Tactical Coalition Voting Strategies

Tactical Coalition Voting
Brian McCuen

United States Government

and

Rebecca B. Morton

Department of Politics
New York University
4
th
Floor, 715 Broadway
New York, NY 10003-6806
voice: 212-998-3706
sec: 212-998-8500
fax: 212-995-4184
rbm5@nyu.edu

Draft not for citation without permission.

Abstract: Most research on voting in proportional representation electoral systems
assumes that voters either choose sincerely for their most preferred parties or strategically
if threshold constraints mean their party has little chance of winning a seat. Voters are
assumed to ignore possible coalition implications of their choices. However, formal
models of coalition formation in PR systems, such as Austen-Smith and Banks (1988),
assume voters care about the ultimate coalition formation in the parliament and vote
strategically in order to affect that coalition formation process, which we call tactical
coalition voting. In this paper, we experimentally evaluate the extent voters in a PR
system engage in tactical coalition voting. We find significant evidence that voters, even
those non experienced with PR systems, do choose strategically to affect post election
coalitions.
Tactical Coalition Voting page 1
Introduction
Traditionally, scholars have believed that voters in proportional representation
(PR) electoral systems should vote sincerely for their most preferred political party
(Duverger 1954; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). While Duverger argued that voters in
plurality rules systems who supported smaller parties would vote strategically, reducing
the number of viable parties, he believed these strategic concerns were absent in PR
systems since achieving near- majority status in the electorate is not necessary for a party
to have representation nationally. However, later research, both empirical, Leys (1959)
and Sartori (1968), and theoretical, Gibbard (1973) and Sattertwaite (1975) show that
even in PR systems strategic voting incentives exist. Nevertheless, most conclude that
voters largely choose sincerely in PR systems and that the strategic incentives are much
smaller and less significant than in plurality rule electoral systems.
In a seminal work, Cox (1997) has explored extensively the theoretical and
empirical effects of strategic voting across different electoral systems. He notes that
there are two types of strategic voting seat maximizing which intends to make votes
count in the allocation of legislative seats and portfolio-maximizing which looks
ahead to the government formation stage, and the coordination problems that arise at
that stage. (p. 272). In plurality rule systems, seat maximizing voting is the force that is
contended to lead to bipartism and discussed by Duverger, while portfolio maximizing
voting is the type of voting emphasized by Alesina and Rosenthal (1989), Alesina,
Londregan, and Rosenthal (1993), and Fiorina (1992) to explain split ticket voting and
divided government in the United States. Most empirical research on strategic voting has
focused on the former over the latter variety, including Coxs own work. This is
unfortunate because in PR systems one could argue that portfolio maximizing voting is
more likely to be relevant than the seat maximizing type. That is, the force to form a
winning coalition within the government to implement policy exists whether the voting
system is PR or plurality. If voters are myopic and do not look ahead to actual
government policy choices, then it appears that the incentive for strategic voting in PR
systems is less, and that the presumption of sincere voting may be reasonable. However,
if voters are forward looking such a conclusion is not obvious.
As Cox notes, there is little empirical exploration of the extent of portfolio-
maximizing voting in PR systems. In this paper, we present experimental evidence of
such voting, which we call tactical coalition voting or TCV. In the experiments, we
investigate voter choices in an experiment based on Austen-Smith and Banks (1988)
formal model of coalition formation under PR (ASB), which we review in the next
section. Then we present our experimental design and the results of the experiments. In
the final section we discuss future research.
Austen-Smith and Banks Coalition Formation Model
The ASB model has three political parties, , , , where = {, , }.
These parties are competing in a one-dimensional policy space P R. The parties are
competing for the votes of N voters, and N is assumed to be sufficiently large (N 15)
and odd. The model has three stages. First, the parties simultaneously announce their
policy positions in P, where p = (p
, p
, p
) indicates the policy positions of the parties.

