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Heaving:
Heaving is associated with deep excavations in soft clay or very stiff soil or excessive filling over a desiccated crust of firm soil of small thickness over a thick layer of soft clay. Heaving of excavation bottoms in the case of soft clay formations is common because of reduced effective stresses. Bulging of excavation sides is also common in the case of very soft deposits. Lateral earth pressure exceeding the effective vertical stress is common in such cases. Heaving of ground due to lateral and upward movement of very soft deposits below relatively thin desiccated crust or better soil occurs when heavy area loads are placed. Heave occurs away from the loaded area and often develops gradually. Indications are displacements and resulting distress in small structures in the heaved area. Deep excavations into very hard over-consolidated clay formations or sedimentary rock formations like shale and mudstone can result large up-heaving of excavation bottom. This is apart from possible swelling under saturation if the soil in-situ is partially saturated. Shrinkage cracks developed within the natural soil immediately below the excavation bottom and sides because of increased 3 and subsequent saturation can cause considerable reduction in bearing capacity and increase in compressibility. Small footings placed over large common excavation area can be affected by this softening. Even very shallow excavations in expansive soils results significant heaving of the excavation bottom by the migration of moisture under changed stress conditions. The heaving is aggravated by the presence of ground water within the capillary range. Lowering of ground water table alone is not reducing the evil of heaving in such cases as the process of heaving is not merely related to the presence of ground water table, but significantly related to moisture locked in the soil itself. Examples of disintegration of highly weathered shale upon shallow excavations are plenty (Figure 6). 4.9 Subsidence:
Figure 6: Disintegration of weathered shale upon one cycle of drying (after excavation) and wetting (during construction) Oragadam, Chennai
General ground subsidence can happen due to ground water lowering in relatively loose and soft deposits. These movements are typically gradual and slow giving enough warning to possible damage to structures in the affected area. The net result is however a more dense sub-soil, and this does not help in avoiding distress in the existing structures because of possible differential movements Mair (2003). Subsidence due to ground movements during tunnelling and mining are often sudden because of the involvement of pore pressure. Such ground movements usually result in loosened soil. Similarly the ground movements due to reduction in density due to particle loss along seepage during heavy ground water lowering by dewatering are also sudden. Caving in of several wells in Kerala during 2001 after a relatively intense rains is an example (Ramantha Ayyar & Jaya, 2003).
4.10
Foundation displacements and slope failures are common where swelling soil is encountered. Moderately swelling soil experiences large volume reductions by loss of moisture. Displacements due to swelling and shrinkage will be highly varying between different parts of a building because of varying moisture build up or loss below different foundations. Usually footings in the corners are affected more because of relatively small loading and more exposure to environmental changes. Moisture variations within the building area in normal conditions will be small leading to small movements for foundations in the interior developing large differential movements between exterior and interior foundations.
Figure 7: Differential Heave Pattern of The Building at Anna Nagar, Chennai (Ramaswamy and Narasimhan, 1978)
The differential heaving associated with the swelling of soil has resulted distress in many structures Ramaswamy and Narasimhan (1978) had investigated a single storey building at Anna Nagar which has undergone severe cracking. The differential heave pattern of the building is shown in Figure 7 as indicated by the plinth line at the time of inspection. Progression of moisture towards interior of buildings where swelling soil is used in backfilling the excavations and plinth can cause swelling of soil in the interior after a prolonged period. Interestingly the cracks usually associated with swelling of foundation soil is vertical and horizontal. Horizontal cracks between roof slab and load bearing wall on one side results when the cross wall foundation is subjected to swelling displacement. Heaving of plinth beams supported on swelling soil can cause hogging in the walls allowing to develop tensile cracks at the top portion of the walls. Outward movement of walls are also noticed due to rotation of plinth beams along horizontal axis. Displacement due to shrinkage is also gradual similar to that due to consolidation settlement, but can be very erratic. Alternate shrinkage and swelling displacements cause distress in the structure over a period of time and this later manifest into a major crack or deformation. By the time this severe crack is noticed in the structure, many minor unnoticed cracks due to stress reversals could have been inflicted weak zones in the structure. Shrinkage of topsoil under drought or ground water depletion causes sinking of floors and development of additional stresses in plinth beams designed as ground beams. Foundations initially resting over medium stiff clays of moderate shear strength can displace due to large volume reduction under loss of moisture. Cases of failures are reported due to shrinkage of foundation soil under boiler foundations under severe moisture loss due to induced heat. These are occurring after a period and can be differentiated from other types of distress.
