Perceptions of Borders and Human Migration: The Human (In) Security of Shan Migrant Workers in Thailand

PERCEPTIONS OF BORDERS
AND HUMAN MIGRATION

THE HUMAN (IN)SECURITY OF SHAN
MIGRANT WORKERS IN THAILAND
About the Author
As a B.A. majoring in International Relations from Thammasat
University in Thailand with experience in Thailand’s Foreign Ministry,
Ropharat Aphijanyatham focused her research on border issues between
Myanmar and Thailand, especially the increasing movement of low-skill
labor from Shan State in Myanmar into Thailand to seek jobs. She also
analyzed the proposed means by which to secure their safe, legal
employment across the borders with decent wages and access to some
social protections, including health care and their children’s education.
She has completed her Master’s Degree from Keio University, Japan and
has returned to Bangkok recently in order to prepare her PhD.
Cover, Maps and Layout: Mikael Brodu

Photographs (including cover): Ropharat Aphijanyatham
ISBN 978-616-90282-1-5
© IRASEC, October 2009

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted,
in any form or means, without prior permission of the author or the publisher.
The opinions expressed in these papers are solely those of the author(s).
A collection under the supervision of Anne-Lise Sauterey and Benoît de Tréglodé
Perceptions of Borders and Human Migration:

The Human (In)Security of Shan Migrant Workers in Thailand
By Ropharat Aphijanyatham
Carnet de l’Irasec / Occasional Paper

Série Observatoire / Observatory Series
n°01
L’observatoire se concentre depuis 2008 sur l’analyse des activités et des mouvements
transfrontaliers illicites en Asie du Sud-est continentale par le biais de programmes de
recherche et d’analyses académiques ou stratégiques. Il est accueilli au sein de l’IRASEC à
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L’Institut de recherche sur l’Asie du Sud-Est contemporaine (USR 3142 – UMIFRE 22
CNRS MAEE) s’intéresse depuis 2001 aux évolutions politiques, sociales et environ-
nementales en cours dans les onze pays de la région. Basé à Bangkok, l’Institut fait appel à
des chercheurs de tous horizons disciplinaires et académiques qu’il associe au gré des
problématiques. Il privilégie autant que possible les démarches transversales.
The Observatory is in charge since 2008 of the analysis of illicit cross-border movements within
mainland Southeast Asia. It supports research programmes and publishes both academic and
strategic works. It is based within the Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia in
Bangkok.
The Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia,, based in Bangkok, Thailand, calls
on specialists from all academic fields to study the important social, political, economic and
environmental developments that affect, together or separately, the eleven countries of the region
(Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-
Leste and Viet Nam).
LE COMITÉ ÉDITORIAL DE L’IRASEC
• Jean BAFFIE, CNRS, IRSEA • Yves GOUDINEAU, EFEO

• Bénédicte BRAC de la PERRIERE, CASE, • Andrew HARDY, EFEO, Hanoi
CNRS, EHESS • Jacques IVANOFF, IRASEC CNRS
• Sophie BOISSEAU du ROCHER, Asia • François LAGIRARDE, EFEO Bangkok
Centre • Christian LECHERVY, MAE
• Jean-Raphaël CHAPONNIERE, AFD • Arnaud LEVEAU, IRASEC
• Christian CULAS, IRASEC CNRS • LE Huu Khoa, Université de Lille
• Gilles DELOUCHE, INALCO • Charles MAC DONALD, CNRS
• Jean-Luc DOMENACH, CERI, Réseau • Rémi MADINIER, IRASEC CNRS
Asie • Philippe PAPIN, EPHE
• Evelyne DOURILLE-FEER, CEPII • François RAILLON, CASE, CNRS,
• Stéphane DOVERT, MAE EHESS
• Frédéric DURAND, Université de • Jean-François SABOURET, CNRS,
Toulouse Réseau Asie
• Alain FOREST, Paris VII • Christian TAILLARD, CASE, CNRS
• Guy FAURE, IAO LASEMA
• Michel FOURNIE, INALCO • Hugues TERTRAIS, Université de
• Charles GOLDBLUM, Institut français Paris I
d’urbanisme • Benoît de TRÉGLODÉ, IRASEC
• Christopher GOSCHA, Université de • Marie-Sybille de VIENNE, INALCO
Montréal
4
Table of Contents
Introduction .................................................................................................7
1 - Understanding Borders Perceptions
and Human Security in Human Migration ..............................................7
2 - Research Framework ..................................................................................8
3 - Organization of the Paper ..........................................................................9
Chapter 1
A history of borders and its influence on Shan
migrant workers’ migration behaviour .....................................11
1 - An Introduction to the Shan, the History of Borders
and Migration Today ................................................................................11
2 - The Contemporary Migration Situation in Northern Thailand ..........14
2.1 - Push Factors: Political and socio-economic insecurities
in Burma drive more people to move to Thailand ..................................14
2.2 - Pull Factors: The Availability of low-paid jobs, work for women
and demographic factors in Thailand attract more people from
Burma to become migrant workers ........................................................19
3 - An Increasing Influx of Foreign Workers in Thailand
and their Macroeconomic Contribution to the Thai GDP ....................20
4 - The Migration Legal Framework in Thailand .......................................26
Chapter 2
A comparative analysis of the different perceptions
of borders and of the cost-benefit assessment between
the Thai government, Shan migrant workers,
Thai employers and informal brokers ........................................31
1 - Human Security and Migration ..............................................................31
1.1 - Human Insecurities in Burma as Factors in Migration .....................31
1.2 - More Human Securities or Less Human Insecurities?
the Post-Migration Situation in Thailand ..............................................33
5
PERCEPTIONS OF BORDERS AND HUMAN MIGRATION
2 - Three Actors’ Perceptions of Borders, their Cost-Benefit

Assessment, and the Migration of Shan Migrant Workers ................. 42
2.1 - The Thai Government’s Perception of Borders:
Legal Borders vs. Social Borders ............................................................ 42
2.2 - Shan Migrant Workers’ Perception of Borders: Borderless or
Ethnic Borders - An Interpretation of Socio-Economic Demand .......... 47
2.3 - Thai Employers’ and Informal Brokers’ Perception of Borders:
Economic Advantages from the Multi-Perceptions of Borders............... 61
2.4 - The “Acquiescent Reciprocity”:
A Factor in the Migration Phenomenon ................................................ 65
3 - Differences in the Perceptions of Borders
and the Perpetuation of Illegal Migration ............................................. 66
Summary and conclusion .................................................................. 67

1 - From the Solid Meaning of Borders by the Nation-State
to the Different Perceptions of Borders by the Locals ......................... 67
2 - Recommendations .................................................................................... 72
2.1 - Inclusion of the Different Perceptions of Borders
in Policy Formulation ............................................................................ 72
2.2 - The Need to Accelerate the Legal Process and to Create Coherence
in Immigration and Registration Policies .............................................. 73
Glossary ....................................................................................................... 75
Bibliography .............................................................................................. 77
6
Introduction
1 - Understanding Borders Perceptions

and Human Security in Human Migration
While there are many prior studies to date on the internal conflicts
in Burma, these are mostly focused on the human rights situation within
the country. In addition, many previous marked studies, such as works
from Thai academics, International Organizations or the World Health
Organization1, have highlighted the human securities of migrant
workers in the destination country whereby the process of migration has
already taken place. However, none of them have focused on the
phenomenon of migration in relation to perceptions of borders and human
1 1) Punpuing et al., Migrant Domestic Workers: from Burma to Thailand (Nakhon Pathom,
Institute for Population and Social Research, Mahidol University, 2004)
สถาบันวิจยั ประชากรและสังคม มหาวิทยาลัยมหิดล, คนรับใช้ ในบ้ าน: แรงงานอพยพจากพม่ ามาไทย, 2004
2) Archavanitkul, Migrant Workers and Research Direction [In Thai] (Nakhon Pathom,
Institute for Population and Social Research, Mahidol University, 2002)
กฤตยา อาชวนิชกุล, สถานะความร้ ูเรืองแรงงานข้ ามชาติในประเทศไทยและทิศทางการวิจัยทีพึงพิจารณา, สถาบันวิจยั ประชากรและสังคม
มหาวิทยาลัยมหิดล, นครปฐม, 2002
3) Chantavanich, Needs Assessment of Host Communities in Burmese Border Refugee Camp Area:
Tasongyang and Pobpra District, Tak Province (Bangkok, Institute of Asian Studies,
Chulalongkorn University, 2003)
่ ย, การประเมินความต้ องการของชมชนบริ
ศูนย์วจิ ยั การย้ายถิ่นแหงเอเชี ุ เวณพืน้ ทีรองรับผ้ หู นีภัยชายแดนไทย-พม่ า: อําเภอท่าสองยาง และอําเภอพบพระ
จังหวัดตาก, จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย, 2003
4) International Labour Organization (ILO), The Mekong Challenge: Underpaid, Overworked
and Overlooked: The Realities of Young Migrant Workers in Thailand, 2006
5) World Health Organization (WHO), Adolescent Migrants in the Greater Mekong Sub-region:
Are they equipped to protect themselves against sexual and reproductive health risks, WHO, 2007
7
security. The lack of study addressing the influence of borders and human
securities as the key indicators to people’s migration behaviour supports
the significance and relevance of this research.
2 - Research Framework
This research aims to understand the differences in the perceptions of
borders between the Thai government, Shan migrant workers, Thai
employers, and informal brokers, which perpetuate the flow of illegal
migration.
Due to the increasing number of illegal Shan migrant workers who
are living, producing and consuming products and services in Thailand,
or in other words, being absorbed into and continuing to contribute to
the Thai economy, it is necessary to map out a framework of borders,
human migration and human security for policy-makers to approach and
use in addressing the migration issue as a basis for future theoretical
development. A focus on the different perceptions of borders in the
migration phenomenon may lead toward a more comprehensive view of
the international migration process, particularly for ASEAN to have
more realistic border and migration policies.
Based on the purpose of the research mentioned above, my
hypothesis is as follows:
“The flow of illegal migrant workers is continuing and increasing
due to the differences in the perceptions and functions of borders
between the Thai government, Shan migrant workers, Thai employers
and informal brokers”.
The actual primary data is derived from fieldwork conducted both

in Thailand and Burma. In addition, secondary data collected from
available literature was processed and reviewed in order to support the
borders approach in addressing human security and migration. Finally, a
comparative case study of Cambodian migrant workers is examined
based on fieldwork made in the Rayong province of Thailand.
8
THE HUMAN (IN)SECURITY OF SHAN MIGRANT WORKERS IN THAILAND
CHINA
Mandalay
Kengtung
SHAN STATE
BURMA
Taunggyi
Tachilek LAO PDR
Mae Sai
Chiang Rai
THAILAND
Chiang Mai
3 - Organization of the Paper

In Chapter One, we would first like to discuss how and in which
historical context the borders between Burma and Thailand were drawn,
and how they consequently influenced the imagination of borders in the
minds of Shan migrant workers. Furthermore, it is important to discuss
in this Chapter how the perceptions of borders and human security affect
not only Shan migrant workers’ behaviour in migrating to Thailand, but
also the migration legal framework in the country.
The core analysis of this study is in Chapter Two, which consists of
the analysis of the different perceptions of borders and the cost-benefit
assessment between the Thai government, Shan migrant workers, Thai
employers and informal brokers. This part intensely discusses the
9
different perceptions of borders among each of the above-mentioned

actors, and how these have affected governmental immigration policies,
Shan migrant workers’ migration behaviour and Thai employers’
patterns of employment.
This Chapter discusses and analyses three main topics. Firstly, by
attempting to determine the push-pull factors that influence Shan people
to migrate, it examines what types of insecurities migrant workers
expect to resolve through migration. Secondly, we will continue to
deliberate on defining the respective perceptions of borders of each actor
involved in the migration phenomenon of Shan workers. Finally, it
discusses what the costs and benefits are for 1) the Thai government and
Thai employers when it comes to the border crossing of Shan migrant
workers and 2) the Shan migrant workers in measuring their well-being
and weighing the advantages between living in Thailand and Burma.
Finally, conclusions are made based on the results of the analysis,

and recommendations as to the governmental policies regarding
migration are also proposed. The section concerning recommendations
tries to point out the importance of including different perceptions of
borders in policy formulation and the need to accelerate the legal process
and create coherence in immigration and registration policies.
10
Chapter 1
A history of borders and its influence
on Shan migrant workers’ migration
behaviour
1 - An Introduction to the Shan,

the History of Borders and Migration Today
The Shan, or Tai-Yai (members of the Greater Tai ethnic family)2,
are a Tai-speaking group who call themselves Tai but whom the
Burmese call Shan - which also refers to all Thai people in the Ayudia
Shan Kingdom (Ayutthaya Siam) or what is now Thailand. The word
Siam is a variation of the word Shan or Sham in Burmese.
The Shan are the second biggest ethnic group3 in Burma, forming
7 percent of the total population in the 1930s4, and about 4 million or
2 The term “Shan” will be used throughout this research to refer to people who are
currently living in the Shan State of Burma or who migrated from the Shan State to
Thailand. (Please refer to the map “Migration Flow from the Shan State to northern
Thailand”)
3 According to the 1983 census, there were 135 distinct ethnic groups in Burma. The
Burmans (Bamars), the largest group, are estimated to constitute two thirds of the
population (about 33 million out of 50 million, or 66 percent). However, these numbers
probably include people of Mon, Karen (Kayin) and other ancestry who have assimilated
themselves to the mainstream Burman language, customs, culture, and most importantly,
to Burmese Buddhism. Seekins, Historical Dictionary of Burma (Burma) (Lanham MD,
Scarecrow Press, 2006), p.7
11
8 percent of Burma’s population of approximately 50 million people5 in

