My inspirations for writing this paper started after reading Beyond Katrina by Natasha Tretheway.

I wanted to commemorate the victims of Hurricane Katrina by pointing out where we went wrong as a society and how we could have avoided such a disaster. Olin Aleman Dr. Crowther English Comp 1101-H The Gulf Coast Disaster: A Breakdown of a Contingency Plan The United States has seen a fair share of natural disasters throughout history. With almost every natural disaster on the list that afflicts the nation, one of the most destructive and deadliest was Hurricane Katrina. In 2005 Hurricane Katrina hit the gulf coast and claimed the lives of over 1,800 lives and caused over 100 billion dollars in damages. Hurricane Katrina was one of the biggest hurricanes to hit the US in 2005. Although each state acted accordingly to plan in their respective region, what followed in the events that preceded the flood was that much of the damage was not as severe as was predicted. It was not until 24 hours later that the levees broke and real damage began to take place. With the sudden rise of the water level in New Orleans, the communication infrastructure became null. The result of the breakdown in communication affected any coordination within local and national agencies, as well as valid news reporting by all media. The calamity Hurricane Katrina caused became the most devastating example of a failed contingency plan. In light of known dangers, past and present, as well as planning capabilities this paper discusses the failure to act in the face of known risks and the failure to anticipate the devastation adequately. What first exacerbated the devastation, particularly in the New Orleans area, were the 53 levee breeches that lead to massive flooding throughout

the city inundating homes, businesses, and landmarks(Hurricane Katrina Effects by Region). In addition to the region of New Orleans being susceptible to hurricanes on an annual basis, the majority of the area is at or below sea level and is in a continual sinking in elevation due to an effect known as subsidence ; a phenomenon of erosion when wet soil compresses and lowers in elevation as it dries. (Below et al.). At present day New Orleans is, on average, six feet below sea level. This is a danger because water flows to areas of least resistance, e.g. lowest levels. Due to New Orleans proximity to the ocean and the Mississippi river, the city has long been susceptible to subsidence. The areas that are most susceptible to subsidence are at the base of the levees (Below et al.). Erosion is an ever increasing reality that threatens the integrity of human structures and other properties on a daily basis. The United States spends over half a billion dollars annually to retrofit, renovate, replace, and rebuild much of the aging infrastructure all due to the ever damaging effects of erosion (Boruff, Emrich, and Cutter). In the Gulf coast alone, the loss to structures and land loss costs the region approximately over 100 million dollars annually (Stephen V. Dunn 30; FEMA.gov | Federal Emergency Management Agency). Nevertheless, most of the infrastructure in this region is outdated or inadequate. The lack of funding received from taxes to properly mitigate the effects of erosion left the region vulnerable for the impending disaster. Furthermore city planners failed to prioritize funding to allocate resources to key infrastructure upgrades, and any projects towards infrastructure upgrades were put on hold nationwide(Boruff, Emrich, and Cutter). The neglect of crucial infrastructure is what lead to the numerous levee breeches and ultimately killing the residences of New Orleans.

Despite poor infrastructure, the United States does take various precautions to protect life and property in the event of an emergency. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was established in 1978 to coordinate the response to a disaster that overwhelms the resources of local and state authorities (FEMA.gov | Federal Emergency Management Agency). In addition to federal disaster relief agencies the federal government has set guidelines about disaster preparedness such as the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NRDF). The NRDF is a guide to promote effective recovery in the event of a large scale disaster. Mentioned in the paper The Disposable Class, creators of the NRDF specifically states that the needs of vulnerable populations must be taken into account, and no one must be left behind in planning for and responding to a disaster(Nassar-Hall). Vulnerable populations include prisoners, elderly, poor, undocumented families, and those with language barriers. Yet, the social landscape of the region adds to the lack of support systems and resources available to most of the residences in the Golf Coast and gives an additional level of risk for the population when a disaster occurs. In either event, of the people that were not evacuated the majority were the poor and elderly (Nassar-Hall). This region was lacking in multiple support systems. NDRF guidelines are merely suggestions that the community must be involved in the planning process. For example in the paper A Comparative Study of Laws, Rules, Codes and Other Influences on Nursing Homes Disaster Preparedness in the Gulf Coast States, it is mandated that employees require certain training in the event of a natural disaster (Brown, Hyer, and Polivka-West). NDRF becomes more specific in its guidelines for its Emergency Support Functions (ECF) which cover transportation, communication, and public safety and

