Watt V Longsdon

{\rtf1
\ansi
{\author 7.9.4.1}
{\viewkind1}
{\viewzk2}
\dntblnsbdb{\colortbl;\red0\green0\blue0;\red0\green0\blue255;\red0\green255\blu
e255;\red0\green128\blue0;\red255\green0\blue255;\red255\green0\blue0;\red255\gr
een255\blue0;\red255\green255\blue255;\red0\green0\blue139;\red0\green139\blue13
9;\red0\green100\blue0;\red139\green0\blue139;\red139\green0\blue0;\red128\green
128\blue0;\red169\green169\blue169;\red211\green211\blue211;\red128\green0\blue1
28;}
{\fonttbl{\f0\ftimes\fcharset0\fprq2 Times New Roman;}{\f1\froman\fcharset0\fprq
2 Times New Roman;}{\f2\fswiss\fcharset0\fprq2 Helvetica;}{\f3\fsans-serif\fchar
set0\fprq2 Arial;}{\f4\fserif\fcharset0\fprq2 Times New Roman;}{\f5\fswiss\fchar
set0\fprq2 Arial;}{\f6\fmodern\fcharset0\fprq1 Courier;}{\f7\ftech\fcharset0\fpr
q2 Symbol;}{\f8\fdecor\fcharset0\fprq2 ZapfDingbats;}{\f9\fmonospace\fcharset0\f
prq1 Courier New;}{\f10\fmingliu\fcharset0\fprq2 NSimSun;}{\f11\fmsmincho\fchars
et0\fprq2 MS Mincho;}{\f12\fverdana\fcharset0\fprq2 Verdana;}}
{\sectd \sbkpage \pgwsxn11894\pghsxn16833
\marglsxn1440\margrsxn1440\margtsxn720\margbsxn720
\pgnrestart\pgnstarts1
\fet2
{\header
\cbpat0 \trowd\cbpat0
\clpadl100\clpadfl3\clpadr100\clpadfr3\clpadl100\clpadfl3\clpadr100\clpadfr3\cel
lx901
lx8112
lx9014
\intbl \cbpat0 \cell\intbl \cbpat0 \fi0 \qc \sa0 \sb0 \li0 \ri0 \sl240\slmult1

\f3 \fs16 {
\b FOR}
{
\b EDUCATIONAL}
{
\b USE}
{
\b ONLY}

\cell\intbl \cbpat0 \fi0 \qr \sa0 \sb0 \li0 \ri0 \sl240\slmult1
\f3 \fs16 {
\i Page}
{
\i \chpgn }

\cell\row \pard\cbpat0 \par
}
\cols1\cbpat0 \cbpat0 \fi0 \qc \sa120 \sb80 \li0 \ri0 \sl240\slmult1
\li0 \f3 \fs20 {
\cf2
Status:}
{\*\shppict{\pict\jpegblip \bin773 JFIFC
$.' ",#(7),01444'9=82<.342C
2!!22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222 "
}!1AQa"q2#BR$3br
%&'()*456789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyz
w!1AQaq"2B #3Rbr
$4%&'()*56789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyz
?e6{]VQu-!>^KzkH\^[[2v^9n ]Fm[TNpKpd2VO\
\cf2
Judicial}
{
\cf2
Consideration}
{
\cf2
or}
{
\cf2
Case}
{
\cf2
History}
{
\cf2
Available}

\par\sa0\sb0\ql \cbpat0 \fi0 \qc \sa120 \sb120 \li0 \ri0 \sl240\slmult1
\f3 \fs24 {
\b \i \cf17
*130}
{
\b Watt}
{
\b v}
{
\b Longsdon.}

\f3 \fs20 Court of Appeal
\f3 \fs20 23 July 1929
\f3 \fs22 {
\b [1928.}
{
\b W.}
{
\b 2092.]}

\f3 \fs22 {
\b [1930]}
{
\b 1}
{
\b K.B.}
{
\b 130}

\f3 \fs20 Scrutton, Greer, and Russell L.JJ.
\f3 \fs20 1929 June 25, 26, 27, 28; July 23.
\par\sa0\sb0\ql \cbpat0 \fi0 \qj \sa80 \sb80 \li0 \ri0 \sl240\slmult1
\f3 \fs20 Defamation\uc1\u8212\'6D Libel\uc1\u8212\'6D Privilege\uc1\u8212\'6D E
vidence of Malice\uc1\u8212\'6D Allegations of Husband's \li0 Misconduct\uc1\u82
12\'6D Publication to Wife\uc1\u8212\'6D Company\uc1\u8212\'6D Voluntary Liquida
tion\uc1\u8212\'6D Interest of Directors in \li0 Company's Affairs.
\f3 \fs20 The fact that a person to whom defamatory matter is published has an o
bvious interest in the \li200 matter published is not of itself enough to make t
he publication a privileged communication. In \li200 order that such communicati
on may be privileged the person making it must have an interest in \li200 the ma
tter communicated, or there must be a duty, legal moral or social, to make the \
li200 communication incumbent on the person making it towards the person receivi
ng it.
\f3 \fs20 One B., the foreign manager of a company which carried on business abr
oad, but was in \li200 voluntary liquidation, wrote to the defendant, who was a
director and was also the liquidator of \li200 the company in England, a letter
containing gross charges of immorality, drunkenness and \li200 dishonesty on the
part of the plaintiff, who was the managing director of the company abroad. \li
200 The defendant wrote in answer that he had long suspected the plaintiff of im
morality, and asked \li200 B. whether he could obtain a sworn statement of the m
atters disclosed in his letter from the \li200 persons mentioned therein as his
informants, adding that it might "even be necessary to bribe" \li200 them, and t
hat he understood that one of them was "a woman of the lowest type on earth - a
\li200 prostitute all her life"; that the plaintiff's wife was an old friend of
his, and that he would be unfair \li200 to an old friend if he did not place the
facts before her, but that without a sworn statement he \li200 would not speak.
Without obtaining any corroboration of the allegations in B.'s letter, and with
out \li200 communicating with the plaintiff, the defendant showed B.'s letter fi
rst to S., the chairman of the \li200 board of directors and the largest shareho
lder in the company, and then to the plaintiff's wife. The \li200 allegations in
B.'s letter were unfounded, but the defendant believed them to be true:-
\f3 \fs20 Held, that the publications to S. and B. were made upon privileged occ
asions, but that the \li200 publication to the plaintiff's wife was not upon a p
rivileged occasion.
\f3 \fs20 {
\i Held}
(by Greer and Russell L.JJ.), that in the circumstances relating to the publica
tions to S. and \li200 to B. and to the plaintiff's wife there was evidence of m
alice which ought to be left to a jury.
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/docu
ment?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I1D1324F0E57111DAB242AFEA6182DD7E"}{\fldrslt\ul\c
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs20 {
\ul \cf13
Coxhead}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Richards(1846)}
{
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
569}
}} \f3 \fs20 considered and explained.
\f3 \fs20 Dicta of Lord Campbell C.J. in Harrison v. Bush (1855) 5 E. & B. 344;
ment?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I2DE24800E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\c
f2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
of}
{
\ul \cf13
Lord}
{
\ul \cf13
Esher}
{
\ul \cf13
M.R.}
{
\ul \cf13
in}
}}\li200 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/ext
ernal/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I2DE24800E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fl
drslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs20 {
\ul \cf13
Pullman}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Hill}
{
\ul \cf13
[1891]}
{
\ul \cf13
1}
{
\ul \cf13
Q.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
524}
}}\f3 \fs20 ; of {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/
app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I52F8DE70E42711DA8FC2A0F0355337E
9"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Lord}
{
\ul \cf13
Atkinson}
{
\ul \cf13
in}
{
\ul \cf13
Adam}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Ward[1917]}
{
\ul \cf13
A.}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
309}
{
\ul \cf13
approved}
}}\li200 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/ext
ernal/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I52F8DE70E42711DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fl
drslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs20 {
\ul \cf13
and}
{
\ul \cf13
followed}
}}\f3 \fs20 . {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app
/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=IC605E1F0E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}
{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Dictum}
{
\ul \cf13
of}
{
\ul \cf13
Lindley}
{
\ul \cf13
L.J.}
{
\ul \cf13
in}
{
\ul \cf13
Stuart}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Bell}
{
\ul \cf13
[1891]}
{
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
Q.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
341}
{
\ul \cf13
questioned.}
}}
\f3 \fs20 APPEAL from the judgment of Horridge J. in an action tried before the
learned judge and a special \li0 jury. The action {
\b \i \cf17
*131}
was for libel. The plaintiff was the managing director at Casa Blanca in Morocc
o \li0 of the Scottish Petroleum Company, Ld., which carried on business there a
nd elsewhere. The \li0 defendant, a young man under thirty years of age, was a d
irector of the company in England. He had \li0 been in Morocco in friendly relat
ions with the plaintiff and his wife. The company went into voluntary \li0 liqui
dation in November, 1927, and the defendant was appointed the liquidator. One E.
A. Browne \li0 was the manager of the company at Casa Blanca. The chairman of t
he board of directors in England \li0 was W. M. G. Singer. He was also the large
st shareholder in the company. On April 30, 1928, while \li0 the plaintiff was i
n Casa Blanca and his wife was in England, E. A. Browne in Casa Blanca wrote to
\li0 the defendant in England a letter stating that the plaintiff had left Casa
Blanca for Lisbon owing \cbpat0 \cbpat0 \li0 \ri0 \qj \f3 \fs20 certain spirit m
erchants 88l., and adding: \cbpat0 \cbpat0 \par
\fi0 \sa80 \sb120 \li600 \ri600 \sl240\slmult1
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "I doubt very much if these people will ever get paid."
\par\sa0\sb0\ql \f3 \fs20 The letter also contained the following passages: \cb
pat0 \cbpat0 \par
\fi0 \qj \sa80 \sb120 \li600 \ri600 \sl240\slmult1
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "Now to come to the amazing tangle. For some few days, that is
to say ever since Mr. \li600 Watt's liquidation was going on, we had noticed tha
t the housemaid's attitude had \li600 completely changed and she was being very
familiar with him. I put this down to cheek \li600 on the part of a person of th
at class. .... On Saturday afternoon the servant herself \li600 called and said
she wanted to speak to me privately. My wife and I received her, of \li600 cours
e, very coldly and told her that her attitude in demanding money from Mr. Watt w
as \li600 disgusting and we could do nothing for her. Judge of our surprise when
she replied that \li600 she had been Mr. Watt's mistress for over two months an
d after all his promises to her \li600 she thought herself quite justified in de
manding sufficient money to keep her until she \li600 could find another job. Of
course I asked for details as it seemed too amazing to be true, \li600 especial
ly as she is an old woman, stone deaf, almost blind, with dyed hair!!! She was \
li600 however able to give me a mass of details which left not the slightest dou
bt and the \li600 cook was also able to corroborate the fact that the servant wa
s in the habit of spending \li600 part of the night with Mr Watt. The servant wa
s also able to repeat things about {
\b \i \cf17
*132}
the \li600 business and intimate things regarding poor Mrs. Watt which she coul
d not have known \li600 had the situation been otherwise than that stated. ....
You will remember that you asked \li600 me whether I knew of any other affair be
yond the .... one and I replied most vigorously \li600 that I was quite certain
there was no other affair. However at present I have both the \li600 cook's and
the housemaid's words that he did receive dancing girls, etc., in his flat, and
\li600 in fact the proprietor of the building had complained of the noise made b
y these visitors. \li600 I am therefore quite certain that orgies of this sort d
id take place without any doubt \li600 whatsoever, which shows Mr. Watt to be a
perfect beast and a perjurer, as my \li600 statement to you was based on stateme
nts which he had made to me. .... However the \li600 servant states definitely t
hat he spent hours discussing with her the way of \li600 compromising my wife an
d practically asked her to assist him to do so. .... From the \li600 servant's s
tatement he is vicious and gets into uncontrollable passions brought on by \li60
0 drink and his own inherent vices. The details are too long and too unsavoury f
or me to \li600 write and I only regret that I did not know the true facts befor
e he left as I am certain he \li600 would have left a sorrier but wiser man. My
wife is, of course, very much upset. She is \li600 young, and it never entered h
er mind that he could have designs on her. All our \li600 sympathy goes out to M
rs. Watt who can never hope to be happy again unless she \li600 separates hersel
f from a man who has shown himself to be a blackguard, a thief, a liar \li600 an
d to whom friendship was a totally unknown thing, and who lived and lives exclus
ively \li600 to satisfy his own passions and lust. ...."
\par\sa0\sb0\ql
\cbpat0 \par
\f3 \fs20 The letter contained a postscript as follows: \cbpat0 \cbpat0 \par
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "From a letter shown to me by Mr. Watt I know how bitterly disa
ppointed Mrs. Watt is \li600 and how very much troubled she is. It would therefo
re perhaps be better not to show her \li600 this letter as it could only increas
e most terribly her own feelings in regard to her \li600 husband. These awful fa
cts might be the cause of a breakdown to her and I think she \li600 has enough t
o cope with at the present. Mr. Singer however should perhaps know."
\par\sa0\sb0\ql \f3 \fs20 {
\b \i \cf17
*133}

