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-Japan Security 09-11-03 9:37 AM

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October 2009

The DPJ and U.S.-Japan Security

by Michael Auslin

SUBSCRIBER LOGIN Posted October 15, 2009

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Just days before his party took power in September, Democratic Party of
Password Japan (DPJ) lawmaker Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi stated that missile defense was
“almost totally useless.” That week, as DPJ leader Yukio Hatoyama became
Japan’s prime minister on Sept. 16, Japan Air Self-Defense Forces shot
down a mock ballistic missile over the skies of New Mexico.
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Register Which security policy approach will survive under Japan’s new government?
The answer has implications not only for Japan, but also for the United
States’ position in Asia. Mr. Yamaguchi’s statement cannot be dismissed out read more
of hand, since he served as the party’s deputy defense spokesman before
the historic elections that turned over power to an opposition party for only
the second time in half a century. In an interview with Japanese press, Mr.
Yamaguchi asserted that the DPJ will likely cut defense spending in order to
push through with domestic entitlement plans, “such as child care
allowance, education, health care and pensions.” Yet, as Japan’s second
successful test shows, Tokyo’s partnership with the United States on missile DOW JONES LINKS
defense is continuing to develop and show promise just as North Korea
continues its missile program and China further beefs up its rocket forces. asia.WSJ.com

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Missile defense development is not cheap, especially in a period of flat

defense spending. Japan’s Ministry of Defense has requested just under $2
billion for missile defense programs, out of a total defense budget of $53
billion (at current exchange rates). Yet missile defense is also just one part
of the larger movement in Japan’s military development over the past
decade. The ministry is also in the midst of selecting its next generation air
defense fighter and continuing a modernization of naval assets, including
more Aegis-equipped destroyers and upgrading its aging P3-C surveillance
planes. These are expensive, long-term investments that will shape the
Japanese military, and influence the U.S.-Japan alliance, for years to come.
And yet, the new government has given almost no indication of what its
own security policies will be or how it will structure the defense budget in
the coming years.

Like all leaderships, Japan’s new national security team must prioritize its
spending plans. Over the last decade, since North Korea launched a

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Far Eastern Economic Review | The DPJ and U.S.-Japan Security 09-11-03 9:37 AM

spending plans. Over the last decade, since North Korea launched a
Taepodong ballistic missile over Japanese airspace in 1998, Tokyo has
aggressively funded programs aimed at emerging threats. In doing so, it
has worked more closely with Washington than any other American ally. It
has deployed land-based PAC-3 batteries, sharing information with U.S.-
operated X-Band radars in Japan, and has installed sea-based SM-3
systems on four Aegis destroyers.

In that time frame, Japan’s neighbors have developed other offensive

weapons systems, thus giving Tokyo further incentive to continue
defensively based programs. Pyongyang has launched short, medium, and
long-range ballistic missiles in 2006 and 2009, as well as set off two small-
scale nuclear explosions. Meanwhile, China has introduced the Jin class of
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, extended the operations of its
diesel submarines, and further refined its mobile medium and intermediate-
range DF-21 ballistic missiles. Russia has returned to the skies, as well,
doing frequent fly-bys of Japanese territory with strategic bombers.

All of which brings us back to Mr. Yamaguchi’s statement on the

uselessness of missile defense. His comments garnered attention because
they are among the very few pieces of evidence foreign observers have for
DPJ thinking on security policies. The recent elections in Japan were about
domestic issues, and Mr. Hatoyama’s election manifesto was heavy on
social and economic reform, with little discussion of foreign and security
policy plans. Yet, since taking power in September, Mr. Hatoyama has
restructured the way policy is made in Japan, so that backbenchers like Mr.
Yamaguchi are finding themselves frozen out of the decision making
process, according to Japanese bureaucrats familiar with the situation.
Under the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party, initial policy was set inside
the party and then sent to the Diet and Cabinet Office. Mr. Hatoyama has
instead centralized policymaking inside the Cabinet Office, which actually
continues the trend of strengthening central power that started with LDP
prime ministers Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe.

Yet the very tightness of control means that the new government’s security
policy goals are harder to discern in the absence of any clear statements by
principal players. The DPJ’s election manifesto included a promise to “re-
evaluate” missile defense, and said nothing about overall force
modernization. Thus the attention given to Mr. Yamaguchi’s statement,
despite that fact that he likely has little influence currently. Analysts
wonder, though, though whether his views are shared by Mr. Hatoyama or
others in the leadership circle. On a positive note, alliance watchers were
heartened when DPJ politician Akihisa Nagashima was named vice minister
for defense. Nagashima is well known in Washington circles as a strong
supporter of the alliance, but he still must take his cues from Mr. Hatoyama
and Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, with whom he is close.

The Cabinet’s foreign policy goals are clearer. Under the long-time
leadership of Ichiro Ozawa, the DPJ has called for closer relations with
China. Mr. Ozawa, who now holds the number two-position in the party
under Mr. Hatoyama, led a 500-person delegation to Beijing in December
2007 at the height of his power. Prime Minister Hatoyama ran on improving
Japan’s relations with Asian nations, something that would benefit the U.S.-
Japan alliance, as well, but not if the result was a Japanese move to limit
our cooperation on key security issues. This past weekend, Prime Minister
Hatoyama joined Chinese President Hu Jintao and South Korean President
Lee Myung-bak in Beijing, where all three pledged to more closely
coordinate trilateral cooperation on economic growth and climate change.
Mr. Hatoyama has called for a new East Asian community, moreover, that
would possibly deal even with security issues, though what role the United
States would play in Mr. Hatoyama’s scheme remains unclear.

In contrast to foreign policy, DPJ statements on the alliance are murky,

often resulting from the need to play to domestic constituencies. It has
indicated it wants to re-negotiate parts of the Status of Forces Agreement
governing the U.S. military presence in Japan, and most controversially,
reconsider key agreements relating to the relocation of U.S. forces on
Okinawa, particularly the location of the Futenma air station replacement.
Mr. Hatoyama has repeatedly said that the cornerstone of Japanese
security will remain the alliance with Washington, but specifics will now be
judged more heavily than rhetoric. U.S. diplomats I talked with recently in
Japan are confident that our agreements with Tokyo will go forward without
serious disruption, but there is still the question of the DPJ’s long-term
security vision.

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Far Eastern Economic Review | The DPJ and U.S.-Japan Security 09-11-03 9:37 AM

If Japan under the DPJ ends its Indian Ocean refueling mission (which
seems almost certain), slows military modernization, and curbs missile
defense, while further engaging China and looking to U.N. sanctions to
solve the North Korean nuclear crisis, then Washington may well re-
evaluate how aligned its security goals are with Tokyo’s. Few analysts,
including this one, doubt that in a real Asian military crisis, Washington and
Tokyo would work together and both partners would uphold their alliance
commitments. But events are much more likely to drift than to come to a
sudden head. The reality is that a gradual shift in strategic vision, shared
agendas, and underlying political will on the part of Tokyo and Washington
will more likely determine how credible each nation’s security policies
remain and how closely they view each other as key security partners.

The Asian strategic environment is not static, and a diminution of Japanese

capability in light of China’s growing strength, or a reverse course on
promising missile defense programs in the shadow of Pyongyang’s
provocations, will present Washington with uncomfortable choices. It also
may cede, unnecessarily, Japan’s role as a liberal leader in Asia. Diplomatic
engagement of the kind proposed by Japan’s new leadership is important
and should be encouraged. But it is only part of the strategic equation, not
the whole.

Michael Auslin is a resident scholar in Asian studies and director of Japan

studies at the American Enterprise Institute.

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