Its a Cold, Cold World Out There!

An eye for an eye only ends up making the whole world blind. And what a sightless plae
this ountry would be if it were always go!erned under the !engeful mentality that flourished
within the White "ouse preeding August #th, $%&'. (y deiding to unleash )the fore from
whih the sun draws its power..against those who brought war to the far east* +White "ouse
,ress -elease, p. $., ,resident Truman and his administration not only killed those responsible
for war, as they intended, but thousands of innoent /apanese i!ilians li!ing in "iroshima and
0agasaki. The blood of these helpless people will fore!er remain on their hands. The
ramifiations of the surprise release of atomi bombs on these two ities are harateri1ed by
muh more than un2ustified fatalities. The attak 2eopardi1ed the seurity and foundation of
Ameria. The 34 was 5uikly launhed into a nulear arms rae and Cold War with -ussia6 one
that left e!ery indi!idual faing )the e!er7present possibility of annihilation should the onflit
enter the phase of total war* +04C7#8, p. 9$8.. -ather than heed the warning of knowledgeable
sientists, the under75ualified ,resident was unduly influened by ad!ie that failed to onsider
the importane of nulear national poliy and thought only of military e:pedieny. It is for these
reasons, and beause effiient alternati!e methods of ending the war were disarded, that the
inhumane dropping of atomi bombs on /apan was unneessary.
The problem begins in the sole fat that what is desribed by ;oner as )...the most
momentous deision e!er onfronted by an Amerian ,resident* +;oner, p. 88#., is left to the
disretion of a man who, up until that point, was not partiipating in the urrent dilemma.
Though Truman had been <ie ,resident, he did not work losely with -oose!elt and he had
minimum e:periene dealing with foreign affairs. The Chief of 4taff at the time, =eorge
>arshall, e!en asked, )Who the hell is "arry Truman?* Trumans lak of insight and prior
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in!ol!ement left him simply unprepared for the responsibility of being president. "e was unduly
influened by the likes of leaders suh as /ames (yrnes. ;rom the ontents of the 0otes of the
Interim Committee >eeting and 0otes from the White "ouse meeting it is lear that Truman did
nothing but listen and agree. It almost seems as if he was a !itim of groupthink. Its alarming
that no where in these disussions is there mention of the ine!itable tragedy of i!ilian death,
in2ury and disease that would be a diret effet of the bombs. "iroshima was hosen beause it
was a large urban area apable of being damaged effeti!ely by a blast, and its hills speifially
would inrease blast damage +0otes from Target Committee.. (eause the targets were analy1ed
for effeti!eness in destroying /apanese war industry and military, the i!ilian deaths were
o!erlooked as old irrele!ant statistis. 4tatistis that were not e!en inluded in the White
"ouses ,ress -elease after the bomb on "iroshima was dropped.
Those old statistis, the militaristi moti!es and the apparent war7time hatred, whih is
e!ident in the way the degrading raial slur )/ap* is repeatedly used in primary soures, made
using the )...indisriminate method of whole7sale destrution of i!ilian life* +>emo from
4ientists, pg. %. easy to rationali1e. The reality is that hundreds of thousands of i!ilians, )more
than twie Amerias military fatalities in the entire ,aifi War* +;oner, p. 88@., with no
demorati rights to oppose their oppressi!e go!ernment, were !itimi1ed. @A,AAA people died
immediately in "iroshima, a ity made up of 8@.'B i!ilians and the rest soldiers. The total
reahed $&A,AAA by the end of the year and steadily inreased o!er the ne:t fi!e years due to
deadly radiation. Three days later the seond bomb o!er 0agasaki killed another @A,AAA people
while the 4o!iet 3nion delared war on /apan and in!aded >anhuria +;oner, p. 88@.. Three
days was by no means enough time for the leaders of /apan to onfirm what had happened and
deliberate on what ourse of ation to take ne:t. Any logi towards the neessity of bombing
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"iroshima is not appliable to 0agasaki, espeially onsidering -ussia would enter the war on
the same day of the seond bomb. To an o!erwhelming portion of the ountry at the time of the
war, proteting a fertili1ed human egg was non7negotiable. In a ulture that plaes so muh !alue
on life, its inredible that the immense death and suffering of non7ombatants aused by the
atomi bombs was )2ustified*.
