IV.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL

PROPERTIES
BY TIMOTHY SPRIGGE
ABB there internal properties of things? By a thing I mean
anything of a sort such that it is true that something of that sort
exists, leaving it open whether all things are what would ordinarily
be called particulars. By an internal property of a thing, I mean
a property of a thing such that the thing could not but have it.
The whole question has been discussed more often with regard
to relational properties. What I say is intended throughout
to apply as much to relational properties as to non-relational
properties. My discussion of this topic represents, for the most
part, my reactions to the ideas of Mr. John Watling, that keen
opponent of internal properties.
The question thus framed is far from definite in meaning.
Let us consider two things which might be meant by the asser-
tion that things have internal properties. Firstly, it might be
meant that some propositions of the form ' Fa ' are necessarily
true. Secondly, it might be meant that some propositions of the
form ' Fa' are entailed by corresponding propositions of the
form ' a exists '. The second I shall dismiss on the grounds that
it is nonsensical to talk of propositions of the form ' a exists '.
The first view is, in my opinion, false. But at the moment I
am less concerned to establish its falsehood than to consider the
appropriate way to state its falsehood.
The ordinary way of expressing the contradictory view is to
say that all propositions of the form' Fa ' are synthetic, and there-
fore contingent, but certain associations of the words " synthetic "
and " contingent"whether they are of their connotations or
not is doubtfulgive to the view a paradoxical air which I shall
briefly point out. ' Charlie Chaplin has at some stage in his life
been a human being ' is a proposition of the form in question. So
on this view it is synthetic. Now the contradictories of synthetic
propositions are generally supposed to be conceivable. Yet the
contradictory of this proposition is not conceivable. This is a
paradox of the view that there are no internal properties in the
sense in question. This is the first of my two topics.
The other topic is this:although it is impossible to distin-
guish the internal properties of a thing from its external properties,
understanding " internal " as above, and " external" as non-
internal, yet the attempt to do so stems from awareness of some
197

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198 T. SPB1GGE :
distinction which there really is to be made. For there is some
sense of could, in which there are some properties of a thing which
it could not be without, and other properties of it which it could
be without. If we use the word " internal " for the first kind of
property, and the word " external" for the second kind of pro-
perty, then there are internal and external properties. Thus
Charlie Chaplin simply could not have been without the property
of at some time in his life being a human being, but he could have
been without the property of having at least four wives. I do
not think that in the sense which I thus allow to the internal-
external distinction, all properties are either on one side or the
other, but certainly some are more internal and others more
external. I shall make some attempt to analyse this distinction,
and this will be my second topic, but until expressly stated, I
shall be using the terms " internal" and " external" in the sense
first mentioned. I thus bring together my two main topics,
because I may approach the matter somewhat obliquely in what
follows.
We may divide propositions into two classesthose which
are about things and those which are not. Let us call the former
particular propositions and the latter universal propositions.
This however is only a convenienceI do not imply that all
entities are particulars.
A criterion, of a sort, for distinguishing between particular and
universal propositions is that the former require in sentences
which are to express them, at least one word standing for a thing,
whereas the latter do not. The proposition expressed by the
sentence " T. S. Eliot is a poet" is a particular proposition.
Such a proposition does not, however, have to be expressed by a
sentence containing what is ordinarily called a proper name.
The same proposition might be expressed either by the symbols
" T. S. Eliot is a poet" or the symbols " The author of The Sacred
Wood is a poet".
In this paper I adopt the following notation. The occurrence
of an expression between double inverted commas shows that the
reference is to symbols or a sentence. The occurrence of an
expression between single inverted commas shows that the
reference is to a concept or a proposition.
Propositions about particulars require for their expression in a
sentence use of a word referring to a particular. But this is not
to say that all such sentences express particular propositions. A
universal proposition mayit seemsbe translated into a sen-
tence including a word standing for a particular. For example,
" All men are mortal" may be translated into " All men in