5 5.1 5.1.1
DISTRESS PATTERNS Lightly Loaded Buildings on Shallow Foundation Due to Differential Loading:
The most common distress found in lightly loaded buildings on shallow foundation is vertical and diagonal cracks below the window sills. This, usually very prominent and eye catching distress, is not strictly due to any geotechnical issue. The imbalance in the load distribution towards foundation due to large openings provided for the windows and the resulting tensile stresses in the generally brittle wall is the reason for such distress. This distress happens within few months from the construction (Figure 8). 5.1.2 Due to Differential Settlements:
If the diagonal cracks are towards the corner or to the edges of the walls, such distress could be associated with differential settlement within or between the foundations. Usually such distress appears in one or two years after the construction and involves the settlement of underlying clayey stratum. The floors are generally intact. The floor portion close to the walls may try to move along with the foundation causing distress little away from the intersection of the floor with the wall. This happens when the settlement is relatively large. More settlement for heavier interior column footings is a clear indication of consolidation of underlying clay stratum. The apron provided around the outer walls is usually detached and cracked when the foundation settlement is excessive. In the case of severe settlements, several horizontal cracks associated with the main diagonal cracks will be sighted (Figure 9). 5.1.3 Due to Shrinkage in Soil:
SHRINKING
SOIL
SHRINKING SOIL
Figure 10: Distress in walls due to differential settlements (shrinkage in founding soil)
Differential settlements occurring after a long period without any change in the loading of the structure shall be attributed to volume changes in founding soil due to desiccation or shrinkage. The foundations below the exterior walls and columns are more affected because of more exposure to environmental changes.
Shrinkage of founding soil aggravated by the water consuming trees and bushes rather than physical interference by the tree roots is also common. There is no definite pattern for such distress, but can be identified from the period at which it occurs. The floors are affected badly in such cases mainly because of the detachment from supporting soil that is dried up. The plinth protection around the outer walls shows severe distress by way of detaching from the walls and settles more than the walls (Figures 10 and 11). 5.1.4 Due to Swelling of Founding Soil:
Distress due to swelling / heaving of founding soil is more haphazard in comparison to the distress resulting from increased differential settlements. Generally wide cracks develop between the interface of the columns and walls or between the roof slab and the interior walls. Shallow foundations supporting the outer columns and walls are generally affected and the problem is aggravated by the fact that these columns and walls are with less loads in comparison with the interior ones. Hogging of the foundation portion below large window openings will result in the case of strip footing placed over expansive soil. This distress is similar to the one attributed to imbalance loading over the wall below the window sill. However, one of the major differences between these two distresses is sort of a cyclic nature of the distress due to swelling. Another difference is the appearance of distress above the window opening or at the interface of the lintel beam and the wall (Figure 12). Lateral separation between window / door frames from the walls is a clear indication of differential heaving in the continuous footing (Figure 13).
SWELLING
SOIL
Complete shear of the walls displacing it from its alignment is an indication of swelling of founding soil. Severe uplift pressure caused by the heaving soil can cause shear of infill walls. The distress is spread to upper floors when the structure is with load bearing walls and more distress will be noticed near the window openings. Detachment of interior cross walls from the outer ones is also very common in such case. Such distresses make the load bearing walls considerably weak and the in-fill walls loosing their confinement. 5.2 Lightly Loaded Buildings Supported on Short Piles / Under-reamed Piles
The major cause for distress in such structures is improper selection of the founding level for the supporting system. Even though the active zone with respect to severe moisture changes can easily be identified from local data, severe draughts and measures like rain water harvesting, etc. can trigger large changes in the active zone. Many case of shearing of wall and column interfaces are reported due to uplift of the supporting system because of changed environments. An extended draught period will result loss of moisture below the active zone causing tremendous swell pressure on the supporting system during next wet season. The floors and plinth walls properly treated for swelling pressures from the soil from shallow depths may remain intact in such cases triggering
distress in the interfaces. Horizontal cracks in upper portions of the infill walls, separation of infill walls from the roof, etc. are other distresses noted in such cases. 5.3 Structures Supported on Pile Foundation
Distress due to settlement of pile foundations is not generally expected unless very large pile groups are involved the supporting system. Large differential settlements between medium and large pile groups are reported because of underlying weaker layers. Excessive and continued settlements are also reported because of inadequate bearing stratum. Severe distress in the form of shear cracks on the beams and the columns supported on piles is reported where one structure on pile foundation abutting another structure on spread foundation is constructed. Consolidation of upper soft clay layers under the weight of the structure with spread footing transfers considerable amount of load through negative drag on the piles of the adjoining structure. Failure of end bearing pile foundations under a load much less than the design load was reported from a site where the filling required for reclamation was the order of four metres. The piles failed in shear just under the tremendous negative drag caused by the consolidation of roughly 6.0m soft clay under the gravely soil fill of 4.0m. The failure occurred just in three to four months 5.4 Bridge Supports
