JURISPRUDENCE IN LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS

Lawyers PRACTICE OF LAW; Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience. One is entitled to practice law if he has been duly admitted to the bar and there maintains a good standing. Acts constituting practice of law appearances in court as counsel and preparation and filing of pleadings in court. Same; The practice of law is a profession and not a b siness. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money/making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. 0he gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration. &uty to public service and to the administration of 1ustice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. 0he practice of law is a noble calling in w2c emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained w2o making much money. Same; After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney/client relationship. Lawyering is not a business. it is a profession in w2c duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. T!E LAW"ER A#$ SOCIET"; %oralit& Iss e' All circumstances taken together indicate that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. 7owever, her relationship, clothed as it was w2 what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. 8mmorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. 0o warrant disciplinary action, such conduct must be 9:;O$$L< 8##O;AL,= that is, it must be corrupt and false as to constitute criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. Same; #ot in (ood Faith; ;espondent did not exercise the good faith required of a lawyer in handling the legal affairs of his client. 8t is evident from the records that he tried to coerce the complainant to comply w2 his letter/ demand by threatening to file various charges against the latter. @hen the complainant did not heed his warning, he made good his threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative cases against the complainant. ;espondentAs action is malicious as the cases he instituted against the complainant di not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client. (learly, the respondent violated the proscription in (anon -5, 5.*- of the (ode of Professional ;esponsibility. Same; )iolation of Oath; 8n the case at bar, respondent violated his solemn oath as a lawyer not to engage in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct. 7e maintained that the signature of the donor was genuine despite the finding of experts to the contrary. 7e also tried to make a mockery of the legal profession by advancing the flimsy excuse that, as a notary public, his failure to submit a copy of the document to the (lerk of (ourt was his secretaryAs !.". #ercado and $ons Agri. %nterprises v. Atty. &e 'era, Admin (ase )*++, &ec. ), ,**-. 3urbe v. Atty. #agulta, A( 4o. 55/+)6, !une -*, ,**,.

3urbe v. Atty. #agulta, A( 4o. 55/+)6, !une -*, ,**,. >i v. Atty. 3onifacio, Adm. (ase 4o. ))-5, !une ?, ,***.

Ong v. Atty. >nto, Adin (ase 4o. ,6-B, Ceb. +, ,**,.

Alitagtag v. Atty. :arcia, Admin (ase 4o. 6B)?, Ceb. +, ,**,.

fault. 0here is also a showing that respondent harassed the occupants of the property sub1ect of the donation. 7e asked #%;AL(O to disconnect its services to the property, threatening law suits if his demands were not heeded. 7e also posted security guards to intimidate the occupants of the property. (learly, respondentAs acts caused dishonor to the legal profession. A notary public who acknowledged a document that was a forgery destroys the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. 7e does not deserve to continue as a member of the bar. T!E LAW"ER A#$ CLIE#T; Professional En*a*ement; 8f a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults an attorney in his professional capacity w2 the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional engagement must be regarded as established. 8t is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion or that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged. neither is it material that the attorney consulted, did not afterward undertake the case about w2c the consultation was had. Same; Law&er+Client Relationship; Lawyer/client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the formerEs fees. 7ence, despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty/bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare F and had actually prepared F at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the clientEs interest. ;ule -?.*) of the (ode of Professional ;esponsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them. !unio v. Atty. :rupo, Adinm (ase D*,*, &ec. -?, ,**-.

3urbe v. Atty. #agulta, A( 4o. 55/+)6, !une -*, ,**,.

Same; Same; Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of 0an v. Lapak, a client, they owe fidelity to such cause and must always )D* $(;A B6, be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. !an. ,), ,**-. 0hey owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm Geal in the maintenance and the defense of the clientEs rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied. Same; Same; After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney/client relationship. A lawyer/client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the formerAs business. 0o constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. 8t is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged. neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for w2c his service had been sought. Likewise, a lawyer/client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the formerAs fees. Same; Same; 0he absence of a written contract does not 3urbe v. Atty. #agulta, A( 4o. 55/+)6, !une -*, ,**,.

$ps. ;abanal

preclude a finding that there was a professional relationship w2c merits attorneyEs fees for professional services rendered. A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney. the contract may be express or implied. 0o establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. 0o constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. . . 8t is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about w2c the consultation was had. 8f a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults w2 his attorney in his professional capacity w2 the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established. Same; Effecti,e Representation; A client is entitled to an effective representation. A lawyer should recogniGe his lack of competence or incapacity to handle a particular task and the disservice he would do his client if he undertakes or continues to undertake the task entrusted to him. 8f that situation occurs, he should either decline to act or obtain his clientAs instruction to retain, consult or collaborate w2 another lawyer to avoid any event detrimental to his clientAs cause. Same; Act of Co nsel is act of Client; (lients should suffer the consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of the counsel whom they themselves hired and had the full authority to fire at any time and replace w2 another even w2o any 1ustifiable reason. Same; Same; Litigants represented by counsel, should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case.

v. Atty. 0ugade, A( 4o. -)B,, !une ,B, ,**,.

7eirs of (ristobal v. (A, :; -)D5D5, #ay --, ,***.

$alva v. (ourt of Appeals, )*6 $(;A +), H-555I. 3ernardo v. (ourt of Appeals, ,BD $(;A 6-) H-55BI. Producers 3ank v. (A, -,++,*, April -B, ,**,. :acutan/ Craile v. &omingo, :; -)?D-?, &ec. -D, ,***.