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INTERNAL AND EXTEBNAL PBOPEBTIES 199
London and all men not in London are mortal ". If thiB latter
sentence expresses the same proposition as the former, then a
universal proposition may be, but does not have to be, expressed
in a sentence which includes a word referring to a particular.
But a particular proposition, such for instance, as " All men in
London are mortal " may not be expressed except by a sentence
including a referring expression.
It might, however, be doubted whether " All men are mortal"
and " All men in London and all men not in London are mortal"
do express the same proposition. The ground of this doubt
would be that to believe the former does not, while to believe
the latter apparently does, require some sort of acquaintance
with London. In that case, presumably, the proposition ex-
pressed by the hitter sentence would be a particular proposition.
But it seems that the two propositions would be logically equiva-
lent, in which case a universal and a particular proposition could
be logically equivalent, which is paradoxical. For the present,
then, I take it that there is but one proposition, and that a
universal one.
Universal propositions divide into the synthetic and the
analytic. ' There are no men over the age of one hundred and
twenty ' is synthetic, and ' There are no men who are not mam-
mals ' is analytic. To believe a universal proposition of either
kind is to be disposed to pass from believing particular proposi-
tions of one sort about any set of particulars to believing particular
propositions of another sort about the same set of particulars, at
least that is my pious hope.
Our first main question is whether propositions about particu-
lars may likewise be divided into the synthetic and the analytic,
for it is only if such a distinction is possible that the distinction
between internal and external properties is possible. The inter-
nalistas I shall call the believer in internal propertiesmust
hold that either there are analytic propositions ascribing proper-
ties to particulars, or that there are propositions ascribing
properties to particulars entailed by propositions ascribing
existence to these particulars.
I shall dismiss the second alternative briefly, while admitting
that my dismissal of it begs the question to some extent. For I
shall boldly assert that an existential proposition cannot be a
particular proposition. That it exists, is not a thing one can say
about a particular. The premise of Moore's argument, that one
can meaningfully say of a particular that it exists because one can
clearly meaningfully say of a particular that it might not have
existed, is false. One cannot say of a particular that it might not

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200 T. SPEIGGE :
have existed. One thinks one can say this, because it appears to
be the contradictory of a proposition to the effect that the thing
necessarily exists, which one is anxious to contradict. But once
one sees that the words " this necessarily exists " express no
intelligible proposition, the wish to contradict it by saying " this
might not have existed " also disappears. If it is accepted then,
that an existential proposition is never about a particular, one
must admit that an existential proposition cannot entail a proposi-
tion about a particular. From the proposition that there is
something of a certain sort, or that something is of a certain sort,
one cannot deduce any proposition about any particular thing.
From a negative existential proposition or universal proposition,
however, one can deduce a proposition about a particular thing,
but this is beside the point. Thus, if the internalist is maintaining
that some proposition ascribing a predicate to a particular
follows from an existential proposition, his case is lost, and there
are seen to be no internal properties. The only remaining
possible form of internalism is that which maintains that some
propositions ascribing predicates to particulars are analytic.
If we could establish that there are no analytic propositions
about particulars, then the internalist view would be refuted.
Most of my argument will be directed to showing that proposi-
tions such as ' The author of The Sacred Wood wrote or otherwise
thought up The Sacred Wood ' or' This river bed has at some stage
had water in i t ' are either not about particulars or are not analytic.
But there is apparently one special class of propositions about
particulars to which it is difficult to deny analyticity. I shall
consider this class first, in order to get them out of the way.
Consider the proposition about a certain table ' this is not-round-
and-square'. It does seem that here we have an analytic
proposition about a particular. If we can call not-round-and-
square a property of the table, then it seems that it is an internal
property of it, it would be self-contradictory to deny it of the
table. In which case it is established that the table has at least
one internal property, which shows that there are internal
properties.
Yet this is surely not the sort of thing which anyone who talks
of internal properties has in mind. For properties like this
belong to everything.
Let us deal with the point thus. Let us say that there can be
no predicate, and therefore no property, F such t hat ' (x) (Fx)' is
analytic. Then we may deny that there are any internal proper-
ties while leaving it open whether there may not be analytic
propositions of .the form ' This ia such and such ' where ' this '

