Morality in Locke

Natural Law, Theology, and Morality in Locke
Author(s): Steven Forde

Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Apr., 2001), pp. 396-409
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2669348 .
Accessed: 05/05/2014 09:14
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
.
Midwest Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
American Journal of Political Science.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 147.91.1.44 on Mon, 5 May 2014 09:14:48 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Natural Law, Theology, and Morality in Locke
Steven Forde University of North Texas
Liberal theorists have always been
confronted with the criticism that
liberalism lacks a moral foundation
adequate to the needs of society. I
undertake a reading of Locke that
agrees with those scholars who have
found greater moral resources in his
philosophy than has sometimes been
allowed. Drawing primarily on the
Essay Concerning Human Under-
standing, the Two Treatises of Gov-
ernment, Some Thoughts Concerning
Education, and The Reasonableness
of Christianity, I find a Lockean basis
for morality that transcends narrow or
mundane self-interest. This morality
however depends on a controversial
and unfinished natural theology. This,
I argue, led Locke to elaborate a
practical teaching that was as inde-
pendent as possible of theology. The
result is a bifurcated legacy: Locke
bequeathes us a philosophy with
moral depth, but a political teaching
vulnerable to the criticism of moral
deficiency.
iberalism has always had to contend with the criticism that it lacks a
sufficient moral foundation. Its notion of a social contract moti-
vated by self-preservation and comfort seems to deny the need for
any moral concern for others, which its individualist psychology poorly
supports in any case. Yet critics question whether society can dispense with
such moral concern altogether. Even before Rousseau launched his famous
assault, Locke and the other pioneers of liberalism were fending off attacks
from often religiously motivated critics of their new politics and morality.
Locke himself denies that his philosophy relies only on narrow, mundane
self-interest, and indeed claims other-wordly support for it. In accordance
with this, some interpreters today find a Locke who is morally more
substantial than his critics have alleged, a "perfectionist" Locke whose
theory provides moral resources overlooked by those critics.1 In view of
modern society's reliance on the liberal philosophy, and the moral failings
sometimes traced to this reliance, we would do well to explore Locke's un-
derstanding of these matters, especially his claim to have included other-re-
garding virtues in his liberalism. It matters to us what the moral founda-
tions of our liberalism are, whether they are the cause or the possible cure
of society's ills.
In a peculiar sense, they might be both. The following reading of Locke
will suggest that philosophically, he provided for a social morality more ro-
bust than his critics have perceived, more robust than Hobbes's for example,
but that his practical teaching leaves that morality to some degree unsup-
ported. Locke's moral philosophy, while not abandoning the distinctively
liberal grounding in self-interest, acknowledges that even liberal morality
will occasionally encroach on the individual's self-interest in this life. This
required Locke to have recourse to a theology of otherworldly rewards and
punishments. He never provided a full account of this theology however,
and doubted the effectiveness of any novel theological teaching in any case.
This problem, I suggest, led Locke in his more practical works to provide a
teaching that rooted itself as much as possible in mundane self-interest,
Steven Forde is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of North Texas,
Denton, TX 76203-5340 (forde@unt.edu).
I would like to thank Professors Thomas Pangle and Thomas West for comments on an
earlier version. Work on this essay was supported by the National Endowment for the
Humanities.
'A good recent review of these controversies may be found in Myers 1998, chapter 1.
Liberalism may be considered "perfectionist" if it rests upon distinctive virtues, viewed
as human perfections. Myers finds a "perfectionist" Locke and places such authors as
William Galston, Joseph Raz, and Stephen Salkever in the attendant camp of liberalism.
In the "neutralist" camp he places John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Bruce Ackerman, and
others. See also Nathan Tarcov's account of the "non-Lockean Locke" (Tarcov, 1983).
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 2, April 2001, Pp. 396-409
?2001 by the Midwest Political Science Association
396
NATURAL LAW, THEOLOGY, AND MORALITY IN LOCKE 397
delving into theology only so far as necessary to correct
the most harmful errors of his contemporaries. In a sense
therefore, Locke bequeathed to us two linked but distinct
moral teachings. The full teaching is found most clearly in
the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, while the
more practical one is most associated with the Second
Treatise of Government. Since the practical works, and the
Second Treatise in particular, account for most of Locke's
influence today, it is a truncated Locke to some extent who
stands behind our liberalism.
In order to get a more complete view of Locke, and
to see how he might supplement the relatively thin mo-
rality he is usually associated with, it is necessary to con-
sult a wider array of his writings than is often done. We
must begin with a review of the theoretical underpin-
nings of Locke's morality, including his reliance on theol-
ogy, as found primarily in the Essay. We will then look at
some of his principal practical works, the Second Treatise,
Some Thoughts Concerning Education, and The Reason-
ableness of Christianity. We will compare the moral teach-
ings of these works to Locke's full or philosophical moral
teaching and evaluate the discrepancies in the light of his
practical or rhetorical purpose in these works.
Difficulties of the Natural Law
We first need to confront some basic questions concern-
ing the foundation of Locke's moral philosophy, ques-
tions raised by apparent gaps in Locke's presentation of
that philosophy. Morality, Locke says repeatedly, is
grounded in "natural law." This law is the law of reason,
or is reason itself (First Treatise, ?101; Second Treatise,
??6, 11, 181). It is not innate, either in the form of "right
reason" or a set of moral principles somehow stamped
on our nature.2 Instead, it is a deduction from certain
first principles. Locke insists that a "demonstrative mo-
rality" is possible on the model of mathematics (Essay
111.11.16, IV.3.18, IV.4.7). Unfortunately, he never pro-
duced this demonstration. He never even produced a sys-
tematic list of the provisions of natural law, as Hobbes
for example had done, though many individual princi-
ples are said by him to belong to the natural law (Strauss
1953, 202; Yolton 1958, 487-488; 1970, 172, 176-177).
Despite the prodding of friends and critics alike, Locke
never filled these gaps in his writing (Ashcraft 1969, 219;
Grant, 1987, 26n; Dunn 1984, 65; Horwitz 1990, 22-28;
Locke 1976,4:767-768, 786-787).
Moreover, Locke's writings are ambivalent on the
question whether demonstrative morality is easy and
widely accessible or plagued with difficulties. He main-
tains in places that the natural law is easily discerned, as
doubtless it must be if all are to be held to it. Near the
beginning of the Second Treatise he states that even in the
state of nature, reason "teaches all Mankind, who will but
consult it" the fundamental precepts of the natural law
(??5, 6; cf. ?12). Tantalizingly, he suggests these precepts
derive from the simple principle of equality, without
however saying exactly how. Later, we learn that the
"greater part" of mankind fails to observe natural law in
the state of nature, due partly to lack of adequate "study"
(?? 123, 124). Nor is human imbecility in this regard lim-
ited to the pre-civil state. In other contexts, Locke em-
phasizes the near-universal failure of human beings to
discover the correct moral code, even in the bosom of so-
ciety. Many are the nations who have lived in complete
ignorance of the true natural law (Questions, 111; cf. 147,
217; Essay 1.3.9). Even the ancient philosophers who de-
voted their lives to the task failed according to Locke to
discover this rule in its entirety (RC, 143, 149). He once
goes so far as to describe the natural law as "hidden and
unperceived" (Questions, 111; cf. 147, 217; Essay 1.3.17;
11.28.11).
Much of the difficulty can be traced to the relation-
ship between the law of nature and theology. Locke al-
ways insisted that any law required a legislating and en-
forcing will to be a law, to be binding (Questions, 101,
103, 159, 193; Essay 1.3.12, 11.28.5-6; cf. Second Treatise
??7-8, 136). In the case of natural law, this can only be
God: Locke's natural law is a species of divine law (cf. Es-
say 11.28.7-8). When Locke says that nations and phi-
losophers failed to discover the "true foundations" of
morality, he means their failure to find the correct theo-
logical underpinnings (Essay, 1.3.6; cf. RC, 139-140,144).
It might be that some parts of the true moral demonstra-
tion are easy, but the elaboration of these underpinnings
is difficult. In any event, for natural law to be natural
rather than revealed, unassisted reason would have to be
able to establish these underpinnings, the existence of the
providential God it postulates. Despite numerous appar-
ent claims that such a proof is possible and even easy,3
2Questions Concerning the Law of Nature, Questions I, IV; Essay
Concerning Human Understanding 1.3. 11.4.22; cf. IV.20.6. Hence-
forth these works will be cited as Questions and Essay, respectively.
The Reasonableness of Christianity will be cited as RC, Some
Thoughts Concerning Education as Thoughts, and Conduct of the
Understanding as Conduct.
