed warheads are thought to be selectable between 0.3 kilotons, 5-10 kt and 100 kt; the yields obtained using either the unboosted primary, the boosted primary, or the entire "physics package". The United Kingdom has purchased the rights to 58 missiles under the Polaris Sales Agreement (modified for Trident) from the United States Navy's "pool". These missiles are fitted with United Kingdom-built warheads and are exchanged when requiring maintenance. Under the agreement the United States was given certain assurances by the UK regarding the use of the missiles, however the United States does not have any veto on the use of British nuclear weapons.[3] The United Kingdom is one of the five "Nuclear Weapons States" (NWS) under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which the UK ratified in 1968. The UK permits the U.S. to deploy nuclear weapons from its territory, the first having arrived in 1954.[4] During the 1980s nuclear armed USAF Ground Launched Cruise Missiles were deployed at RAF Greenham Common and RAF Molesworth. As of 2005 it is believed that about 110 tactical B61 nuclear bombs are stored at RAF Lakenheath for deployment by USAF F-15E aircraft.[]
A Trident missile launched from a submerged ballistic missile submarine.
HMS Vanguard, one of four Vanguard class ballistic missile submarines of the Royal Navy, which serve as the UK's nuclear delivery system.
In March 2007, the UK Parliament voted to renew the country's Trident nuclear submarine system at a cost of 20bn.[5] In July 2008, The Guardian claimed that the decision had already been made to replace and upgrade Britain's nuclear warhead stockpile at a cost of 3bn, extending the life of the warheads until 2055.[6]
Chemical weapons
The UK was a signatory of the Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) which outlawed the use of poison gas shells, but omitted deployment from cylinders probably because it had not been considered. However, during the First World War, in retaliation to the use of chlorine by Germany against British troops from April 1915 onwards, British forces deployed chlorine themselves for the first time during the Battle of Loos on 25 September 1915. By the end of the war, poison gas use had become widespread on both sides and by 1918 a quarter of artillery shells were filled with gas and Britain had produced around 25,400 tons of toxic chemicals. Britain used a range of poison gases, originally chlorine and later phosgene, diphosgene and mustard gas. They also used relatively small amounts of the irritant gases chloromethyl chloroformate, chloropicrin, bromacetone and ethyl
United Kingdom iodoacetate. Gases were frequently mixed, for example white star was the name given to a mixture of equal volumes of chlorine and phosgene, the chlorine helping to spread the denser but more toxic phosgene. Despite the technical developments, chemical weapons suffered from diminishing effectiveness as the war progressed because of the protective equipment and training which the use engendered on both sides. See Use of poison gas in World War I. After the war, the Royal Air Force dropped mustard gas on Bolshevik troops in 1919, and Winston Churchill, secretary of state for war and air, suggested that the RAF use it in Iraq in 1920 during a major revolt there. Historians are divided as to whether or not gas was in fact used.[7] The UK ratified the Geneva Protocol on 9 April 1930. The UK signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on 13 January 1993 and ratified it on 13 May 1996. Despite the signing of the Geneva Protocol, the UK carried out extensive testing of chemical weapons from the early 1930s onwards. In the Rawalpindi experiments, hundreds of Indian soldiers were exposed to Mustard gas in an attempt to determine the appropriate dosage to use on battlefields. Many of the subjects suffered severe burns from their exposure to the gas.[8] Many ex-servicemen have complained about suffering long term illnesses after taking part in tests on nerve agents. It was alleged that before volunteering they were not provided with adequate information about the experiments and the risk, in breach of the Nuremberg Code of 1947. Alleged abuses at Porton Down became the subject of a lengthy police investigation called Operation Antler, which covered the use of volunteers in testing a variety of chemical weapons and countermeasures from 1939 until 1989. An inquest was opened on 5 May 2004 into the death on 6 May 1953 of a serviceman, Ronald Maddison, during an experiment using sarin. His death had earlier been found by a private MoD inquest to have been as a result of "misadventure" but this was quashed by the High Court in 2002. The 2004 hearing closed on 15 November, after a jury found that the cause of Maddison's death was "application of a nerve agent in a non-therapeutic experiment".
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Biological weapons
During the Second World War, British scientists studied the use of biological weapons, including a test using anthrax on the Scottish island of Gruinard which left it contaminated and fenced off for nearly fifty years, until an intensive four-year programme to eradicate the spores was completed in 1990. They also manufactured five million linseed-oil cattle cakes with a hole bored into them for addition of anthrax spores between 1942 and mid-1943. These were to be dropped on Germany using specially designed containers each holding 400 cakes, in a project known as Operation Vegetarian. It was intended that the disease would destroy the German beef and dairy herds and possibly spread to the human population. Preparations were not complete until early 1944. Operation Vegetarian was only to be used in the event of a German anthrax attack on the United Kingdom.[9] Offensive weapons development continued after the war into the 1950s with tests of plague, brucellosis, tularemia and later equine encephalomyelitis and vaccinia viruses (the latter as a relatively safe simulant for smallpox). In particular five sets of trials took place at sea using aerosol clouds and animals. Operation Harness off Antigua in 1948-1949. Operation Cauldron off Stornoway in 1952. The trawler Carella accidentally sailed through a cloud of pneumonic plague bacilli (yersinia pestis) during this trial. It was kept under covert observation until the incubation period had elapsed but none of the crew fell ill.[10] Operation Hesperus off Stornoway in 1953. Operation Ozone off Nassau in 1954. Operation Negation off Nassau in 1954-5. The programme was cancelled in 1956 when the British government renounced the use of biological and chemical weapons. It ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in March 1975.
United Kingdom
336
Radiological weapons
The United Kingdom tested a 1 kiloton bomb incorporating a small amount of cobalt as an experimental radiochemical tracer at their Tadje testing site in Maralinga range, Australia on September 14, 1957.[11]
References
[2] Status of World Nuclear Forces (http:/ / www. fas. org/ programs/ ssp/ nukes/ nuclearweapons/ nukestatus. html) Federation of American Scientists [6] Britain plans to spend 3bn on new nuclear warheads (http:/ / www. guardian. co. uk/ world/ 2008/ jul/ 25/ nuclear. weaponstechnology), Guardian, 25 July 2008 [7] British Relations with Iraq (http:/ / www. bbc. co. uk/ history/ recent/ iraq/ britain_iraq_07. shtml) BBC, February 10 2003 [8] Mustard Gas Tested on Indian Soldiers (http:/ / history1900s. about. com/ b/ 2007/ 09/ 04/ mustard-gas-tested-on-indian-soldiers. htm) [9] Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence, 1942-47 by Julian Lewis [11] Radiological weapon
External links
Video archive of the UK's Nuclear Testing (http://sonicbomb.com/modules. php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=111) at sonicbomb.com (http://www.sonicbomb. com) FAS bulletin (http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~hsp/bulletin/cbwcb48.pdf) The Nuclear Threat Initiative on the United Kingdom (http://www.nti.org/e_research/ profiles/UK/index.html) Churchill's Anthrax Bombs - A Debate by Julian Lewis and Professor RV Jones (http://www.julianlewis.net/ local_news_detail.php?id=9) Nuclear Files.org (http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/basics/nuclear-stockpiles. htm) Current information on nuclear stockpiles in the United Kingdom
United States
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United States
United States of America
Nuclear program start date First nuclear weapon test First fusion weapon test Last nuclear test Largest yield test Total tests Peak stockpile Current stockpile Maximum missile range
21 October 1939 16 July 1945 1 November 1952 23 September 1992 15 Mt (1 March 1954) 1,054 detonations 31,255 warheads (1966) 10,500 total 13,000km (8,100mi) (land) 12,000km (7,500mi) (sub) Yes (1968, one of five recognized powers)
NPT signatory
By type

