Seminar Globale Gerechtigkeit Universitt Erfurt

Dozentin: Dr. Tatjana Tarkian Seminar fr Philosophie

Veranstaltungsnummer: 1040002
Semester: WS 2013/2014





Hausarbeit
Global Justice An Alternative Approach
im Modul
Moral und Politik




Autorin: Maria Reich (Matrikelnr. 35909)
Adresse: Asbachstr. 48, 99423 Weimar
Telefon: 03643.457.1474
M.A. Philosophie (Sprache Wissen Handlung)
1. Fachsemester
i

Content
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 1
Two Approaches to Global Justice .................................................................................................. 2
Rawlsian Ideal-Nonideal Theory .................................................................................................. 2
The Distinction between Ideal and Nonideal Theory .......................................................... 2
Global Justice Founded in a Contract between Peoples ...................................................... 3
Critical Theory ................................................................................................................................ 5
Critical Theory and Habermass Understanding of Justice .................................................. 5
Moving Past International Law as a Regulator in Global Justice ........................................ 8
The Spectrum of Just States or What is (Global) Justice? ...................................................... 10
All or Nothing .............................................................................................................................. 10
Scaling Justice ............................................................................................................................... 11
Global Injustice as Pathway to Global Justice ............................................................................. 12
Injustice as Measure of Justice ................................................................................................... 12
Global Justice through Absence of Global Injustice .............................................................. 13
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 15







1

Introduction
It is obvious that when thinking about justice, none would declare the current situation of
the world as just and that we must find a way to draw up a model of a just world that is
capable of and desirable for altering our current circumstances to more closely match said
model. Theories of global justice have done this for more than 100 years now, yet it seems
that so far no widely applicable version of a theory of global justice has been found. Given
the complexity of the issue which deals not only with the understanding of justice of the
interests of now more than 7 billion people (US Census Bureau 2014) per se, but also with
the addition of cultural, economic, political and a number of other influences of high
variability, it seems that either the issue is one not to be solved (which is not what I believe)
or there is another, possibly better way to be found to look at the topic of global justice and
the way to achieve the ultimate goal of a just world.
Two important approaches of the mid- to late 20
th
century to a theory of global justice are
John Rawlss approach through Ideal and Nonideal Theory and the Frankfurt Schools
Critical Theory applied to the question of global justice by Jrgen Habermas. The two
authors take opposite approaches to a theory of (global) justice and while basing their
argumentations on the same understanding of justice, find rather different ways to
formulate a possible realization of this understanding on a global scale.
In this paper, I will critically analyze the very foundations of the justice understanding in
Rawlss Ideal Theory and the Frankfurt Schools Critical Theory. I will then show how
neither of the two theories gives an adequate starting point to realizing global justice in
todays world and discuss a possibility of an alternative approach through addressing the
problem of justice as the absence of injustice.

2

Two Approaches to Global Justice
As mentioned above, I will start out by laying out and evaluating two already thought out
approaches to a theory of global justice those by John Rawls and Jrgen Habermas.
Rawlsian Ideal-Nonideal Theory
John Rawls has laid out his theory of justice in his 1971 book of the same name (Rawls
2003). In it, he lays out his general ideas towards a theory of justice. He does this by making
a distinction between ideal and nonideal theory that suggests that in order to create a
sensible theory of justice, political philosophers have to first create an image of what the
ideal state of complete justice would be in order to then be able to create policies within
nonideal theory that includes the circumstances in the world as they are. First in an essay
and later in the book with the same title The Law of Peoples, Rawls then describes the
application of his theory onto the realm of global justice.
The Distinction between Ideal and Nonideal Theory
In Theory of Justice, Rawls lays out his proposed solution to the venerable problem of
characterizing the relationship between philosophical theory and political practice
(Simmons 2010, 6). He does so by first arguing that in order to know what kind of policies
can be effective in establishing a just society or world, political philosophers must first be
concerned with establishing what this just society actually is, i.e. philosophers must
complete the task to design a theory of ideal justice a picture of what a perfectly just
world or society would look like (Rawls 2003, 2). Only the second job of a political
philosopher is to turn to nonideal theory which determines what policies should be applied
in the real, unjust world.