The most common distress found in bridge structures is the level difference between approach length and the deck portion. This is definitely due to settlement of the approach portion. Generally there is a thick embankment or fill below the approaches and a well laid fill or embankment is not expected to undergo compression. Consolidation settlement of the founding soil is the major cause. The level difference or opening up of the deck joints over a pier suggests differential settlement between the piers or tilting of piers. Joints opening up between the deck slabs can also indicate uplift of piers founded on very hard clayey soil or shale formation when the river swell after a long draught period. Lifting of the first deck slab supported on the abutment pier is an indication of the rotation of the abutment pier under the embankment load. 6 CASE STUDIES OF DISTRESS DURING CONSTRUCTION A Geotechnical Engineer will 1. Foresee several scenarios 2. Assume most reliable design parameters including the loading (with the help of an investigation) 3. Anticipate deviations from the assumptions 4. Analyse such possible deviations 5. Set the limits 6. Estimate the stresses and strains for all the possible scenarios, and 7. Reworks if the stresses and strains exceed the limit before finalising a geotechnical design. However, often the inadequate data on the structure itself, continuous changes in the overall planning of the structure by the architects and owners, etc. compel the geotechnical engineer to finalise a design well before the finalisation of the final project the owner decides to execute. Very rarely the geotechnical design is re-looked or re-analysed to fulfil all
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the requirements of the finalised project. At the same time there are instances where the geotechnical engineer failed to foresee the problems of a particular construction procedure that lead to unsatisfactory performance of the foundation. There are several cases in which the geotechnical investigation was inadequate of inaccurate that led to failures of near failures. The three cases described below try to illustrate some of these lapses. 6.1 6.1.1 The Case of Lifted Piles Problem
In 1994, in Chennai, about 1100 driven cast-in-situ piles were constructed to support a multistoried building with two basements. The construction of piles was done from (-) 4.0m level, whereas the basements were to be as deep as (-)9.5m and (-)11.5m. 600mm diameter and 550mm diameter piles extending to (-)19.0m were driven. Since the piles were to be cut-off below the basement levels, the concreting depth was limited to (-)8.0m, while the remaining length up to the working level was filled with sand. When the excavation started after the construction of piles, the concrete top levels were found to be at much higher level than planned. The owners engineer thought that the piles were somehow lifted and there could be gap between the pile tip and the soil. Some piles were then stripped up to the cut-off levels and found reduction in pile diameter over a large length (Figure 14) and also discrepancies in the levels of reinforcement. The reinforcement top levels were however lower than the expected ones in most of the cases of discrepancy, while the cases of cage lifting were also significant (Anirudhan, 1997). 6.1.2 The Distress
The major distress apprehended here was the loss of contact between pile tip and the supporting soil. The discrepancy in reinforcement top level brought the fear of cavities in the pile concrete at deeper levels. 6.1.3 Perusal of Construction Method
The foundation consultants had cautioned about necking (reduction in pile diameter) in pile concrete over a portion between (-)6.5m and (-)10.0m where soft clay existed. Ground water table was at (-)4.50m during construction and the excess pore pressure developed in this soft clay could exert tremendous pressure on the green concrete forcing it to squeeze. Ideal option for preventing this was to provide concrete up to the working level irrespective of deep cut-off levels.
However, the concrete top level during construction was decided as roughly 2.0m above the cut-off level and filling of sand in the rest of the length was adopted to save cost. This remedial measure proved ineffective because of arching of sand within the casing pipe completely relieving the load over the green concrete that was supposed to have been provided with an overburden. Similarly the excess hydrostatic pressure developed in the very dense clayey sand (residual type) at the pile tip during driving could be very significant, while the hydrostatic pressure inside the casing is zero. The minimum height of concrete column within the casing pipe was hence suggested