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Brazil Bulgaria
United States

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Burma Canada PRC France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Mexico Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Sweden Syria ROC (Taiwan) Ukraine United Kingdom United States Proliferation

The United States is known to have possessed three types of weapons of mass destruction: nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and biological weapons. The U.S. is the only country to have used nuclear weapons in combat. The U.S. also used chemical weapons in World War I. It had secretly developed the earliest form of the atomic weapon during the 1940s under the title "Manhattan Project".[1] The United States pioneered the development of both the nuclear fission and hydrogen bombs (the latter involving nuclear fusion). It was the world's first and only nuclear power for four years before being joined in the "nuclear club" by the Soviet Union. The United States has the largest number of deployed nuclear weapons in the world, with 300 more deployed nuclear weapons than Russia.[2]
United States
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Nuclear weapons
Nuclear weapons have been deployed twice in wartime: two nuclear weapons were used by the United States against Japan in World War II in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Altogether, the two bombings killed an estimated 200,000 Japanese citizens and injured another 130,000. The U.S. conducted an extensive nuclear testing program. 1,054 tests were conducted between 1945 and 1992. The exact number of nuclear devices detonated is unclear because some tests involved multiple devices while a few failed to explode or US nuclear warhead stockpiles, 1945-2002. were designed not to create a nuclear explosion. The last nuclear test by the United States was on September 23, 1992; the U.S. has signed but not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Currently, the United States nuclear arsenal is deployed in three areas: Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs; Sea-based, nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or SLBMs; and Air-based nuclear weapons of the U.S. Air Force's heavy bomber group The United States is one of the five "Nuclear Weapons States" under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which the US ratified in 1968. On October 13, 1999, the U.S. Senate rejected ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, having previously ratified the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. The U.S. has not, however, tested a nuclear weapon since 1992, though it has tested many non-nuclear components and has developed powerful supercomputers in an attempt to duplicate the knowledge gained from testing without the actual tests themselves. In the early 1990s, the U.S. stopped developing new nuclear weapons and now devotes most of its nuclear efforts into stockpile stewardship, maintaining and dismantling its now-aging arsenal. The administration of George W. Bush decided in 2003 to engage in research towards a new generation of small nuclear weapons, especially "earth penetrators" .[3] The budget passed by the United States Congress in 2004 eliminated funding for some of this research including the "bunker-busting or earth-penetrating" weapons. The exact number of nuclear weapons possessed by the United States is difficult to determine. Different treaties and organizations have different criteria for reporting nuclear weapons, especially those held in reserve, and those being dismantled or rebuilt: As of 1999, the U.S. was said to have 12,000 nuclear weapons of all types stockpiled.[4] In its Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) declaration for 2003, the U.S. listed 5968 deployed warheads as defined by START rules.[5] For 2007, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists listed the U.S. with about 5,400 total nuclear warheads: around 3,575 strategic and 500 nonstrategic warheads; and about 1,260 additional warheads held in the inactive stockpile. Other warheads are in some step of the disassembly process.[6] The exact number as of Sept. 30, 2009, was 5,113 warheads, according to a U.S. fact sheet released May 3, 2010.[7] In 2002, the United States and Russia agreed in the SORT treaty to reduce their deployed stockpiles to not more than 2,200 warheads each. In 2003, the US rejected Russian proposals to further reduce both nation's nuclear stockpiles to 1,500 each.[8] In 2007, for the first time in 15 years, the United States built some new warheads. These were to
United States replace some older warheads as part of the Minuteman III upgrade program.[9] 2007 also saw the first Minuteman III missiles removed from service as part of the drawdown. Overall, stockpiles and deployment systems continue to decline in number under the terms of the New START treaty. In 2010, The Pentagon disclosed that the current size of its nuclear arsenal is a total of 5,113 warheads operationally deployed, kept in active reserve and held in inactive storage. The figure does not include the estimated 4,600 warheads that have been retired and scheduled for dismantlement. The number of operationally deployed strategic warheads stands at 1,968.[10]
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Land-based ICBMs
The US Air Force currently operates 450 ICBMs, located primarily in the northern Rocky Mountain states and the Dakotas. These are all of the Minuteman III ICBM variants. Peacekeeper missiles were phased out of the Air Force inventory in 2005. All USAF Minuteman II missiles have been destroyed in accordance with the START treaty and their launch silos imploded and buried then sold to the public. To comply with the START II most US multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs, have been eliminated and replaced with single warhead missiles. However, since the abandonment of the START II treaty, the U.S. is said to be considering retaining 500 warheads on 450 missiles.[9] The U.S. goal under the SORT treaty is to reduce from 1,600 warheads deployed on over 500 missiles in 2003 to 500 warheads on 450 A Minuteman III ICBM test launch. missiles in 2012. The first Minuteman III were removed under this plan in 2007 while, at the same time, the warheads deployed on Minuteman IIIs began to be upgraded from smaller W62s to larger W87s from decommissioned Peacekeeper missiles.[9]
Heavy bomber group