\f3 \fs20 On May 5, 1928, the defendant sent the above letter to Mr. Singer, the
chairman of the board of \li0 directors in England. On the same day the defenda
nt wrote to E. A. Browne a letter containing the \li0 following passages:- \cbpa
t0 \cbpat0 \fi0 \sa80 \sb120 \li600 \ri600 \sl240\slmult1
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "As you will have gathered accompanying the letter under reply
I received your private \li600 one regarding Mr. Watt. In the first I am indeed
grateful for the trouble you took in writing \li600 me at such length on a matte
r which must be most painful to you, and before I go any \li600 further may I ex
press my deep regret that your wife should ever have met and known a \li600 man
of so base a nature and character as that of this individual. Indirectly he came
into \li600 your lives through me. .... Both of you always through the generosi
ty of your hearts ever \li600 ready to befriend those whom you deemed in need, t
hat your kindness and friendship \cbpat0 \cbpat0 \cbpat0 \cbpat0 \li600 \ri600 \
qj \f3 \fs20 should be so abused is very painful to me. .... Passing on to his g
eneral conduct outside \li600 of your own home, the information vile and sourdid
(sic) as it is does not come in any \li600 way as a surprise. You have long kno
wn I have suspected he was leading a life as has \li600 now proved itself. Do no
t think I am priding myself on such knowledge, far be it, the \li600 difficulty
with me was to prove it. I merely guessed it, for I had no proof beyond a few \l
i600 slender threads. ..... There is one whom it concerns very deeply, his poor
wife, who is \li600 indeed one of the world's best, a woman of the highest honou
r. To me it is wrong, \li600 wicked and I will say cruel, that she, the one most
concerned, should be in the dark to \li600 these disgusting and degrading happe
nings. To think the man will return to her and take \li600 up his life with her
as an innocent and wholesome being is to me too appalling. Surely to \li600 God
she should be told and give her (sic) the chance to decide what she wishes to do
. \li600 To me, to hide such facts from a friend, no matter how great or how sma
ll a one, is \li600 iniquitous. Do not you agree? In any case, I am going to ask
you to do something for \li600 me. This woman who has been his mistress is doub
tless still in Casa Blanca and also \li600 the maid who corroberated (sic) to yo
u the disgusting disclosures the former made. His \li600 mistress I understand i
s one of the lowest type of women on earth {
\b \i \cf17
*134}
- a prostitute all \li600 her life. As a friend of mine, which I truly know you
to be, could you obtain a sworn \li600 statement of all these happenings. It ma
y be even necessary for you to bribe the women \li600 to do such and if only a m
atter of a few hundred francs I will pay it and of course the \li600 legal expen
ses. I feel this matter very deeply. Mrs. Watt is an old friend of mine and \li6
00 once when dangerously ill she saved my life and therefore there is nothing in
this world I \li600 would not gladly do to recompense for all she did for me. T
he circumstances of this case \li600 are so appalling that I feel I would be let
ting down an old friend if I did not place truth \li600 and facts before her. Na
turally I would not say anything until I had a sworn statement in \li600 my poss
ession and only with such proof would I speak, for an interferer between \li600
husband and wife nearly always comes off the worst. .... In conclusion I just as
k you to \li600 be good enough to help me in order that I may stand by an old fr
iend who I feel has \li600 been treated worse than fit for the vilest harlot on
earth. To me it is incredible that any \li600 man with a grain of decency could
do such a thing. If his mistress had pretences at \li600 being a decent individu
al it might partially be understood but to cohabitate with such a \li600 creatur
e is, well beyond words of expression."
\f3 \fs20 On May 14, before getting any sworn statement or any other corroborati
on of the allegations \li0 contained in Browne's letter of April 30, the defenda
nt showed that letter to the plaintiff's wife, with the \li0 result that the pla
intiff and his wife separated, and the wife instituted proceedings for divorce.
\f3 \fs20 The plaintiff then brought this action alleging publication by the def
endant (a) to Singer and (b) to the \li0 plaintiff's wife of Browne's letter of
April 30, and publication of the defendant's own letter to Browne of \li0 May 5.
The defendant did not justify the libels contained in the letters, but pleaded
that Browne's letter \li0 to him was published to Singer and to the plaintiff's
wife in circumstances which made the \li0 publications privileged, and that his
letter to Browne was written and published in similar \li0 circumstances. At the
trial the plaintiff put in the defendant's answers to two interrogatories, {
\b \i \cf17
*135}
the \li0 effect of which answers was that before publishing Browne's letter of
April 30 he took no steps and \li0 made no inquiries to ascertain whether the ma
tters alleged therein were true and that he believed all \li0 the matters allege
d in the said letter were true.
\f3 \fs20 The learned judge ruled that the three publications complained of were
all made on privileged \li0 occasions and that there was no evidence of malice
to go to the jury. He therefore gave judgment for \li0 the defendant.
\f3 \fs20 The plaintiff appealed.
\f3 \fs20 {
\i T.}
{
\i J.}
{
\i O'Connor}
{
\i K.C.}
and {
\i C.}
{
\i P.}
{
\i Harvey}
for the appellant. First with regard to the publication by the \li0 respondent
to the appellant's wife of Browne's letter of April 30: The learned judge was wr
ong in \li0 holding, as he did, that \cbpat0 \cbpat0 \par
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "If there is an obvious interest in the person to whom a commun
ication is made which \li600 causes him to be a proper recipient of a statement,
if that statement is honestly made, \li600 then the statement is privileged."
\par\sa0\sb0\ql \f3 \fs20 Where the person making and the person receiving a com
munication have a common interest in the \cbpat0 {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E4
2811DA8FC2A0F0355337E912}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E912}}\
cbpat0 \li0 \ri0 \qj \f3 \fs20 subject matter the communication is generally pri
vileged; and so if the person making the \li0 communication has an interest in t
he matter, and the person to whom it is made has a legal moral or \li0 social du
ty to regard and respect that interest. But where there is no common interest, o
r no interest \li0 in one party coupled with at least a social duty upon the oth
er to regard it, there is no privilege: {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC
2A0F0355337E91}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E91}}{{\*\bkmksta
rt srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E92}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC
2A0F0355337E92}}{{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E93}{\*\bkmke
nd srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E93}}\li0 Harrison v. Bush {\field {\*\fl
dinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E91"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf1
3
\fs12 {
\ul \fs20 \super \cf13
1}
}}\f3 \fs20 ; {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app
/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I2DE24800E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}
{
\ul \cf13
Pullman}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Hill}
{
\ul \cf13
&}
{
\ul \cf13
Co.}
}} {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E92"}{\fl
drslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
2}
}}\f3 \fs20 ; {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app
/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I52F8DE70E42711DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}
{
\ul \cf13
Adam}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Ward}
drslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
3}
}}\f3 \fs20 , per Lord Atkinson. The learned judge has {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F7
3AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E94}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9
4}}\li0 cited in support of his opinion {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://lo
gin.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I1D1324F0
E57111DAB242AFEA6182DD7E"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Coxhead}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Richards}
drslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
4}
}}\f3 \fs20 , where the mate of a ship wrote to an intimate \li0 friend, the def
endant, a letter complaining of the danger to which he and other members of the
crew \li0 were subjected owing to the drunkenness of the captain, the plaintiff;
and the defendant sent the letter \li0 to the owner of the ship, who thereupon
dismissed the plaintiff. The Court of Common Pleas was \li0 equally divided upon
that case, Tindal C.J. and Erle J. holding that the communication of the letter
to \li0 the {
\b \i \cf17
*136}
shipowner was privileged, while Coltman and Cresswell JJ. held that it was not.
The \li0 judgment of the Chief Justice and Erle J. has been repeatedly approved
: by Willes J. in Amann v. {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9
5}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E95}}{{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F7
3AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E96}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9
6}}{{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E97}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F7
3AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E97}}\li0 Damm {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF
0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E95"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
5}
}}\f3 \fs20 ; by Blackburn J. in Davies v. Snead {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \
\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E96"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
6}
}}\f3 \fs20 ; and by Lindley L.J. in {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login
.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=IC605E1F0E42
811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Stuart}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Bell.}
drslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
7}
}}\f3 \fs20 No doubt the \li0 matter contained in that letter gravely concerned
the shipowner; but it concerned others as well as {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E
42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E98}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E98}}\l
i0 him, and therefore {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/
wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I1D1324F0E57111DAB242AFEA61
82DD7E"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Coxhead}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Richards}
drslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
8}
}}\f3 \fs20 is not an authority for holding that the interest of the person \li0
receiving a communication is of itself sufficient to confer a privilege on the
publication. Such authority {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E
99}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E99}}\li0 as there is points
to the contrary conclusion. In {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westl
aw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=IE96E0510E42711DA8
FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Macintosh}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Dun}
drslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
9}
}}\f3 \fs20 , followed in {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co
.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=IE2AB5E30E42711DA8FC2A0
F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Greenlands,}
{
\ul \cf13
Ld.}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
}}{{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E910}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F
73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E910}}\li0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://logi
n.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=IE2AB5E30E4
\f3 \fs20 {
\ul \cf13
Wilmshurst}
}} {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E910"}{\f
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
10}
}}\f3 \fs20 , a report made by a trade protection society to a tradesman concern
ing the solvency of \li0 the plaintiff was held not to be privileged, notwithsta
nding the interest of the tradesman in the matter. \li0 The test for privilege i
s the same whether the matter communicated interests the party making or the \li
0 party receiving the communication, or both parties. It was formulated by Parke
B. in Toogood v. {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E911}{\*\bk
mkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E911}}\li0 Spyring {\field {\*\fldinst
HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E911"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
11}
}}\f3 \fs20 : \cbpat0 \cbpat0 \par
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "If fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or exigency, an
d honestly made, such \li600 communications are protected for the common conveni
ence and welfare of society."
\par\sa0\sb0\ql \f3 \fs20 Is it for the common convenience and welfare of societ
y that a shipowner should be informed of the \li0 \ri0 \qj conduct of his captai
n which is endangering the lives of his crew? The law has answered that in the {
{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E912}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD
1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E912}}\li0 case of {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://
login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I1D1324
F0E57111DAB242AFEA6182DD7E"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Coxhead}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Richards}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
12}
}} \f3 \fs20 it was. The question whether it is for the common convenience and \
li0 welfare of society that a wife should be informed of her husband's misconduc
t is a very different \li0 question. It cannot be answered categorically either
way. The answer must depend on the \li0 circumstances. The relation between the
party making and the party receiving the communication; for \li0 example, the re
lation of parent and child, or brother and {
\b \i \cf17
*137}
sister, the relation between cousins, \li0 long and intimate friendship; all th
ese may in varying degrees warrant or excuse a communication like \li0 that unde
r discussion. The question in this case is whether in the circumstances the comm
on \li0 convenience and welfare of society were being served when the respondent
handed to Mrs. Watt the \li0 letter he had received from Browne. That question
has never been answered.
\f3 \fs20 Next with regard to the respondent's letter to Browne, the contents of
which the respondent also \li0 published to Mr. Singer; and thirdly with regard
to the publication to Singer of Browne's letter of April \li0 30; the learned j
udge has held that, although by s. 186 of the Companies Consolidation Act, 1908,
the \li0 powers of the directors of a company cease on the appointment of a liq
uidator except so far as he \li0 sanctions their continuance, nevertheless Brown
e, Singer, and the respondent had each and all of \li0 them a common interest in
the affairs of the company and that these publications were therefore \li0 priv
ileged. It is submitted that they were not; but if they were, there was ample ev
idence of malice, \li0 which ought to have been left to the jury. The fact that
the respondent showed to the appellant's wife \li0 Browne's letter without ever
communicating with the appellant and without getting any corroboration \li0 of t
he outrageous charges it contained; his offer to pay for a sworn statement suppo
rting them from \li0 witnesses whom he knew to be untrustworthy, even if it shou
ld be necessary to bribe them; these \li0 matters of themselves, apart from the
strong, but natural, expressions of disgust and abhorrence at \li0 the supposed
conduct of the appellant, ought to have been left to the jury.
{{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E916}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73A
D1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E916}}\par\sa0\sb0\ql \cbpat0 \fi0 \qj \sa80 \sb80 \li0
\ri0 \sl240\slmult1
D1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E913}}\f3 \fs20 {
\i Stuart}
{
\i Bevan}
{
\i K.C.}
and {
\i Kenelm}
{
\i Preedy}
for the respondent. {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/w
luk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I1D1324F0E57111DAB242AFEA618
{
\ul \cf13
Coxhead}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Richards}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
13}
}}\f3 \fs20 established that the \li0 interest of the party receiving a communic
ation may create a privileged occasion. The respondent \li0 takes his stand upon
the principle of that case, which has been recognized by Willes J. in Amann v.
D1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E914}}{{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F035533
7E915}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E915}}{{\*\bkmkstart srcfn
IF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E916}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F035
5337E916}}\li0 Damm {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0
\fs12 {
14}
}}\f3 \fs20 , by Blackburn J. in Davies v. Snead {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \
\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E915"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
15}
}}\f3 \fs20 , and by Lindley L.J. in {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login
.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=IC605E1F0E42
{
\ul \cf13
Stuart}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Bell}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
16}
}}\f3 \fs20 , and which \li0 ought to {
\b \i \cf17
*138}
be supported for the common welfare of society. The principle of that case cove
rs this. \li0 The cogency of Mrs. Watt's interest in the matter of Browne's lett
er was at least equal to that of the \li0 shipowner's interest in the mate's let
ter. The respondent believed the allegations, disgraceful as they \li0 were, in
Browne's letter; he was an intimate friend of Mrs. Watt and under a great obliga
tion of \li0 gratitude towards her. He felt that to hear and believe the imputat
ions upon her husband, and to lie by \li0 mute and inactive, was a cowardly betr
ayal of one who was entitled to his sympathy and support. If a \cbpat0 {{\*\bkmk
start srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E917}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811D
A8FC2A0F0355337E917}}\cbpat0 \li0 \ri0 \qj \f3 \fs20 reciprocal duty upon the pa
rty making a communication is necessary to create a privilege, surely \li0 there
was here a duty more exigent than any duty owed by Richards towards the shipown
er. All that \li0 is necessary to create a privileged occasion is a state of thi
ngs which explains why the \li0 communication was made and thereby shows that it
was not the outcome of mere malice or \li0 perversity, and that the presumption
of malice is not warranted. The presumption is easily displaced. \li0 It rests
on the questionable position that defamatory matter is generally published witho
ut just cause \li0 or excuse. Accordingly as soon as the defendant shows that th
ere is a fair and reasonable \li0 explanation of his act in publishing the defam
atory matter, the presumption of malice is rebutted. \li0 Then to entitle the pl
aintiff to succeed he must adduce evidence more consistent with the existence of
{{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E917}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73
AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E917}}\li0 malice than with its absence: {\field {\*\fl
dinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.
0&vr=1.0&docguid=I1D139A20E57111DAB242AFEA6182DD7E"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Somerville}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Hawkins.}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
17}
}} \f3 \fs20 It cannot be said that the respondent's conduct \li0 in showing Bro
wne's letter to Mrs. Watt was more consistent with malice than with perfect good
faith; \li0 and the learned judge was right in holding that this publication wa
s upon a privileged occasion.
\f3 \fs20 With regard to the other publications - namely, those to Mr. Singer an
d to Browne, it is admitted in the \li0 statement of claim that the respondent,
Singer, and Browne were all engaged in the business of the \li0 company, and of
course they were interested in its affairs notwithstanding the fact that it was
in \li0 voluntary liquidation. It is clear therefore that these publications wer
e made upon privileged \li0 occasions. {
\b \i \cf17
*139}