3

Rawls is convinced that justice can only be judged in regards to societal institutions and in-
how-far the same are just institutions. This reflects in his ideal-nonideal theory of justice as
he only concerns himself with establishing a model for a completely just society. A just
society for Rawls is one that follows two principles:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal
basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyones advantage, and (b) attached
to positions and offices open to all. (Rawls 2003, 11)
He comes to this conclusion by assuming that a just societal order must be voted upon by
the people living in such a society and that these people must choose on these principles
under a veil of ignorance (Rawls 2003, 3) or in the original position (Rawls 2003, 3).
This means that neither one participant in the process knows which advantages or
disadvantages will come for him or her through choosing any particular principle. They do
not know any particulars of their social or economic background, biological features such as
intelligence or (dis-)abilities. Through this, Rawls wants to achieve unbiased choice on the
side of the participants. The notion of the original position or the veil of ignorance also
seems to eliminate the factor of complete or partial noncompliance (i.e. injustices) with the
principles on which a just society must be based. This is important to Rawls as he sees
considerations on the matter of (partial) noncompliance to be subject of nonideal theory
(Rawls 2003, 2).
Global Justice Founded in a Contract between Peoples
While Rawls discusses mainly ideal theory in his works, he does develop a scheme which
explains the relationship and sequences between ideal and nonideal theory and their

4

application to the current state of the world both in A Theory of Justice and The Law of Peoples
(Rawls 2002). Rawls denies the notion of nation-states as the basic operators within a theory
of global justice and asserts that the peoples of the world should be considered as such
(Rawls 2002, 2). Just as within a society, the principles of justice or a theory of justice must
be chosen by representatives of the society at hand on the global level: representatives of
the peoples of the world. These representatives find themselves in a similar position as
those choosing principles of justice on a societal level: the must base their decision only in
the principles while being under a veil of ignorance: they do not know what type of order
governs their particular people, they do not know of any economic or social advantages or
disadvantages their people have or must endure.
The basic sequence and application of the principles of just societies for both ideal and
nonideal theory on an individual, national, and international level was laid out by A. John
Simmons in his article Ideal and Nonideal Theory like this:
Ideal Theory Nonideal Theory
I. Basic Structures a. deliberate noncompliance (institutional
injustice): civil disobedience, etcetera.
b. unfortunate noncompliance (poverty, culture):
the general conception
II. Individuals a. deliberate noncompliance (wrongs, crimes):
punishment/reparation
b. unfortunate noncompliance (insanity,
immaturity): paternalism
III. Nations a. deliberate noncompliance (outlaw states): just
war, intervention
b. unfortunate noncompliance (burdened
societies): international assistance
(Simmons 2010, 17)

As one can see, in ideal theory, Rawls is only concerned with the agents which are to be
affected by institutions on the different levels and who are to choose about the basic

5

principles. Only in nonideal theory, Rawls concerns himself with the possibility of (partial)
noncompliance with the justice principles laid out by ideal theory. In other words, Rawls
finds that a theory of global justice (just like a theory of justice for the individual or on a
societal level) must seek its starting point in a utopian state of which we know that it is not
the case in reality. Only after the ideal has been decided upon, nonideal theory then can deal
with possible injustices.
Critical Theory
Critical Theory is a philosophical tradition with a foundation in German Idealism:
For Marx and his generation, Hegel was the last in the grand tradition of
philosophical thought able to give us secure knowledge of humanity and history on
its own. The issue for Left Hegelians and Marx was then somehow to overcome
Hegelian theoretical philosophy, and Marx argues that it can do so only by making
philosophy practical, in the sense of changing practices by which societies realize
their ideals. (Bohman 2013)
In this paper, I will concern my discussion with only of one of the representatives of the
Frankfurt School a term that refers to the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt, the
philosophers who worked there and the particular school of thought associated with both:
Jrgen Habermas, his theory of and his essay Does the Constitutionalization of International Law
Still Have a Chance? (Habermas 2006, 115-193).
Critical Theory and Habermass Understanding of Justice
While Rawls bases his theory of justice on Kant and others contractualism (Rawls 2003,
3), he does not go past acknowledging that a contract which describes the principles of a
society will be the basis of a just society. Habermas takes a different approach: He uses a

