Paat vs.

CA GR # 111107 FACTS: On May 19, 1989, the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman, while on its way to Bulacan from an !ose, Ba""ao, #a"ayan, was seized $y the %&'( personnel in )ritao, 'ueva Vizcaya $ecause the driver could not produce the re*uired documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck+ ,etitioner !ovito -ayu"an, the #&'(O in )ritao, #a"ayan, issued on May ./, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and "ave the owner thereof 10 days within which to su$mit an e1planation why the truck should not $e forfeited+ ,rivate respondents, however, failed to su$mit the re*uired e1planation+ On !une .., 1989, (e"ional &1ecutive %irector (o"elio Ba""ayan of %&'( sustained petitioner -ayu"an2s action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck+ ,rivate respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated !une .8, 1989 which was, however, denied in a su$se*uent order of !uly 1., 1989+ u$se*uently, the case was $rou"ht $y the petitioners to the ecretary of %&'( pursuant to private respondents2 statement in their letter dated !une .8, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would $e denied then 3this letter should $e considered as an appeal to the ecretary+3 ,endin" resolution of the appeal, a suit for replevin was filed $y the private respondents a"ainst petitioner -ayu"an and &1ecutive %irector Ba""ayan with the (e"ional 4rial #ourt, Branch . of #a"ayan, orderin" the return of the truck to private respondents+ ,etitioner -ayu"an and &1ecutive %irector Ba""ayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contendin" that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to e1haust administrative remedies+ 4he trial court denied the motion to dismiss+ 4heir motion for reconsideration havin" $een likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed $y the petitioners with the respondent #ourt of )ppeals which sustained the trial court2s order rulin" that the *uestion involved is purely a le"al *uestion+ 5ence, this present petition, with prayer for temporary restrainin" order and6or preliminary in7unction, seekin" to reverse the decision of the respondent #ourt of )ppeals was filed $y the petitioners+ By virtue of the (esolution dated eptem$er .8, 199/, the prayer for the issuance of temporary restrainin" order of petitioners was "ranted $y this #ourt+ ISSUE: 9ithout violatin" the principle of e1haustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to recover a mova$le property which is the su$7ect matter of an administrative forfeiture proceedin":

HELD: 4his #ourt in a lon" line of cases has consistently held that $efore a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre;condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him+ 5ence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still $e resorted to $y "ivin" the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his 7urisdiction then such remedy should $e e1hausted first $efore court2s 7udicial power can $e sou"ht+ 4he premature invocation of court2s intervention is fatal to one2s cause of action+ )ccordin"ly, a$sent any findin" of waiver or estoppel the case is suscepti$le of dismissal for lack of cause of action+ 4his doctrine of e1haustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and le"al reasons, for one thin", availment of administrative remedy entails lesser e1penses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies+ <t is no less true to state that the courts of 7ustice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has $een completed and complied with so as to "ive the administrative a"ency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case+ 5owever, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of e1haustion of administrative remedies as tested $y a $attery of cases is not an ironclad rule+ 4his doctrine is a relative one and its fle1i$ility is called upon $y the peculiarity and uni*ueness of the factual and circumstantial settin"s of a case+ 5ence, it is disre"arded =1> when there is a violation of due process, =.> when the issue involved is purely a le"al *uestion, =/> when the administrative action is patently ille"al amountin" to lack or e1cess of 7urisdiction, =?> when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative a"ency concerned, =0> when there is irrepara$le in7ury, =@> when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter e"o of the ,resident $ears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, =8> when to re*uire e1haustion of administrative remedies would $e unreasona$le, =8> when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, =9>when the su$7ect matter is a private land in land case proceedin"s, =1A> when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and ade*uate remedy, and =11> when there are circumstances indicatin" the ur"ency of 7udicial intervention+ %&'( should $e "iven a free hand unpertur$ed $y 7udicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its 7urisdiction+ 4he assumption $y the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed $y private respondents constitutes an un7ustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative a"ency2s prero"ative+