Constructing discourse and discourse constructions1

Francisco Jos Ruiz de Mendoza Ibez Mara de los ngeles Gmez Gonzlez

1. Introduction One of the main concerns of discourse studies is the identification of the factors that play a role in the coherent flow of discourse, i.e. what allows speakers and hearers to align their mutual understanding of each others assumptions about what is being talked about (the topic) and what is being meant (the focus of information). There is now a tradition, which dates back to alliday ! asans ("#$%) pioneering work on te&t linguistics, according to which discourse connections are either a matter of linguistic mechanisms (so'called cohesion de(ices) or inference (which lies at the root of coherence). )uch of the literature on discourse is related to the study of coherence and cohesion, whether e&plicitly or implicitly. Thus, some discourse accounts ha(e looked at discourse connecti(ity in terms of rhetorical structure ()ann ! Thompson, "#**+ ,sher ! -ascarides, .//0) and pragmatic inferencing based on the principled use of world knowledge (e.g. 1rmer, ./""). Others ha(e in(estigated linguistic strategies such as le&ical patterns (e.g. oey, "##") and discourse markers (e.g. 2chiffrin, "#*%, 3lakemore, .//., .//4). Our (iew in the present paper further e&pands on the cohesion5coherence dichotomy. 6e use the co(er term discourse connectivity to refer to the result of the acti(ity of cohesion5coherence mechanisms. 6e contend that discourse connecti(ity can be accounted for partly in terms of the inferential e&ploitation of knowledge structures of (arious kinds (which we identify with -akoffs, "#*$, ideali7ed cogniti(e models) and partly in terms of what we term discourse constructions, that is, form'meaning parings whose purpose is to set up connections that go beyond basic predications (i.e. saturated predicate'argument relations) reali7ed as clauses. Our starting point will be the account of discourse constructions found in )airal ! 8ui7 de )endo7a (.//#). This account is based on the -e&ical 9onstructional )odel, or -9), as initially laid out in 8ui7 de )endo7a ! )airal (.//*). The -9) is a meaning construction model of language structured in four descripti(e le(els: le(el " deals with basic predicate'argument relationships, usually e&pressed through le&ical or argument'structure characteri7ations+ le(els . and 0 deal respecti(ely with non' illocutionary and illocutionary either constructional or implicational meaning and structure+ le(el ; addresses discourse meaning and structure, also from the constructional and an implicational perspecti(es. <or e&ample, at le(el ", the sentence I on!t eat t"at garbage# let alone $ay %or it contains two different uses of the transiti(e construction (one where the ob=ect is affected and the other where it is not)+ at le(el . it con(eys the additional constructional implication (& 'on!t () that the speaker is upset at performing either action+ at le(el 0, it e&presses speakers refusal ( I 'on!t () to perform the actions+ finally, at le(el ;, the & )et *lone ( construction makes the content of the > element less likely to happen than the ? element. 6e cannot go into the details of the -9). The reader may find critical o(er(iews of the -9) in 3utler (.//#, ./"0) and recent de(elopments in 8ui7 de )endo7a !
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The research on which this paper is based has recei(ed financial support from the 2panish )inistry of @conomy and 9ompetiti(eness, grants no. <<1 ./"/'"$%"/5<1-O and ?????

)airal (./""), Aalera ! 8ui7 de )endo7a (./""), and 8ui7 de )endo7a (./".). The -9) specifies the way in which le&ical, constructional, and inferential acti(ity cooperate in meaning production and interpretation at all four le(els. The combination of meaning construction and interpretation strategies is a principled process based on constraints that arise from conceptual compatibility between meaning representations and such conceptual re'construal phenomena as high'le(el metaphor and metonymy (cf. 8ui7 de )endo7a and )airal, .//$). ,n up'to'date account of constraints is found in 8ui7 de )endo7a (./".). 1n the present paper we will briefly discuss the nature of le(el'; or discourse constructions and their role in discourse structure. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. <irst, we shall introduce the notion of cogniti(e model and discuss the role of different cogniti(e model types in meaning construction. 2econd, we will address the -9) notion of construction in terms of its role in making meaning in discourse (which in(ol(es the speaker'hearer alignment of assumptions in production and interpretation). Third, we will focus our attention on the nature of discourse constructions and discuss their specific contribution to the o(erall dynamics of building meaningful messages that are adapted to specific communicati(e needs. 1n this connection, we will propose the e&istence of constructional families at the le(el of discourse structure and enBuire into their specific semantic nature. <inally, we will address the role of non'constructional mechanisms to create discourse coherence conditions. 2. A typology of cognitive models The label Idealized +ognitive Model (19)) stems from Aeorge -akoffs ("#*$) work on conceptuali7ation, where he postulates the e&istence of a number of principles that structure knowledge thus gi(ing rise to different kinds of 19)s. ,n 19) is thus a knowledge structure that arises from the acti(ity of one such structuring principle. 1n -akoffs proposal, there are four basic types of 19): (") %rames, (.) image sc"emas, (0) meta$"ors, and (;) metonymies. 6e offer a brief description of each 19) type. <rames refer to sets of predicate'argument relationships, i.e. 19)s that capture what we know about the ob=ects of our e&perience in the world including their properties, the situations and e(ents in which they take part, and so on. 2uch notions as Cmother, Chouse, Canger, Churricane, Csleeping, Cdri(ing, etc., can be described in terms of knowledge frames that ha(e been constructed on predicate'argument relationships. <or e&ample, we say that a mother is a woman that has children and takes care of them, that a house is a dwelling place for a family, that a hurricane is a tropical storm with winds that a(erage $; miles per hour or more, and so on.. 1mage schemas, on the other hand, are pre'conceptual topological structures topological configurations such as spatial orientations (e.g. up5down, front5back), part'whole and container'contents relations, path and motion along a path, and others (cf. Dohnson, "#*$). 3oth frames and image schemas can be used to create metaphors or metonymies.
.