\ri0 \sl240\slmult1
\f3 \fs20 There remains the question of malice. Strong expressions used in the r
espondent's letter cannot be \li0 relied on as evidence of malice. It is common
ground that he believed the allegations in Browne's \li0 letter; if they were tr
ue they warranted the strongest expression of disapproval. The Court will not be
\li0 at pains to find evidence of malice, nor astute in discovering it. As Lord
Dunedin says in {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/
app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I52F8DE70E42711DA8FC2A0F0355337E
{
\ul \cf13
Adam}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
}}{{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E918}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F
73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E918}}\li0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://logi
n.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I52F8DE70E4
\f3 \fs20 {
\ul \cf13
Ward}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
18}
}}\f3 \fs20 : "When considering whether the actual expression used can be held a
s evidence of express \li0 malice no nice scales should be used"; and what appli
es to the expression should equally apply to the \li0 circumstances in which it
is uttered.
\f3 \fs20 {
\i O'Connor}
{
\i K.C.}
in reply.
\par\sa0\sb0\ql \cbpat0 \fi0 \qr \sa80 \sb80 \li0 \ri0 \sl240\slmult1
\f3 \fs20 {
\i Cur.}
{
\i adv.}
{
\i vult.}

\f3 \fs20 July 23. The following written judgments were delivered:- SCRUTTON L.J
.
\f3 \fs20 This case raises, amongst other matters, the extremely difficult quest
ion, equally important in its legal \li0 and social aspect, as to the circumstan
ces, if any, in which a person will be justified in giving to one \li0 partner t
o a marriage information which that person honestly believes to be correct, but
which is in \li0 fact untrue, about the matrimonial delinquencies of the other p
arty to the marriage. The question \li0 becomes more difficult if the answer in
law turns on the existence or non-existence of a social or \li0 moral duty, a qu
estion which the judge is to determine, without any evidence, by the light of hi
s own \li0 knowledge of the world, and his own views on social morality, a subje
ct matter on which views vary in \li0 different ages, in different countries, an
d even as between man and man.
\f3 \fs20 The Scottish Petroleum Company, which carried on business, amongst oth
er places, in Morocco, had \li0 in Casa Blanca, a port in Morocco, a manager nam
ed Browne, and a managing director named Watt. \li0 The company had in England a
chairman named Singer, who held a very large proportion of shares in \li0 the c
ompany, and also another director, Longsdon, a young man under thirty years of a
ge. The latter \li0 had been in Morocco in business and friendly {
\b \i \cf17
*140}
relations with Watt and Browne, and was a friend \li0 of Mrs. Watt, who had nur
sed him in an illness. The company went into voluntary liquidation in \li0 Novem
ber, 1927, and Longsdon was appointed liquidator. In April, 1928, Mrs. Watt was
in England, \li0 and her husband in Casa Blanca. It is not clear, and there is n
o evidence, what the effect of the \li0 liquidation had been on the actual emplo
yment of Watt and Browne, that is, whether they, or either of \li0 them, still r
eceived a salary. Watt's directorship was, under the Companies Act, in a state o
f \li0 suspended animation. Under these circumstances Longsdon in England receiv
ed at the beginning of \li0 May from Browne in Casa Blanca a letter stating that
Watt had left for Lisbon to look for a job, that he \li0 had left a bill for 88
l. for whisky unpaid, and that he had been for two months in immoral relations w
ith \li0 his housemaid, who was now publicly raising claims against him for mone
y matters. The woman was \li0 described as an old woman, stone deaf, almost blin
d, and with dyed hair. A number of details were \li0 given which Browne said Wat
t's cook had corroborated. The information was mixed up with an \li0 allegation
that Watt had been scheming to compromise or seduce Mrs. Browne. The letter conc
luded: \cbpat0 \cbpat0 \fi0 \sa80 \sb120 \li600 \ri600 \sl240\slmult1
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "From a letter shown to me by Mr. Watt I know how bitterly disa
ppointed Mrs. Watt is, \li600 and how very much troubled she is. It would theref
ore perhaps be better not to show her \li600 this letter as it could only increa
se most terribly her own feelings in regard to her \li600 husband. These awful f
acts might be the cause of a breakdown to her, and I think she \cbpat0 \cbpat0 \
cbpat0 \cbpat0 \li600 \ri600 \qj \f3 \fs20 has enough to cope with at present. M
r. Singer, however, should perhaps know."
\par\sa0\sb0\ql \f3 \fs20 On May 5, Longsdon, without making inquiries, sent Bro
wne's letter on to Singer, the chairman of the \li0 \ri0 \qj board of directors.
At the trial Watt's counsel put in Longsdon's answer to interrogatory 5 that he
\li0 believed the statements in the letter to be true. On May 5 Longsdon wrote
a long letter to Browne, in \li0 which he said that he had long suspected Watt's
immorality, but had no proof; that he thought it \li0 wicked and cruel that Mrs
. Watt, a very old friend of the writer's, should be in the dark when Watt \li0
might return to her - did not Browne agree? - that he {
\b \i \cf17
*141}
(Longsdon) would not speak until he had a \li0 sworn statement in his possessio
n, "and only with such proof would I speak, for an interferer between \li0 husba
nd and wife nearly always comes off the worst." Could Browne get a sworn stateme
nt? "It may \li0 even be necessary for you to bribe the women to do such, and if
only a matter of a few hundred \li0 francs I will pay it and of course the lega
l expenses." Longsdon's letter describes one of the women \li0 who was to make t
his sworn statement as "a prostitute all her life," a description not contained
in \li0 Browne's letter. Watt returned to England in May. Without waiting for th
e sworn statement, on May 12, \li0 Longsdon sent the letter to Mrs. Watt. Mr. an
d Mrs. Watt separated, and Mrs. Watt instituted \li0 proceedings for divorce, wh
ich apparently are still pending.
\f3 \fs20 Mr. Watt then instituted proceedings against Longsdon for libel - name
ly (1.) the publication of \li0 Browne's letter to Singer; (2.) the publication
of the same letter to Mrs. Watt; (3.) Longsdon's letter of \li0 May 5 to Browne.
The claim alleged: \cbpat0 \cbpat0 \par
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "The plaintiff, the defendant, and one E. A. Browne were at all
material times in the \li600 employment in Morocco of the Scottish Petroleum Co
mpany, Ld., a company now in \li600 liquidation, of which one W. M. G. Singer wa
s chairman and had a controlling interest \li600 therein,"
\par\sa0\sb0\ql \f3 \fs20 and the defence admitted it: "The facts alleged in par
agraph 1 of the statement of claim are admitted." \li0 \ri0 \qj The plaintiff al
so put in at the trial the defendant's answers to interrogatories that his only
information \li0 on the subject was derived from Browne's letter, that he made n
o further inquiries, and that he \li0 believed that all the statements in Browne
's letter, and in the defendant's letter of May 12 were true. \li0 The defendant
did not justify, but pleaded privilege. The case was tried before Horridge J. a
nd a jury. \li0 The learned judge held that all three publications were privileg
ed, and that there was no evidence of \li0 malice fit to be left to the jury. He
therefore entered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.
\ri0 \sl240\slmult1
\f3 \fs20 The learned judge appears to have taken the view that the authorities
justify him in holding that if \li0 "there is an obvious interest in the person
to whom a communication is made {
\b \i \cf17
*142}
which causes him \li0 to be a proper recipient of a statement," even if the par
ty making the communication had no moral or \li0 social duty to the party to who
m the communication is made, the occasion is privileged. He derives {{\*\bkmksta
rt srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E919}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8F
C2A0F0355337E919}}\li0 this from the opinions of Tindal C.J. and Erle J. in {\fi
eld {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document
?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I1D1324F0E57111DAB242AFEA6182DD7E"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \
cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Coxhead}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Richards}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
19}
}} \f3 \fs20 as approved by Willes J. in {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8F
C2A0F0355337E920}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E920}}{{\*\bkmk
start srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E921}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811D
A8FC2A0F0355337E921}}\li0 Amann v. Damm {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0
F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E920"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
20}
}}\f3 \fs20 ; and by Blackburn J. in Davies v. Snead {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLI
NK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E921"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
21}
}}\f3 \fs20 , and especially from the approval of {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E
42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E922}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E922}}
\li0 these decisions, and the citation of the judgment of Erle C.J. in Whiteley
v. Adams {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E92
\fs12 {
22}
}}\f3 \fs20 , by Lindley L.J. {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F035533
7E923}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E923}}\li0 in {\field {\*\
fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK
1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=IC605E1F0E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Stuart}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Bell.}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
23}
}}\f3 \fs20 He has therefore found in the present case that the occasion of each
of the three \li0 communications, to Singer, to the wife, and to Browne, was pr
ivileged, and that there is no evidence \li0 of excess of communication or of ma
lice to be left to the jury. "No nice scales should be used," as {{\*\bkmkstart
srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E924}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A
0F0355337E924}}\li0 Lord Dunedin said in {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://l
ogin.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I52F8DE7
0E42711DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Adam}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Ward.}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
24}
}}
\ri0 \sl240\slmult1
\f3 \fs20 By the law of England there are occasions on which a person may make d
efamatory statements \li0 about another which are untrue without incurring any l
egal liability for his statements. These \li0 occasions are called privileged oc
casions. A reason frequently given for this privilege is that the \li0 allegatio
n that the speaker has "unlawfully and maliciously published," is displaced by p
roof that the \li0 speaker had either a duty or an interest to publish, and that
this duty or interest confers the privilege. \li0 But communications made on th
ese occasions may lose their privilege: (1.) they may exceed the \li0 privilege
of the occasion by going beyond the limits of the duty or interest, or (2.) they
may be \li0 published with express malice, so that the occasion is not being le
gitimately used, but abused. A very \li0 careful discussion of the way in which
these two grounds of loss of privilege should be considered will {{\*\bkmkstart
0F0355337E925}}\li0 be found in Lord Dunedin's judgment in Adam v. Ward. {\field
{\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E925"}{\fldrslt\ul\
cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
25}
}} \f3 \fs20 The classical definition of "privileged {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73A
D1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E926}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E92
6}}\li0 occasions" is that of Parke B. in Toogood v. Spyring {\field {\*\fldinst
HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E926"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
26}
}}\f3 \fs20 , a case where the tenant of a farm complained \li0 to the agent of
the landlord, who had sent a {
\b \i \cf17
*143}
workman to do repairs, that the workman had \li0 broken into the tenant's cella
r, got drunk on the tenant's cider, and spoilt the work he was sent to do. {{\*\
bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E927}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42
811DA8FC2A0F0355337E927}}\li0 The workman sued the tenant. Parke B. gave the exp
lanation of privileged occasions in these words \li0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLI
NK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E927"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
\ul \cf13
27}
}}\f3 \fs20 : \cbpat0 {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E931}{
\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E931}}\cbpat0 \cbpat0 \cbpat0 \fi
0 \qj \sa80 \sb120 \li600 \ri600 \sl240\slmult1
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "In general, an action lies for the malicious publication of st
atements which are false in \li600 fact, and injurious to the character of anoth
er (within the well-known limits as to verbal \li600 slander), and the law consi
ders such publication as malicious, unless it is fairly made by \li600 a person
in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether legal or moral, or in \
li600 the conduct of his own affairs, in matters where his interest is concerned
. In such cases, \li600 the occasion prevents the inference of malice, which the
law draws from unauthorized \li600 communications, and affords a qualified defe
nce depending upon the absence of actual \li600 malice. If fairly warranted by a
ny reasonable occasion or exigency, and honestly made, \li600 such communication
s are protected for the common convenience and welfare of \li600 society; and th
e law has not restricted the right to make them within any narrow limits."
\par\sa0\sb0\ql \f3 \fs20 It will be seen that the learned judge requires: (1.)
a public or private duty to communicate, whether \li0 \ri0 \qj legal or moral; (
