Moravcsik / Princeton University / 2010

LIBERAL THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A PRIMER Andrew Moravcsik1 This memo outlines the liberal approach to theorizing international relations. Like realism institutionalism or non!rational approaches it is a name given to a "amily o" relate# theories o" international relations. $ere it %ill not be use# as many use it in international relations to #esignate theories that stress the importance o" international institutions. &or to #esignate theories that stress the importance o" universal altruistic or utopian values o" a liberal sort such as human rights or #emocracy. &or to #esignate theories "avore# by le"t!%ing '(liberal)* political parties or policies in the U+. ,nstea# it is a theory that stresses the role o" the varie# social interests and values o" states an# their relevance "or %orl# politics. Liberals argue that the universal con#ition o" %orl# politics is globalization. +tates are an# al%ays have been embe##e# in a #omestic an# transnational society %hich creates incentives "or economic social an# cultural interaction across bor#ers. +tate policy may "acilitate or block such interactions. +ome #omestic groups may bene"it "rom or be harme# by such policies an# they pressure government accor#ingly "or policies that "acilitate realization o" their goals. These social pressures transmitte# through #omestic political institutions #e"ine -state pre"erences- .that is the set o" substantive social purposes that motivate "oreign policy. +tate pre"erences give governments an un#erlying stake in the international issues they "ace. +ince the #omestic an# transnational social conte/t in %hich states are embe##e# varies greatly across space an# time so #o state pre"erences. 0ithout such social concerns that transcen# state bor#ers states %oul# have no rational incentive to engage in %orl# politics at all but %oul# simply #evote their resources to an autarkic an# isolate# e/istence. To motivate con"lict cooperation or any other costly "oreign policy action states must possess su""iciently intense state pre"erences. The resulting globalization!in#uce# variation in social #eman#s an# thus state pre"erences is a "un#amental cause o" state behavior in %orl# politics. This is the central insight o" liberal international relations theory. ,t can be e/presse# collo1uially in various %ays2 ( What matters most is what states want, not how they get it. or- Ends are more important than means. Liberal theory is #istinctive in the nature o" the variables it privileges. The liberal "ocus on variation in socially!#etermine# state pre"erences #istinguishes liberal theory "rom other theoretical tra#itions2 realism '"ocusing on variation in coercive po%er resources* institutionalism '"ocusing on in"ormation* an# most non!rational approaches '"ocusing on
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3or more #etail inclu#ing citations an# re"erences see 4n#re% Moravcsik (- The &e% Liberalism - in 5hristian 6eus!+mit an# 7uncan +ni#al e#s. The Ox ord !andboo" o #nternational $elations '2008*9 -Taking Pre"erences +eriously2 4 Liberal Theory o" ,nternational Politics- #nternational Organization '4utumn 1::;*<9 Liberal ,nternational 6elations Theory2 4 +cienti"ic 4ssessmentin 5olin =lman an# Miriam 3en#ius =lman e#s. %rogress in #nternational $elations Theory& 'ppraising the (ield '5ambri#ge Mass.2 M,T Press 200>* 1?:!20@9 (,s 4nybo#y +till a 6ealistA- #nternational )ecurity '3all 1:::* '%ith Be""rey Legro*. 4ll are available at %%%.princeton.e#u/Camoravcs. The "ocus on variation in state pre"erences is consistent %ith some or all o" other scholarly %riting on ,6 theory. +ee "or e/ample 7avi# Lake an# 6obert Po%ell e#s. )trategic *hoice and #nternational $elations )trategic *hoice and #nternational $elations 'Princeton 1:::* 5hapter T%o9 6obert Deohane #nternational #nstitutions and )tate %ower& Essays in #nternational $elations Theory 'Eoul#er 1:::*.

patterns o" belie"s about appropriate means!en#s relationships*. ,n e/plaining patterns o" %ar "or e/ample liberals #o not look to inter!state imbalances o" po%er bargaining "ailure #ue to private in"ormation or uncertainty or particular non!rational belie"s or propensities o" in#ivi#ual lea#ers societies or organizations. Liberals look instea# to con"licting state pre"erences #erive# "rom hostile nationalist or political i#eologies #isputes over appropriable economic resources or e/ploitation o" unrepresente# political constituencies. 3or liberals a necessary con#ition "or %ar is that social pressures lea# one or more -aggressor- states to possess -revisionist- pre"erences so e/treme or risk!acceptant that other states are un%illing to submit. Three speci"ic variants o" liberal theory are #e"ine# by particular types o" pre"erences their variation an# their impact on state behavior. #deational liberal theories link state behavior to varie# conceptions o" #esirable "orms o" cultural political socioeconomic or#er. *ommercial liberal theories stress economic inter#epen#ence inclu#ing many variants o" -en#ogenous policy theory.- $epublican liberal theories stress the role o" #omestic representative institutions elites an# lea#ership #ynamics an# e/ecutive!legislative relations. +uch theories %ere "irst conceive# by prescient liberals such as ,mmanuel Dant 4#am +mith Bohn +tuart Mill Bohn $obson 0oo#ro% 0ilson an# Bohn Maynar# Deynes!%riting %ell be"ore the #eep causes 'in#epen#ent variables* they stress 'e.g. #emocratization in#ustrialization nationalism an# %el"are provision* %ere %i#esprea#. This essay intro#uces the liberal approach in three steps. ,t presents t%o #istinctive assumptions un#erlying an# #istinguishing liberal theories. Then it "urther e/plicates the three variants o" liberal theory that "ollo% "rom these assumptions. 3inally it revie%s some #istinctive strengths that liberal theories ten# to share vis!F!vis other types o" international relations theory. Two Unique Assumptions underlying Liberal Theory 0hat basic assumptions un#erlie the liberal approachA T%o assumptions liberal theory make are the assumptions o" anarchy an# rationality. +peci"ically states +or other political actors, exist in an anarchic environment an# they generally act in a broadly rational way in ma"ing decisions.2 The anarchy assumption means that political actors e/ist in the #istinctive environment o" international politics %ithout a %orl# government or any other authority %ith a monopoly on the legitimate use o" "orce. They must engage in sel"!help. The rationality assumption means that state lea#ers an# their #omestic supporters engage in "oreign policy "or the instrumental purpose o" securing bene"its provi#e# by 'or avoi#ing costs impose# by* actors outsi#e o" their bor#ers an# in making such calculations states seek to #eploy the most cost! e""ective means to achieve %hatever their en#s 'pre"erences* may be. Liberal theory shares the "irst 'anarchy* assumption %ith almost all international relations theories an# it shares the secon# 'rationality* assumption %ith realism an# institutionalism but not non!rationalist process theories. Liberal theories are #istinguishe# "rom other rationalist theories such as realism an# institutionalism by t%o uni1ue assumptions about %orl# politics2 '1* +tates represent social groups %hose vie%s constitute state pre"erences9 an# '2* ,nter#epen#ence among state pre"erences in"luences state policy. Let us consi#er each in turn. Assumption One: States Represent Societal Preferences
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This is not to assume that states are per"ectly rational calculating machines nor to claim that political contestation %ithin states is unimportant "or international a""airs. &or is it to assume that states have all relevant in"ormation at their #isposal. Liberals #o assume ho%ever that states are in a broa# sense instrumentally rational in "oreign policy!making.