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INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PBOPEBTIES 201
refers to a particular. But in such propositions' is such and such'
is not a genuine predicate.
We may then divide particular propositions into predicative
and pseudo-predicative ones. The mark of a pseudo-predicate is
that necessarily it applies to everything, or, if a relation, that it
relates everything. We may also call pseudo-predicates those
which, necessarily, apply.to nothing.
I take it that in denying that any predicative proposition is
analytic, I am denying that there are internal properties.
But after all are not some of these propositions analytic? Is it
not analytic that the author of Waverley wrote Waverleyusing
" write " in a way sufficiently sophisticated to rebut Moore's
naivety?
Now ' The author of Waverley wrote Waverley ' might express
an analytic proposition. It might express the proposition that
if anything is the only author of Waverley, then that thing is an
author of Waverley. To believe this proposition is to be disposed
to pass from any predicative proposition of the form ' x is the
author of Waverley' to a certain predicative proposition of the
form ' x is an author of Waverley'. That is, it is to be ready to
classify anything one has classified as the only author of Waverley
as an author of Waverley. It would be an analytic proposition
because the success of the disposition in which believing it consists
comes about in a manner different from that in which, for example,
the success of a disposition to pass from any proposition of the
form ' x is called Thomas Stearns Eliot' to a certain proposition
of the form ' x wrote The Sacred Wood ' comes about.
But " The author of Waverley wrote Waverley " might be used
to say the same thing as is said by " Scott wrote Waverley " and
this thing is clearly no analytic proposition. So it seems that if
we interpret the sentence " The author of Waverley wrote
Waverley " as about a certain particular (i.e. the particular who
wrote Waverley and is known as Scott) then it is not analytic.
That is, if it is used to give a description of a certain thing it is
not analytic.
This point may be rammed home by saying that, after all,
the author of Waverley, that is, Scott, might easily not have
written Waverley, and therefore it is a contingent fact thatand
therefore a synthetic proposition thathe did write Waverley.
But to ram home the point in this way is to raise the paradox
upon which I remarked at the beginning. For it invites one to
consider whether Scott could have been the very same person,
and not have written Waverley, which, on consideration, one must
grant he could have been. In this way one is invited to consider

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202 T. SPBIGGE :
any proposition about Scott which one might be tempted to
analytic, and to reject its claim to analytdcity on the ground that
one can imagine what it would be like for Scott not to have had
the property predicated of him in the proposition; and one is
forced in each case to think that indeed he could have been
without these properties. Scott could have been born of dif-
ferent parents, have been famous as a composer rather than as an
author, have lived in a different country. But could Scott have
been a pig? When we answer that he could not have been a pig,
that is, not throughout his whole life have been a pigfor the
question whether he might have been at some stage transformed
into one by magic like the sailors of Odysseus is another question
we are surely making a logical rather than a factual claim.
Or again, consider a very full description of St. Paul and a very
full description of Scott. Surely it is not even logically possible
that the descriptions might have applied differently, that which
in fact applies to Paul applying to Scott and vice versa.
This whole approach is wrong. For it presupposes a distinc-
tion between predicates which necessarily apply and those which
apply only contingently, between internal and external properties.
It attacks the idea that things have internal properties, not at
root by a criticism of the concept of an internal property, but by
showing that supposed internal properties do not necessarily
qualify their subjects.
On the one hand there are those who say that it is always a
synthetic proposition that a thing has certain properties. On the
other hand there are those who say that for a thing to be at all,
it must have certain properties. If there were not a thing exem-
plifying these properties that thing would not be at all. The
former regard the latter as superstitious because they think that
they cling to some notion of each object having an essence. The
latter regard the former as superstitious because they think that
they have some idea of a bare particular which is only contin-
gently connected with certain properties, although it could as
well have existed with any others instead.
The argument may proceed this way. The anti-essentialist
challenges the internalist to find any properties which, say, the
Queen must have had. The internalist suggests, perhaps, that
the Queen must have the property of at some stage in her life
being Sovereign. The other suggests that it is only a contingent
fact that the Queen did not die at birth, and therefore only a
contingent fact that, and so a synthetio proposition that, the
Queen has the property at some stage in her life being Sovereign.
The internalist then says that the Queen must have been born of