There is a lot more that we can associate to frame knowledge. , hurricane causes de(astation and can cause se(ere loss of property and human life, so people are afraid of hurricanes and take measures to protect themsel(es. Ao(ernment authorities and agencies also work on addressing the problem by declaring the state of emergency and performing e(acuations when needed. <rames are called scri$ts when, rather than denote ob=ects or actions, they take the form of rich scenarios containing what in ,rtificial 1ntelligence has been termed Eprocedural knowledgeE (cf. 2chank ! ,belson, "#$$), i.e. stereotyped seBuences of actions. , classical e&ample is the restaurant script, where a customer enters, is directed by a waiter to a table, sits at the table, asks for the menu, reads the menu, orders a meal, is ser(ed the meal, eats it, asks for the bill, pays the bill, tips the waiter, and lea(es.

<or e&ample, the concept Chand, used to refer to one of the pointers of a clock, has been constructed metaphorically on the basis of the shape and functionality of a human hand. 3ut Chand can also be used metonymically to stand for Chelp (often gi(en with the hands) (e.g. ,e "ave me a "and it" t"e bags ). ,ccording to -akoff ! Dohnson ("###), following Arady ("##$), image schemas are used to construct $rimary meta$"ors. These are metaphors directly grounded in sensorimotor e&perience. <or e&ample, -"e!s %ull o% anger treats a person as if she were a container of emotions+ I!m all scattered sees a person inability to cope with different tasks in terms of the person ha(ing lost his or her part'whole integrity+ 'e .ee$ moving %or ard to our goals sees progress in terms of motion. These metaphors are different from others that reBuire finding similarities between ob=ects, states, situations or e(ents. <or e&ample, the metaphorical use of Chand mentioned abo(e is based on functional and physical resemblance. 1n more recent research into cogniti(e modeling by 8ui7 de )endo7a (.//$, ./""), it has been proposed that metaphor and metonymy, gi(en their more dynamic nature, are not cogniti(e models, as -akoff ("#*$) proposed, but rather cogniti(e operations on cogniti(e models. This means that metaphor and metonymy, unlike frames and image schemas, do not in(ol(e any structuring principle. Thus, attributing a gi(en shape to a hand amounts to making e&plicit a property that belongs to this concept+ that is, the shape and other properties of a hand structure this concept. owe(er, using the notion of hand metaphorically to understand some of the properties of the pointers in a clock does not gi(e structure to the notions of hand or clock but simply presupposes the e&istence of a gi(en set of properties in both the hand and the clock. 6hat the metaphor does is put the two concepts in correspondence so that we can reason about rele(ant aspects of the shape and functionality of pointers in terms of corresponding properties of hands. The same holds for metonymy. 6e can use Chand to make it stand for Chelp simply because Chand is a subdomain (i.e. part) of the domain of Chelp with the hands. 6e do not need the metonymy in order to know that people can gi(e physical help by using their hands. On the basis of these obser(ations, it seems reasonable to discard metaphor and metonymy as cogniti(e models $er se and to acknowledge their operational status. 8ecent research into high'le(el metaphor by 8ui7 de )endo7a ! )airal (.//$, .//*) bears this point out. 9onsider the sentence ,e laug"ed me out o% t"e room . There is a peculiarity in the synta& of this sentence: the (erb laug" has an ob=ect that is not introduced by the preposition at (cf. ,e laug"ed at me but /,e laug"ed me). 1n fact, this sentence treats the (erb laug" as if it were a contact'by'impact (erb capable of causing motion: ,e .ic.ed0$us"ed0$ulled# etc1# me out o% t"e room . Once the (erbal action is re' construed in this way, the (erb becomes a(ailable for use in the constructional framework for contact'by'impact predicates (FGO3DGHH). This cogniti(e operation takes place at a more abstract le(el than the le&ical metaphor "and or than primary metaphors. 1t uses actions denoting physical impact to help us understand other actions whose impact is psychological. )etonymy can also work on high'le(el concepts. , case in point is when an effect stands for its cause. Hanther ! Thornburg (.///) illustrate this point through the '"at!s 2"at 34 construction, as in '"at!s t"at noise4, where Cnoise stands for Cthe cause of the noise. There are other high'le(el metonymies (8ui7 de )endo7a ! HIre7, .//"), some of which are listed in ("): (") i. O3D@9T <O8 ,9T1OJ: ,e en5oyed t"e boo. (e.g. reading5writing the book)

ii. iii. i(.