Same; Same; E-ception; @here the negligence of counsel is one that is so gross, palpable, pervasive and reckless w2c is the type of negligence that deprives a party of his or her day in court. 8n effect does not bind the client. Same; Simple #e*li*ence; (ounselAs negligence in filing a defective notice of appeal and defective motions for reconsideration and in not elevating nor advising herein petitioner to elevate adverse orders to the higher court for review is undisputed, but it cannot be said that there was sheer absence of real effort on his part to defend his clientAs cause amounting to gross negligence. Same; #e*lect of $ t&; 4eglect of legal matter entrusted to counsel. &eceiving his client that he had already filed the petition in the annulment case when in fact, the petition was only filed on a later date. Cor his neglect in handling the case, he promised to return half of the amount that was paid to him but he never did. $uch misconduct clearly betrays the confidence reposed in him by his client.

;eyes v. !avier, Admin (ase 4o. DDB6, Ceb. -, ,**,.

Same; $ t& to Acco nt Promptl&; Lawyers must promptly account for money or property they receive on behalf of their clients. Cailure to do so constitutes professional misconduct and 1ustifies the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. Same; Same; 0he highly fiduciary relation of attorney and client requires that respondent lawyer should promptly account for the funds w2c he received and help for the benefit of his client. 0he client has the right to know how the funds were used or disbursed by his counsel.

!udge Angeles v. Atty. >y, Adm. (ase 4o. D*-5, April +, ,***. (unanan v. Atty. ;imorin, Ad,in (ase 4o. (3&/ 5?JD-?, Aug. ,), ,***. 3asa v. Atty. 8cawat, Admin (ase 4o. 6,?,, Aug. ,6, ,***. ;ivera v. Atty. Angeles, Admin (ase 4o. ,D-5, Aug. ,5, ,***. 0orres v. Atty. Orden, Adm. (ase 4o. 6+6+, April +, ,***. 8n ;eK Atty. 3riones, Admin (ase D6?+, Aug. -D, ,**-. (ariLo v. &e los ;eyes, Admin (ase 65?,, Aug. 5, ,**-. !unio v. Atty. :rupo, supra.

Same; Same; 0he lawyerAs right to be paid for his legal services cannot be exercised whimsically by appropriating for himself the money intended for his clients.

Same; $ereliction of $ t&; ;espondentAs failure to submit the brief to the appellate court w2in the reglementary period is not only a dereliction of duty to his client but also to the court as well. Same; #e*lect of $ t&; Cailure to submit the reqd brief w2in the reglementary period.

Same; Same; Cailure to file criminal complaint.

Same; %alpractice and (ross %iscond ct' A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clientAs interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Same; %iscond ct; 0he lawyer actively solicited the letter of reconsideration from complainant and later on used said letter against the interest of complainant to support the lawyerAs motion to dismiss the civil case revealing lack of candor and fairness in said lawyerAs dealings. Same; E-tortion; Lawyer who arrogate unto himself the mantle of a !ustice of the $upreme (ourt for the purpose of extorting money from a party/litigant commits ultimate betrayal of his duty w2c cannot and should never be countenanced. Same; Attorne&.s Fees; 0wo concepts of attorneyAs feesK H-I 8n the ordinary sense, it represents the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered. H,I 8n its extraordinary concept,

Osop v. Atty. Contanilla, Adimin (ase D*6), $ept. -5, ,**-. 8goy v. $oriano, A.#. 4o. ,**-/$(, Oct. --, ,**-. (ompania #aritima v. (A, :; -,?6D,, 4ov.

attorneyAs fees may be awarded by the court as indemnity -+, -555. for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party. 8n the ordinary concept, the amount of AttyAs. fees due is that stipulated in the retainer agreement w2c is conclusive as to the amount thereof. 8n the absence of such agreement, the amount of AttyAs. fees is fixed on the basis of quantum meruit, i.e. the reasonable worth of his services. 8n determining the amount of AttyAs. fees, the ff. factors are consideredK H-I the time spent and extent of services rendered. H,I the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved. H)I the importance of the sub1ect matter. H6I the skill demanded. HDI the probability of losing other employment as a result of the acceptance of the proffered case. H+I the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client. HBI the certainty of compensation. H?I the character of employment. and H5I the professional standing of the lawyer. Same; Attorne&.s Lien; A lawyer is entitled to a lien over the funds, documents and papers of his client w2c have lawfully come into his possession. >nder (anon -+.*) of the (ode of Professional ;esponsibility, he may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. 8n both case, however, it is to be assumed that the client agrees w2 the lawyer in the amount of AttyAs. fees. 8n case of disagreement on the amount claimed by the lawyer, the lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees. instead, it should behoove the lawyer to file, if he still deems it desirable, the necessary action or the proper motion w2 the proper court to fix the amount of his AttyAs. fees. Same; Conflict of Interest; @hen a lawyer agrees to represent the defendant and later on, also the plaintiff in the same case, he can no longer serve either of his said clients faithfully, as his duty to the plaintiff necessarily conflicts his duty to the defendant. T!E LAW"ER A#$ T!E CO/RTS; Respectf l Attit de; Lawyers may not be held to too strict an account for words said in heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language. @hile 1udges must exercise patience, lawyers must also observe temperate language as well. A lawyer is an officer of the (ourt, bound by the law. 8t is a lawyerAs sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of 1ustice. 8t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the 1udicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. 8t is peculiarly incumbent for lawyers to support the courts against 9un1ust criticism and clamor.= Same; Willf l $isobedience to lawf l Orders; 0he lawyerAs failure to submit proof of service of appellantAs brief to the $OL:%4 and his failure to submit the reqd. comment manifest willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the $(, a clear violation of the canons of professional ethics. !.". #ercado and $ons v. &e 'era, Adm. (ase 4o. )*++, Oct. ,+, -555.