2.) that the communication should be "fairly warranted by any reasonable occasio
n or \li0 exigency"; (3.) or a statement in the conduct of his own affairs where
his interest is concerned. Parke \li0 B. had given several other definitions in
slightly varying terms. For instance, in Cockayne v. {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73
AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E928}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9
28}}\li0 Hodgkisson {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0
\fs12 {
28}
}} \f3 \fs20 he had directed the jury \cbpat0 \cbpat0 \par
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "Where the writer is acting on any duty, legal or moral, toward
s the person to whom he \li600 writes, or where he has, by his situation, to pro
tect the interests of another, that which \li600 he writes under such circumstan
ces is a privileged communication."
D1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E929}}\par\sa0\sb0\ql \f3 \fs20 This adds to the protect
ion of his own interest spoken of in Toogood v. Spyring {\field {\*\fldinst HYPE
RLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E929"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
29}
}} \f3 \fs20 the protection of the \li0 \ri0 \qj interests of another where the
situation of the writer requires him to protect those interests. This, I \li0 th
ink, involves that his "situation" imposes on him a legal or moral duty. The que
stion whether the \li0 occasion was privileged is for the judge, {
\b \i \cf17
*144}
and so far as "duty" is concerned, the question is: Was \li0 there a duty, lega
l, moral, or social, to communicate? As to legal duty, the judge should have no
\li0 difficulty; the judge should know the law; but as to moral or social duties
of imperfect obligation, the \li0 task is far more troublesome. The judge has n
o evidence as to the view the community takes of moral \li0 or social duties. Al
l the help the Court of Appeal can give him is contained in the judgment of Lind
ley {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E930}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0
F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E930}}\li0 L.J. in {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "ht
tp://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=IC
605E1F0E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Stuart}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Bell}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
30}
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "The question of moral or social duty being for the judge, each
judge must decide it as \li600 best he can for himself. I take moral or social
duty to mean a duty recognized by English \li600 people of ordinary intelligence
and moral principle, but at the same time not a duty \li600 enforceable by lega
l proceedings, whether civil or criminal. My own conviction is that all \li600 o
r, at all events, the great mass of right-minded men in the position of the defe
ndant \li600 would have considered it their duty, under the circumstances, to in
form Stanley of the \li600 suspicion which had fallen on the plaintiff."
\par\sa0\sb0\ql \f3 \fs20 Is the judge merely to give his own view of moral and
social duty, though he thinks a considerable \li0 \ri0 \qj portion of the commun
ity hold a different opinion? Or is he to endeavour to ascertain what view "the
\li0 great mass of right-minded men" would take? It is not surprising that with
such a standard both judges \li0 and text-writers treat the matter as one of gre
at difficulty in which no definite line can be drawn. I refer \li0 to the judici
al recognition of the difficulty cited in Fraser on Libel, 6th ed., pp. 183 to 1
86, the late Mr. \li0 Blake Odgers' book on Libel, 6th ed., p. 220, and Mr. Gatl
ey's book, 2nd ed., p. 252. A conspicuous \li0 instance of the diffIculties whic
h arise when judges have to determine the existence of duties, not \li0 legal, b
ut moral or social, by the inner light of their own conscience and judgment and
knowledge of {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E931}{\*\bkmkend
srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E931}}\li0 the world, is to be found in the
case of {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/exte
rnal/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I1D1324F0E57111DAB242AFEA6182DD7E"}{\fld
rslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Coxhead}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Richards.}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
31}
}} \f3 \fs20 A correct appreciation of what was the \li0 difference of opinion i
n that case is, in my opinion, of great importance in the decision of the presen
t \li0 case. The short facts were that Cass, the mate of a ship, wrote to Richar
ds, an intimate friend of his, \li0 a {
\b \i \cf17
*145}
letter stating that on a voyage from the Channel to Wales, which was going to c
ontinue to \li0 Eastern ports, the captain, Coxhead, had by his drunkenness enda
ngered the safety of the ship, and \li0 the lives of the crew; and Cass asked Ri
chards' advice what he should do in view of the risk of \li0 repetition of this
danger on the voyage to the East. Richards, after consulting "an Elder Brother o
f the \li0 Trinity House, and an eminent shipowner," sent this letter to Ward, t
he owner of the ship. Richards did \li0 not know Ward, and had no interest in th
e ship. The owner dismissed the captain, who thereupon \li0 brought an action ag
ainst Richards. The judge at the trial directed the jury, if they should think t
hat the \li0 communication was strictly honest, and made solely in the execution
of what he believed to be a duty, \li0 to find for the defendant. They did so,
while finding that the plea of justification failed. The plaintiff \li0 then mov
ed for a new trial, on which motion the Court after two hearings was equally div
ided. It is not \li0 very clear whether the judges differed on a general princip
le, or on its application to the facts of the \cbpat0 {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73
AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E944}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9
44}}\cbpat0 \li0 \ri0 \qj \f3 \fs20 case. I understand Tindal C.J. to have taken
the view that if a man has information materially affecting \li0 the interests
of another, and honestly communicates it to that other, he is protected, though
he has no {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E932}{\*\bkmkend sr
cfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E932}}\li0 personal interest in the subject ma
tter {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E932"}{
\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
32}
}}\f3 \fs20 , and that his protection arises from "the various social duties \li
0 by which men are bound to each other," and that it was the duty of the defenda
nt to communicate this {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E933}{
\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E933}}\li0 information to the own
er. {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E933"}{\
fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
33}
}}\f3 \fs20 Erle J. appears to put the matter on "information given to protect d
amage \li0 from misconduct," "the importance of the information to the interest
of the receiver," and says that a \li0 person having such information is justifi
ed in communicating it to the person interested, though the \li0 speaker did not
stand in any relation to the recipient, and was a volunteer. He does not expres
sly \li0 refer to any social duty. On the other hand, Coltman and Cresswell JJ.
both appear to me to hold that {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F03553
37E934}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E934}}\li0 in such circum
stances there was no moral duty {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E4
\fs12 {
34}
}}\f3 \fs20 , for that any tendency {
\b \i \cf17
*146}
that way was \li0 counterbalanced by the moral duty not to slander your neighbo
ur. In the subsequent case of Bennett {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A
0F0355337E935}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E935}}\li0 v. Deac
on {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E935"}{\f
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
35}
}} \f3 \fs20 the same four judges repeated the same division of opinion, where D
eacon, a man to \li0 whom the plaintiff owed 25l., volunteered to a tradesman, w
ho was about to deal with the plaintiff, the \li0 statement that unless the trad
esman was paid ready money he would lose the goods, and his money, \li0 or price
, for he (Deacon) was about to seize the goods of the plaintiff for debt. I thin
k it is clear that \li0 Tindal C.J. and Erle J. thought that a volunteer, with n
o personal interest, would be protected in giving \li0 information apparently ma
terial to the interest of the recipient, and that Coltman and Cresswell JJ. \li0
thought he would not. How far either set of judges meant to lay down a general
principle applicable to \li0 all such cases is not very clear. They certainly di
ffered in its application to the particular facts of those \li0 cases. I myself
should have thought, and I think most of the judges who have considered the case
, as {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E936}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF
0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E936}}{{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0
355337E937}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E937}}\li0 for instan
ce Willes J. in Amann v. Damm {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E428
\fs12 {
36}
}}\f3 \fs20 and Lindley L.J. in Stuart v. Bell {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l
"fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E937"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
37}
}} \f3 \fs20 did think, that in the {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F
0355337E938}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E938}}\li0 particula
r facts of {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/ex
ternal/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I1D1324F0E57111DAB242AFEA6182DD7E"}{\f
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Coxhead}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Richards}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
38}
}} \f3 \fs20 Richards, if he believed the statements in the letter to be \li0 tr
ue, had a moral duty to forward them to the shipowner, who had obviously a vital
interest in them, if {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E939}{\
*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E939}}\li0 they were true. In 1855
, in Harrison v. Bush {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2
A0F0355337E939"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
39}
}}\f3 \fs20 , Lord Campbell C.J. giving the judgment of the Court of \li0 Queen'
s Bench accepted a principle stated thus: \cbpat0 \cbpat0 \par
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "A communication made {
\i bona}
{
\i fide}
upon any subject matter in which the party \li600 communicating has an interest
, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if \li600 made to a per
son having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contain \li600 criminat
ory matter which, without this privilege, would be slanderous and actionable."
\par\sa0\sb0\ql \f3 \fs20 This is the first of a series of statements that both
parties, the writer and the recipient, must have a {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1
E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E940}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E940}
}\li0 \ri0 \qj corresponding interest or duty. Lord Esher M.R. says in {\field {
\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=W
LUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I2DE24800E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Pullman}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Hill}
{
\ul \cf13
&}
{
\ul \cf13
Co.}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
40}
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "An occasion is privileged when the person who {
\b \i \cf17
*147}
makes the communication has a \li600 moral duty to make it to the person to who
m he does make it, and the person who \li600 receives it has an interest in hear
ing it. Both these conditions must exist in order that the \li600 occasion may b
e privileged."
D1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E941}}\par\sa0\sb0\ql \f3 \fs20 Lord Atkinson in {\field
{\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs
=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I52F8DE70E42711DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf1
3
{
\ul \cf13
Adam}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Ward}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
41}
}} \f3 \fs20 expresses it thus: \cbpat0 \cbpat0 \par
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "It was not disputed, in this case on either side, that a privi
leged occasion is, in \li600 reference to qualified privilege, an occasion where
the person who makes a \li600 communication has an interest or a duty, legal, s
ocial, or moral, to make it to the person \li600 to whom it is made, and the per
son to whom it is so made has a corresponding interest \li600 or duty to receive
it. This reciprocity is essential."
\par\sa0\sb0\ql \f3 \fs20 With slight modifications in particular circumstances,
this appears to me to be well established law, \li0 \ri0 \qj but, except in the
case of communications based on common interest, the principle is that either t
here \li0 must be interest in the recipient and a duty to communicate in the spe
aker, or an interest to be \li0 protected in the speaker and a duty to protect i
t in the recipient. Except in the case of common \li0 interest justifying interc
ommunication, the correspondence must be between duty and interest. There \li0 m
ay, in the common interest cases, be also a common or reciprocal duty. It is not
every interest which \li0 will create a duty in a stranger or volunteer. This a
ppears to fit in with the two statements of Parke B. {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73A
2}}{{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E943}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F
73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E943}}\li0 already referred to {\field {\*\fldinst HY
PERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E942"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
