The

Emerging
aiiiixi
Industry
A joint study by A.T. Kearney and
The Society of British Aerospace Companies
Introduction
The skies were empty for days following the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. The U.S.
Department of Transportation grounded all flights, and when permission was granted to resume
commercial air traffic a few days later, it became clear that the industry faced a major challenge in
restoring travelers confidence. At the time, officials estimated that revenue losses in the United
States could reach as high as US$18 billion within one year.
In the ensuing months, some of the fears became reality. A number of major airlines filed for
bankruptcy, including Swissair, Sabena, U.S. Airways and, more recently, United Airlines. In an
attempt to survive, airlines embarked on rapid cost cutting initiatives. Approximately 100,000 airline
employees, almost 15 percent of the industrys workforce, lost their jobs in the United States during
the last quarter of 2001. Although the revenue losses have not been as severe as predicted (about
US$12 billion in 2001 in the United States alone), they have continued. Last year proved to be
almost as difficult, with only a slight improvement (losses of US$8 billion), and estimates for 2003
are constantly being lowered.
While the major airlines were having a difficult time, the low-cost segment of the market remained
strong, with several airlines achieving significant growth (see figure 1 on page 2). Southwest Airlines,
the United States no-frills leader, now has a market capitalization of US$10.7 billion, twice that of
the other major carriers combined. EasyJet, the United Kingdoms low-fare airline, boosted revenues
by 35 percent, and in August 2002 bought its competitor Go. Irelands Ryanair, modeled on
Southwest, has not only increased revenues by 35 percent but improved profit before tax by 71
percent in the past year.
Today, more than a year after the disaster, the uncertainty continues, particularly in terms of market
recovery. And many questions remain: Will there be a long-term, fundamental change in the
industry? Will the predictions of recovery in 2003 hold true? When, if ever, will the industry
return to the way it was before September 11?
To help answer these questions, A.T. Kearney and the Society of British Aerospace Companies
(SBAC) conducted a joint study.
The Emerging Airline Industry
:
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The primary objective of the study was to
answer one key question: Has the business
model for commercial aviation changed per-
manently post-September 11? To answer this
question, A.T. Kearney and the Society of
British Aerospace Companies teamed up in a
12-week examination of the airline industry,
beginning in July 2002 at the Farnborough
International Airshow.
The study involved a combination of
research, detailed analyses and more than 50
interviews with aviation leaders in government
and across all sectors of the industry, including
operators, manufacturers, suppliers and airport
authorities. The focal point was the mainstream
civil aviation markets (international, regional
and low-cost) in the three major geographic
regions: the Americas, Europe and Asia Pacific.
Team members developed a framework to
define the business model prior to September
11 and to map expected changes (see figure 2).
The model comprises operator value chains
in each region, and the players in each value
chain, including government and regulatory
bodies, customers, ticket distributors, mainte-
nance repair and operations (MRO) providers,
airports and operators. The framework identi-
fies six types of operators and characterizes the
supply chain as a single global manufacturing
value chain.
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Generally, the findings reveal that the primary
impact of September 11 was a significant accel-
eration of existing trends trends that include
the ongoing global economic slowdown, a con-
tinued concern over terrorism, the parking of
large numbers of aircraft in the desert, and a
rise in low-cost airlines. This last trend, not
experienced in previous downturns, was creat-
ing a strong buyers market for aircraft and
thereby causing a significant drop in the price
of new and used aircraft. These low-cost airlines
are also blamed for severe cost pressures through-
out the supply chain and for the fragility of the
industrys future business model.
The following offers specific insights into
the study findings.
Acceleration of existing trends
Roughly 84 percent of respondents agree
about one thing: The events of September 11
accelerated existing passenger trends. Moreover,
two-thirds of the 84 percent believe that these Source: A.T. Kearney
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Lufthansa British
Airways
easyJet Ryanair
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(19962001)
Figure 1: Low-cost carriers outgrow
traditional carriers
The Emerging Airline Industry
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a . r. x i a i xi \
trends are here to stay, and that the industry
will never be the same.