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INTBENAL AND EXTERNAL PROPERTIES 2 0 3
Royal Blood. The anti-essentialist says that there would be no
contradiction in a news bulletin asserting that it had been estab-
lished that the Queen was not in fact the child of her supposed
parents, but had been secretly adopted by them, and therefore
the proposition that she is of Royal Blood is synthetic.
In this way the anti-internalist parries the argument of the
internalist by suggesting with regard to each proposed internal
property of the particular in question, that we can quite well
imagine that very same particular without the property in ques-
tion.
For a time he is winning. Yet there comes a time when his
claims appear a trifle too far fetched. The internalist suggests
that we cannot imagine that particular we call the Queen having
the property of at no stage in her existence being human. If the
anti-internalist admits this, admits that it is logically inconceivable
that the Queen should have had the property of, say, always being
a swan, then he admits that she has at least one internal property.
If on the other hand he says that it is only a contingent fact that
the Queen has ever been human, he says what it is hard to accept.
Can we really consider it as conceivable that she should never
have been human?
Here then the internalist is winning. But it is not an al-
together happy victory, for the properties which he may win for
the Queen as internal to her are of a somewhat unspecinc nature.
The properties which can be won for her as internal are hardly
such as distinguish her from her courtiers.
The internalist can make a rather better case for a somewhat
different sort of particular. But it should not be thought that
the difficulties he had in ascribing individuating internal proper-
ties to the Queen arise from special problems connected with
the criteria of personal identity. Usually it is as difficult to
find specific internal properties for individual physical objects.
Consider now a particular experience. At a certain specific
time a certain person A has a certain particular experience E.
It is an unpleasant gustatory sensation caused by having got some
soap into the mouth, in the course of shampooing his hair. A can
to some extent describe his experience, and in so doing he is
clearly describing a particular. It was a nasty bitter taste, or
perhaps rather the consciousness of a nasty bitter taste. Now
the anti-internalist would say that that very same particular
might logically have been a sweet taste, rather than a bitter
taste. But the internalist would surely speak reasonably if he
said that to suppose this, is to suppose that the particular in
question might never have occurred at all, but some other

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2 0 4 T. SPBIGGE :
particular have occurred instead. That particular taste could not
conceivably have been a sweet tasteits bitterness was a property
internal to it.
In order to deny internal properties the anti-internalist finds
himself forced into quite unplausible contentions, such as that that
very same taste might have been sweet and not bitter. Also he
has to make even odder claims such as that it is only a contingent
fact, and therefore a synthetic proposition that, Napoleon was a
human being and not a boat. All this he seems forced into, when
he wishes to deny that any particular thing necessarily has some
of the properties which it has.
He is making a valid logical point, but somehow his whole
approach is wrong. For it tacitly accepts a distinction between
predicates which necessarily apply and those which apply only
contingently, internal and external properties, and attacks the
idea that things have internal properties, not at root by a criticism
of the concept of an internal property, but rather by attempted
impeachment of any proposed internal property, as lacking the
credentials, that is as not being a property which the particular
necessarily has.
If by an internal property of a particular is meant a property
such that the proposition that the particular exemplifies it is
analytic, then there are no internal properties. But this has
nothing to do with any indefiniteness in our concept of the par-
ticular in question, but rests upon the nature of predication.
If one considers the sentences which express propositions the
point becomes almost grammatical. In sentences expressing par-
ticular propositions where the subject word is a name, the subject
word has no connotation. Therefore no predicate word can have
a connotation which is incompatible with the connotation of the
subject word. But a subject-predicate sentence could only
express a necessary proposition if the connotation of the subject
word were incompatible with the connotation of the negation of
the predicate word. Since this cannot be the case where the
sentence expresses a particular proposition, no sentence can
express a proposition ascribing properties to a particular which
proposition is necessary. From this one may conclude that there
are no such propositions and hence that particulars do not have
internal properties. Of course, this rests upon the questionable
view that there may be naming words without connotationand
this indeed is basically the point at issue. Our discussion may
at least remove certain reasons for refusing to accept that there
may be such names, for it may show that it does not have the
paradoxical consequence that anything might have had any