6

version of Kants Categorical Imperative as a measure of moral justification by introducing
it as a principle of universalization (Habermas 1990a, 120):
(U) For a norm to be valid, the consequences and side effects that its general
observance can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the particular interests of
each person affected must be such that all affected can accept them freely. (ibid.)
This principle forms the foundation of Habermass discourse ethics and therefore also for
his theory of justice (Shih 2004, 208ff.). To understand what this means, one must also
know the second principle of Habermass discourse ethics: (D) Every valid norm would
meet with the approval of all concerned if they could take part in a practical discourse
(Habermas 1990a, 121).
These two principles make Habermass theory of justice a communication theory-based,
universalist, cognitivist, formalist and procedural (Shih 2004, 208, my translation) one. In
both his discourse ethics and his theory of justice, Habermas focuses on evaluating already
existing norms that underlie everyday actions in the light of the two principles (U) and (D).
Like all critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, he aims at evaluating and therefore
possibly making better already existing structures and norms of society. The starting point
for creating justice therefore is not, as it is for Rawls, a situation of an ideal or perfectly just
world, but rather the potentially unjust, messy real world.
I will now take a moment to reflect on an important part of Habermass theory, namely the
requirement of a situation in which all participants can argue according to certain standards
an ideal speaking situation. He takes over the requirements for such a situation from
Robert Alexy:
(3.1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take
part in a discourse.

7

(3.2) a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.
b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the
discourse.
c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs.
(3.3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from
exercising his rights as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2). (Habermas 1990b, 89)
He finds that if these conditions are approximate realized, or realized in an approximation
adequate enough for the purpose of argumentation, regardless of whether and to what
extent these assumptions are counterfactual in a given case or not (Habermas 1990b, 91f.),
the ideal speaking situation requirement is satisfied. He states that in real life when the
participants are not Kants intelligible characters but real human beings (Habermas
1990b, 91), such an ideal speaking situation can be realized through institutionalization of
discourse, meaning within an actual discourse situation, there must be some kind of order
or rules in place to guarantee an ideal speaking situation.
I find this approach similar to Rawlss original position as both try to eliminate the threats
that a real-life situation poses to ideal or unconfined discourse or principle-finding.
However, Habermas has in mind an institutionalization of real-life processes whereas Rawls
designs a completely utopian situation. In Rawlss original position, participants are
forced (or coerced) into making a decision completely unaware of their personal
convictions, presuppositions, etc. In Habermass ideal speaking situation however, all
these factors that make the discourse applicable to real-life are not supposed to be
eliminated or unknown to the participants, they are just to be controlled so that productive,
uncoerced discourse is possible.


8

Moving Past International Law as a Regulator in Global Justice
In his essay Does the Institutionalization of International Law Still have a Chance?, based on his
understanding of justice, Habermas sketches a possible world order that among other
things is to realize global justice. He does so by analyzing Kants conception of a
cosmopolitan position or weltbrgerlichen Zustand (Habermas 2006, 115) and then
criticizing Kants idea of realizing such a position through a league of nations (Habermas
2006, 126).
Habermas describes Kants idea of a cosmopolitan constitution (Kant 2012, 23) as that of
a world in which all human beings live in peace as [the] abolition of war is a command of
reason (Habermas 2006, 121) and as the condition of peace made permanent (ibid.).
According to Habermas, Kant sees this permanent peace realized within a
universal state of nations (Habermas 2006, 122) as states which are already
ordered from within, but [] are still externally (in relation to one another
in a lawless condition (Habermas 2006, 121)
need to be ordered by law in order to be able to leave there external lawless condition.
Habermas criticizes Kants use of an analogy to the state of nature as disanalogy because
citizens of any state have already undergone a long process of political formation and
socialization. (Habermas 2006, 129). He argues that the citizens of such states would not
see it preferable to have sovereignty from their own state taken away as this would threaten
the realization of their rights and freedoms within the state. Rather, Habermas argues, the
transition from international law to a cosmopolitan condition is complementary
(Habermas 2006, 130). He sees such a transition as constitutionalization rather than the