The US Air Force also operates a strategic nuclear bomber fleet. The bomber force consists of 94 B-52 Stratofortresses, and 19 B-2 Spirits. All 64 B-1s were retrofitted to operate in a solely conventional mode by 2007 and are no longer counted as nuclear platforms. In addition to this, the US armed forces can also deploy smaller "tactical" nuclear weapons either through cruise missiles or with conventional fighter-bombers. The U.S. maintains about 400 nuclear gravity bombs capable of use by F-15, F-16, and F-35.[9] Some 350 of B-2 Spirit stealth strategic bomber. these bombs are deployed at seven airbases in six European NATO countries;[9] of these, 180 tactical B61 nuclear bombs fall under a nuclear sharing arrangement.[11]
United States
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Sea-based ICBMs
The US Navy currently has 18 Ohio-class submarines deployed, of which 14 are ballistic missile submarines. Each submarine is equipped with a complement of 24 Trident II missiles. Approximately 12 U.S. attack submarines are equipped to launch, but do not currently carry nuclear Tomahawk missiles. Sea-launch weapons make up the majority of weapons declared under START II rules. Some Trident missiles are equipped with the W88 warhead.
Biological weapons
The United States offensive biological weapons program was instigated by President Franklin Roosevelt and the U.S. Secretary of War in October 1941.[12] Research occurred at several sites. A production facility was built at Terre Haute, Indiana but testing with a benign agent demonstrated contamination of the facility so no production occurred during World War II.[13] A more advanced production facility was constructed in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, which began producing biological agents in 1954. Fort Detrick, Maryland later became a production facility as well as a research site. The U.S. developed anti-personnel and anti-crop biological weapons.[14] Several deployment systems were developed including aerial spray tanks, aerosol spray canisters, grenades, rocket warheads and cluster bombs. (See also US Biological Weapon Testing) In mid-1969, the UK and the Warsaw Pact, separately, introduced proposals to the UN to ban biological weapons, which would lead to a treaty in 1972. The U.S. cancelled its offensive biological weapons program by executive order in November 1969 (microorganisms) and February 1970 (toxins) and ordered the destruction of all offensive biological weapons, which occurred between May 1971 and February 1973. The U.S. ratified the Geneva Protocol on January 22, 1975. The U.S. ratified the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) which came into effect in March 1975.[Kissinger 1969] Negotiations for a legally binding verification protocol to the BWC proceeded for years. In 2001, negotiations ended when the Bush administration rejected an effort by other signatories to create a protocol for verification, arguing that it could be abused to interfere with legitimate biological research. The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, located in Fort Detrick, Maryland, produces small quantities of biological agents, for use in biological weapons defense research. According to the U.S. government, this research is performed in full accordance with the BWC. In September 2001, shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C. there was series of mysterious anthrax attacks aimed at US media offices and the US Senate which killed five people. The anthrax used in the attacks was the Ames strain, which was first studied at Fort Detrick and then distributed to other labs around the world. See 2001 anthrax attacks for more information.
USSKentucky(SSBN-737), an Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine
United States
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Chemical weapons
History
The U.S. had entered into the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 which banned aerial bombing and chemical warfare among other things but which were disregarded in actual combat. In World War I, the U.S. produced its own munitions as well as deploying weapons produced by the French. The U.S. produced 5,770 metric tons of these weapons, including 1,400 metric tons of phosgene and 175 metric tons of mustard gas. This was about 4% of the total chemical weapons produced for that war and only just over 1% of the era's most effective weapon, mustard gas. (U.S. troops suffered less than 6% of gas casualties.) After the war, the U.S. was party to the Washington Arms Conference Treaty of 1922 which would have banned chemical weapons but failed because it was rejected by France. The U.S. continued to stockpile chemical weapons, eventually exceeding 30,000 tons of material. Chemical weapons were not used by the U.S. or the other Allies, during World War II; however, quantities of such weapons were deployed to Europe for use in case Germany initiated chemical warfare. At least one accident occurred: On the night of December 2, 1943, German Junkers Ju 88 bombers attacked the port of Bari in Southern Italy, sinking several American ships - among them John Harvey, which was carrying mustard gas. The presence of the gas was highly classified, and authorities ashore had no knowledge of it - which increased the number of fatalities, since physicians, who had no idea that they were dealing with the effects of mustard gas, prescribed treatment not consistent with those suffering from exposure and immersion. According to the U.S. military account, "Sixty-nine deaths were attributed in whole or in part to the mustard gas, most of them American merchant seamen" out of 628 mustard gas military casualties.[Navy 2006][Niderost] Civilian casualties were not recorded. The whole affair was kept secret at the time and for many years after the war. After the war, the Allies recovered German artillery shells containing three new nerve agents developed by the Germans (Tabun, Sarin, and Soman), prompting further research into nerve agents by all of the former Allies. Thousands of American soldiers were exposed to warfare agents during Cold War testing programs as well as in accidents. In 1968, one such accident killed approximately 6,400 sheep when an agent drifted out of Dugway Proving Ground during a test.[15] The U.S. also investigated a wide range of possible nonlethal, psychobehavioral chemical incapacitating agents including psychedelic Honest John missile warhead cutaway, showing indoles such as lysergic acid diethylamide (experimented to see if it M134 Sarin bomblets (photo c. 1960) could be used for effective mind control) and marijuana derivatives, certain tranquilizers like ketamine or fentanyl, as well as several glycolate anticholinergics. One of the anticholinergic compounds, 3-quinuclidinyl benzilate, was assigned the NATO code BZ and was weaponized at the beginning of the 1960s for possible battlefield use. This agent was allegedly employed by American troops as a counterinsurgency weapon in the Vietnam War but the U.S. maintains that this agent never saw operational use.[16] The North Koreans and Chinese have alleged that chemical and biological weapons were used by the United States in the Korean War;[17] but, the United States denial is supported by Russian archival documents.[18] On November 25, 1969, President Richard Nixon unilaterally renounced the first use of chemical weapons and renounced all methods of biological warfare.[19] He issued a unilateral decree halting production and transport of chemical weapons which remains in effect. From 1967 to 1970 in Operation CHASE, the U.S. disposed of chemical weapons by sinking ships laden with the weapons in the deep Atlantic. The U.S. began to research safer disposal methods for chemical weapons in the 1970s, destroying several thousand tons of mustard gas by incineration at
United States Rocky Mountain Arsenal and nearly 4,200 tons of nerve agent by chemical neutralization at Tooele Army Depot and Rocky Mountain Arsenal.[20] The U.S. began stockpile reductions in the 1980s, removing some outdated munitions and destroying its entire stock of BZ beginning in 1988. In June 1990, Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System began destruction of chemical agents stored on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific, seven years before the Chemical Weapons Convention came into effect. In 1986 President Ronald Reagan made an agreement with Chancellor Helmut Kohl to remove the U.S. stockpile of chemicals weapons from Germany. As part of Operation Steel Box, in July 1990, two ships were loaded with over 100,000 shells containing GB and VX taken from US Army weapons storage depots such as Miesau and then-classified ammunition FSTS (Forward Storage/Transportation Sites) and transported from Bremerhaven Germany to Johnston Atoll in the Pacific, a 46-day nonstop journey.[21] In May 1991, President George H.W. Bush unilaterally committed the United States to destroying all chemical weapons and renounced the right to chemical weapon retaliation. In 1993, the United States signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, which required the destruction of all chemical weapon agents, dispersal systems, chemical weapons production facilities by April 2012. The U.S. prohibition on the transport of chemical weapons has meant that destruction facilities had to be constructed at each of the U.S.'s nine storage facilities. The U.S. met the first three of the treaty's four deadlines, destroying 45% of its stockpile of chemical weapons by 2007. However, official expectations for the date of complete elimination of all chemical weapons was after the treaty deadline of 2012. Under the United States policy of Proportional Response, an attack upon the United States or its Allies would trigger a force-equivalent counter-attack. Since the United States only maintains nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is the stated policy that the United States will regard all WMD attacks (Biological, Chemical, or Nuclear) as a nuclear attack and will respond to any WMD attack with a nuclear strike.[22]
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Treaties
The United States was a party to some of the earliest modern chemical weapons ban treaties, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and the Washington Arms Conference Treaty of 1922 although these treaties were unsuccessful. The U.S. ratified the Geneva Protocol which banned the use of chemical and biological weapons on January 22, 1975. In 1989 and 1990, the U.S. and the Soviet Union entered an agreement to end their chemical weapons programs, including "binary weapons." The United States ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention which came into force in April 1997. This banned the possession of most types of chemical weapons, some of which were possessed by the U.S. at the time. It also banned chemical weapons development, and requires the destruction of existing stockpiles, precursor chemicals, production facilities and weapon delivery systems.
Chemical weapons disposal