$ibulo v. Atty. (abrera, A$# (ase 4o. 6,-?, !uly ,*, ,***. $oriano v. (A, :; -**+)), Aug. ,?, ,**-.

8n ;eK 'icente <. 3ayani, Admin (ase 4o. D)*B, Aug. 5, ,***.

Same; Improper Cond ct; ;espondent has achieved a <ared v. 7on. remarkable feat of character assassination. 7is verbal 8larde, :;

darts, albeit entertaining in a fleeting way, are cast w2 little regard for truth. 7e does nothing more than to obscure the issues, and his reliance on the foolAs gold of gossip betrays only a shocking absence of discernment. Same; S bstit tion of Co nsel; A verbal substitution of counsel albeit impliedly granted by respondent 1udge, contravenes $ec. ,+ of ;ule -)? of the ;ules of (ourt w2c prescribes the requirement for change of attorneys, namelyK MiN written consent of the client filed in court. and MiiN written notice of the substitution to the adverse party. PEOFESSIO#AL LAW PART#ERS!IP; A partnership of lawyers duly organiGed and registered under the $%(. 8ts rights and obligations are governed by the law on partnership of the (ivil (ode.

--6BB),, Aug. -, ,***.

;equierme v. !udge <uipco, A.#. 4o. ;0!/ 5?/-6,B, 4ov. ,B, ,***. Law Cirm of Abrenica, 0ungol O 0ibayan v. (A, :; -6)B*+, April D, ,**,. ;illoraGa, Africa, &e Ocampo and Africa vs. %astern 0elecommuni cations, 8nc., )*5 $(;A D++ H-555I. Producers 3ank of the Phils. v. (A, :; -,++,*, April -B, ,**,. Agpalasin v. !udge Agcaoili, A.#. ;0!/5D/-)*?, April -,, ,***. 7old &eparture Order 8ssued by !udge Abalos, A.#. 55/5/-6-/ #0((, 4ov. ,D, -555. ;eK 7old/ &eparture Order issued by !udge $ardido, A.#. 4o. *-/5/,6D/ #0(, &ec. D, ,**-. Ligad v. &ipolog, A.#. 4o. #0!/*-/

LAW FIR%; @hen a client employs the services of a law firm, he does not employ the services of the lawyer who is assigned to personally handle the case. ;ather, he employs the entire law firm. 8n the event that the counsel appearing for the client resigns, the firm is bound to provide a replacement.

!udges

Competence0 Inte*rit&0 and Independence; ;espondent 1udge has failed to live up to these standards. 7is acts of allowing a litigant in his sala to pay for the freight of his personal acquisitions constitutes a blatant violation of ;ule P.*6, (anon D of the (ode of !udicial (onduct prohibiting 1udges from accepting gifts, bequest, favor or loan from anyone except as may be allowed by law. Professional Competence; 0he (ode of !udicial (onduct en1oins 1udges to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence. !udges should be diligent in keeping abreast w2 developments in law and 1urisprudence, and regard the study of law as a never/ ending and ceaseless process.

Same; 0he members of the bench must keep abreast w2 the developments in law and 1urisprudence. >nder (ircular 4o. )5/5B, #0(As have no 1urisdiction to issue hold/ departure orders.

Same; Application of the (hild and <outh @elfare (ode HP& +*)I. ;espondent 1udge betrayed his Qignorance of the lawQ when he denied the release of $ailan to the

custody of complainant. ;espondent 1udge erroneously -)?+, &ec. D, applied the second paragraph of $ection -) of ;ule --6 of ,**-. the -5?D ;ules on (riminal Procedure. 7ad he been more circumspect in ascertaining the applicable laws, respondent 1udge would have known that Article -5- of P.&. 4o. +*) properly applies in this case since $ailan was a minor. Article -5- providesK Qthe court may release a youthful offender on recogniGance, to the custody of his parents or other suitable person who shall be responsible for his appearance whenever required.Q Incompetence and (ross I*norance of the Law; 0he issuance of a search warrant on the ground that complainant allegedly failed to pay the purchase price of the vehicles, contrary to the averment in the application for search warrant w2c cited violation of law and regulation involving tax exemption privileges. Same; 0he failure to issue a pre/trial order as required under $ec. -6 of ;ule ,* of the ;ules of (ourt cannot be excused by alleged heavy case load of the 1udge. &iGon v. 'eneracion, !uly ,*, ,***. &araca v. 4atividad, $ept. ,B, ,***. #aunlad $avings v. (A, :; --656,, 4ov. ,6, ,***. 'illanueva v. %stoque. A.#. 4O. ;0!/55/ -656, 4ov. ,5, ,***.