9

establishment of a world state or state of nations. Habermas derives this from the
conception of state vs. constitution. He says,
[a] state is a complex of hierarchically organized capacities available for the
exercise of political power or implementation of political programs; a
constitution, by contrast, defines a horizontal association of citizens by
laying down the fundamental rights that free and equal founders mutually
grant each other. (Habermas 2006, 131)
Habermas then goes on to sketch what his idea of a politically constituted world society
which would assume the classical international law as an already existing constitution for
a global society. Habermass idea is that such a constitution would define a multilevel
system (Habermas 2006, 135) which would include the following:
- Supranational Level: At this level, a suitably reformed world organization could
perform the vital but clearly circumscribed functions of securing peace and
promoting rights (ibid.)
- Transnational Level: Major powers would address [] global domestic politics
and a number of global players would have to form continental regimes on the
model of an EU equipped with sufficient power to conduct an effective foreign
policy of its own (Habermas 2006, 136).
Additionally to these two levels the national level would of course not cease to exist.
Such a model of a constitutionalized world society seems to be a reproduction of
Habermass discourse ethics and his conception of justice on a global scale. It
institutionalizes the mechanisms which in Habermass theory guarantee the existence of the

10

ideal speaking situation and therefore also make possible the generation of justice on a
global scale.
As with his theory of discourse ethics and subsequent application of the principles found
there to his theory of justice, Habermas also prefers an approach to global justice by finding
a way to use and adjust existing circumstances through communication. His discourse ethics
hereby form the foundation which makes it possible for him to argue without concern for
cultural or socioeconomic differences as he defines the ultimate decision-maker in an
argument as the better argument.
The Spectrum of Just States or What is (Global) Justice?
As almost all philosophical accounts of (global) justice, Rawls and Habermas design their
theories of justice on common ground: They search to define justice or establish a theory of
it and then apply the found ideas to the global scale and adjust their principles accordingly.
In this section, I will analyze problems that can arise with such an approach and discuss a
possible solution.
All or Nothing
When we talk about justice, naturally we often think of it as elimination of injustice. This
is intuitive as the only way to measure justice we have is to see how much injustice is
present and compare this to the (intangible) amount justice prevalent in our world
whether this world be our immediate living circumstances, our home country or culture, or
global society. This then often leads to a calculation in which round up or off rather
indiscriminately: If justice is prevalent, we choose to label the examined situation as just, is
injustice prevalent, the situation is just. This way it comes about that many Western nations
and cultures are seen as just even though (sometimes terrible) injustices happen within

11

them. At the same time, we perceive nations or cultures which do not have a positive
balance on their justice sheet as fundamentally unjust.
However, when it comes to global justice, philosophers and laymen alike tend to be softer
in their judgments: We utter phrases like but there are cultural differences or its a
Western worldview. In fact, I have done so on more than one occasion in this paper. I find
this distinction and separation problematic. When it comes to justice, Rawls and Habermas
are correct in this viewpoint, we should be able to have a universally founded principle
which will lead us to conclusions that can be applied to justice in any circumstance. There
should not be an all or nothing approach that defines nations, societies, or cultures, even
individuals as just or unjust and then lets us hang dry when it comes to global (in)justice.
We need an alternative approach.
Scaling Justice
When I think of justice, I do so on a scale with complete injustice on one end and complete
justice on the other. Undoubtedly, most people in this world find themselves somewhere
around the middle. However, if my mathematical skills have not left me completely, there
also must be people living closer to the edges which means that while some people in this
world live in (almost) complete justice, some also live in (almost) complete injustice. This
picture is rather powerful and leads me to think about whether there is a way to approach
the subject that will not leave people living in justice offended, but will help those living in
injustice. The only conclusion seems to me to be focusing on the lower end of the scale,
focusing on injustice.



12

Global Injustice as Pathway to Global Justice
When we focus on injustice as a pathway to injustice, it seems to be much easier to define
what needs to be done and what needs to be stopped in order to reach the ultimate goal.
Intuitively, it is rather easy for us to define when someone is treated unjustly. So why not
make use of this attribute of human psychology?
Injustice as Measure of Justice
When we start looking at injustice as a measure of justice, we first need to find a way to
actually use injustice as a measure. In his article What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?,
Amartya Sen uses the following analogy to describe the unnecessity of an ideal state of
justice for a theory of justice:
For example, we may indeed be willing to accept, with great certainty, that
Everest is the tallest mountain in the world, completely unbeatable in terms
of stature by any other peak, but that understanding is neither needed, nor
particularly helpful, in comparing the heights of, say, Kanchenjunga and
Mont Blanc. There would be something very deeply odd in a general belief
that a comparison of any two alter natives cannot be sensibly made without a
prior identification of a supreme alternative. (Sen 2006, 222)
I find this analogy to be exact. However, the analogy is incomplete. Unlike with justice,
when comparing the heights of mountains, we have an impartial scale to which we can
relate the height of a certain peak: sea level. Basically, we measure the height of a mountain,
a house, a tree in the difference between its highest point compared to sea level and we do
so in meters, feet, centimeters, etc. That means, we use an existing system of measurement
and apply its scale to the object at hand. With justice, this is rather difficult. We have no