A@J@819 <O8 2H@91<19: ,e ill do t"e dis"es "ile a do t"e car$ets (Cdo for Cwash and Cclean). H8O9@22 <O8 ,9T1OJ: 2"e door o$ened (an agent or a force actually opened the door). ,J @JT1T> <O8 OJ@ O< 1T2 H8OH@8T1@2: 2"ere is a lot *merica in everyt"ing s"e does.

8ui7 de )endo7a (.//$) argues that there also e&ist low'le(el situational 19)s such as those pro(ided by scripts. 1n line with pre(ious work by Hanther (.//4), it is argued that situation'based implicatures arise when either the whole scenario or part of it is accessed metonymically. ,s an illustration, think of the following e&change occurring in a restaurant script: (.) ,: ow did you like your meal at DerseysK 3: 1 didnt lea(e a tip. 2ince lea(ing a tip is a sign of en=oying the meal and the ser(ice, it follows that not doing so in(ol(es the opposite. Thus, I didn!t leave a ti$ stands for a situation in which the ser(ice and the meal pro(ided at the restaurant was not to the customers satisfaction. 1n addition, 8ui7 de )endo7a (.//$) and 8ui7 de )endo7a ! 3aicchi (.//$) recogni7e the e&istence of high'le(el situational 19)s or high'le(el scenarios. These scenarios are constructed by abstracting knowledge away from multiple low'le(el situational scenarios. 1n a way that parallels the deri(ation of situation'based implicatures, the metonymic e&ploitation of high'le(el scenarios underlies the production of so'called illocutionary meaning. To gi(e some illustration, think of the notion of begging. , begging scenario is grounded in the idea that people are e&pected to act in ways that are beneficial to other people. 6ithin the conte&t of this social con(ention, repeating the politeness marker $lease when asking for something, e.g. 6lease# $lease# don!t leave me, in(ol(es e&plicit submission to the addressees will thereby standing for a situation in which the speaker is in such serious need that he or she is recogni7ing that obtaining his or her reBuest e&clusi(ely depends on the addressees mercy. To sum up, we propose that 19)s can be classified along two lines: (") their degree of genericity, which gi(es rise to high'le(el and low'le(el cogniti(e models+ (.) their situational or non'situational nature. )etaphor and metonymy are to be regarded not as cogniti(e models but rather as cogniti(e operations on cogniti(e models, whether they are high'le(el, low'le(el, situational, non'situational or any combination of these. 3. Constructions The -e&ical 9onstructional )odel (-9)) takes sides with comprehensi(e functional approaches to meaning such as 2ystemic <unctional Arammar (cf. alliday ! )atthiessen, .//;) and <unctional Liscourse Arammar ( enge(eld ! )acken7ie, .//*) in its focus on (erbal interaction as a primary factor in determining the shape of utterances in their conte&t of production and interpretation. owe(er, the -9) markedly differs from these approaches in its emphasis on cogniti(e modeling as

essential to determine the meaning impact of utterances. 1t also gi(es a much more prominent role to constructional meaning. 3y construction the -9) understands a pairing of form and meaning (or function) where meaning is reali7ed by form and form affords access to meaning to the e&tent that such processes are recogni7ed by language users to be stably associated or are at least potentially replicable by other language users (cf. 8ui7 de )endo7a, ./"., for detailed discussion). ,t le(el ", constructions take the form of argument'structure configurations such as the transiti(e, intransiti(e, ditransiti(e, resultati(e, caused'motion, causati(e, inchoati(e, and middle constructions, among many others freBuently discussed in the literature (cf. -e(in, "##0+ Aoldberg, "##4, .//%). -isted in (0) are the basic descriptions of the canonical meaning of these le(el'" constructions: (0) 1ntransiti(e: ? does something (e.g. ,er "eart as $ounding ildly) Transiti(e: ? does something to > (e.g. ,e smac.ed "er %ace) Litransiti(e: ? causes > to recei(e M (e.g. ,e donated a lot o% money to a c"urc") 8esultati(e: ? causes > to become M (e.g. 2"e dog ate t"e bo l clean) 9aused'motion: ? causes > to mo(e M (e.g. ,e $us"ed t"e table into a corner) 9ausati(e: ? causes > to do something (e.g. 2"e ind o$ened t"e door) 1nchoati(e: > does something as caused by ? (e.g. 2"e door o$ened) ,t le(els ., 0, and ;, constructions contain a greater amount of fi&ed elements. They can be highly fi&ed, as is the case of the le(el'. construction 7-o8 sue me9, which is formally short for -o# i% you %eel o%%ended# t"en ta.e me to court and sue me or a (ariant of this longer e&pression. 2peakers use 7-o8 sue me9 when they know that the hearer has taken offence, but they do not think they ha(e to apologi7e or make amends in any way since the hearer is o(erreacting. This e&pression additionally con(eys a degree of irritation on the part of the speaker. These meaning implications are now con(entionally associated with the e&pression. owe(er, their origin is found in inferential acti(ity based on two cogniti(e operations (cf. 8ui7 de )endo7a, ./""): one is the metonymic acti(ation of a scenario in which people sue other people in order to obtain redress+ this acti(ation is cued by the use of the imperati(e form of sue often in connection with the conseBuence discourse marker so, which together act as an in(itation for the hearer to take action if they feel wronged+ in the second operation, which is metaphorical, the hearer is e&pected to see the real situation that bothers him in terms of the speakers in(itation within the conte&t of the more serious legal scenario. The mismatch between the real scenario, where the offence is immaterial, and the figurati(e scenario, where offences are serious and punishable by law, gi(es rise to the central meaning implication that the hearer is acting in a disproportionate way. <rom an illocutionary perspecti(e, 7-o8 sue me9 has also con(entionali7ed its meaning. 1n the original scenario, it is an in(itation for the hearer to e&ercise his rights. owe(er, the le(el'. implication that the hearer is o(erreacting calls for a different illocutionary interpretation in which the hearer is being warned to stop his beha(ior. This interpretation is also con(entional: it arises from the metonymic acti(ation of the illocutionary scenario for warnings, where people who are acting in ways that affect other people negati(ely are strongly encouraged to change (cf. 8ui7 de )endo7a ! 3aicchi, .//$+ 3aicchi ! 8ui7 de )endo7a, ./"/). ,n important source of highly fi&ed constructions is found in greetings such as ,ello9# Good Morning9, and 'is" you all t"e best9 Areetings are often stereotyped e&pressions of good will that arise from the social con(ention according to which we