Same; 8f respondent 1udge felt he could not decide the case w2in the reglementary period, all he had to do was to ask for a reasonable extension of time to decide the case. 0he (ourt, cogniGant of the caseload of 1udges and mindful of the difficulty encountered by them in the seasonable disposition of cases, would always grant the request. Inefficienc& and (ross I*norance of the Law; 0he 1udge explained that he had discretion to add names of respondents in the complaint filed by the police investigator as well as to determine the degree of their participation whether as principal by participation or inducement or as accomplice. @hen the law transgressed is elementary, the failure to know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 0he (ourt cannot permit any act or omission which yanks public faith away from the 1udiciary. Curthermore, 0he mere failure to propound a proper question to a witness, which might develop some material fact upon which the 1udgment of the case would vary is considered negligence in the performance of their duties if a miscarriage of 1ustice resulted therefrom. A 1udge therefore must conscientiously endeavor each time to seek the truth, to know, and aptly apply the law, and to dispose of the controversy ob1ectively and impartially, all to the end that 1ustice is done to every party. ,? 0hese qualities are wanting on the part of respondent 1udge (ross I*norance of the Law; Observance of the law is required of every 1udge. @hen the law is sufficiently, basic, a 1udge owes it to his office to simply apply it. anything less than that is either deliberate disregard thereof or gross ignorance of the law. Partialit&; 8n the present case, respondent 1udge opened himself to suspicion of partiality when he exhibited extraordinary leniency and indulgent attitude towards the accused.

(abLero v. !udge (aLon, A.#. 4o. #0!/*-/-)+5, $ept. ,*, ,**-. ;eK ;elease by !udge #uro of an Accused in a 4on/ bailable Offense, A.#. 4o. P/**/B/ ),)/;0!, Oct. -B, ,**-.

&e :uGman, !r. v. $ison, A.#. 4o. ;0!/ *-/-+,5, #atch ,+, ,**,. ;eK ;elease by !udge #uro of an Accused in a 4on/bailable

Offense, A.#. 4o. P/**/B/ ),)/;0!, Oct. -B, ,**-. Official Cond ct; !udges should be free from any appearance of impropriety and his2her personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of 1udicial duties but also in his or her every day life, should be beyond reproach. >se of intemperate and insulting language against a litigant departs from the proper 1udicial decorum expected and demanded of a 1udge. 3ergonia v. !udge :onGaleG/ &ecano, A.#. 4o. 55/+5,/ ;0!, Oct. ,5, -555.

Prompt $isposition of Cases; !udges are bound to :allego v. dispose of the courtAs business and to decide cases w2in !udge the required period. &oronilla, A.#. #0!/**/ -,B?, !une ,+, ,***. Same; $ec. -D, Art. '88 of the (onstitution provides that all cases filed before the lower courts must be decided or resolved w2in ) months from the date of submission. 4on/ observance of this mandate constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting 1udge. Same; $ec. -D, Art. R'888 of the (onstitution provides that lower courts shall decide cases or matters pending before them w2in ) months from the date of submission of such cases or matters for decision or resolution. #osquera v. !udge Legaspi, A.#. 4o. ;0!/55/ -D--, !uly -*, ,***. $ibayan/ !oaquin v. !avellana, A.#. 4o. ;0!/ **/-+*-, 4ov. -), ,**-. Arap v. !udge #ustafa, A.#. 4o. $((/*-/ B, #arch -,, ,**,.

(ross Inefficienc&; /nd e $ela& in Renderin* $ecision; Lower (ourts are mandated by Art. '888, $ec. -D H-I of the (onstitution to resolve or decide cases w2in ) months after they have been submitted for decision. An extension of the period may be granted by the (ourt upon request of the 1udge concerned on account of heavy caseload or for other reasonable excuse. @2o an extension granted by the (ourt, a delay in the disposition of cases is tantamount to gross inefficiency on the part of the 1udge.

Raffle of Cases; 0he supervision over the raffling of $antos v. cases is the personal duty and responsibility of the !udge %xecutive !udge. 3uenaventura , A.#. 4o. ;0!/55/-6?D, Oct. --, ,**-. Contempt Powers; 0he role of a 1udge in relation to those who appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience and courtesy. (omm. ;odrigueG v. !udge 3onifacio, 4ov. +, ,***. (aLas v. 7on. (astigador, :; -)5?66, &ec. -D, ,***.

Same; A 1udge who is commanded at all times to be mindful of his high calling and his mission as a dispassionate and impartial arbiter of 1ustice is expected to be a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences w2c he shares w2 his fellow mortals.

Renderin* Wron*f l 1 d*ment2 A 1udge will be held administratively liable for rendering an un1ust 1udgment where he acts in bad faith, malice, revenge or some other similar motive. Absent the element of bad faith, an erroneous 1udgment cannot be the basis of a charge of any offense, mere error of 1udgment not being a ground for disciplinary action. Same; 3nowin*l& Renderin* an /n4 st 1 d*ment; (omplainant failed to show that respondent 1udge had ill motives in rendering the decision and similarly the records of the case fails to support the accusation. 8n order to 1ustify a disciplinary action against a 1udge, or to render him accountable, for an un1ust 1udgment, the error or mistake must be gross or patent, malicious or deliberate, or done in bad faith. any other rule can sub1ect him to undue risks, untold anxiety, and inordinate harassment, or the like, that could make his 1ob miserable and unbearable. Same; Same; A charge of rendering an un1ust 1udgment will not proper against a 1udge acting in good faith. Absent he element of bad faith, an erroneous 1udgment cannot be the basis of a charge for any said offenses mere error of 1udgment not being a found for disciplinary proceedings.

Almendra v. !udge Asis, A.#. ;0!/**/ -DD*, April +, ,***.

:anGon v. !udge %reno, A.#. ;0!/**/ -DD6, !une -, ,***.