13

universally applicable instances of justice we can use to measure the actual fulfillment of
justice, nor do we have such a scale for injustices. The goal of a theory of (in)justice must
therefore be to establish such a scale. In the following section, I will sketch out an approach
to global justice using the intuitive scaling of injustices rather than the pursuit of an ideal
state of justice.
Global Justice through Absence of Global Injustice
When we think about (global) justice and how we can measure it, it seems quite natural to
assume justice as a state of the absence of injustice. On the scale of justice as described
above, this would be the highest point or the state of ideal justice. Now, to describe a theory
of justice through the absence of justice, we must imagine the traditional justice scale as
inverted. On such a scale, the justice would equal zero and correspond to sea level in Sens
analogy. If an injustice occurs, we can then place this occurrence of injustice on the scale
and compare it to the position of other injustices on said scale. The question that arises is in
what units such a scale could be divided.
This is a rather difficult question as the effects of any injustice might be quite different for
each affected individual. For example, the recent blocking of access to websites like Twitter
and YouTube in Turkey (Turkey Blocks YouTube Days after Twitter Crackdown 2014)
might seem less unjust to a Turkish citizen who does not actively use such websites as it
does for a Turk who bases their livelihood on these services (e.g. the owner of an online
business who uses either or both for generation of business). This means that there must be
a scale found that measure the effect on individuals and accumulates the effects into a
variable that can then sufficiently be put on a scale in comparison to other justices. The

14

problem that arises is that mathematics and the measurable effects of injustice are not easily
to combine. What could a possible measurement be?
In order to answer this question, it seems that we must derive a system or measurement
which all people can agree to there must be consent of all human beings on such a scale.
A solution to a problem like this in my opinion could be found by combining Rawlss
and Habermass approaches to justice. By making use of Habermass discourse ethics, we
can come to establish a measurement system for injustice that all people can agree to. As
such a discourse among all inhabitants of the world would prove rather difficult, it seems
that Rawls idea of representatives to be included in such a discourse could become useful.
The same principle is already in use in court room in the Anglo-American world as well as
in scientific studies in order to make fair (just) judgments, we choose a number of
representatives who as a group represent the overall population (of a society, human
population, culture, etc.). Within an ideal speaking situation, this group of representatives
to the human race should be able to establish by rules of argument what the best scale for
measuring injustices would be.
Once such a system of measurement is established, the task of fulfilling a just state would
become much easier as the priorities would be set clearly with the biggest (or in Rawlsian
terminology most grievous) injustices to be the ones which should be eliminated first and
the subsequently smaller ones to be tackled once the grievous ones are resolved.
The last question for such a theory of justice through the absence of justice would be how
such a quest for a scaling of injustice could be institutionalized. Here I agree completely
with Habermas that a supranational organization such as the United Nations could
constitute the formal framework for such a discourse.

15

Conclusion
While Rawls and Habermas both base their theories of justice in Kantian ideas, they
approach the subject from opposite ends of a continuum between reality and ideal. Neither
one describes a bullet-proof theory with Rawlsian theory having more issues to be plausible
and real-life applicable and Habermasian theory neglecting the imperfection of human
communication.
However, combining the two approaches and looking at justice from the viewpoint of
injustice, can lead us to be able to define a system of measurement for injustice and
consequently justice and constitutionalizing an institution to tackle the elimination of
injustice.
What seems a distinct requirement for such an institution though is that all individuals,
nations, and regional organizations (political and non-governmental) are on board. To
establish such consensus, we would once again have to make use of a discourse in the
Habermasian sense. It seems therefore that the question of global justice is one that must
follow the question of a consensus of all people in the world to work together toward
justice per se.

16

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