need not only to act in ways that are beneficial to others but also to wish them the best. 3ut greetings ser(e a discourse function too since the greeter e&pects an eBually stereotyped response (often the same kind of salutation is returned) and they can act as preparatory de(ices for a more comple& discourse de(elopment (e.g. :ear -ir7s8, as an opening to a speech or letter). )ost non'argument structure constructions, howe(er, contain (ariable elements. 9onsider the following cases: (;) -e(el .: '"o :o (ou 2"in. (ou *re &02o &4 (e.g. '"o do you t"in. you are tal.ing to0 to tal. to me li.e t"is4 )+ '"o!s been ;ing &4 (e.g. '"o!s been messing it" my com$uter4)+ :on!t (ou & me9 (e.g. :on!t you <"oney= me9). -e(el 0: I% I ere you# I!d & (e.g. I% I ere you# I!d ait a bit longer )+ I ant you & (e.g. I ant you in my o%%ice in ten minutes0to clean your room , etc.)+ (ou :on!t 'ant Me & 7:o (ou48 (e.g. (ou don!t ant me to tell "er# do you4). -e(el ;: & )et *lone ( (e.g. I on!t eat t"at garbage# let alone $ay %or it)+ & as is evidenced by ( (e.g. 2"is t"reat is continuing to t"is day# as is evidenced by t"e recent attac.s in Indonesia and Israel)+ & on condition t"at ( (e.g. -"e said s"e>d "el$ it" t"e costumes on condition t"at s"e ould get ten %ree tic.ets). There is an essential Bualitati(e difference between constructions belonging to le(els . and 0, on the one hand, and those belonging to le(el ;, on the other hand. 6hile the former work by pro(iding metonymic access to con(entional situational cogniti(e models or scenarios, the latter e&ploit combinations of high'le(el non'situational cogniti(e models. <or e&ample, the interpretation of :on!t you <"oney= me9 is based on the common e(eryday scenario in which people make use of honey or other affectionate appellati(es. ,sking the addressee not to use the appellati(e suggests that there is a (probably temporary) breach in the speaker'addressee affecti(e relationship. The linguistic e&pression, which only makes e&plicit part of the more comple& situation that we ha(e described, affords access to the whole of it for adeBuate interpretation. 1llocutionary meaning is also based on the partial mention of a more comple& scenario that has to be accessed metonymically. 9onsider (ou don!t ant me to tell "er# do you4 , which has a clear default use as a threat. Threats are based on a more generic scenario where the speaker wants to control the addressees beha(ior by re(ealing the harmful conseBuences that not doing as told will ha(e on him. The conseBuences are made e&plicit while the rest of the scenario has to be worked out inferentially. 3y contrast, at le(el ;, we ha(e logical relations such as cause'effect or e(idence'conclusion, tem$oral relations such as precedence and simultaneity, or conce$tual relations such as similarity, contrast, conditioning, and concession, among others. The relations e&ploit high'le(el cogniti(e models. 6e e&plore discourse constructions in more detail in the ne&t section. 4. Discourse constructions Liscourse constructions are idiomatic constructions with fi&ed and (ariable elements where the fi&ed elements capture relational meaning grounded in high'le(el cogniti(e models (e.g. addition, e&emplification, contrast, cause'conseBuence, etc.). , preliminary list of discourse relations has been offered in )airal ! 8ui7 de )endo7a (.//#: "$$). 3elow is an adapted (ersion:

Discourse relation 8estatement

9omment

Some basic constructional layouts &# In ?t"er 'ords (@ &# 2"at Is 72o -ay8 ( &# '"ic" (

Description The information in > is fully or partially eBui(alent to the information in ? The information in > addresses all or part of the information in ?