Prior to September 11, the airline industry
was already in a downturn. Growth in revenue-
passenger-kilometer, or RPK, was rapidly declin-
ing (see figure 3 on page 4). And a drop in first-
and business-class passengers caused a substantial
reduction in revenues, an impact most pro-
nounced in the United States.
Post-September 11, the situation worsened.
Travelers continuing concerns about personal
safety, corporate drives to reduce costs, and an
increase in the hassle factor all worked to dis-
courage passengers from air travel. Traditional
carriers grounded planes, condensed their
routes and postponed new aircraft purchases,
all in an effort to cut costs and conserve cash.
In fact, more than 1,000 aircraft were grounded
in the six months following September 11,
with some airlines reporting more than 50 per-
cent reductions in routes and flight frequency.
But while parking older, less efficient planes
provided short-term savings in aircraft mainte-
nance and associated staff costs, the resultant
negative effect on capital assets (reduced value)
and therefore profits could not be ignored.
Source: A.T. Kearney
Lessor/owner
M
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Prime manufacturer
Suppliers
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Operator
Distributor
Customer
Cargo
Business jet
Holiday charter
International network
Regional network
Low-cost regional
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Figure 2: The emerging airline industry business model
The Emerging Airline Industry

a . r. x i a i xi \
In the United States, companies undertook
massive cost reduction efforts, particularly in
connection with annual labor union rate agree-
ments. Delta and United, for example, reduced
their costs by US$1.1 billion and US$1.2
billion, respectively, through labor rate nego-
tiations. Still, some companies failed to stave
off Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedures. Thus,
the need for even greater savings prompted an
examination of the international airline oper-
ating model. In particular, the hub-and-spoke
system came under scrutiny. Although most
leading airlines adopted this system to mini-
mize wait times and thereby cater to business
passengers, it is expensive to implement. As
planes are synchronized to fly in and out in
close timeframes, the resulting work peaks
require more staff and ground equipment.
Meanwhile, the low-cost operators, enjoy-
ing solid growth both pre- and post-September
11, adopted a different approach. These airlines
adopted a point-to-point system, which focuses
on delivering the lowest cost travel between
two points, and does not attempt to provide an
integrated flight service. A report by Cranfield
University published in January 2000 pre-
dicted that low-cost airlines would increase
their carry rates of passengers within Europe
from 4 percent in 2001 to between 12 and 15
percent by 2010.
Source: International Air Transport Association
40
30
20
10
0
10
20
January
2001
March
2001
May
2001
July
2001
September
2001
November
2001
January
2002
May
2002
March
2002
vrncrxr cnaxor
World
United States
European Union
Asia Pacific
Figure 3: Prior to September 11, 2001, revenue-passenger-kilometer was already declining
The low-cost carriers have been aggressively
cutting prices to attract new customers and
increase demand. Having captured elements
of business travel and some package holiday
segments, they have expanded their market to
include weekend breaks and are now catering
to long-distance commuters by offering lower
prices. The lower costs of their point-to-point
operations and reduced hassle at regional air-
ports (fewer people, shorter lines), also proved
to be attractive to travelers. As a result, the
low-cost operators have achieved staggering
passenger growth rates since September 11,
evident in Ryanairs reported 37 percent
increase in passengers last year.
Further good news can be found in the
cargo marketusually an early indicator of
passenger trendswhich is experiencing a
strong recovery (see figure 4). Following a 6
percent drop in world cargo during 2001, the
market rebounded strongly in 2002, particu-
larly in the Far East and in the United States.
(In fact, the anthrax scare in the United States
had a more significant negative effect on cargo
growth than September 11.)