$ps. &aracan v. !udge 4atividad, A.#. 4o. ;0!/ 55/-66B, $ept. ,B, ,***. Crani v. Pagayatan, A.#. 4o. ;0!/ *-/-+,+, Aug. ,?, ,**-. (o v. !udge (alimag, A.#. ;0!/55/-65), !une ,*, ,***. &ichaves v. !udge Apalit, A.#. #0!/**/ -,B6, !une ?, ,***. 0apiru v. !udge 3iden, A.#. #0!/**/ -,+,, April +, ,***. $oriano v. hon. Angeles, :; -*55,*, Aug. )-, ,***.

Same; Same; Cor a 1udge to be held administratively liable for knowingly rendering an un1ust 1udgment, the complaint must prove that the 1udgment is patently contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence and made w2 deliberate intent to perpetrate an in1ustice. 5ias or Pre4 dice; ;espondentAs act of personally furnishing a party copies of orders issued, w2o the same passing through the court docket, is highly irregular giving rise to the suspicion that the 1udge is partial to one of the parties in the case pending before him. Same; An isolated error of 1udgment would normally not make a 1udge susceptible to administrative liability. 3ut, here, respondentAs partiality fro a party to a case before him is evident in his several orders favoring the accused in the criminal case before him, even going to the extent of disregarding settled rulings. Same; A 1udgeAs act of writing to complainants re compromise agreement in a case pending before his court can easily be misunderstood to put to doubt the 1udgeAs impartiality on the matter before him. Same; #ere suspicion that the 1udge is partial to one of the parties is not enough. there must be evidence to prove the charge. ;espondent 1udgeAs effort to have the parties arrive at an amicable settlement is not evidence of partiality. PetitionerAs claim that respondent 1udge was biased is belied by his failure to move for respondent 1udgeAs inhibition. Same; 8n intervening on behalf of the defendants, respondent 1udge failed to live to the mandate that a 1udge should not only be impartial but must also appear impartial. @hile a 1udge may, to promote 1ustice, prevent

;equierme, !r. v. <uipco, ,***.

waste of time or clear/up some obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during trial, it should always be burned in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth. Same; 0o successfully disqualify a 1udge on the ground of bias or partiality, there must be concrete proof that a 1udge has a personal interest in the case and his bias is shown to have stemmed from an extra/1udicial source. 0his precept springs from the presumption that a 1udge shall decide on the merits of a case w2 an unclouded vision of its facts. 0hus, an erroneous ruling on the grant of a bail alone does not constitute evidence of bias. Likewise, respondent 1udgeAs reliance on the order of confinement even if erroneous is not sufficient to point to the conclusion that he was manifestly partial to the defense. Inhibition of 1 d*es; $ection -, ;ule -)B of the ;ules of (ourt lays down the rule on the 1udgeEs inhibition and disqualification. 0he import of the rule on voluntary inhibition of 1udges is thatK Q. . . the decision on whether or not to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the trial 1udge based on his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him. 8t points out to the members of the bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for ad1udication, there might be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of ob1ectivity, thus calling for inhibition for, indeed, the factors that lead to preference and predilections are many and varied.Q PP v. 7on. :ako, !;., :; -)D*6D, &ec. -D, ,***.

$eville1a v. Laggui, A.#. 4o. ;0!/*-/ -+-,, Aug. -6, ,**-.

Same; )ol ntar& Inhibition; @hen a suggestion is made 'illanueva of record that the 1udge be induced to act in favor of one %stoque, party or w2 bias or pre1udice against a litigant arising from supra. circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, the 1udge should conduct a careful $%LC/ %RA#84A08O4. 7e should exercise his discretion in a way that the peopleAs faith in the courts of 1ustice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he should reflect on the probability that the losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the 1udge unmeritoriously tiled the scales of 1ustice against him. Same; Cor any other reason, a litigant may not demand that a 1udge inhibit himself. 0he test for determining the propriety of the denial of a motion to inhibit is whether the movant was deprived of a fair and impartial trial. 38A$ and P;%!>&8(% to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of 1udges, must be proved w2 clear and convincing evidence. Same; Same; 8t is oftentimes necessary for the presiding 1udge to re/examine a witness so that his 1udgment rest upon full and clear understanding of the facts. 8t is a 1udgeAs prerogative to ask questions to ferret out the truth. 8t cannot be taken against him if the questions he propounds reveals certain truth w2c, in turn, tend to destroy the theory of one party. Same; When a 4 d*e sho ld inhibit himself from a case. QAs to the prayer for inhibition, petitioner claims that the issuance of the questioned Orders shows that respondent !udge has already lost his impartiality or cold

v.

$oriano v. (A, :; -**+)), Aug. ,?, ,**-.

PP v. ;ivera, :; -)5-?*, !uly )-, ,**-.

'iewmaster (onstruction (orp v. ;oxas, :;