The "irst assumption share# by liberal theories is that states represent some subset o domestic society, whose views constitute state pre erences . 3or liberals the state is a representative institution constantly subGect to capture an# recapture construction an# reconstruction by #omestic social coalitions. These social coalitions #e"ine state (pre"erences) in %orl# politics at any point in time2 the (tastes ) (en#s ) (basic interests ) or ("un#amental social purposes) that un#erlie "oreign policy. Political institutions constitute a critical (transmission belt) by %hich these interests o" in#ivi#uals an# groups in civil society enter the political realm. 4ll in#ivi#uals an# groups #o not %iel# e1ual in"luence over state policy. To the contrary their po%er varies %i#ely #epen#ing on the conte/t. Hariation in the precise nature o" representative institutions an# practices helps #e"ine %hich groups in"luence the (national interest.) +ome states may represent i#eal!typically the pre"erences o" a single tyrannical in#ivi#ual a Pol Pot or Bose" +talin9 others a""or# opportunities "or broa# #emocratic participation. Most lie in bet%een. The precise pre"erences o" social groups %eighte# by their #omestic po%er shape the un#erlying goals '(state pre"erences)* that states pursue in %orl# politics. +ometimes non!governmental organizations '&IJs* an# other actors may "orm transnational alliances to assist social "orces. (+tate!society relations)Kthe relationship bet%een a state an# its #omestic 'an# transnational* society in %hich it is embe##e#Klies at the center o" liberal theory. >
Liberals believe that state pre"erences cannot be re#uce# to some simple metric or pre"erence or#ering such as seeking (security) or (%ealth). Most mo#ern states are not +partan2 They compromise security or sovereignty in or#er to achieve other en#s or in#ee# Gust to save money. &or #o mo#ern states uni"ormly seek (%ealth.) ,nstea# they strike rather strike comple/ an# varie# tra#e! o""s among economic social an# political goals. &or "inally #o they seek (po%er) in the sense o" (#omination)2 Many countries %oul# clearly rather spen# money on (butter) rather than (guns.) To see ho% conse1uential the variation in goals can be one nee# look no "urther than the implications "or international relations o" IermanyLs evolution "rom 4#ol" $itlerLs pre"erence "or militant nationalism "ascist rule autarky an# ruthless e/ploitation o" Ierman -ebensraum un#er .as .ritte $eich to the social compromise un#erlying the post%ar /undesrepubli" .eutschland %hich "avore# capitalist #emocracy e/pan#ing Ierman e/ports an# peace"ul reuni"ication. +imilarly one can look at the striking change in policy bet%een Maoist an# post!Maoist 5hina +oviet an# post!+oviet 6ussia ,mperial an# post!,mperial Bapan an# so on.

Assumption Two: nterdependence among State Preferences nfluences State !eha"ior The secon# core assumption share# by liberal theories is that the interdependence among o state pre erences in luences state behavior. 6ather than treating pre"erences as a "i/e# constant as #o realists or institutionalists liberals seek to e/plain variation in pre"erences an# its signi"icance "or %orl# politics. The precise #istribution an# nature o" the (stakes) e/plains #i""erences in state policy an# behavior. +tates liberals argue orient their behavior to the precise nature o" these un#erlying pre"erences2 compatible or con"lictual intense or %eak an# their precise scope. +tates re1uire a (social purpose) K a perceive# un#erlying stake in the matter at han# K in or#er to pay any attention to international a""airs let alone to provoke con"lict inaugurate cooperation or take any other signi"icant "oreign policy action. ," there is no such inter#epen#ence among state obGectives a rational state %ill con#uct no international relations satis"ying itsel" %ith an isolate# an# autarkic e/istence. 5on"lictual goals increase the incentive "or o" political #isputes. 5onvergence o" un#erlying pre"erences creates the precon#itions "or peace"ul coe/istence or cooperation.
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&ote that "or liberals the key term (pre"erences) or (un#erlying interests) #esignates as it #oes in economics vie%s about the ultimate substantive outcomes o" policy rather than imme#iate instrumental obGectives that may vary %ith the tactical or strategic setting. Ey (pre"erences) liberals mean un#erlying (pre"erences over outcomes) 'e.g. sectoral or national prosperity peace national unity or a cleaner environment* not (pre"erences over strategies or tactics) 'e.g. #eterring an attack balancing a rival or constructing an e""icient international institution*. The latter are (policies ) (strategies) or (tactics.)

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The critical theoretical link bet%een state pre"erences on the one han# an# state behavior on the other is the concept o" policy inter#epen#ence. Policy inter#epen#ence re"ers to the #istribution an# interaction o" pre"erencesKthat is the e/tent to %hich the pursuit o" state pre"erences necessarily imposes costs an# bene"its 'kno%n as policy externalities* upon other states in#epen#ent o" the -transaction costs- impose# by the speci"ic strategic means chosen to obtain them. 7epen#ing on the un#erlying pattern o" inter#epen#ence each o" the 1ualitative categories above the "orm substance an# #epth o" con"lict an# cooperation vary accor#ing to the precise nature an# intensity o" pre"erences.

The e/istence o" some measure o" #ivergent "un#amental belie"s scarcity o" material goo#s an# ine1ualities in #omestic political po%er among states an# social actors ren#ers inevitable some measure o" pluralism an# competition among an# %ithin states. Unlike realists such as 0altz an# Morgenthau liberals #o not assume these #ivergent interests are uni"ormly zero!sum. 4t the same time liberals reGect the utopian notion 'o"ten attribute# to them by realists* o" an automatic harmony o" interest among in#ivi#uals an# groups in international society. &or #o liberals argue as realists like Morgenthau charge believe that each state pursues an i#eal goal oblivious o" %hat other states #o. Liberals argue instea# that each state seeks to realize #istinct pre"erences or interests un#er constraints impose# by the #i""erent interests o" other states. @ This #istribution o" pre"erences varies consi#erably. 3or liberals this variationKnot realism<s #istribution o" capabilities or institutionalism<s #istribution o" in"ormationKis o" #ecisive causal importance in e/plaining state behavior. 4 "e% e/amples illustrate ho% liberal theories #i""er "rom realist institutionalist or non! rational ones. 0e have alrea#y encountere# the e/ample o" %ar in the intro#uction in %hich liberals stress states %ith aggressive pre"erences rather than imbalances o" po%er incomplete in"ormation or non!rational belie"s an# processes. 4nother illustration is tra#e policy. =conomists %i#ely agree that "ree tra#e is superior %el"are!improving policy choice "or states yet tra#e protection is o"ten practice#. To e/plain protectionism liberals look to #omestic social pre"erences. 4n important "actor in almost all countries is the competitive position o" a""ecte# economic sectors in global markets %hich generates #omestic an# transnational #istributional e""ects2 Protectionism is generally backe# by pro#ucers %ho are globally uncompetitive9 "ree tra#e by pro#ucers %ho are globally competitive. Moreover even i" the state is a net bene"iciary "rom "ree tra#e #omestic a#Gustment costs may be too high to tolerate politically or may en#anger other countervailing #omestic social obGectives such as #omestic social e1uality or environmental 1uality. 5ertain #omestic political institutions such as non!parliamentary legislative systems %hich governe# U+ tra#e policy be"ore 1:>@ grant #isproportionate po%er to protectionist interests. This #i""ers "rom realist e/planations o" tra#e protectionism %hich ten# to stress the role o" (hegemonic po%er) in structuring tra#e liberalization or the nee# to #e"en# sel"!su""icient national security %ithin the prevailing zero!sum geopolitical competition perhaps by maintaining sel"!su""iciency or by ai#ing allies at the e/pense o" purely economic obGectives. ,nstitutionalists might cite the absence o" appropriate international institutions or other means to manage the comple/ in"ormational tasks an# collective action problemsKnegotiation #ispute resolution en"orcementKre1uire# to manage "ree tra#e. Those %ho "ocus on non!rational theories 'psychological cultural organizational epistemic perceptual or bureaucratic* might stress an
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Liberalism is not a (#omestic politics) theory that ignores the (international system.) ,t is a (systemic) theory as Denneth 0altz #escribes one in Theory o #nternational %olitics. Eut it simply treats the #istribution o" interests as an important systemic element Gust as realism stresses the #istribution o" coercive po%er an# regime theory stresses the #istribution o" in"ormation.