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INTERNAL AlO) EXTERNAL PKOPEBTTES 2 0 5
properties whatever, at least that it does not have this conse-
quence in a form which is paradoxical.
To express a proposition about a particular is to describe or
evaluate something. We will consider only descriptive proposi-
tions for the present. Such propositions merely classify the thing
as of one sort or another. It is quite inappropriate to seek for
some properties which the thing must have to be what it is. But
one does not quite Kke admitting this, because it seems to draw a
division between substance and properties, and to suggest that
the connection between them is somehow fortuitous, and that the
substance could just as well have quite different properties.
But it seems that one must identify a thing by some descrip-
tion, and having been thus identified as answering to that des-
cription, is it not in effect denned as the thing having those
properties, which properties therefore it necessarily has?
One may remove these doubts, I hope, by considering a
conversation such as follows. It is not a very ordinary conver-
sation, but it is quite intelligible. A : I am going to describe a
certain thing to you. B : What thing? A : You will recognise
it as the description proceeds. It is domed. It is made mainly
of stone. It is partly hollow. It is in the heart of a great city.
It houses many famous paintings. B: You're talking of the
National Gallery. A : I will continue. Entrance to it is free.
In front of it is a square containing a tall column on which stands
the statue of a famous sailor who is looking out upon the capital
city of his country.
Now in enunciating these properties A was describing a
certain object. A had to give a certain amount of the descrip-
tion before B cottoned on to what he was saying. But the proper-
ties of the National Gallery, the mention of which in A's descrip-
tion enabled B to identify it, are not properties of the National
Gallery in any logically different way from those mentioned after
B had managed to identify the object. If one sets out to describe
an object one cannot distinguish between properties which are
essential to it and those which are not. It simply is a thing of a
certain sort, and that is that.
But people find it difficult to see how the object can so to speak
get into the proposition except as an object, or the object, answer-
ing to a certain description. A serious attempt to deal with this
point would require an analysis of the concept of a proposition.
But some light on the nature of a predicative proposition may be
thrown by consideration of a simple situation in which one is
formulated.
Someone notes a passing object and says ' That is a starling '.

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2 0 6 T. SPRIGGE :
Here the speaker nearly uses the object as its own name. If he
caught the bird he might almost hold it up and say ' is a
starling'. When one Bays that a passing object is a starling, one's
belief that it is a starling is a way of treating a certain actual
object. One k classifying it, the very object iteelf, that is,
roughly, one is behaving towards it in a manner such as one does
towards certain other, but not all other, thingB which one comes
across. To hold a belief of this sort is quite different from holding
a universal belief, for in thiB case one's belief is a way of treating
an actual thing, and one can only believe a proposition about that
thing by treating it itself in a certain way. But a universal belief
is a second order disposition, a disposition to pass from one's
treatings of things in one way to treatings of them in another way,
and this second order disposition can existin the manner of
dispositionswithout ever being activated by any treating of an
actual object. Thus actual objects figure in particular proposi-
tions, which are the internal accusatives of beliefs, as they do not
in universal propositions.
This account does all very well for the belief in particular
propositions where the particular in question is sensibly present
to the believer, and may itself be classified in some way or other.
Then we may perhaps consider a belief about the particular as
being a certain treating of that particular. But what about
belief in propositions about particulars which are remote in space
and time?
Bertrand Kussell at times held that we could only believe
propositions about particulars which were sensibly present, and
we would get out of our difficulty if we followed him here. But
this would be to give upas he didtreating " Julius Caesar " as
a word used by us to name a particular, and I do not think we
would be right to do this.
Rather, I would say that in believing propositions about
Julius Caesar we are still reacting to him, to the man himself,
in some way, and treating him, when for instance we believe
him to have been a dictator, in a way such as we treat some other
but not all other objects. It is something of the same kind as our
classification of a passing object as a starling, and as such basically
different from believing a universal proposition.
However this may be, to describe an object cannot be to
formulate an analytic proposition. One may gather from
someone's description what object it is of which he is talking.
But there is only one way of describing an objectthat is saying
what sort of thing it is, and one cannot distinguish some such
sayings as analytic.