Second, each voter casts one vote for one of the three parties. The parties receive seats in
the legislature in exact proportion to the number of votes that they received in the
election; however, a party must receive at least s votes to gain its proportionate share of
seats. A party that fails to receive at least s votes has its votes invalidated and the
proportion of votes cast for the remaining parties are normalized so that they sum to 1.
Let w = (w
, w
, w
) indicate the proportion of votes that the parties received. Third, a

government is formed. A government is composed of a party or group of parties (a
coalition), which received a majority of votes in the election.
In the remaining description of the model, it is assumed that all parties receive at
least s votes and that a government coalition always has the minimum number of parties
necessary for a majority. The result of these two assumptions is that all government
coalitions are composed of only two parties. The government chooses a policy y P and
a distribution of transferable benefits among the parties. Let (G) = {g
, g
, g
) represent
the set of such distributions. These benefits represent portfolios in the new government.
The government formation process has three steps. First, the party with the
largest number of seats proposes a winning coalition (C
1
S (), whose members
received a majority of the votes), a policy (y
1
P), and a distribution of benefits (g
1

G). The party that the party with the largest number of seats proposes as its coalition
partner either accepts or rejects the coalition. If the coalition is accepted, then policy y
1

and distribution g
1
are implemented. If the first coalition is rejected, then the party that
received the second largest number of seats proposes a coalition, policy, and distribution.
If the second coalition fails then the third party makes its proposal. If the third partys
coalition proposal is rejected then it is assumed that a caretaker government is elected.
The caretaker government is assumed to choose a policy and distribution of benefits that
results in the parties receiving zero utility.
Since the government formation process is a sequential game with perfect
information, Austen-Smith and Banks use backwards induction to solve the game.
Determining the equilibrium proposals generated at t = 3 and t = 2, allows the party with
the most votes to offer a coalition proposal at t = 1 that is accepted. The offer at t = 1 is
accepted since the largest party will offer a proposal that at least matches the utility that
its partner could receive at t = 2 or t = 3. Austen-Smith and Banks find that in
equilibrium the parties with the highest and lowest vote totals form a government. The
policy position of the government lies somewhere between the largest partys most
preferred policy and the median point between the largest and smallest parties policy
positions. The exact position of the policy will depend on the distribution of votes among
the parties and the distance between the coalition members policy points. Therefore, the
equilibrium policy outcome from the government formation stage depends upon w, the
distribution of votes cast by the voters, and p, the policy positions of the parties. In
general, the equilibrium prediction will be unique for any (p, w).
Voters are assumed to be purely policy oriented. Their preferences are
characterized by quadratic utility functions u
h
() = u(; x
h
) over the policy space P; x
h
indicates voter hs ideal point in P. It is assumed that x = (x
1
,,x
n
) is common
knowledge. The voters are distributed symmetrically about the median voters ideal
point. A strategy for voter h is a function that indicates the probability that h votes for
each party given the electoral positions,
h
: P P P (). Let
h
(p) = (
h
(),
h
(),
h
()), where
h
(k) is the probability that voter h votes for party k and (p) =
(
1
(p),,
n
(p)). If there exists a probability distribution () over P, then the expected
utility for voter h is:
[u
h
()] = -(y
- x
h
)
2
- s
, where y
is the mean and s
is the
variance of the distribution of , despite uncertainty over the policy outcome of the
government formation stage.
Since the policy outcome of the government formation stage is dependent on p
and w, the voters can determine the final policy outcome for any p and any set of voting
strategies (p). This relationship means that the equilibrium voting behavior of the
voters is an n-tuple *(p) such that p, h N,
h
(p): (*, p) [u
h
(y)] (
h
,
*
- h,
p) [u
h
(y)]. Therefore, a voting equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the game with
N players and payoffs induced by the equilibrium behavior in the government formation
stage. Recall that voters base their vote decisions on the final policy outcome and not the
position of individual party positions. Interestingly, Austen-Smith and Banks find that if
all voters are forced to vote sincerely then there is no equilibrium set of party policy
positions.
In equilibrium, one party adopts the median voters policy position and the other
two parties position themselves equidistant from the median voter. The equilibrium
voting strategies for this distribution of party positions results in the median party
receiving exactly s (the minimum threshold level) votes and the two non- median parties
dividing the remaining votes among themselves. This result means that the non- median
parties have an equal probability of being the largest party. The party that wins the tie-
breaking procedure then forms a government with the median party and the government
policy point is set halfway between the coalition partners.
The equilibrium party positions are shown in Figure 1. The points P
l
, P
m
, P
r
show
the policy positions of respectively, the left, middle, and right parties. The middle party
adopts the median voters policy position. The left and right parties adopt policy
positions that are equidistant from the middle party. The points P
lm
and P
mr
represent the
median points between the left and middle parties and the middle and right parties. In
addition, these points represent the possible coalition policy points.
Figure 1: Equilibrium Party Positions in ASB Model