3See, e.g., Essay 1.4.17, IV.3.21, IV.10, 11.17.17; Questions, questions
II, V. It is ambiguous in most if not all of these passages whether
the easy and natural proof Locke speaks of establishes the existence
of the providential and enforcing God required by morality (cf.
Dunn 1984, 84). This of course would be more difficult than prov-
ing the mere existence of a deity.
398 STEVEN FORDE
Locke never produced one, and may in fact not have
thought it fully possible.4 Yet this would seem to lead to
the conclusion that "there is no law of nature according
to Locke" (Rabieh 1991, 951; cf. Strauss 1953, 204, 220).
This state of affairs is doubly puzzling since Locke
could have avoided it in several ways. Most simply, he
could have subscribed to any of several possible "proofs"
of a legislating, enforcing God. Locke alludes to such
proofs in his published and unpublished writings, but
endorses none of them.5 We must assume he found them
defective. He might then have stipulated that natural law
does not require a legislating will, or a divine enforcer, to
be law. This was the view taken by Hugo Grotius, a
wholly respectable authority on natural law in Locke's
day. The fact that Locke follows Pufendorf rather than
Grotius in this matter, despite the difficulties it caused his
theory, is a compelling sign that this was his sincere per-
suasion.6 Finally, Locke could have abandoned natural
law altogether in favor of some other foundation for mo-
rality. Perceptive and forceful arguments have been made
that Locke did precisely this, professing allegiance to
natural law while covertly replacing it with natural right,
in the manner of Hobbes (Strauss 1953, 212-214, 227-
229; 1959, 201-206; Zuckert 1994, 237-240, 274; Rabieh
1991). It is undeniable that Locke proceeds by this kind
of misdirection in other matters, especially matters
touching on religion.7 But he seems to foreclose the pos-
sibility of grounding morality in this type of right rather
than natural law when he insists, as he does repeatedly,
that not only "natural law," but "duty," "virtue," indeed
"morality" tout court depend upon divine legislation and
enforcement.8 As we shall see, Locke is compelled to take
this position by the premises of his moral philosophy.
Theology and the Foundations of Morality
The Essay Concerning Human Understanding, which con-
tains Locke's most thorough treatment of moral theory,
also contains some of his most emphatic statements that
morality per se depends upon divine legislation and
enforcement: "what duty is, cannot be understood with-
out a law; nor a law be known, or supposed, without a
lawmaker, or without reward and punishment" (1.3.12; cf.
Questions, 101, 103). Distinguishing himself specifically
from Hobbes and from the classical philosophers, he says
that "the true ground of morality" can only be "the will
and law of a God, who sees men in the dark, has in his
hand rewards and punishments, and power enough to call
to account the proudest offender" (1.3.6; cf. RC, 139-140,
144). These rewards and punishments moreover must
consist of "some good and evil that is not the natural
product and consequence of the action itself" (11.28.6).
The enforcer must be an active and providential agent.
These are not idle statements. Reward and punish-
ment are made indispensable to morality by Locke's view
of human or rational nature and his awareness of the in-
evitable conflict between morality and individual inter-
est. The sole motive not only of a human being, but of
any rational creature, he asserts, is its own happiness
(11.21.43, 52, 62; 11.27.17-18, 26; cf. RC 149). This happi-
ness is reducible to pleasure, which men pursue in differ-
ent ways (11.21.41, 54-56, 62). Good and evil are but
names for what brings pleasure and pain, which has led
men to shape morality, variably, in accordance with their
views of happiness (11.20.2; 1.3.6). True moral good and
evil on the other hand require both divine legislation and
4Strauss 1953, 207; 1959, 202-203, 206; Dunn 1984, 30, 84-85;
Grant 1987, 25-26; Pangle 1988, 201; Horwitz 1990, 26. See also
RC, 139.
5Locke outlines a providential natural theology based on God's
role as father in his journal for 15 July 1678 (passage transcribed in
von Leyden 1956, 35). See also RC 133, 149 (but, cf. 139); Essay
IV.3.18, IV.13.3. Locke would have been aware of Cicero's lengthy
discourse on natural theology in De Natura Deorum, as well as
Montaigne's commentary on the natural theology of Raimond de
Sebonde (Apologie de Raimond Sebond, Essais 11.12). It is worth
mentioning as well that Locke could have professed to adopt one of
these proofs, while indicating that the true basis of his moral
theory lay elsewhere.
For Locke's admission that he never provided an adequate
proof himself, see his letter to William Molyneux of January 19,
1694 (Locke 1976-, vol. 4, 784-787; cf. 767-768). He tended to be
evasive when asked why he did not complete this part of his natu-
ral theology. Others who find the arguments Locke offers for God's
existence or providence less than satisfactory include Lenz 1956,
118; Ashcraft 1969, 203-206, 214; Dunn 1969, 194; Pangle 1988,
198-201. See also the passages cited in notes 3 and 4. Dunn (1984,
84) argues that Locke originally thought the development of an
adequate natural theology to be easier than it proved. This may be
true, though it is in his early Questions Concerning the Law of Na-
ture that Locke describes the law of nature as "hidden and unper-
ceived" (111). See also Horwitz (1990,26-27).
6Grotius [1625] 1925 Prolegomena 13; Pufendorf [1673] 1991
1.2.2, 6, 7; 1.3.10. Cf. Olivecrona 1974, 211. Locke's statement in A
Letter Concerning Toleration that "The taking away of God, tho but
even in thought, dissolves all," seems to be a direct rebuttal of
Grotius' statement to the contrary (Locke, [1689a] 1983, 51).
7Locke makes himself appear to be more orthodox than he is on
matters like the Fall and the basis for salvation (Dunn 1969, 23,
193; Myers 1998, 187-188). He also conceals his kinship with
Hobbes on matters like the state of nature. Some of these cases will
be discussed below.
8
See Questions, 95 (including the formulation of the first question
itself), 101; Essay 1.3.6, 12, 18; 11.28.5-6; IV.10.7; Thoughts, ? 61.
This is not to deny that Locke turns natural law on its head by
rooting it in a form of right. For partially contrasting views, see
Strauss 1953, 228, and Zuckert 1994, 272-275.
enforcement, to align happiness with a proper law
(11.28.5-6, 8). Since hedonism is inseparable from ratio-
nality, the moral law will have to take account of it, in-
deed build on it: "it would be utterly in vain to suppose a
rule set to the free actions of man, without annexing to it
some enforcement of good and evil to determine his
will" (11.28.6). Morality, like obedience to any other law
or rule, cannot reasonably be expected of men, unless
they each gain individually by it.
It is sometimes alleged that by tying morality so
closely to enforcement, Locke confuses obligation and
motivation, but this is simply a consequence of his hedo-
nistic moral psychology.9 Not every act that man is moti-
vated to is moral, obviously, but morality cannot justly
be demanded of him unless an appropriate motive is
supplied. This is why divine providence is necessary: the
gains from violating morality can easily outweigh the ad-
vantages of obeying it, in this world. Only a providential
enforcement whose rewards and punishments specifi-
cally outweigh the gains of immorality can bring the
individual's pleasure and pain fully into line with moral
action (1.3.13; 11.21.70; 11.28.8; cf. Tarcov 1984, 101;
Pangle 1988, 191). Curiously, it appears that the more ra-
tional a man is, the more providence becomes necessary
to support his morality. Most human beings, Locke re-
minds us, follow custom and habit more than reason in
their thoughts and actions (1.3.24-25; 11.28.12; IV.16.4;
cf. Questions, 127, 135; Conduct, 381). If they are moral, it
is likely for this reason. But those who think for them-
selves, who understand the true principles of rational ac-
tion, need instead a reason for behaving morally. Provi-
dence is the only reason offered to such individuals by
Locke's philosophy.
To be sure, the morality Locke proposes, liberal mo-
rality, is less demanding than its predecessors, and, as we
shall see, this fact is pivotal to his practical teaching.
Lockean morality derives from the fundamental prin-
ciple of the preservation and happiness of mankind, un-
derstood in the hedonistic way Locke has outlined (1.3.6;
cf. 11.21.47-52; First Treatise ??56, 59, 86; Second Treatise
??6, 7, 135, 182; Thoughts ?116; RC, 147). A morality di-
rected to this end will impinge on the interests of indi-
viduals much less than other, more austere moral codes.
But Locke does not imagine that its demands can always
be reconciled with personal happiness or self-interest in
this life (cf. RC pp. 148-149; Tarcov 1984, 149; Pangle
1988, 191, 211). That reconciliation can only take place
in another.