According to the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency by January, 2011, the United States had destroyed 89.75% of the original stockpile of nearly 31,100 metric tons (30,609 long tons) of nerve and mustard agents declared in 1997.[23] The U.S. disposed of the more dangerous modern chemical weapons before starting the destruction of its older mustard gas stockpile which presented additional difficulties due to the poor condition of some of the shells. Of the weapons destroyed up to 2006, only 500 tons were mustard gas and the majority were other agents such as VX and sarin (GB) (86% of the latter was destroyed by April 2006).[24] 13,996 metric tons (13,775 long tons) of prohibited weapons had been destroyed by June 2007 to meet the Phase III quota and deadline.[25] The original commitment in Phase III required all countries to have 45 percent of the chemical stockpiles destroyed by April 2004. Anticipating the failure to meet this deadline, the Bush administration in September 2003 requested a new deadline of December 2007 for Phase III and announced a probable need for an extension until April 2012 for Phase IV, total destruction (requests for deadline extensions cannot formally be made until 12 months before the original deadline). This extension procedure spelled out in the treaty has been utilized by other countries, including Russia and the unnamed "state party". Although April 2012 is the latest date allowed by
United States the treaty, the U.S. also noted that this deadline may not be met due to environmental challenges and the U.S. decision to destroy leaking individual chemical shells before bulk storage chemical weapons.[26][27] The primary remaining chemical weapon storage facilities in the U.S. are Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado and Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky.[28] These two facilities hold 10.25% of the U.S. 1997 declared stockpile. Other non-stockpile agents (usually test kits) or old buried munitions are occasionally found and are sometimes destroyed in place. Disposal of chemical munitions has concluded at seven of the U.S.'s nine chemical depots (89.75% stockpile reduction). Pueblo and Blue Grass are constructing pilot plans to test novel methods of disposal. The U.S. also uses mobile treatment systems to treat chemical test samples and individual shells without requiring transport from the artillery ranges and abandoned munitions depots where they are occasionally found. The destruction facility for Pueblo is expected to be completed in 2012 with disposal occurring between 2015 and 2017. Blue Grass is expected to complete operation by 2021.[29] In 19881990, the destruction of munitions containing BZ, a non-lethal hallucinating agent at Pine Bluff Chemical Activity in Arkansas. Hawthorne Army Depot in Nevada destroyed all M687 chemical artillery shells and 458 metric tons of binary precursor chemicals by July 1999. Operations were completed at Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System where all 640 metric tons of chemical agents were destroyed by 2000 and at Edgewood Chemical Activity in Maryland, with 1,472 metric tons of agents destroyed by February 2006. All DF and QL, chemical weapons precursors, were destroyed in 2006 at Pine Bluff. Newport Chemical Depot in Indiana began destruction operations in May, 2005 and completed operations on August 8, 2008, disposing of 1,152 tonnes of agents. Pine Bluff completed destruction of 3,850 tons of weapons on November 12, 2010. Anniston Chemical Activity in Alabama completed disposal on September 22, 2011. Umatilla Chemical Depot in Oregon finished disposal on October 25, 2011. Tooele Chemical Demilitarization Facility at Deseret Chemical Depot in Utah finished disposal on January 21, 2012.[23]
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References
[1] The world's nuclear stockpile (http:/ / english. aljazeera. net/ news/ americas/ 2010/ 04/ 20104735153263423. html). 7 April 2010. [3] BBC NEWS | Americas|Mini-nukes on US agenda (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ americas/ 3126141. stm) [4] Nuclear Forces Guide (http:/ / www. fas. org/ nuke/ guide/ summary. htm) [5] http:/ / www. state. gov/ t/ ac/ rls/ fs/ 2004/ 30816pf. htm [6] U.S. nuclear forces, 2008 (http:/ / thebulletin. metapress. com/ content/ pr53n270241156n6/ fulltext. pdf) The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists [7] (http:/ / www. aolnews. com/ nation/ article/ us-nuclear-arsenal-revealed-5000-plus-warheads/ 19463888)"News article 3, May 2010" [8] Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S.-Russian Agenda (http:/ / www. fas. org/ sgp/ crs/ nuke/ IB98030. pdf) [9] http:/ / thebulletin. metapress. com/ content/ pr53n270241156n6/ fulltext. pdf [11] "Belgium, Germany Question U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe", Oliver Meier, http:/ / www. armscontrol. org/ act/ 2005_06/ Belgium_Germany_Tactical. asp, June 2005 [12] Committees on Biological Warfare, 1941-1948 (http:/ / www7. nationalacademies. org/ archives/ cbw. html) [13] United States: Biological Weapons, http:/ / www. fas. org/ nuke/ guide/ usa/ cbw/ bw. htm, Federation of American Scientists, October 19, 1998 [14] United States (http:/ / www. fas. org/ nuke/ guide/ usa/ cbw/ bw. htm) [15] Report for the Committee On Veterans' Affairs [16] 007 Incapacitating Agents (http:/ / www. brooksidepress. org/ Products/ OperationalMedicine/ DATA/ operationalmed/ Manuals/ RedHandbook/ 007IncapacitatingAgents. html) [19] Biological Weapons Convention (http:/ / www. state. gov/ t/ ac/ trt/ 4718. htm) [20] http:/ / www. cma. army. mil/ fndocumentviewer. aspx?docid=003676901 [21] Broadus, James M., et al. The Oceans and Environmental Security: Shared U.S. and Russian Perspectives, ( Google Books (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=X6t8cDhn0_MC& pg=PA103& dq=#+ Johnston+ Atoll+ Chemical+ Agent+ Disposal+ System& client=firefox-a)), p. 103, Island Press, 1994, (ISBN 1559632356), accessed October 25, 2008. [22] http:/ / www. airpower. maxwell. af. mil/ airchronicles/ apj/ apj03/ spr03/ conley. html [23] Army Agency Completes Mission to Destroy Chemical Weapons (http:/ / www. cma. army. mil/ fndocumentviewer. aspx?DocID=003683880), USCMA, January 21, 2012 [24] United States Seeks Extension for Chemical Weapons Destruction - US Department of State (http:/ / usinfo. state. gov/ is/ Archive/ 2006/ Apr/ 21-578128. html)