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as 11m before allowing even a small lift of the casing pipe so that the weight of green concrete is adequate to counter the hydrostatic pressure developed at the pile tip. 6.1.4 Actual types of distress Now the types of distress in question were modified to the following Reduction in pile diameter due to necking Possible reduction in pile diameter below the soft clay levels also Deterioration of concrete at pile tip due to excess pore pressure Vertical displacement of reinforcement cage 6.1.5 Issues to be Investigated 1. Whether the necking was limited to the soft clay between (-)6.50m and (-)10.0m alone?. Even though there was no weak layers below (-)10.0m, the soil layers up to (-)16.0m were not very dense or stiff. 2. Whether the pile really lifted from the base? 3. Weather the reinforcement was intact in its position or was there a lift of the reinforcement on account of the necking? 4. Whether the piles were deficient in their structural capacity due to reduction in cross section? 5. Whether the piles had deficiency in end bearing resistance due to bad concrete at pile tip? 6.1.6 Investigation of Distress A systematic investigation of these distresses was executed in the site. The extend of necking in pile shaft: This task was achieved by systematic volume measurements with the aid of reasonably thorough pile driving records and, concreting & reinforcement details available for each pile executed. The top level of pile concrete was measured using precision level. Diameters at every 300 to 500mm length interval were then measured to a level at which the pile diameter was equal to the design diameter after the occurrence of first necking. The total volume of the concrete within the necking portion was found to be equivalent to the theoretical volume of the pile up to the theoretical concrete top level. Such observations were made for almost all the piles suggesting that there was no reduction in pile diameter (necking) below the first level of necking found at about (-)10.0m. Lifting of pile from the base: The above measurements also expelled the fear of lifting of pile from the base Reinforcement displacement: The fear was that when the necking in concrete took place resulting an upward movement of the green concrete, this concrete might have also lifted the reinforcement cage. The length of reinforcement cage above the level up to which the necking took place is only one sixth of the total reinforcement length. The resistance offered between the remaining length of the reinforcement and the concrete around this length is much more than the lifting force that can be offered by the concrete moved upward while necking took place. Physical verification of the top level of the reinforcements for each pile were made. Interestingly the observations revealed that the top levels of the reinforcements for almost all the
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piles in a group remain same. There were groups of 6 piles to 18 piles. Very rarely there was relative difference within a group. There was a drawback of not recording the actual ground levels at each pile location that complicated this review process. An average ground level of (-)4.50m was mentioned in the records of all the piles which could not have been the case in such a large piling area. The length required for reinforcement cage in each pile was estimated based on this average ground level. This caused small differences between the levels of reinforcement in piles of different groups. About 1% piles found suffering from relative displacement of reinforcement by 50mm to 350mm, in which most of the cases were less than the lengths as per record. A slip at lap joints when the laps were towards the bottom of the cage was suspected to be the reason for this phenomenon and this was verified from some records. Only 5 piles recorded lifting of reinforcement. One pile recorded a cage lift of 560mm. Compression capacity of piles with respect to bearing: Direct measurement of static vertical compression capacity by means of maintained load tests was resorted to. Eleven piles out of about 1000 piles were subjected to load tests apart from two initial load tests carried out from a higher level. Eight piles recorded settlements within the permissible limits and two piles recorded slightly excessive settlements. One pile failed at very small load and this pile had the history of cage lifting by 560mm. However, the range of settlements recorded in some of the load tests were towards the maximum limits and there were deficiencies when compared with the results from initial load tests. The piles were driven to a very hard set of 3 to 5mm for ten blows of 4 tonnes hammer falling from 1.20m height at the time of construction and such large settlements were not expected under static load. The effect of excavation for basement: The relief of roughly 6.0m thick soil for the construction of basement will cause a heave in the soil below the excavation level since these layers are relatively stiff and dense. This heave might cause lifting of piles through the friction between the heaving soil and the pile. This might also cause a relative movement between the pile tip (flat shoe in this case) and the soil at this level. However, such relative displacements shall be fairly uniform and the load test results should also have resulted a uniform pattern. Large differences in the behavior of piles pointed to different reason/s. The excess pore pressure at the time of pile driving: The completely weathered rock present at the pile bearing level has reasonable amount of clay suggesting low permeability. Large amount of excess pore pressure could develop during such hard driving of pile. Anticipating that the entire excess pressure could not have dissipated before completing the concreting and lifting of the casing pipe, the piling instructions included a direction not to lift the casing pipe before placing minimum length of 11m concrete column within the casing. This concrete column provided a pressure of 22 t/m2 against excess pore pressure of about 8 t/m2 plus the static water pressure of 14.5m at the pile tip. It was reported that some of the piling rig did not have the capacity to lift the casing pipe carrying a large column of concrete. There was also significant resistance from the soil around the casing. Therefore, the piling agency resorted to an initial lifting of 500mm after filling only about three metre concrete in the casing pipe. The concrete exposed to the existing excess pore pressure should have suffered loss of cement particles resulting a weak concrete at the pile tip. Then the real worry was to identify such piles since the piling records did not mention the initial lifting of casing pipes.