neutrality to administer 1ustice, and that petitioner does not -))DB+, !uly stand a chinamanEs chance of ever getting 1ustice before -), ,***. respondent !udge. $uch sweeping conclusions here do not merit consideration. 0he questioned Orders, by themselves, do not sufficiently prove bias and pre1udice to disqualify respondent !udge under $ection -, second paragraph of ;ule -)B of the ;ules of (ourt. Cor such bias and pre1udice, to be a ground for disqualification, must be shown to have stemmed from an extra1udicial source, and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the 1udge learned from his participation in the case. Opinions formed in the course of 1udicial proceedings, as long as they are based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by the 1udge, even if found later on as erroneous, do not prove personal bias or pre1udice on the part of the 1udge. %xtrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. 0his, the petitioner herein did not sufficiently adduce to warrant respondent !udgeEs inhibition or disqualification.Q Same; Criminal Cases; 0he (ourt does not, as a matter of course, dismiss administrative complaints against members of the 3ench on account of the withdrawal of the charges or desistance of the complainant from prosecuting the complaint. otherwise its disciplinary power may be put to naught, thereby undermining the trust character of a public office and impairing the integrity and dignity of the (ourt as a disciplining authority. #e*li*ence; Loss of co rt records; Inefficienc& in the %ana*ement of Co rt and its Personnel . 0hat inefficiency was highlighted by the loss of court records. 0he loss was not immediately reported to respondent until much later. Although the branch court interpreter admitted her part in the loss of said records, her admission, however, does not exonerate respondent from his administrative liability. !udges are responsible not only for dispensing 1ustice but also for managing their courts efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery of court services. &ue diligence in the exercise of respondentEs administrative supervision over his court would have readily disclosed the fact that the records of (ivil (ase 4o. 5+/*,D+ were missing. (orrective measures could have been taken early on. Obviously, respondent neglected to observe the standard of diligence required for efficient court management. (ross %iscond ct; Intercedin* in 5ehalf of S spected $r * 6 een; ;espondent, then an Associate !ustice of the (A, was found guilty of interceding in behalf of a suspected drug queen. (ity :overnment of 0agbilaran v. !udge 7ontanosas, A.#. 4o. #0!/5?/--+5, !an. ,5, ,**,. #eris v. !udge Alumbres, A.#. 4o. ;0!/ **/-D55, 4ov. -D, ,**-.

8n ;eK &erogatory 4ews 8tems (harging (A !ustice &emetria, A.#. 4o. &ec. -5, ,**-. 3alderama v. !udge Alagar, A.#. 4o. ;0!/ 55/-665, !an. -?, ,**,.

In+Chamber Sessions; 0his (ourt cautioned against in/ chambers sessions with 1udges, but only when the other party and their counsel are not present. 8n the instant case, respondent !udge had been rather open with the parties as to his advise in entering a plea of guilty. 8t was not an offer clandestinely made.

Sanctionin* $ishonest& and $ef&in* $irecti,e of the Co rt; A 1udge is supposed to set the example for court personnel under his administrative supervision to follow. 7e cannot expect to be effective in his 1udicial and administrative duties if he himself acts contrary to the law and the established rules and orders of the $(. ;espondent 1udgeAs conduct in giving a court employee the protective mantle to falsify her official time records, the penalty for w2c is dismissal from the service, and signing the same, merits no less than the penalty of dismissal. #oreover, respondent 1udgeAs #emorandum authoriGing respondent employeeAs further stay in 3aguio (ity was issued in direct contravention of an official action and directive from the (ourt Administrator through whom the $( exercises administrative supervision over all lower courts and personnel thereof. Immoral Cond ct; ;espondentAs intimate relationship w2 a woman other than his wife shows his moral indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Improper Cond ct; 8t was improper for respondent 1udge to allow his wife to have access to court records in his sala. ;ecords of cases are necessarily confidential, and to preserve their integrity and confidentiality, access thereto ought to be limited only to the 1udge, the parties or their counsel and the appropriate personnel in charge of the custody thereof. Same; ;espondent, in removing the bamboo poles and fishing nets installed by complainant, acted in his private capacity. 4evertheless, w2o in any way pre1udging respondentAs liability, respondent should be admonished to be careful even in his private conduct because he is a model of the law/abiding citiGen and, for this reason, his private life cannot be completely separated from his public persona. Impropriet&; Presence in :ambling (asinos or (ockpits. !udges of inferior courts are en1oined from playing or being present in gambling casinos and2or going to cockpits and placing bets in cockfights H(ircular 4o. 6 issued on ,B August -5?*I. 0he fact that the cockpits where respondent used to go were licensed and the cockpits were conducted on authoriGed days will not absolve him. 'erily, it is plainly despicable to see a 1udge inside a cockpit and more so, to see him bet therein. #ixing w2 the crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors is unbecoming a 1udge and undoubtedly impairs the respect due him. >ltimately, the 1udiciary itself suffers therefrom because a 1udge is a visible representation of the 1udiciary. #ost often, the public mind does not separate the 1udge from the 1udiciary. Same; 0he 1udgeAs use of physical violence against a colleague reveals a marked lack of 1udicial temperament and self/restraint, traits not only desirable but indispensable for every 1udge to possess. besides the basic equipment of learning in the law. $uch behavior puts the 1udiciary in disrepute. 3y fighting w2in court premises, the parties have failed, not only to observe the proper decorum expected of members of the 1udiciary, they have failed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 1udiciary.

0he (ourt Administrator v. Abdullahi, A.#. 4o. P/ *,/-D+*, #arch ,*, ,**,.

Cr. $innott v. !udge 3arte, A.#. 4o. ;0!/ 55/-6D), &ec. -6, ,**-. :ordon v. Lilagan, A.#. 4o. ;0!/ **J-D+6, !uly ,+, ,**-.

3ernardo v. !udge 0iamson, A.#. 4o. ;0!/ **/-D+D, Aug. -+, ,**-.

(ity :overnment of 0agbilaran v. !udge 7ontanosas, A.#. 4o. #0!/5?/--+5, !an. ,5, ,**,.

!udge Alumbres v. !udge (aoibes, !r., A.#. 4o. ;0!/ 55/-6)-, !an. ,), ,**,.