i#eological #isposition to accept (mercantilist) theory share# historical analogies an# the psychological pre#isposition to avoi# losses. To "urther illustrate the importance o" patterns o" policy inter#epen#ence consi#er the "ollo%ing three circumstances2 zero!sum harmonious an# mi/e# pre"erences. ,n the case o" zero0 sum pre"erences attempts by #ominant social groups in one state to realize their pre"erences through international action may necessarily impose costs on #ominant social groups in other countries. This is a case o" (zero!sum) pre"erences similar to the (realist) %orl#. Iovernments "ace a bargaining game %ith "e% mutual gains an# a high potential "or interstate tension an# con"lict. Many ancient cities an# states inclu#ing those o" 4ncient 4thens o"ten impose# imperial tribute on #e"eate# neighbors or in e/tremis kille# the male population cast %omen an# chil#ren into slavery an# repopulate# the to%n %ith their o%n citizensKa situation appro/imating zero!sum con"lict. To#ay it might still be argue# that there are certain casesK tra#e in agricultural goo#s by in#ustrial #emocracies "or e/ampleK%here entrenche# national interests are so strong that no government seriously consi#ers embracing "ree tra#e. ,n the case o" harmonious pre"erences %here the e/ternalities o" unilateral policies are optimal 'or insigni"icant* "or others there are strong incentives "or 1uiet coe/istence %ith lo% con"lict an# 'at most* simple "orms o" interstate coor#ination. 3or e/ample a#vance# in#ustrial #emocracies to#ay no longer contemplate %aging %ar on one another an# in some areas governments have agree# to mutual recognition o" certain legal stan#ar#s %ithout controversy. Jne case o" mixed pre"erences is bargaining %here states can achieve common gains 'or avoi# common losses as %ith a %ar* i" they agree to coor#inate their behavior but may #isagree strongly on the #istribution o" bene"its or a#Gustment costs. Un#er such circumstances one o" the most important #eterminants o" bargaining po%er is the intensity o" the pre"erences o" each party9 the more intense their pre"erence "or a bene"icial settlement the more likely they are to make concessions 'or employ coercive means* in or#er to achieve it. 4nother situation o" mi/e# motives is a situation %here interstate coor#ination can avoi# signi"icant risks an# costs as in agreement to avoi# naval inci#ents at sea or to share in"ormation on in"ectious #iseases. ,n such situations institutional pre!commitments an# the provision o" greater in"ormation can o"ten improve the %el"are o" all parties. Liberals #erive several #istinctive conceptions o" po%er very #i""erent "rom that o" realism. Jne "orm o" international in"luence "or liberals stems "rom the inter#epen#ence among pre"erences that Deohane an# &ye '%ower and #nterdependence, call (asymmetrical inter#epen#ence.) 4ll other things e1ual the more inter#epen#ent a state is the more intense its pre"erence "or a given outcome the more po%er others potentially have over it9 %hile the less a state %ants something the less a state cares about outcomes the less intense its pre"erences the less po%er others have over it. +ituations o" asymmetrical inter#epen#ence %here one state has more intense pre"erence "or an agreement than another create bargaining po%er. ,n tra#e negotiations "or e/ample smaller an# poorer countries are o"ten more #epen#ent on tra#e an# thus bene"it more "rom "ree tra#e an# thus ten# to have a %eaker position an# make more concessions in the course o" negotiations. =nlargement o" the =uropean Union is a recent instance. 6elative pre"erence intensity can also in"luence the outcome o" %ar but in a #i""erent %ay. &ations are in "act rarely prepare# to mortgage their entire economy or military in con"lict so their po%er #epen#s not on their coercive po%er resources but on their resolve or %ill. This is %hy smaller states o"ten prevail over larger ones. Hietnam "or e/ample #i# not prevail over the U+ in the Hietnam 0ar because it possesse# more coercive po%er resources but because it ha# a more intense pre"erence at stake.