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Investigation by pile integrity test, PDA: A large number of piles were subjected to low energy PDA to confirm the pile diameter, length of pile and the quality of concrete. These factors were determined with some accuracy, but the results were not conclusive on two aspects. One is the quality of concrete at pile tip and the other was inconsistencies in shear wave velocities. In almost all the cases intact pile tips were recorded, which was proved wrong by other means later. Investigation by high energy hammer tests: It was decided to conduct some high energy tests by driving the piles using a 4 tonne hammer. A suitable frame with leader was devised and initially around 100 piles were driven. While about 70% piles did not penetrate more than 4mm under three or four hammer blows, 30% piles penetrated more than 10mm in one or two blows. This was attributed to poor tip conditions caused by premature lifting of the casing pipe since the piles were initially driven to very hard set. Most of these piles, however, offered resistance after this initial displacement. These 30% piles would have settled more under the working load while the pile are expected to settle only 6 to 8mm under the working load. These observations were not in comparison with the PDA test results, particularly in the case of quality of pile tip. Therefore, PDA tests were discontinued. However, driving the piles using high energy drop hammer was resorted for identifying the piles with bad tip conditions and also for driving it further to achieve adequate seating of piles with relatively large displacement during initial blows. Except for 5% piles, the piles could be driven to a hard set with maximum movement of 10 to 12mm. Piles with more set: The 5% piles with more set had to be underrated from its safe capacity and some piles were to be rejected altogether because of continued displacement. About 1% of the total piles were rejected and new piles were driven to compensate the deficiency. 6.1.7 Conclusions
Concreting the piles up to about 3.0m above the cut-off level and filling the remaining length up to working level using sand did not work against necking of concrete within soft clay potion. This was identified to be attributed to arching of sand within the casing pipe completely relieving the intended load over the green concrete. However, in this particular case, the cut-off level was very close or below the portion affected by necking. Foundation consultants had to learn this lesson. The piling agency failed to comply with the requirement of minimum length of concrete column within the casing for countering the excess pore pressure developed during driving. This resulted bad concrete at the tip of a significant number of piles The piling agency also failed to take ground level measurements at each pile location and instead resorted to approximate measurements leading to misjudgment of reinforcement lengths. This resulted difficulty in identifying piles with real problem of reinforcement cage lifting. Placing un-welded laps on main bars towards the tip of the reinforcement cage had the risk of slipping at the lap by self weight of remaining cage above the lap. These lapses resulted huge investment on rectification measures like re-driving of all the piles and, underrating of few piles and rejecting some piles apart from heavy loss of time. 6.2 6.2.1 The Case of Settling Bungalows The Problem
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A vast residential project site was developed from a lowland by filling good quality murrum (residual gravely soil) and then by preloading, supplemented with band drains for increased rate of consolidation settlement. The effect of preloading was confirmed by time-settlement measurements using plate settlement markers. The observed settlements were 780mm to 850mm, close to 90% of the total estimated settlement of 900 to 950mm. The time settlement curves also suggested 90 % consolidation under the prescribed pre-loading period of 60 days. Construction of two bungalows was taken up immediately and a systematic measurement of settlement under every stage of construction was carried out. Two bungalows were then constructed and a detailed monitoring of the settlement was made. One bungalow settled by about 145mm and the other one settled by 80mm, whereas the expected settlement of the structure after ground improvement was less than 40mm. Fortunately, the settlements were uniform because continuous RCC strip footing foundation was provided for these buildings, whereas the initial design was based on RR masonry strip footing. Even though the structure did not experience any distress because of uniform settlement, the excessive settlement far beyond the expected settlement, was considered as a failure in the design of ground improvement programme. 6.2.2 Distress and Owners Worry
Even though the settlements were uniform, there were apprehensions about settlements larger than acceptable limits. The differential settlements at every stage were negligible because of fairly uniform construction schedule adopted for these two buildings. The foundation consultant and the ground improvement agency were called upon to explain the large settlements irrespective of the commitment that the settlement of finished structure not to exceed 40mm. 6.2.3 The Soil Profile
The detailed investigation prior to the foundation design revealed presence of 1.20m thick residual soil fill followed by soft to very soft marine clay of 4.50m to 7.00m thick below which relatively stiff residual clay existed. Weathered rock stratum followed. Compressibility of plastic clay was high and long term settlement due to consolidation of these layers under the weight of existing fill and another 0.80m fill proposed was estimated. Shallow foundations resting in the fill and deep foundation resting in weathered rock suffered doubts of long term performance. The distress in infrastructure like roads, sewage lines, water pipe lines, etc. were anticipated and ground improvement using pre-loading was considered more appropriate. 6.2.4 Original Design
The amount of preload was decided based on a pre-determined finished ground level of 0.80m above the existing ground level. There already existed an original fill of 1.20m thick that has not undergone adequate compaction. A fill of about 3.80m above the existing level imposing a load of about 7.0 t/m2 was the recommended pre-load as the average load intensity from the proposed construction including the weight of the 0.80m fill required to reach the finished ground level was close to 6.2 t/m2 (roughly 90% of the pre-load). Vertical band rains at an interval of 0.90m were introduced for the depth of soft clay for accelerating the consolidation process. It was expected that about 2.20m thick preload fill (equal to a load of 4.2 t/mm2) could be shifted to other locations
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leaving the FGL as required. Figure 15 illustrates the preload fill and the expected settlement under the preload. Figure 16 illustrates the design principle of pre-load for ground improvement.
Area for building Other areas Preload for removal Finished ground level
Original ground level Soft clay compressed by 400 to 500mm under pre-load
Soft clay compressed by 800 to 1000mm under pre-load Pre-consolidation improved by 2.5 t/m2
6.2.5
The owner and architect meanwhile decided to raise the ground level by another 0.80m for better appearance and also to avoid any possibility of flooding of the premises. But this was informed to the consultant and the ground improvement agency only after the removal of the preload and the strat of foundation excavation.. The consultant advised further pre-loading to compensate the deficiency arose because of revision in the finished ground level. However, the owner decided to compact the soil at founding level and carried out plate load test on the compacted soil. Satisfied with the small settlements measured in the plate load test, the owner proceeded without further pre-loading.