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INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PROPERTIES 207
Yet to say that a proposition descriptive of a particular is
synthetic is liable to mislead. To say that it is synthetic suggests
the thought that logically it might have been otherwise. For
instance consider the proposition ' it is a building'where ' i t '
refers to the National Gallery.
If we say that this proposition is synthetic it suggests that it is
logically possible, that is conceivable, that the National Gallery
should not have been a building. Then we worry ourselves as
to what it would have been like for the National Gallery not to
have been a building. For if it is a synthetic proposition that
it is a building, it must be logically possible that it should not have
been a building, and if it is a synthetic, though false proposition,
that it is not a building, we should be able to imagine what it
would have been like for it to be true.
Here we have the source, I think, of some of the worry that the
concept of a substance produces. For if it is a synthetic proposi-
tion with regard to any substance, or particular, that it has any
property, it seems that it could have been the very same substance
while having quite different properties. This makes trans-
substantiation possiblethough this is actually the reverse, a
change of substance without change of propertiesbut leaves
the substance as an unknown something.
If every proposition has to be synthetic or analytic then it is
better to call the description of a particular, that is a predicative
proposition, synthetic. But to call predicative propositions
synthetic is misleading, in that it suggests the thought that one
could imagine what it would be like for them to be false.
Here is a certain thing, let me try to classify it. That is the
spirit in which a description is properly made. It just is a thing
of a certain sort which sort the descriptionthe assertion of the
predicative propositionattempts to specify. To ask whether a
world is conceivable in which this very thing was quite otherwise
is bewildering.
Certain descriptions apply to the thing. Once one has noticed
that they apply, one does not always know what to make of the
questionmust they have applied?
Thus it would be in some ways more suitable to say that the
analytic-synthetic distinction does not apply to predicative
propositions than to say that they are synthetic. They cannot
properly be called analytic. On the other hand one cannot
in many casesproperly ask what it would be like for them to
be false. If, therefore, we do call them synthetic, it should only
be as a way of contradicting the claim that any of them are
analytic.