42}
}}\f3 \fs20 , and with the language of Erle C.J. in Whiteley v. Adams {\field {\
*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E943"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2
\cf13
\fs12 {
43}
}}\f3 \fs20 , that the \li0 communication was made in the discharge of some soci
al or moral duty, or on the ground of an {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8F
C2A0F0355337E944}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E944}}\li0 inte
rest in the party making or receiving it. This is approved by Lindley L.J. in {\
field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/docume
nt?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=IC605E1F0E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2
\cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Stuart}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Bell}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
44}
}}\f3 \fs20 , but I \li0 think should be expanded into "either (1.) a duty to co
mmunicate information believed to be true to a \li0 person who has a material in
terest in receiving the information, or (2.) an interest in the speaker to be \l
i0 protected by communicating information, if true, relevant to that interest, t
o a person honestly \li0 believed to have a duty to protect that interest, or (3
.) a common interest in and reciprocal duty in \li0 respect of the subject matte
r of the communication between {
\b \i \cf17
*148}
speaker and recipient." If {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.
co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=IE96E0510E42711DA8FC2
A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Macintosh}
}}\cbpat0 {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E947}{\*\bkmkend s
rcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E947}}\cbpat0 {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E4
2811DA8FC2A0F0355337E945}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E945}}\
li0 \ri0 \qj {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/
external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=IE96E0510E42711DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{
\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs20 {
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Dun}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
45}
}} \f3 \fs20 is rightly decided the duty to communicate does not arise where the
communication is made \li0 in pursuance of a contract made for the private gain
of the speaker. But after the decision of the {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E428
11DA8FC2A0F0355337E946}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E946}}{{\
*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E947}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E
42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E947}}\li0 House of Lords in {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK
"http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid
=IE2ABAC50E42711DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
London}
{
\ul \cf13
Association}
{
\ul \cf13
for}
{
\ul \cf13
Protection}
{
\ul \cf13
of}
{
\ul \cf13
Trade}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Greenlands,}
{
\ul \cf13
Ld.}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
46}
}} {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/d
ocument?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=IE96E0510E42711DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\u
l\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs20 {
\ul \cf13
Macintosh}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Dun}
}}\li0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E947
"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
\ul \cf13
47}
}} \f3 \fs20 must not be relied on too strongly.
\ri0 \sl240\slmult1
D1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E948}}\f3 \fs20 Lastly, in {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK
"http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docgui
d=IC605E1F0E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Stuart}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Bell}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
48}
}}\f3 \fs20 there was again a difference of opinion, though not an equal divisio
n of the {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E949}{\*\bkmkend src
fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E949}}\li0 judges, as in {\field {\*\fldinst HY
PERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0
&docguid=I1D1324F0E57111DAB242AFEA6182DD7E"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Coxhead}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Richards.}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
49}
}} \f3 \fs20 Stanley, the explorer, and his valet, Stuart, were staying with \li
0 the mayor of Newcastle, Bell. The Edinburgh police made a very carefully worde
d communication to \li0 the Newcastle police that there had been a robbery in Ed
inburgh at an hotel where Stuart was \li0 staying, and it might be well to make
very careful and cautious inquiry into the matter. The Newcastle \li0 police sho
wed the letter to the mayor, who after consideration showed it to Stanley, who d
ismissed \li0 Stuart. Stuart sued the mayor. Lindley and Kay L.JJ. held that the
mayor had a moral duty to \li0 communicate, and Stanley a material interest to
receive the communication; Lopes L.J. held that in \li0 the circumstances there
was no moral duty to communicate, though in some circumstances there \li0 might
be such a duty in a host towards a guest. I myself should have agreed with the m
ajority, but the \li0 difference of opinion between such experienced judges show
s the difficulty of the question.
\f3 \fs20 In my opinion Horridge J. went too far in holding that there could be
a privileged occasion on the \li0 ground of interest in the recipient without an
y duty to communicate on the part of the person making \li0 the communication. B
ut that does not settle the question, for it is necessary to consider, in the pr
esent \li0 case, whether there was, as to each communication, a duty to communic
ate, and an interest in the \li0 recipient.
\ri0 \sl240\slmult1
\f3 \fs20 First as to the communication between Longsdon and Singer, I think the
case must proceed on the \li0 admission that {
\b \i \cf17
*149}
at all material times Watt, Longsdon and Browne were in the employment of the \
li0 same company, and the evidence afforded by the answer to the interrogatory p
ut in by the plaintiff \li0 that Longsdon believed the statements in Browne's le
tter. In my view on these facts there was a duty, \li0 both from a moral and a m
aterial point of view, on Longsdon to communicate the letter to Singer, the \li0
chairman of his company, who, apart from questions of present employment, might
be asked by Watt \li0 for a testimonial to a future employer. Equally, I think
Longsdon receiving the letter from Browne, \li0 might discuss the matter with hi
m, and ask for further information, on the ground of a common interest \li0 in t
he affairs of the company, and to obtain further information for the chairman. I
should therefore \li0 agree with the view of Horridge J. that these two occasio
ns were privileged, though for different \li0 reasons. Horridge J. further held
that there was no evidence of malice fit to be left to the jury, and, \li0 while
I think some of Longsdon's action and language in this respect was unfortunate,
as the plaintiff \li0 has put in the answer that Longsdon believed the truth of
the statements in Browne's and his own {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC
2A0F0355337E950}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E950}}\li0 lette
r, like Lord Dunedin in {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.u
k/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I52F8DE70E42711DA8FC2A0F0
355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Adam}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Ward}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
50}
}}\f3 \fs20 , I should not try excess with too nice scales, and I do not \li0 di
ssent from his view as to malice. As to the communications to Singer and Browne,
in my opinion the \li0 appeal should fail, but as both my brethren take the vie
w that there was evidence of malice which \li0 should be left to the jury, there
must, of course, be a new trial as to the claim based on these two \li0 publica
tions.
\ri0 \sl240\slmult1
\f3 \fs20 The communication to Mrs. Watt stands on a different footing. I have n
o intention of writing an \li0 exhaustive treatise on the circumstances when a s
tranger or a friend should communicate to husband \li0 or wife information he re
ceives as to the conduct of the other party to the marriage. I am clear that it
is \li0 impossible to say he is always under a moral or social duty to do so; it
is equally impossible to say he \li0 is never under such a duty. It must depend
on the circumstances of each case, the nature of the \li0 information, and {
\b \i \cf17
*150}
the relation of speaker and recipient. It cannot, on the one hand, be the duty
\li0 even of a friend to communicate all the gossip the friend hears at men's cl
ubs or women's bridge \li0 parties to one of the spouses affected. On the other
hand, most men would hold that it was the moral \li0 duty of a doctor who attend
ed his sister in law, and believed her to be suffering from a miscarriage, {{\*\
bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E951}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42
811DA8FC2A0F0355337E951}}\li0 for which an absent husband could not be responsib
le, to communicate that fact to his wife {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF
0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E951"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
51}
}} \f3 \fs20 and the {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E952}{\*
\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E952}}\li0 husband. Hawkins J. in K
itson v. Playfair {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0
355337E952"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
52}
}} \f3 \fs20 did not have to rule on this point because of the finding of \li0 t
he jury as to malice, and, I think, postponed ruling as long as he could. If thi
s is so, the decision must \li0 turn on the circumstances of each case, the judg
e being much influenced by the consideration that as \li0 a general rule it is n
ot desirable for any one, even a mother in law, to interfere in the affairs of m
an \li0 and wife. Using the best judgment I can in this difficult matter, I have
come to the conclusion that \li0 there was not a moral or social duty in Longsd
on to make this communication to Mrs. Watt such as to \li0 make the occasion pri
vileged, and that there must be a new trial so far as it relates to the claim fo
r \li0 publication of a libel to Mrs. Watt. The communications to Singer and Bro
wne being made on a \li0 privileged occasion, there must be a new trial of the i
ssue as to malice defeating the privilege. There \li0 must also be a new trial o
f the complaint as to publication to Mrs. Watt, the occasion being held not to \
li0 be privileged. The plaintiff must have the costs of this appeal; the costs o
f the first trial must abide the \cbpat0 \cbpat0 \li0 \ri0 \qj \f3 \fs20 result
of the second trial, the issues being separated.
\f3 \fs20 GREER L.J.
\ri0 \sl240\slmult1
\f3 \fs20 The question involved in this appeal is one that, in my judgment, woul
d be easy to answer if it were \li0 not for the difficulties occasioned by some
of the earlier decisions on the subject of privileged \li0 occasions in the law
of libel. Notwithstanding the serious difference of judicial opinion in {
\b \i \cf17
*151}
the {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E953}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF
0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E953}}{{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0
355337E954}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E954}}{{\*\bkmkstart
0F0355337E955}}\li0 cases of {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw
.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I1D1324F0E57111DAB24
2AFEA6182DD7E"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Coxhead}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Richards}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
53}
}}\f3 \fs20 ; Blackham v. Pugh {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42
\fs12 {
54}
}}\f3 \fs20 ; and Bennett v. Deacon {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73A
D1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E955"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
55}
}}\f3 \fs20 , the rule of law we \li0 have to apply in the present case has been
finally accepted in the form stated by Lord Atkinson in {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0
F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E956}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F035533
7E956}}\li0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/e
xternal/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I52F8DE70E42711DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\
fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Adams}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Ward}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
56}
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "A privileged occasion is .... an occasion where the person who
makes a communication \li600 has an interest or a duty, legal, social, or moral
, to make it to the person to whom it is \li600 made, and the person to whom it
is so made has a corresponding interest or duty to \li600 receive it. This recip
rocity is essential."
D1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E957}}\par\sa0\sb0\ql \f3 \fs20 The language of Lord Atk
inson is similar to that which was used by Lord Campbell in Harrison v. Bush \li
0 \ri0 \qj {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E
\fs12 {
\ul \cf13
57}
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "A communication made {
\i bona}
{
\i fide}
upon any subject matter in which the party \li600 communicating has an interest
, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if \li600 made to a per
son having a corresponding interest or duty."
D1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E958}}\par\sa0\sb0\ql \f3 \fs20 This statement of the la
w is in accord with what was said by Parke B. in Toogood v. Spyring {\field {\*\
fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E958"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \
cf13
\fs12 {
58}
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "In general, an action lies for the malicious publication of st
atements which are false in \li600 fact, and injurious to the character of anoth
er (within the well-known limits as to verbal \li600 slander), and the law consi
ders such publication as malicious, unless it is fairly made by \li600 a person
in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether legal or moral, or in \
li600 the conduct of his own affairs, in matters where his interest in concerned
."
\par\sa0\sb0\ql \f3 \fs20 It is suggested, however, on the authority of Willes J
.'s approval of the decision of Tindal C.J. and Erle {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73A
9}}{{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E960}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F
73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E960}}\li0 \ri0 \qj J. in {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLI
NK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docg
uid=I1D1324F0E57111DAB242AFEA6182DD7E"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Coxhead}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Richards}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
59}
}}\f3 \fs20 , in Amann v. Damm {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42
\fs12 {
60}
}}\f3 \fs20 , and the similar approval of Blackburn J. in Davies {{\*\bkmkstart
0F0355337E961}}{{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E962}{\*\bkmke
nd srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E962}}\li0 v. Snead {\field {\*\fldinst H
YPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E961"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
61}
}}\f3 \fs20 , and of the judgment of Lindley L.J. in {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLI
NK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docg
uid=IC605E1F0E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Stuart}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Bell}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
62}
}}\f3 \fs20 , that it is unnecessary that there \li0 should be any duty in the p
erson making the communication, and that it is sufficient if there is either a \
li0 duty on his part or an interest in the person receiving the communication. I
t is clear, however, that {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E96
3}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E963}}\li0 what was said by Wi
lles J. in Amann v. Damm {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8
FC2A0F0355337E963"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
63}
}}\f3 \fs20 was merely obiter, and that he was not \li0 {
\b \i \cf17
*152}
considering the question whether interest in the recipient was sufficient to es
tablish a privileged \li0 occasion; and the observations relied on in the presen
t case by Horridge J. in the judgment of {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8F
C2A0F0355337E964}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E964}}\li0 Blac
kburn J. in Davies v. Snead {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811
DA8FC2A0F0355337E964"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
64}
}} \f3 \fs20 do not support the proposition for which they were cited. Blackburn
\li0 J. is in effect treating the judgments of Tindal C.J. and Erle J. as based
on the duty of the defendant \li0 to make the communication in question. He poi
nts out that the result of those two judgments, {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42
811DA8FC2A0F0355337E965}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E965}}\l
i0 afterwards followed in Blackham v. Pugh {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fn
IF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E965"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
65}
}}\f3 \fs20 , "is that where a person is so situated that it becomes \li0 right
in the interests of society that he should tell to a third person certain facts,
then if he bona fide \li0 and without malice does tell them it is a privileged
communication." These words clearly indicate that \li0 the privileged occasion i
s based on a duty in the person making the communication to do what is right \li
0 in the interests of society. It may be, of course, that the interest of the pe
rson receiving the \li0 communication is of such a character as by its very natu
re to create a social duty in another under the \li0 circumstances to make the c
ommunication that he does in fact make. In such a case the cause of the \li0 pri
vileged occasion is not merely the interest of the recipient; it is that interes
t plus the corresponding \li0 social duty which arises in the circumstances of t
he case by reason of the nature of the interest. It is {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F7
3AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E966}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E
966}}\li0 however unfortunate that Lindley L.J. in {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK
"http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docgui
d=IC605E1F0E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Stuart}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Bell}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
66}
}} \f3 \fs20 uses the words quoted by Horridge J., which \li0 appear to indicate
that the occasion of privilege may arise either out of the moral or social duty
of the \li0 person making the communication, or out of the interest of the pers
on receiving it. It is quite clear, \li0 however, that the Lord Justice and the
other members of the Court of Appeal did not decide the case \li0 on the ground
that the existence of the recipient's interest was sufficient in itself to give
rise to \li0 privilege. In his judgment Lindley L. J. cites with approval the fo
llowing words from the judgment of {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0
355337E967}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E967}}\li0 Parke B. i
n Toogood v. Spyring {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A
0F0355337E967"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\fs12 {
67}
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "If fairly warranted by any {
\b \i \cf17
*153}
reasonable occasion or exigency, and honestly made, \li600 such communications
are protected for the common convenience and welfare of \li600 society."
\cbpat0 {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E969}{\*\bkmkend srcf
nIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E969}}\cbpat0 \li0 \ri0 \qj \f3 \fs20 These word
s seem to me to indicate that there must be the warrant of some social duty crea
ted by \li0 the "reasonable occasion or exigency." Assuming that the defendant h
as no common interest with the \li0 person to whom the libel is published, and i
t is necessary that there should be some moral or social \li0 duty to make the c
ommunication, what is the test by which duty is to be determined? This may be a
\li0 question which it is very difficult to answer. Opinions may easily differ a
s to whether the \li0 circumstances are such as to make the communication a mora
l or social duty. Similar questions of \li0 degree arise in many cases, and are
left to the determination of a jury. In negligence cases, what the \li0 reasonab
ly careful man would do is left to be determined by a jury whenever it is a ques
tion in which \li0 opinions may differ. But it is well settled that whether an o
ccasion be privileged or not is a question for \li0 the judge, though he may ask
the jury to determine any particular facts that are in dispute. The only \li0 g
uide one can get from previous decisions is to be obtained from the judgments of
the Court of {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E968}{\*\bkmken
d srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E968}}\li0 Appeal in {\field {\*\fldinst H
YPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.
0&docguid=IC605E1F0E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Stuart}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Bell.}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
68}
}} \f3 \fs20 There Lindley L.J. says: "I take moral or social duty to mean a dut
y \li0 recognized by English people of ordinary intelligence and moral principle
, but at the same time not a \li0 duty enforceable by legal proceedings, whether
civil or criminal." Would the great mass of \li0 right-minded men in the positi
on of the defendant have considered it their duty, under the {{\*\bkmkstart srcf
nIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E969}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F03
55337E969}}\li0 circumstances, to make the communication? Kay L.J. says {\field
{\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E969"}{\fldrslt\ul\c
f2 \cf13
\fs12 {
69}
}}\f3 \fs20 : "The true mode of judging upon the \li0 question is to put oneself
as much as possible in the position of the defendant." I think these tests are
\li0 as near as one can reasonably get to the tests to be applied in forming an
opinion on the question \li0 whether a privileged occasion arising out of a mora
l or social duty has or has not arisen.
\f3 \fs20 In my judgment no right minded man in the position of the defendant, a
friend of the plaintiff and of his \li0 wife, would {
\b \i \cf17
*154}
have thought it right to communicate the horrible accusations contained in Mr.
\li0 Browne's letter to the plaintiff's wife. The information came to Mr. Browne
from a very doubtful source, \li0 and in my judgment no reasonably right-minded
person could think it his duty, without obtaining some \li0 corroboration of th
e story, and without first communicating with the plaintiff, to pass on these \l
i0 outrageous charges of marital infidelity of a gross kind, and drunkenness and
dishonesty, to the \li0 plaintiff's wife. As regards the publication to the pla
intiff's wife, the occasion was not privileged, and it \li0 is unnecessary to co
nsider whether there was evidence of express malice. As regards the publication
\li0 to the chairman of the company, who owned nearly all the shares, and to Mr.
Browne, I think on the \li0 facts as pleaded there was between the defendant an
d the recipients of the letters a common interest \li0 which would make the occa
sion privileged, but I also think there is intrinsic evidence in the letter to \
li0 Browne, and evidence in the hasty and unjustifiable communication to the pla
intiff's wife, which would \li0 be sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to ask fo
r a verdict on these publications on the ground of express \li0 malice.
\ri0 \sl240\slmult1
\f3 \fs20 The plaintiff's counsel put in as part of his case the defendant's ans
wers to interrogatories 5 and 8, \li0 which were to the effect that the defendan
t believed all the matters alleged in Browne's letter, which \li0 he published t
o the plaintiff's wife and to Mr. Singer, to be true. It was suggested that this
belief made \li0 it impossible to say that the publication was malicious. I do
not agree with this view. Malice is a state {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811D
A8FC2A0F0355337E970}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E970}}\li0 o
f mind: see the judgments in the case of {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://l
ogin.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I0C60B4A
1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Nevill}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Fine}
{
\ul \cf13
Arts}
{
\ul \cf13
and}
{
\ul \cf13
General}
{
\ul \cf13
Insurance}
{
\ul \cf13
Co.,}
{
\ul \cf13
Ld.}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
70}
}} \f3 \fs20 in the \li0 Court of Appeal. A man may believe in the truth of a de
famatory statement, and yet when he \li0 publishes it be reckless whether his be
lief be well founded or not. His motive for publishing a libel on \li0 a privile
ged occasion may be an improper one, even though he believes the statement to be
true. He \li0 may be moved by hatred or dislike, or a desire to injure the subj
ect of the libel, and may be using the \li0 occasion for that purpose, {
\b \i \cf17
*155}
and if he is doing so the publication will be maliciously made, even \li0 thoug
h he may believe the defamatory statements to be true. I agree with the statemen
t of the law \li0 contained in the late Mr. Blake Odgers' monumental book on lib
el and slander, which will be found at \li0 p. 354 of the 5th edition. It is as
follows: \cbpat0 \cbpat0 \par
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "And even though it is clear that the defendant believed in the
truth of the \li600 communication he made, and was acting under a sense of duty
on a privileged \li600 occasion, the plaintiff may still rely upon the words em
ployed, and the manner and \li600 mode of publication, as evidence of malice. An
angry man may often be led away into \li600 exaggerated or unwarrantable expres
sions; or he may forget where and in whose \li600 presence he is speaking, or ho
w and to whom his writing may be published. Clearly this \li600 is often but fai
nt evidence of malice; the jury will generally pardon a slight excess of \li600
righteous zeal. In some cases, however (which we will proceed to examine) such \
li600 excess has secured the plaintiff the verdict. But if the jury find there w
as no malice in the \li600 defendant, such excess becomes immaterial."
D1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E971}}\par\sa0\sb0\ql {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l
"fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E971"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
71}
}}
\f3 \fs20 I think the defendant's conduct in disseminating the gross charges tha
t he did to the plaintiff's wife, \cbpat0 \cbpat0 \li0 \ri0 \qj \f3 \fs20 and to
Mr. Singer, and repeating and to some extent adding to them in his letter to Mr
. Browne, and \li0 his offer to provide funds for procuring the evidence of the
two women in Casa Blanca, affords some \li0 evidence of malice which ought to ha
ve been left to the jury. It is not for us to weigh the evidence. It \li0 will b
e for the jury to decide whether they are satisfied that in publishing the libel
s the defendant was \li0 in fact giving effect to his malicious or otherwise imp
roper feelings towards the plaintiff, and was not \li0 merely using the occasion
for the protection of the interests of himself and his two correspondents.
\f3 \fs20 For these reasons I think the appeal should be allowed with costs, a n
ew trial ordered, and the costs \li0 of the former trial should abide the event
of the new trial.
\f3 \fs20 {
\b \i \cf17
*156}