United States
[25] U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, http:/ / www. cma. army. mil/ , accessed September 28, 2007 [26] Chemical Weapons Convention (http:/ / www. opcw. org/ html/ db/ cwc/ eng/ cwc_frameset. html) [27] http:/ / www. opcw. org/ docs/ csp8_nat_statements/ USA. pdf [28] Chemical Weapons United States (http:/ / www. fas. org/ nuke/ guide/ usa/ cbw/ cw. htm) [29] Pueblo Chemical Weapons Disposal Plant 85% Complete, Official Says (http:/ / www. nti. org/ gsn/ article/ pueblo-chemical-disposal-plant-85-finished/ ), Global Security Newswire, January 17, 2012 ^
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Michael Barletta and Christina Ellington (1998). "Obtain Microbial Seed Stock for Standard or Novel Agent" (http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/flow/iraq/seed.htm). Iraq's Biological Weapons Program. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. Retrieved 2006-09-18. Wikipedia:Link rot ^ Center for Nonproliferation Studies (2003). "BW Agents" (http://web.archive.org/web/20050308225139/ http://nti.org/e_research/e1_iraq_BWagents.html). Iraq Profile. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Archived from the original (http://www.nti.org/e_research/e1_iraq_BWagents.html) on 2005-03-08. Retrieved 2006-09-18. ^ Henry A. Kissinger (ca. November 1969). "Draft NSDM re United States Policy on Warfare Program and Bacteriological/Biological Research Program" (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB58/ RNCBW9.pdf) (PDF). Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files. The National Security Archive. Retrieved 2006-09-18. Note: Declassified United States Government Document "Naval Armed Guard Service: Tragedy at Bari, Italy on December 2, 1943" (http://www.history.navy.mil/ faqs/faq104-4.htm). Frequently Asked Questions. United States Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center. August 8, 2006. Retrieved 2006-09-18. Note Original Source: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. "History of the Armed Guard Afloat, World War II." (Washington, 1946): 166-169. ^ Niderost, Eric. "German Raid on Bari" (http://www.historynet.com/magazines/world_war_2/3027436. html). World War II. Retrieved 2006-09-18. Note Original URL (http://www.historynet.com/wwii/ blluftwaffeadriatic/) redirected to the URL shown here; article lacks date or volume reference.
^
External links
Video archive of the US's Nuclear Testing (http://sonicbomb.com/modules. php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=109) at sonicbomb.com (http://www.sonicbomb. com) "Iraq links germs for weapons to U.S. and France" (http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract. html?res=F20614FF3D550C758DDDAA0894DB404482) by Philip Shenon, "The New York Times", March 16, 2003 late edition final, section 1, p.18, retrieved October 8, 2006 United States Nuclear Forces Guide (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/index.html) Abolishing Weapons of Mass Destruction: Addressing Cold War and Other Wartime Legacies in the Twenty-First Century By Mikhail S. Gorbachev (http://www.opcw.org/synthesis/html/s6/p4prt.html) Nuclear Threat Initiative on United States (note: wrongfully writes that the original commitment to destroy all chemical weapons was for 2004 although this deadline was only for 45% of the stockpiles) (http://www.nti.org/ e_research/profiles/USA/index.html) Nuclear testing history (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Tests/) U.S. Army Chemical Weapons Agency website (http://www.cma.army.mil/map.aspx) Map of US WMD's from NY Indymedia (http://www.internationalterrorist.com/artwork/terrormap_24x36. pdf) Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2006 (http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/j8v4421j728q2v76/ ?p=24edc9d2b50845cb9e7b9442befb4c31&pi=0) by Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2006. Lessons Lost (http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/j315pu1670282723/ ?p=405bbf40fda94354acd3a0ec9e416f32&pi=1), by Joseph Cirincione. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2005.
United States Nuclear Files.org (http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/basics/nuclear-stockpiles. htm) Current information on nuclear stockpiles in the United States U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: New report provides unprecedented details (http://www.nukestrat.com/us/ afn/nato.htm) Nukestrat, February 2005 Timeline: United States and Chemical Weapons (http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline. jsp?timeline=us_military&us_military_weapons_of_mass_destruction=us_military_chemicalWeapons) Posted at Center for Cooperative Research Timeline: United States and Biological Weapons (http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline. jsp?timeline=us_military&us_military_weapons_of_mass_destruction=us_military_biologicalWeapons) Posted at Center for Cooperative Research Putin: U.S. pushing others into nuclear ambitions (http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/02/10/putin. us.ap/index.html) (February 2007) New nuclear warhead design for US (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6414197.stm) U.S. government settles on design for new nuclear warheads (http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/03/03/ america/NA-GEN-US-New-Warheads.php) US announces plans to build new nuclear warheads (http://fr.jpost.com/servlet/ Satellite?cid=1171894558959&pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull) U.S. picks design for new generation of nuclear warheads (http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/nation/ 4598305.html) Bush administration picks Lawrence Livermore warhead design (http://www.aberdeennews.com/mld/ aberdeennews/business/16820390.htm) Trends in U.S. Nuclear Policy (http://www.ifri.org/downloads/prolif_11_Potter.pdf) - analysis by William C. Potter, IFRI Proliferation Papers n11, 2005
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Treaties
By type


