Summary- Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two- level games

By Robert D. Putnam

- Domestic Politics and international relations are entangled, one influencing the other
- E.g the Bonn negotiations in which a proposal was made by J apan, Germany and the
USA to recover the locomotive from oil shock
- In these negotiations a package deal was made which was for all actors better than the
status quo
- The Bonn summit produced a balanced agreement of unparalleled breadth and
specificity in which all parts of the package were actually implemented
How was this possible?
- 1) Key governments adopted policies which were different from those which they
would have adopted without this international negotiation
- 2) Power minorities in each government favoured policy on domestic ground

the two- level game in international negotiations
- Politics of international negotiations can be conceived as a two level game:
- 1) domestic level: domestic groups put pressure on government to adopt favoured
policies ( build coalitions)
- 2) International level: national governments want to maximize ability to satisfy
domestic pressure and minimize adverse consequences foreign developments
- ( both levels must be taken into account)
- national political leaders appear in both games ( moves that are rational for the
political leader on one board might be impolitic for him at the other one)
- nevertheless both games interact
- therefore national political leader often seek to spot a move on one board that will
trigger realignments on the other one ` two- table metaphor

theory of ratification: importance of win- set
- In the case of a two- level game the negotiators representing two organisations meet to
find an agreement but already know that this agreement needs to be ratified by their
respective organisation
- The negotiator seeks to find an agreement that will be attractive to his constituents (
because they will need to ratify the agreement in the end)
- There are 2 stages in finding an agreement:
- 1) Level I : on this level the negotiators bargain in order to find a tentative agreement
- 2) Level II: on this level a separate discussion within each group of constituents takes
place in which they discuss whether or not the agreement can be ratified ( vote upon)
- In order to find a satisfying agreement which can be ratified in the end, the win-sets of
both levels need to overlap ( in general the larger the win- sets the more they will
overlap and the other way around)
- The win- set of Level II can be considered as all possible Level I agreements that
would gain the majority among the constituents (meaning that a larger win- set of
Level II makes agreements on Level I more likely)
- But nevertheless there is always the chance of failing ratification which can be
distinguished into 2 defections:
- 1) Voluntary defection: it refers to reneging by a rational egoist in the absence of
enforceable contracts
- 2) Involuntary defects: refers to the behaviour of an agent who is unable to deliver on
a promise because of failed ratification, therefore only promise what you are able to
deliver ( ` deliver ability )
- In general the credibility of the negotiator at Level I is enhanced by a negotiators
ability to deliver at Level II ( so if he can ensure ratification of agreement met at Level
I)
- The smaller the win- set the greater the risk of involuntary defection
- ( in general the costs of both defections is pretty high and even though actors in
international cooperation have incentives to cheat the risk is minimized whenever they
expect to meet again- anarchic `self- help)
- In general in two- level games the size of the win- set is important because the relative
size of the respective Level II win- sets will affect the distribution of the joint gains
from the international bargaining
- the larger the perceived win- set of a negotiator, the more he can be pushed around by
the other Level I negotiators
- Therefore a small domestic win- set can be a bargaining advantage ( an agreement
needs to be found which can be ratified on the domestic level)

Determinants of the win- set

- What circumstances affect the win- set size?
- 3 sets of factors are especially important:
- 1) Level II preferences and coalitions
- 2) Level II institutions
- 3) Level I negotiators strategies

1) Size of win- set depends on the distribution of power, preferences and
possible coalitions among Level II constituents
- In general it is to say that the lower the costs of a non- agreement ( keeping sq) are the
smaller is the win- set
- The size also depends on the relative size of the `isolationist ( who oppose
international cooperation in general) and on the `internationalists ( who offer `all-
purpose support) being part of the constituents ( the latter is more likely in smaller
and dependent countries with open economies)
- The preferences of the constituents also determine the size of the win- set: in cases in
which the constituents share homogeneous interests, non- agreement would be the
only significant disagreement. In cases in which the interests of the constituents are
more heterogeneous, Level I agreements are imposed unevenly on them and a non-
agreement is more likely ( if sq is better for the majority of them)
- Both cases of constituents preferences can impose problems upon the Level I
negotiator:
- 1) Problem of Level I negotiator if preferences of constituents are homogenous:
- the more the negotiator can win at Level I the better his odds of winning ratification-
therefore the negotiator is faced with the problem to manage the discrepancy between
his constituents expectations and the negotiable outcome
- 2) Problem of Level I negotiator if preferences of constituents are heterogeneous:
- he also wants to maximize the chances that the negotiated agreement gets ratified but
there are lines of cleavages in Level II constituents that will cross- cut Level I division
so the negotiator needs to find allies at his opponents domestic table
- In general a government that is internally more divided is more likely to strike a deal
internationally than one that is firmly committed to a single policy
( heterogeneousness in Level II may improve international negotiations)
- Another factor which can determine the size of the win- set is the participation rate in
the ratification process ( this rate varies across groups and issues, in general those
constituents whose interests are most affected will exert special influence on the
ratification process)
- Whenever an issue has a high degree of politicisation, constituents are more likely to
actively participate in the ratification process

The size of the win- set depends on the Level II political institutions
- domestic practices are able to affect the win- set for example strong discipline within
the governing party increases the win- set by widening the range of agreements for
which the Level II negotiator can expect to receive backing
- In the determination of the size of the win-set `state strengths and ` state autonomy
must also be taken into consideration:
- The greater the autonomy of the central decision- makers from their Level II
constituents the larger the win- set and the greater the likelihood of achieving
international agreements
- The stronger the state is in terms of autonomy from domestic pressure, the weaker its
relevant bargaining position internationally ( ceteris paribus)