PRESENT LOADING
SETTLEMENT
PLASTIC YIELD
The plate load test using a 450mm x 450mm plate naturally showed less settlement since the test was done on the compacted fill. Based on the results the construction proceeded, but after agreeing to provide continuous strip raft as foundation (Figure 17).
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The construction of both the buildings was fairly uniform and took about 6 months. Regular measurements of settlement at different corners of the buildings were made. The band drains functioned very effectively during the construction and the settlements were very rapid. The settlements measured after completing the construction were 145mm and 80mm for the two buildings. The Figure 18 illustrates the settlement of one villa. Settlement stabilised within fifteen days from the completion of the construction. Uniform construction schedule helped in resulting a uniform settlement without any significant differential settlement. 6.2.7 Analysis
SETTLEMENT VILLA # 42
NO OF DAYS
0 0 20 40 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
CUM SETTLEMENT MM
REAR FRONT
Very careful study of the load settlement curves will show that the rate of settlement significantly increased after 20 to 30mm settlement suggesting the major settlement is resulting form virgin compression and not from re-compression expected from pre-loaded soil. This means that there is a deficiency in the pre-load intensity. In this case, the pre-load fill that could be removed after the preloading period was limited to 1.40m because of the upward revision of finished ground level. Thus the effective preloading suffered a deficiency of about 1.5 t/m2 equal to 0.80m thick fill (Figure19) that caused this additional virgin compression. However, it is very clear from the settlement observation in the front and rear of the building, the settlements were very uniform. The main reason for such uniform settlement was very uniform vertical progress of the construction possible for a load bearing wall construction. The initial design was to have independent footings with RCC frame and infill walls that would have resulted very non-uniform construction pattern. Having the vertical drains in position, the settlements could have been very fast (also as seen from the time settlement curve in Figure 18) resulting large differential settlements. Another reason for such uniform settlement is that the inverted T RCC strip footing with much higher stiffness contributed to a more uniform load distribution. A detailed settlement analysis revealed that the probable settlement due to this extra loading is 80 to 105mm. More settlement for one villa could have been the
EXTRA LOAD FROM THE REVISED FGL
SETTLEMENT EXPECTED
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ACTUAL SETTLEMENT
result of compression of initial portion of the preload fill that remained below the founding level. 6.2.8 Further Constructions
However, such large settlements could not be allowed because of the fact that the RCC strip raft foundation was relatively expensive and a uniform construction pattern could not be enforced in the case of RCC frame construction. Even though the owner decided not to listen to the arguments, adopted required additional pre-loading for the remaining sections of the project. The settlements observed during preloading increased to 900 to 1000mm and the completed bungalows recorded settlements less than 30mm. 6.2.9 Conclusions
Ground improvement programmes like pre-loading with settlement accelerators require good planning with respect to site development. All the possible changes in the development programme shall be thoroughly investigated and the improvement shall take care of the worst case. Coordination between the foundation consultant, the architect, the structural engineer and the owner is a must in such programmes. A thorough and systematic monitoring of improvement in terms of settlements versus the load and time is needed. Adoption of expensive RCC strip raft foundation for the area with under-improvement helped in preventing large distress in the structure. However, adoption of similar measures for all the villas could have affected the economy of the project. 6.3 6.3.1 The Case of Rotating Abutment Pier Problem
Two abutment piers and three intermediate piers for a rail over bridge was constructed on shallow footings placed at about 2.60m below the natural ground level. The construction was planned without hindering the rail traffic and hence launching of main girders through rails supported on approach embankments was in the offing. The general layout of the piers and the embankment is shown in Figure 20.
Failed pier
Embankment fill
Embankment fill
Piers
The embankment construction progressed from both the sides and when the embankment near one of the abutment piers reached almost maximum height, the embankment fill failed. The top of the abutment pier moved towards the embankment fill while the embankment cross section close to the pier slipped by more than 1.50m (Figure 21). The embankment fill did not reach the abutment rear face when failure occurred. 6.3.2 The Distress
Fill sandy clay, cu = 0.35 kg/cm2 Fill clayey sand, = 28 Sandy clay, cu = 0.70 kg/cm2 Sandy clay, cu = 0.30kg/cm2 sandy clay, cu = 0.28 kg/cm2 Soft clay, cu = 0.21 kg/cm2 Sandy clay, cu = 0.65 kg/cm2
It was a clear case of base failure of almost vertical embankment section facing the abutment pier, without a support by the pier. A wedge shaped gap was provided between the abutment pier and the embankment for the provision of conventional filter layer. Rotation of the abutment pier about its base and towards the embankment clearly suggested the involvement of soil beneath the pier foundation in the embankment base failure. The major distress was failure of the abutment foundation because of its rotation. 6.3.3 The Investigation
A possible slip circle was constructed based on the shape and position of the slip line. The slip circle passed very close to the abutment pier foundation and the diameter of the slip circle was roughly estimated as 36 metres. The design of pier foundation was done on the basis of net safe bearing capacity equal to 18 t/m2 arrived at on the assumption that stiff sandy clay with good shear strength present 2.60m below the ground level is continuing towards depth. Further investigation through four exploratory boreholes and five dynamic cone penetration tests revealed presence of soft clay and soft sandy clay with undrained shear strength in the range of 0.20kg/cm2 to 0.28 kg/cm2 between 3.0m and 8.0m below the ground level. The thickness of relatively good bearing stratum between the founding level and the weak layer was less than 0.50m. The soil profile and the failure imagined are illustrated in Figure 20. The detailed geotechnical investigation data from one borehole is presented in Figure 21.