Manufacturing cost strains
Most survey respondents say that before
September 11, they were anticipating a slow-
down in the manufacturing supply chain, but
The Emerging Airline Industry
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Source: International Air Transport Association
30
20
10
0
10
20
30
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul.
vrncrxr cnaxor
Asia Pacific
North America
Europe
2001 2002
Figure 4: The cargo market experiences a strong recovery
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a . r. x i a i xi \
they were bullish about its ability to cope. Post-
September 11, it became obvious that the
industry could not absorb the massive drop in
airframe demand.
Almost immediately following September
11, the industry took stock of the potential vol-
ume reduction and quickly shed labor and costs.
Most survey respondents agree that such reduc-
tions would have been necessary regardless of the
circumstances. September 11 simply provided
the triggerand therefore the confidenceto
face the unions and make the difficult decisions.
The price of aircraft plummeted as the two
major manufacturers struggled to undercut each
other to capture the few remaining buyers.
Boeings dominance in the market undoubtedly
fueled the competition, although Airbus stayed
in the game. For example, when easyJet signed
a deal with Airbus to purchase 120 A319 air-
craft, with an option for another 120, reports
suggested that the airlines received a price
discount of as much as 30 to 45 percent.
However, even these large orders will not fill
the air framers production hangars.
Despite rapid and significant capacity reduc-
tions, prime manufacturers continue to have
unused production slots. Both Boeing and
Airbus predict that demand will not recover
until 2004, although many analysts consider
this to be an optimistic forecast (see figure 5).
The last major downturn, triggered by the
Gulf War in the early 1990s, lasted less than
*Estimate
Source: ABN Amro Aerospace & Defense Market Analysis, 2001
0
100
200
300
400
600
500
700
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003*
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Boeing deliveries
Airbus deliveries
Figure 5: Aircraft deliveries for Boeing and Airbus
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18 months and had limited impact on prices
because there was no demand from any seg-
ment in the market. The present downturn,
according to study respondents, may last more
than three years. Boeing has taken the hardest
hit. Its airframe output has dropped by 50
percent from its peak in 1999. Airbus slower
growth means it is taking a softer hit, only
reducing its airframe output by 10 percent.
Still, the impact on the primes shows that
while they are loathe to shut off major capacity,
they are, contrary to earlier trends, tempted to
insource non-strategic parts. But with reduced
manufacturing processes and already low mar-
gins, they have only two real options: to seek
higher margin business or to further reduce
costs in the supply chain.
A similar situation is playing out in the lower
levels of the supply chain, where consolidation
among suppliers has come to a near standstill.
Minus consolidation, suppliers are taking a new
tack to lower costseither looking to increase
volumes or to increase their higher margin busi-
nesses. The result is a host of companies scram-
bling to move up the supply chain by seeking
more design authority from the manufacturers.
In the longer term, the continuous pres-
sure to reduce costs and maintain margins will
force purchasers to seek cheaper sources for
manufactured parts. This explains the growing
interest in moving primary manufacturing to
regions such as Eastern Europe and China,
eventually putting into question the future of
prime manufacturing in Western Europe and
the United States.
New industry stresses
The study findings indicate that industry
executives focus has shifted considerably since
September 11. Almost all executives are dealing
with more immediate concerns about security,
insurance costs, leasing and consolidation.
Security. With security issues a major
concern, airlines and governments around the
world have responded to the terrorist attacks
by improving procedures and aircraft security
to help restore travelers confidence. However,
these processes come at a price. Delta Airlines
CEO, Leo Mullin, told the U.S. Congress
recently that funding airline security measures
would cost the industry US$4 billion, with
a possible additional US$2.5 billion lost from
the hassle factor of government security
measures imposed after the attacks.
Measures such as increased identity verifi-
cation and searches have led to some airports
being unable to cope with their current infra-
structure and staffing levels especially in the
United States, where pre-September 11 secu-
rity had a poor reputation. However, different
standards and solutions at airports across the
world are still evident, and confidence among
passengers will not be restored until they see
consistency.
The longer queues and check-in times
mostly experienced at major airports have also
influenced the fly-or-not-to-fly decision. This
increase in door-to-door travel time has resulted
in customers seeking alternative forms of travel.