348
A variety of treaties and agreements have been enacted to regulate the use, development and possession of various types of weapons of mass destruction. Treaties may regulate weapons use under the customs of war (Hague Conventions, Geneva Protocol), ban specific types of weapons (Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention), limit weapons research (Partial Test Ban Treaty, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty), limit allowable weapons stockpiles and delivery systems (START I, SORT) or regulate civilian use of weapon pre-cursors (Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention). The history of weapons control has also included treaties to limit effective defense against weapons of mass destruction in order to preserve the determent doctrine of mutually assured destruction (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) as well as treaties to limit the spread of nuclear technologies geographically (African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty).
General
Environmental Modification Convention Protocol I and Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions
Delivery systems
International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (not a treaty)
Biological weapons
Biological Weapons Convention Geneva Protocol
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Chemical weapons
Brussels Convention on the Law and Customs of War (not adopted but relevant language incorporated into Hague Convention) Chemical Weapons Convention Geneva Protocol Hague Convention Strasbourg Agreement Treaty of Versailles Washington Naval Treaty
Nuclear weapons
Anti-proliferation
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Seabed Arms Control Treaty Outer Space Treaty Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency By region African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty Antarctic Treaty Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act
Weapons limitation
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (not completed) Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty McCloy-Zorin Accords Partial Test Ban Treaty SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) SALT II SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty) START I (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) START II START III (not completed) START treaty (2010) ("New START treaty")
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Cooperation
1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement Nassau agreement Polaris Sales Agreement Quebec Agreement (with Canada)
Article Sources and Contributors
351