5riber& 7 #ot Established2 An accusation of bribery is (o v. !udge easy to concoct and difficult to disprove, thus, to our mind, (alimag, the complainant must present a panoply of evidence in supra. support of such an accusation. 8nasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent 1udge connotes a misconduct so grave that, if proven, it would entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof required should be more than substantial.Q 8n the same case, we further declared that QMiNn order that the allegation of a charge of this nature may not be considered a fairy tale, evidence other than the doubtful and questionable verbal testimony of a lone witness should be adduced. (ross #e*lect of $ t&2 ;ule ).*D of (anon ) en1oins all 1udges to attend promptly to the business of the court and decide cases and its incidents within the time fixed by law. 0he failure of a 1udge to render the decision within the prescribed period of ninety H5*I days from submission of a case for decision constitutes serious misconduct, to the detriment of the honor and integrity of his office and in derogation of speedy administration of 1ustice. 8nability to decide a case within the required period is not excusable. it constitutes gross inefficiency. + @e cannot countenance undue delay, at a time when clogging of court dockets is still the bane of the 1udiciary. !udges are expected to observe utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their 1udicial functions and the discharge of their duties. 0he failure or inability of a 1udge to decide a case within the period fixed by law sub1ects him to administrative sanctions. (ra,e %iscond ct in Office; $efiance toward the S preme Co rt; 8t was not a matter of negligence, but a deliberate act of defiance of the $(As authority by a lower court 1udge. ;espondent 1udge persistently disregarded well/known legal rules in the designation of acting sheriffs. 3y such action, he repeatedly usurped the appointing authority of the $( w2c act amounts to grave misconduct in office. 8n this case, 0he $( tempered the severity of the recommended sanction considering the long service in the govAt. and the 1udiciary of respondent 1udge and his obedience to the order of the (ourt Administrator, thus, evincing remorse and repentance for his unauthoriGed acts. Corr ption in Office; ;eceiving bribe from both parties. @hile every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the 1udiciary. 7ence, 1udges are strictly mandated to abide with the law, the (ode of !udicial (onduct and with existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of our people in the administration of 1ustice. !udges must adhere to the highest tenets of 1udicial conduct. 0hey must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. A 1udgeEs conduct must be above reproach. Like (aesarEs wife, a 1udge must not only be pure but above suspicion. A 1udgeEs private as well as official conduct must at all times be free from all appearances of impropriety, and be beyond reproach. 7e received a bribe from both sides, Qlagaring haponQ. 7e has no place in the 1udiciary. 7e dishonored the 1udicial robe he wore. 7is acts could even be criminal in nature. @e have unhesitatingly removed from office 1udges and court $aylo v. !udge ;o1o, A.#. #0!/55/ -,,D, April -,, ,***.

Office of the (ourt Administrator v. !udge 'eneracion, A.#. ;0!/55/ -6),, !une ,-, ,***.

#agarang v. !dge !ardin, A.#. ;0!/55/ -66?, April +, ,***.

employees for less serious transgressions. %is se of Office; 0he reqmt. that a 1udge be above suspicion extends to the conduct of his private life. @hile respondent 1udge may argue that he did not protect his son from arrest, his actuation relative thereto must never serve to fuel suspicion over a misuse of the prestige of his office to enhance personal interest. 0apiru !udge supra. v. 3idin,

$ ties of 1 d*es RE Application for 5ail; (ross #arGan/ I*norance of the Law; Cailure of the 1udge to conduct the :elacio v. hearing reqd. prior to the grant of bail in capital offenses. !udge Clores, A.#. ;0!/55/ -6??, !une ,*, ,***. Same; Same; 0o be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the 1udge must be shown to have committed an error that was 9:;O$$ or PA0%40, &%L83%;A0% and #AL8(8O>$.= Sarate v. !udge 3alderian, A.#. #0!/**/ -,+-, April ), ,***. PP v. 0oledano, :; --*,,*, #ay -?, ,***.

(ra,e Ab se of $iscretion; ;espondent 1udge dismissed the information on the ground that the administrative case filed against private respondent w2 the Office of the Ombudsman had been dismissed. $aid dismissal amounts to grave abuse of discretion. Administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission. 3esides, the reliance made by respondent 1udge on the re/election of private respondent as "agawad in the #ay -55, election so as to warrant the dismissal of the information filed against him, citing Aguinaldo v. $antos is misplaced. 0he ruling in said case w2c forbids the removal from office of a public official fro administrative misconduct committed during a prior term does not apply to criminal cases pending against said public official. E-+Parte Proceedin*s; Oc lar Inspection; An ex-parte ocular inspection w2o notice to nor presence of the parties and after the case had already been decided was highly improper. 8f respondent 1udge entertained doubts that she wished to clarify after the trial had already terminated, she should have ordered muto proprio the reopening of the trial fort he purpose, w2 due notice to the parties, whose participation therein is essential to due process.
&isciplinary Procee/ dings

Adan v. !udge Abuce1o/ LuGano, A.#. 4o. #0!/**/ -,5?, Aug. ), ,***.

$isciplinar& Proceedin*s A*ainst Law&ers. #at re; 0hey are sui generis, in that they are neither civil nor criminal actions but rather investigations by the (ourt into the conduct of its officers. Although these proceedings are not, in the strict sense, ordinary actions where trials are held and the rules of procedure apply, the rules on evidence cannot be shunted aside considering that the exercise of oneAs profession is at stake. Same; Same; Actions against lawyers cannot be abated by the complainantAs w2drawal of charges or refusal to prosecute. Cailure to answer a complaint is not equivalent to an admission of the allegations therein. Same; 5 rden of Proof; 8n administrative cases against lawyers, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. (omplaints that are prima facie groundless as shown in the pleadings filed by the parties need not be referred to

(oncepcion v. Atty. Canfino, Adm. (ase 4o. )+BB, !une ,-, ,***.