1999. In the past, the Shan State was divided into more than
30 individual states, with each having its own saophas or sawbwa (Shan
princes) as the governing leader. The Shan states survived under British
colonial rule; that is to say, the authority of saophas was recognized by
the British colonial administration. The status of the Shan princes was
somewhat similar to that of the rulers of the Indian princely states.
It is believed that the native land of the Tai-Yai is located between

south-western Yunnan (province of China) and north-eastern Burma,
with the Salween river to the east and the valley of India’s Assam State
to the west, near the 8th century trade routes that linked China, India and
the rest of Southeast Asia. This geographic proximity illustrates the
socio-economic relation between people living in these areas and their
movement since then.
The greater Tai race progressively dispersed itself over time

throughout the valley of Assam in eastern India, farther into inland
China, northern Thailand, northern Laos, and some parts of northern
Vietnam, with a majority settling in north-eastern Burma, now known as
the Shan State. As the populations of the Tai race settled throughout the
above-mentioned region where other polities had also established a
home base, they were thus within close reach of various communities.
Interactions thus developed between them as geographic proximity and
cultural assimilation supplement each other. As a result, this type of
geographic assimilation shapes the kingdoms’ leaders’ and people’s
perspective of borders. To the leaders, there is an overlapping sovereignty
over the overlapping kingdom boundaries. To the people, like their
leaders, geographic proximity and cultural similarity absorb people into
the same socio-economic system.
4 According to the 1931 census, Silverstein, Burmese politics: the dilemma of national unity
(New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1980)

5 Keat Gin Ooi, Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor
(Santa Barbara CA, ABC-CLIO, 2004), p.1191

12
If we explore both State and non-State actors’ perceptions of borders in

the 19th century, before the transformation of each kingdom into the
modern conception of a nation, we can see that the inter-state relations
and multiple sovereignties between overlords and tributary states
created a concept of borders as a blended region where people from both
kingdoms co-existed, rather than an imaginary line on the map.6 This
kind of border perception leads to two consequences. First, people in
both kingdoms perceived border-crossing as a general movement.
Second, the assimilation of ethnic identities among these various cultural
areas, resulting from political and/ or socio-economic exchange, takes
place both intentionally and voluntarily. These perceptions and activities
have remained in the local people’s perspective of borders to this day.
For instance, the Kachin have assimilated themselves to the Shan by
adopting the sawbwa7 political system from them in the 19th century.
Thus, political, socio-economic and cultural exchanges were, and are still
to this day, commonplace. In the same way, Shan people who nowadays
migrate to Thailand view their border-crossing as a day-to-day general
movement, and not as an act of international migration, just as their
ancestors did. They have also intentionally adjusted and transformed
their own identity to Thai cultural norms in the hope of changing their
economic and political status in Thailand. At the same time, they are
trying to resurrect the idea of their shared Tai or Thai ethnic heritage in
order to ensure the legitimacy of their entering Thailand.8
On the other hand, the modern concept of borders has transformed
the above-mentioned perception into a clear-cut line in the mind of the
6 Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu, University of

Hawaii Press, 1997)
7 Sawbwa (Burmese term) or Saopha (Shan term) is the political system by which a
hereditary prince rules the state. Iijima, ‘An Oral History Approach to a Sawbwa Family's
Strategy: Research Notes for a Short History of Hsenwi’ in Ecological Resource Use and Social
Change in the Minority Regions of Burma (Kyoto, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies of Kyoto
University, 2007) Vol.45, No.3, p.450
8 Based on this fact, identity is a kind of “perception” that can be recreated, transformed
and extended to serve both political and socio-economic purposes. With regard to this
method of thought, each head town did not develop at the same time as others, but over a
long period of time these were gradually combined. “Shanness” is, as a result, a man-made
history pulling each individual under the same umbrella of ancestral legend.
13
state, a phenomenon that Benedict Anderson calls an artificial boundary9.

Meanwhile, the Shan immigrants’ perception and definition of borders
and movement still remain the same as in the 19th century. The States
have institutionalized the modern concept of borders and have
established this as the law in order to identify the others, who move from
another nation-state in the hope of improving their human securities, as
immigrants, and the action of movement as migration. This approach is
meant to benefit the nation in two ways. The first is to identify the
ownership of natural resources, and the second is to create a sense of
superiority, unity and loyalty among us or citizen, the new status given
to those who belong to the nation-state. The result is that the Thai
government views Shan migrant workers in Thailand as a threat to the
security of the receiving population.
2 - The Contemporary Migration Situation

in Northern Thailand
2.1 - Push Factors: Political and socio-economic
insecurities in Burma drive more people
to move to Thailand
2.1.1 - Ethnic Conflict: Ethnic Cleansing War, Depleted Forest,

Environmental Degradation and Forced Relocation
The remains of the Kuomintang (KMT) invasion during the 1950s

and the ongoing fighting since Burma’s independence between the Mong
Tai (also known as the Shan Army or MTA) and the Burmese military
within the Shan State have placed a great hardship on local civilians. This
political instability causes a feeling of life instability or social insecurity
(crime or internal disorder) among the Shan population. Due to this
ceaseless war and irregular farming, the agricultural environment has
been degraded, while forests are being depleted because of the increase in
large-scale teak logging, thus displacing people and their activities.
9 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York, Verso, 1983)

14
Push Factor on the Burmese Side
BURMA CHINA
LAO
PDR
Displaced villages
in Eastern Burma
(1996-2007)
Hiding Areas
THAILAND
Ceasefire Areas
Refugee Camp
Source: based on maps retrieved on January the 9th 2009 from www.tbbc.org
15
Furthermore, military forces suddenly increased three-fold in 1988.

The Burmese government sent one fourth of its armed forces to station
within the Shan State. As a result, the biggest forced relocation took
place during 1996-1997 from rural areas to the central part of the Shan
State. More than 300,000 people from 1,400 villages were forced to leave
for the newly assigned areas.10 This time, relocation not only led to the
second and third biggest migration waves into northern Thailand (the
first wave took place in 1962), but also to the increase in numbers and
severity of rape, crime, forced labour, tax demands and other violent
activities in the centre of the Shan State. Hence, the pattern of migration
has evolved into becoming more or less a phenomenon of long-term
settlement ever since the relocation policy was enforced, whereas during
the colonial period, people went from the Shan State to neighbouring
areas mainly for trading purposes, and thus movements took place on a
short-term basis.
2.1.2 - Socio-Economic Hardships:

Unpaid Labour, Lost Land and Lack of Food
The Burmese military government exploits the traditional economic

system and its forms of labour exchange by manipulating them into
becoming forms of unpaid labour. Badly affected by this malpractice on
the military’s part, the Shan, questioning the efficiency of their own
labour exchange system, have shifted from their traditional ideas to a
new concept whereby labour is something that may be sold and bought
in the market. This new form of idea motivates people to migrate from
peasant economic areas to the commercial production sector.
Additionally, land has become a market commodity and a capital for
commercial production. When peasants need to forfeit land to creditors,
their production capability is reduced to a rice production that is merely
sufficient for household consumption, and considerably insufficient to
sell for capital gain. Finally, many people are forced to sell their labour
for daily wages in the commercial sector. Most peasants do not have the
10 Please refer to the map on the previous page.

16
Unpaid Labour
Hydropower Project
CHINA
Mining
Gas Pipeline SHAN

STATE
Proposed BURMA
Asia Highway
Logging
LAO
PDR
Naypyidaw
Agricultural Project
Rangoon
THAILAND
Andaman Sea Bangkok
Source: based on maps retrieved on January the 9th 2009 from www.tbbc.org
17
required skills or education for urban work. As a result, they become

comparatively worse off, particularly in the case of Shan migrant pea-
sants who migrate to work in modern commercial sectors in Thailand.
Many become unemployed or under-employed. But with the changes in
the whole fabric of social and economic life in Shan villages in Burma,
they are forced to move with the expectation of getting daily wage work,
in spite of wages below the national standard or their disadvantages in
social and work welfare.
2.1.3 - The Lack of Socio-Cultural Freedom
The suppression of ethnic language is a good example to demonstrate

the process of Burmanization undertaken by the Burmese military
government. There is an interesting dimension to the altered names, not
only the country’s name (from Burma to Myanmar in 1989), but also the
capital (from Rangoon to Yangon), and minority areas such as towns in
the Shan State: Hsipaw to Thibaw, Hsenwi to Theinli or Thinli, Kengtung
to Kyaingtong, Mong Hsu to Maing Shu, Lai-Hka to Laycha, Pangtara to
Pindaya, the list goes on. The important point here is that the original
name of each town has a meaning in the Shan language, while the new
Burmanized names have none.11 Deprived of their tradition and history,
ethnic minorities were further dissatisfied. Furthermore, the current
prohibition on learning Shan language and on group gatherings creates
more disparity between Shan and Burmese people.
11Lintner., op.cit.; Lintner gives a very clear detailed description of the linguistic and
symbolic implication of Myanmar/Burma’s military junta. It is controversial whether

Myanmar or Burma is the legitimate term for the country. In 1989, Burma’s military
government changed the country’s name from Burma to Myanmar. The name “Burma” is
claimed illegitimate because of its association with the British colonial administration,
which named the territory after the main ethnic group in the country, the Burmese.
“Myanmar” was chosen instead as it was argued that it includes the Burmese and all other
“ethnic races”, including the Shan, the Karen, the Mon, the Kachin and more than 100 other
ethnic groups. However, some argue that the use of “Myanmar” is a tool to legitimize the
military government’s power, and that the term is not appropriate to encompass the
multitude of people within the union, as the actual situation seems to be the opposite. As a
result, those who do not recognize the military government’s power and its claimed
legitimacy reject the “Myanmar” appellation. However, both names have been used
interchangeably throughout history, with Burma being more colloquial and Myanmar
more formal.
18
2.2 - Pull Factors: The Availability of low-paid jobs,

work for women and demographic factors in
Thailand attract more people from Burma
to become migrant workers
Human security is the significant pull factor in the dynamic force

and cross-border activities. At the same time, invisible borders facilitate
migration. Human networking across boundaries reinforces today’s
familiar term- borderless world. The role of nationalism has subsided, yet
some military-dominated states, like Burma, still insist on exerting
nationalism by subjugating and discriminating other ethnic groups in
the country.
One significant characteristic of international migration in Asia is
the increasing availability of work for women in the labour market. This
is the result of rapid industrial development and increasing competition
with a globalizing economy in the destination countries, together with
the declining population of people of working age. Border areas between
Thailand and Burma seem to be a favourable place for relocation due to
its infrastructure development and access to cheaper labour.12 Border
industrialization, with its huge demand for cheap female workers,
empowers the border-crossing mobility of more and more Shan women.
Moreover, many Shan migrant workers may benefit from the availability
of professions that accompany border industrialization, namely
construction, domestic, restaurant and entertainment work. The
increasing number of jobs available to women and the influx of Shan
female migrant workers go hand-in-hand with the increasing numbers
of total Shan migrant workers in Thailand.
Demographic factors also represent one of the main forces pulling
migrants from neighbouring countries into Thailand. The average
annual growth rate of the Thai population is now only 0.8 percent. The
population of people aged between 15-39 years old is hardly growing in
Thailand, whereas it is increasing by 1.3 percent per annum in Burma.
12 Kusakabe and Pearson, “Border industrialization and labour mobility: A case of Burmese
migrant workers in border area factories”, Presented at the 10th International Conference
on Thai Studies, Bangkok, Thailand, 9-11 January 2008
19
3 - An Increasing Influx of Foreign Workers in

Thailand and Their Macroeconomic Contribution
to the Thai GDP
Thailand has attempted to shift from being an agricultural country
to an industrialized one since the 1980s, and has seen a rapid growth
from the mid-1980s. After the financial crisis that hit Southeast Asia in
1997, the economic situation has somewhat recovered, and the flow of
migration from neighbouring countries, namely Burma, Laos and
Cambodia, was all the while increasing. This phenomenon is motivated
by previously mentioned push-pull factors from both sending and
receiving countries.
Threats to their living conditions in Burma are pushing Shan people
to move to Thailand, seeking human security. Chiang Mai and Chiang
Rai have demonstrated a high level of employment demand for migrant
workers, which can be observed through the registration periods and the
high number of work permits being granted. Regarding the total number
of immigrants permitted to work in Thailand (August 2008), Table 1
shows that Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai rank 1st and 3rd in having the
highest number of illegal immigrants permitted to work in the country13,
with 25,995 out of 56,990 being illegal ethnic minority immigrants being
Shan.
Furthermore, Table 2 reports the increasing number of migrant
workers in Thailand by showing the estimated number of migrants and
the Thai labour force between 1996 and 2006. The number of migrants
has increased by 153 percent over this decade, from 700,000 to almost
1.8 million, compared to the Thai labour force has seen a mere increase
of 13 percent, from 31.5 million to 35.7 million.
13 This refers to a certain number of immigrants who entered Thailand and worked illegally
until the registration process was initiated, thus enabling them to change their legal status.
This problematic registration policy which takes place after the immigrant’s entry into
Thailand is later discussed in The Migration Legal Framework in Thailand in this chapter.
20
Migration Flows from Burma