\f3 \fs20 RUSSELL L.J.
\f3 \fs20 The plaintiff complains of publication by the defendant of defamatory
matter on three occasions - \li0 namely, (1.) publication to the plaintiff's wif
e of the letter of April 30, 1928, from Browne to the \li0 defendant; (2.) publi
cation to Singer of the same letter; and (3.) publication to Browne of the \li0
defendant's own letter of May 5, 1928. There is no plea of justification. The su
bstantial defence as to \li0 each publication is that the letter was published w
ithout malice, and in the belief that the matters \li0 contained therein were tr
ue, and on a privileged occasion, and in such circumstances as to make it a \li0
privileged publication.
\f3 \fs20 The plaintiff put in evidence the defendant's answers to the fifth and
eighth interrogatories; the appeal \li0 accordingly falls to be decided upon th
e footing: (1.) that the defamatory matter contained in the \li0 letters is all
false, and (2.) that the defendant believed it all to be true. Horridge J. decid
ed that each \li0 publication was made on a privileged occasion, and that there
was no evidence of malice to go to the \li0 jury. He accordingly withdrew the ca
se from the jury, and entered judgment for the defendant.
\f3 \fs20 The grounds of the decision as to privilege were as follows: As regard
s the publication to Singer he \li0 held that Singer, as director and largest sh
areholder of the Scottish Petroleum Company, and the \li0 defendant as director
and liquidator of the company, had common interests in the communications \li0 r
egarding the conduct of the plaintiff while in the employ of the company. As reg
ards the publication to \li0 Browne, he held that the defendant was entitled to
apply to Browne for further particulars, and that he \li0 and Browne had a commo
n interest in communications relating to the conduct of the plaintiff while in \
li0 the employ of the company. He held, therefore, that the publication to Singe
r and the publication to \li0 Browne were made on privileged occasions.
\ri0 \sl240\slmult1
\f3 \fs20 As regards the publication to the plaintiff's wife, he felt more diffi
culty. As I understand the language \li0 used by the learned judge, the question
which he considered and decided was this: Is it sufficient to \li0 constitute p
rivilege that the {
\b \i \cf17
*157}
recipient of the communication has an interest in receiving it, even if \li0 th
e person making the communication has no interest in making it, or duty to make
it, or is it \li0 necessary to constitute privilege that reciprocity should exis
t, so that there should be both an interest \li0 or duty in the person making th
e communication to make it, and a duty or interest in the receiver to {{\*\bkmks
tart srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E972}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA
8FC2A0F0355337E972}}\li0 receive it? The former he regards as the view of Tindal
C.J. and Erle J. in {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.westlaw.co.uk/w
luk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I1D1324F0E57111DAB242AFEA618
{
\ul \cf13
Coxhead}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Richards}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
72}
}}\f3 \fs20 ; the \li0 latter, as the view of Coltman and Cresswell JJ. in the s
ame case. After referring to authorities, which \li0 he regards as supporting th
e former view, he concludes his judgment as to privilege thus: \cbpat0 \cbpat0
\par
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "I think the right view is that if there is an obvious interest
in the person to whom a \li600 communication is made, which causes him to be a
proper recipient of a statement, if \li600 that statement is honestly made, then
the statement is privileged. Therefore I hold that \li600 on this occasion the
statement to the wife, which consisted in producing the letter, was a \li600 sta
tement made on a privileged occasion. Therefore I think all the communications -
the \li600 communications to Mr. Singer, the communication to the wife, and the
communication to \li600 Browne - were all made on privileged occasions."
\par\sa0\sb0\ql \f3 \fs20 For myself, I am not prepared to assent to this view.
In my opinion the true result of the authorities is {{\*\bkmkstart srcfnIF0F73AD
1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E973}{\*\bkmkend srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E973
}}\li0 \ri0 \qj as stated by Lord Atkinson in {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "htt
p://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I52
F8DE70E42711DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
Adam}
{
\ul \cf13
v.}
{
\ul \cf13
Ward}
ldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs12 {
73}
\li600 \f3 \fs20 "A privileged occasion is .... an occasion where the person who
makes a communication \li600 has an interest or a duty, legal, social, or moral
, to make it to the person to whom it is \li600 made, and the person to whom it
is so made has a corresponding interest or duty to \li600 receive it. This recip
rocity is essential."
\par\sa0\sb0\ql
\cbpat0 \par
\f3 \fs20 In view of the detailed examination of the authorities contained in th
e judgments of Scrutton and \cbpat0 \cbpat0 \li0 \ri0 \qj \f3 \fs20 Greer L.JJ.
I am content to express my view without further reasoning. That being my opinion
, I now \li0 consider how the result of the authorities affects the decision in
the present case.
\f3 \fs20 As regards the publication to Singer, we must act upon the view, commo
n to both sides of the \li0 pleadings, that at all {
\b \i \cf17
*158}
material times the plaintiff, the defendant and Browne, were in the employ \li0
of the Scottish Petroleum Company. In these circumstances, and the defendant be
lieving the truth of \li0 the libels, there was a duty on the defendant to make
the communication to Singer, and an interest in \li0 Singer to receive it; hence
was the occasion a privileged occasion. As regards the defendant's letter \li0
to Browne, this must also, I think, be held to have been written on a privileged
occasion; the \li0 defendant having a duty to communicate to Singer had an inte
rest in asking Browne for further \li0 information, and so an interest in making
the communciation, which Browne had a duty to receive. \li0 Accordingly I agree
with the learned judge, that as regards these two publications the occasions of
\li0 them were privileged occasions.
\f3 \fs20 In regard to the question of evidence of malice, I have felt more diff
iculty in agreeing with the learned \li0 judge. I should have thought that the c
onduct of the defendant in making his hasty communication to \li0 the wife, and
his subsequent conduct and the language used by him in his letter to Browne, was
\li0 some evidence to go to the jury. No doubt the necessity of accepting the v
iew that the defendant did \li0 in fact believe the truth of all the defamatory
matters alleged, diminishes the weight of the other \li0 matters which might be
relied upon by the jury as indicating express malice. The question should \li0 h
owever in my opinion have been left to them to consider and determine.
\f3 \fs20 As regards the communication to the plaintiff's wife, I am unable to s
ay that, in the circumstances of \li0 the present case, there existed any duty o
n the defendant to communicate to the plaintiff's wife \li0 Browne's letter of A
pril 30, 1928. The question whether any duty lies on a third party to communicat
e \li0 to one spouse the delinquencies of the other can never be answered by ref
erence to a fixed test or \li0 rule. The answer in each case must always depend
upon the actual facts of that case. After carefully \li0 considering the proved
facts of the present case I agree with the other members of the Court that the \
li0 publication made by the defendant to the plaintiff's wife of Browne's letter
was not made upon a \li0 privileged {
\b \i \cf17
*159}
occasion. The appeal should be allowed, and a new trial ordered.
\f3 \fs22 {
\b Representation}