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YAR08, YMB29, Yettie0711, Yummy123, Zammy5, Zeamays, Zereshk, Zocky, 747 anonymous edits Nuclear weapon Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=546911192 Contributors: -ross616-, 0nizuka the Great, 119, 128.59.51.xxx, 129.186.219.xxx, 134.132.112.xxx, 136.186.1.xxx, 144.132.75.xxx, 15.253, 203.109.250.xxx, 208.28.113.xxx, 209.239.202.xxx, 209.75.42.xxx, 213.253.39.xxx, 216.237.32.xxx, 24.15.135.xxx, 24.93.53.xxx, 2D, 5-HT8, 62.253.64.xxx, 682635q, 84user, 9Nak, A Softer Answer, A bit iffy, A scientist, A. B., A3 nm, AAA765, ABF, ACSE, AGToth, ATLBeer, Aarchiba, Aardark, Aaron DT, Aaron Schulz, AbJ32, Abeg92, Academic Challenger, AdamW, Adambro, Addshore, Adilch, Admiral Valdemar, Adrian J. Hunter, Adrienhocky16, Aeons, Afa86, Afitillidie13, Afonsecajames, Ageekgal, Ahloahlo, Ahoerstemeier, Airconswitch, Aitias, Aivazovsky, Ajm81, Akamad, Akmoilan, Aksi great, Aktalo, Alansohn, Alavena, AlbertBickford, Ale jrb, Aleksandar Guzijan, Alex earlier account, Alex.tan, Alex756, Alexwcovington, Alfio, Ali K, Aliwalla, Alksub, AllanDeGroot, Allstarecho, Altair1453, Amenzix, Amjsjc, AnOddName, Ancheta Wis, Anders.Warga, Andonic, Andre Engels, Andrew Gray, Andrewlol546, Andy M. 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file:WMD world map.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:WMD_world_map.svg License: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported Contributors: User:Andux, User:Fastfission, User:Simon, User:Vardion File:Symbol book class2.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Symbol_book_class2.svg License: Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 2.5 Contributors: Lokal_Profil File:Folder Hexagonal Icon.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Folder_Hexagonal_Icon.svg License: GNU Free Documentation License Contributors: Anomie, Mifter Image:US nuclear warheads 1945-2002 graph.png Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:US_nuclear_warheads_1945-2002_graph.png License: Public Domain Contributors: User:Fastfission Image:Skull and crossbones.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Skull_and_crossbones.svg License: Public Domain Contributors: Andux, Andy0101, Bayo, Coyau, D0ktorz, Derbeth, Eugenio Hansen, OFS, Franzenshof, Ies, J.delanoy, JMCC1, Jahoe, Juliancolton, Karelj, Ksd5, MarianSigler, Natr, Sarang, Silsor, Stepshep, Str4nd, Sven Manguard, The Evil IP address, Tiptoety, Trelio, W!B:, Wknight94, 21 anonymous edits Image:Radiation warning symbol.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Radiation_warning_symbol.svg License: Public Domain Contributors: Captain Miles, Conscious, Cosmo1976, Fandecaisses, Fibonacci, Georg-Johann, Guillom, Jarekt, Knyaz-1988, Nyks, Rfc1394, Sarang, Silsor, Ssolbergj, Trelio, Uwe W., W!B:, Yann, 8 anonymous edits Image:Biohazard symbol.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Biohazard_symbol.svg License: Public Domain Contributors: Common Good, Ksd5, Liangent, Lokal Profil, Manuelt15, MarianSigler, Nandhp, Nerd65536, Penubag, Sarang, Scalable Vector Raccoon, Silsor, W!B:, 7 anonymous edits File:Shiro-ishii.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Shiro-ishii.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Masao Takezawa Image:B-w-scientists.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:B-w-scientists.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: USG Image:Chemical agent protection.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Chemical_agent_protection.jpg License: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported Contributors: User:Johan Elisson. Image:Poison gas attack.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Poison_gas_attack.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: DrKiernan, Liftarn, Tartalizza, Wutsje, Xenophon, 3 anonymous edits Image:Poison Gas Attack Germany and Russia 1916.JPG Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Poison_Gas_Attack_Germany_and_Russia_1916.JPG License: Public Domain Contributors: Pmcyclist, Rcbutcher Image:Mc-1 gas bomb.png Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Mc-1_gas_bomb.png License: Public Domain Contributors: Original uploader was ClockworkSoul at en.wikipedia Image:Albania chemweapcanister.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Albania_chemweapcanister.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: US Government File:Flickr - Israel Defense Forces - "Yanshuf" Battalion Soldiers at ABC Warfare Exercise, Nov 2010.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Flickr_-_Israel_Defense_Forces_-_"Yanshuf"_Battalion_Soldiers_at_ABC_Warfare_Exercise,_Nov_2010.jpg License: Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Contributors: Israel Defense Forces from Israel Image:Ukrainian Army in Iraq.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Ukrainian_Army_in_Iraq.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: US government File:British 55th Division gas casualties 10 April 1918.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:British_55th_Division_gas_casualties_10_April_1918.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: 2nd Lt. T.L. Aitken Image:mustard gas burns.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Mustard_gas_burns.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Balcer, Chewie, Rcbutcher, Skeezix1000, Timeshifter, Xenophon, 3 anonymous edits File:World War I, British soccer team with gas masks, 1916.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:World_War_I,_British_soccer_team_with_gas_masks,_1916.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: . (Agence photographique, photo agency) Image:Sarin.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Sarin.svg License: Public Domain Contributors: User:Bryan Derksen File:Shanghai1937IJA gas.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Shanghai1937IJA_gas.