CHINA
Arunachei
Pradesh
BHUTAN
Ka
sh
in
group
INDIA
KACHIN CHINA
Any ethnic
STATE
BANGLADESH Manipur
in
sh
Ka
SAGAING
an
Mizoram
Sh
DIVISION
Chin &
Burman
SHAN
Arak
CHIN STATE
STATE
an
MANDALAY Sh
an
R
oh DIVISION
in
gy Tachilek
a
MAGWE NayNaypyidaw
Pyi Daw Mae Sai
Shan LAOS
DIVISION
To upper
ARAKAN Northern
STATE KAYAN Thailand
STATE
PEGU
DIVISION
Ka
y a Ka
n
up Rangoon
ro
re
Mae Sot
cg
n
ni IRRAWADDY Kayan
th
ye DIVISION Myawaddy
Karen To Tak province
An YANGON or Central Thailand
DIVISION KAREN
By Air MON STATE Burman
To Malaysia STATE
& Singapore THAILAND
Sangkhla Buri
Any
Mon
e
thni
Bangkok
c gr
Mo
oup
TENASSERIM
DIVISION
Kawthaung Ranong
Muslim To Malaysia
0 100 200 km
To Southern
Thailand
Source: Mekong Migration Network, Asian Migrant Centre,
Resource Book: Migration in the Greater Mekong Subregion, 2005.
21
Total Number of Immigrants Permitted to Work in Thailand (August 2008)
500 000
400 000
300 000
200 000
100 000
Total in Thailand Chiang Mai Chiang Rai Tak

Total
Illegal 558 560 59 222 13 192 28 128
Immigrants
3 Nationalities
(Burma, Lao, 501 570 39 213 7 806 26 619
Cambodia)
Ethnic Minority
(Shan=25 995) 56 990 20 009 5 386 1 509
Source: Office of Foreign Workers Administration (Work Permit), http://www.doe.go.th
An increasing Number of Migrants Workers in Thailand (1996-2007)
36 Millions of workers
(total labour force in Thailand)
35
34
33
32
31
30
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2.0 Millions of workers (total migrant workers)
Registered migrant workers

1.5 Non registered migrant workers
1.0
0.5
0
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Note: An additional 53,202 migrants were registered under the MOU (Memorandum
of Understanding) in 2006. Most were already in Thailand.
Source: Office of Foreign Workers Administration (Work Permit), http://www.doe.go.th
Ministry of Labour, Presentation by Rattanarut, 2006 and Huguet, 2007, cited in Martin,
The Economic Contribution of Migrant Workers to Thailand: Towards Policy Development, 2007.
22
The following statistics of illegal Shan migrant workers and their

macroeconomic contributions to Thailand’s Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) are shown to address the significant role of Shan migrant workers
in relation to Thai economic consumption.
Migrant Workers’ Contribution to the Thai GDP (Sector Analysis, 2005)

Employment Employment Value added Output/Worker
Total Migrants 2005 ($ million) 2005 ($ million)
Agriculture 15,120,000 720,000 16,931 1,120
Industry 7,320,000 720,000 82,863 11,320
Services 13,500,000 360,000 76,808 5,689
Total 35,940,000 1,800,000 176,602 4,914
20%
38% 42% 40%
40%
20%
Agriculture
Total Industry Migrants
Services
According to the table above, most studies report that, among the
approximate 1.8 million migrant workers, 40 percent work in agriculture
and fisheries, 40 percent in industry and construction and 20 percent in
services.
However, most migrant workers in Thailand are low-skilled. But
given that some Thai workers are also low-skilled, the value-added
calculations in the table next page were based on an assumption that
migrant workers are either 25, 50, 75 or 100 percent as productive as Thai
workers according to specific sectors of employment, in order to
compare the average efficiency of Thai and migrant workers in doing the
same job. For example, if migrants are 25 percent as productive as Thai
workers in each sector, they account for 1.2 percent in agriculture,
2.4 percent in industry and construction, and 0.6 percent in services, or
1.6 percent of the total value-added in the Thai economy. If migrants are
23
as productive as Thais in each sector, their total contribution would be

6.2 percent of the Thai GDP.
Assumptions or scenarios on the productivity of migrant workers

compared to Thai workers, Migrant value-added ($ million, 2005)
25% 50% 75% 100%
Agriculture 202 403 605 806
Industry 2,038 4,075 6,128 8,150
Services 512 1,024 1,540 2,048
Total 2,751 5,502 8,274 11,004
Assumptions or scenarios about productivity of migrant workers

compared to Thai workers, Migrant value-added (% of total, 2005) *
25% 50% 75% 100%
Agriculture 1.2% 2.4% 3.6% 4.8%
Industry 2.4% 4.9% 7.3% 9.8%
Services 0.6% 1.3% 2.0% 2.7%
Total 1.6% 3.1% 4.7% 6.2%

Note: Migrant employment is assumed to be distributed as follows: 25 percent in agriculture, 15 percent in
fisheries, 40 percent in industry and 20 percent in services.
* For further details on the migrant workers’ contribution to the Thai GDP, please refer to
Philip Martin, The Economic Contribution of Migrant Workers to Thailand: Towards Policy Development,
International Labor Organization (ILO) Sub regional Office for East Asia, ILO/EU Asian Programme
on the Governance of Labour Migration, ILO/Japan Managing Cross-border Movement of Labour
in Southeast Asia, Bangkok, 2007
It is controversial whether migrant workers have a negative impact

on the status of Thai workers in the labour market. There are two
perspectives on this topic, each varying from one extreme to the other.
24
On the one hand, migrant workers and local workers are considered as
perfectly inter-changeable. As a result, it is often thought that the
entering of migrant workers into Thailand decreases the availability of
jobs for local Thai workers. On the other hand, it is argued that migrant
workers take on the jobs that local workers have abandoned. Regardless
of which view one may adopt, the presence of migrant workers in the
Thai labour market may encourage local workers to avoid migrant jobs,
or so-called 3D jobs - dirty, difficult and dangerous.14
In fact, migrant workers are considered to be both substitutes and

complements to national workers. Their presence undoubtedly affects
wages as well as employment options for local workers. The degree to
which migrants can be substitutes for or complements to national
workers varies according to factors ranging from the workers’ respective
characteristics to technologies of production, and from the nature of
work to product markets.15 For example, in the border districts, we can
associate lower wages with a higher share of migrants. As a result of the
large numbers of unregistered migrants, the latter seem to be the main
factor in putting downward pressure on Thai wages.
Although it is obvious from the above consideration that many

semi- and low-skilled goods and services consumed by Thai people are
mostly produced by migrant workers from Burma, the importance of
their existence in Thailand is still practically not recognized by the Thai
government when it comes to the formation of border perceptions and
migration. The Thai nation-state’s imagined boundary and definition of
Shan migrant workers have framed Thai people’s ideology, in a way that
Shan workers become marginalized. This kind of “prejudice” is
repeatedly reflected in the Thai mass media, creating the image of
14 Martin, The Economic Contribution of Migrant Workers to Thailand: Towards Policy

Development, International Labour Organization (ILO) Sub regional Office for East Asia,
ILO/EU Asian Programme on the Governance of Labour Migration, ILO/Japan Managing
Cross-border Movement of Labour in Southeast Asia, Bangkok, 2007, p.15
Cross-border Movement of Labour in Southeast Asia, Bangkok, 2007.
25
Burma migrant workers as aliens, “dirty and dangerous, and the source
of all social problems”16. This attitude creates a bias in viewing the
migration issue, particularly among policy-makers.
In conclusion, Thai people are still consuming goods and services

which are mostly produced and provided by Burma migrant workers.
Hence, one can not overlook the fact that Thai people live in association
with Shan migrant workers, who represent the largest group of migrant
workers in northern Thailand. This is the starting line from which the
research was launched.
4 - The Migration Legal Framework in Thailand

According to Chantavanich (2006), the country’s immigration
policies can be divided into 4 periods: the first period being the area-
based, non-quota system that took place from 1992 to 1998, and the
second being the area and quota-based system from 1999 to 2000. The
third was the amnesty policy that occurred from 2001 to 2003. Finally,
the last and most recent period was the second amnesty in 2004-2005.
The chronology of registration policies is shown below.
The most recent immigration policy that has been exercised is the
registration procedure for all migrants from Burma, the Lao PDR and
Cambodia at the Ministry of Interior (MOI). The registration system
comprises two main parts. One needs to register at the MOI in order to
get permission to stay and seek employment in Thailand until the
designated deadline. For example, migrants who registered in July 2004
were given permission to stay until 30 June 2005. Once one gets
permission and finds employment, he or she needs to apply to the
Ministry of Labour (MOL) for a work permit which is valid for up to one
year.
16Kerdmongkol and Karnjanadit, Burmese Migrant Workers and Violence, midnight2545,

2002 <http://www.midnightuniv.org/midnight2545/document9652.html> [in Thai]
26
As the registration policy states that a migrant has to find

employment before applying for a work permit, a loophole in the policy
is thus created, allowing the employer to play a key role in directing the
migrant’s ability to apply for a work permit and to extend it. Moreover,
the system is problematic in itself due to the workers’ dependent
condition on their employers. Workers who registered with a specific
employer were given permits valid for only one year, restricted to that
particular employer. If their employment were terminated, so would
their legal status in Thailand (MAP Foundation, 2007). In addition,
employers usually keep the work permit in their possession, giving the
worker a mere photocopy in order to limit his or her ability to leave for
another job. In this case, migrants are often exploited by their present
employers.
As the registration in 2004 was gratis for migrants, the number of

registered migrants doubled those who registered in 2001 and 2002. This
assumes that there had been a large number of illegal migrants who had
been working in Thailand without being previously registered.
However, migrants who arrived in Thailand after 31 July 2004 have not
been permitted to register. This lack of continuity in the registration
policy has consequently contributed to the government’s inability to
estimate the actual number of migrants and the resulting greater number
of illegal migrant workers.
The time of enforcement of migrant registration according to the

Thai Immigration Law (1978) is also problematic. It allows Shan migrant
workers to register after their entry into Thailand. This enables illegal
brokers to exploit irregular Shan migrant workers due to their need of
alien and work permit cards. I would recommend that the card
registration procedure take place before migration in order to minimize
the current illegal influx of Shan migrant workers. Moreover, the Thai
government should adjust the total cost of the registration process to an
affordable price in order to gradually restrict the role of illegal brokers.
27
Chronology of Registration Policies for Migrant Workers in Thailand (1992-2000)

Administration Anand Chavalit Chuan
Year 1992 1996 1998 1999 2000
Policies Allow migrant Regulate and Regulate and - Regulate and control the
workers to be control the control the employment of illegal migrant
employed in 9 employment employment workers only in the unskilled
border of illegal of illegal labour sector
provinces migrant migrant - Arrest and deport illegal
workers in workers only migrant workers who did not
unskilled in the register
labour and unskilled - Promote the employment of
house work labour sector Thai workers
Measure/Implementation
Workers'
Nationality Burmese Burmese, Laotian, Cambodian
Procedure Medical check-up Medical check-up and social security card
9 border
Area 43 provinces 54 provinces 37 provinces
provinces
Sector of
5 sectors 24 sectors 47 sectors 18 sectors
Employment
Quota Not specified 106,684 persons Unlimited
Duration of
4 years 2 years 1 year
Work Permit
Department of Employment, Department Department of Employment,

Government Ministry of Labour and Social of Provincial Ministry of Labour and Social
Office in Welfare Administra- Welfare
Charge tion, Ministry
of Interior
28
Chronology of Registration Policies for Migrant Workers in Thailand (2001-2005)

Thaksin
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Source: Chantavanich (2006), in a paper presented at the 2007 Conference on “International Migration, Multi-local Livelihoods and Human
- First - Extension of the first - Second - Extension of the
amnesty to all amnesty to all illegal migrant amnesty to all second amnesty
illegal migrant workers in the unskilled labour illegal migrant to all illegal migrant
Security: Perspectives from Europe, Asia and Africa.” At the Institute of Social Studies, the Hague, 29-30 August 2007.
workers in the
workers in the sector workers in the
unskilled labour
unskilled - Arrest all illegal migrants unskilled labour sector and to their
labour sector workers who do not register sector and to family members
- Promote the - Promote the employment of their family - Arrest all illegal
employment Thai workers members migrant workers
of Thai - Promote the who do not register
workers employment of - Promote the
employment of
Thai workers
Thai workers
Measure/Implementation
Burmese, Laotian, Cambodian
Medical check-up and social security card
76 provinces
2 major sectors:
11 sectors 6 sectors unskilled labour
and house work
409,339 814,247
Unlimited Unlimited
persons persons
1 year
Department of Department of Department of Employment, Department of

Employment, Employment, Ministry of Labour Employment,
Ministry of Labour Ministry of Ministry of Labour,
and Social Labour and and Department of
Welfare and Social Welfare Provincial
private company Administration,
Ministry of Interior
29
Chapter 2
A Comparative Analysis of the
Different Perceptions of Borders
and of the Cost-Benefit Assessment
Between the Thai Government,
Shan Migrant Workers, Thai Employers
and Informal Brokers
1 - Human Security and Migration