Note: n = number of voters
Note: s = threshold level

The voters that engage in TCV are those voters who sincerely prefer the middle
party but vote for the closest non- median party. These voters behave in this manner
(increasing the vote share of their second most preferred party and decreasing the vote
share of their most preferred party) since the government formation process always
results in a coalition of the largest and smallest parties. The defection of voters who
sincerely prefer the middle party continues until the middle party has s votes. The
defection stops at this point since the failure of the middle party to enter the legislature
P
m P
lm
P
l

P
mr
P
r

Individuals who vote
strategically
(n-s)/2 voters

Vote L

(n-s)/2 voters

Vote R

s voters

Vote M
would cause the final policy outcome to move away from the median and towards the
ends of the distribution.
Experimental Design
In the experiment there are three parties are named B, C and D which compete on
a one-dimensional policy space. There are 23 voters (n = 23) who are symmetrically
distributed around the median voter. In the ASB model, the voting threshold is odd and
has the following range s [3, n/3). Given that n = 23, the possible values for s in the
experiment are 3, 5 and 7.
In ASB, the equilibrium distribution of the parties in the policy space depends
upon the number of voters and the threshold level. The equilibrium middle partys policy
position is at the median voters policy position (P
C
= x
). The other two parties (B and

D) in equilibrium are equidistant from the median voters policy position and their
distance from the median voter is d, where d ((8/3) * (( + ((s-1)/2)) - x
)). The value

of this equation equals the minimum number of voters that must be between the policy
position of the non- median parties and the policy position of the median party. Using the
three possible values for s (s = 3, s = 5 and s = 7) results in d 2.6, d 5.3 and d 8
respectively. In our design d 8. Using this value of d allows us to use the same
distribution of parties regardless of the value of s. Using the same distribution permits us
to compare directly how the different threshold levels influence voting behavior. Figure
2 indicates the distribution of parties and voters in the experiment. Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6
indicate the equilibrium voting choices as a function of the s. The positions B/C and C/D
indicate the coalition policy positions of these two possible coalition governments. Note
in particular that as s increases, we expect to find less tactical coalition voting.
Sincerely
Prefers
Party B
B
Figure 2: Distribution of Parties and Voting Types
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Sincerely
Prefers
Party C
Sincerely
Prefers
Party D

B/C
C
C/D
D
Figure 3: Equilibrium Voting Behavior when the Threshold = 3

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

B
B/C
Votes for
Party B
C
C/D
D
Votes for
Party C
Votes for
Party D
Votes
Sincerely
Votes
Tactically
Votes
Sincerely
Votes
Tactically
Votes
Sincerely
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
B
B/C
C
C/D
D
Votes for
Party B
Votes for
Party C
Votes for
Party D
Votes
Sincerely
Votes
Sincerely
Votes
Sincerel
y
Votes
Tactically
Votes
Tactically