Thus does Locke anticipate the argument that even a
liberal order cannot be viable without a religiously
grounded morality. But it is necessary to mark closely the
type of religion this order requires and the method Locke
uses to discover it. To begin with, God must understand
that moral behavior cannot be reasonably expected of
human beings (or any rational beings) unless he makes it
worth their while in terms of pleasure or happiness
(1.3.13, 11.21.62). Locke's general procedure in theology is
to reason in this way from his own considered views of
morality to conclusions concerning divine will. Nor is
this an abusive form of moral reasoning. Locke's syllogis-
tic or demonstrative morality would take precisely this
approach, beginning from ideas grounded in perception
(v. Grant 1987, 38; Myers 1998, 49). Thus, since punish-
ing others for Adam's sin is incompatible with justice,
Locke knows that God does not do so (First Treatise
??46-47; RC, pp. 6-8; cf. Dunn 1969, 22, 192). Similarly,
the curse put upon Eve is something she and her daugh-
ters are perfectly free to evade, if they can, in the name of
happiness (First Treatise ?47). Locke sides with reason
against scripture concerning man's natural right to use
the animals for food, a right derived logically from pres-
ervation (Second Treatise ?25; contrast First Treatise ?86
with ?39 and with Genesis 1:29 and 9:3). As he writes in
the Essay, "Reason is natural revelation," and must be
used to "regulate" our assent to alleged supernatural
revelations (IV.19.4, 14). Speaking specifically of reli-
gious matters, he says "Reason must be our last judge and
guide in every thing" (IV. 17.24; cf. First Treatise ?86). In
fine, "natural religion" is to be preferred to revelation
(111.9.23).
Locke uses his fundamental principle of natural law,
that the preservation and happiness of mankind are to be
served as much as possible, to sift revelation, accepting
some of its precepts and rejecting others. He interprets the
Biblical injunction "be fruitful and multiply" as a simple
statement of this principle. Whether or not it was actually
uttered by God, Locke asserts that it is conveyed to men
via the natural impulse of self-preservation (First Treatise
?86). Thus did God speak to man-"that is, directed him
by his senses and reason"-commanding him to provide
for himself (id.). This command proves to mandate not
only Locke's doctrine of property, but "the improvement
too of the Arts and Sciences, and the conveniences of Life,"
together with such things as a ban on absolute monarchy
(First Treatise ?33; cf. Second Treatise ?4 1). God could not
be so capricious or cruel as to give us irresistible impulses
to preservation, comfort, propagation, and the like, and
then punish us for following them. Rather, such impulses,
together with our natural desire for happiness and the
characteristics of the world in which we have been placed,
9In the Essay, Locke writes "the inclination and tendency of
[men's] nature is an obligation and motive to them" (11.21.52, em-
phasis added). See Dunn 1969, 190; Yolton 1958, 491; Zuckert
1994, 286; Myers 1998, 137.
400
STEVEN FORDE
are our surest indications of the divine plan (First Treatise
?86). Locke silently dismisses the possibility that these
impulses might be the corrupt appurtenances of a fallen
nature, or that our natural condition might be partly the
consequence of Adam's sin.10
Without even having established the existence of a
providential God, we already know a great deal about
what his will or intention must be. What God wills is hu-
man prosperity and happiness; the moral law that he
gives us is directed to that and that alone. God wills pri-
vate property and the respect of that property by others.
He wills rational and industrious accumulation and has
granted the earth (solely) to those who practice it (Se-
cond Treatise ?34). This, rather than any quietism or
purely spiritual perfection, is God's plan for mankind (cf.
Dunn 1969,chapter 18; Ashcraft 1969). The perfection of
our nature is the pursuit of happiness in the most reflec-
tive or rational manner possible (Essay 11.21.47, 51). The
law we are given, Locke says, is but "the direction of a free
and intelligent Agent to his proper Interest, and pre-
scribes no farther than is for the general Good of those
under that Law" (Second Treatise ?57).
But this brings us back to our problem: natural law is
directed to the "general Good" of mankind, which will
often but not always coincide with the "proper Interest"
of the individual. The rational individual is concerned
with his own interest above all (Essay 11.27.17, 18), but
for Locke, the moral perspective is the perspective of the
generality. It is not possible to bring these two fully into
harmony without providence, which is why Locke is
unwilling to relinquish the theological aspects of his
moral theory. The question that has vexed interpreters
from Locke's day to this is, Why did he not provide an
adequate proof of the providential God his theory re-
quires? His writings sketch a fairly robust natural theol-
ogy; all it lacks, pointedly, is this cornerstone. We know
that Locke was aware of this problem, if only because of
the pleas of his friends, but we may never be able to say
for certain why he left it unremedied."1 Perhaps a partial
remedy is to be found in his argument that some things
can be known only probably, which are nonetheless ad-
equate for guiding our conduct (I. 1.4-5; IV. 14; cf. IV.3.6).
Locke is careful to stipulate at a number of points, in
Pascalian fashion, that the prospect of divine rewards
and punishments is enough to determine our actions
even if considered in the mere probability (11.21.44, 70;
IV.14.2). Indeed, upon examination, many of his state-
ments about our knowledge of God, and hence the status
of "demonstrative morality," turn out to be couched in
probabilistic terms (e.g., IV.3.6, 17-18; IV.14.2; IV.17.23).
Whether this is fully compatible with his stronger state-
ments about the solidity of natural theology and demon-
strative morality is an open question.
In any case, it is clear that Locke never modified his
explicit teaching on morality on account of this difficulty
and that that teaching is dependent upon natural theolo-
gy. What is striking as we move from the Essay Concern-
ing Human Understanding to Locke's more practical
works, where moral conduct is discussed in concrete
terms, is how this whole controversy recedes into the
background. These works make some use of natural the-
ology, but typically very little. They rely much more on
other motivations to produce moral action. In light of
the difficulties of natural theology, this should not be
surprising. Locke seeks in his practical works to provide a
foundation for moral action as independent as possible
of the uncertainties that will necessarily surround his
theology. At the same time, Locke is aware that any natu-
ral theology, however solid, could not immediately be-
come the basis for the sweeping reform of politics and
moral culture that he seeks. To tie his practical project
too closely to a novel theology, even a fully perfected one,
would only be to jeopardize its success.
Natural Law and Politics
Despite occasionally prominent mention of the Deity,
the Second Treatise of Government develops an argument
that is almost wholly independent of theology and the
controversies surrounding natural law. It relies not on di-
vine legislation and enforcement, but on mundane inter-
ests and material incentives. It shows eloquently and at
length how the social good is most effectively advanced
by self-interested action, in the acquisition of property,
the defense of individual rights, and the like. In making
this argument, the Second Treatise takes the perspective
of society rather than the individual citizen almost exclu-
sively. This is natural enough, given its focus, but we
should not fail to notice that this perspective also allows
it to elide almost completely the difference between
society's "general Good" and the individual's "proper in-
terest," disguising the need for other-regarding morality
in citizens. To show that selfish action on the whole ad-
vances the social good, as in economics, is not to show
10This is not to say that following any and every appetite amounts
to morality (Essay 1.3.13). On the contrary, the essence of morality
is rational discipline of the appetites (Essay 11.21.57, 62; Thoughts
?33). But morality does consist in finding and pursuing true plea-
sure in this world first. This we can do rationally, without divine
grace being necessary to correct a "fallen nature" (cf. Essay
11.21.47).
1'See the citations and discussion at note 5.
that self-interest has no harmful consequences. Locke
does say at the outset of the Second Treatise that the pur-
suit of individual self-interest must be bounded by the
law of nature, which commands that each strive, "as
much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind" (?6). But
he interprets this duty purely negatively, as a prohibition
of harm: "no one ought to harm another in his Life,
Health, Liberty, or Possessions" (?6). And it is remarka-
ble how far the Second Treatise advances the common
interest without relying on even this minimal duty.12
Property is the paradigmatic case. In the original
state of nature, natural law imposed a limit on accumula-
tion, that of waste: it was a violation of the law to allow
anything to spoil in one's possession (??31, 38, 46, 48).
This restriction was rooted in the general good of man-
kind, inasmuch as waste robs others of their share (??3 1,
37, 46). But Locke emphasizes that it was the interest of
individuals, not their charitableness, that made this rule
effective: no one has an incentive to gather goods that
will rot in their possession (??46, 48, 51). With the inven-
tion of money, even this limit is lifted, and accumulation
without regard to others' shares becomes legitimate
(??36, 50; cf. Fagiani 1983, 169). Locke's well-known ar-
gument is that this limitless accumulation serves the
common good by unleashing the productive power of la-
bor and increasing wealth exponentially (??37, 40-41,
43). The concern with others' shares is obviated by
greater social prosperity, as acquisitiveness serves the
natural law's mandate to "preserve mankind" better than
charity itself. Though Locke had spoken of charity in the
First Treatise,13 it is notoriously absent from his treat-
ment of property in the Second Treatise (Pangle 1988,
chapter 14; Strauss 1953, 248). Traditional charity could
paradoxically interfere with the preservation or comfort
of mankind, since too great an emphasis on charity is
likely to turn into a condemnation of the acquisitive im-
pulse that truly serves the good of mankind. Traditional
charity also fails to distinguish adequately between the
"Industrious and Rational" to whom God gave the earth
and the "Quarrelsom and Contentious," to whom he ap-
parently did not (?34; cf. Fagiani 1983, 168). On both
counts, it would run counter to the divine plan, or to
natural law.