1.1 - Human Insecurities in Burma as Factors
in Migration
“People move because of some threat to security or to

improve their security. In so doing, they are often seen as a
threat to the security of the receiving population, or at least
sections thereof, particularly if the movement is large enough
in numerical terms or dissimilar enough in qualitative terms.”
(Graham, 2000)
In Wongboonsin’s work on Human Security and Transnational

Migration, she points out that the transnational migration of labourers in
Thailand is induced by the problem of human insecurity within the
countries of origin and results in a widening and deepening scope of
31
human insecurity in both sending and receiving countries.17 At this

point, I would like to clarify the dimensions and extent of threat and
security in the above argument which is also referred to in this research.
To Shan migrant workers, insecurity can be visible or perceivable only
when the previous or current conditions of life are threatened. When
people perceive threats to their immediate security, they often become
less tolerant. The oppression and perceptions of injustice of Shan people
inflicted by the Burma military, who invade their villages, take their
food and land - the first two priorities in their hierarchy of needs - have
led to a violent protest and armed conflicts against authoritarianism
between the Shan and Burmese armies. These situations have also
motivated Shan local people to migrate to where they believe they can
broaden their range of choices in terms of economy, food, health and
personal/political security. Moreover, their destination needs to be a
place where they believe they can exercise these choices safely and
freely, where they can be relatively confident that the opportunities they
have today will not be totally lost tomorrow.18
In the case of Shan migrant workers, migration is also driven by the

many images and messages emitted particularly from Thailand through
the development of global communications and entertainment networks.
Shan migrant workers mostly receive outside information through radio
and television. Personal networks also play a significant role through the
accounts of returning migrant workers of life outside Burma. It has
helped to expand awareness of life beyond the borders and to create the
image of a more civilized and secure lifestyle in Thailand. “Imagination
and Hope of Betterment” (according to Shan informants corresponds to
the comparatively higher number of choices at the destination) and is the
17 Wongboonsin, Human Security and Transnational Migration: The Case in Thailand (The 21st
Century Centre of Excellence Programme “Policy Innovation Initiative: Human Security

Research in Japan and Asia”, Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University,
Japan, 2004).
18พรพิมล ตรี โชติ, ชนกลุ่มน้อยกบรั
ั ฐบาลพมา่ , กรุ งเทพฯ: สํานักงานกองทุนสนับสนุนการวิจยั และมูลนิธิโครงการตําราสังคมศาสตร์ และมนุษยศาสตร์ ,
2542, หน้า 51-90.
Trichot, The Burmese Government and the Ethnic Minority Groups [In Thai] (The Thailand
Research Fund and The Foundation for The Promotion of Social Sciences and Humanities
Textbooks Project, Bangkok, 1999), pp.51-90.
32
push factor influencing Shan migrant workers’ cost and benefit assess-
ment of migration.
However, whether Shan migrant workers can achieve the aim of

widening their choices and whether a new form of insecurity must be
traded off for the achievement of another will be discussed in the
following section.
1.2 - More Human Securities or Less Human Insecurities?

The Post-Migration Situation in Thailand
Labour movements from the Shan State into Thailand create multi-
dimensional impacts on both source and destination countries at micro
and macro levels, affecting not only the migrant at an individual level,
but also their family and community, and at national and regional levels.
This issue is raised in order to explain how the forms and conditions of
human insecurity change after the migration process.
1.2.1 - At the Individual Migrant Level
Due to their illegal status and lack of skills, in the short term
perspective, illegal Shan migrant workers are at risk of poor and abusive
working conditions, coupled with irregular income. This economic
insecurity causes both the unplanned or extended migration time frame
in Thailand and their chronic migration after returning to the Shan State.
In the short term, some may enjoy higher wages, but in the long run,
some may end up in an unsustainable professional life in Thailand
fraught with not only financial problems (debt repayments for migration
fees and relatively higher living costs), but also with fewer opportunities
in terms of skill development or even, in some cases, basic education. In
this situation, it can be argued that the freedom of migrant workers’ in
professional terms is defined by different actors such as the military
government in Burma, Thai brokers, Thai employers and the Thai
government. In terms of health insecurity, their hope of gaining a higher
number of socio-economic choices has led to their assessment of health
33
risks from poor working conditions as a mere trade-off for their higher
income in Thailand.
Most Shan migrant workers believe that it is more secure to work in Thailand than in
Burma. The way in which they perceive securities varies from one life condition to the
other at a given place and time. Their insecure professional life in Burma is expressed
through the lack of freedom in selecting jobs, in daily life and in managing their income.19
However, conditions of insecurity in Thailand exist in different forms.
“At home we are treated by the Burmese government unequally. We are forced to
behave and follow the government’s unjust rules and orders. We cannot refuse the
military if they want to take our agricultural products and possessions. Moreover, we are
prohibited to teach and learn our Tai Yai language. I once was arrested by the military on
this unfair charge and forced to sign a document stating that we will not continue to study
our language.”
“Although it is easier to live and work in Thailand, we are treated unequally by Thai
employers. We are often threatened to be fired and sent back to Burma if we ask for
holidays or sick leave.”
Source: พรสุ ข เกดสวาง
ิ ่ (บรรณาธิ การ), คนทอตะวัน : สิ บบทสนทนากับผู้ลภี้ ัย
และแรงงานอพยพจากประเทศพม่ า , เชียงใหม่, ไทย, เพื่อนไร้พรมแดน, 2545, หน้า 5-6, 13-14.
Pornsuk Kerdsawang (ed.), Kon Tor Ta Wan: Ten Conversations with Refugees/ Displaced Persons and Migrant
Workers from Burma [In Thai] (Chiang Mai, Thailand, Pern Rai Pom Dann, 2002), pp. 5-6, pp.13-14.
“The broker system manages the chronic selling of migrant workers. This means that
migrant workers go from one broker to the other until one of them manages to sell them
to an employer for the highest price. This chronic selling causes the chronic debt to each
new broker. As a result, an amount is deducted from their salary each month in order to
pay the broker’s fee. Consequently, the possibility of acquiring savings to expand their
choices and opportunities becomes almost unattainable. Most are unaware of their rights
and describe their circumstances as sheer bad luck. After a certain period of time, some
of them choose to save money in order to move back to their original country.”
Source: A MAP (Migrant Assistance Programme) Foundation Staff, interviewed by the author at the MAP
Foundation, Chiang Mai, Thailand, February-March 2008
19 Such as their commitment to military provisioning and unpaid labour.

34
To summarize the issue of Shan migration in relation to human

security, the number of choices and the opportunity to utilize these
choices are indicators of improved conditions at the destination, not only
for the individual but also for his/her children and the rest of the family
back in the Shan State.
“There is nothing here to compare to the big roads and department stores in Chiang Mai
at all. I know many people who moved to work in Thailand and later decided not to go
back to the Shan State because they started getting used to the modern life in the big
cities. I think they just can not stand the simple life back here. There is nothing to buy.”
Source: A Shan migrant worker who lives on the Burma side of the border with Thailand where she has worked
for 10 years until now, interviewed by the author, February-March 2008
“Everything in Rayong is better than the conditions back home. We earn more money
more easily here, so we can save enough money to send back home every month.
Moreover, there are a lot of “massage parlours” here, too.”
Source: A 17-year-old Cambodian male migrant worker, interviewed by the author in Rayong province,
February-March 2008
Thus, in this sense, it is not necessarily the greater availability of

commodities at the destination, but rather the command over goods and
services, whether self-produced or otherwise, that attract migrant
workers. Choices, to Shan migrant workers, refer to choices in terms of
commodity possession. The more money they earn, the more
commodities they can obtain, coupled with the relatively higher living
standard in Thailand.
“In the Mae Suai District, only two percent of Shan people are involved in crime or illegal
drug trade. To us, we feel neutral towards Shan people. Most of them work and live a
simple life, without causing so many problems compared to hill tribes. If we compare
Shan migrant workers to Thai workers who are at a similar socio-economic transition, we
think the former develops their economic status much better than the latter. This might
be explained by the stronger need for Shan migrant workers, whose status is alien here,
to improve their socio-economic conditions and by their willingness to struggle.”
Source: A policeman from Mae Suai police station, Chiang Mai, Thailand, interviewed by the author in Chiang
Mai, August-September 2008
35
Nevertheless, Shan migrant workers seem to ignore the costs of this

so-called betterment, often demanding higher investment, such as bribes
to local Thai policemen as a guarantee to ignore their illegal status in
Thailand.
“It is difficult to bring a charge against Thai employers when migrant workers do not
receive the full amount of their salary. It is widely known that bribery exists between Thai
employers and local authorities, not to mention the informal agreement between informal
brokers and Thai employers regarding debt collection (bribery fee and broker fee),
deducted from the employee’s salary. ”
Source: A Shan migrant worker who used to work in Thailand and has now moved back to Tachilek, Burma,
interviewed by the author in Tachilek, February-March 2008
In conclusion, there seems to be some recklessness in the

assessment of costs and benefits on the part of Shan migrant workers,
since they mostly assess improved conditions by the value of money
they can earn from working in Thailand. On the contrary, they forget to
take working conditions and the availability of merely temporary jobs
into account. As a result, they can not live on a regular basis and rely
more and more on the notion of chance.
1.2.2 - At the Household Level
Improved human security at the household level can be expected

from migrant remittances. Many Shan migrant workers perceive the
contribution of their migration to their household back in the Shan State
merely in financial terms. However, the remittance may not improve
their family’s living and economic conditions. In this research, we may
find that most Shan migrant workers are subject to recruitment fees.
“The most common practice of human trafficking is the phenomenon of bringing Shan
migrant workers from their hometown in the Shan State to the Burma-Thailand border via
informal brokers, who either demand payment of travelling fees at the place of origin if
funds are available, or collect it as a debt at the destination. After that, they will be taken
to find jobs. Although the broker’s fees start at a fixed rate, the Shan migrant workers are
not informed of the other costs that will be incurred, nor are they made aware of the
36
specific place they will be taken to, who they will work for, their salary details, the terms
of employment or the debt that often follows. When they left their homes, none of the
Shan migrant workers knew exactly how much the trip to Thailand would cost, nor did
they learn of the specific patterns of the travelling route. As a result, most of their savings
they made from working in Thailand are spent to reimburse the recruitment fee.”
Source: A Shan migrant worker who used to work in Thailand and has now moved back to Taung Gyi, Burma,
interviewed by the author in Taung Gyi, February-March 2008
As a result, these remittances become the main source of funding to

pay back debts and interests. The financial burden created by the
migration determines how long the migrants work in Thailand,
depending on each informant’s situation. However, for some families,
remittances play a prime role in minimizing household economic
poverty and improving housing, education and healthcare.
“I migrated to Thailand about 40 years ago because I think it is easier to earn money and
to make a living in Thailand than in Burma. After I had worked for a certain period of time
and had gathered some savings, I bought a piece of land and put my daughter’s name
on the title deed, as I did not get Thai nationality, but my daughter who was born in
Thailand did”.
Source: A 65 and 60 year-old Shan couple in Bann Rom Po Thong, Tha Ko Town, Mae Suai District, Chiang
Rai, Thailand, interviewed by the author in Chiang Rai, February-March 2008
Even though the real benefits of these remittances are often

questionable as to whether they are spent towards a productive invest-
ment or wasted on luxury non-productive consumption, remittances can
help provide a stimulus for local suppliers and local industry.
However, outward migration from the Shan State is also likely to
cause family problems. The sizeable number of Shan female workers
migrating to work in Thailand has produced a social and cultural gap of
gendered contribution in the private sphere in Burma, creating a
distortion in family- and child-care.
37
As people leave with the expectation of socio-economic benefits at the destination, the
demographic trend of Shan-Thai people from old Shan villages in north-eastern Shan
State and rural areas in northern Thailand has resulted in an aging society. On the other
hand, upon examining the recent Shan migrant workers in Thailand overall, specifically in
urban areas, its demographic trend is increasingly full of young and working-age migrant
workers.
Source: Local authorities who work at Tachilek police station in Burma, interviewed by the author in Tachilek,
February-March 2008
1.2.3 - At the Community Level
Even though remittances may represent a considerable contribution

to some families and even their community, they may also increase, and
therefore worsen, the income gap between people and households
within a certain community.
“The problem that has recently surfaced in our community is the lack of human resources
within social work. The media and the neighbours who receive remittances give new
meanings to money and its value, which then have a profound influence on young Shan
people’s perception of money. Their lack of choices and cases of successful migrant
workers in Thailand considerably push them to struggle for higher education or more
money-making jobs, thus leaving their former identity.”
Source: Local authorities who work at Tachilek police station in Burma, interviewed by the author, February-
March 2008
“Their friends and relatives networks that are currently working or used to work in
Thailand have a considerable influence on their decision to migrate. A simple story of
better infrastructure, higher wages and higher purchasing power effectively attracts Shan
local people to migrate with the expectation of experiencing the same things. Bad
experiences of migration to Thailand within their social networks are assessed by this
group as unavoidable bad luck.”
Source: Local authorities who work at Tachilek police station in Burma, interviewed by the author, February-
March 2008
The examples of successful Shan migrant workers induce more

migration from the Shan State to Thailand.
38
1.2.4 - At the National Level
-Boosting economic growth in the labour receiving country-