An in!asion of /apan, a demonstration of the weapon or waiting for -ussia to delare war
on /apan were Amerias alternati!es to the use of the atomi bomb, all !iable ourses of ation,
rendering the use of nulear weapons unneessary. An in!asion would ha!e resulted in a minimal
number of Amerian asualties and would not ha!e targeted innoent /apanese iti1ens, yet
would ha!e further diminished the fore of an already struggling /apan. Therefore, it was an
effeti!e means to ompel the surrender of /apan. =eneral Couglas >aArthur, supreme
ommander of the Allied fores in the ,aifi, stated in the 0otes from the White "ouse meeting
on the sub2et of an in!asion of /apan, )I regard the operation as the most eonomial one in
effort and li!es that is possible,* and that he did not e:pet a )high rate of loss* as a result of an
attak on /apan. An in!asion of mainland /apan would not ha!e killed a large number of
Amerian soldiers, and was therefore an option that should ha!e been pursued, not negleted, in
order to defeat /apan.
Although the 3.4. and /apan had no diplomati relations after ,earl "arbor, a
demonstration might ha!e been arranged disretely through some bak hannel gi!en the
irumstanes. The 3nited 4tates onduted a suessful atomi bomb test in 0ew >e:io in
/uly of $%&' +;oner, p. 8@.. If representati!es of the /apanese go!ernment, military, or sientifi
ommunity ould ha!e seen the bomb, it might ha!e been enough to on!ine them of the
foolishness of ontinued resistane. If not, at least the 3.4. ould say that they had tried, thereby
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maintaining somewhat of a moral high ground. Dastly, its an important point about -ussian
partiipation in the war that the impat of -ussian entry on the already hopeless /apanese may
well had been the deisi!e ation le!ering them into apitulation at that time, or shortly thereafter
if the 34 landed on /apan.
(ut rather than wait three days for the 4o!iet 3nion to delare war on /apan, and perhaps
e!en linh a surrender, Truman hose to use the latter 7 or as 4timson referred to it, )the most
terrible weapon e!er known in human history* +;oner, p. 88@.. In doing so Truman initiated what
sientists and 4timson had warned him about6 a nulear arms rae and inability to establish
poliy for de!elopment of atomi power for peaeful and humanitarian purposes only. Trumans
deision to introdue atomi weapons to the world through a sudden indisriminate release on
/apan implies that he and his administration had more paramount ob2eti!es in mind than
international agreement on total pre!ention of nulear warfare. This was first and foremost a
strategy to end the war 5uikly, but it was also a sare tati against -ussia. Truman and selet
members of his administration were under the impression that if 4talin perei!ed Ameria as a
nulear threat it would be easier for them to ontain the 4o!iet 3nions ommunism and
e:pansion. They disregarded the ad!ie of 4timson, who was on!ined of the importane of a
hange in -ussian attitude toward indi!idual liberty, but ame to the onlusion that it would not
be possible to use possession of the atomi bomb as a diret le!er to produe the hange +"enry
4timson to "arry Truman, p. $..
Also disregarded were the opinions of redible sientists with knowledge of the
ramifiations of the atomi bomb that were beyond the understanding of military and politial
offiials. The >emo from 4ientists at the 3ni!ersity of Chiago an be summed up in this
5uoteE
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)The military ad!antages and the sa!ing of Amerian li!es ahie!ed by the sudden use of atomi
bombs against /apan, may be outweighed by the ensuing loss of onfidene and wa!e of horror
and repulsion, swooping o!er the rest of the world, and perhaps di!iding e!en the publi opinion
at home* +>emo from 4ientists, p. %7$A..
The sientists ad!oated for the best possible atmosphere for the ahie!ement of an international
agreement, whih they proposed was a demonstration before the eyes of representati!es of all the
3nited 0ations. The people most aware of the bombs apabilities, the !ery ones whos minds
helped reate it, stressed the need to establish trust and dismantle plans for an unannouned
attak.
Toward the end of the war the /apanese were nearing surrender without any fighting at
all. /apanese offiials had ommuniated a willingness to ome to peae if Fmperor "irohito
ould remain on his throne. The Allies unonditional demands in the ,otsdam Celaration held
firm and the surrender was thereby illegitimate. "owe!er, after fulfilling the delarations
promise of omplete annihilation, the 34 agreed to "irohitos sur!i!al +;oner, p. 88@.. This
means that the 34 ould ha!e initially aepted /apans onditional surrender and entered peae
negotiations, sparing hundreds of thousands of innoent li!es, unpreedented destrution and a
Cold War.
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