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

B
B/C
C
C/D
D
Votes for
Party B
Votes for
Party C
Votes for
Party D
Votes
Sincerely
for B
Votes
Sincerely
for C
Votes
Sincerely
for D
The experiment consisted of five sessions (the differences between the sessions
will be explained in the next section) and each session involved 23 subjects. The subjects
were recruited from students at the University of Iowa. The subjects are primarily
undergraduates enrolled in political science classes and are drawn from a pool of students
that had volunteered to participate in political science research projects.
At the beginning of each session, the 23 subjects were seated separately at a
computer terminal. Partitions were placed between the subjects so that they could not
observe the voting behavior of the other subjects. Each subject was assigned a unique
identification number. A set of instructions (see Appendix B) was given to each subject.
The instructions were read aloud and all questions were answered publicly, ensuring that
all instructional information was common knowledge. The subjects were not allowed to
communicate among themselves during the experiment session. Once we reviewed and
answered all questions concerning the instructions, the first election was conducted.
At the beginning of each election, the computer program randomly assigned each
subject to one of the 23 voter policy positions (see Figure 2). The 23 policy positions are
called voting types. Since each voting type occupies a unique policy position, the
outcome of the election has a different impact upon each subject. In the ASB model
voters maximize expected utility from the governments policy position. The distance
between the subject's policy position and the government's policy position determines the
subject's utility. As the government's policy position converges upon the subject's policy
position, the utility received by the subject increases. In the experiment, monetary
payoffs were used to represent utility. The payoff each subject earns from each election
is determined by a function that transforms the linear distance between the subject's
policy position and the government's policy position into an amount that ranges from
$1.70 to $0.35. The function is: i's payment = 1.70 ((|x
g
- x
i
|/100) * 12), where x
g
is the
policy position of the government and x
i
is the policy position of subject i. Each subject
is given a complete payoff schedule that indicates the amount of money each voting type
would receive for all the possible outcomes (see Appendix B).
After the assignment phase was complete, the voting phase began. The program
privately displayed to each subject his or her voting type for that election. The program
informed the subjects about the threshold level (the s value in the ASB model) for the
election and the subjects were asked to vote. They cast one vote for a party (B, C or D)
or they abstain. The subject's vote is displayed to the subject and the subject is asked to
confirm the vote. After the subjects confirmed their vote, the program collects the votes.
Once all the votes were collected, the program determined the winner of the
election and displayed the results. The program follows the ASB government formation
parameters, where the largest and smallest parties form a coalition government if no
single party receives a majority of the votes. The government policy position is set
halfway between the two coalition partners and the payoffs for each subject is calculated.
In the case of ties between two or more parties, the computer randomly determined the
winner. The percentage of valid votes cast for each party and the composition of the new
government was then displayed to all the subjects. Each subject's vote and payoff for that
election was privately displayed to each subject. Once the subjects finished reviewing
the results, a new election began with the program randomly reassigning voting types to
the subjects. The subjects participated in 20 elections. After the 20
th
election, the
subjects filled out a questionnaire concerning their voting behavior and were paid their
cumulative election payoffs in cash.
In the experiments, we varied the information subjects had about the voting
environment. In the high information treatment, the payoff schedule included a small
table that summarized the distribution of the most preferred party preferences of the
subjects (see Appendix B). Given the voting rules and government formation rules, the
table should help the subjects realize that the equilibrium outcome of the election is a
coalition government between either B/C or C/D. The payoff schedule in the low
information treatment did not include the most preferred party table.
Experimental Results
In the treatments with thresholds equal to 3 and 5, we expect to observe 240
voters whose first preference is party C voting strategically for their second preferred
party (either B or D) and all other voter choices to be sincere. Table 1 reports the results
of a logistic estimation of the probability that a voter chooses tactically for her second
preference (more detailed data summaries are provided in Appendix A) as a function of
her voter type, the information level of the experiment, and the value of the threshold.
Specifically, the null case in the estimation is a voter whose first preference is party C,
choosing under high information with a threshold equal to 7. In this case, all voters
should choose sincerely. Variable TCV*(s = 3) equals 1 if a voter should vote tactically
when the threshold equals 3, 0 otherwise; TCV*(s = 5) equals 1 if a voter should vote
tactically when the threshold equals 5, 0 otherwise; s = 3 equals 1 if the threshold is 3, 0
otherwise, s = 5 equals 1 if the threshold is 5, 0 otherwise; Election equals the election
period in the treatment and takes values from 1 to 20; Low Infor. equals 1 if subjects are
provided with low levels of information; 0 otherwise; 1
st
Pref. B equals 1 if voters first
preference is party B, 0 otherwise; and 2
nd
Pref. D equals 1 if voters first preference is
party D, 0 otherwise.
Table1: Logistic Estimation of Probability of Voting Strategically for 2
nd
Preference
(Null case: s = 7, 1
st
preference is C, voter should choose sincerely, high information)