Thai employers can enjoy cheaper Shan labourers, helping to fill the
gaps in 3D (Dangerous, Dirty, Difficult) tasks avoided by domestic
workers. Also, Thailand, as the labour-importing country, can use the
availability of Shan migrant workers as a tool to keep a lid on rising
wages.20 This means consumers generally benefit from cheaper goods
and more affordable services, such as cheaper Shan maids who an
increasing number of Thais are employing. Semi and unskilled jobs,
which are mostly performed by Shan migrant workers, have contributed
to higher production with lower costs for the export market and have
come to be associated with the increase of the Thai national income.
Thus, Shan migrant workers’ mobility can be seen as a variable boosting
Thai economic activity.21
Nevertheless, there are still concerns and dissatisfaction among
domestic workers who are afraid that the influx of Shan migrant workers
is synonymous with the displacement of local workers and the
depression of their wages.
“We treat both Thai and migrant workers all the same. However, I think other Thai
employers prefer to hire Shan migrant workers due to the cheaper wages. They are easy
to control and order. At least they can understand Thai better than Burmese or Karen
migrant workers can.”
Source: A Thai employer who owns an agricultural farm and hires Shan migrant workers, interviewed by the
author in Chiang Mai, Thailand, February-March 2008
-Negative impacts on long-term economic development-

The unsystematic flows of Shan migrant workers not only lead to
the failure of the Thai government to control the invisible flows of labour

Cross-border Movement of Labour in Southeast Asia, Bangkok, 2007, pp.15-16.
21 The Institute of Asian Studies, Migrant Workers from Burma to Thailand, for a seminar
“Reviewing Policies and Creating Mechanisms to Protect Migrant Workers”,

Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 2003, pp. 17-19.
39
migration, but also affect the possibility for Thailand and Burma to reach
higher capacities for their national economies and, especially in the case
of Thailand, to upgrade its international competitiveness. According to
the ADB22, Thailand is classified as a middle-income country moving
towards more skill-intensive activities and production. Thus, as a result
of the great influx and availability of low-skilled Shan migrant workers,
both the governmental and private sector are less motivated to invest in
more productive human resources, which is the main factor in gaining
higher competencies in the world market. This has minimized the
country’s ability to move into higher value-added economic activities. In
the short term perspective, it may seem that Thailand gains huge
benefits from cheap Shan labour. However, in the long run, the country
will not be able to avoid facing severe competition from countries with
high technological capacities and labour-intensive strategies of
development, given the fact that the number of industrial countries with
outsourcing market strategies is greatly increasing.23
In turn, Burma, being the country that is sending its labour force
elsewhere, is also losing the opportunity to develop its human resources
of people of working age. Adequate human resources would have
enabled the country to optimize its economic capacity and to be included
in the category of middle-income countries at a further stage.24
Furthermore, with the minimal opportunities to develop labour skills
while working in Thailand, these Shan migrant workers remain low-
skilled labourers and unavoidably become part of the aging population,
thus carrying a financial burden to society, rather than building a
productive workforce. Unless awareness of this circle of circumstance is
raised, the economic drive of the entire ASEAN region toward acquiring
22 Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asian Development Outlook 1998, Manila, 1998, cited in
Wongboonsin, Human Security and Transnational Migration: The Case in Thailand, Keio
University, Japan, 2004, p.21.

Japan, 2004), pp.21-25
24 Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asian Development Outlook 1998, Manila, 1998, cited in
Wongboonsin, Human Security and Transnational Migration: The Case in Thailand, Keio
University, Japan, 2004, p.22
40
the sustained opportunities and choices for people to lead their daily
lives and achieve the basic human needs of food, shelter, clothing,
education and healthcare to their highest potential, may take too long.
1.2.5 - At the Regional Level
-Regional cooperation on international migration in ASEAN-

Labour-exporting countries are keen to lower the barriers to
international labour migration, while labour-importing countries have
asymmetrical policies that regard the import of unskilled/semi-skilled
workers as politically and socially sensitive, and are more inclined to
favour flows of professional/skilled workers and business persons.25
This situation is reflected in ASEAN cooperation. Prospects of an

ASEAN free labour market remain remote as the vision for the ASEAN
Economic Community, which is hoped to be realized by 2020, includes
only free movement of skilled labour. Cooperation is still limited on the
core migration issues, such as orderly recruitment of migrant workers,
protection of migrant workers’ rights, acceptance of asylum seekers,
compensation for the loss of skilled workers and the facilitation of
circular migration and remittance flows. However, in reality, the influx
of unskilled labourers within ASEAN is increasing heavily and the Thai
government is failing to systematically manage its flow in accordance
with legal procedures. My concern is that the lack in addressing this
unsystematic migration movement represents an important barrier for
ASEAN to reach the goal of the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) in
2015 regarding the regulation of international migration flow.26 These

Japan, 2004)
26 United Nations (ESCAP: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
Pacific), Ten as One: Challenges and Opportunities for ASEAN Integration, Bangkok, 2007. The
Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) establishes several areas of cooperation as the
following: 1) Investment and Financial Flows; 2) Trade Integration; 3) Management of
International Migration Flows; 4) Control of Communicable Diseases and their Spread
across Borders; 5) Environment Sustainability; 6) Energy Security; 7) Information
Infrastructure; 8) Transport Infrastructure.
41
failures are partly due to the low level of collaboration between

governments and employers, especially to the reluctance of employers in
labour-importing countries to commit themselves to improve the
migrants’ working conditions and skills.
What is still missing in the regional context is an institution

established to formulate labour migration policies and to implement
these on a regional level. I believe that the analysis of the perceptions of
borders and the migration costs and benefits assessment of each actor
involved constitute the essential ingredient that can lead to a new
framework of human migration, borders and human security for policy-
makers to approach and use in identifying the migration problem.
2 - Three Actors’ Perceptions of Borders,

Their Cost-Benefit Assessment and the Migration
of Shan Migrant Workers
2.1 - The Thai Government’s Perception of Borders:
Legal Borders vs. Social Borders
The objective of this section will be to identify how the different

perceptions and functions of borders between the Thai government, Shan
migrant workers, Thai employers, and informal brokers shape the
migration behaviours of Shan migrant workers and perpetuate the
illegal migration phenomenon. In order to do so, we will engage in an
in-depth analysis on how the various definitions and functions of borders
according to the Thai nation-state and its active body, the Thai
government, were formed and have effectively influenced governmental
immigration policies at both macro and micro levels.
“In the indigenous polity in which the power field of a

supreme overlord radiated like a candle’s light, the tiny tributaries
were always located in the overlapping arena of the power fields. In
the indigenous interstate relations, the overlapping margin of two
power fields was not necessarily considered a problem unless it
42
served as a bridge for the enemy to invade. For a modern state,

however, the overlapping frontier is not permissible. The division
of territorial sovereignty between states must be clear-cut at the
point where both power fields interface. To transform a pre-modern
margin to a modern territorial interface, or to create a modern edge
of a state out of a pre-modern shared space, there could be more
than one possible boundary, and all of them would be equally
justified because the boundary could be anywhere within the
overlapping arena, depending on how the sovereignty of a
tributaries was decided.”
In the wake of modern state boundaries, administration, boundary

demarcation and mapping are equipped to keep boundaries fixed and
sovereignty exclusive.27
“There has always been a tension between the fixed, durable and
inflexible requirements of national boundaries and the unstable and
flexible requirements of people. If the principle fiction of the nation-state
is ethnic, racial, linguistic and cultural homogeneity, then borders
always give the lie to this construct.”28 According to Anderson29, borders
(which Anderson refers to as frontiers) are both institutions and
processes. In order to maintain state sovereignty and rights to individual
citizenship, borders were institutionalized and employed by state
governments. Borders function through the imagination of each
individual within the state boundaries. Borders, thus, are made capable
to control the people within them. Given this, they create a sense of both
political and social separateness and otherness. This function of borders
simultaneously excludes people who live in the border areas from
national society. Borders emphasize people’s heterogeneity and create the
phenomenon that distinguishes them from homogeneous and powerful
zones at the state core. In other words, borders are also recognized by
27 Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu, University of

Hawaii Press, 1997), pp.100-101.
28 Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 1994
29 Malcom Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World, 1996
43
Anderson as the markers of political and socio-cultural identities of both

the people and the modern state.30
In an era of the cultural globalization and internationalization of

economics and politics, the modern idea of defined legal borders has
appeared, as opposed to the traditional concept of fluid borders. My
concern is that globalization and liberalization have opened the border
and eased state controls for high-skilled workers, but have limited the
movements of low-skilled workers, including their goods, capital and
information. It is controversial that the nation-state in the era of
capitalism demands a greater number of cheap labourers to fulfil its
economic objectives, while it imposes selective immigration policies on
migrants, especially low-skilled workers. In the case of the Thai
government, they have to balance the needs of the nation’s two public
entities: the Thai employers’ demand for cheap labour and the Thai
working-class opposition to surpluses of foreign workers who increase
competitiveness within the labour market. The government has to
control potential effects on national unemployment, a drain on public
and private funds, and public dissatisfaction, while maximizing its
national economic capacities and interests. Borders for the Thai
government sometimes serve as a tool to define the eligibility of required
cheap migrant workers, and often act as a screen or filter which
functions through a defensive legal wall. Borders, in this sense, determine
who is eligible for the governmental protection of human security.
However, many studies on borders and boundaries with regard to

migration, when tracing the evolution of national and international
boundaries and examining their structures and functions, are mostly
focused on the formal arrangements made between states, often failing
to take into account the needs, desires and other realities of the people
who live at the borders, as well as the cultural significance of borders to
the people living there.31
30 Donnan and Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State, p. 5.

31 Donnan and Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State, p. 11.
44
The Thai government’s perceptions of physical and geographical

borders can not solely explain the perpetuating illegal migration
phenomenon. Addressing how the definition of social borders among the
locals influence their migration will attempt to supplement the yet-
lacking correspondence of border perceptions between state and non-
state actors, which is the main barrier to decreasing the degree of illegal
and unsystematic migration. Social borders, in the case of Shan migrant
workers, are interpreted according to their socio-economic benefits. They
simply perceive the border areas along the Shan State of Burma and
northern Thailand as “the same social borders where individuals are
aware that they share a common status, that they are a single social
category.”32 The transfusion of racial, linguistic and other cultural
characteristics of the Tai ethnic group who live primarily in the Shan
State and northern Thailand has formed a cultural homogeneity for the
sake of socio-economic benefits. However, the legal borders imposed by
Burma and Thai legislation have become a significant factor in
separating insiders from outsiders in terms of both legal status and
social identity. I would like to conclude that perceptions of social borders
among Shan migrant workers overlap each other when it comes to
determining their migration behaviour.
2.1.1 - Benefits
In conclusion, borders according to the Thai government serve as

both a geo-political and economic line dividing two nation-states that
practice two different legal systems and economies. Borders are
formalized as a mechanism to create a sense of superiority towards the
other and unity among their own, whereby a status of inferiority is
attributed to illegal migrant workers, such as the Shan, who are
considered an economic threat to Thailand due to decreasing job
opportunities. Imagined borders are also utilized to formulate
governmental immigration policies, which fluctuate between restrictive
and welcoming ones depending on the economic demand of cheap
migrant workers.
Merton, ‘Social Theory and Social Structure’, in “Social Borders: Defintions of Diversity”,
32
Current Anthropology, vol.16, no.1, 1975, pp.53-72

45
Furthermore, borders defined by the nation-state lead to the

emergence of local powers governing access to social and public services
in Thailand. Thai local authorities, such as border patrol policemen or
local government officers, at the border areas exploit the virtual
existence of border lines and deportation laws as a means to gain both
power and money from illegal Shan migrant workers.
2.1.2 - Costs
The differences and lack of common perceptions of borders

between the Thai government and non-state actors (Shan migrant
workers, Thai employers and informal brokers) are the main factors
perpetuating the illegal and unsystematic flow of Shan migrant workers
to Thailand. This situation is costly for the government both directly and
indirectly. In financial terms, huge national budgets are spent on
preventing and deporting illegal migrant workers. At the same time, the
government fails to organize the national budget on social welfare for
the unnumbered migrant workers.33
According to the Thai national budget in 2008, 43.4 percent of 19.6 percent of the
national budget in general administration was allocated to national security.
41.9 per cent of the national budget was spent on the community - education, public
welfare and social work.
It is controversial that the national budget on community and social

welfare, which is supposed to be allocated for Thai citizens, is largely
consumed by migrant workers by means of social services such as public
health and education. This problem remains ineffectively managed
mainly due to the unavailability of reliable statistics on migrants and
their consumption in Thailand. Furthermore, as a consequence of illegal
and unsystematic migration, border problems such as the trafficking of
humans, drugs, and illicit goods have risen and have become more
33Although statistics are provided in Table 4, the government numbers are not reliable as
the migration flow fluctuates from one day to the other.
46
severe over time. In an effort to control this, the state allocates a greater
number of human resources to patrol the borders.
2.2 - Shan Migrant Workers’ Perception of Borders:

Borderless or Ethnic Borders - An Interpretation of
Socio-Economic Demand
A Border commonly refers to the modern concept of nation-state

boundaries, which is a static dividing line, developed and employed by
political geographers. These kinds of national boundaries deal with its
form, rather than its functions. This is a systematic accompaniment to
the building of modern nation-states. An individual state is forced to
form the more specific definitions of the locations of boundaries in order
to claim the nation’s wealth and political unit contained within that
defined territory.34
The borders, which are the main subject of this section, can not be
understood in the above definition of boundaries. It can not be denied
that modern boundaries constitute a formidable legal barrier in terms of
migration. Nonetheless, in the societies along the borders of the Shan
State and northern Thailand, this research has found that Shan people do
not wholeheartedly perceive or commit themselves, whether economic-
ally and culturally, to either the Shan State or Thailand. Socio-economic
assessment has become the significant factor in defining their social
identity. 35
34 Petras, ‘The role of national boundaries in cross-national labor market’ in Cohen, Robin
(ed.), The Sociology of Migration, pp.494-500.
35 Please refer to Shan informants in Table 6 in Chapter2
Tinker, ‘Burma’s Northeast Borderland Problems’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 29, no. 4, 1956,
pp.324-325.
47
Tachilek-Mae Sai River
Tachilek (Shan State of Burma)-Mae Sai (Chiang Rai of Thailand) Border
48
Tachilek-Mae Sai Border
According to a Thai-Shan informant who lives in Tachilek, a border town along the Thai-
Burma border, some Shan villagers hold identification cards from both countries. This
dual ownership is mostly acquired through official paper fraud among local networks.
Their social identity, formally approved by their legal paper identity, fluctuates and is
defined based on socio-economic benefits.
Over the period of boundary demarcation, the individual nation-

state attempts to integrate as many frontier peoples as possible in order
to accumulate human resources, natural resources and land.36 Deprived
of ethnic and social trust, the resistance from the Shan army and the quiet
social conflicts among Shan individuals toward the Burmese govern-
ment has risen during this process. The extremely unequal distribution
of income and social welfare at the place of origin creates an impetus
that drives Shan migrant workers to move near or across the borders
where there may have perceivably greater socio-economic opportunities.
36 Donnan and Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State, p.15.
49
Life along the Tachilek-Mae Sai Border
The existence of national boundaries creates concepts of cross-

border activities, such as human migration, and requires the
establishment of a governing administration. In other words, the
movements of migrants need to be approved by both the sending and
receiving states by means of formal administration. An individual
person’s identity and travelling rights are defined by passports,
passbooks, visas, and work permits. The governmental definition of
boundaries as the legal spatial delimitation of nations is applied to people
on both sides of the Thai-Burma border, neglecting sociological
attributes.
“Few people cross many boundaries, and when they compare one
boundary with another they naturally consider their own personal
experience; they usually have little opportunity and less inclination to
perceive the many functions which boundaries serve today and to
discover what the boundary means in the lives of the people concerned,
50
especially those who live nearest to the frontier.”37 Borders to Shan

migrant workers and local people, therefore, are various cultural zones
or spaces, independent from formal boundaries. This perception is out of
tune with the governmental view on the issue of migration.
“I think there is a very simple reason why most Shan people choose to go and find jobs
on the Thai side of the border. Wages in the Shan State are very low and jobs are rare.
People living along the Burma-Thailand border simply view the action of movement as a
day-to-day practice. No one really perceives that they are two different countries. Many
who are currently working or used to work in Thailand bring their friends or relatives to
work at the same workplace afterwards.”
Mrs. A: A Shan woman who has been living and trading along the Tachilek (in Burma) and Mae Sai (in
Thailand) border for more than 10 years, interviewed by the author in Tachilek, February-March 2008
As mentioned earlier, the existence of artificial nation-state

boundaries is more recognized than its functions for local people. It can
be explained that people in each delimited territory would not
necessarily recognize the status of the boundaries that have been agreed
to both by the individual state and its neighbours. “The recognition of
one state as an international unit by another state does not necessarily
assume that the recognizing state acknowledges the status of the
boundaries of the recognized state.”38
The following case study supports the above idea and the main
argument that the different perceptions and functions of borders among
the different actors and the lack of correspondence between them
perpetuate the flow of illegal migration.
The migration of people residing in the border areas is distinct from

that of ones staying farther inland from the borders. Shan migrant
workers from the Shan State clearly demonstrate their exclusive
perceptions of borders. Since they do not recognize the legal existence of
delimited boundaries, Shan migrant workers perceive the action of
Boggs, International Boundaries: A Study of Boundary Functions and Problems, p.3

37
38Cukwurah cited in Petras, ‘The role of national boundaries in cross-national labor

market’ in Cohen (ed.), The Sociology of Migration, op. cit., p.496.
51
Observation Hole on the Burma Side
Local Society along the Tachilek- Mae Sai River.

On the left, Thailand, and on the right, Burma
52
border-crossing as a general movement, not international migration,

derived from the evolution of modern boundaries. Consequently, they
lack the concept of committing their movement to formal state
immigration policies and legislation. Furthermore, the nature of the
borders39 virtually facilitates their ability to move, while making the
everyday informal deportation of Shan migrant workers by Thai border
patrol authorities at the border ineffective.
Due to the nature of the terrain such as non-patrolled forests and the long narrow rivers
separating the two countries, movement can be relatively free for both legal and illegal
migrant workers.
Therefore, people living along the border on both sides can just go back and forth freely
and easily every day.
The everyday informal practice of deportation by the receiving country and punishment
by the original country along the border does not correspond with the Thai governments’
immigration policies.
For example, on the Burma side, local authorities normally release the deported migrants
with no formal recording, but instead take bribes from them. And in some cases, they
allow or even help the arrested migrant workers to cross back into Thailand.
Source: A local authority from the Human Trafficking Department in the Tachilek area, interviewed by the author
in Tachilek, February-March 2008
Their behaviours in informal migration, such as cyclic migration,

daily migration, become illegal in the eyes of Thai government. This is
because there is a lack of correspondence between the borders defined
by these two different entities. Shan migrant workers acknowledge the
nature of borders more as cultural zones where the movement of people
along the borders implies a hidden meaning in their lives’ securities.
Examples of these securities are trading, working and earning money on
the other side of the border, thus affirming their economic securities at
both individual and household levels.
39 Interview with a local authority in the Human Trafficking Department in the Tachilek
area.
53
Informal Shops for Money Exchange along Tachilek-Mae Sai Border (Burma Side)
The functions of borders from a local perspective regarding to the

movements of humans and goods fluctuate between the informal and
formal governance of local authorities, which is somewhat conditioned
by local corruption and the connections between local authorities and
people.
On the other hand, the Thai nation-state perceives the concept of

state borders more in terms of a delimitation of geographical boundaries
- the invisible lines that separate the Thai state from others, whereby
“boundaries in the state mind are paper walls created by the contractual
relations with the mutual agreements among modern nation states.”40
40 Petras, Elizabeth, ‘The role of national boundaries in cross-national labor market’ in
Cohen, Robin (ed.), The Sociology of Migration, Cheltenham, UK and Brookfield, US, 1996,
p.496.
54
Immigration at the Burma-Thailand Border

(Thailand in the foreground, Burma in the background)
Migrant Registration at Chiang Mai Provincial Office of Labour and Social Welfare
55
2.2.1 - Benefits
According to the above case study on Shan migrant workers, the

border between Burma and Thailand is perceived as an indicator of their
potentially expanding choices in terms of income, benefitting from the
currency exchange rate from the expensive Thai Baht to the cheap Burma
Kyat, and access to public services such as education and health care,
which are inadequate in the district of origin.
The number of choices and the migrants’ capability to utilize these

choices indicate the improved conditions of human security at the
destination. According to Amartya Sen41, “capability of a person is a
freedom or ability of the person to choose the desired function of a
commodity and his command over it.” In the case of Shan migrant
workers, the higher capability or freedom, according to Sen’s definition,
expected through migration is not only for the individual, but also for
his/her children and the rest of the family back in the Shan State.
Migration, thus, is done with the expectation of expanding their
capability in their command over goods and services, in exchange of
cash which is not allowed at the place of origin under the authoritarian
regime.
2.2.2 - Costs
Choices, in the case of Shan migrant workers, refer to choices in

terms of the purchase and possession of commodities. The more money
they earn, the more commodities they can obtain, in addition to a
relatively higher living standard in Thailand. Yet Shan migrant workers
seem to ignore the costs of this so-called betterment. New forms of
economic and individual insecurity may appear from the beginning of
their migration process.
The degree of costs incurred by each migrant depends on the main
actors involved, therefore on Burma and/or Thai informal brokers,
Burma and Thai local authorities, the Thai government and Thai
employers. They unavoidably pay the price of becoming migrant
41 Sen, Inequality Re-examined, 1992, p.9

56
workers through the invisible health risks, unexpected accidents42,

unstable working conditions, the temporary nature of available jobs
(farming, construction, etc…), legal trouble, fraud, and bribery burden.
Use of pesticides on agricultural farms
Mrs. B’s hands are contaminated with pesticides from working on the orange farm.
However, she decided not to speak out about her health problem as she was worried she
would get fired. Her costs and benefits assessment of being a migrant worker in Thailand
was calculated with hope and fear, the hope to maintain her working status, and the fear
of losing her job due to her health problem.
To Shan migrant workers, economic security comes before health in the short term
perspective. Besides some technical problems, such as the language barrier and money
shortage, the long term and short term risks help explain this assumption. Or in other
words, their health problem presents too few symptoms to make them aware of it in the
short term, although it is an actual risk for the future.
Source: Mrs. Saowanee Auitakoon, a registered nurse at the Health Department for migrant workers mainly from
Cambodia and Burma, Rayong Hospital, Thailand, interviewed by the author in Rayong, February-March 2008
42 Interview with Mrs. Saowanee Auitakoon, a registered nurse at the Health Department
for migrant workers mainly from Cambodia and Burma, Rayong Hospital, Thailand,
interviewed by the author in Rayong, February-March 2008
57
A Shan migrant worker’s hands contaminated with pesticides
Based on this fact, questioning on how to promote health security for migrant workers is
a need for concern. Dr. Kittisak Klabde, Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of
Public Health of Thailand, has expressed that failing to provide migrant workers with
basic services will ultimately burden the health system and national well-being.
Hence, this issue is another significant problem to which the Thai government and
society need to pay more attention, for each year a huge amount of the governmental
budget acquired from Thai peoples’ taxes has been spent on health services for migrant
workers for the sake of everyone’s health security, but the results of preventing and
improving migrants’ health conditions have not been effective.
Source: Mrs. Saowanee Auitakoon, a registered nurse at the Health Department for migrant workers mainly from
Cambodia and Burma, Rayong Hospital, Thailand, interviewed by the author in Rayong, February-March 2008
58
Risks of accidents at a construction site
Shan migrant workers on an orange farm
59
“Functioning”, according to Amartya Sen, of Shan migrant workers

in pre- and post-migration is different. “Functioning or the use of a
commodity may determine the state of a person.” (Sen, 1992) Here, the
state refers to the utility or satisfaction met by using the commodity in a
specific way. Shan migrant workers might lack the freedom or ability to
choose the desired function of a commodity or/and to function their
possessed commodity at the place of origin.
Due to political coercion, forms of exploitation limiting the potential

functioning of commodities at the place of origin have manifested
themselves in the post-migration destination in different ways. The
essence is that their commodities and forced commitments to the Burma
military at the pre-migration situation are transferred to different actors
in post-migration. Commodities, such as agricultural products, and the
commitment to the military in the form of unpaid labour, are replaced
by new forms of exploitation such as bribes or gifts to Thai local
authorities and the new commitment to Thai legal requirements or
employers’ demands.
Low housing standard at a construction site
60
In conclusion, their potential to expand their commodities in

Thailand depends on informal brokers and Thai employers, while their
freedom or ability to utilize these commodities, such as education or
healthcare, as a migrant worker is stipulated by the approval of the Thai
government.
2.3 - Thai Employers’ and Informal Brokers’

Perception of Borders: Economic Advantages
from the Multi-Perceptions of Borders
Although human movements predate the globalization process, the
scale and scope of human migration have expanded to unprecedented
levels. The movement of people is, thus, one of the most fundamental
aspects of the idea of a shrinking world, where transactions, trade,
economic and cultural intercourse are conducted with fewer barriers of
physical distance.43
However, labour movements still seem to be the only feature
excluded from any free movements facilitated by the spirit of
globalization and liberalization. “There is a growing consensus in the
community of states to lift border controls for the flow of capital,
information, and services and, more broadly, to further globalization.
But when it comes to immigrants and refugees […] the national state
claims all its old splendor in asserting its sovereign right to control its
borders.”44 “Labor remains grounded by state boundaries and policies.
In the case of labor import, national boundaries have traditionally been
employed by the state in the interests of core capital to regulate the
quality and quantity of alien labor with scant interference from the
exporting government.”45 Ironically, too many restrictive immigration
policies lead to the increase in numbers of cases of alien smuggling. This
is because the recent restriction policies46 contradict each other over
43 Graham ‘The people paradox: Human movements and human security in a globalizing
world’ in Graham and Poku (eds.), Migration, globalisation and human security, pp.186-187.
44 Sassen, S., ‘Losing Controls? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization’, in Pecoud and
Guchteneire Migration without Borders, UNESCO and Berghahn, p.13.