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2 0 8 T. 8FBIGGE :
But despite the fact that descriptions of a thing cannot be
divided into expressions of analytic, and expressions of synthetic
propositions, yet there is a sense in which propositions of the
form ' Fa' may either ascribe to a thing a property such as it
could have been without or may ascribe to a thing a property
such as it could not have been without. For instance, this chair
has both the property of being a chair, and the property of being
in this room between 3 and 4 this afternoon, but whereas one would
want to say that it could easily not have been in this room at
the time in question, it could not have failed to be a chair.
Similarly Macmillan could easily not have been Prime Minister
in 1959, but it is not easy to see that he could have failed to be a
man, and perhaps not easy to see that he could have failed to be
British. What account can we make of this sort of distinctiona
distinction at which those who distinguish between internal and
external properties have perhaps been aiming? For what they
have been suggesting is that while it is rubbish to suggest that
Macmillan might not have been human, it is not rubbish to suggest
he might not have been Prime Minister.
Someone might ask whether the Nelson Column could be
painted gold and retain its brightness. This is a question the
answer to which would depend upon how London's atmosphere
affects gold paint. That is to say, among the predicates which
may apply to a thing are many such as ' would soon look dirty if
painted gold ', ' would burst if pricked ', ' would hit you if you
said that' , ' would die if injected with such and such '. Many
questions of the form ' could this thing be different from what it
is? ' may be answered by drawing attention to the predicates
of this sort which apply to it. The question' could Scott have
written music instead of novels ?' would be answered if we could
decide that certain predicates applied or did not apply to him,
e.g. ' would have written beautiful music if he had been given a
training in harmony ', ' would not have written his novels if he
had had more money'. In short, there are all sorts of truths
about particulars of the general character ' x would under such
and such circumstances not have had such and such properties
which x now has' , or ' there are no circumstances under which x
would have had such and such a property '. So we may make a
distinction between properties which a thing would have under
any circumstances and those which it would not have had granted
certain other circumstances.
But to ask whether a thing could have been quite different
from what it is, whether Scott could actually have had all the
properties of Handel, is on a different level. The questions we

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INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PROPERTIES 209
have just been asking are all to some degree requests for further
descriptions of Scott. But the present question is not one that
calls for any investigation of Scott, and it is difficult to accept
that a question which calls for no investigation of Scott, to which
nothing about Scott is relevant, is really about Scott.
What I want to understand is why, while we can accept the
idea that Scott might have written music rather than novels, we
cannot accept the idea that he might have had all Handel's
properties, and Handel have had all Scott's.
But our question does not have to be asked about persons.
Some philosophers have thought that this sort of problem was
especially perplexing about persons, but the perplexity with
which I am at present concerned should be provoked equally by
meditations upon pots and pans, ideas and feelings.
Describing a particular is classifying it, saying that it is of
one sort rather than another. Now in some cases to say of a
particular that it might have been different from what it is, saying
that it might have had a property F, which is incompatible with
G, a property which it has, is one way of classifying it. That is,
to say it might not have had property G, or more specifically,
would under specified conditions have had property F, is
in some cases to tell one something true about how the object
actually is.
Suppose someone says of a certain lawyer, on the basis of
hearing him sing at home, that he might have been a great opera
singer. This is to classify him in a certain way just as to say
that he is a very bad lawyer is to classify him in another. Sup-
pose one says of him that he might never have been a lawyer.
This is somewhat vague, and one would probably require
elucidation of it if it were ever said. A very general interpreta-
tion of it would be that at an earlier stage in his life there was much
to suggest that he would not become a lawyer but something
quite different. It might, however, be a prelude to some very
detailed story concerning how his becoming a lawyer was a result
of some quite unexpected circumstances.
To say that Scott might have composed music rather than
written novels, might be to make a variety of claims. It might
be to say that he belonged to a class of men who may become
either very good composers or very good novelists, and that
which they become depends upon external circumstances.
My general point is this: to say that something might have
had a property F, which is incompatible with a property G which
it does have, may be a way of saying something quite true about
the sort of thing it is. But there are many cases when to aay
14