Coefficient Std. Error z Pr>|z|
TCV*(s = 3) 1.69 0.23 7.39 0.00
TCV*(s = 5) 1.59 0.27 5.91 0.00
s = 3 -0.42 0.16 -2.64 0.01
s = 5 -0.16 0.15 -1.09 0.27
Election 0.02 0.01 1.95 0.05
Low Infor. -0.24 0.12 -2.09 0.04
1
st
Pref. B 0.35 0.16 2.19 0.03
1
st
Pref. D 0.63 0.16 4.03 0.00
Constant -1.69 0.18 -9.23 0.00
Log Like. -1166.7415
# of Obser. 2300
Pseudo R
2
0.0383

Both TCV dummy variables are highly significant, which shows that voters
predicted to vote tactically are significantly more likely to do so than other voters whose
first preference is party C. Strategic voting also is more likely to increase with the
election period, demonstrating some degree of learning. Similarly, the low information
treatment leads to significantly less strategic voting. Finally, voters whose first
preference is either B or D are significantly more likely to vote strategically than voters
whose first preference is C and strategic voting is significantly less likely when the
threshold is 3 than 7 (the dummy variable representing a threshold of 5 is insignificant).
As the coefficients of logistic results are difficult to interpret, Table 2 presents the
predicted probability of voting tactically by voter type, threshold level, and information
for the last election period (Election = 20).
Table 2: Predicted Probability of Voting Tactically
Should Not Vote Tactically
Threshold
Should
Vote
Tactically 1
st
Pref. B 1
st
Pref. C 1
st
Pref. D
7 NA 27% 21% 33%
5 52% 24% 18% 29%

High
Information
3 48% 20% 15% 25%
5 46% 20% 15% 25% Low
Information 3 42% 16% 12% 20%

In general, even voters predicted to vote tactically are estimated to have a higher
probability of voting sincerely than tactically and there is a baseline tendency to vote
strategically when thresholds and information is high and voters have extreme
preferences. This is not a surprise since the subjects were not experienced with PR
systems, but are with plurality rule where this type of strategic voting is normal.
However, the probability of voting tactically is highest when a voter is predicted to vote
tactically by the theory, even though these voters are moderates.
Conclusions

Appendix A Summaries of Experimental Results
Figure A1: Voting Behavior in the High Information Treatment when the Threshold = 3

Figure A2: Voting Behavior in the Low Information Treatment when the Threshold = 3
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Voting Type
(%)
Second Most Preferred Most Preferred
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Voting Types
(%)
Table A1: Comparison of Voting Behavior in the High Information
Treatment when the Threshold = 3

Predicted Voting Behavior

Actual Voting
Behavior

Voting Types that
should Vote Sincerely
(1-8, 11-13, 16-23)

Voting Types that
should Vote
Tactically
(9-10, 14-15)

Sincere

77.7%
(275)

43.7%
(31)

Tactical

22.3%
(79)

56.3%
(40)

Total

100%
(354)

100%
(71)
Number of Cases = 425,
2
= 33.954, significant at the 0.05 level
Table A2: Comparison of Voting Behavior in the Low Information
Treatment when the Threshold = 3


Actual Voting
Behavior

Voting Types that
(1-8, 11-13, 16-23)

Voting Types that
should Vote
Tactically
(9-10, 14-15)

Sincere

84.1%
(301)

64.9%
(48)

Tactical

15.9%
(57)

35.1%
(26)

Total

100%
(358)

100%
(74)

2


Figure A3: Voting Behavior in the High Information Treatment When the Threshold = 5

0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Voting Types
(%)
Figure A4: Voting Behavior in the Low Information Treatment when the Threshold = 5

0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Voting Types
(%)

Treatment When the Threshold = 5


Actual Voting
Behavior

Voting Types that
(1-8, 10-14, 16-23)

Voting Types that
should Vote
Tactically
(9, 15)