The size of the win- set depends on the strategies of the Level I negotiators
- The Level I negotiator seeks to maximize the win- set of the other negotiators ( easier
to find agreement and the greater the win- set of the other the easier they can be
pushed around)
- With regard to his own win- set the negotiator inhabits mixed feelings:
- the greater his own win- set the easier agreements can be met but the weaker is his
own bargaining position ( he also needs to `soften up at home because he needs
domestic constituents in order to ratify the agreement)
- Also important is the role of side- payments which are used in order to attract marginal
supporters ( may come from unrelated domestic sources or received as part of the
international negotiations)
- An experienced negotiator seeks to the cost- effectiveness ( to him and his
constituents) which is necessary in order to ensure ratification and to satisfy his own
demands and threats. This is done by targeting his initiatives with an eye to his Level
II incidence at home and abroad
- Furthermore, Level I negotiators have a strong interest in the popularity of his
opposite number ( If the popularity of one party increases, the win- set increases and
there also is an increase in the success and the relative bargaining leverage of the other
party) Therefore negotiators should be expected to reinforce one anothers standing
with their respective constituents
- Furthermore, partly for this reason and partly because of media attention, participation
on the world stage normally gives a head of government a special advantage vis--vis
his or her domestic position

Uncertainty and bargaining tactics
- Level I negotiators are often badly informed about Level II politics
- Uncertainty about a win- set can be both a bargaining device and a stumbling block in
2 level negotiations
- In Level I negotiations negotiators have the incentive to understand their own win- set
- Every negotiator is likely to know more about his Level II win- set his opponent does
- One tactic of negotiators is to exploit divisions within their own government ( You
should better make a deal with me because the alternative is even worse)
- Uncertainty about the opponents win- set can also cause involuntary defections; if the
win- set of the opponents is not known it is hard to reach an agreement that falls
within the lines and can be ratified by the Level II constituents of the opponents
- The tactic of an utility- maximizing negotiator would seek to convince his opposite
number that the proposed deal is likely to be ratified but that a deal slightly more
favourable to the opposite is unlikely to be ratified
- Solutions that expand the scope of joint gain and improve the odds of ratification are
likely to require fairly accurate information about constituents preferences

Restructuring and reverberation
- Game- theory analysis requires that the structure of issues and payoffs be specified in
advance
- In reality, much what happens in any bargaining situation involves attempts by the
players to restructure the game and to alter one anothers perception of the costs of no
agreement and the benefits of proposed agreements
- Governments seek to expand one anothers win-set ( most common activities: wooing
opinion leaders, establishing contact with opposition parties, offering foreign aid to a
friendly but unstable government- they have exactly those functions)
- When it comes to reverberation, the social- choice theory views it as rather
problematic. It implies a certain interconnection the utility functions of independent
actors, across different levels of the game
- 2 rationales explaining reverberation:
- 1) In a complex, unfriendly and interdependent world, offending foreigners may be
costly in the long run ( to get along, go along)
- 2) takes into account cognitive factors and uncertainty; Given the pervasive
uncertainty that surrounds many international issues, messages from abroad can
change minds, move the undecided and hearten those in the domestic minority (
Suasive reverberation is more likely among countries with close relations and is
probably more frequent in economic than in politic- military negotiations)
- Reverberation implies that international pressure expands the domestic win- set and
facilitates agreement
- But it can also be negative: foreign pressure may create a domestic backlash
- Cognitive balance theory suggests that international pressure is more likely to
reverberate negatively if its source is generally viewed by domestic audiences as an
adversary rather than an ally

The role of the chief negotiator
- the chief negotiator is the only formal link between Level I and Level II
- he has no independent policy views but acts as an honest broker or as an agent on
behalf of his constituents. This is in theory true, but in reality the preferences of the
chief negotiator may well diverge from those of his constituents
- 2 level negotiations are often costly and risky for the chief negotiator and they often
interfere with his priorities
- The motivates of a chief negotiator include:
- 1) Enhancing his standing in the Level II game by increasing his political resources or
by minimizing potential losses
- 2) Shifting the balance of power at Level II in favour of domestic policies that he
prefers for exogenous reasons
- 3)To pursue his own conception of the national interest in the international context


- In the case of the 2- level- game the chief negotiator will normally give primacy to his
domestic calculus
- He is also more likely to present an international agreement for ratification , the less
of his own political capital he expects to have to invest to win approval, and the
greater the likely political returns from a ratified agreement
- He also has a veto over possible agreements (even though if deal is in Level II win- set
if he opposes it there is no agreement)
- A constraint on successful two- level negotiations derives from the leaders existing
domestic coalition ( everyone has a fixed investment in a pattern of policy a
supporting coalition) if the agreement threatens it or if ratification would require him
to construct a different coalition, the chief negotiator will be reluctant to endorse I,
even if it could be ratified (the greater the loss of supporters the greater the reluctance)
(his constituents might even be more eager for an agreement than he is)
- In general if the negotiators own domestic standing would be threatened if he were to
reject an agreement that falls within his Level II win- set and if this is known to all
parties, then the other side at Level I gains considerable leverage
- All in all the chief negotiator has great responsibilities over the negotiation outcome

Conclusion
- In analysing negotiations and its outcomes it is important to take the entanglements
between both Levels into account ( Level I and Level II)
- The 2- level analysis recognizes the inevitability of domestic conflicts about what the
`national interests require as well as it recognizes that central decision- makers strive
to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously ( statement can be
face strategic opportunities as well as strategic dilemmas)