Case #1

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949

Facts: 1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and commanding general of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities committed against military and civilians. The military commission was establish under Executive Order 68. 2. Petitioner assails the validity of EXecutive Order 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the military commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds: - that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes) 3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the 2 US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not EXecutive Order 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal jurisdiction is valid HELD: 1. Executive Order 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan) 2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest because its country and people have been greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was being charged of. 3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of the special law cited in the foregoing.

Case #2

Lo Ching vs. Archbishop of Manila 81 Phil 601

FACTS: On August 30, 1940, the Archbishop of Manila through the Bank of the Philippine Islands leased a farm to Lo and So Yun Ching Chong Co. with Nos. 1095 with 1101 R. located at de la Calle Hidalgo, Manila, under a monthly income of P500 by the end of three years counting from the first of September 1940, extendable to two years (two years upon agreement of the parties). The tenant took the property by setting it in a hotel. In February 1942, the Japanese army echoed the tenants of the property and delivered the latter to German Otto Schulze who worked until January 1945 at the advent of the liberation army. In early February 1945, tenant reoccupied the property and paid the monthly rental fee. Before the end of August of that year, the landlord required the tenants to vacate the property, however, they refused. Therefore, the landlord on September 8, 1945 filed for an application for eviction in the Municipal Court of Manila. On October 8, 1945, it ordered the tenants to vacate the property and pay its monthly rent of P625 from the first September 1945, plus damages in the amount of P500 and legal expenses. The appellants contend that they are entitled to occupy the property for three full years, the occupation must be effective, and continuous material, which should not be deprived of the use and enjoyment of the property, and the appellants are entitled to deduct that period of three years, all the time that no longer have the lease available to the Japanese army. ISSUE: WON Hague Convention of 1907 allows occupation and seizure of private lands. WON Japanese soldiers occupied the farm in dispute. RULING: No. The Hague Convention of 1907 does not allow an occupying army to seize private property in the territory invaded. In contrast, states that: "Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated." (Article 46).

The farm is not even used as army barracks, and there is no evidence that it was seized by military necessity, what can be deduced that the Japanese soldiers disposed of the property, not in the legitimate exercise the authority of an occupying army, but spurred on by uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire to take over other people.

Case #3

VICTOR BOROVSKY vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION and THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS G.R. No. L-4352
FACTS: Victor A. Borovsky, petitioner, claims to be a stateless citizen, born in Shanghai, China, of Russian parentage. He came to the Philippines in 1936 and had resided herein ever since, if the period of his detention be included. On June 24, 1946, by order of the Commissioner of immigration of the Philippines the petitioner was arrested for investigation as to his past activities. A warrant for deportation was issued by the Deportation Board on the grounds that he has been found to be an undesirable alien, a vagrant and habitual drunkard. Petitioner was deported to China but he was not provided with an entry visa because he was not a a national of China. He was therefore brought back to Manila and was confined to the new Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa. On December 8, 1947, was granted provisional release by the President through Secretary of Justice for a period of six months. Before the expiration of that period, the Immigration department rearrested him and brought him to Cebu for the purpose of placing him on board a Russian vessel carrying out the deportation order issued against him. However, said deportation failed to materialize as the captain of the ship refused to take him on board without permission from the Russian government. As such, petitioner was again detained. The Immigration Officials however alleged that while in detention, they have been taking steps regarding the disposition of those foreigners subject to deportation while awaiting availability of transportation or arrangements to the place where they may be sent. Petitioner then filed for a writ of habeas corpus to which the court denied as mainly on the ground that such detention was merely temporary. Over two years had elapsed since the decision was promulgated, but still the Government had not found ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the country. Hence this second petition for writ of habeas corpus.

September 28, 1951

ISSUE: WON petitioner be continuously detained without a fix period pending deportation HELD: NO. Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein (Soewapadji vs. Wixon, Sept. 13, 1946, 157 F. ed., 289, 290), even if they are "stateless," which the petitioner claims to be. Foreign nationals, not enemy, against whom no criminal charges have been formally made or judicial order issued, may not indefinitely be kept in detention. The protection against deprivation of liberty, without due process of law and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality. Whether an alien who entered the country in violation of its immigration laws may be detained for as long as the Government is unable to deport him, is beside the point and we need not decide. There is no allegation that the petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not lawful; on the contrary, the inference from the pleadings and the Deportation Board's findings is that he came to and lived in this country under legal permit. Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. lt was there resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status (Art. 2) ; that "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9) etc.

Case #4

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS, et al, G.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994
Facts: The Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Caloocan City filed a lettercomplaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the residents and the environment. It was found out that the City Government of Caloocan (CGC) was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing the documents as required by law. A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the LLDA to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite. The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the CGC. However, the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting was conducted and the parties concerned failed to settle the problem. The LLDA issued another order reiterating its first order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the CGC from continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin area. Pending its motion, the CGC filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (RTCC) an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction. The CGC sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction. The Executive Judge of the RTCC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist order. The LLDA, for its part, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, that under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of the complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by the Court of Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court. Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio (Judge Serapio) consolidated the civil cases earlier filed but LLDA maintained that the foregoing cases, being independent of each other, should have been 5

treated separately. Judge Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the consolidated cases an order denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order. The LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for restraining order with the Supreme Court seeking to nullify the aforesaid order. The Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. The Court of Appeals dismissed Civil Case, preliminary injunction issued was set aside; the cease and desist order of LLDA was likewise set aside and the temporary restraining order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the subject dumpsite was lifted. Hence, the petition. Issue: Whether or not the LLDA has the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws? Ruling: The irresistible answer is in the affirmative. The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws, cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution." 24 (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction. To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease and desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.

Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not expressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such authority need not necessarily be express. While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. 26 In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.

Case # 5

Lao H. Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez 101 Phil 105

FACTS Chinese businessman, Lao Ichong, entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities in the Philippines. His type of business particularly is a retail business. He and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in P asay. But in June 1954, Congress passed the Republic Act No. 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act. In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; an exception there from in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; a provision for the forfeiture of licenses for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and

a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation. Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title the Act violates international treaties and obligations the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession ISSUE WON the Act violates international treaties and obligations. HELD NO. It cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country. But the nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State (plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.) We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as

Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted. xxx

Case #6

Oetjen vs. Central Leather Corporation

246 U.S. 297 Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. Facts: In January, 1914, General Francisco Villa, while conducting independent operations as a duly commissioned military commander of the Carranza government, which had then made much progress in its revolution in Mexico, levied a military contribution, and, in enforcing it, seized and sold some hides then owned and possessed by a citizen of Mexico. The court notices judicially that the government of the United States recognized the government of Carranza as the de facto government of the Republic of Mexico on October 19, 1915, and as the de jure government on August 31, 1917. Semble, that the Hague Conventions, in view of their terms and international character, do not apply to a civil war, and that the regulation annexed to the Convention of 1907 do not forbid such a military seizure and sale of private property as is involved in this case. Issue: Whether or not the conduct of one independent government can be questioned in the court of another involving title to property brought within the custody of a court as to the claim for damages based upon act in the foreign country. Held: No, it cannot be successfully questioned by the court of another. Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.

Case #7

PEOPLE VS. PERFECTO G.R. L-18463

FACTS: Defendant Gregorio Perfecto, editor of LA NACION was accused of violation of Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code for publishing an article in La Nacion about the Philippine Senate and its members, and was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Mr. Perfecto filed an appeal in the Supreme Court to dismiss the case on the ground that Article 256 was not in force anymore. ISSUE: WON Mr. Perfecto violated Article 256 of the Penal Code. Will a law be abrogated by the change of Spanish to American Sovereignty over the Philippines?

HELD: Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. It is, however, the general rule of Public Law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the Ceded region are totally abrogated. The view of the Chief Justice is that, the accused be acquitted for reason that Art. 256 were completely abrogated by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and is inconsistent with democratic principle of government.

Case #8 VILAS v. CITY OF MANILA, 220 U.S. 345 (1911) FACTS: Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under Act No. 183 of the Philippine Commission, petitioner Vilas is the creditor of the City. The City of Manila that incurred the debts has changed its sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898. After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action against the city to recover the sum of money owed to him by the latter upon the theory that the city, under its present charter from the government of the Philippine Islands, is the same juristic person and liable upon the obligations of the old city. The contention of the City of Manila, on the other hand, now is founded on the theory that by virtue of the Act No. 183 its liability has been extinguished. 10

ISSUE: Whether or not, notwithstanding the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States, followed by a reincorporation of the city, the present municipality is liable for the obligations of the city incurred prior to the cession to the United States. HELD: Yes. The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the municipal corporation organized under the former sovereign. The new City of Manila is in a legal sense the successor of the old city. Thus the new city is entitled to all property and property rights of the predecessor corporation including its liabilities. The court held that only the governmental functions that are not compatible with the present sovereignty are suspended. Because the new City of Manila retains its character as the predecessor of the old city it is still liable to the creditors of the old City of Manila.

Case #9 THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR.and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC. 238 SCRA 524 (G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994) FACTS: This is a controversy over a parcel of land in Paraaque City. Lot 5-A, registered under the name of the Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D registered in the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence. Said lots were sold through Msgr. Domingo CirilosJr acting as agent, to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. Squatters of said land refused to vacate the lots, creating a dispute between Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. and Holy See because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money (P100,000) will be returned,which Msgr. Cirilos, the agent, subsequently did. The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.

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Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale of the three lots, and specific performance and damages against petitioner(represented by the Papal Nuncio), and Msgr. Cirilos, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can claim sovereign immunity from suit. HELD: The Supreme Court held that Holy See may properly claim sovereign immunity for its nonsuability. The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 . As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts and are deemed incorporated as part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations. It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis (private act). However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines, as public act or act jure imperii . The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court. The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of 12

the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property. Supreme Court granted the petition and dismissed the complaint against petitioner.

Case #10

Underhill v. Hernandez 168 US 250

FACTS: In the early part of 1892 a revolution was initiated in Venezuela, against the administration thereof, which the revolutionists claimed had ceased to be the legitimate government. George F. Underhill was a citizen of the United States, who had constructed a waterworks system for the city of Bolivar, under a contract with the government, and was engaged in supplying the place with water; and he also carried on a machinery repair business. Sometime after the entry of Gen. Hernandez, Underhill applied to him, as the officer in command, for a passport to leave the city. Hernandez refused this request, and requests made by others in Underhill's behalf, until October 18th, when a passport was given, and Underhill left the country. This action was brought to recover damages for the detention caused by reason of the refusal to grant the passport, for the alleged confinement of Underhill to his own house, and for certain alleged assaults and affronts by the soldiers of Hernandez's army. The cause was tried in the circuit court of the United States for the Eastern district of New York, and on the conclusion of plaintiff's case the circuit court ruled that upon the facts plaintiff was not entitled to recover, and directed a verdict for defendant, on the ground that 'because the acts of defendant were those of a military commander, representing a de facto government in the prosecution of a war, he was not civilly responsible therefor.' Judgment having been rendered for defendant, the case was taken to the circuit court of appeals, and by that court affirmed, upon the ground 'that the acts of the defendant were the acts of the government of Venezuela, and as such are not properly the subject of adjudication in the courts of another government. Thereupon the cause was brought to this court on certiorari. ISSUE: WON a foreign tribunal has an authority to interfere acts of government in a sovereign state.

13

RULING: No. The evidence upon the trial indicated that the purpose of the defendant in his treatment of the plaintiff was to coerce the plaintiff to operate his waterworks and his repair works for the benefit of the community and the revolutionary forces,' and that 'it was not sufficient to have warranted a finding by the jury that the defendant was actuated by malice or any personal or private motive. The acts of the defendant were the acts of the government of Venezuela, and as such are not properly the subject of adjudication in the courts of another government. Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. Nor can the principle be confined to lawful or recognized governments or to cases where redress can manifestly be had through public channels. The immunity of individuals from suits brought in foreign tribunals for acts done within their own states, in the exercise of governmental authority, whether as civil officers or as military commanders, must necessarily extend to the agents of governments ruling by paramount force as matter of fact. Where a civil war prevails (that is, where the people of a country are divided into two hostile parties, who take up arms and oppose one another by military force), generally speaking, foreign nations do not assume to judge of the merits of the quarrel.

Case #11

Republic of the Philippines vs Marcos 806 F.2d 344

The act of state doctrine is one of the methods by which States prevent their national courts from deciding disputes which relate to the international affairs of another State, the other two being immunity and nonjusticiability. It is an avoidance technique that is directly related to a States obligation to respect the independence and equality of other States by not requiring them to submit to adjudication in a national court or to settlement of their disputes without their consent. It requires the forum court to exercise restraint in the adjudication of disputes relating to legislative or other governmental acts which a foreign State has performed within its territorial limits. Facts:

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The Republic of the Philippines sought preliminary injunction barring former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his wife Imelda, several real estate holding companies and their alleged principal and managers as record holders of certain properties in New York from transferring or encumbering properties, which were alleged to have been purchase using ill-gotten wealth from the Philippines. There was a temporary restraining order given and the real estate holding companies and alleged principals and managers were ordered to vacate the said estates. The US Southern District Court of NY granted preliminary injunction, but the defendants appealed the case with the Court of Appeals. It was held that, among other rulings regarding the case, the act of state doctrine did not prohibit adjudication in federal court of legality of acts of former President Marcos and his wife in that action purely private acts by the president. This doctrine will also not apply even to public acts because the Marcos government was no longer in power and danger of interference with executives conduct of foreign policy. Issue: Whether or not the acts of the Marcoses are insulated because they were acts of state, thereby, not reviewable by US courts Held: No. The classification of certain acts as "acts of state" with the consequence that their validity will be treated as beyond judicial review is a pragmatic device, not required by the nature of sovereign authority and inconsistently applied in international law. (Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 1964) The purpose of the device is to keep the judiciary from embroiling the courts and the country in the affairs of the foreign nation whose acts are challenged. Minimally viewed, the classification keeps a court from making pronouncements on matters over which it has no power; maximally interpreted, the classification prevents the embarrassment of a court offending a foreign government that is "extant at the time of suit." The "continuing vitality" of the doctrine depends on "its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political branches of the Government on matters bearing upon foreign relations." Consequently, there are "constitutional underpinnings" to the classification. A court that passes on the validity of an "act of state" intrudes into the domain of the political branches. The proper application of the doctrine is illustrated by Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co. (1972). As a practical tool for keeping the judicial branch out of the conduct of foreign affairs, the classification of "act of state" is not a promise to the ruler of any foreign country that his conduct, if challenged by his own country after his fall, may not become the subject of scrutiny in our courts. No estoppel exists insulating a deposed dictator from accounting. No guarantee has been granted that immunity may be acquired by an ex-chief magistrate invoking the magic words "act of state" to cover his or her past performance.

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The classification might, it may be supposed, be used to prevent judicial challenge in our courts to many deeds of a dictator in power, at least when it is apparent that sustaining such challenge would bring our country into a hostile confrontation with the dictator. Once deposed, the dictator will find it difficult to deploy the defense successfully. The "balance of considerations" is shifted. (Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 1964) A fortiori, when a ruler's former domain has turned against him and seeks the recovery of what it claims he has stolen, the classification has little or no applicability. The act of state doctrine is supple, flexible, ad hoc. The doctrine is meant to facilitate the foreign relations of the United States, not to furnish the equivalent of sovereign immunity to a deposed leader. In the instant case the Marcoses offered no evidence whatsoever to support the classification of their acts as acts of state. The burden of proving acts of state rested upon them. (Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 1976). They did not even undertake the proof. The United States, invited by the court to address this matter as an amicus, assures us that the Executive does not at present see the applicability of this defense. Brief of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae, p. 11. The act of state doctrine, the Executive declares, has "no bearing" on this case as it stands. As the doctrine is a pragmatic one, we cannot exclude the possibility that, at some later point in the development of this litigation, the Marcoses might produce evidence that would warrant its application. On the present record, the defense does not apply.

Case #12

US vs Ruiz 136 SCRA 487

Facts:

At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied with the requests based on the letters received from the US. In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The 16

complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects. The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.) Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. Issue/s: WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity Held: No. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts) The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. 17

Correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act

Case #13

United States of America vs. Guinto 182 SCRA 644

FACTS The private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base. The Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, U.S. Air Force, solicited bids for such contracts through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw, which was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the private respondents, who claimed that he had made a bid for four facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area, which was not included in the invitation to bid. Private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon, and to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions

ISSUE WON the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.

HELD The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international community. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states.

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While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions. There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver may be implied. The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the record as the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions were not available. Accordingly, this case was remanded to the court below for further proceedings. A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. xxx

Case #15

US vs Rodrigo 182 SCRA 644

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. Leonard RODRIGO and Cheliah Parmasavam, Defendants-Appellants. Facts: Cheliah Parmasavam, Leonard Rodrigo and Sadhasivan Parmasavam are all Sri Lankan nationals who worked as crew aboard the M/V DIMI. All three were arrested and indicted on four counts of cocaine possession. Cheliah was once in the United States for three days, the 19

others had never visited the Western Hemisphere before. While in Colombia, Cheliah made the acquaintance of a man named Marcel. After this the facts become disputed.The government introduced testimony from two undercover agents. They had learned a shipment of cocaine was coming into this country from Colombia by a man named Marcel. They met the contact, a man named "Salem," aboard the DIMI. "Salem" turned out to be Cheliah. Cheliah got Rodrigo to come in and help negotiate a price for the cocaine.1 Rodrigo carried the packages of cocaine up to Cheliah's room in several trips hidden inside his coveralls. Sadhasivan helped carry some of the cocaine up to Cheliah's room. All three were subsequently arrested. All three defendants testified they had agreed to bring a large box, the contents of which was unknown, into America for Marcel. They testified they had not negotiated a price for the cocaine, and it was never brought up to Cheliah's room. Defendants sought to introduce testimony that natives of Sri Lanka are ignorant of cocaine, and do not even have a word for it in their language. Prosecution objected to this testimony and the trial judge excluded it.Sadhasivan was acquitted, while Cheliah and Rodrigo were convicted of all four counts. Cheliah and Rodrigo claim there was a failure of proof and they were denied a trial by their peers because the trial judge did not allow any evidence on what Sri Lankans know about cocaine. At closing argument, the defendants asserted they were victims of a "sting" operation. Rodrigo and Cheliah claim the government committed plain error in making the improper responds. Issue: Whether or not the government committed plain error in making an improper response. Held: No error occured. Defendants arguement that the government made an impermissibly prejudicial comment during closing argument by denying the existence of a governmental "sting", is that the government took a reasonable inference away from the jury. While this statement standing alone might be impermissible, a prosecutor may respond in rebuttal to improper arguments by defense counsel. The complained of comment was in direct response to a statement made by defense in its closing argument, therefore the government's remarks were "invited," consequently, no error occurred. And since ignorance of the law is excuses no one and guilty knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances under which a transaction occurs, the jury's verdict is therefore affirmed. As well the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to convict. Conspiracy may be inferred by the jury based upon inferences drawn from the circumstantial evidence of the situation. In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence we look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

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Case #15

JUSMAG Philippines vs. NLRC (Article XVI Sec. 3) (Foreign Government)

Facts: Florencio Sacramento (private respondent) was one of the 74 security assistance support personnel (SASP) working at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the Philippines (JUSMAG-Phils.). He had been with JUSMAG from 1969-1992. When dismissed, he held the position of Illustrator 2 and incumbent Pres. of JUSMAG Phils.- Filipino Civilian Employees Assoc., a labor org. duly registered with DOLE. His services were terminated allegedly due to the abolition of his position.Sacramento filed complaint w/ DOLE on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG. He asked for reinstatement. JUSMAG filed Motion to Dismiss invoking immunity from suit. Labor arbiter Cueto in an Order dismissed the complaint "for want of jurisdiction". Sacramento appealed to NLRC. NLRC reversed the ruling of the labor arbiter and held that petitioner had lost its right not to be sued bec. (1) the principle of estoppel-that JUSMAG failed to refute the existence of employer-employee rel. (2)JUSMAG has waived its right to immunity from suit when it hired the services of private respondent. Hence, this petition. Issue: W/N JUSMAG has immunity from suit

Held: Yes. When JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement between the Phils. and America* JUSMAG consists of Air, Naval and Army group and its primary task was to advise and assist the Phils. on air force, army and naval matters. A suit against JUSMAG is one against the United States government, and in the absence of any waiver or consent of the latter to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper. Immunity of State from suit is one of the universally recognized principles of international law that the Phils. recognizes and adopts as part of the law of the land. Immunity is commonly understood as the exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state and anchored on the principle of the sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habeat imperium (an equal has no power over an equal) As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities and does not extend to commercial, private and proprietary acts. 21

A suit against JUSMAG is one against the United States Government and in the absence of any waiver or consent of the latter to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper. In this jurisdiction we recognize and adopt the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. Immunity of state from suit is one of these universally recognized principles. In international law immunity is commonly understood as the exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. This is anchored on the principle of sovereignty of equal states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal power has no power over an equal). As it now stands, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jus imperii) and does not extend to commercial, private and proprietary acts (jus gestionis).

Case#16 LASCO VS. UN REVOLVING FUND FOR NATURAL RESOURCES EXPLORATION (241 SCRA 681)

FACTS: Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages before the NLRC, respondent Labor Arbiter issued an order dismissing the complaints on the ground that private respondent was protected by diplomatic immunity. The dismissal was based on the letter of the Foreign Office which confirmed that private respondent, being a special fund administered by the United Nations, was covered by the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of which the Philippine Government was an original signatory. Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari without first seeking a reconsideration of the NLRC resolution. Petitioners argued that the acts of mining exploration and exploitation are outside the official functions of an international agency protected by diplomatic immunity. Even assuming that private respondent was entitled to diplomatic immunity, petitioners insisted that private respondent waived it when it engaged in exploration work and entered into a contract of employment with petitioners.

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ISSUE: whether an international organization is entitled to diplomatic immunity is a "political question" and such determination by the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and quasi-judicial agencies HELD: As a matter of state policy as expressed in the Constitution, the Philippine Government adopts the generally accepted principles of international law (1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2). Being a member of the United Nations and a party to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, the Philippine Government adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Both treaties have the force and effect of law. Our courts can only assume jurisdiction over private respondent if it expressly waived its immunity, which is not so in the case at bench (Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, Art. III, Sec. 4). Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence here is by virtue of a joint project entered into by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. Its mission is not to exploit our natural resources and gain pecuniarily thereby but to help improve the quality of life of the people, including that of petitioners. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations states that "each specialized agency shall make a provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party." Case #17

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION and VERSTUYFT vs AQUINO G.R. No. L-35131

FACTS:
An Original Action for Certiorari and Prohibition to set aside respondent judges refusal to quash a search warrant issued by him at the instance of respondents COSAC (Constabulary Offshore Action Center) officers for the search and seizure of the personal effects of petitioner official of the WHO (World Health Organization)

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Notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly recognized by the executive branch of the Philippine Government and to prohibit respondent judge from further proceedings in the matter. Upon filing of the petition, the Court issued on June 6, 1972 a restraining order enjoining respondents from executing the search warrant in question. Respondents COSAC officers filed their answer joining issue against petitioners and seeking to justify their act of applying for and securing from respondent judge the warrant for the search and seizure of ten crates consigned to petitioner Verstuyft and stored at the Eternit Corporation warehouse on the ground that they contain large quantities of highly dutiable goods beyond the official needs of said petitioner and the only lawful way to reach these articles and effects for purposes of taxation is through a search warrant. It is undisputed in the record that petitioner Dr. Leonce Verstuyft, who was assigned on December 6, 1971 by the WHO from his last station in Taipei to the Regional Office in Manila as Acting Assistant Director of Health Services, is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the Host Agreement executed on July 22, 1951 between the Philippine Government and the World Health Organization. When petitioner Verstuyfts personal effects contained in twelve (12) crates entered the Philippines as unaccompanied baggage on January 10, 1972, they were accordingly allowed free entry from duties and taxes. The crates were directly stored at the Eternit Corporations warehouse at Mandaluyong, Rizal, pending his relocation into permanent quarters upon the offer of Mr. Berg, Vice President of Eternit who was once a patient of Dr. Verstuyft in the Congo. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge committed a grave abuse in discretion in issuing the temporary restraining order against the execution or enforcement of the search warrant.

HELD: Such diplomatic immunity carries with it, among other diplomatic privileges and immunities, personal inviolability, inviolability of the officials properties, exemption from local jurisdiction, and exemption from taxation and customs duties. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government,[8] and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as 24

in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government. The Philippine Government is bound by the procedure laid down in Article VII of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, for consultations between the Host State and the United Nations agency concerned to determine, in the first instance the fact of occurrence of the abuse alleged, and if so, to ensure that no repetition occurs and for other recourses. This is a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government and as such, has the force and effect of law. The Court, therefore, holds that respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft. ACCORDINGLY, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are hereby granted, and the temporary restraining order heretofore issued against execution or enforcement of the questioned search warrant, which is hereby declared null and void, is hereby made permanent. The respondent court is hereby commanded to desist from further proceedings in the matter. No costs, none having been prayed for. The clerk of court is hereby directed to furnish a copy of this decision to the Secretary of Justice for such action as he may find appropriate with regard to the matters mentioned in paragraph 3 hereof. So ordered.

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