In politics as well, the Second Treatise replaces altru-
ism or beneficence as much as possible with self-interest.
Limited government may be the only government that
properly serves the preservation of mankind and there-
with the natural law (??42, 229; First Treatise, ??33, 41),
but Locke presumes neither a "godlike prince" who will be
wise or generous enough to maintain such a system (Se-
cond Treatise ?42), nor a citizenry who will demand it in
the name of the good of mankind. Free government is se-
cured rather by individuals acting in their own interest
(??208, 230; 17, 23, 111). Individuals will not even rise to
the defense of oppressed fellow-citizens, unless they be-
lieve that oppression augurs ill for themselves (??208,
230). Finally and most notoriously, individuals in the state
of nature will not by and large enforce the law of nature
on others' behalf, although they have that power (??7,
126). This power is rooted explicitly in the "right" each in-
dividual has to preserve mankind; but the only "duty" said
to arise from it is a duty not to harm (??1 1, 13, 16).
Even a negative duty is a duty though, and the moral
minimalism of the Second Treatise should not blind us to
the fact that its natural law does impose limits on indi-
viduals. This is most visible in the well-known differ-
ences between Locke and Hobbes. Hobbes had derived
morality entirely from mundane self-interest. His natural
law bid men to be socially accommodating, to be
"compleasant" to one another, solely for their own good
in this life, which is served by peace.14 Locke requires
greater moral restraint from individuals, partly because
they have greater moral privileges. Lockean individuals
enjoy exclusive property rights even in the state of nature
and hence do not have rights to one another's life or
limb, except perhaps in extremis. There can be "force
without right" in the state of nature, a possibility that
scarcely exists in Hobbes."5 Locke's rights, unlike those of
Hobbes, entail duties on the part of others (Tarcov 1984,
12For much more detailed accounts of this, see Pangle 1988, chap-
ters 16, 17, 20, and Zuckert 1994, chapters 8, 9.
13?42, where charity is apparently limited to cases of starvation on
the one side and the existence of a "surplusage" on the other. We
should also note the context: Locke is arguing that one man can
never use the neediness of another to force him into subjection-
that Adam, even if he had had exclusive dominion of the world,
could not have used it to gain dominion over others, but would
have been bound to give them of his surplus (??41-43). See also
the argument for charity as a duty in extremis in the short essay
labeled "Venditio," dated 1695 (reprinted in Dunn 1968, pp. 84-
87).
'4Hobbes, Leviathan, chapters 14, 15. Hobbes does assert, like
Locke, that the law of nature is law only due to divine legislation
(Leviathan, chapters 15, 21, 26, 31). This however does not appear
to alter the purely mundane nature of the self-interest this law
serves. In the Leviathan, Hobbes introduces natural law, defines its
basis (preservation of a man's "life," that is, existence in this world),
and lists and analyzes the nineteen laws of nature, before mention-
ing divine legislation almost as an afterthought (chapters 14-15).
He also says, in opposition to Locke, that these laws are enforced by
the purely natural consequences their violation brings (chapter 31;
contrast Locke, Essay 11.28.6).
'5Second Treatise ??19, 232. "Force without right" might exist in
Hobbes's state of nature if one individual attacked another without
being motivated by concern for his preservation. Hobbes takes
little cognizance of this possibility, except perhaps through his at-
tack on vainglory (Leviathan,chapters 13-15).
402 STEVEN FORDE
132; Grant 1987, 91; Zuckert 1994, 275). Though these
are purely negative, duties to do no harm, they do entail
restrictions on the pursuit of self-interest (Tarcov 1984,
149; Pangle 1988, 211). The fact that many flaunt these
restraints with impunity does not render them nugatory
as moral rules or prevent Locke from establishing a fun-
damental moral divide between the "Industrious and Ra-
tional" and the "Quarrelsom and Contentious," in the
state of nature itself.16 Those who violate property rights
might well advance their personal interest thereby; the
rule they violate is that which seeks the general good of
mankind. For Locke unlike Hobbes, there is such a thing
as injustice in the state of nature, and its source is the ex-
cessive pursuit of self-interest.
This is why neither the theoretical difficulties of
natural law nor its practical ineffectiveness in the state of
nature and in most societies induce Locke to replace it
with natural right, at least as he understands that term.17
To be sure, the rights of individuals, based on their deep-
est needs and interests, are the basis of his moral sys-
tem-this is what makes his a liberal morality. But it is
Locke's view that rights cannot form a natural basis for
morality without a pre-civil duty on the part of others to
respect them. This is natural law. Its moral focus is the
general good, or the preservation of mankind, the same
perspective Locke takes in advancing his philosophy. Yet
this leaves unsettled the question of individual motiva-
tion, and hence obligation,18 in those cases where the
general and individual good do not coincide. Again:
While it is true that the security of my property depends
on an environment in which rights are respected, I may
still benefit from taking advantage of others' forbearance
in such an environment. It may be a logical contradiction
for an individual to claim property rights without con-
ceding the like to others (as Locke's derivation of natural
law from bare equality in the Second Treatise suggests: ?6;
cf. Strauss 1953, 229; Zuckert 1994, 277-278), but this
will not affect individual motivation or obligation in any
way recognized by Locke's philosophy.
In the end, the Second Treatise of Government does
not fully explain how individuals can rationally be ex-
pected to obey the natural law. Virtue is left to some de-
gree "unendowed" (RC, 150). The problem is minimized
by laying out the broad common ground between public
and private interest, which Locke's liberalism makes
broader by defining the common good as an aggregation
of private interests, and confining natural moral duty to
abstention from harm. This is adequate so long as we are
painting in broad strokes, concentrating on the way in
which a regime of natural law serves the generality. But
limitations of the approach are visible in the argument of
the Second Treatise itself. Locke does not mar his presen-
tation for example by bringing up the nettlesome subject
of military service, an area where public and private in-
terest clash most urgently. This was an issue about which
Hobbes was most forthright (Leviathan, chapter 21).
Similarly, liberty appears in the Second Treatise primarily
as a safeguard of material interests, a "Fence" to preserva-
tion (??17-18, 23). This is a surprisingly crabbed defense
of freedom for one of the founding documents of mod-
ern free government. In other works, Locke places free-
dom in a decidedly nobler light, designating it "a perfec-
tion of our nature" (Essay 2.21.47; cf. 2.21.67; Thoughts
??33, 38, 45, 122; Grant 1987, 90-93, 198; Myers 1998,
163, 168). It is a perfection because true freedom is ratio-
nal freedom, the rational direction of our nature to its
true happiness. Rational freedom presupposes a reflec-
tive awareness of the distinction between true and appar-
ent happiness and a weighing of the respective alter-
natives. In the Second Treatise, this understanding of
freedom is barely visible in Locke's argument for natural
law as self-restraint: freedom is freedom only within the
limits of reason. Those who defy these limits forfeit their
rights and sink to the level of beasts (??8, 10, 11, 163,
172). The language is striking, but equally striking is the
fact that Locke scarcely uses it in the Second Treatise to
argue the nobility of free action or of free government.
He does not explain, as he does in other works, why ra-
tionality is that which makes men human. In the Second
Treatise, rational self-restraint is only abstention from
harm, to avoid receiving harm in return (?6). Rationality
is simply a faculty that makes men productive, and safe
to one another. This corresponds to the limited focus of
the work as a whole.
It has been said that the Second Treatise is more a
civil than a philosophical work (Strauss 1953, 220; cf.
Dunn 1969, 88, 120); in that capacity, it has been a stun-
ning success. It has transformed customary ways of
thinking, even where it does not provide a complete ac-
count of the basis of its own philosophical underpin-
nings (Dunn 1969, 88; Myers 1998, 38). It has been suc-
cessful partly because, while explicitly basing itself on
natural law, it minimizes the duties demanded by that
16?34. It is possible to argue that in practice Locke's state of nature
resolves so thoroughly into a state of war that his law of nature be-
comes essentially a dead letter in that state, as with Hobbes (v.
Zuckert 1994, 235-240). It seems to me though that this would en-
tail the demise of Locke's exclusive, prepolitical property right as
well as his distinction between the rational and the contentious,
which would have the direst consequences for his political philoso-
phy as a whole. His argument for limited government, for example,
at least as a moral argument, would be in extreme jeopardy.