E ample

2pecification

&; (

know5say0t"in.1

2"at

@&emplification

& *s Is Illustrated0Avidenc ed0ABem$li%ied Cy ( & *nd (

,ddition

@&ception

& ABce$t 7For80'it" 2"e ABce$tion o% ( Ait"er & ?r (

,lternation

9ontrast

& Cut (0 "o ever (0 &

&#

9omparison Time

&# ( 2oo@ &# -o Is0:oes ( *%ter &# (0 ( *%ter &@ Ce%ore &# (0 ( Ce%ore &@ '"en &# (0( '"en

-"e "as run out o% money@ in ot"er ords# s"e is bro.e ?nly t"e driver survived t"e accident# "ic" is still under investigation The information in > 'e all .ne t"at gi(es details on the kind a cyclone as of state of affairs that coming the cogni7er in ? has represented in his mind The information in > ?ur cultural e&emplifies the diversity is under information in ? t"reat as is illustrated by language loss The information in > is I ore a "at and added to the s$rayed my scal$ information in ? in a every %e "ours way that preser(es conceptual consistency The information in > I li.e t"e ne cancels out part of the candidate eBce$t information in ? %or "is %oreign $olicy The information in > Ait"er "e>s evil# cancels out all of the or "e>s a %ool information in ? (contrasti(e) (contrasti(e alternation) ,e is neit"er evil or complements it nor a %ool (complementary (complementary) alternation) The information in > is ,e "as a 3e totally or partially in (or. accent@ conflict with the "o ever# "e as information in ? born in 2eBas The information in > is Mary is careless similar to the and so is "er information in ? sister The information in > *%ter "e "ad relates temporally to the al.ed %or information in ? anot"er "our# "e %elt unbearably t"irsty

-ocation

9ause

9ondition

&@ & *t 2"e -ame 2ime as ( & 7ABactly0Just8 The information in > ,e %ound t"e ma$ '"ere ( relates spatially to the eBactly "ere "e information in ? "ad le%t it many years be%ore & Cecause0-ince ( The information in > is Many teenagers & Cecause o% ( the reason why the 5oin gangs information in ? holds because t"ey need to %ill emotional needs & ?n +ondition The information in > is Antry is granted 2"at 07?nly8 I% ( a condition for the on condition t"at information in ? to you do not or. hold %ull time

Table ". :iscourse relations and related constructions in t"e )+M @ach of these discourse relation types roughly falls under one of the three logico' semantic relations postulated in 2ystemic <unctional -inguistics (2<-+ alliday ! )atthiessen, .//;) as underlying comple& clauses: elaboration, eBtension, and en"ancement. The first si& discourse relations (restatement, comment, specification, e&emplification, contrast, comparison) are cases of elaboration, since they work by making the information in the second (ariable address all or part of the information in the first (ariable. The ne&t three relations (addition, e&ception, and alternation) are a matter of e&pansion: the information in the second (ariable either adds to or takes away (partially or totally) from the information in the first (ariable. <inally, time, location, cause, and condition specifications relate to enhancement: the information pro(ided by the second (ariable Bualifies the information in the first (ariable. 1n the -9), discourse relations underlie the meaning part of discourse constructions. ,t the le(el of form, such relational meaning is reali7ed by the fi&ed elements of the construction. 1n turn, each fi&ed element profiles the specific way in which the relational meaning in Buestion is to be understood. <or e&ample, both only i% and on condition t"at set up a condition connection between the constructional (ariables in their corresponding constructions. owe(er, only i% e&cludes any possibility of o(erriding the condition, which is not the case with on condition t"at: (4) *dmission to t"e $rogram is granted only i% t"e a$$licant "as a university degree1 44ABce$tions to t"is regulation are stated by individual de$artments1 (%) *dmission to t"e $rogram is granted on condition t"at t"e a$$licant "as a university degree1 ABce$tions to t"is regulation are stated by individual de$artments1 6e shall refer to this phenomenon by the term constructional discourse $ro%iling. This phenomenon is but an e&tension into discourse acti(ity of common profile'base relationships postulated in -angackers 9ogniti(e Arammar from its inception (cf. -angacker, "#*$+ see also -angacker, "###). , straightforward e&ample of profile'base relationships is pro(ided, at the le&ical le(el, by the notion of Cplane. 9onsider the