Sincere

77.1%
(297)

50.0%
(19)

Tactical

22.9%
(88)

50.0%
(19)

Total

100%
(385)

100%
(38)

2


Actual Voting
Behavior

Voting Types that
(1-8, 10-14, 16-23)

Voting Types that
should Vote
Tactically
(9, 15)

Sincere

77.5%
(310)

55.3%
(21)

Tactical

22.5%
(90)

44.7%
(17)

Total

100%
(400)

100%
(38)

2
Figure A5: Voting Behavior in the High Information Treatment
When the Threshold = 7

0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Voting Types
(%)

Voting Types

Actual Voting
Behavior

Voting Types
Previously Predicted
to Vote Sincerely
When the
Threshold = 3
(1-8, 9-13, 16-23)

Votes Types
to Vote Tactically
When the
Threshold = 3
(9-10, 14-15)

Sincere

73.8%
(268)

78.2%
(62)

Tactical

26.2%
(95)

21.5%
(17)

Total

100%
(363)

100%
(79)
2
= 0.742

Voting Types

Actual Voting
Behavior

Voting Types
to Vote Sincerely
When the
Threshold = 5
(1-8, 10-14, 16-23)

Votes Types
to Vote Tactically
When the
Threshold = 5
(9, 15)

Sincere

74.4%
(299)

77.5%
(31)

Tactical

25.6%
(103)

22.5%
(9)

Total

100%
(402)

100%
(40)
2
= 0.187
Table A7: Comparison of the Voting Behavior of the Voting
Types (9-10, 14-15) that should Vote Tactically in the
High Information Treatment and Low Information

Treatments

Actual Voting
Behavior

High Information
Treatment

Low Information
Treatment

Sincere

43.7%
(31)

64.9%
(48)

Tactical

56.3%
(40)

35.1%
(26)

Total

100%
(71)

100%
(74)
2
Table A8: Comparison of the Voting Behavior of the Voting
Types (9, 15) that should Vote Tactically in the High
Information Treatment and Low Information

Treatments

Actual Voting
Behavior

High Information
Treatment

Low Information
Treatment

Sincere

50.0%
(19)

55.3%
(21)

Tactical

50.0%
(19)

44.7%
(17)

Total

100%
(38)

100%
(38)
2
= 0.211

Table A9: Comparing the Voting Behavior of the Voting Types
in all the Voting Sessions (s = Threshold)

Treatment One

Treatment Two Voted
According
to ASB
Predictions

s = 3

s = 5

s = 7

s = 3

s = 7

Overall
Totals

Yes

68.7%

68.5%

71.7%

71.1%

71.1%

70.2%

No

31.3%

31.5%

28.3%

28.9%

28.9%

29.78%

Total

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

Figure A6: Distribution of the Voters in all Voting Sessions who
Voted According to the ASB Predictions
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
Percentage of Voters Voting According to the ASB Predictions
N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

V
o
t
e
r
s

Appendix B: Experiment Instructions

The instructions will be read aloud and we ask that you wait until the reader has
finished reading all the instructions before you ask any questions. The number at the top
of this sheet is your identification number. Please do not hit any keys on the keyboard
until we are ready to begin the experiment.
General
This experiment is part of a study examining voting behavior. The experiment
will consist of a series of 20 separate elections. During each election you will vote for
one of three parties; they are labeled B, C, and D. The votes cast will determine the
winner in each election. A party must receive a majority of the votes, twelve, to win the
election. The party that wins the election determines how much money you will receive
for that election. You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment. The exact
amount will depend upon the decisions made by you and the other participants.
Election Process
At the beginning of each election you will be randomly assigned a voting type.
There are 23 voting types and each person is assigned to one voting type. Your voting
type is indicated by the assignment screen (see figure 1). The first line indicates your
identification number, which remains constant throughout the experiment (the number at
the top of this sheet). The second line indicates your voting type for the current election.
All the possible voting types are displayed on the voting schedule (see handout). The
simplified voting schedule shows you which party is most preferred by each voter. A
voters most preferred party is the party that the voter will receive the most money if that
party wins the majority of the votes. The individual voting schedule shows the amount of
money each voting type will receive depending on the outcome of the election. For
example, if you were assigned to voting type one, then you would look at the row labeled
1 in the voting schedule. If party B won a majority of the votes then you would receive
$1.67 for this election. And, if party C won a majority of the votes then you would
receive $1.04, and so forth. The amount of money that you receive depends solely upon
the outcome of election. The last column reminds you that only one person is assigned to
each voting type.
The third line in figure 1 indicates the threshold. The threshold is the minimum
percentage of votes that a party must receive. If a party fails to receive the minimum
number of votes then those votes that were cast for the party are voided and the party is
thrown out of that election. The minimum threshold for all the elections is 20 % of the
votes. This threshold level means that each party must receive at least five votes to cross
the threshold.
-Example 1:
Suppose the following occurred:
Party B receives 11 votes
Party C receives 10 votes
Party D receives 2 votes

The final result is party B wins with 11 votes and Party C receives 10 votes and party D
receives 0 votes since it did not receive at least 5 votes.
The fourth and fifth lines indicate the names of the parties. The sixth line should
be ignored.
Voting
Figure 2 shows the voting screen. Once you are finished with the assignment
screen you need to press the C to move to the voting screen. The first line indicates
which election is being conducted (there will 20 elections). The second line indicates
your voting type for this election. The third line asks you to vote. You must choose
either party B (Push B), party C (Push C), party D (Push D), or abstain (Push O).
Abstaining means that you are not going to vote for any of the parties. You will be asked
to push either Y to confirm your vote choice or N to cancel your vote and to cast a
new vote.
Results
Once everyone has voted, I will tell you to press 1. This will move you to the
results screen (see figure 3). The first section of the results screen tells you which party
you voted for, your type, and the amount of money that you earned. The second section
tells you the percentage of votes that each party received and the voting threshold. The
last line tells you the result of the election.
When I tell you, everyone will push 1 to start the new election. After pushing
1 you will be returned to the assignment screen which will randomly assign you a
voting type for the new election.
As you may have noticed in the voting schedule, the result of the election can be a
single party (B, C, or D) or a combination of parties (B/C, C/D, B/D). A single party
wins the election if that party receives more than 50% of the votes. If no party wins more
than 50% of the votes then the winner of the election will be a combination (a coalition)
of parties.
-Example 2:
Suppose the following results occur:
Party B receives 1 vote

Party B fails to cross the threshold so its one vote is voided, Party C receives 9 votes, and
party D wins the election since it received over 50% of the valid votes cast. If you were
voting type 23 in this election then you would receive $1.67 (see Voting Schedule).
If no single party receives over 50% of the votes then the parties with the most
and least numbers of votes forms a coalition.
-Example 3:
Party B receives 5 votes

The result would be a coalition between parties B and C (B/C) since party C received the
most votes (11) and party B received the least number of votes (5) but still received the
minimum number of votes (5). If you were voting type 23 in this election then you
would receive $0.70 (see Voting Schedule).
Tie-Breaking
Whenever two or three parties receive the same number of votes, the computer
randomly breaks the tie determining the winner.
Notification and Recording
The computer keeps track of your type, party vote, and winnings in each election.
In case of unforeseen circumstances, we suggest that you keep a paper record (see figure
4) of type, party vote, and winnings in each election.

Conclusion
When the experiment is concluded, we will hand out a questionnaire, which will
ask you about your voting behavior. Once you finished the questionnaire, we will pay
you your winnings.
If you have any questions during the experiment, raise your hand and wait for
someone to help you. Otherwise, you must keep silent until the experiment is completed.
Figure 1

Your ID# is 999 in election 1
You are type 1

The threshold value is 20%
Party names are:
B, C, D
Current government is 0

Press c to continue

Figure 2

This is the 1 th election
Your type is 1
Now it is time for you to vote
Please enter the party name for which you are voting
or O to abstain
Your vote:

Figure 3

You voted for party B
Your type was 1
The amount you earned this election is $1.67