17Questions, 101. Again, see Locke's statements on law as the only
possible basis of morality, Essay 1.3.6, 12.
'8See note 9, and text, above.
law and focuses much more memorably on natural
rights. Freedom-loving human beings respond much
more enthusiastically to this approach (cf. Tarcov 1984,
114). As to theology, the natural law is said in the Second
Treatise to be authorized by God, but no strong or the-
matic statements are made on the subject, and the argu-
ment proceeds almost wholly without relying on divinity.
In almost every instance where God is mentioned, a par-
allel argument relying simply on reason or "nature" is of-
fered as well. The prohibition of suicide may be the only
exception (though cf. Glenn 1984, 86-87; Zuckert 1994,
245-246). In the work, there appears to be only one ex-
plicit mention of God as legislator (?135) and none as
enforcer-even in the section on the enforcement of the
natural law (??7-13)! This parsimony allows Locke to
develop his argument with minimum controversy and
maximum appeal, but it leaves the argument with some
important gaps.
Virtue in Education
Locke might be dismayed were he to learn that the Se-
cond Treatise of Government has become so definitive of
his thought for so many readers in our age. Its moral
teaching is limited to the rules of social convenience and
does not give a complete view of why even that morality
is choice worthy for individuals. A more complete view
of these matters is found in Some Thoughts Concerning
Education, Locke's curriculum for a moral upbringing
and another key example of his practical teaching. This
work contains Locke's most complete account of the vir-
tues and provides a more rounded view than the Second
Treatise alone of the cultural transformation that
Lockean liberalism has in view. It makes no reference to
natural law, but does take the preservation of mankind to
be the defining principle of morality. This principle is
presented unequivocally as the basis of morality, and the
origin of natural duties, as well as rights: "truly, if the
preservation of all mankind, as much as in him lies, were
everyone's persuasion, as indeed it is everyone's duty, and
the true principle to regulate our religion, politics, and
morality by, the world would be much quieter and better
natured than it is" (?116).
We note that this formulation of the principle high-
lights the concern for others in it, the difference between
the preservation of mankind and the narrow self-interest
of the individual. This is the theme that the Second Trea-
tise largely finessed. Still, it is not immediately clear what
duties this principle prescribes, or exactly how or why we
are to be concerned for others. The statement quoted ap-
pears in Locke's discussion of cruelty and how it can be
prevented in children. As the antithesis of concern for the
preservation of mankind, cruelty could be considered the
archetypical crime or vice for Locke, as for many modern
thinkers. But how does Locke understand this vice and its
countervailing virtue? To begin with, Locke refuses to be-
lieve that there is any natural impulse to cruelty, hypothe-
sizing instead that it must come from custom, and from
history, which typically confers glory on the perpetrators
of cruelty.19 To prevent cruelty from developing in their
children, there are two things Locke tells parents to do.
They should not allow their children to torment animals,
a practice that paves the way to cruel treatment of human
beings (?116). And they must teach them civil and com-
passionate behavior toward their social inferiors (?117).
The second of these, and perhaps the first as well, essen-
tially constitute lessons in the principle of equality. Equal-
ity is the principle from which natural law or the duty to
preserve mankind was derived in the Second Treatise (?6);
Locke's procedure here suggests that that principle, if sin-
cerely embraced by the child, of itself fosters humanitar-
ian fellow-feeling. "Children should not be suffered to lose
the consideration of human nature in the shufflings of
outward conditions" (?117). Social rank is an obstacle to
the development of humane sentiment; it is all too likely
to give rise to a haughty pride that nurtures cruelty and
oppression (id.). Locke wishes to forestall pride-based
cruelty in children and foster in its stead a humanitarian
concern for others rooted in equality.
Locke's education to justice reflects a similar orienta-
tion toward others. It is especially useful to compare this
part of his curriculum with the teaching of the Second
Treatise. As with the other virtues, Locke begins his in-
struction in justice by playing on the child's desire for the
esteem and approval of his parents-by appealing to a
positive kind of pride. "The first tendency to any injustice
that appears," writes Locke, "must be suppressed with a
show of wonder and abhorrence in the parents and gover-
nors" (?110; cf. ?84). Gradually, parents may teach chil-
dren certain "rules and cases of justice," the beginnings of
a rational view of the subject. Children who remain in-
tractable, Locke says, should have some possession of
theirs taken away, to make them understand the sting of
injustice, and to "make them sensible what little advantage
they are like to make by possessing themselves unjustly of
what is another's, whilst there are in the world stronger
and more men than they" (?110). Here is a rational argu-
ment for justice-and a remarkably Hobbesian one. It is
19?1 16 (but cf. ? 102). Hobbes also denied that cruelty is natural to
men (Leviathan, chapter 6, 126), and Montaigne regarded it as a
cardinal vice ("De la cruaute'," Essais, 11. 1 1).
404 STEVEN FORDE
based on the child's vulnerability and appeals only to his
self-interest. But Locke is careful to inform us that this is
not how he wishes children-or adults-to think about
justice. Rather, they should be imbued with "an ingenuous
detestation of this shameful vice," which is explicitly pre-
sented as a different, and a better, fence against injustice
than "any considerations drawn from interest" (?110).
The "Hobbesian" logic is marshalled only as a last resort.
Its argument is a true one, and most effective for children
whose selfishness has proven intractable, but for Locke it
represents neither the complete argument nor the true
motive for
justice.
Locke's preferred education to justice grounds it in-
stead in liberality. The first thing children should learn re-
garding material possessions, Locke contends, is how to
part with them, "easily and freely" (?110). Parents foster
this by compensating children for any losses, ensuring
that their children always profit by being liberal. Of
course, a profitable liberality hardly deserves the name,
but Locke's purpose is to develop habits that will later
make children truly liberal, deriving independent pleasure
from generosity to others. Even in the early stages of this
education, Locke says that the child's gain from liberality
will be twofold: greater plenty (guaranteed by the parents)
and "a return of kindness" from those they benefit and
any who observe their liberality (?110). By the time chil-
dren learn that liberality is often a material sacrifice, they
will find it rewarding on its own terms, owing to the
goodwill of their beneficiaries and the esteem of society at
large. The result is to be an "ingenuous detestation" of in-
justice and a positive inclination to liberality.
Locke's procedure may be surprising to readers of
the Second Treatise. The apostle of natural, exclusive
property rights teaches children liberality before prop-
erty, and as an educational matter at least, lays the "foun-
dations" of justice in this other-regarding virtue (? 110).
The virulence with which Locke condemns illiberality
might even take us by surprise: "Covetousness, and the
desire of having in our possession and under our domin-
ion more than we have need of, being the root of all evil,
should be early and carefully weeded out" (? 110). This
quasi-Biblical rhetoric is hardly what we would have ex-
pected from the Locke of the Second Treatise. Where that
work portrayed "the desire of having in our possession
and under our dominion more than we have need of" as
productive of the greatest social good, it is here produc-
tive of the greatest social evil, due to its association with
"covetousness."
The two assessments of property are not contradic-
tory, nor do they stem from differing views of the subject.
What they reflect is the divergent purposes of the two
works. The Second Treatise outlines a political morality
based on individual rights, with minimal natural-law du-
ties to others. It shows how self-interested action based on
those rights is the most effective guarantor of the social
good, without fully accounting for individual motivation
and action. Some Thoughts Concerning Education, on the
other hand, is primarily concerned with these. Locke's
goal here is the formation of an individual who is to find
personal happiness as a useful member of society. This
leads Locke beyond the moral minimalism of the Second
Treatise, even as individual pleasure remains the motiva-
tion. In order to counteract the natural tendency of the
love of property to become predatory or "covetous," Locke
weaves liberality into the very foundation of the child's
concern with property. This procedure suggests that at
least psychologically, justice and beneficence are closely
bound, that respect for the rights of others necessarily in-
volves a certain element of liberality, rather than simple
selfish calculation. Hobbesian calculation may be a re-
straint on the injustice of especially refractory children,
but it is not justice as Locke wishes to cultivate it.
The same must be said of the moral ideal of Some
Thoughts Concerning Education as a whole. The work is
suffused with the belief that beneficence is vital to the
individual's happiness in society. The good will it earns
from others, and just as importantly, the satisfaction one
can learn to take in beneficence itself, are lasting rewards
that the properly raised child learns especially to relish.
These rewards are not to be dismissed lightly. They consti-
tute the real link between virtue and individual happiness
in the work, the bridge that liberal theory typically has
most difficulty constructing. Like all liberals, Locke must
find a way to make fundamentally separate and indivi-
dualistic human beings sociable enough to sustain social
order. In Some Thoughts Concerning Education, he finds a
solution in civility and "good breeding," traits that be-
come the ultimate goal of his education. These specifically
social virtues enhance the warmth and pleasure of the life
of virtue in society (??94, 134). Civility and good breed-
ing, more than the other virtues, turn Lockean individuals
into social creatures, though of a distinctive sort.