Similarly, some businesses are preferring to
conduct international meetings via video link.
In the United States, the decision point for
flying as opposed to driving has increased
from around 200 miles to 400 miles.
Insurance. Throughout the 1990s, the
aviation insurance industry experienced con-
sistent losses, and in early 2001, the sector was
already anticipating a year-end crunch. Following
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a . r. x i a i xi \
September 11, insurers withdrew liability cover-
age for war and terrorist risks, so new legislation
was introduced in Europe and the Americas
with governments assuming some responsibility
for war risk claims. When insurance companies
reentered the market to cover the shortfall, pre-
miums rose fifteenfold for war risk and eight-
fold for passenger liability. Although insurance
only accounts for about 1 percent of costs,
doubling this amount nearly halves the average
net operating margin that airlines are strug-
gling to achieve. To date, airlines have only
been able to mitigate the high cost of insurance
by passing additional costs on to consumers
and governments.
Leasing. In the leasing market, the drop in
secondhand aircraft prices has forced a decline
in lessors asset values by 12 to 17 percent. In
addition, the monthly leasing rental has seen
a similar drop from 1 percent capital value
to between 0.85 percent and 0.9 percent. The
only hope is that failed airlines will park more
aircraft in the desert, thus rebalancing aircraft
supply and demand and enabling increased
rental value.
Consolidation. Market uncertainty has
deferred all merger discussions. Prior to
September 11, industry experts acknowledged
the fundamental overcapacity, and pressed for
changes in legislation to allow consolidation.
However, management focus switched to sur-
vival mode, with an emphasis on conserving
cash, which slowed the consolidation drive. In
addition, the large fall in share price of most
larger airlines has provided opportunities for
the low-cost airlines. In 2002, easyJet bought
its rival Go, increasing its size by nearly 70 per-
cent, and in 2003 plans to buy German airline
Deutsche BA.
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Anticipating how the industry will change is key
to crafting the strategies necessary to survive in
the years and decades ahead. A.T. Kearney pre-
dicts that the emerging business model for the
industry will feature both increased horizontal
integration (through globalization) and greater
vertical integration (through added services) at
all levels of the supply chain. The following
markets are central to this business model:
Operators
Over time, the continued pressure on profits
and increased competition will force mergers
and consolidation, although timing of the latter
will depend upon national legislative restric-
tions. Market valuations and financial strength
will limit the companies that can lead these
consolidations. To the smaller pool of players,
the business model of choice for regional oper-
ations will shift to the low-cost carriers.
Low-cost carriers success with their point-
to-point model will raise further questions about
the economic sense of the expensive hub-and-
spoke system run by most of the national flag
carriers. Carriers in the United States are look-
ing at ways to reduce hub-and-spoke costs
without losing the passenger benefits of an inte-
grated network. However, increasing capacity
constraints at major airports, particularly in
Europe, will determine how the passenger of
the future can best be served. The air framers
appear to be taking different approaches, with
Airbus looking to maximize seats per plane,
thereby optimizing hub operations, while
Boeing (having rapidly changed tack from the
Sonic Cruiser) is now looking at building
smaller, more efficient 100 to 200 seaters that
can service smaller airports.
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Ultimately, a smaller international network
of operators will increase its focus on global
markets. A strong regional low-cost point-to-
point model will develop primarily in Europe.
Operators will also enjoy a protracted buyers
market, which will continue to put pressure on
prices. Any potential consolidations will only
increase that pressure as purchase decisions are
delayed and fleets rationalized.
Regarding the speed of change, ownership
and competition laws will prolong any moves
toward consolidation, and Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy laws in the United States will continue to
effectively shield U.S. companies from collapse.
In addition, significant portions of the industry
have responded to September 11 by focusing
on short-term survival strategies; longer-term
plans regarding fundamental structural changes
appear to be viewed with skepticism as com-
panies adopt a wait-and-see attitude.
Over time, these factors will cause greater
fundamental change and are likely to coincide
with the next industry downturn.
Prime manufacturers
In response to the reduced volume, prime
manufacturers have continued to focus on
cutting costs, and hence price, through col-
laboration, improved operations and sourcing
strategies. The primes will need to accelerate
expansion of their product offerings to sup-
port sales and pursue additional revenue
streams, including aircraft finance and MRO.
In addition, they will also face new account-
ing and finance issues, including increased
balance sheet risk from sales financing. They
will need to decide whether to take profits
from original equipment or from after-market
equipment sales.
Because many of the primes were under-
taking internal cost reduction initiatives prior
to September 11, further improvements will
not be realized through internal drives alone;
cost reductions will need to cascade down the
supply chain.
To achieve this, the primes are looking
at adopting techniques from other industries
such as automotive, including asking suppliers
to take on more responsibility and to share
some risk. Both air framers and major equip-
ment suppliers are aggressively seeking risk-
sharing partnerships. For example, Airbus has
announced more than 30 risk-sharing part-
ners for the A380 project including Alenia,
Eurocopter, Fokker, Gamesa, Labinal and Saab.
Its partners will cover about 25 percent (US$3
billion) of the projects total non-recurring costs.
Rolls-Royce announced six risk-and-revenue
sharing partners for its Trent 900 engine that
will power the Airbus A380 jet. Volvo, FiatAvio,
Goodrich, Hamilton Sundstrand and Honeywell
will all participate in financing and developing
the engine.
Such partnerships have given Airbus a dis-
tinct advantage over Boeing in recent years.
By adopting a consortium mentality and out-
sourcing modularly, Airbus has been able to
develop many different models simultaneously
and thereby reduce development costs. However,
tighter accounting regulations are forcing com-
panies to declare risk-sharing benefits within a
limited number of years. This negates a major
benefit of the deals and may restrict future
development in this area.
Unlike the operators, the speed of change
for manufacturers will be driven by the need to
stay ahead of the cost curve. Primes that focus
on restructuring and cost improvements over
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the next two to three years will be in a strong
position for the anticipated upturn in 2005.
Suppliers
The impact on manufacturers will differ
slightly depending on where the supplier is
placed within the chain. First tier suppliers
will have to consider vertical expansion and
increased cost efficiencies to offset price reduc-
tions. They will, however, also have opportu-
nities to move up the value chain: to supply
whole modules and subsystems as manufacturers
increase outsourcing.
As mentioned earlier, suppliers will also
seek to develop greater design authority, become
system integrators, and foster collaborative
partnerships. Clearly, only companies with sig-
nificant financial backing will be able to com-
pete for such programs due to the levels of risk.
In 2001, GKN Engage and Airbus UK teamed
up to develop the wing for a new aircraft. GKN,
however, is looking for investors to cover almost
US$50 million of its investment rather than
take on the full burden of risk.
The project is a new way of working for
us, says Graham Chinsall, director of group
operation engineering for GKN Engage. It is
also a good example of the long-term partner-
ships we are developing with customers to ful-
fill their need for engineering resources in all
disciplines.
Suppliers beyond tiers 1 and 2, those that
produce smaller, lower-valued parts, will need
to adopt different strategies. With the primes
looking to manufacturing sites in the Far East
and Eastern Europe to lower costs, smaller
businesses will either concentrate on selling to
new markets or on consolidating niche produc-
tion technologies. In the United Kingdom, for
example, Doncasters Precision Forgings used
funding from venture capitalists to consolidate
its niche production businesses, thus getting
better prices from its suppliers, which were
passed along to customers.
Overall, suppliers will face cost pressures
on two fronts. First, the reduced price of air-
frames will cascade down the supply chain,
affecting spare-parts sales as consolidation in
the MRO market increases buyer power.
Second, new accounting and finance pressures
from longer-term revenue returns will increase
cost pressures, as will pricing and risks from
increased total cost of ownership (for example,
original equipment sales versus MRO). Suppliers
will want to find new ways to pass risk further
down the supply chain.