different ways of understanding this notion within different conte&ts: a plane stationed on the runway+ a plane flying+ a plane on the assembly line+ a plane being dismantled. @ach conte&t pro(ided a different base domain for the notion of plane to be understood. 1f a plane is stationed on the runway, we either e&pect the plane to be about to take off or to ha(e =ust landed after flying between locations. 6e thus think of the passengers in their assigned seats, with their safety belts fastened, waiting either to depart or to get off soon. 3ut if we think of a plane flying, we en(isage the passengers in their seats reading, sleeping, ha(ing a light snack, etc. On the assembly line, the plane is not a plane yet: it is being built on the basis of a blueprint+ we think of workers and engineers taking part in the process, each with a specific role. 1f a plane is being taken apart, we assume that it is not in use any longer, perhaps because it is old or because of a crash. The plane is the profiled entity, i.e. the designated entity, in each of these conceptual conte&ts or base cogniti(e domains. The way we en(isage the plane, that is, the way we picture this designated entity in our minds, is different for each base domain. Jow, since discourse relations are based on connections between high'le(el cogniti(e models, it follows that they must be sensiti(e to profile'base acti(ation. That this is so is e(idenced by the comparison of the e&amples (4) and (%) abo(e, where the choice of one profile (ersus another has conseBuences in terms of discourse coherence: only i% profiles the conditional discourse connection in such a way that e&ceptions are impossible, while on condition t"at lea(es the door open for e&ceptions. <rom this e(idence, we conclude that for discourse coherence to be possible, profile'base relations ha(e to be kept intact. ,nother important aspect of discourse constructions is their broad reali7ational (ariability for a same profile'base relationship. -et us take the following utterances where the filler for the ? (ariable substitutes for a (topical) portion of pre(ious te&t thus making the underlying constructions discourse ones: ($) , further e&ample of this phenomenon is pro(ided by the recently disco(ered trans'Jeptunian dwarf planet aumea.0 (D6revious to$ical teBtiE@ * 7%urt"er80*n additional0?ne more eBam$le o% &i is $rovided0su$$lied by0%ound in 7connection to8 () (*) This phenomenon is further e&emplified by the recent disco(ery of the trans' Jeptunian dwarf planet aumea (D6revious to$ical teBtiE@ &i is 7%urt"er0additionally8 eBem$li%ied by () (#) The recent disco(ery of the trans'Jeptunian dwarf planet aumea further e&emplifies this phenomenon. (D6revious to$ical teBtiE@ &i 7%urt"er0additionally8 eBem$li%ies (). Te&t ($) is an attested e&ample, while (*) and (#) are artificial (ariants of ($) constructed for the sake of the ensuing discussion. The portion of te&t preceding ($) discusses a cosmological phenomenon of which ($) supplies e&tra e&emplification or e(idence. This is a case of what we ha(e called e&emplification in Table " abo(e. Te&ts (*) and (#) are only two possible (ariants of ($), which are fully compatible with the pre(ious portion of the te&t in terms of conceptual coherence, that is, both te&ts make use of a constructional (ariant that preser(es the profile'base structure of the underlying discourse relation in a way that is consistent with pre(ious te&t. owe(er, there are subtle differences in terms of focal structure among the three constructional reali7ation
0

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options: ($) and (*) treat the e&plicit constructional marker of e&emplification ( a %urt"er eBam$le o% &@ & is %urt"er eBem$li%ied by ( ) as a topic of con(ersation, while (#) gi(es e&emplification focal prominence. This makes ($) and (*) more adeBuate choices than (#) for the o(erall discourse flow since they preser(e topic continuity. ,t the same time, there is a difference between ($) and (*) in terms of what we can call constructionF internal %ocus, to be differentiated from o(erall discourse focus. Thus, ($) situates the e&plicit e&emplification marker (a %urt"er eBam$le) in topical rather than focal position within the topical part of the le(el'; construction * %urt"er eBam$le o% & is $rovided by ( (cf. ANme7'Aon7Ole7, .//"). This is not the case in (*) and (#), where the e&plicit e&emplification marker has a focal position within the same topical part of the construction. To the e&tent that reali7ational (ariation brings about changes in focus, it is possible to talk about a constructional (ariant being a construction in its own right. <or e&ample, the choice between %urt"er0additional in ($) is almost immaterial since it does not affect either the profile'base e&emplification relationship on which the construction is grounded or its focal structure. Therefore, it does not gi(e rise to a new construction. 3y contrast, the choice between * %urt"er eBam$le o% & is $rovided by ( , & is %urt"er eBem$li%ied by (, and & %urt"er eBem$li%ies ( has more important conseBuences in terms of shifts in construction'internal and discourse focal structure discussed abo(e. owe(er, since the three choices e&ploit the same profile'base relationships, we can say that they belong to the same constructional %amily, that is, they ser(e (ery similar discourse functions but introduce subtle changes in focal structure. This proposal is consistent with pre(ious work in cogniti(ely'oriented constructionist accounts. Thus, Aon7Ol(e7'AarcPa (.//#) has discussed the e&istence of constructional families at the le(el of argument structure characteri7ations. , constructional family is set up on the basis of the 6ittgensteinian notion of %amily resemblance relationships, a phenomenon that has recei(ed much attention in the cogniti(e'linguistic literature (cf. Taylor, .//0). <amily resemblances are set up on the basis of partial o(erlapping similarities among conceptual items. <or a le&ical item, it is easy to see such resemblances when categori7ing specific cases of an embracing concept, such as Cbird, Cfurniture or Cgames. <or e&ample, a robin is a good e&ample of bird, i.e. it is a prototypical bird. This is so because robins ha(e an 2 shape, they ha(e a beak and feathers, they are relati(ely small, they can fly, the perch on trees, and so on. Ostriches are also birds, but they cannot fly, they can run fast and are (ery big. , penguin is also a bird, but it cannot fly and has no feathers. 1t is also relati(ely big. Qndoubtedly, there are o(erlapping similarities between ostriches and penguins, but there are also differences. 1n other words, there are family resemblances between them, which allow us to categori7e them as birds. The same rational holds for furniture items (think of the strong similarities and small differences between chairs, stools, sofas, and then obser(e the strong differences they ha(e with tables and wardrobes) and games (think of the similarities football and basketball+ then contrast these games with chess and checkers, which scarcely share any structure with the other e&amples of game). Aon7Ol(e7'AarcPa (.//#) argues that sub=ecti(e'transiti(e constructions bear family resemblance structure, much in the same way as has been postulated by Aoldberg ! Dackendoff (.//;: 40%) for different cases of resultati(e construction, such as the intransiti(e resultati(e (2"e $ond %roze solid), the transiti(e resultati(e (2"e gardener atered t"e %lo ers %lat), the unselected transiti(e resultati(e (2"ey dran. t"e $ub dry), and the fake refle&i(e resultati(e ('e yelled ourselves "oarse). 6hat these constructions ha(e in common is their intrinsic telicity, but the rest of their properties change. Thus, the result can be seen as the end'point of a process, of a controlled