#rom Assumptions to Theories Taken by themselves these liberal assumptionsKthe international system is anarchic states are rational social pressures #e"ine state pre"erences inter#epen#ence among pre"erences #ictates state behaviorKare thin. They e/clu#e most e/isting realist institutionalist an# non! rational theories but they #o not taken by themselves #e"ine very precisely the positive content o" liberal theory. +ome might rightly complain that simply pointing to state pre"erences opens up an unmanageably %i#e range o" hypothetical social in"luences on policy. Met in practice research has sho%n that in practice the range o" viable liberal theories that test out empirically are relatively "e% "ocuse# an# po%er"ul. Three broa# variants or categories o" liberal theory e/ist2 ideational, commercial, and republican liberalism. 4t the core o" each lies a #istinct conception o" the social pressures an# representative institutions that #e"ine state pre"erences an# the conse1uences "or state behavior. +ome o" these have proven empirically to be among the most po%er"ul theories in international relations. Let us consi#er each in turn. deational Liberalism: State Preferences !ased on $omestic Social %alues and dentities ,#eational liberalism vie%s domestic social identities and values as basic #eterminants o" state pre"erences. 7ra%ing on a liberal tra#ition o" political philosophy #ating back to Bohn +tuart Mill Iiuseppe Mazzini 0oo#ro% 0ilson an# Bohn Maynar# Deyes liberals #e"ines social values as the set o" pre"erences hel# by various in#ivi#uals an# groups in society concerning the proper scope an# nature o" legitimate state obGectives. ,n particular nations an# groups %ithin nations #i""er in their conceptions o" %hat a legitimate #omestic or#er isKthat is their conception o" %hich social actors belong to the polity an# %hat is o%e# them. Thus "or liberals en#s that may appear universalKsuch as the #e"ense o" political sovereignty an# national securityKare not necessarily en#s in themselves but are Gusti"ie# only inso"ar as they are means to realize the speci"ic un#erlying pre"erences o" social actors concerning (legitimate social or#er.) +ome states such as aggressive states like $itler<s Iermany %illing place security an# sovereignty at risk in or#er to achieve con1uest. Jther states may place security at risk to maintain peace or prosperity. &one o" these choices are necessarily (irrational)9 they simply involve varying sets o" social pre"erences. 3oreign policy in the i#eational liberal vie% is an e""ort to realize these vie%s #omestically. +ocial actors provi#e support to the government in e/change "or institutions that accor# %ith their i#entity!base# pre"erences an# are there"ore #eeme# (legitimate). +imilarly actors %ill sometimes a#vocate "oreign policies that subvert the e/isting #omestic social or#er. Jn the liberal vie% the e""ect o" conceptions o" social legitimacy on state behavior #epen#s on patterns o" inter#epen#ence among these i#ealsKin other %or#s on the transnational e/ternalities create# "or others by attempts to realize those pre"erences in one place. Liberal theories pre#ict that %here national conceptions o" legitimate bor#ers political institutions an# socioeconomic e1uality are compatible generating positive or negligible e/ternalities peace"ul coe/istence is likely. 0here social i#entities are incompatible an# create signi"icant negative e/ternalitiesKas %hen one state vie%s the promotion o" its legitimate bor#ers political institutions an# socioeconomic stan#ar#s as re1uiring aggression or #eman#s vis010vis another stateKtension an# zero!sum con"lict is more likely. 0here national claims can be ma#e more compatible through reciprocal policy a#Gustment e""orts to cooperate e/plicitly through international institutions are more likely.

+ome social pre"erences about a legitimate social or#er are particularly important such as those pertaining to the proper location o" national bor#ers the nature o" political institutions an# the scope o" socioeconomic regulation. 2ational #dentity& Jne basic type o" social i#entity concerns the scope o" the (nation)2 speci"ically the legitimate location o" national bor#ers an# the allocation o" citizenship rights. 0here bor#ers coinci#e %ith un#erlying patterns o" i#entity coe/istence an# even mutual recognition are more likely but %here there are inconsistencies bet%een bor#ers an# un#erling patterns o" i#entityKas there have been in the Ealkans "or over 100 years in central =urope in the mi#!1:th century an# in many places in the %orl# to#ayKgreater potential "or interstate con"lict e/ists. Jver the last century an# a hal" "rom mi#!nineteenth century nationalist uprisings to late t%entieth!century national liberation struggles the #esire "or national autonomy constitutes the most common issue over %hich %ars have been "ought an# great po%er intervention has taken place. The Ealkan con"licts prece#ing 0orl# 0ar , an# in the "ormer Mugoslavia a"ter the en# o" the 5ol# 0ar are notorious e/amples. &ot by chance is scenario planning "or 5hina/Unite# +tates con"lict "ocuse# almost e/clusively on Tai%anKthe one Guris#iction %here bor#ers an# national i#entity 'as %ell as political i#eology* are subGect to competing claims . %olitical #deology& The secon# basic type o" social i#entity stems "rom in#ivi#uals an# group commitments to particular "orms o" political institutions. 0here the realization o" legitimate #omestic political institutions in one Guris#iction threatens its realization in others 'negative e/ternalities* con"lict is more likely. 3rom 4ncient Ireece %here oligarchic an# #emocratic "actions in city!states use# "oreign policy to #e"en# an# a#vance their pre"erre# "orm o" government to the 3rench 6evolution an# nineteenth!century 5oncert o" =urope %here monarchies use# international cooperation to 1uash #emocratic an# nationalist revolution to the +econ# 0orl# 0ar %here #emocracies an# communists "ought "ascists to the 5ol# 0ar %hen the Unite# +tates an# the +oviet Union %ere motivate# by #ivergent political i#eologies #isputes over political i#eology have "uele# international con"lict. )ocioeconomic $egulation& The thir# basic type o" social i#entity relevant "or %orl# politics stems "rom belie"s about legitimate socioeconomic regulation an# re#istribution. Mo#ern liberal theories 'in contrast to the laissez aire libertarianism sometimes labele# as 1uintessentially (liberal)* have long recognize# that societal pre"erences concerning the appropriate nature an# level o" regulation impose legitimate limits on transnational markets. 7omestic an# international markets are embe##e# in local social compromises concerning the provision o" regulatory public goo#s. The e/tent to %hich countries can cooperate to liberalize markets "or e/ample #epen#s on the level o" con"lict or convergence o" vie%s about immigration social %el"are ta/ation religious "ree#om "amilies health an# sa"ety environmental an# consumer protection cultural promotion an# many other #omestic public goo#s. These issues have increasingly been the subGects o" international economic negotiations. 0e o"ten see o## #omestic coalitions ma#e up o" i#ealists an# materialistsKso!calle# (Eaptist! bootlegger) coalitions %here those %ho "avor regulation "or public spirite# reasons '(Eaptists)* ally %ith those %ho bene"it in a material sense '(bootleggers)*Karoun# international economic issues. 3or e/ample %e sometimes observe unions uncompetitive business an# environmentalists all supporting tra#e protectionK"or 1uite #i""erent reasons. &ommercial Liberalism: State Preferences !ased on 'conomic nterests 5ommercial liberal theories seek to e/plain the international behavior o" states base# on the #omestic an# global market position o" #omestic "irms %orkers an# o%ners o" assets.