Civility is an extension of the humanity or fellow
feeling that Locke wants children to develop from a sense
of the equality of men. Both qualities are cultivated by
preventing haughty behavior toward social inferiors
(? 1 17). Locke first invoked the sense of humanity to pre-
vent cruelty in children; now, under his husbandry, it
blossoms into a "respect and good will to all people"
(?67). Locke emphasizes that good will is not to be mere
outward show, but a sincere warmth toward others
(??67, 143). Affectation, feigning this warmth where it is
lacking, is particularly condemned by Locke (?66; Tarcov
1984, 109). It is essential that children develop a real, not
a counterfeit, concern for others, for only a sincere civil-
ity will fulfill the functions Locke designs for it.
We cannot but be pleased with a humane, friendly,
civil temper wherever we meet with it. A mind free
and master of itself and all its actions, not low and
narrow, not haughty and insolent, not blemished
with any great defect, is what everyone is taken
with.. .This seems to me to be that beauty which
shines through some men's actions... .when by a con-
stant practice, they have fashioned their carriage, and
made all those little expressions of civility and respect
which nature or custom has established in conversa-
tion, so easy to themselves that they seem not artifi-
cial or studied, but naturally to follow from a sweet-
ness of mind and a well-turned disposition. (?66)
This solicitude for others is not entirely natural-it must
be practiced-but it can and should become entirely sin-
cere (Tarcov 1984, 138). This sincerity is "sweetness of
mind" (?66), "good nature and kindness" (?67), or simply
"good nature" (?110), and it is the culmination of Lockean
social virtue. Complete civility-the "internal civility of
the mind," together with the external forms to convey it-
is what Locke calls good breeding, the "first and most tak-
ing of the social virtues" (?143; cf. ?67). Well-bred indi-
viduals gain pleasure from pleasing others, basking in the
esteem of society and of themselves. For this purpose,
Locke confides, good breeding is more important than
any other virtue or virtues. "The happiness that all men so
steadily pursue consisting in pleasure, it is easy to see why
the civil are more acceptable than the useful.... Power and
riches, nay virtue itself, are valued only as conducing to
our happiness" (?143). Since the essence of virtue accord-
ing to Locke is restraint and self-denial (??33, 38, 45; cf.
Essay 1.3.13), civility and good breeding provide the re-
ward for this sacrifice in our relations with others. Good
breeding comes to take pleasure in the very discipline of
social virtue, in liberality and social beneficence. It accom-
plishes what Locke's social philosophy must, combining
individual hedonism with the concern for the well being
of mankind that is the defining principle of his morality.
These two qualities make the life of virtue not only a most
respectable, but a most pleasant life.
This pleasure, obviously, is wholly of this world,
which accords well with Locke's desire to avoid reliance
on theology where possible. But religion is not absent
from Locke's education; he says indeed that obedience to
God is the true standard of morality (?61), and that a
"true notion of God" is the foundation of virtue in the
child (?? 136, 139; cf. Essay I.3.18). Still, the child's creed
is limited to a few simple ideas. He is to know God as
"Supreme Being, Author and Maker of all things, from
Whom we receive all our good, Who loves us, and gives
us all things" (?136). In due course, God is revealed as
one who sees and hears all, governs all, and "does all
manner of good to those that love and obey Him" (id.).
While hardly a full theology, this creed is evidently ad-
equate to the support of virtue, and not only children's
virtue (id.). We note that it presents God as a lawgiver
only implicitly (God as governor, as one who should be
obeyed); his role as enforcer is even more latent (omni-
scient giver of good to those who obey). Locke says noth-
ing of the afterlife or of punishments for those who dis-
obey. Divine retributions are not invoked even in the case
of the most refractory children (the Hobbesian bogey is
enlisted instead). The God discovered by Locke's pupils is
both more benign, and more remote, than the God of
many of their compatriots. As for the Bible, Locke indi-
cates that it has much that is wrongheaded along with the
good (??158-159). He recommends some reading from
the Bible for young children, but only selectively, and
centered on moral tales (??158-159). In older pupils, the
Bible is taken up again-in fact, it is the only reading of-
fered in morals-but Locke notes that at this point in the
pupil's education, reading is less important than the
training in morals that he has already experienced
(?185).20 In accordance with what we have noticed in
other contexts, Locke's use of the Bible displays more
concern that children not receive false notions from it,
than that the book should be neglected. The purely social
compensations of civility and good breeding carry much
more weight in Locke's education to virtue.
The Reasonableness of Christianity
and Theological Reform
In Some Thoughts Concerning Education, as in the Second
Treatise of Government, Locke wishes to construct a mo-
rality with minimal reliance on theology. He does this in
part because of the unfinished state of his own theology,
in part to avoid unnecessary confrontations with Chris-
tianity. But even in his practical works, he cannot avoid
theology altogether. The Two Treatises of Government and
Some Thoughts Concerning Education inevitably uncover
flaws in Christianity, at least as interpreted in his day-
unjust in its belief in the Fall, wrongheaded in its insis-
tence on charity, false in its denigration of happiness in
20Though the Bible is the only reading in "morals," Cicero is as-
signed as reading in "ethics," and Pufendorf and perhaps Grotius
in politics, natural right, and law (??185-186).
406 STEVEN FORDE
this life. Locke's procedure in these instances is to substi-
tute proper principles surreptitiously, quoting the Bible
where possible, remaining silent where not, above all
never admitting a disagreement with Christianity. But
Christian orthodoxy still looms as an unconquered for-
tress-a practical obstacle now, more than a theoretical
one. An assault on the fortress, in the name of natural the-
ology, would clearly be counterproductive. What strategy
would then be effective? Sound principles of natural the-
ology may eventually replace Christian error, but Locke's
moral and political teachings will have to make their way,
initially at least, in a world dominated by orthodoxy.
The Reasonableness of Christianity represents Locke's
response to this immediate problem. In some respects, it
represents the furthest reach of his strategy with the prac-
tical works. It shows how far Locke believed orthodoxy
could be pushed in the direction of his teachings, in his
immediate historical context, and how far it would have to
be accommodated. This appears to be the reason for the
most puzzling aspect of the The Reasonableness of Chris-
tianity, its apparent acceptance of the veracity of scrip-
tural revelation, and the remarkable accommodations it
makes to portions of the Biblical teaching at odds with
liberal morality. These have been interpreted as philo-
sophical capitulation (Ashcraft 1969, 218; Dunn 1969,
187), but we should see them instead as parts of a tempo-
rizing strategy. The Essay Concerning Human Understand-
ing was composed roughly simultaneously with The Rea-
sonableness of Christianity (Dunn 1969, 198; cf .Yolton
1970, 179), and that work leaves no doubt about the diffi-
culty if not impossibility of confirming revelation and the
danger of relying on it implicitly (IV. 16, 18, 19). The Essay
strictly subjects revelation to the scrutiny of reason, under
the dictum, "Reason must be our last judge and guide in
every thing" (IV.19.14; cf. IV.16, 18, 19; Conduct, p. 342).
The Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the
Scriptures, by contrast, signals by its very title a strategy of
accepting scripture at face value, interpreting it without
investigating its provenance. Given their contempora-
neity, the differences between the two works must be
traceable to differences of strategy alone.
Indeed, the Essay itself suggests the need for a work
like Reasonableness. Although it is the duty of each of us
to follow reason even in matters of religion, the Essay
tells us, the unfortunate fact is that "a great part of man-
kind are, by the natural and unalterable state of things
in this world," doomed to an "invincible ignorance" of
the basis of their own opinions (IV.20.2-3; cf. 1.4.22;
11.21.47-53, 67). The Reasonableness of Christianity con-
curs: "the greatest part [of mankind] cannot know, and
therefore they must believe" (146). Paradoxically, one of
the things Locke finds most "reasonable" about
Christianity is its substitution of authoritative revelation
for reason (142-144, 147, 157). Up to the time of Jesus,
philosophy had failed to establish a true morality, upon
the foundation of a proper natural theology (pp. 139-
140,144). Even if it had, Locke notes, the true phil-
osophy would have had to compete with the false and
could never have been as effective a prop to morality as
an authoritative dogma (141-143). Moreover, the times
were corrupt, burdened with pernicious "manners and
principles" (144). All this made it reasonable for Jesus to
teach by fiat rather than logic (143).