&e %re v. ;ubi, A.(. 4o. D-B+, &ec. -6, -555. #anubay v. Atty. :arcia, Adm. (ase 4o. 6B**,

the 83P for further investigation and may be summarily dismissed for utter lack of merit. Same; $isbarment Proceedin*s; 8n complaints for disbarment, a formal investigation is a mandatory requirement except in such extreme situations as when respondent fails to appear at the hearing despite reasonable notice. ;elevant guidelines in disbarment casesK Q(omplaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the (ourt. 8f, at the outset, the (ourt finds a complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it outrightly dismisses the case. 8f, however, the (ourt deems it necessary that further inquiry should be made, such as when the matter could not be resolved by merely evaluating the pleadings submitted, a referral is made to the 83P for a formal investigation of the case during which the parties are accorded an opportunity to be heard. An ex parte investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails to appear despite reasonable notice. 0he applicable provisions are provided for in ;ule -)5/3 of the ;ules of (ourt. Same; Sanctions; 4either disbarment nor suspension should be imposed unless the case against a lawyer is free from doubt not only as to the acts but as to its motive. Same; Indefinite S spension from Law Practice2 0he indefiniteness of respondentEs suspension, far from being QcruelQ or QdegradingQ or QinhumanQ has the effect of placing, as it were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own hands. 0hat sanction has the effect of giving respondent the chance to purge himself in his own good time of his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from every member of the bar and officer of the courts. ;espondentAs suspension must deservingly be fixed at ten H-*I years. (onsequently, the same may only be lifted after the expiration of the said period, counted from the time when his suspension actually commenced. Same; Law&ers in (o,ernment Ser,ice; A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. 7owever, if the misconduct also constitutes violation of the (P; or the lawyerAs oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct. 3r certifying as true and correct the $o'As in question, respondent committed breach of ;ule -.*- of the (ode w2c stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. 3y express provision of (anon +, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. 8n addition, the lawyerAs oath to 9do no falsehood= was likewise violated. $isciplinar& Proceedin*s a*ainst 1 d*es; &isciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against 1udges do not complement, supplement, or substitute 1udicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. An inquiry into their civil, criminal and administrative liability may be made only

April ,***.

-,,

&e los $antos v. ;obiso, Admin (ase D-+D, &ec. -6, ,**-.

Osop v. Atty. Contanilla, ,**-. &umadag v. Atty. Lumaya, Adm. (ase 4o. ,+-6, !une ,5, ,***.

Pimentel v. llorente, Admin. (ase 4o. 6+?*, Aug. ,5, ,***.

(aguioa v. !udge LaviLa, A.#. 4o. ;0!/ **/-DD), 4ov. ,*, ,***.

after the available remedies have been exhausted and decided w2 finality, #oreover, a party litigant abuses the process of the court by prematurely resorting to administrative disciplinary action or criminal prosecution of a 1udge even before the 1udicial remedies are settled. Same; 1 dicial Remed& not Administrati,e; An administrative complaint against a 1udge cannot be pursued simultaneously w2 the 1udicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by an erroneous 1udgment. 0he administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor commulative to 1udicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof. Same; Administrati,e Cases; $ec. ), ;ule -B of the ;ules of (ourt provides that if the plaintiff fails to comply w2 any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the courtAs own motion, and the dismissal shall have the effect of an ad1udication on the merits, unless otherwise provided by the court. 0he (ourt has applied this rule in an administrative case against a 1udge where the complainant failed to appear and present evidence despite notice. 0he (ourt would like to put to task complainants who file administrative cases against members of the bench and later desist from pursuing them to their conclusion. !udges should be protected from frivolous complaints for they erode the administration of 1ustice. Same ; Forfeit re of Retirement 5enefits ; Corfeiture of retirement benefits and leave credits is sanctioned by ;ule R8' M&isciplineN of the Omnibus ;ules 8mplementing 3ook ' of %O ,5, HAdminstrative (ode of -5?BI and other pertinent (ivil $ervice laws. 8n a number of cases involving 1udges and court personnel, 07% (O>;0 7A$ $7O@4 (O#PA$$8O4 in imposing the penalty of forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits and disqualification for reemployment in :O((As. 0hese cases paved the way for the amendment of ;ule -6*, ;O(. 3efore its amendment, ;ule -6* only provided for the procedure in case a complaint was filed against a ;0( 1udge. 0here was no mention of specific sanctions that may be imposed. As Amended, ;ule -6* now provides for specific sanctions serving as basis for the (ourt to order the forfeiture of retirement benefits in whole or in part, depending on the circumstances of each case. Crani v. Pagayatan, supra. Cr. $innot v. !udge 3arte, supra. 'istan v. !udge Angeles, A.#. 4o. ;0!/*,/ -+B,, !an. )*, ,**,.

Atty. #eris v. !udge Ofilada, A.#. 4o. ;0!/ 5B/ -)5*, Oct. -B, ,**-.

Same; $eath or Retirement and Administrati,e (abaLero v. Liabilit&; 0he cassation from office of respondent 1udge !udge (aLon, due to death does not per se warrant the dismissal of the ,**-. administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service. Same; Same; 4either is the retirement of a 1udge from the service a bar to the finding of any administrative liability to w2c he shall still be answerable. Pagayao v. 8mbing, A.#. 4o. ?5/6*), Aug. -D, ,**-. Lilia v. !udge CanuLal, A.#. 4o. ;0!/55/ -D*), &ec. -), ,**-.