5ommercial liberal theory posits that changes in the structure o" the #omestic an# global economy alter the costs an# bene"its o" transnational economic e/change thus creating pressure on #omestic governments to "acilitate or block such e/changes through appropriate "oreign economic an# security policies.
5ommercial liberal theory #oes not pre#ict that economic incentives automatically generate universal "ree tra#e an# peace but "ocuses instea# on the interplay bet%een aggregate incentives an# #istributional conse1uences. The greater the economic bene"its "or po%er"ul private actors the greater their incentive all other things e1ual to press governments to "acilitate such transactions9 the more costly the a#Gustment impose# by the propose# economic e/changes the more opposition is likely to arise. 4s 7ani 6o#rik has argue# contemporary tra#e liberalization generates #omestic #istributional shi"ts totaling many times aggregate %el"are bene"its. Losers generally ten# to be better i#enti"ie# an# organize# than bene"iciaries. 4 maGor source o" protection liberals pre#ict lies in uncompetitive un #iversi"ie# an# monopolistic sectors or "actors o" pro#uction. Their pressure in#uces a systematic #ivergence "rom laissez!"aire policies!a ten#ency recognize# by 4#am +mith %ho "amously complaine# o" mercantilism that -the contrivers o" this %hole mercantile system OareP the pro#ucers %hose interest has been so care"ully atten#e# to.) This commercial liberal approach to analyzing con"lict over "oreign economic policy is #istinct "rom those o" realism 'emphasizing security concerns an# relative po%er* institutionalism 'in"ormational an# institutional constraints on optimal interstate collective action* an# constructivism 'belie"s about -"ree tra#e-*. =/tensive research supports the vie% that "ree tra#e is most likely %here strong competitiveness e/tensive intra!in#ustry tra#e or tra#e in interme#iate goo#s large "oreign investments an# lo% asset speci"icity internalize the net bene"its o" "ree tra#e to po%er"ul actors re#ucing the in"luence o" net losers "rom liberalization. +imilar arguments can be use# to analyze issues such as sovereign #ebt e/change rate policy agricultural tra#e policy =uropean integration "oreign #irect investment ta/ policy an# migration policy. The e""ect o" economic inter#epen#ence on security a""airs varies %ith market incentives. 4 simple starting point is that the collateral #amage o" %ar #isrupts economic activity2 the more vulnerable an# e/tensive such activity the greater the cost. 4 more sophisticate# cost!bene"it calculation %oul# take into account the potential economic costs an# bene"its o" %ar. 0here monopolies sanctions slavery plun#er o" natural resources an# other "orms o" coercive e/traction backe# by state po%er are cost! e""ective means o" elite %ealth accumulation!as %as true "or most o" human history!%e shoul# e/pect to see a positive relationship bet%een transnational economic activity an# %ar. 0here conversely private tra#e an# investment %ithin comple/ an# %ell!establishe# transnational markets provi#e a less costly means o" accumulating %ealth an# one that cannot be cost!e""ectively appropriate#!as is most strikingly the case %ithin mo#ern multinational investment an# pro#uction net%orks!the e/pansion o" economic opportunities %ill have a paci"ic e""ect. 4long %ith the sprea# o" #emocracy an# relative absence o" nationalist con"lict this #istinguishes the current era "rom the perio# be"ore the 3irst 0orl# 0ar %hen high levels o" inter#epen#ence "amously "aile# to #eter %ar. 0e see in current 0estern relations %ith 5hina a very #eliberate strategy to encourage the slo% evolution o" social pre"erences in a paci"ic #irection by encouraging tra#e. =ric Iartzke has recently argue# that the -#emocratic peace- phenomenon can largely be e/plaine# in terms o" a lack o" economic an# other motives "or %ar. =ven among #evelope# economies ho%ever circumstances may arise %here governments employ coercive means to protect international markets. This may take varie# "orms as occurre# un#er nineteenth!century empires or %ith pressure "rom business "or the Unite# +tates to enter the 3irst 0orl# 0ar to #e"en# tra#e %ith the allies.

Republican Liberalism: State Preferences !ased on Systems of $omestic Representation

4 "inal source o" state pre"erences is the structure o" #omestic political representation. 0hile i#eational an# commercial theories stress respectively particular patterns o" un#erlying societal i#entities an# interests relate# to globalization republican liberal theory emphasizes the %ays in %hich #omestic institutions an# practices aggregate an# transmit such pressures trans"orming them into state policy. The key variable in republican liberalism %hich #ates back to the theories o" Dant 0ilson an# others is the nature o" #omestic political representation %hich helps #etermine whose social pre"erences #ominate state policyKthereby #e"ining the (national interest). 4 simple conse1uence is that policy ten#s to be biase# in "avor o" the governing coalitions or po%er"ul #omestic groups "avore# by representative institutionsK%hether those groups are a#ministrators 'rulers armies or bureaucracies* or societal groups that -capture- the state. 5osts an# risks are passe# on to others. 0hen particular groups %ith outlier pre"erences are able to "ormulate policy %ithout provi#ing gains "or society as a %hole the result is likely to be ine""icient an# suboptimal policy "or the policy as a %hole. To the e/tent that most in#ivi#uals an# groups in society ten# generally to be risk averse the broa#er the range o" represente# groups the less likely it is that they %ill support in#iscriminate use o" policy instruments like %ar or autarky that impose large net costs or risks on society as a %hole. 7emocracies ten# to be choosy about the %ars they enter2 +electing lo%er cost %ar not provoking great!po%er %ar an# "ighting to %in. 6epublican liberal theory thereby helps to e/plain phenomena as #iverse as the -#emocratic peace - mo#ern imperialism an# international tra#e an# monetary cooperation. Iiven the plausibility o" the assumption that maGor %ar imposes net costs on society as a %hole it is har#ly surprising that the most prominent republican liberal argument concerns the -#emocratic peace2L %hich one scholar has terme# -as close as anything %e have to an empirical la% in international relations- .one that applies to tribal societies as %ell as mo#ern states. 3rom a liberal perspective the theoretical interest in the -#emocratic peace- lies not in the greater transparency o" #emocracies 'a claim about in"ormation* the greater military po%er o" #emocracies 'a realist claim* or norms appropriate behavior 'a constructivist claim* but the #istinctive pre"erences o" #emocracies. This is not o" course to imply that broa# #omestic representation necessarily generates international cooperation. ,n speci"ic cases elite pre"erences in multiple states may be more convergent than popular ones. Moreover the e/tent o" bias in representation not #emocracy per se is the theoretically critical point. There e/ist con#itions un#er %hich speci"ic governing elites may have an incentive to represent long!term social pre"erences in a %ay that is less biase#!"or e/ample %hen they #ampen nationalist sentiment as may be the case in some #emocratizing regimes or e/clu#e po%er"ul outlier special interests as is commonly the case in tra#e policy. The theoretical obverse o" -#emocratic peace- theory is a republican liberal theory o" %ar %hich stresses risk !acceptant lea#ers an# rent !seeking coalitions. There is substantial historical evi#ence that the aggressors %ho have provoke# mo#ern great!po%er %ars ten# either to be e/tremely risk!acceptant in#ivi#uals or in#ivi#uals %ell able to insulate themselves "rom the costs o" %ar or both. Back +ny#er "or e/ample has re"urbishe# $obsonLs classic le"t!liberal analysis o" imperialism!in %hich the military uncompetitive "oreign investors an# tra#ers Gingoistic political elites an# others %ho bene"it "rom imperialism are particularly %ell place# to in"luence policy!by linking unrepresentative an# e/treme outcomes to log!rolling coalitions. 5onsistent %ith this analysis the highly unrepresentative conse1uences o" partial #emocratization combine# %ith the #isruption o" rapi# in#ustrialization an# incomplete political socialization suggest that #emocratizing states i" subGect to these in"luences may be particularly %ar!prone. This o""ers one ans%er to the para#o/ pose# by Bames 3earon!namely %hy rational states %oul# ever enter into %ar rather than negotiate their %ay out. Parallels to the -#emocratic peace- e/ist in political economy. 0e have seen that illiberal commercial policies!tra#e protection monetary instability an# sectoral subsi#ization that may mani"estly un#ermine the general %el"are o" the population!re"lect pressure "rom po%er"ul #omestic