The times in which Locke writes are corrupt enough
in their own way, and revelation remains a much more
powerful tool than philosophy, if its worst abuses can be
corrected.21 Though Locke indicates clearly enough the
unverifiability of Jesus' claim to revelation,22 he makes no
issue of it. To repeat, his undertaking in The Reasonable-
ness of Christianity is to interpret the Bible as it stands,
and the Bible's teaching is emphatically not natural the-
ology (5). What the Bible teaches instead is the Fall (4),
salvation by faith (17-20, 50-51), and a highly stringent
moral code (1 15). Locke begins by accepting these pre-
mises, gradually turning them to account, so far as they
may be turned to account.
Thus The Reasonableness of Christianity endorses the
principle of salvation by faith, indeed elevates it into the
sole tenet of Christianity. The result is to make it an en-
gine of toleration. Any who believe that Jesus is the Mes-
siah are Christians and are eligible for salvation on the
basis of divine forgiveness (17-20, 50-51). The myriad
other points of Christian theology, which have set Chris-
tians at each others' throats for so long, are relegated to
secondary if not insignificant status. If this interpretation
of the Bible were to prevail, virtually all bases for sectari-
anism would be removed, and toleration would be uni-
versal among Christians. But Locke goes further. Faith,
he says, is not the only avenue to salvation in the Bible.
Non-Christians may merit eternal life if they obey "every
tittle" of the law and so do not stand in need of forgive-
ness (12; cf. 10). This appears to be very difficult, and
Locke is ambivalent on its possibility for human beings
(11, 110, 112, 114). But if this path to salvation is closed,
21Cf. Dunn 1984, 66. For good accounts of how Locke softens or
modifies Christian doctrine in Reasonableness, see Zuckert 1986;
Pangle 1988, 151-158; Rabieh 1991. See also Kraynak 1980, 60, 62,
66.
22
Locke says Jesus' commission was proven by his miracles, which
were so certain that no one has ever dared deny them, not even
Julian (138). Yet the existence of non-Christians, atheists, and yes,
Julian the Apostate, show the reverse so patently that Locke's state-
ment can only be understood ironically (Strauss 1959, 210; Rabieh
1991, 149-150). He notes that the Jews might even have admitted
the miracles, without conceding Jesus' commission (80). Locke's
Discourse of Miracles subjects miracles subtly but unmistakably to
rational judgment (Locke 1997a, 261-262, 264).
or extremely difficult, the age-old question arises, How
can those justly be condemned who never heard of Jesus?
To this, the "obvious and natural" answer, says Locke, is
that all those will be forgiven by God "who rely on him,
for whatever, either by the light of nature, or particular
promises, he has revealed to them of his tender mercies,
and taught them to expect from his bounty" (130). The
"light of nature" might reveal to many a merciful and
forgiving God; belief in this deity puts them on a level
with Christians. Faith in Jesus, the defining tenet of
Christianity, can be replaced by a purely rational belief in
the tender and forgiving nature of God (cf. 133).
Thus Locke endorses the Biblical principle of salva-
tion by faith, uses it to sow toleration among Christians,
then opens it to non-Christians, on the basis of what we
can only call natural theology. Still, the need for salva-
tion by faith is not questioned, nor is the principle that
creates that need, the Fall.23 These are intrinsic to the
Bible. Locke's accommodation to scripture is even more
striking in his treatment of morality or natural law.
Drawing exclusively on Jesus' statements in the Bible,
Locke concludes that this law forbids "not only murder,
but causeless anger, and so much as words of contempt";
"irregular desires," "ostentation of charity," "covetous-
ness" and "wordly care," as well as "lasciviousness" and
"evil thoughts"-all, "upon pain of hell-fire" (115-116).
Locke goes out of his way to identify these principles
with "the eternal law of right," or natural law, repeating
assertions to this effect to the point of monotony (10,
11-13, 112, 115, 122, 142-143, 144, 157).
It is not possible to square this teaching with the lib-
eral morality Locke himself champions elsewhere under
the rubric of natural law. It suffices to think of the iden-
tification of happiness with pleasure in the Essay, or the
"industrious and rational" virtues of acquisition on
which God smiles in the Two Treatises. The Reasonable-
ness of Christianity accepts the Biblical teaching instead,
even though its moral stringency contributes to the
need for continual forgiveness, salvation by faith, and
other theological peculiarities. What sense can be made
of this? Aside from his self-imposed rule in this work to
take scripture at its word, Locke's strategy seems to be to
identify Jesus' teaching with rational morality or natural
law-by hook or by crook-then gently to suggest an-
other understanding of such a morality (142-143). In a
crucial set of passages, Locke first vindicates Jesus' mis-
sion by pointing to the failure of pre-Christian philoso-
phy to establish true natural law. But in the course of
that discussion, he reveals that at least some true know-
ledge of right was abroad in antiquity. In politics, true
rules of right were discovered by statesmen who simply
sought social convenience and general prosperity. For
"The law of nature is the law of convenience too" (142;
cf. 139, 144, Essay 1.3.6). Similarly, part of natural law
was known to the "heathen philosophers," though they
failed to teach it effectively (p. 138-139, 142). The oppo-
sition of priests, the competition with false philosophy,
and the failure of the philosophers themselves to find
the true foundation of natural law, all doomed them to
impotence (135, 139, 140-144). Their failure justified
Jesus' recourse to revelation.
Locke's own situation is not unlike that of the an-
cient philosophers, and his reliance on revelation in The
Reasonableness of Christianity is one result. But that reli-
ance severely limits what he can say in the work about
natural law. Locke does not say that the law of conve-
nience is all of the law of nature (cf. 140, 142; Essay
1.3.10), but we know that his reform of moral philosophy
is designed to bring it much closer to the sum of those
rules than the Bible will strictly allow. The Reasonableness
of Christianity notes that one of the problems with virtue
before Jesus was its "unendowed" character (150). It was
unendowed because it required unnecessary sacrifices
and lacked otherworldly enforcement. Christianity rem-
edies the second defect, but only aggravates the first.
"Virtue and prosperity do not often accompany one an-
other," says Locke at one point, taking the Biblical per-
spective (148). But this is not his own perspective. Liberal
virtue, the virtue of the "industrious and rational," coin-
cides with prosperity the great majority of the time. This
virtue and its reward are scarcely visible in The Reason-
ableness of Christianity, although Locke is careful to give
them some recognition. The Bible may be nudged in the
direction of liberal, acquisitive virtue, and in the direc-
tion of Locke's natural theology, but it cannot without
falsification be brought into the liberal fold.
This is why The Reasonableness of Christianity should
be seen as a provisional work, one that Locke hoped per-
haps would outlive its usefulness. A case could be made
that Locke's ultimate goal as a reformer is the replacement
of Christianity with a natural theology of the type he out-
lines in other works. Perhaps he hoped for something like
the situation that prevailed one hundred years after his
writing, when Deism seemed on the verge of supplanting
Christianity-in no small part due to Locke's influence.
This was the era of Jefferson's bold prediction, "I trust that
there is not a young man now living in the United States
who will not die an Unitarian."24 But not long thereafter,
"See pages 6, 105. This is not to say that Locke's interpretation of
the Fall is orthodox.
24This statement was penned in 1822 (Jefferson 1984, 1459; cf.
1464). On the influence of Locke's theology, including its influence
in colonial America, see Pangle 1988, 151-158; Pangle and Pangle
1993,28,76-78.
408 STEVEN FORDE
natural theology was on the wane, and Christianity resur-
gent. Liberalism in the West has had to confront more or
less permanently a Biblical understanding with which it
can never be entirely in accord. This is the situation for
which The Reasonableness of Christianity was designed.
Conclusion: Locke's Complex Bequest
The Reasonableness of Christianity reveals most starkly
the complex nature of Locke's bequest to his posterity,
the sometimes extreme accommodations he was willing
to make to different audiences and occasions. The Se-
cond Treatise of Government and Some Thoughts Con-
cerning Education show different sorts of accommoda-
tion, but accommodations they remain. Philosophically,
Locke developed a liberal politics and morality that
draws on the moral resources of (natural) theology, but
in these practical works he presents his liberalism in
forms mostly shorn of its theological supports. My argu-
ment has been that Locke did this intentionally, owing
to the problems posed by the theological elements of his
full theory. Those problems are both theoretical-the
lack of a complete or fully satisfactory natural theol-
ogy-and practical-the resistance his political and
moral philosophy would meet if tied too closely to a
novel theology.
The result of this strategy is that Locke's bequest is
divided into two main strands. In its fully articulated
form, his liberalism enlists divine support in order to
bring rational and hedonistic individuals to the service of
the "preservation of Mankind." Locke could not dispense
with this element of his thought because the need for in-
centives to virtue is built into the very foundations of his
philosophy. Without these, no other-regarding actions
can be expected of Lockean individuals, and indeed no
such obligations can be laid on them. Locke agrees with
those who have argued, from Hobbes's day to this, that
even liberal morality needs more than narrow or mun-
dane self-interest to be viable. But this message has been
muddled by his strategy of fashioning a practical teach-
ing largely independent of that theology.