acti(ity or of an instigated action. 1n turn, sub=ecti(e'transiti(e constructions, which ha(e the manipulati(e (I ant you in "ere tomorro a%ter sc"ool ), the e(aluati(e (I %ind your boo. very "el$%ul and in%ormative), the declarati(e (2"ey call me a liar), and the generic (-"e li.es "er meat ra ) (ariants, also share some properties. <or e&ample, the first participant is prototypically human and their predicati(e complement can only ha(e a characteri7ing (ne(er identifying) function (since they are (ariants of comple&' transiti(e constructions). owe(er, there are differences. <or e&ample, all the members of the family, e&cept the manipulati(e construction, highlight at least one conspicuous property of the ob=ect. 3ut this property is presented as the result of the sub=ects personal reaction to the ob=ect (e(aluati(e construction), as an un(erified shared opinion (declarati(e construction) or as a (usually) (erified obser(ation (generic sub=ecti(e' transiti(e construction). @(idently, this kind of analysis of family resemblance relations is also applicable to discourse constructions, as has been illustrated through our discussion of e&amples ($)'(#) abo(e. The difference is to be found in the nature of the meaning structure of the constructions in Buestion: in the case of argument'structure constructions, o(erlapping and non'o(erlapping features are arise from the way constructional arguments relate to one another through a predicate+ in the case of discourse constructions, whate(er elements they ha(e in common is a matter of whether or not the same discourse relation is acti(ated. a(ing the same underlying discourse relation pro(ides us with enough conceptual material in common among constructions for family resemblance connections to hold. 9onstructional (ariants thus result from different e&ploitations of one basic discourse relation. <inally, we ha(e obser(ed that the choice of one constructional (ariant with preference to another has effects on the o(erall coherence of a te&t. !. Constructing discourse The architecture of the -9) has a dynamic nature. This allows for the online construction and interpretation of messages as needed according to ad "oc discourse needs. Thus, unlike 2<A and <LA, the -9) is not e&clusi(ely a top'down model starting from speakers intentions and going down to linguistic reali7ation. 1t is not a bottom'up model either, unlike pro=ectionist theories of language such as 8ole and 8eference Arammar (88A+ cf. Fan Falin, .//4) and most constructionist accounts of language, including 9ogniti(e 9onstruction Arammar (Aolderberg, .//%) and 9ogniti(e Arammar (-angacker, "###, .//*). 8ather, the -9) is sensiti(e to the combination of bottom'up and top'down strategies, which are decided upon as discourse progresses. This means that discourse is not constructed only on the basis of le(el'; acti(ity+ discourse is the result of meaningful strategic choices that respond to speakers communicati(e goals and to speaker'hearer online re'adaptations as discourse progresses. <or e&ample, imagine a speaker is frustrated about the meal he has been offered after ordering at a fast food restaurant. On the spur of the moment, he first e&claims I on!t eat t"at garbage+ then, as an afterthought, he continues after a brief pause by saying let alone $ay %or it. The first clause is an e&plicit refusal to eat and, perhaps, implicitly, a complaint. This is le(el'0 acti(ity. The utterance could ha(e stopped here, so, from the point of (iew of discourse, we could e&pect a (erbal reaction on the part of the hearers addressing the refusal and the complaint in some way (e.g. through a response like (ou!re rig"t1 )et!s %ind anot"er $lace to eat, which combines two le(el'0 acts, agreement and suggestion, into a cause'conseBuence discourse unit).