The rate of change will vary depending on
the size of the company and where it is posi-
tioned in the supply chain. For example, the
rate at which first tier suppliers move up the
supply chain will be driven by the level of new
products being created. Developing the A380
engine or Sonic Cruiser will take longer than
developing smaller aircraft parts. Thus, it may
take six to eight years before significant struc-
tural changes occur among first tier suppliers.
In the case of the smaller, lower tier sup-
pliers, consolidation will continue, as will out-
sourcing to low-cost economies and insourcing
to maintain demand. This will contribute to
ongoing, continuous change and a prolonged
period of upheaval and uncertainty.
Maintenance, repair and operations
In 2002, the US$42 billion global MRO
market shrunk in line with aircraft usage,
resulting in an estimated 10 percent drop
in revenue. Future trends in this market can
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be assessed by observing the different mainte-
nance sectors.
The largest single sector, engine mainte-
nance, is led by the OEMs. These OEMs,
particularly GE and Rolls-Royce (due to
engine in-service profiles), will continue to
squeeze the independents and attempt to miti-
gate low margins on original equipment. They
will offer the airlines better service models,
refine their cost-per-hour agreements and
acquire independent suppliers.
The second largest sector, line maintenance,
is dominated by in-house airline maintenance
groups. Here, the need to copy the no-frills
airlines (increasing flights per day) will force
quicker turnaround times at the airports and
minimal delays at the gate. To achieve this, in-
house maintenance groups will likely look for
outsourcing solutions but, in doing so, they
will open the door to competition from the
independents, which are better able to offer
flexible service.
In the heavy maintenance sector, the move-
ment to source to low-cost labor economies will
continue and grow. This trend is evident in
Lufthansas transfer of A330/A340 checks from
Hamburg to the Philippines. Although U.S.
airlines are competitively hampered in this area,
due to restrictive union agreements and high
labor costs, bankruptcy laws may provide an
opportunity to restructure.
For all industry players, the study findings
point to a continuation of global consolida-
tionleading to increased buying power and
reduced inventory pools. The reduced inven-
tory pools will, in turn, increase pressure on
those OEMs that have traditionally depended
on spares for business success.
Conclusion
The supply chain will not recover until late 2004 or 2005. This is among the top conclusions of
A.T. Kearneys study of the global airline industry. The findings go on to reveal that the acceleration
of ongoing trends and new challenges in the industry will affect airline operators differently than
global suppliers. Change for airline operators will be driven by reduced demand and yields; change
in the global supply chain will be driven by reduced prices.
The result is that different pressures and goals within the industry will propel increased disruption
and discontinuity among the players. Unless a single goal can be created that aligns all levels of the
aircraft industry supply chain, the differences will only continueand possibly become exaggerated.
A better method must be found for coordinating the interests of the different groups in the airline
industry; otherwise the industry will remain fragile.
Copyright 2003, A.T. Kearney, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced in any form without
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axrni cas
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Atlanta
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Boston
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Buenos Aires
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Caracas
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Chicago
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Cleveland
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Detroit
Los Angeles
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Mexico City
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Miami
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Minneapolis
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New York
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Plano
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San Diego
San Francisco
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So Paulo
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Silicon Valley
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Stamford
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Toronto
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Washington, D.C.
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Amsterdam
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Athens
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Berlin
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Brussels
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Copenhagen
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Dsseldorf
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Frankfurt
Geneva
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Helsinki
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Istanbul
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Lisbon
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London
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Madrid
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Milan
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Moscow
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Munich
Oslo
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Paris
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Prague
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Rome
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Stockholm
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Stuttgart
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Turin
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Vienna
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Warsaw
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Zurich
asi a vaci vi c
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Bangkok
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Beijing
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Hong Kong
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Jakarta
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Kuala Lumpur
Melbourne
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New Delhi
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Seoul
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Shanghai
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Singapore
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Sydney
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Tokyo
avni ca
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Johannesburg
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