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Arilang1234, Baycrest, Blueshirts, High Contrast, HongQiGong, Kintetsubuffalo, Nemo5576, 1 anonymous edits File:A vietnamese Professor is pictured with a group of handicapped children.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:A_vietnamese_Professor_is_pictured_with_a_group_of_handicapped_children.jpg License: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported Contributors: Alexis Duclos Image:Iranian soldiers in PPE.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Iranian_soldiers_in_PPE.jpg License: GNU Free Documentation License Contributors: Futuretrillionaire, Julian-kamal, Trelio, 1 anonymous edits File:Chemical Weapons Convention 2007.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Chemical_Weapons_Convention_2007.svg License: Public Domain Contributors: Cflm001 (talk) File:nagasakibomb.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Nagasakibomb.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: The picture was taken by Charles Levy from one of the B-29 Superfortresses used in the attack. file:Fat man.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Fat_man.jpg License: unknown Contributors: Avron, Davepape, Fastfission, HowardMorland, Oldie, Patricka, Superm401, Tiptoety, Twinsday, Vonvon, Wikifreund, 10 anonymous edits File:Fission bomb assembly methods.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Fission_bomb_assembly_methods.svg License: Public Domain Contributors: Fastfission File:Teller-Ulam device 3D.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Teller-Ulam_device_3D.svg License: Public Domain Contributors: User:Fastfission File:Edward Teller (1958)-LLNL.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Edward_Teller_(1958)-LLNL.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: BenTels, Hawkeye7, Infrogmation, PaweMM File:Fat man.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Fat_man.jpg License: unknown Contributors: Avron, Davepape, Fastfission, HowardMorland, Oldie, Patricka, Superm401, Tiptoety, Twinsday, Vonvon, Wikifreund, 10 anonymous edits File:Trident II missile image.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Trident_II_missile_image.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: DragonFire1024, Dual Freq, Edward, GDK, High Contrast, Martin H., Matrek, Para, Shizhao, Sumanch, Yann, 2 anonymous edits File:W87 MX Missile schematic.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:W87_MX_Missile_schematic.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Acdx, Avron, Bomazi, Dual Freq, Fastfission, Foroa, GDK, High Contrast, 2 anonymous edits File:Flag of IAEA.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Flag_of_IAEA.svg License: Public Domain Contributors: IAEA File:SS-24 silo destruction.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:SS-24_silo_destruction.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: User:Fastfission File:Essais nucleaires manif.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Essais_nucleaires_manif.jpg License: Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 2.0 Contributors: Community of the Ark of Lanza del Vasto. File:Sedan Plowshare Crater.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Sedan_Plowshare_Crater.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Federal Government of the United States File:Groves memo 30oct43 p1.GIF Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Groves_memo_30oct43_p1.GIF License: Public Domain Contributors: Nrcprm2026, 1 anonymous edits Image:Nuclear weapon programs worldwide oct2006.png Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Nuclear_weapon_programs_worldwide_oct2006.png License: Public domain Contributors: Savantpol at en.wikipedia. Later version(s) were uploaded by Bill3000, Gerash77, Newsnightmeirion, Asterion, Rwendland, Esoltas at en.wikipedia. Image:Libya centrifuges 2003 (at Y12).jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Libya_centrifuges_2003_(at_Y12).jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Bomazi, Fastfission, Petri Krohn, 2 anonymous edits Image:IRIS-T air-to-air-missile.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:IRIS-T_air-to-air-missile.jpg License: GNU Free Documentation License Contributors: Photo taken 2005-07-16 in Koblenz by Owly K Image:BGT IDAS.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:BGT_IDAS.jpg License: GNU Free Documentation License Contributors: KTo288, Stahlkocher File:H-55 AS-15 Kent 2008 G1.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:H-55_AS-15_Kent_2008_G1.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: George Chernilevsky

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Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Weapons of mass destruction

Biological Chemical Nuclear Radiological By country

Weapon of mass destruction

Chemical Nuclear Missiles Treaties

List of treaties Book Category

Early uses of the term weapon of mass destruction

Evolution of its use

Weapon of mass destruction

Definitions of the term

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

WMD use, possession and access

Weapon of mass destruction

United States politics

Media coverage of WMD

Weapon of mass destruction

Public perceptions of WMD

WMD in popular culture

Common hazard symbols

Weapon of mass destruction

Radioactive weaponry/hazard symbol

Biological weaponry/hazard symbol

Weapon of mass destruction

Weapon of mass destruction

Biological Chemical Nuclear Radiological By country

Chemical Nuclear Missiles Treaties

List of treaties Book Category

Shiro Ishii, commander of Unit 731

The international biological hazard symbol

List of BW institutions, programs, projects and sites by country

Soviet Union and Russia

List of people associated with BW

HN1 HN2 HN3

Tabun (GA) Sarin (GB) Soman (GD) Cyclosarin (GF) GV V-Agents

EA-3148 VE VG VM VR VX Novichok agents Nettle agents

Agent 15 (BZ) Dimethylheptylpyran (DMHP)

CS CN (mace) CR List of chemical warfare agents