owe(er, a conte&t in which the incompetence of the restaurant outrages the speaker, he may decide to de(elop his utterance further into a more comple& discourse unit: the afterthought mentioned abo(e, let alone $ay %or it, con(eys the idea that the speaker feels that since the food is terribly bad, he cannot be e&pected to pay for it. <rom a discourse perspecti(e the let alone addition is a more emphatic (ersion of I on!t eat t"at garbage and 7o% course8 I on!t $ay %or it , which is an e&ample of what we can call, following )airal ! 8ui7 de )endo7a (.//#: "$%) com$lementary alternation. 3y alternation is meant a relation that signals a change from one state of affairs to another and then (potentially) back again. 9omplementary alternation is distinguished from contrastive alternation in that, in the latter, but not in the former, the second member cancels out the first (e.g. Ait"er "e!s evil or "e!s a %ool ). 1n complementary alternation the second member, in fact, complements the first one, thus shading off into a case of addition. This alternation follows the general constructional pattern 3or &# nor ( (cf. )airal ! 8ui7 de )endo7a, .//#) but it has a number constructional (ariants, including the & )et *lone ( (initially discussed by <illmore ! O9onnor, "#**) and & on!t (@ and & ont G. @ach constructional choice is thus determined by discourse needs that arise as discourse de(elops. 1magine now a plausible conte&t for the sentence '"at!s t"e c"ild doing it" t"e .ni%e4, which is an e&ample of the le(el'. '"at!s & :oing (4 construction (Ray ! <illmore, "###). , child handling a knife is a dangerous situation. 2o the sentence seems to be, first of all, a warning about the danger but probably also a call for urgent action on the part of the addressee and a reproach. This means that the sentence '"at!s t"e c"ild doing it" t"e .ni%e4 is multidimensional from an illocutionary perspecti(e. 2uch multidimensionality has conseBuences for discourse construction: a Buestion demands an answer+ a reBuest, like a warning, reBuires action, and a reproach either a change or the promise of a change in beha(ior patterns. The Buestion is where do all these meaning implications arise fromK The answer lies in how le(el'. meaning acti(ates le(el'0 meaning structure and where this acti(ation should stop. -et us start with le(el . meaning. ,s Ray ! <illmore ("###) ha(e noted, the '"at!s & :oing (4 construction con(eys the idea that the situation described bothers or worries the speaker. ,s noted in )airal ! 8ui7 de )endo7a (.//#: "%#), this implication arises from the freBuent use of e&amples of this construction in conte&ts in which the speaker knows that the addressee is aware of the situation that he is asking about. The rationale behind asking a Buestion whose answer is self'e(ident in terms of content is that the speaker is drawing attention not to the content but to his emotional reaction to the state of affairs described in the content. 1n principle, the emotional reaction could be either positi(e (e.g. awe or admiration) or negati(e (e.g. irritation), but through freBuent use with problematic situations, the construction has con(entionali7ed the negati(e implications. ,t this stage is where le(el'0 structure comes into play, since there is a social e&pectation that people ha(e to help other people to deal with negati(e situations in the best possible way (cf. 8ui7 de )endo7a ! 3aicchi, .//$). This social e&pectation underlies the speech act interpretation of e&pressions of dissatisfaction as reBuests for action (e.g. I!m starving# mum9 meaning C)um, gi(e me something to eat). 3ut '"at!s t"e c"ild doing it" t"e .ni%e4 is also a warning since its content describes an impending danger for someone that we ha(e to take care of. , warning is in fact a reBuest for remedial action when an unsatisfactory situation is potentially dangerous. <inally, the reproach deri(es from the fact that the addressee should ha(e acted on the situation on his own free will when first becoming aware of it but has not done so. The following are some plausible discourse de(elopments that take into account one or more of the pre(iously mentioned speech act

(alues: ,: '"at!s t"e c"ild doing it" t"e .ni%e4 Sthe speaker shows concern and reBuests for addressees actionT 3: ?" my goodness9 I!ll get it %rom "im Sthe addressee shows compliance with speakers reBuestT ,: '"at!s t"e c"ild doing it" t"e .ni%e4 Sthe speaker shows concern+ he reproaches addressee and reBuests for actionT 3: ?H# I!ve got it no 1 I on!t let t"at "a$$en again1 Sthe addressee shows compliance and promises changeT ,: '"at!s t"e c"ild doing it" t"e .ni%e4 Sthe speaker shows concern+ he reproaches addressee and reBuests for actionT 3: I don!t .no 1 '"y are you as.ing me4 (ou ta.e care o% t"is Sthe addressee challenges the speakers con(ention'dri(en e&pectationsT These discourse de(elopments are not based on le(el'; constructions but on conceptual consistency between le(el'. and le(el'0 meaning constructs. This obser(ation should not be surprising in (iew of our discussion of cogniti(e model types in section .. 1t has long been known that le&ical concepts contribute, though their encyclopedic knowledge structure, to discourse coherence (cf. Araesser ! 3ower, "##/). 1n our (iew, non'le&ical concepts, such as either low'le(el or high'le(el situational cogniti(e models, like those described abo(e, are also crucial elements in the creation of discourse coherence. 2uch pairs as Buestion'answer, reBuest'compliance, and so on, are a clear e&ample of how discourse can de(elop non'constructionally through the acti(ation of situational cogniti(e models. ". Conclusion This paper has outlined a framework for the detailed study of discourse connecti(ity in terms of some of the descripti(e and e&planatory tools pro(ided by the -e&ical 9onstructional )odel or -9). Our point of departure has been the assumption that constructions are used to con(ey meaning beyond argument'structure representations of the kind in(estigated by Aoldberg ("##4, .//%). 1n line with pre(ious work on the -9), which recogni7es a specific discourse le(el in meaning representation, we ha(e postulated the e&istence of discourse constructions. 6e ha(e refined part of this pre(ious work by postulating that discourse relations such as restatement, contrast, condition, and others, pro(ide cogniti(e base domains against which the fi&ed elements of discourse constructions are profiled. This is a cogniti(e mechanism that allows us to determine in what way a gi(en discourse relation is to be understood. Then, we ha(e argued that the different constructions that profile the same base domain are members of the same family. 6e ha(e discussed the degree of interchangeability, in terms of discourse connecti(ity, of members of the same family. <inally, we ha(e argued that discourse connecti(ity goes beyond the acti(ity of discourse constructions. 1n this connection, we ha(e e&amined some e&amples of how such connecti(ity can be achie(ed on the basis of coherence relations arising from other le(els of linguistic description.

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