45 Petras, Elizabeth, ‘The role of national boundaries in cross-national labor market’ in
Cohen, Robin (ed.), The Sociology of Migration, Cheltenham, UK and Brookfield, US, 1996,
p.495.
46 Please refer to Tables 9 and 10: The registration policies of migrant workers in Thailand
during 1992-2005. The unstable immigration policies lead to ineffective policy formulation
and implementation.
61
national boundaries: to a certain extent, they open borders to

international capitals and information, while failing to manage and
legalize a pool of foreign labourers who make use of the features of
globalization, such as the availability of transportation and linkages in
the migration system47, in seeking and migrating to the location where
their labour can be exchanged for more desirable wages and living
conditions.
In the regional and global free market, labourers become the most
popular commodities that function through middle non-state actors,
such as informal brokers, who the conventional state actors fail to take
into account in the migration phenomenon. They become a significant
entity in facilitating the illegal process of migration over the years. They
represent a legal grey zone48 both in the labour market and in border
areas to run the broker business of informal recruitment, a process that
had never existed in traditional human movements before the drawing
of nation-state boundaries. Informal brokers somewhat perceive the
theory of static clear-cut lines, as defined by the nation-states, but
simultaneously take advantage of the practice of fluid movements in
border areas.
2.3.1 - Benefits to informal brokers
Informal brokers benefit from the process of informal recruitment,

allowing them exclusive rights to dictate the conditions of repayment
and employment. First, concerning the repayment of broker fees, the
nature of the non-written contract between the broker and the Shan
47 Family and personal networks, the most influencing network to Shan migrant workers,
represent one of linkages between sending and receiving countries which favour chain
migration. Fawcett in Cohen (ed.) Migration, Diasporas and Transnationalism, pp.16-26.)
1) In the category of tangible/family and personal linkages, it refers to remittances and
written or face-to-face communications flowing between migrants at the destination and
their family or village members back home.
2) In regulatory/family and personal linkages, it can be explained by the culturally-based
family obligations of migrant workers. Person-to-person obligations among relatives and
fellow ethnics dictate the condition of sponsorship of potential migrants by former
migrants.
3) For relational/family and personal network linkages, the socio-economic disparity at the
micro level is a great motivation force for potential migrants. “Successful” Shan migrant
workers serve as role models, while “failure” of return Shan migrant workers are seen as
simple bad luck to the desperate.
48 A legal grey area in the border zones is where law enforcement fluctuates between the
informal and formal governance of local authorities based on the relationship between
informal brokers and border authorities.
62
migrant worker leads to trickery through the imposition of broker and

transportation fees, coupled with unstable and unfair interest rates.
Furthermore, informal brokers profit greatly from the chronic selling of
Shan migrant workers who are mostly incapable of paying off their huge
debts to their Thai employers. Second, being in command of their
employment status, informal brokers’ have the negotiating power for the
price of labourers, which varies according to the employers’ need for
cheap migrant workers and the availability of qualified labour. In order
to continue reaping the benefits from the broker business, informal
brokers accept to pay a certain amount of money to local border
authorities to guarantee their status outside legal lines.
“An amount was deducted from our salary on a monthly basis. We were told by our
broker that it was deducted for transportation and broker fees that we could not afford in
the first place, but he did not tell us how long these deductions would last. After I had
worked one year at my first job, the same broker brought me to another workplace in
Mae Hong Song (northern province of Thailand). It was an entertainment bar. I later
realized that I was sold to the bar owner and expected to work as a sex worker. I could
not stand those conditions for long. After two months, I escaped back to the Shan State
with another broker.”
Source: A Shan migrant worker who used to work in Thailand and has moved back to the Shan State,
interviewed by the author, February-March 2008
2.3.2 - Benefits to Thai employers
Thai employers view borders as a means to ensure the availability

of cheaper cross-national labourers. The hiring and use of Shan migrant
workers, a relatively cheaper commodity, is profitable for business. In
the agricultural sector, Thai employers not only cut costs by hiring cheap
Shan migrant workers, but also increase productivity by using pesticides
which have a highly detrimental effect on their health. Moreover, low-
standard accommodation and working conditions are commonplace in
any low-skilled migrant job sector. The practice of informal recruitment
and the existence of legal grey zones are at the root of these working
conditions, allowing Thai employers to enjoy a privileged space of non-
commitment to migrant lives.
63
“It is easy to find and hire migrant workers from Burma in this area. Many Shans who live
along the Burma-Thailand border just walk across the Mae Sai River and find jobs mostly
at construction sites or agricultural farms in Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai or Mae Hong Son.”
A border patrol policeman at Tachilek police station, Shan State, interviewed by the author in Tachilek,
February-March 2008
---o---
“It is widely known that every orange farm in Chiang Mai uses a lot of pesticides. It is
understandable. We just need to make sure that each year our productivity is sufficient
enough to earn profits.”
A Thai employer who owns an agricultural farm in Chiang Mai, interviewed by the author in Chiang Mai, August-
September 2007
---o---
“It is difficult for Burma migrant workers in Thailand to make any requests to their Thai
employers to claim their basic rights at work because they are hired illegally. There is no
legal protection that guarantees their safety over there.”
A policeman at the Human Trafficking Department, Taung Gyi, Shan State, interviewed by the author in Taung
Gyi, February-March 2008
2.3.3 - Costs to informal brokers and Thai employers
While informal brokers and Thai employers are reaping the benefits
from these various perceptions of borders, the legal risks of trafficking
and employing illegal Shan migrant workers come at a cost. Bribery and
voting for local authorities and politicians, such as village and township
heads, are thus common practices for many employers as a means to
manage these risks. Furthermore, nearby communities and the surroun-
ding environment are affected by contamination from the use of
pesticides on farms. Ironically, the contaminating products are distribut-
ed in the market where the buyers are Thai employers themselves as
well as other Thai people.
“Thai immigration legislation clearly stipulates that a Thai employer who intends to hire a
migrant worker from Burma, the Lao PDR or Cambodia needs to accompany the migrant
to apply for his/her visa and work permit. Furthermore, the amount of migrant workers
they intend to hire must not exceed a designated quota. An employer who refuses to
obey the law shall be arrested and fined.”
A government officer at the Provincial Labour Office of the Foreign Workers Administration in Chiang Mai,
interviewed by the author in Chiang Mai, August-September 2007
64
2.4 - The “Acquiescent Reciprocity”:

A factor in the migration phenomenon
In addition to the different perceptions and functions of borders,

socio-economic acquiescent reciprocity between the three entities is
another significant factor that characterizes 1) The trend or changes in
Thai immigration control 2) The migration behaviours of Shan migrant
workers and 3) The degree of adherence to the law of Thai employers
and informal brokers.
Acquiescent Reciprocity between the Thai government,

Shan migrant workers, Thai employers and informal brokers
Thai government
Contribution to Sustaining the national
the Thai GDP Immigration policies economy
Socio-economically
Social welfare provisions "acquiescent reciprocity": "Open" immigration
and legal status Some reluctance in each entity's policies
cost-benefit assessment in migration
Thai employers
Shan migrant workers
/ Informal brokers
Degree of adherence
Migration behaviours
to the law
Low standard
Cheap Labour
working conditions
2.4.1 - Acquiescent Reciprocity between the Thai government, Thai

employers and informal brokers
The Thai government’s immigration policies can not be formulated

without the consideration of the Thai employers’ demand for cheap
labourers, since the latter’s economic performance sustains and affects
the national economy. Thus, the Thai government to a certain degree
formulates and implements open immigration policies, not only to serve
the previously mentioned purpose, but also to decrease the illegal broker
business. However, Thai employers recognize that they must abide by
65
the law to a certain extent in order for the Thai government to maintain
and/or formulate open immigration policies.
2.4.2 - Acquiescent Reciprocity between the Thai government and

Shan migrant workers
Due to the large scale of employment of cheap migrant workers

from Burma, the Thai government realizes the extent of Shan migrant
workers’ contribution to the Thai GDP. Immigration policy formulation
is, therefore, highly influenced by this. Shan workers’ migration
behaviours are, on the other hand, shaped by the Thai government’s
immigration policies. Their life strategies after their migration to
Thailand are formulated and adopted based on their need for social
welfare and legal status. For example, they acquiesce to practicing
bribery due to their illegal status or they acquiesce to a high price for a
fake alien card because they are desperate for healthcare services.
2.4.3 - Acquiescent Reciprocity between Shan migrant workers,

Thai employers and informal brokers
Because of their desperation for cash income, Shan migrant workers

also acquiesce to the low standard of working conditions provided by
Thai employers. On the other hand, Thai employers realize that they
have to provide Shan migrant workers with basic needs such as
accommodation or shelter, regardless of their quality in order to
guarantee the availability of cheap migrant workers.
3 - Differences in the Perceptions of Borders

and the Perpetuation of Illegal Migration
Based on the borders approach, I would like to conclude that
differences in the perception of borders between the Thai government,
Shan migrant workers, Thai employers and informal brokers, in addition
to each actor’s cost-benefit assessment, not only perpetuate the flow of
illegal migrant workers from the Shan State to Thailand, but also create
human insecurities for Shan migrant workers.
66
Summary and Conclusion
1 - From the Solid Meaning of Borders

by the Nation-State to the Different
Perceptions of Borders by the Locals
“Ever since the creation of the modern nation-state, borders and
their regions have been extremely important symbolic territories of state
image and control. Yet border cultures are not constructed solely by
national centre. In fact, most state borders have been places where
people’s interaction on the one hand with the forces of the state, with its
top-down notions of national culture, and on the other hand with
peoples across the borderline, who are in their own contest over their
“national culture”, have helped to fashion distinctive national societies
and culture.”49
This research has attempted to tackle the issue of borders by

examining the dynamics of lives and routines experienced by various
actors involved in the migration phenomenon, namely border people or
Shan migrant workers, the Thai government, Thai employers and
informal brokers. Moreover, it has attempted to point out how the
perceptions of borders of the three entities differ from one another in their
construction and influence each other in various ways. At the same time,
this research discusses why the top-down governmental policies do not
49 Donan and Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State

67
work effectively at the local level in managing illegal migration flows

from Burma to Thailand.
An era of commodity-defined needs creates economic dependencies

on wages, driving people with low access to capital to move to other
economic spaces where access to it is higher. In the capital-oriented
economy in the age of the nation-state, human mobility depends on the
availability of “transportation”, and no longer on feet and open
frontiers50. After the colonial period, the movement of humans and
goods across the nation-state’s borderlines had to proceed within the
state’s legal framework, with the required documentation. “Whether
“legal” or “illegal”, “official” or “unofficial”, the would-be crosser must
enter into dialogue with the agents of the state and engage in practices
ultimately determined by the state: either directly through compliance
with and acceptance of state regulation, or indirectly, through
avoidance, dissimulation and concealment.”51
“Invisible” borders, before the emergence of the nation state, were

made “visible” and “measurable” after the state’s foundation. Modern
state borders serve as a guard to their human and natural resources.
They are politically and socio-economically strategic and symbolic to the
state. Throughout this research, particularly in Chapter One, the notion
of borders was discussed and illustrated by a historical and
contemporary account of the Thai state’s relations with the Shan State of
Burma. Borders transform the socio-economic structure of people living
along the borders, while governmental immigration policies have been
developed separately from the lives of border people.
Since borders are used to mark the differences between “us” and
“them”, borders can be both bridges and barriers for more opportunities
in another political and socio-economic space. Whether and how Shan
migrants’ border crossings will create opportunities or close them off to
various actors involved in migration will be concluded in the border
perceptions approach that is to follow.
50 Illich, Shadow work