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210 T. SPRIGGE :
such a thing is not to say anything true about the sort of object it
is. Sometimes indeed philosophers may say that a thing might
have had such a property F as a way of saying that the proposi-
tion that it has property not-F is not analytic. But thisas we
have seenis a misleading way of making the point.
But we wished to distinguish between internal and external
properties. I suggest that a property is internal to a particular
to the extent that no information about that particular is con-
veyed by one who says that it might have lacked that property.
I think that the distinction between internal and external
properties is not exact. Now it seems that to say that Napoleon
night not have been human, and perhaps that he might not have
been Corsican, is to convey no information about him But to
say that he might have won the battle of Waterloo might well
be said in a context in which it conveys information. To say
that Caesar might not have crossed the Rubicon might really
convey information about the sort of man he was, it might tell
us that there were many motives in him working against his
crossing the Rubicon. But to say that he might have been
Japanese does not seem to tell us anything about him. But
perhaps it might be to say that many of his qualities were com-
patible with being Japanese. Anyway one has in each individual
case to find out what is being said. The central point is that
suggestions that a thing might have been otherwise are intelligible
in so far, and only in so far, as they are attempts to classify the
object as it is, or to say what would happen to it under specifiable
circumstances.
I propose the following definition. Let F be any property of a
thing a. Then F is an external property of a if something
interesting and true may be said of the form ' if such and such
then not-Fa'. Otherwise F is an internal property. But as
from different points of view different things are interesting, so
from different points of view different properties are internal
and external.
The question has so far only been considered with reference to
those things which are commonly called particulars. Are there
any other things, for instance universals, and supposing there are,
does what has been said apply to them also?
Suppose there is such a thing as the colour Blue. One may
raise the question whether it can be denied that the proposition
' Blue is a colour' is both about a thing, Blue, and logically
necessary. In this case there would be internal properties in
the first sense, the sense in which I have denied that there are,
though indeed only internal properties of non-particulars.

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INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PROPERTIES 21 1
To avoid this, it might be argued that ' Blue is a colour ' is a
universal proposition to the effect that (x) (x has the property of
being the universal Blue D x has the property of being a colour).
This is analytic, but it is not about Blue. But if there is something
which is the colour Blue, why cannot one talk directly about it?
If one is not going to do so, one may as well forthwith equate the
above proposition with ' (x) (x is blue D x is coloured)'.
Consider now a conversation like that I imagined earlier.
A. I am going to describe a eertain thing to you.
B. What thing?
A. You will recognise it as I proceed. It is eternal. It is non-
spatial. It is very beautiful. It is a colour. It is more like
black than red. It is often exemplified by the sky.
At some stage B will recognise what A is describing, namely
Blue. Or perhaps if he is a nominalist he will say that he doesn't
think A has succeeded in describing anything. But presuming
for the moment that A is describing something, his propositions
are not analytic, even if he ends up by saying ' It is the property
Blue '. The interest of this example is that it brings out force-
fully the manner in which propositions about particulars are
synthetic. It shows that the syntheticness of predicative
propositions is nothing to do with the nature of the entities of
which they are descriptive, nor anything to do with the separa-
bility in thought of a thing from its properties. Here it is a
universal, rather than a particular, that is in question, and if
propositions about universals may be regarded as synthetic, how
much more may propositions about particulars be! The point
is that although propositions about particulars such as the
National Gallery or universals such as Blue are not analytic, and
therefore perhaps to be called synthetic, it does not follow from
their being synthetic that we may reasonably ask what it would
be like for them to be false. It does not mean that we can imagine
the National Gallery not being a gallery, or Blue not being a colour.
They are what they areand the question Could they be different?
can only be answered by considering the applicability to them of
certain other predicates of the type ' would have been F,
* ? ' .
Yet it seems that if one does accept t hat ' Blue is a colour ' is of
the form ' Fa' , and is not the same as either of the universal
propositions above, one is landed with a thing having internal
properties in the objectionable sense. For surely it is logically
necessary that Blue is a colour?
I would dispute this. If in the sentence " Blue is a colour ",
" Blue " really is used to refer to something, namely the colour

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2 1 2 T. SPRIGGE : INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PROPERTIES
Blue, then the proposition expressed is not analytic. The fact
that it would not be analytic throws some light on the question
of internal properties in the objectionable sense. For if anything
had internal properties in that sense one might think it would be
Blue. And this shows that the denial that a thing has internal
properties need not be linked with any claim that in the case of
each of its properties it could be conceived or imagined without it.
The reason for saying t hat ' Blue is a colour ' is, if it is actually
about Blue, not analytic, is that if it is actually about Blue it is a
description, and a description of something cannot be the expres-
sion of an analytic proposition.

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