security (Nassar-Hall). Although, when the levee broke any plans for transportation and communication were disarrayed. Communication is one of the prime reasons why state and local agencies could not adapt to this disaster. Communication breakdown of government agencies was an unspoken part of the system. Even in past disasters prior to Katrina the system had been declared a failure. However there was a breakdown in communication in local agencies to smaller nonprofit agencies as well To complicate things further, in a post 9/11 government FEMAs priorities were not geared towards natural disaster planning due to their new focus on the war on terror (McGuire and Schneck). Furthermore, in a post 9/11 era, FEMA had been absorbed by the Department of Homeland Security (pg3 McGuire). FEMA has ten regions that vary in culture, ethnicity, income level, and political climate. With the new focus on terrorist attack preparedness, regional administrators felt free to act independently. Conflict among managers within FEMA further exacerbated a communication breakdown between regions. (McGuire and Schneck 2) Communication breakdown also affected assistance and the import of supplies. This is supported in a paper highlighting the role of the National Guard (Meeds). Meeds illustrated the need for national, local, and state coordination using a national response as the first responders at the request of local authorities. However the National Guard (NG) Commander Lieutenant General Blum has stated in 2006 that the priority role of the NG is defense (Meeds pg7). Similar to FEMA, this is a conflict in priority between terrorist attacks and natural disaster preparedness. The media began reporting that help was coming, when in actuality no one was on their way. For example, the news piece Through Hell and High Water illustrates how a public hospital waited for four days for

FEMA to evacuate them when they never came. After four days the only help they received was from a privet hospital across the street (Cave). Natural disasters are a common occurrence throughout human history. The importance of preparing for a natural disaster is an intrinsic part of being a responsible and moral society. It requires foresight, experience and team work to realize a good plan in the event of an emergency. The first step in preparing for an emergency is being aware of its potential danger. Having the proper resources supports the actions necessary to save lives. Considering the economic standing of the United States there should have been more action to anticipate this known risk. When Katrina made landfall on the coast of Louisiana FEMA and local agencies made preparations for potential damage anticipating a hurricane disaster but, not so far as the flooding of New Orleans needed. Many residents of the Gulf Coast perished as a direct result of the inaction to prevent a potential flood and Hurricane Katrina will always be remembered for that. One could only hope we are able to remember this part in history as an important yet dark lesson for practical action and always realize the immense cost of not doing so. Bibliography: Below, Chris et al. Why New Orleans Is Vulnerable. Environmental Hazards Storm Surge Induced Flooding in New Orleans. N. p., 7 May 2006. Web. 22 Apr. 2014. Boruff, Bryan J., Christopher Emrich, and Susan L. Cutter. Erosion Hazard Vulnerability of US Coastal Counties. Journal of Coastal Research 215 (2005): 932942. CrossRef. Web. 14 Apr. 2014. Brown, Lisa M, Kathryn Hyer, and LuMarie Polivka-West. A Comparative Study of Laws, Rules, Codes and Other Influences on Nursing Homes Disaster

Preparedness in the Gulf Coast States. Behavioral sciences & the law 25.5 (2007): 655675. NCBI PubMed. Web. Cave, Mark. Through Hell and High Water: New Orleans, August 29 - September 15, 2005. The Oral history review 35.1 (2008): 110. Print. FEMA.gov | Federal Emergency Management Agency. N. p., n.d. Web. 19 Apr. 2014. Hurricane Katrina Effects by Region. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 24 Apr. 2014. Wikipedia. Web. 28 Apr. 2014. McGuire, Michael, and Debra Schneck. What If Hurricane Katrina Hit in 2020? Th E Need for Strategic Management of Disasters. Public Administration Review Dec. 2010 : 7. Print. Meeds, Heather K. Communication Challenges During Incidents of National Significance: A Lesson From Hurricane Katrina. N. p., 2006. Print. Mohr, C. L., and L. N. Powell. Through the Eye of Katrina: The Past as Prologue? An Introduction. Journal of American History 94.3 (2007): 693694. CrossRef. Web. 22 Apr. 2014. Nassar-Hall, Emilly. The Disposable Class: Ensuring Poverty Consciousness In Natural Disaster Preparedness. DePaul Journal for Social Justice Vol. 7.Issue 1 (2013): p55. Print. Stephen V. Dunn. Evaluation Of Erosion Hazards. US: The Heinze Company, 2000. Web. 10 Apr. 2014.