\par\sa0\sb0\ql \f3 \fs20 Solicitors for appellant: Smith, Rundell, Dods & Bocke
tt. Solicitors for respondent: Church, Rendell, Bird & Co. \cbpat0 \par
\li0 \f3 \fs20 Appeal allowed. New trial ordered. (W. H. G. )
\par\sa0\sb0\ql \cbpat0 {{\pict{\*\picprop\shplid1025{\sp{\sn shapeType}{\sv 1}}
{\sp{\sn fFlipH}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipV}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fillColor}{\sv 8421504}
}{\sp{\sn fFilled}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fLine}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn alignHR}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\
sn dxHeightHR}{\sv 30}}{\sp{\sn fStandardHR}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fHorizRule}{\sv 1}}
{\sp{\sn lineColor}{\sv 9}}{\sp{\sn fLayoutInCell}{\sv 1}}}\picscalex1860\picsca
ley6\piccropl0\piccropr0\piccropt0\piccropb0\picw1764\pich882\picwgoal1000\pichg
oal500\wmetafile8}}\cbpat0 {{\*\bkmkstart fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E91}{
\*\bkmkend fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E91}}\cbpat0 \li0 {\field {\*\fldins
t HYPERLINK \\l "srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E91"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13

\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
1}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 5 E. & B. 344.
}
\par\sa0\sb0\ql {{\*\bkmkstart fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E92}{\*\bkmkend
fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E92}}\cbpat0 \li0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK
\\l "srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E92"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
2}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1891]}
{
\ul \cf13
1}
{
\ul \cf13
Q.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
524}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
3}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
ment?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I52F8DE70E42711DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\c
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1917]}
{
\ul \cf13
A.}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
309}
}}\f3 \fs14 , 334.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
4}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
569}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
5}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 (1860) 8 C. B. (N. S.) 597, 602.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
6}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 (1870) L. R. 5 Q. B. 608.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
7}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
ment?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=IC605E1F0E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\c
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1891]}
{
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
Q.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
341}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
8}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
569}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
9}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
ment?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=IE96E0510E42711DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\c
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1908]}
{
\ul \cf13
A.}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
390}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E910}}\cbpat0 \li0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLI
NK \\l "srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E910"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
10}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
ment?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=IE2AB5E30E42711DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\c
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1913]}
{
\ul \cf13
3}
{
\ul \cf13
K.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
507}
}}\f3 \fs14 ; reversed in the House of Lords nom. London Association for Protect
ion of Trade v. Greenlands, Ld. {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://login.west
law.co.uk/wluk/app/external/document?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=IE2ABAC50E42711DA
8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\cf2 \cf13
{
\ul \cf13
[1916]}
{
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
A.}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
15}
}}\f3 \fs14 , on the ground that the society being unincorporated could not be s
ued, and that the remaining defendant was acting as a confidential agent.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
11}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 (1834) 1 C. M. & R. 181, 193.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
12}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
569}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
13}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
569}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
14}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 8 C. B. (N. S.) 597.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
15}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 L. R. 5 Q. B. 608.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
16}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1891]}
{
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
Q.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
341}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
17}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
ment?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I1D139A20E57111DAB242AFEA6182DD7E"}{\fldrslt\ul\c
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
(1851)}
{
\ul \cf13
10}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
583}
}}\f3 \fs14 , 590.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
18}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1917]}
{
\ul \cf13
A.}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
309}
}}\f3 \fs14 , 330.
}
\par\sa0\sb0\ql \cbpat0 \cbpat0 {{\*\bkmkstart fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337
E919}{\*\bkmkend fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E919}}\cbpat0 \li0 {\field {\*
\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E919"}{\fldrslt\ul\c
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
19}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
569}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
20}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 8 C. B. (N. S.) 597, 602.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
21}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 L. R. 5 Q. B. 608.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
22}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 (1863) 15 C. B. (N. S.) 392.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
23}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1891]}
{
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
Q.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
341}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
24}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1917]}
{
\ul \cf13
A.}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
309}
}}\f3 \fs14 , 330.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
25}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 [1917] A. C. 329.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
26}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 1 C. M. & R. 181.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
27}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 1 C. M. & R. 181, 193.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
28}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 (1833) 5 C. & P. 543, 548.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
29}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 1 C. M. & R. 181, 193.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
30}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1891]}
{
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
Q.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
341}
}}\f3 \fs14 , 350.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
31}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
569}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
32}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 2 C. B. 596.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
33}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 2 C. B. 598.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
34}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 2 C. B. 601, 604.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
35}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 (1846) 2 C. B. 628.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
36}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 8 C. B. (N. S.) 602.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
37}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 [1891] 2 Q. B. 347.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
38}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
569}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
39}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 5 E. & B. 344, 348.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
40}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1891]}
{
\ul \cf13
1}
{
\ul \cf13
Q.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
524}
}}\f3 \fs14 , 528.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
41}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1917]}
{
\ul \cf13
A.}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
309}
}}\f3 \fs14 , 334.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
42}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 1 C. M. & R. 193; 5 C. & P. 548.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
43}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 15 C. B. (N.S.) 392, 418.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
44}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1891]}
{
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
Q.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
341}
}}\f3 \fs14 , 348.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
45}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1908]}
{
\ul \cf13
A.}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
390}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
46}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
ment?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=IE2ABAC50E42711DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\c
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1916]}
{
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
A.}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
15}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
47}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1908]}
{
\ul \cf13
A.}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
390}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
48}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1891]}
{
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
Q.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
341}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
49}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
569}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
50}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1917]}
{
\ul \cf13
A.}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
309}
}}\f3 \fs14 , 330.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
51}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 Quaere whether there is a publication of what a husband utters to his
wife: Wennhak v. Morgan(1888) 20 Q. B. D. 635.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
52}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 The Times, March 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 1896.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
53}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
569}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
54}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 (1846) 2 C. B. 611.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
55}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 2 C. B. 628.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
56}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1917]}
{
\ul \cf13
A.}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
309}
}}\f3 \fs14 , 334.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
57}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 5 E. & B. 344, 348, 349.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
58}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 1 C. M. & R. 181, 193.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
59}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
569}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
60}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 8 C. B. (N. S.) 597, 602.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
61}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 L. R. 5 Q. B. 608.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
62}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1891]}
{
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
Q.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
341}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
63}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 8 C. B. (N. S.) 597, 602.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
64}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 L. R. 5 Q. B. 608.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
65}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 2 C. B. 611.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
66}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1891]}
{
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
Q.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
341}
}}\f3 \fs14 , 347.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
67}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 1 C. M. & R. 181, 193.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
68}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1891]}
{
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
Q.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
341}
}}\f3 \fs14 , 350.
}
\par\sa0\sb0\ql \cbpat0 \cbpat0 {{\*\bkmkstart fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337
E969}{\*\bkmkend fnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E969}}\cbpat0 \li0 {\field {\*
\fldinst HYPERLINK \\l "srcfnIF0F73AD1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E969"}{\fldrslt\ul\c
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
69}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 [1891] 2 Q. B. 359, 360.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
70}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
ment?rs=WLUK1.0&vr=1.0&docguid=I0C60B4A1E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9"}{\fldrslt\ul\c
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1895]}
{
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
Q.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
156}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
71}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
\f3 \fs14 6th Ed. (1929), p. 291.
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
72}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
2}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
B.}
{
\ul \cf13
569}
}}\f3 \fs14 .
}
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
73}
}}\f3 \fs14 . \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \qj {
f2 \cf13
\f3 \fs14 {
\ul \cf13
[1917]}
{
\ul \cf13
A.}
{
\ul \cf13
C.}
{
\ul \cf13
309}
}}\f3 \fs14 , 334.
}
\li0 \f3 \fs14 (c) Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England & Wales
\f3 \fs14 2008 Sweet & Maxwell Ltd
\par\sa0\sb0\ql \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \li0 \cbpat0 \fi0 \qc \sa120 \sb100 \li0 \ri0
\sl240\slmult1
{\*\shppict{\pict\jpegblip \bin1796 JFIFC
$.' ",#(7),01444'9=82<.342C
2!!22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222 n"
}!1AQa"q2#BR$3br
%&'()*456789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyz
w!1AQaq"2B #3Rbr
$4%&'()*56789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyz
?&4M}n.!2 :(4yZF g*Mn`4Mf<J!Z+ Jh;a4m~/u;8!?
Np)J;I.p*|f1rk%5wGOg t'8=U<L,vr,ZH+~[k
-+OCZj3NcO+{D_;OuTgK^O_hHlayE1 c<vE*"*
*Sn/)Tu3CfbW~MNO
v@3R5TSmj^t*e%O-#hU[#m5wwrq"FT q8{5C a8WR.-8)>^D`{7s;_Xt6]v
U"(Y.}qufrs7esl[25L0n\
z(uJMi4kk J;X;gI``0A=jh [18_=zV:6t5
iSC
ZX@h=Q5EB#M?'}}
\par\sa0\sb0\ql \cbpat0 \sa0 \sb0 \li0 \sect}}

Watt V Longsdon

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Watt V Longsdon

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

{\rtf1

You might also like