groups. ,n part this po%er results "rom biases %ithin representative institutions such as the po%er o" money in electoral systems the absence or presence o" insulate# institutions. 5onsi#er the e/ample o" international tra#e. 4s %e sa% in the prece#ing section perhaps the most %i#esprea# e/planation "or the persistence o" illiberal commercial policies such as protection monetary instability an# sectoral subsi#ization that may mani"estly un#ermine the general %el"are o" the population is pressure "rom po%er"ul #omestic groups. The po%er o" such groups is o"ten e/acerbate# by biases %ithin representative institutions. 0here the latter sort o" biases e/istKan# it is seen in most contemporary representative institutionsKspecial interest groups are likely to gain protection through tari""s subsi#ies "avorable regulation or competitive #evaluation. 0here policy makers are insulate# "rom such pressures %hich may involve less #emocraticKsuch as ("ast track) provisions e/ecutive agreements an# the Unite# +tates Tra#e 6epresentativeKopen policies are more viable. ,ronically in such cases less (#emocratic) institutions in the sense o" less (populist) an# (participatory) institutions may in "act be more representative o" society as a %hole.

The Scope of the Liberal Perspecti"e 0e have seen that liberal theory is a coherent "amily o" i#eational commercial an# republican theories that share common assumptions about international relations. +uch theories e/plain not only cooperation among liberal states but pertain to liberal an# non!liberal polities con"lictual an# cooperative situations security an# political economy issues an# both in#ivi#ual "oreign policy an# aggregate behavior. +uch theories challenge the conventional presumption that realism is the simplest most encompassing an# most po%er"ul o" maGor ,6 theories. 4lthough not all liberal theories are easy to speci"y hypotheses about en#ogenous tari"" setting the #emocratic peace an# nationalist con"lict suggest that liberalism generates many empirical arguments as po%er"ul an# parsimonious as those o" realism. 4t "irst glance some may obGect that the claim that state pre"erences or interests matterKthat is %hat states %ant shapes %hat they #oKis trivial. Met in "act the liberal approach is #istinctively #i""erent than other %i#ely a#vocate# "amilies o" theories %hich stress instea# the #istribution o" coercive po%er in"ormation cultural belie"s an# other characteristics o" states. Jthers may "eel that stressing pre"erences may lea# to an impossibly broa# an# vague approach because thousan#s o" "actors might a""ect the social #eman#s place# on a mo#ern state. ,n practice ho%ever speci"ic liberal theories turn out to be not Gust po%er"ul but precise an# "ocuse# as %ell. 3i"ty years ago Morgenthau launche# the mo#ern post!%ar "iel# o" international relations by proclaiming that international relations theory shoul# avoi# (t%o popular "allaciesQthe concern %ith motivesQan# the concern %ith i#eological pre"erences.) Liberalism seeks to theorize motives i#eologies an# pre"erencesKan# the empirical #ata sho%s that it has #one so success"ully. Theories base# on the liberal approach can e/plain moreover a number o" phenomena "or %hich realist institutionalist an# non!rational theories o" international relations approaches lack a persuasive account. 3irst the liberal approach provides a plausible theoretical explanation or variation in the substantive content o oreign policy. &either realism nor institutionalism e/plains the changing substantive goals an# purposes over %hich states con"lict an# cooperate. Eoth "ocus instea# on "ormal causes such as relative po%er issue #ensity or the #istribution o" in"ormation Kan# on "ormal conse1uences such as con"lict an# cooperation per se. Ey contrast liberal theories provi#e a plausible e/planation not Gust "or con"lict an# cooperation but "or the substantive content o" "oreign policy. Liberal ,6 theory o""ers plausible parsimonious hypotheses to e/plain things like the #i""erence bet%een 4nglo!4merican &azi an# +oviet plans "or the

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post.0orl# 0ar ,, %orl#9 U.+. concern about a "e% &orth Dorean ,ra1i or 5hinese nuclear %eapons rather than the greater arsenals hel# by Ireat Eritain ,srael an# 3rance9 the substantial #i""erences bet%een %ithin the Eretton 0oo#s compromise o" RRembe##e# liberalism<< an# the perio# o" ("ree tra#e imperialism) that prece#e# it #ivergences bet%een economic cooperation un#er the =5 an# &43T4 an# many other cases. +imilarly liberalism makes more sense o" the su##en reversal o" =ast.0est relations a shi"t ma#e possible by the %i#esprea# vie% among 6ussian o""icials 'so intervie% #ata reveal* that Iermany %as at once ethnically satis"ie# politically #emocratic an# commercially incline#. +econ# the liberal approach o ers a plausible explanation or historical change in the international system. The static 1uality o" both realist an# institutionalist theories an# their lack o" persuasive e/planations "or "un#amental long!term change in the nature o" international politics are recognize# %eaknesses. Ilobal economic #evelopment over the past "ive hun#re# years has been closely relate# to greater per capita %ealth #emocratization e#ucation systems that rein"orce ne% collective i#entities an# greater incentives "or trans!bor#er economic transactions. 6ealist theory accor#s such shi"ts no theoretical importance but analyzes en#uring patterns o" state behavior re"lecting cyclical shi"ts in po%er as in the rise an# #ecline o" great po%ers. Liberal theories by contrast "orge a #irect causal link bet%een economic political an# social mo#ernization an# state behavior in %orl# politics. $ence "or e/ample it is signi"icant to liberals that over the mo#ern perio# the principles o" international or#er have been #ecreasingly linke# to #ynastic legitimacy an# increasingly to "actors #irectly #ra%n "rom the three variants o" liberalism2 national sel"!#etermination an# social citizenship the increasing comple/ity o" economic integration an# liberal #emocratic governance. Thir# "ollo%ing on "rom the secon# point the liberal approach o ers a plausible explanation or the distinctiveness o modern international politics. 4mong a#vance# in#ustrial #emocracies a stable "orm o" interstate politics has emerge# groun#e# in reliable e/pectations o" peace"ul change #omestic rule o" la% stable international institutions an# intensive societal interaction. 0hereas realists o""er no general e/planation "or the emergence o" this #istinctive mo#e o" international politics liberal theories argue that the emergence o" a large an# e/pan#ing bloc o" paci"ic inter#epen#ent normatively satis"ie# states has been a precon#ition "or such politics. 5onsi#er "or e/ample the current state o" =urope. Unlike realist theories "or e/ample liberal theories e/plain the near total absence o" competitive alliance "ormation among the lea#ing #emocratic po%ers to#ay. #rom Unicausal to (ulti)&ausal Theory 0e have seen that liberal assumptions about %orl# politics o""er a #istinct "oun#ation on %hich a number o" po%er"ul theories may be groun#e#. Met any goo# historian policy!maker or social scientist is instinctivelyKan# rightlyKsuspicious o" mono!causal e/planations base# on only a single theory. +urely %orl# politics is more comple/. 0hat i" %e %ant to combine a liberal theory %ith other theories liberal or non!liberalA T%o "inal points are %orth noting both o" %hich elaborate the various in %hich any given liberal theory can be combine# %ith other theories. 3irst various liberal theories wor" well in tandem with one another. &ot only #oes liberal theory apply across a %i#e #omain o" circumstances but its three variantsKi#eational commercial an# republican liberalismKare mutually rein"orcing. They are stronger taken together than separately. &ot only #o they share assumptions an# causal mechanisms but their empirical implications aggregate in interesting %ays. ,t is %i#ely accepte# "or e/ample that