Depth below GL (metres) Soil Profile SPT / VST
Test Depth m
Field Description
Blow Counts
15 30 45 60
N**
0.5
Greyish dry sandy clay Brownish grey soft clay with sand pockets Light grey soft clay with fine sand 0.75 2 1 0 0
2
1.0
1.5
2.0
0 0
2
3.0
3.00 Sunk @63.5kg Greyish soft sandy clay/clayey sand 3.75 Su=0.24kg/cm
4.0
0 0 0 0
5.0
5.1
19
Dark grey soft clay
6.0
6.2
6.25 Su=0.38kg/cm
Figure 22 Soil profile 15m away form the failed pier foundation
6.3.4
The Analysis
Standard slip circle analysis resulted a minimum factor of safety of 1.29 based on the soil data revealed from the investigation. Relatively high shear strength of 0.70kg/cm2 for the sandy clay available up to 3.0m from original ground level is providing considerable resistance to failure. This called for a re-look into the back analysis. It was then observed that the possible slip circle passed through the interface between the backfill of pier foundation excavation and the original stiff sandy clay. The large excavation made for the construction of the abutment pier left a weak zone having very poor backfill in place of the stiff clay. A slip circle analysis was then carried out assuming only about one sixth of the shear strength of the stiff sandy clay along the foundation excavation line, and a factor of safety 0.83 was obtained. The soil layers below the abutment foundation have very high compressibility and any load over the abutment pier beyond the self weight of the pier should have resulted excessive settlement and a bearing capacity failure.
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6.3.5
Conclusions
The foundation provided for the abutment pier was inadequate in view of soft clay layers immediately below the founding level. Very large load from 8.0m high embankment triggered the failure. Major load over the abutment pier from the main girders, road formation and the road traffic was due. Even if the failure of abutment was not happened during the embankment construction, a major failure when the abutment was loaded fully was sure to happen. Changes in the shear strength parameters because of possible construction activities like foundation excavation and backfilling of such excavations are very relevant in similar cases. This case illustrates clear failure from the part of the designer and the owner who went ahead with the design and construction without ascertaining the soil conditions below the embankment and the piers. REFERENCES Allen Marr, W. Ramos J.A, Lambe T.W. (1982), Criteria for Settlement of Tanks, Journal of the Geotechnical Engineering Division, Proc. ASCE, Vol 108, No: GT8, Aug 1982, 1017-1039 Anirudhan I.V. (1997), Driven cast-in-situ piles Execution and performance, Proc. Indian Geotechnical Conference, IGC 1997, Vadodara, pp 233-236 Anirudhan I.V. (2005), Types of distress in Geotechnical Structures, Proc. Indian Geotechnical Conference IGC 2005, Ahmadabad, pp 165-168 Boone S.J. (2001), Assessing Construction and Settlement-induced Building Damage: A Return to Fundamental Principles, Proceedings Underground Constructions, Institution of Mining and Metallurgy, London, 559-570 Boscardin M.D. & Cording E.J. (1989), Building Response to Excavation Induced Settlement, Journal of Geotechnical Engineering, ASCE, 115(1), pp1-21 Burland J.B. (1997), Assessment of Risk of Damage to Buildings due to Tunnelling and Excavation, Earthquake Geotechnical Engineering, Ishihara (ed), Balkema, Rotterdam, 1189-1201 Burland J.B. Wroth C.P. (1974), Settlement of Buildings and Associated Damages, State of Art Report, Proc. Conference of Settlement of Structures, Cambridge pp 611-654 Burland J.B., Broms B.B, DE Mello V.F.B. (1977), Behaviour of Foundations and Structures, State of Art Report, Proc. 9th ICSMFE, Tokyo, Vol 2 495-546 Madhav M.R.(2003), Modelling Methods in Geotechnical Forensic engineering, Proc. of a Workshop by Committee on Professional Practice of Indian Geotechnical Society, Chennai, Feb28 March 1, 2003, pp 75-81 Mair R.J. (2001), Research on Tunnelling Induced Ground Movements and Their Effects on Buildings Lessons from the Jubilee Line Extension, Proc of the Intnl Conference on Response of Buildings to Excavation Induced Ground Movements, Imperial College, London, UK, July 17-18, pp 3-26 Poulos H.G. (2003), Framework for Forensic Foundation Engineering, Proc. of Workshop on Forensic Geotechnical Engineering, Committee on Professional Practice of IGS, Feb 28-Mar 1, 2003, pp 7-13
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Radhakrishnan R and Anirudhan I.V. (2003), Ground improvement with pre-fabricated V drains and pre-load A case study, Proc. Symposium on Advances in Geotechnical Engineering, SAGE 2003, IIT Kanpur, pp 426-430 Ramanatha Ayyar T.S. & Jaya V (2003), Geotechnical Aspects of Mass Collapse of Shallow Wells in Kerala During 2001, Proc. of workshop on Forensic Geotechnical Engineering, Committee on Professional Practice of IGS, Feb 28-Mar 1, 2003, pp 33-36 Ramaswamy, S.V. and Narasimhan, S.L. (1978), Behaviour of Buildings on Expansive Soils Some Case Histories, Jnl. Institution of Engineers (India), Vol. 58, Pt. CI 4, pp 141 46.