Percentage of votes received by each party:
Party B received 52 percent of the votes
Party C received 48 percent of the votes
Party D received 0 percent of the votes
The threshold value was 20%
The new government is B
Figure 4

ID#:

Election Your
Vote

Your
Type
Outcome Money
Won
Votes
for B
Votes
for C
Votes
for D
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Voting Schedule
Simplified Voting Schedule

Voting Types

Most Preferred
Party

Total
1-8 B 8
9-15 C 7
16-23 D 8

Individual Voting Schedule

Possible Outcome Voting
Type

B

B/C

C

B/D

C/D

D

# of
Voters

1

1.67

1.39

1.04

1.04

.70

.35

1

2

1.64

1.42

1.07

1.07

.73

.38

1

3

1.61

1.45

1.10

1.10

.76

.41

1

4

1.58

1.48

1.13

1.13

.79

.44

1

5

1.57

1.49

1.14

1.14

.80

.45

1

6

1.56

1.50

1.15

1.15

.81

.46

1

7

1.55

1.51

1.16

1.16

.82

.47

1

8

1.54

1.52

1.17

1.17

.83

.48

1

9

1.34

1.69

1.37

1.37

1.03

.68

1

10

1.28

1.63

1.43

1.43

1.09

.74

1


Possible Outcomes Voting
Type

B

B/C

C

B/D

C/D

D

# of
Voters

11

1.04

1.39

1.67

1.67

1.33

.98

1

12

1.01

1.36

1.70

1.70

1.36

1.01

1

13

.98

1.33

1.67

1.67

1.39

1.04

1

14

.74

1.09

1.43

1.43

1.63

1.28

1

15

.68

1.03

1.37

1.37

1.69

1.34

1

16

.48

.83

1.17

1.17

1.52

1.54

1

17

.47

.82

1.16

1.16

1.51

1.55

1

18

.46

.81

1.15

1.15

1.50

1.56

1

19

.45

.80

1.14

1.14

1.49

1.57

1

20

.44

.79

1.13

1.13

1.48

1.58

1

21

.41

.76

1.10

1.10

1.45

1.61

1

22

.38

.73

1.07

1.07

1.42

1.64

1

23

.35

.70

1.04

1.04

1.39

1.67

1

ID#:
Name:

During the experiment were you ever voting type 1 to 8?
If you were one of these voting types then Party B was your most preferred party.
When you were one of these voting types did you ever vote for party C or D?
Please explain why you thought voting for Party C would be useful?

Please explain why you thought voting for party D would be useful?

If you were one of these voting types then Party C was your most preferred party.
When you were one of these voting types did you ever vote for party B or D?
Please explain why you thought that voting for party B would be useful?

Please explain why you thought that voting for party D would be useful?

If you were one of these voting types then Party D was your most preferred party.
When you were one of these voting types did you ever vote for party B or C?
Please explain why you thought voting for party B would be useful?

Please explain why you thought voting for party C would be useful?

References

Alesina, Alberto and Howard Rosenthal. 1995. Partisan Politics, Divided Government,
and the Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey Banks. 1988. Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative
Outcomes. American Political Science Review 82: 405-422.

Cox, Gary W. 1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the Worlds
Electoral Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Duverger, Maurice. 1954. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the
Modern State. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1992. Divided Government. New York: Macmillan.

Gibbard, Alan. 1973. Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result.
Econometrica 41: 587-601.

Leys, Colin. 1959. Models, theories and the Theory of Political Parties. Political
Studies 7: 127-146.

Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan. 1967. Party Systems and Voter Alignments:
Cross-National Perspectives. New York: Free Press.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1968. Political Development and Political Engineering. In John D.
Montgomery an Albert O. Hirschmann, eds. Public Policy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

Satterthwaite, Mark Alan. 1975. Strategy-Proofness and Arrows Conditions:
Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social
Welfare Functions. Journal of Economic Theory 10: 187-217.

Tactical Coalition Voting Strategies

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Tactical Coalition Voting

) indicates the policy positions of the parties.

) indicate the proportion of votes that the parties received. Third, a

is the mean and s

). The other two parties (B and

)). The value

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