51 Donan and Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State
68
This research has attempted to illustrate the concept of borders

according to three definitions and functions from three separate entities.
Firstly, to the Thai government, borders are politically defined,
delimited, and demarcated. They are simultaneously employed as a
means to separate the Thai state from others and to join the trend of
emerging nation-states. Given this particular function, borders are
employed to maintain state control over the movement of people, goods
and information, by those who are in a position of power at the state’s
core and who may have never even visited border areas, but whose
decisions affect the lives of border people. Immigration policies, which
are formulated based on this top-down perception of borders, thus
create loopholes and are ineffective in controlling the illegal flows of
Shan migrant workers from the Shan State to Thailand.
Secondly, to border people or Shan migrant workers, borders are

not perceived as political frontiers or territorial zones which are
standardized as a periphery in the geographical landscape, the people,
and culture. Borders, on the other hand, imply the meaning or are
symbolic of a centre for job opportunities and for socio-cultural variety.
On the micro level, borders are constructed and function through a
cultural perspective which transcends political borders. Social
interactions give meaning to borders since border people cannot infer or
deduce knowledge from the political and economic borderline defined
by the state. Borders, to local people, however, function within two
overlapping meanings of borders; the first being that the very existence of
borders defined by the state creates frontier socio-economic activities for
the locals, and second being that of social borders which are mainly
discussed in Chapter Three.
Thirdly, with regard to Thai employers and informal brokers, they

seem to be a group of people who are hidden from the discussions of
modern nation-state border issues, while quietly gaining the benefits.
They obtain their definition of borders from both previously mentioned
entities - the Thai government and Shan migrant workers - and apply
them separately or/and mutually depending on the situation. On the
one hand, by using the macro definition of borders, Thai employers and
informal brokers make use of the non-stringency and inconsistency of
69
immigration laws and policies to take advantage of potential migrant

workers both in the process of migration and work. On the other hand,
they take into account and exercise the local meanings of borders to
create and maintain their informal broker business in accordance with
the Thai employers’ demand for cheap Shan migrant workers.
According to the above perceptions of borders, I would like to

conclude that borders function like a sponge whose features are flexible
and absorbent. In the same way, modern borders can take some people in
and/or exclude these people out of their territorial space. Its features
and functions vary depending on whether and how it shapes the
perception of those involved.
The analysis of borders perceptions drives me to question whether

and how illegal migration would be possible to control, given that the
Thai state should try to balance the migrant workers’ fruitful economic
contribution and their numbers. The Thai government has faced and
answered to the dilemma that borders must remain business-friendly
and “open” to cheap labour. However, it has failed to control an
oversupply of low-skilled migrant workers from the last decade. The
recent immigration controls by the Thai government attempt to curb
migration the flows of low-skilled workers52 from three countries,
namely Burma, the Lao PDR and Cambodia, rather than support and
recognize the opportunities they have to offer. The lack of collaboration
and correspondence at the borders, between the Thai government, Shan
migrant workers, Thai employers and informal brokers has led to
inconsistent immigration policies, as demonstrated in the migrant
registration process from 1992-2005.53 Instead of adopting a mutualistic
symbiosis approach, the Thai government employs one of parasitic
symbiosis toward Shan migrant workers, thus creating a gap between the
ambition of policy-makers and the actual situation. The parasitic
symbiosis approach employed in the migration policy formulation (for
52 Pecoud and Guchteneire, Migration without Borders: Eassay on the Free Movement of People,
UNESCO and Berghahn Books, p.2.
53 Please refer to Tables 9 and 10: The registration policies of migrant workers in Thailand
during 1992-2005.
70
policies implemented in post-migration) is the perspective that the Thai

government loses its national benefits, while only Shan migrant workers
are able to take advantage from the migration phenomenon. This is
opposed to the actual relation between the Thai government and Shan
migrant workers who can both gain benefits from the one another’s
existence, also known as a mutualistic symbiosis relation. However, we can
not take mutualistic and parasitic symbiosis approaches into account in
analysing pre-migration policies as they have been neglected in the
process of policy formulation, which is influenced by the government’s
realization that Shan migrant workers contribute greatly to the Thai
economy. The lack of coherence in policy-making may stir up anti-
immigration feelings among the public, as well as among migrant
workers who believe that the government is unable or unwilling to solve
the problem.
The contemporary trends in migration control take on two forms:

external and internal. For external controls, receiving countries are more
concerned about border security and attempt to encourage sending and
transit countries to perform a more strict surveillance against irregular
migration. This is found to be unsuccessful due to the lack of local
perspectives in immigration and security policy formulations within
both the sending and receiving governments. When external controls
fail, the receiving government tries hard to establish internal controls
over the undocumented migrants after their entry. Controls on
workplaces are normally ineffective since it displeases Thai employers
and could entail economically and politically detrimental consequences.
Moreover, informal relations and networks among local authorities, Thai
employers and informal brokers are important factors in determining
how successful the immigration policies from the central government
would be. Therefore, “another option is to control undocumented
migrants’ access to social services. Immigration status is increasingly
used to restrict access to welfare provisions, but this policy meets
resistance: it is questionable from a human rights perspective, as it
generates even greater exclusion for migrants and contradicts the
inclusive nature of the welfare system”54
54 Cohen et al. (ed.), From Immigration Controls to Welfare Controls, London, Routledge.
71
2 - Recommendations
Regarding the characteristics of border controls at the micro level, I
would like to conclude that they are more a matter of symbols than of
activities yielding actual results. The roles of local authorities are
formally designated by the central government, but also informally
influenced and directed by the nature of border people and border areas.
The formation of national identity and authority by the central
government does not completely work either for border authorities or
people. This research tries to prove that this leads to a self-perpetuating
process: the lack of mutual understanding of border perceptions and
functions between various entities creates more problems for border
controls implemented by the government. This may result in more
human trafficking and illegal migration, which then call for further
control. In this respect, border controls are policies that merely
determine the status of “legal” or “illegal”.
2.1 - Inclusion of the Different Perceptions of Borders

in Policy Formulation
It is worth noting that governmental immigration policies need to

be reconsidered and adjusted in accordance with local situations in order
to limit the number of illegal migrants. To achieve this, the government
(Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Interior and Office of Foreign Workers
Administration) needs to work collaboratively and to consider the other
different perceptions of borders in order to formulate locally-oriented
immigration policies. Furthermore, the government needs to be more
concerned about the administrative system such as the transparency of
the immigration process and the mechanisms of cross-checking among
bureaus. In addition to these macro controls, it would be also more
effective if the Ministry of Labour simultaneously made immigration
and migration information more available at a local level both to
potential migrants in the sending country (Burma) and to legal and
illegal migrant workers in the receiving country (Thailand). Moreover, it
is necessary for the Ministry of Labour to provide attractive benefits to
72
informal brokers in order to encourage them to perform their roles

within a legal framework. I would also like to emphasize that the more
efforts the Thai government will make to pull Shan migrant workers into
the legal area, the less human insecurities these people may face
throughout the migration process.
2.2 - The Need to Accelerate the Legal Process

and to Create Coherence in Immigration
and Registration Policies
In contradiction to the immigration law of 1978, the process of

migrant registration (please refer to Tables 1 and 2 in Chapter One) may
only take place after the alien’s entry. As a result, it leads to the creation
of loopholes when it is put into practice. Thai employers make use of this
legal provision to register illegal migrant workers after hiring them.
Accelerating the immigration process and creating coherence between
immigration and registration policies are necessary steps to systematize
the migration flows by means of the locally-oriented measures suggested
above.
73
Immigration Policies according to the Law on Immigration 1978

1. Regarding an alien who has not 2. Regarding an alien who has
entered to the Kingdom yet already entered to the Kingdom
1.1. An alien who wants to enter to 2.1. An alien who has been
the country with the purpose of permitted entry to work in the
working shall require a “Non- Kingdom under the law on
Immigrant Visa” delivered from investment promotion or other
the Thai consul or embassy in the laws shall submit an application to
country of origin. the Director-General or official
entrusted by the Director-General
1.2. Subject to the law on
within thirty days from the date of
immigration, any person wishing
his/her entry into the Kingdom.
to employ an alien in his/her
business in the Kingdom may 2.2. An alien who applies for a
submit an application on behalf of work permit must possess the
the alien to the Director-General or following qualifications:
official entrusted by the Director- 2.2.1. Having a place of residence in
General. the Kingdom or having been
permitted entry into the Kingdom
The Director-General or official
for temporary stay (1.1) under the
entrusted by the Director-General law on immigration, but not as a
may issue a permit to an alien only tourist or in transit;
after the alien’s entry into the 2.2.2. Not being disqualified or
Kingdom. prohibited under the conditions
prescribed by the Minister as
published in the Government
Gazette.
Source: Office of Foreign Workers Administration, Thailand.
74
Glossary
Phonetic Thai Thai alphabet English Translation

Kwarm-Kao-Jai-Reung- ความเข้าใจเรื่ องชายแดน Perceptions of Borders
Chaii-Dan
Chaii-Dan ชายแดน Borders
Poo-Op-Pa-Yop ผูอ้ พยพ Migrant workers
Naii-Naa นายหน้า (ผิดกฎหมาย) Informal brokers
Garn-Op-Pa-Yop-Kao- ่
การอพยพเข้าเมืองอยาง Illegal migration
Muang-Yang-Pid-Kod-Maii ผิดกฎหมาย
Raeng-Ngan-Op-Pa-Yop- แรงงานอพยพชาวฉาน Shan migrant workers
Chao-Shan
Garn-Op-Pa-Yop-Khong- การอพยพของมนุษย์ Human Migration
Ma-Nud
Kwarm-Man-Kong-Haeng- ่ ษย์
ความมัน่ คงแหงมนุ Human Security
Ma-Nud
Garn-Tang-Taup-Tan- ่
การตางตอบแทน ด้วยความ Acquiescent reciprocity
Duay-Kwarm-Jam-Yorm จํายอม
Sa-Pa-Wa-Tee-Dee-Kuen สภาวะที่ดีขึน Betterment
Kwarm-Mai-Man-Kong- ความไมมั่ น่ คงด้านชีวติ Life instability
Darn-Chee-Wit
Kwarm-Mai-Man-Kong- ความไมมั่ น่ คงด้านสังคม Social insecurity
Darn-Sang-Kom
Garn-Aow-Praep การเอาเปรี ยบ exploitation
Chaii-Dan-Sueng-Mong- ่ น
ชายแดนซึ่งมองไมเห็ Invisible border
Mai-Haen
Sang-Kom-Sueng-Rai- สังคมซึ่ งไร้ขอบเขตชายแดน Borderless world
Kob-Kaet-Chaii-Dan
Goom-Chart-Ti-Pan กลุ่มชาติพนั ธุ์ Ethnic minority
Moon-La-Ka-Perm-Jak- ่ ่มจากแรงงานอพยพ
มูลคาเพิ Migrant value-added
Raeng-Ngan-Op-Pa-Yop
75
Phonetic Thai Thai alphabet English Translation

Tak-Sa ทักษะ Skills
Kob-Kaii-Khong-God-Maii- ่
ขอบขายของกฎหมายด้ าน Migration Legal
Darn-Garn-Op-Pa-Yop การอพยพ Framework
Garn-Pra-Muen-Pol-Dai- การประเมินผลได้-ผลเสี ย Cost-benefit
Pol-Sae assessment
Jin-Ta-Na-Garn-Garn-Mee- จินตนาการการมีอยูข่ อง Imagination of Borders
Yoo-khong-Chaii-Dan ชายแดน
Puet-Ti-Gam-Garn-Op-Pa- พฤติกรรมการอพยพ Behavior in Migration
Yop
76
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Perceptions of Borders and Human Migration: The Human (In) Security of Shan Migrant Workers in Thailand

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PERCEPTIONS OF BORDERS

AND HUMAN MIGRATION

Cover, Maps and Layout: Mikael Brodu

© IRASEC, October 2009

Perceptions of Borders and Human Migration:

Carnet de l’Irasec / Occasional Paper

LE COMITÉ ÉDITORIAL DE L’IRASEC

• Jean BAFFIE, CNRS, IRSEA • Yves GOUDINEAU, EFEO

2 - Three Actors’ Perceptions of Borders, their Cost-Benefit

Summary and conclusion .................................................................. 67

1 - Understanding Borders Perceptions

The actual primary data is derived from fieldwork conducted both

3 - Organization of the Paper

different perceptions of borders among each of the above-mentioned

Finally, conclusions are made based on the results of the analysis,

1 - An Introduction to the Shan,

8 percent of Burma’s population of approximately 50 million people5 in

It is believed that the native land of the Tai-Yai is located between

The greater Tai race progressively dispersed itself over time

(New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1980)

(Santa Barbara CA, ABC-CLIO, 2004), p.1191

If we explore both State and non-State actors’ perceptions of borders in

6 Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu, University of

state, a phenomenon that Benedict Anderson calls an artificial boundary9.

2 - The Contemporary Migration Situation

2.1.1 - Ethnic Conflict: Ethnic Cleansing War, Depleted Forest,

The remains of the Kuomintang (KMT) invasion during the 1950s

9 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York, Verso, 1983)

Push Factor on the Burmese Side

Furthermore, military forces suddenly increased three-fold in 1988.

2.1.2 - Socio-Economic Hardships:

The Burmese military government exploits the traditional economic

10 Please refer to the map on the previous page.

Gas Pipeline SHAN

Andaman Sea Bangkok

required skills or education for urban work. As a result, they become

2.1.3 - The Lack of Socio-Cultural Freedom

The suppression of ethnic language is a good example to demonstrate

symbolic implication of Myanmar/Burma’s military junta. It is controversial whether

2.2 - Pull Factors: The Availability of low-paid jobs,

Human security is the significant pull factor in the dynamic force

3 - An Increasing Influx of Foreign Workers in

Migration Flows from Burma

Total in Thailand Chiang Mai Chiang Rai Tak

Source: Office of Foreign Workers Administration (Work Permit), http://www.doe.go.th

An increasing Number of Migrants Workers in Thailand (1996-2007)

2.0 Millions of workers (total migrant workers)

Registered migrant workers

The following statistics of illegal Shan migrant workers and their

Migrant Workers’ Contribution to the Thai GDP (Sector Analysis, 2005)

Agriculture 15,120,000 720,000 16,931 1,120

Industry 7,320,000 720,000 82,863 11,320

Services 13,500,000 360,000 76,808 5,689

Total 35,940,000 1,800,000 176,602 4,914

as productive as Thais in each sector, their total contribution would be

Assumptions or scenarios on the productivity of migrant workers

25% 50% 75% 100%

Agriculture 202 403 605 806

Industry 2,038 4,075 6,128 8,150

Services 512 1,024 1,540 2,048

Total 2,751 5,502 8,274 11,004

Assumptions or scenarios about productivity of migrant workers

25% 50% 75% 100%