Locke's practical works show both how desirous he
was of disentangling his bequest from theological con-
troversy and how far Lockean liberalism can get without
theology. The Second Treatise appeals to very little be-
yond immediate self-interest, yet constructs a vision of
government and individual rights that human beings
have found compelling. It is able to do this in part be-
cause its focus on the general social good allows it to fi-
nesse some of the conflicts between that and the indi-
vidual good. This leaves it open to the objections of those
who find liberalism morally inadequate. Some Thoughts
Concerning Education by contrast shows how Locke be-
lieves an individual might be motivated to perform his
duty to tend to the general good, who indeed will be glad
to practice liberality and other forms of social benefi-
cence. Esteem and reputation are this individual's re-
ward, but Locke emphasizes the virtues of civility and
"good breeding" as the pivotal gratifications of social vir-
tue. These, when properly cultivated, find pleasure in the
very act of serving others.
To the extent that Locke discusses theology in these
works, it is more to counteract false and baleful notions
held by his contemporaries than to advance a full-blown
theology of his own. Those few notions aside, he largely
leaves the field to Christianity, at least for the immediate
future. This renders all the more salient the need to
make Christianity itself more reasonable, at least as rea-
sonable as it can become, given its dependence on the
text of the Bible. This limited, provisional, but nonethe-
less important task is undertaken in The Reasonableness
of Christianity.
The complexity of Locke's strategy, which is devised
to maximize the social and cultural influence of his phi-
losophy, resulted in an oeuvre whose individual works do
not always seem to agree. One of the most significant
consequences of this is a practical teaching severed to a
significant degree from the theological underpinnings
that it had in Locke's own mind. It is no doubt true that
the immense influence of Lockean liberalism is due in
part to this separation, but it also lays him open to
charges of an impoverished, morally inadequate philoso-
phy. This no doubt is not the outcome Locke would have
desired, but I have suggested that it is almost invited by
the way he presents his teaching. The result is that Locke
could paradoxically be said to be responsible for some of
the moral shortcomings with which liberalism is charged
today, while at the same time offering guidance on how
those very shortcomings might be made good.
Manuscript submitted March 4, 2000.
Final manuscript received September 5, 2000.
References
Ashcraft, Richard. 1969. "Faith and knowledge in Locke's phi-
losophy."
In John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, ed. John
Yolton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cicero. 1933. De Natura Deorum, trans. H. Rackham. New
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. Loeb Classical Library.
Dunn, John. 1968. Justice and the Interpretation of Locke's Po-
litical Theory. Political Studies 16:68-87.
Dunn, John. 1969. The Political Thought of John Locke: An His-
torical Account of the Argument of the Two Treatises of Gov-
ernment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dunn, John. 1984. Locke. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fagiani, Francesco. 1983. "Natural Law and History in Locke's
Theory of Distributive Justice'" Topoi 2:163-185. Reprinted
in Locke, Volume I. Great Political Thinkers series, ed. John
Dunn and Ian Harris. Lyme, Conn.: Edward Elgar, 1997.
Franklin, Benjamin. 1987. Writings. New York: The Library of
America.
Glenn, Gary D. 1984. "Inalienable Rights and Locke's Argu-
ment for Limited Government: Political Implications of a
Right to Suicide." Journal of Politics 46: 80-105.
Grant, Ruth W. 1987. John Locke's Liberalism. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press.
Grotius, Hugo. 1925 [1625]. The Law of War and Peace: De Jure
Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres. Trans. Francis W. Kelsey. Washing-
ton: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Re-
printed, no date, by Bobbs-Merrill, New York.
Hobbes, Thomas. [1651] 1975. Leviathan. Ed. C.B.
Macpherson. Baltimore: Penguin Books.
Horwitz, Robert. 1990. "Introduction." In John Locke, Ques-
tions Concerning the Law of Nature, trans. Robert Horwitz,
Jenny Strauss Clay, and Diskin Clay. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press.
Jefferson, Thomas. 1984. Writings. Ed. Merrill D. Peterson. New
York: Library of America.
Kraynak, Robert P. 1980. "John Locke: From Absolutism to Tol-
eration." American Political Science Review 74:53-69.
Lenz, John W. 1956. "Locke's Essays on the Law of Nature." Phi-
losophy and Phenomenological Research 16:105-113. Re-
printed in Locke, Volume L Great Political Thinkers series,
ed. John Dunn and Ian Harris. Lyme, Conn.: Edward Elgar,
1997.
Locke, John. [1663?] 1990. Questions Concerning the Law of Na-
ture. Trans. Robert Horwitz, Jenny Strauss Clay, and Diskin
Clay. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Locke, John. [1689] 1995. An Essay Concerning Human Under-
standing. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books.
Locke, John. [1689a] 1983. A Letter Concerning Toleration.
Trans. William Popple, ed. James H. Tully. Indianiapolis:
Hackett.
Locke, John. [1690] 1989. Two Treatises of Government. Ed. Pe-
ter Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Locke, John. [1693] 1947. Some Thoughts Concerning Educa-
tion. In John Locke on Politics and Education. Roslyn, N.Y.:
Walter J. Black.
Locke, John. [1695] 1997. The Reasonableness of Christianity, as
Delivered in the Scriptures. In The Works of John Locke, in
Nine Volumes. Reprint of 1794 edition. London: Routledge/
Thoemmes, vol. 6.
Locke, John. 1976-. The Correspondence of John Locke. Ed. E.S.
de Beer. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Locke, John. 1997. Of the Conduct of the Understanding. In The
Works of John Locke. Reprint of 1794 edition, Vol II. London:
Routledge Thoemmes.
Locke, John. 1997a. A Discourse of Miracles. In The Works of
John Locke, in Nine Volumes. Reprint of 1794 edition. Lon-
don: Routledge Thoemmes, vol. 8.
Michel de Montaigne, Essais. From Oeuvres Completes, Paris:
Aux Editions du Seuil, 1967.
Myers, Peter C. 1998. Our Only Star and Compass: Locke and the
Struggle for Political Rationality. New York: Rowman &
Littlefield.
Olivecrona, Karl. 1974. "Appropriation in the State of Nature:
Locke on the Origin of Property." Journal of the History of
Ideas 35:211-230. Reprinted in Locke, Volume L Great Politi-
cal Thinkers series, ed. John Dunn and Ian Harris. Lyme,
Conn.: Edward Elgar, 1997.
Pangle, Thomas L. 1988. The Spirit of Modern Republicanism:
The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philoso-
phy of Locke. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Pangle, Lorraine Smith, and Thomas L Pangle. 1993. The
Learning of Liberty: The Educational Ideas of the American
Founders. Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas.
Pufendorf, Samuel. [1673] 1991. On the Duty of Man and Citi-
zen According to Natural Law. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Rabieh, Michael S. 1991. "The Reasonableness of Locke, or the
Questionableness of Christianity." Journal of Politics 53:933-
957.
Strauss, Leo. 1953. Natural Right and History. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press.
Strauss, Leo. 1959. "Locke's Doctrine of Natural Law." Re-
printed in What is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies.
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
Tarcov, Nathan. 1983. "A'Non-Lockean' Locke and the Charac-
ter of Liberalism." In Liberalism Reconsidered, ed. Douglas
MacLean and Claudia Mills. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman
& Allanheld.
Tarcov, Nathan. 1984. Locke's Education for Liberty. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
von Leyden, W. 1956. "John Locke and Natural Law." Philoso-
phy 31:23-35. Reprinted in Locke, Volume L Great Political
Thinkers series, ed. John Dunn and Ian Harris. Lyme,
Conn.: Edward Elgar, 1997.
Yolton, John W. 1958. "Locke on the Law of Nature." Philo-
sophical Review 67:477-498. Reprinted in Locke, Volume L
Great Political Thinkers series, ed. John Dunn and Ian Har-
ris. Lyme, Conn.: Edward Elgar, 1997.
Yolton, John W. 1970. Locke and the Compass of Human Under-
standing: A Selective Commentary on the 'Essay.' Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Zuckert, Michael P. 1986. "Locke and the Problem of Civil Reli-
gion." In The Moral Foundations of the Americal Republic, ed.
Robert Horwitz. Charlottesville: University Press of
Virginia.
Zuckert, Michael P. 1994. Natural Rights and the New Republi-
canism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Morality in Locke

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Morality in Locke

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Natural Law, Theology, and Morality in Locke

Author(s): Steven Forde

You might also like