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economic #evelopment has a strong in"luence on the viability o" #emocratic governance %ith its paci"ic implications9 liberal #emocratic governments ten# in turn to support commerce %hich promotes economic #evelopment. +uch claims can be analytically rein"orcing even %here they #o not make parallel pre#ictions. 4nomalies %ithin one variant o" liberal theory may be resolve# by consi#ering other variants. Positive movement along one liberal #imensionKpatterns o" national i#entity #emocratic participation or transnational economic transactionsKmay con#one or e/acerbate the negative #istortions along another liberal #imension. &orman 4ngell %hose commercial liberal claims on the eve o" 0orl# 0ar , inclu#e# a pre#iction that %ar among maGor po%ers %as obsolete is o"ten paro#ie# by secon#han# critics. Met he #oes not #eserve this. 4ngell staunchly maintaine# that his %ell!kno%n RRunpro"itability o" %ar<< thesis in no %ay implies RRthe impossibility o" %ar)Ka #octrine he #ismisse# "or republican liberal reasons 'i.e. the "act that not all governments are representative* as a RRri#iculous myth.<< 0here representative bias permits special interests to control policy aggregate incentives "or %el"are!improving tra#e are likely to have less e""ect. 6ecent stu#ies reveal that the correlation bet%een economic inter#epen#ence an# peace hol#s "ar more strongly among liberal states. 5onversely %here #emocratization heightens socioeconomic ine1uality nationalist cleavages uneven patterns o" gains an# losses #ue to inter#epen#ence or e/treme heterogeneity o" interests Kas may have occurre# in the "ormer Mugoslavia an# other #emocratizing nationsKit may e/acerbate international economic an# political con"lict. +uch interaction e""ects among liberal "actors o""er a promising area "or more #etaile# analysis. Liberal theories are greater than the sum o" their parts. +econ# liberal theories are easily combined with other international relations theories, generating multi0causal explanations. +urely there are cases in %hich a combination o" liberal an# other theories o""ers a better e/planation o" state behavior than any single sort o" theory alone liberal or other%ise. ,n such cases a multicausal synthesis is re1uire#. Eut an (anything goes) attitu#e %ill 1uickly lea# to comple/ity. $o% can %e #iscipline such a synthesisA 0hat mo#el shoul# %e useA Most theorists believe %e shoul# synthesize theories by employing realism "irst '%ith pre"erences assume# to be invariant* an# then intro#uce liberal theories to e/plain %hatever is le"t over. The Gusti"ication o"ten given is that realist theories #eal %ith the most (important) phenomena in international a""airs coercive threats to national security an# no state %ill pay attention to liberal "actors until they resolve such classic $ealpoliti" issues. Met such claims arbitrarily privilege realist e/planations o" any phenomena that might be e/plaine# by other theoriesKan# liberal theories as %e have seen #o #eal %ith essential matters o" peace an# %ar. Moreover it is clearKas %e have seen aboveKthat con"lict o"ten comes about precisely because states have varie# interests an# some aggressor states have privilege# something above security this violating the key assumptions o" realism. The truth is in "act the opposite2 to the e/tent that both pre"erences an# coercive other "actors matter liberal theories en3oy analytical priority in any synthesis. The assumption o" rationality or purposive behavior central to realism 'like the RRboun#e# rationality<< claims o" institutionalism* implies action on the basis o" a prior speci"ic an# consistent set o" pre"erences. Unless %e kno% %hat these pre"erences are 'that is unless %e kno% the e/tent to %hich states value the un#erlying stakes* %e cannot assess realist or institutionalist claims linking variation in the particular means available to states '%hether coercive capabilities or institutions* on interstate con"lict or cooperation. &or can %e use non!rational #ecision!making theory to assess %hether the means!en#s calculations use# to realize those interests are rational or not. Pre"erences #etermine the nature an# intensity o" the game that states are playing an# thus are a primary

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#eterminant o" %hich systemic theory is appropriate an# ho% it shoul# be speci"ie#. Hariation in state pre"erences o"ten in"luences the %ay in %hich states make calculations about their strategic environment %hereas the converseKthat the strategic situation lea#s to variation in state pre"erencesKis inconsistent %ith the rationality assumption share# by all three theories. #n short, liberal theories explain when and why the assumptions about state pre erences underlying realism or institutionalism hold. The reverse is not the case at least in the short term. ,n situations %here these assumptions #o not hol# realism an# institutionalism 'as %ell as some variants o" constructivism* are not Gust o" limite# importance they are theoretically irrelevant. ? The priority o" liberalism in multicausal mo#els o" state behavior implies "urthermore that collective state behavior shoul# be analyze# as a two0stage process. +tates "irst #e"ine pre"erencesKa stage uni1uely e/plaine# by liberal theoriesKan# only then #o they #ebate bargain or "ight to particular agreementsKa secon# stage e/plaine# by realist an#/or institutionalist 'as %ell as liberal* theories o" strategic interaction. The t%o!stage mo#el o""ers a general structure "or research #esign an# theoretical e/planation. ,n those cases %here liberal "actors only in"luence strategic outcomes #irectly through pre"erences an# pre"erence intensities 'a in 3igure 1* liberalism can be teste# as a monocausal hypothesis against alternative realist or institutionalist "actors 'c in 3igure 1*. Liberal "actors may also in"luence outcomes in#irectly because the nature o" pre"erences helps #etermine ' b in 3igure 1* the relative po%er an# in"luence o" states. 'c in 3igure 1*. 6ecall that pre"erences #o not simply shape outcomes they tell us %hich realist or institutionalist "actors are important an# ho% they relate to state behavior. ,n such cases e/plaining 'or at least controlling "or* variation in state pre"erences is analytically prior to an analysis o" strategic interaction. 0ithout a prior analysis o" pre"erences only monocausal "ormulations o" realist or institutionalist theory can be teste#.

This conclusion shoul# not be surprising to anyone %ith even un#ergra#uate training in political science. ,t is the unambiguous lesson o" the classic literature on the metho#ology o" stu#ying po%er an# in"luence %hether in local communities or global politics. 6obert 7ahl<s analysis o" po%er teaches us that %e cannot ascertain %hether (4 in#uce# E to #o something) 'that is po%er or in"luence* unless %e kno% RR%hat E %oul# other%ise #o<< 'that is pre"erences*. The implication is clear2 &ot only #o %e nee# to kno% %hat state pre"erences are but unless they are arraye# so that substantial interstate con"lict o" interest e/ists an# the #eployment o" capabilities to achieve a marginal gain is acceptable realist theory is po%erless to e/plain state behavior. +imilarly institutionalist e/planations o" suboptimal cooperation are appropriate only un#er circumstances in %hich states have an interest in resolving particular interstate collective action problems. ,6 theorist Denneth Jye #ra%s the implication2 RR0hen you observe con"lict think 7ea#lockKthe absence o" mutual interestKbe"ore puzzling over %hy a mutual interest %as not realize#.<<

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The primacy o" liberal theories in such multicausal e/planations may appear to be an abstract a#monition yet it is o" real practical importance in interpreting historical e/perience an# current policy. $o% are %e to un#erstan# "or e/ample 0oo#ro% 0ilson<s proposal "or the League o" &ations o"ten cite# as the epitome o" liberal RRlegalism<< an# RRutopianism.<< 4t "irst glance 0ilson<s proposal seems to re"lect a naive con"i#ence in international institutions. Met in "act it %as a t%o!stage liberal proposalKan# a realistic one at that. 3rom the start 0ilson %as skeptical about the autonomous in"luence o" international institutions. $e care# little about their precise "orm because he vie%e# them as no more than (a symbolic a""irmation o" the Rrightness< o" #emocracies in their mutual relations.) Thus "or e/ample his initial #ra"t o" the League 5ovenant inclu#e# no provisions "or international la% or a supranational court9 both %ere eventually a##e# only at the insistence o" more conservative 'an# more cynical* "oreign an# #omestic politicians. $e %as skeptical that the League coul# ever actually overri#e national #ecisions. ,nstea# %hat 0ilson terme# the RR"irst point<< to remember about the League %as not institutionalist but liberal2 ,ts membership %as to be restricte# to those countries enGoying republican government an# national sel"!#etermination. ,nso"ar as the League %as to rely on public opinion it %as to be solely democratic public opinion. Ease# on a multicausal liberal analysis 0ilson e/plicitly i#enti"ie# a set o" narro% precon#itions un#er %hich collective security institutions coul# succee#. The League he argue# %oul# "unction only i" nationally sel"! #etermining #emocracy %as a nearly universal "orm o" government among great po%ers %hich in turn controlle# an over%helming proportion o" global military po%er. ,n 1:1; 0ilson believe# this situation to be imminent2 (There are not going to be many other kin#s o" nations "or long. . . . The $apsburgs an# the $ohenzollerns are permanently out o" business.) Iiven 0ilson<s un#erlying theory is it surprising that the League ha# become moribun# by 1:>N a"ter t%elve =uropean countries ha# move# "rom #emocracy to #ictatorshipA Jr that this shi"t isolate# #emocratic 3rance an# Eritain e/acerbating their o"t!note# geopolitical #ilemmas in Manchuria an# 4byssiniaA 0hen a similar situation arose in the "ormer Mugoslavia a"ter 1:8: in a %orl# %here almost all the great po%ers in the region %ere liberal #emocraciesKas %e have seen above K0estern governments intervene# to oppose aggression %hile avoi#ing any hint o" arme# con"lict among themselves. ,n#ee# the absence o" serious con"lict among 0estern po%ers over MugoslaviaKthe RR0orl# 0ar , scenario<<Kre"lects in large part a share# perception that the geopolitical gains "rom con"lict among #emocratic governments are lo%. ,n this sense the inter%ar "ailure o" the League o"ten cite# as a realist re"utation o" utopian liberal ideology, in "act con"irms liberal ,6 theory. Multicausal liberalism helps to e/plain not only ambitious schemes "or cooperation like collective security but RRrealist<< policy outcomes like po%er balancing an# bipolar con"lict. 4 "orm o" multicausal liberalism un#erlay the post.0orl# 0ar ,, U.+. policy o" containmentKa policy tra#itionally treate# as the embo#iment o" realism. 5ontainment o" the +oviet Union %as never simply about po%er balancing. ,t %as a liberal gran# strategy as ma#e e/plicit a"ter 0orl# 0ar , by 0ilson an# Bohn 7e%ey then a"ter 0orl# 0ar ,, by Ieorge Dennan. Dennan in this regar# a liberal linke# the =uropean threat to the nature o" the +oviet regime9 it is o"ten "orgotten that nine!tenths o" the seminal RRS<< article %as given over to an analysis o" +oviet #omestic belie"s. 4 0estern military #eterrent %oul# be re1uire# he argue# only until the Eolshevik revolution ha# run its course %hereupon the +oviet system %oul# collapse o" its o%n accor#. The #ecisive 0estern actions in the 5ol# 0ar accor#ing to Dennan %ere the reconstruction o" Iermany an# Bapan as capitalist #emocracies through policies like the Marshall Plan. The goal o"

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the policy %as the trans"ormation o" social purposes an# state pre"erences in 0estern countries neither o" %hich %oul# assume much importance in a purely realist analysis. ,n the en# the con#uct an# conclusion o" the 5ol# 0ar procee#e# precisely as Dennan<s t%o!stage liberal mo#el ha# pre#icte#. 6ealist po%er balancing serve# throughout as a static interim instrument to maintain the status 1uo but shi"ting state pre"erences e/plain the outbreak an# eventual passing o" the con"lict. Ey 1:?: stan#ing in a Mosco% e/hibit o" kitchen%are 6ichar# &i/on an# &ikita Dhrushchev #eclare# that the 5ol# 0ar %oul# be %on an# lost not through relative military capabilities but through the relative economic pro%ess an# i#eological attractiveness o" the t%o superpo%ers. =conomic stagnation an# a measure o" i#eological change in the =ast pre#ate# "oreign policy change. ," the 0est as Dhrushchev rashly promise# ha# been burie# un#er the superior economic per"ormance o" the =ast the outcome might %ell have been #i""erent. These e/amples #emonstrate the ability o" multicausal liberal theories to e/plain critical t%entieth!century "oreign policy #ecisions such as those taken in 1:18 1:@; an# 1:8: even %hen national security interests are "ully engage#. ,n interpreting such cases the maGor #i""erence bet%een realist an# liberal theories lies not as is o"ten claime# in the observation that realist states are concerne# about security threats or even %ith balancing security threats. Eoth theories pre#ict this un#er speci"ic circumstances. 0here the t%o "amilies o" theory genuinely #i""er is on the sources o" security threats themselves %ith realists attributing them to particular con"igurations o" po%er 'against %hich states balance* %hereas liberals attribute them to e/treme con"lict among i#eological institutional an# material pre"erences. '3or their part ,nstitutionalists attribute them to uncertainty an# the "ailure o" commitment strategies an# epistemic theorists to particular belie"s about the e""icacy or appropriateness o" speci"ic policy responses.* ," liberal theories contribute to e/plaining core realist cases such as bipolar con"lict there is goo# reason to believe that the most po%er"ul in"luences in %orl# politics to#ay are not the #eployment o" military "orce or the construction o" international institutions but the 1uiet trans"ormation o" the #omestic an# transnational social values interests an# institutions that un#erlie the %i#ely varying pre"erences states bring to %orl# politics.

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