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Peter Day Jones & Wagener Consulting Engineers, Rivonia, South Africa, 2128 day@jaws.co.za
ABSTRACT: This paper describes the initial stage of a forensic geotechnical investigation, namely the gathering of data on the site, the works and the failure for further detailed analysis. It has been written as part of the effort by the ISSMGE Technical Committee TC40 to prepare a handbook on forensic geotechnical engineering. The paper provides guidance to the investigator on the objectives of the investigation, the nature of the data required, sources of information to be considered and the recording and storage of data. 1. BACKGROUND Forensic geotechnical engineering deals with the investigation of failures of geotechnical origin, not only from a technical viewpoint but also with the possibility of legal proceedings in mind (Rao, 2005). Forensic investigations differ from conventional geotechnical investigations in that they are retrospective. They seek to explain what has happened rather than to predict future performance. A further distinguishing factor is that, following a failure, there is an urgency to clean up the site and rebuild or repair the works. This limits the time available for investigation and makes it essential that all relevant data is recorded before the evidence is removed. The ideal outcome of the data collection stage of a forensic investigation would be to have a body of information that is (a) as complete as reasonable possible, (b) accepted by all parties as an accurate record of the facts and events and (c) is stored in an accessible and readily understood way. This paper describes procedures aimed at achieving this outcome. 2. SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION Although some geotechnical failures such as landslides occur in the absence of any human intervention, most geotechnical failures involve both the ground (soil, rock and groundwater) and the works (some man made structure or intervention). The works may be a structure that imposes loads on the ground, the alteration of the surface geometry (cuts or fills), alteration of drainage patterns or the creation of underground openings. Thus, the forensic geotechnical investigation must include a study of the event or failure which gave rise to the investigation, the site on which the failure occurred and the nature of the works. Only after these three aspects have been investigated and recorded can post-failure diagnostic testing and back-analyses commence.
2.1 The Failure In any forensic investigation, it is essential that the circumstances and events surrounding the failure are investigated and recorded as soon as possible, before any evidence is removed. Details of this stage of the investigation will vary from case to case. Nevertheless, there are common aspects that apply to all failure investigations. These include the conditions that prevailed immediately prior to the failure, the sequence of events, and the condition of the works and surrounding areas following the failure. 2.1.1 Circumstances prior to failure Before one can establish the cause of the failure, it is essential to investigate and record the condition of the works immediately prior to the failure. Typical factors to be recorded include: the stage of completion of the works at the time (see sub-section 2.3.3 below), the occurrence of accidental actions (impact, explosion, earthquake, flooding or water leakage, etc) or abnormal loading, abnormal meteorological conditions (wind, snow, rainfall, temperature, etc), the results of any monitoring (pore pressures, deformations, settlements, anchor loads, etc), and any early warnings of incipient failure (cracking of ground or structure, falls of ground, changes in anchor loads, etc). 2.1.2 Sequence of events Obtaining an accurate record of the sequence of events that lead to the failure will assist greatly in determining the failure mechanism and, in many cases identifying the trigger. The information to be recorded will vary from site to site. However, an attempt should be made to obtain as much information as possible from the time when the first signs of distress were noted. An attempt should be made to draw up a time line from which the sequence of events and the speed of progression can be ascertained. 2.1.3 Resulting distress The two sub-sections above deal with the before and during situations. This sub-section deals with the after or post-failure state of the works and surrounding areas. An accurate description of the distress caused by the failure may be pivotal in determining the value of any claim for compensation or damages which may follow. Unlike the before and during situations which must be investigated by reference to historical records, the after situation can be directly observed, photographed and recorded. Note that the recording of the condition of the works after the occurrence as described in this paper is distinct from the detailed diagnostic tests that may be required to provide parameters for back-analysis of the failure. the extent and severity of distress, Typical information to be recorded may include: