1-Truth Reconciliation in South Af and Beyond

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Journal of Conflict Resolution
DOI: 10.1177/0022002706287115
2006; 50; 409 Journal of Conflict Resolution
James L. Gibson
Africa
The Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation: Lessons From South
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AUTHORS NOTE: This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the conference on Judging
Transitional Justice: An Interdisciplinary Workshop on New Democracies Coming to Terms with Their
Past, University of California, Irvine, October 30-31, 2004. This research has been supported by the Law
and Social Sciences Program of the National Science Foundation (SES 9906576). Any opinions, findings,
and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not neces-
sarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. The project is a collaborative effort between
Amanda Gouws, Department of Political Science, University of Stellenbosch (South Africa), and me.
I am indebted to Charles Villa-Vicencio, Helen Macdonald, Paul Haupt, Nyameka Goniwe, Fanie du Toit,
Erik Doxtader, and the staff of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (South Africa), where I am a
distinguished visiting research scholar, for the many helpful discussions that have informed my under-
standing of the truth and reconciliation process in South Africa. Most of the research on which this
article relies was conducted while I was a visiting scholar at the Russell Sage Foundation, to which I am
extremely grateful. I also acknowledge the research assistance of Eric Lomazoff, of the Russell Sage
Foundation. I appreciate very much the most helpful comments on an earlier version of this article by
Marc Morj Howard, Leslie Vinjamuri, Ursula van Beek, and Jack Snyder. I especially appreciate the
detailed advice of Barry ONeill.
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 50 No. 3, June 2006 409-432
DOI: 10.1177/0022002706287115
2006 Sage Publications
The Contributions of
Truth to Reconciliation
LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA
JAMES L. GIBSON
Department of Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis and
Centre for Comparative and International Politics
Stellenbosch University, South Africa
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is undoubtedly the most widely
discussed truth and reconciliation process in the world, and by many accounts, the TRC is among the most
effective any country has yet produced. What is the explanation for its success? This article has two objec-
tives. First, it seeks to identify the characteristics of South Africas truth and reconciliation process that
contributed to its performance. Second, it then asks whether the truth and reconciliation process is itself
endogenous. Thus, the ultimate objective is to assess whether truth and reconciliation processes can have
an independent influence on reconciliation and especially on the likelihood of consolidating an attempted
democratic transition. The conclusion of this article is that the truth and reconciliation process in South
Africa did indeed exert independent influence on the democratization process through its contributions
toward creating a more reconciled society.
Keywords: reconciliation; forgiveness; South Africa; democratization
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An increasingly common feature of attempts at transition to democratic politics is
the creation of some sort of truth and reconciliation process.
1
Roughly two dozen
such processes have been established, including what is probably the first American
effort at truth and reconciliation, the Greensboro (North Carolina) Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.
2
Truth may not be the only route to reconciliation, but
it is an increasingly popular choice of those seeking to move beyond the past to a
more peaceful and democratic future.
The popularity of such transitional justice processes is in no small part a reaction
to the apparent success of South Africas Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC).
3
At the most simplistic level, South Africa has recently celebrated its first ten
years of democracy, with a transition from apartheid that was marred by remarkably
little bloodshed, retribution, and vengeance.
4
In the eyes of many, a crucial factor in
the success of this transition was the TRC. Led by Desmond Tutu and fully sup-
ported by Nelson Mandela, the process certainly generated a great deal of informa-
tion if not truth (including a seven-volume report), and talk of reconciliation filled
public discourse since the time when the commission was created. Although some
South African commentators are less sanguine,
5
many observers throughout the
world subscribe to the view that the truth process did indeed contribute to reconcil-
iation in South Africa and that reconciliation has been a crucial factor in moving the
country toward a more democratic future.
Indeed, my recently published book, Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth
Reconcile a Divided Nation? (Gibson 2004), answers the question posed by the
subtitle with a cautious and qualified yes, at least for some groups in South
Africa. Based on an analysis of a representative sample of ordinary South
Africans, that inquiry concludes that truth and reconciliation are connected, that
truth (as promulgated by the TRC
6
) did not undermine reconciliation within any of
the groups in South Africa, and that for whites, Coloured people, and those of
Asian origin, truth may actually have caused reconciliation.
7
And among at least
410 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
1. Indeed, Hayner (2001), for instance, predicts that such commissions will become even more
common in the future.
2. See http://www.gtcrp.org [accessed June 2, 2004].
3. See http://africana.rug.ac.be/texts/publications/Annelies/Survey.doc for a bibliography of nearly
450 works on the South African truth and reconciliation process [accessed June 2, 2004].
4. Tetlock (1998) reports that only eleven of twenty-six experts on South Africa correctly predicted
the demise of the apartheid system.
5. For instance: The TRC is regarded as a novel experiment of restorative justice and nation-building
through reconciliation; it is often recommended as an international model for similar conflicts elsewhere;
and its achievements are widely overrated outside South Africa, while largely dismissed inside (Adam
and Adam 2000, 33, emphasis added). For a contrary view, see Gibson (2005).
6. As will become clearer below, when I refer to truth I mean the truth about the apartheid past,
as documented by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The TRC put forth this truth as a
collective memory of the past. My purpose is not to judge the veracity of the TRCs truth but rather to
measure the degree to which ordinary South Africans judge the TRCs conclusions to be truth.
7. For a more detailed consideration of race in South Africa, see Gibson and Gouws (2003, 35-8)
and Gibson (2004, 24-7). In general, I accept the racial categories as identified by the editor of a special
JCR287115.qxd 4/11/2006 7:59 PM Page 410
some blacksthose who are not religioustruth also seemed to facilitate recon-
ciliation. The truth and reconciliation process was certainly costly, in terms of both
money and in the failure to produce retributive justice. But the clear conclusion of
that research is that the truth and reconciliation process was worth its considerable
price because it contributed positively to the initiation of democratic reform in
South Africa.
Many questions remain, however, about the exact nature of the contribution of the
truth and reconciliation processes to democratic change. Consider once more the
South African case. My argument is that the truth process facilitated reconciliation
because it was able to apportion blame to all sides in the struggle over apartheid
(Gibson 2004). But alternative explanations are possible. For instance, let me posit
that South Africa is relatively high in two characteristics: political pluralism, by
which I mean multiple, competing centers of power, and commitment to the rule of
law, with its emphasis on universal standards for judging behavior. These two char-
acteristics themselves might have given rise to a truth and reconciliation process
with a strong propensity to cast blame on all who violated the law of human rights,
including the liberation forces. As a consequence, these cultural characteristics may
have shaped the attributes of the TRC itself. At the same time, these are the very char-
acteristics that would render people receptive to the finding that all sides in the strug-
gle committed gross human rights abuses. If all of this is so, the root cause of South
Africas reconciliation may not be the truth and reconciliation process itself but may
instead be the very cultural and institutional attributes that gave rise to the commis-
sion in the first place. In technical terms, the truth and reconciliation process is
endogenousit is (perhaps) not a cause of anything but is instead an effect. The
most compelling implication to follow from this analysis, if true, is that were a truth
and reconciliation process established in a country without the requisite supportive
culture and institutions, that process would likely fail since the root cause of recon-
ciliation lies in the culture and institutions of the country, not in the truth and recon-
ciliation process itself.
Were we able to randomly assign countries to truth and reconciliation experi-
ments, this causal ambiguity could be resolved. The opportunity to conduct such a
field experiment is not, obviously, likely to materialize any time soon. A different
methodologyone based in logic and grounded in the available empirical
Gibson / CONTRIBUTIONS OF TRUTH TO RECONCILIATION 411
issue of Daedalus focused on South Africa: Many of the authors in this issue observe the South African
convention of dividing the countrys population into four racial categories: white (of European descent),
colored (of mixed ancestry), Indian (forebears from the Indian subcontinent), and African. The official
nomenclature for Africans has itself varied over the years, changing from native to Bantu in the mid-
dle of the apartheid era, and then changing again to black or, today, African/black. All of these terms
appear in the essays that follow (see Graubard 2001, viii). Note as well that Desmond Tutu felt obliged
to offer a similar caveat about race in South Africa in the final report of the TRC. Although these racial
categories were employed by the apartheid regime to divide and control the population, these are nonethe-
less labels South Africans use to refer to themselves (see, e.g., Gibson and Gouws 2003). I use the term
Coloured to signify that this is a distinctly South African construction of race and Asian origin to refer to
South Africans drawn from the Indian subcontinent.
JCR287115.qxd 4/11/2006 7:59 PM Page 411
evidenceis therefore necessary if headway is to be made on unraveling these
complex causal interrelationships.
The purpose of this article is to explore the causal processes through which truth
commissions are connected to reconciliation. My main objective is to consider the
possibility that the truth reconciliation relationship is spurious in the sense that
both truth and reconciliation are caused by some other exogenous forces. Thus, I
explicitly consider the hypothesis that truth and reconciliation processes reflect
rather than cause societal reconciliation.
I begin this article with an overview of the evidence that South Africas truth and
reconciliation process was successful, focusing in particular on the attributes of the
endeavor contributing most to its accomplishments. This portion of my analysis
relies heavily on my recently published examination of the truth causes reconcilia-
tion hypothesis.
The second portion of this article asks whether the truth and reconciliation
process is endogenous to South African politics by developing and proposing alter-
native views of the causal processes involved. This section is of necessity more spec-
ulative since no earlier research has systematically investigated alternative causal
models. I posit in particular that there are indeed elements of the South African polit-
ical culture that plausibly account for reconciliation apart from the production of
truth. Nonetheless, I also argue in favor of an independent influence of the truth and
reconciliation process in societal transformation. Because South Africas process so
captured the attention of ordinary people, and because ordinary people ascribed
legitimacy to the TRCs truth and were so satisfied with what they observed, large-
scale change in perspectives became possible and, according to my analysis, in fact
materialized.
Finally, in the concluding section, I assess whether South Africas experiences
might be applicable to other political systems confronting an atrocious past. Of
course, it may be impossible to replicate a Tutu or a Mandela, but lessons nonethe-
less emerge from the South African case that may be valuable to others attempting
to move beyond their conflictual pasts. These lessons do indeed seem applicable to
many, but perhaps not all, polities attempting to create a more reconciled, and demo-
cratic, society.
THE SUCCESS OF SOUTH AFRICAS
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION PROCESS
Is there evidence that such truth and reconciliation processes have in fact
succeeded? The difficulty in answering this question only begins with trying to spec-
ify what the objectives of such endeavors are since, in many instances, conflicting
aims are pursued simultaneously. In the South African case, the goals were reason-
ably clear but included such broad objectives as creating a collective memory for the
society, establishing and nurturing a culture of human rights in South Africa, trans-
forming the society, and enhancing reconciliation, in addition to granting amnesty to
JCR287115.qxd 4/11/2006 7:59 PM Page 412
those admitting to involvement in gross human rights violations.
8
Obviously, any
rigorous assessment of the effectiveness of a truth and reconciliation process in
achieving these massive goals would require unprecedented social scientific effort.
Worse, other truth and reconciliation processes have had much more ambiguous and
even conflicting and contested goals.
Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation? (Gibson 2004)
assesses the hypothesis that truth contributes to reconciliation. Truth is conceptu-
alized and operationalized as the degree of individual acceptance of the collective
memory promulgated by the TRC (e.g., the TRCs conclusions that apartheid was a
crime against humanity and that all sides in the struggle committed gross human
rights violations).
9
This scale measures agreement with the findings of the TRC. It is
notable that interracial differences on the index are trivial.
Reconciliation is more complicated, consisting of four major subdimensions:
(1) interracial reconciliation (rejection of interracial stereotypes and prejudice),
(2) political tolerance (willingness to allow ones political foes full rights of politi-
cal contestation), (3) support for human rights principles (and, in particular, the rule
of law), and (4) the extension of legitimacy to the political institutions of the New
South Africa (Parliament and the Constitutional Court).
10
Truth and reconciliation are measured at the level of the individual South
Africansince this research is based on a representative sample of the nation, the
respondents are predominantly bystanders, not victims or perpetratorsso the
hypothesis is that citizens participating more in the TRCs truth are more likely to
respect and trust those of other races, to tolerate those with different political views,
to support the extension of human rights to all South Africans, and to extend legiti-
macy and respect to the major governing institutions of South Africas democracy.
This is not an analysis of activists or elites or victims or perpetrators; instead, it is
a study of truth acceptance and reconciliation within the broad South African
population. Since I contend that one of the primary goals of the truth and reconcili-
ation process was societal transformation, this focus on a representative sample of
ordinary South Africans is appropriate.
8. It is interesting that few, if any, assert that the goal of the TRC was to end the extensive political
violence that broke out after the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the release of
Nelson Mandela and other leaders in 1990. Conventional wisdom holds that more South Africans died in
political violence in the 1990-1994 period than in all other periods of South African history combined.
Such violence started to abate just about the time at which the TRC began to function in South Africa,
probably as a result of the success of the 1994 election, so it is doubtful that the truth and reconciliation
process was a cause of peace. Contrariwise, perhaps the truth and reconciliation process played a role in
stopping political violence from reemerging, although counterfactuals such as this are always extremely
difficult to prove.
9. Thus, this approach addresses the broad truth about the countrys apartheid past, not the specific
truth of individual events. The latter has often been hotly contested, even by friends of the truth and
reconciliation process.
10. With the possible exception of interracial tolerance, these aspects of reconciliation are applica-
ble to most countries wracked by political strife. These are also essential components of a democratic
political culture
JCR287115.qxd 4/11/2006 7:59 PM Page 413
Table 1 reports the correlations within South Africas four main racial groups
between acceptance of the TRCs truth and reconciliation. This table is drawn from
my (Gibson 2004) analysis and uses a measure of reconciliation that summarizes the
four major subdimensions of the concept (interracial tolerance, political tolerance,
support for human rights, and the extension of legitimacy to South Africas major
political institutions). Readers should consult the book for details on these measures.
The most certain conclusion of this research is that truth did not undermine
reconciliation: none of the correlations is negative. Also relatively certain is the find-
ing that those subscribing to the TRCs truth are more likely to be reconciled.
Significantly less certain is my causal claim (based on advanced statistical analysis)
that truth did indeed create reconciliation, at least among some segments of the
South African population. Based on this type of evidence, I draw the conclusion that
truth may have produced reconciliation in South Africa.
Through what process did truth produce reconciliation? My conclusion is that it
succeeded in getting people to rethink their views about the struggle over apartheid
by creating cognitive dissonance and by mitigating cognitive dogmatism, resulting in
changes in the way South Africans feel about each other. In short, the truth and rec-
onciliation process may have created uncertainty and doubt about the goodness and
morality of ones cause. As I demonstrate below, one of its most consequential lessons
was that all sides in the struggle did horrible things. Truth exposed atrocities, perhaps
making some people less likely to reconcile. But the TRC also documented atrocities
by all parties in the struggle over apartheid, making many South Africans less certain
about the purity of their side and forcing people to acknowledge that the other side
was also unfairly victimized. Recognizing the legitimacy of ones opponents claims
to human rights abuses may be a necessary condition for reconciliation.
Sharing responsibility, blame, and victimhood creates a common identity, which
can provide a basis for dialogue. If people are no longer dogmatically attached to
a good versus evil view of the struggle, then perhaps a space for reconciliation is
opened. As the commission proclaimed,
One can say that the information in the hands of the Commission made it impossible
to claim, for example, that: the practice of torture by the state security forces was not
systematic and widespread; that only a few rotten eggs or bad apples committed
TABLE 1
The Connection between Truth and Reconciliation, South Africa
Africans Truth Acceptance .23 Reconciliation
Whites Truth Acceptance .53 Reconciliation
Coloured people Truth Acceptance .34 Reconciliation
Asian origin Truth Acceptance .09 Reconciliation
SOURCE: Gibson (2004).
NOTE: Entries shown are bivariate correlation coefficients.
JCR287115.qxd 4/11/2006 7:59 PM Page 414
gross violations of human rights; that the state was not directly and indirectly involved
in black-on-black violence; that the chemical and biological warfare programme was
only of a defensive nature; that slogans by sections of the liberation movement did not
contribute to killings of settlers or farmers; and that the accounts of gross human
rights violations in the African National Congress (ANC) camps were the consequence
of state disinformation. Thus, disinformation about the past that had been accepted as
truth by some members of society lost much of its credibility. (Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, Final Report 1998, 1:111-2)
But just how does reconciliation lead to the consolidation of democratic transi-
tions?
11
Reconciliation can give rise, in turn, to the consolidation of democratic
change through several specific processes related to the reduction of intergroup con-
flict. These are described in Table 2.
Table 2 portrays a set of mechanisms through which reconciliation institutions
and processes might help mitigate intergroup conflict and enhance the prospects of
democratic consolidation. Briefly, political tolerance means supporting the exten-
sion of the rights of political competition (e.g., speech, assembly) to all who would
compete in the marketplace of ideas. Intergroup prejudice refers to the suspension of
group stereotypes and the extension of intergroup trust. The legitimacy of human
rights values signifies the willingness of both masses and elites to support key prin-
ciples of human rights (e.g., universalism in the rule of law). In addition, the institu-
tions of the new system must be granted the authority to make binding decisions
(legitimacy), thereby generating a presumption of compliance and acquiescence to
law (e.g., Tyler and Huo 2002). Finally, by building and certifying a collective
memory of the past, a truth and reconciliation process can free a society from its
TABLE 2
Connecting Reconciliation and Democratic Consolidation
Mechanism for Mitigating Intergroup Conflict
Component of Reconciliation and Enhancing Democratic Consolidation
Reduction of political intolerance Expansion of individual freedom and an unrestricted
marketplace of ideas
Reduction of intergroup prejudice Increased intergroup trust and cooperation
Support for a human rights culture Increased constraints on the ability of authorities to
suspend/manipulate the rule of law
Institutional legitimacy Expanded capacity of institutions to make unpopular
but necessary decisions; increased acquiescence
Collective memory Redirecting political debate from the past to the future
11. Some may view reconciliation as an end in and of itself. For political scientists, reconciliation
is probably more interesting to the extent that it contributes to a political culture that is supportive of
democratic institutions and processes (on political culture, see below). For others, reconciliation may con-
tribute to civil peace, irrespective of whether the system is democratic.
JCR287115.qxd 4/11/2006 7:59 PM Page 415
obsession with past injustices, redirecting political debate to contemporary issues.
While intercorrelated, each of these factors is hypothesized to contribute indepen-
dently to the mitigation of intergroup conflict and the consolidation of democratic
reform through the identified mechanism.
CONDITIONS CONTRIBUTING TO THE SUCCESS OF THE
SOUTH AFRICAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION PROCESS
From the South African case, it is possible to draw several general conclusions
about the factors contributing to the effectiveness of truth and reconciliation processes.
(1) The process must penetrate society, capturing the attention of all of its seg-
ments. If society is to be changed by the revelations and conclusions of a truth com-
mission, then people must pay attention to the information. For instance, the South
African Broadcast Corporation aired special reports on the TRC every Sunday from
April 1996 until March 1998, and the program often scored as among the most pop-
ular on South African television. And TV exposure was minuscule in comparison
to radio exposure, which is crucial since radio is the most widely available informa-
tion medium for most South Africans. The process made known, in highly personal-
ized and excruciating detail, the suffering of thousands of individual South Africans.
The atrocities committed during the struggle over apartheid were not abstractions but
were, instead, deeply human losses that resonated with South Africans of every color.
Through its numerous hearings in every part of the country, including the hinterland,
the TRC pierced the consciousness of nearly all South Africans. With such saturation,
it seems likely that everyone had the opportunity to judge the TRCs conclusions.
(2) Legalistic processes are less successful at capturing the attention of people
than simple truth-telling events. Without denying the loss of important due process
rights when the legalistic process is relaxed, I believe the TRC made its work accessi-
ble by allowing ordinary people to tell their stories largely unhindered by adversary-
style proceedings. Many of these stories captured the imagination of broad segments
of South African society; if the goal is the transformation of a political culture, tri-
als and legalistic proceedings are unlikely to contribute much because they fail to
capture and hold the attention of ordinary people.
(3) South Africas TRC was charged with ideological and partisan bias virtually
from the day it was created, and in the end, the commission was condemned by essen-
tially all political parties in South Africa, from the ANC to the Inkatha Freedom Party
(IFP). Many treat this as evidence of the evenhandedness of the TRC (a few dubbed
it poisonous evenhandedness). Generally, most South Africans seem to be satisfied
with the impartiality of the commission and its work (Gibson 2005). For example,
roughly three-fourths of black South Africans approve of the work of the commission,
although the racial minorities (whites, Coloured people, and those of Asian origin) are
less positive toward it. The commission did not engage in a witch-hunt, contrary to
the allegations of some extreme segments of the white Afrikaans-speaking population.
Because it did not, its findings and conclusions were not widely rejected by ordinary
JCR287115.qxd 4/11/2006 7:59 PM Page 416
people; little justification was available to most South Africans for repudiating out
of hand the collective memory produced by the proceedings. To succeed, a truth and
reconciliation process cannot be an agent of the victor in the struggle (which was of
course relatively easy in the South African case since the brokered transition produced
no hegemonic victor). Impartiality contributes to the legitimacy of (and acceptance of)
the truth processs collective memory.
(4) The most puissant characteristic of the collective memory created by South
Africas TRC was its willingness to attribute blame to all parties engaging in the
struggle over apartheid.
12
Because all participants did horrible thingseven if they
did not do them with equal ferocity or frequencyall sides were compromised to
some degree, and legitimacy adhered to the complaints of their enemies about
abuses. Whites cannot believe today that their apartheid state committed no atroci-
ties against blacks. Blacks cannot believe today that the liberation forces did not
unfairly harm both black and white South Africans. Once one concedes that the other
side has legitimate grievances, it becomes easier to accept some of its claims and,
ultimately, to affirm the new political dispensation. Promulgating this view of shared
blame was probably the single most importantand influentialcharacteristic of
the South African truth and reconciliation process.
13
(5) Another effective but perhaps idiosyncratic element of South Africas truth
and reconciliation process was its emphasis on nonretributive forms of justice.
Despite granting amnesty to gross human rights violators, the truth and reconcilia-
tion process in South Africa generated justice that appeared to satisfy manyit over-
came the justice deficit. The compensatory justice was in part distributive (but in
the view of many, a too small part) but was also procedural and restorative. Allowing
people to come forward and tell their storiesand allowing South Africans to hear
these stories, in all their shocking, human detailhad a tremendous effect on how
people reacted to the truth and reconciliation process. And undoubtedly, some per-
petrators expressed heartfelt remorse, apologizing for their actions in terms that were
widely understood to be sincere. The truth and reconciliation process contemplated
that distributive justice (compensation) might ameliorate the pain of failing to
receive retributive justice. But few who designed and participated in the process
12. Leslie Vinjamuri (personal communication, 2004) has suggested that this argument about the
need to blame all sides may be inconsistent with efforts in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) to
blame all three ethnic groups for gross human rights violations. It seems at least possible that the politi-
cal cultures in the FRY were not particularly committed to the rule of law and that, after the war, no truth
process was put into place to legitimize the grievances of all sides in the conflagration. Consequently,
each side remained firmly committed to its unreconstructed and unreconciled version of the truth. Thus,
blaming all sides may not be a successful strategy in all circumstances. One objective of this article is to
attempt to identify the conditions under which such approaches to truth can be effective.
13. It is difficult to imagine an armed struggle in which atrocities are not committed by all parties,
even if victors justice tends not to apply the same standards to all combatants. The impartial truth about
which I write here would have no difficulty laying blame at the doorsteps of both sides of the
Israeli/Palestinian dispute, the Catholic/Protestant conflict in Northern Ireland, and even the American/
Iraqi turmoil. When security concerns, wars against terrorism, or a crusade are allowed to trump equal
and universal applications of human rights principles, then whatever truth might be produced is unlikely to
have legitimacy with all parties, and truth is therefore unlikely to contribute to reconciliation.
JCR287115.qxd 4/11/2006 7:59 PM Page 417
anticipated that procedural and restorative justice could have such salutary conse-
quences. Other truth processes have foundered, owing to their inability to generate
compensatory forms of justice capable of mollifying citizens and getting them to
accept the injustices forced on them by the transitional process.
(6) Finally, the roles of Tutu and Mandela were no doubt instrumental in getting
people to accept the TRCs collective memory and to get on with reconciliation.
Tutus message of forgiveness, though irritating to many, set a compelling frame of
reference for moving beyond the atrocities uncovered. Mandelas constant and insis-
tent calls for reconciliation, coupled with his willingness to accept the findings of the
TRC (even when the ANC did not), were surely persuasive for many South Africans.
The two giants of the anti-apartheid struggle defused and delegitimized much of the
potential criticism of the truth and reconciliation process.
The key issue for societal transformation is getting people to accept a commis-
sions version of the truth. Not all truths can be sold to the people. But a truth that
is impartialas signaled by its willingness to cast blame wherever blame is
deservedgains credibility, especially when backed by leaders who are trusted. To
change society, a collective memory must be proffered, and people must pay atten-
tion. In South Africa, the TRC seemed to succeed at both getting the attention of the
people and persuading them of its view of the struggle over apartheid. Thus, I
contend that the South African truth and reconciliation process was persuasive, and
it succeeded in part due to the nature of the truth it promulgated.
CONNECTING TRUTH WITH
RECONCILIATION: CAUSAL MECHANISMS
In a superb recent study of transitional justice mechanisms, Snyder and Vinjamuri
(2003; see also Vinjamuri and Snyder 2004) reach a somewhat different conclusion
about the effectiveness of truth and reconciliation processes. Focusing on an analy-
sis of thirty-two cases of civil wars between 1989 and 2003, they conclude that truth
commissions contribute to democratic consolidation only when a prodemocracy
coalition holds power in a fairly well institutionalized state. Absent those conditions,
truth commissions can have perverse effects, sometimes exacerbating tensions and
at other times providing public relations smoke screens for regimes that continue to
abuse rights. Apparent successes of truth commissions are better attributed to the
effects of the amnesties that accompany them (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003, 20).
14
Furthermore, truth commissions have most often been the choice of states whose
stability depends on the cooperation of still-powerful potential spoilers. We find
that truth commissions are most likely to be useful when they provide political cover
for amnesties, and when they help a strong, reformist coalition to undertake the
14. It is unclear to me whether Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003) take into account the wide diversity in
the structures, functions, and mandates of truth commissions throughout the world. In many respects, the
South African truth and reconciliation process was unique, and it may well be the peculiar aspects of that
process that contributed so much to its success.
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strengthening of legal institutions as part of a strategy based on the logic of conse-
quences (p. 31).
15
This conclusion, if true, may undermine my contention that the
South African truth and reconciliation process had an independent impact on
reconciliation (although providing political cover is certainly a form of impact) since
(a) the South African process included an amnesty mechanism, and (b) it may be that
the prodemocratic ANC and the highly institutionalized South African state created
reconciliation, rather than the truth and reconciliation process itself.
Thus, it is useful to try to disentangle the various concepts and causal processes
by which truth, reconciliation, and democratic consolidation might be connected.
Perhaps in the end, a rapprochement can be found between my claim that truth pro-
duces reconciliation and the Snyder and Vinjamuri claim that the key causal agent is
the preexisting characteristics of the societys institutions.
Figure 1 depicts a set of processes through which the production of truth (a
collective memory) might give rise to democratic consolidation.
16
I begin this dis-
cussion with the argument that truth makes an independent contribution to democ-
ratic consolidation, which is how I understand the causality involved in the process.
The first hypothesis in this figure (the hypothesis advanced to this point in the
article) is that the activities of the TRC gave rise to a collective memory. Of course,
for a TRC to be influential, it must have captured the attention of the people in a
country; awareness must precede conversion. As I have argued, the South African
case is certainly one in which the activities of the TRC received widespread atten-
tion over a long period of time.
Not all collective memories contribute to reconciliation. I hypothesize that truth
that apportions blame to all sides in the past conflict is most effective at enhancing
reconciliation (and, as I have noted, it is difficult to imagine a conflict in which this
claim is in fact not true). The first step on the road to reconciliation is the realization
that ones opponents were unfairly victimized and that ones own side bears some
responsibility. In South Africa, the TRCs evenhanded message that all sides did
horrible things during the struggle contributed to reconciliation.
17
Thus, according to this logic, truth makes an independent contribution to democra-
tic consolidation by changing society, changing how people think about their own side
and about their opponents.
18
A simplified view of the causality involved is as follows:
Truth Reconciliation Democratic Consolidation
15. Many believe that the granting of amnesty to gross human rights violators itself undermines
institutions, especially legal institutions, grounded on the principle of the rule of law (e.g., Neier 1998).
For evidence that this was not the case in South Africa, see Gibson (2005).
16. Students of democratization distinguish between the initiation of democracy and the consolida-
tion of democracy. The latter is defined as only possible when political competitors . . . come to regard
democracy (and the laws, procedures, and institutions it specifies) as the only game in town, the only
viable framework for governing the society and advancing their own interests (Diamond 1999, 65).
17. Factors other than truth obviously also contribute to reconciliation. I represent these variables
with Interracial Contact since Overcoming Apartheid (Gibson 2004) reports that contact in the South
African case is also a strong predictor of interracial reconciliation.
18. It would be foolish to argue that only truth and reconciliation processes contribute to democra-
tic consolidation, so I include in Figure 1 other important determinants of democratic consolidation under
the label Etc.
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Of course, other factors also contribute to reconciliation, just as democratic consolidation
is dependent on additional factors such as wealth, equality, and cultural homogeneity.
THE ENDOGENEITY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION PROCESS
The alternative view that must receive careful consideration is that the truth and
reconciliation process is endogenous to South African society and, therefore, that the
process had no independent impact on reconciliation or democratic consolidation.
That is, truth and reconciliation processes are created by a society, and the very
forces that lead to the creation of such institutions may be the primary causes of both
reconciliation and democratization. Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003) emphasize the role
of a prodemocracy political party holding power and of having a well-institutionalized
state. These factors may be influential, but they are most likely also derived from
broader characteristics of the political culture of the polity. Thus, these factors may
themselves be endogenous to a political system.
More generally, I acknowledge that the success of a TRC may be dependent on
the larger political culture of the polity.
19
Not only does political culture determine
the nature of the collective memory produced, but it also independently and directly
fosters reconciliation. If so, the relationship between truth and reconciliation
processes and democratization may be spurious.
Figure 1: Processes Linking Political Cultures, Truth, Reconciliation, and Democratic
Consolidation
TRC
Activities
Truth-
Collective
Memory
Political
Culture
Etc.
(Interracial
Contact)
Reconciliation
[See Table 2]
Democratic
Consolidation
Etc. (Wealth
Equality,
Homogeneity)
19. Political culture may be thought of as the beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors that predom-
inate in a political system. Culture is important because it gives rise to norms and expectations that influ-
ence political action. Political cultures do not necessarily dictate public policies, but they do set broad
constraints on the policy options available to elites.
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But just what specific aspects of the political culture might contribute to a success-
ful truth and reconciliation process? From the South African case, several factors seem
to be important, including the following: the nature of the legislation establishing the
truth and reconciliation process, the support within South African political culture for
the rule of law, political pluralism, the amnesty process itself, the size of the victim and
perpetrator populations, and the leadership of the truth and reconciliation process.
Figure 2 provides an overview of the various exogenous factors I hypothesize to be
influential in producing reconciliation and democratic consolidation.
THE ENABLING LEGISLATION
The legislation creating the TRC (passed with wide parliamentary support) was
specifically designed to enhance the impartiality of the proceedings. For instance,
the commission itself was intended to be broadly representative of all interests in the
struggle over apartheid, and the legislation mandated that gross human rights viola-
tions be investigated irrespective of the ideological position of the perpetrator. The
commissioners selected to serve were indeed ideologically balanced.
20
And, as I have
noted, the work of the TRC has been bitterly criticized by just war advocates for
its poisonous evenhandedness.
Of course, law itself may be endogenous to the political system, so this explanation
does not go a great distance in solving the problem of causal mechanisms. That is,
Truth and
Reconciliation
Process
Rule of Law
Political Pluralism
Amnesty
Extent of Injuries
Leadership
Evenhandedness
Leadership
Societal Penetration
Impact
Macro Model
Figure 2: A Macro-Level Model of the Influence of the Truth and Reconciliation Process
20. Useful accounts of the day-to-day operation of truth commissions have been published. For
instance, Boraine (2000) gives the insiders view of the politics of South Africas TRC. So too does Orr
(2000), although her story is both more personal and more connected to specific cases before the TRC.
The transformation of an individual commissioner is documented by Gobodo-Madikizelas (2003) mov-
ing account of her meetings with one of apartheids worst assassins. Several highly informative antholo-
gies on truth commissions have been published. In the South African case, none is better than that
compiled by Villa-Vicencio and Verwoerd (2000).
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the characteristics that caused the law to emphasize impartiality may be the ultimate
cause of the performance of the TRC, not the law itself. As many have argued, law
is rarely an entirely exogenous force in processes of social change.
SOUTH AFRICAS RULE OF LAW CULTURE
More controversial will surely be my claim that South Africas relatively strong
support for the rule of law contributed to the success of the truth and reconciliation
process. Because this argument will seem counterintuitive to those who equate
apartheid with arbitrary rule, it must be discussed in some detail.
In some sense, apartheid may appear to be a system entirely at odds with the rule
of law. Certainly, there was no equality before the law, and indeed by the constitu-
tional scheme implemented in 1983, Africans were meant to be largely expelled
from South Africa (relocated in Bantustans) through forced removals and ethnic
cleansing (e.g., so-called black spots). Such a system can hardly be considered to
exemplify the rule of law.
But at least in terms of procedure, apartheid was very much a system based on the
rule of law.
21
For instance, the respected legal observer John Dugard asserts, Law
played a pivotal role in the apartheid state. Racial discrimination and political repres-
sion were not practiced outside the law in an arbitrary and unregulated manner. On
the contrary, racial injustice was perpetrated in accordance with legal rules, and
political repression was administered according to carefully defined legal proce-
dures (Abel 1995, XIII).
22
The contrast here should not be between South Africa
and fully functioning democracies but rather between South Africa and other
authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian (or totalitarian) rule is often arbitrary ruleas
represented in the phrases legal nihilism or even telephone justiceand the
antithesis of the rule of law is arbitrariness. Of course, a rule-based system can be
repressivelaw can serve tyrants and democrats well, even if perhaps not equally
wellbut to a remarkable degree, South Africa provided procedural protections to
those to whom it denied substantive rights.
23
Perhaps the Snyder and Vinjamuri
(2003) prodemocracy institutions argument might be more precisely delineated in
terms of one of the subcomponents of democracyinstitutional and cultural
commitments to the rule of law.
24
An argument contrary to this would rely on at least two factors: the frequent sus-
pension of law through emergency proclamations and the use of covert and entirely
21. On the rule of law in Africa, see Widner (2001). She seems to agree with my view that the rule
of law can be compatible with abhorrent, entirely unjust statutes.
22. This quote is taken from the Foreword to Abels (1995) book, written by John Dugard.
23. One cannot help but be impressed by Mandelas reports in his autobiography (1994) of the fre-
quency of formal hearings granted prisoners at Robben Island. See also Buntman (2003) for similar accounts.
24. Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003) are surely correct in arguing that the distribution of political power
has a crucial influence on peace and reconciliation. But they believe that the consequence of the power
balance is mainly to allow a prodemocratic coalition to assume power. Perhaps it is not actually support
for democracy that is important but rather that all sides in the conflict have sufficient power to ensure that
the gross human rights violations they experienced get recognized and acknowledged. It is not necessarily
democracy that gives rise to evenhandedness; instead, pluralism may be the primary cause.
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illegal activity against members of the anti-apartheid struggle (e.g., de Kock 1998).
Neither of these can be denied.
Yet in a curious way, each supports my argument. When the South Africans felt
it necessary to suspend ordinary civil law, they did so through established, legalistic
methods. Stalin never sought a declaration of martial law in the Soviet Union; law
rarely if ever impeded his actions. In contrast, procedural regularity was an impor-
tant characteristic of rule by apartheid.
25
As has been argued elsewhere (Gibson 2004), white South Africans claimed not
to have known about covert activities by their government against the anti-apartheid
movement. Furthermore, I contend that the revelations of such widespread illicit
activity actually contributed to reconciliation among whites by fostering the belief
that blacks had legitimate grievances against the apartheid system. Thus, it seems
entirely possible that the commitment of white South Africans to the rule of law
made them responsive to the TRCs revelations of gross government misconduct.
White South Africans have long looked to Europe and European culture and
traditions for approval and sustenance. An important aspect of the racism that dom-
inated the culture was the belief that Europeans are different from (superior to)
Africans. One way in which this superiority is manifest is through the commitment
to democracy (of a sort) and to institutions such as the rule of law. Some empiri-
cal evidence does indeed indicate that South Africans, especially whites, express a
level of commitment to the rule of law that is quite similar to that of Europeans (e.g.,
Gibson and Gouws 1997; Gibson 2004).
This preference for legal universalism shaped to a considerable degree the
proceedings of the truth and reconciliation process,
26
particularly the willingness to
blame all sides in the struggle for abuses of human rights. The just war theory that
might excuse atrocities was certainly put forth in some quarters in South Africa, but
it failed to carry the day with the TRC itself. Legal universalism, in which all sides
were held accountable to the same ecumenical standards, dominated the conclusions
of the truth and reconciliation process.
27
Thus, I argue that the truth and reconciliation process succeeded in part due to its
willingness to judge evenhandedly, applying the same standards to all parties, and
that this practice was countenanced (and legitimized) by a fairly widespread com-
mitment in the culture to the rule of law (legal universalism). This commitment
25. Although I have not conducted a systematic comparison of the Soviet Union and South Africa,
the contrast between the Rivonia trial (sending Nelson Mandela and others to prison) and Stalins show
trials in terms of the rule of law seems stark.
26. Even the exceptions to this assertion support my argument that a high degree of commitment to
the rule of law characterized this process. When the TRC granted blanket amnesty to the ANC
leadershipan action clearly outside its authoritythe decision was challenged and overturned by the
Constitutional Court. In addition, through litigation, the TRC was forced to extend due process to alleged
perpetrators. Concern for due process shaped many aspects of the commissions activities. Of course, the
availability of such institutions as the Constitutional Courtwhich had sufficient legitimacy to get its
decisions acceptedmay be one of the institutional factors identified by Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003) as
contributing to the consolidation of democracy.
27. Again, I should emphasize that neither I nor the TRC is asserting that gross human rights viola-
tions committed by the government and the liberation forces were in any sense of equal scale or breadth.
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reflects in part the European origins of South African whites and their continuing
use of Europe as a reference group, as well as their desire to win the approval of
Europeans and the rest of the Western world. Thus, in this sense, the success of the
truth and reconciliation process may reflect a larger cultural commitment to the rule
of law in South Africa.
The rule of law and trials
The above argument may seem to imply that formal legal proceedings (trials) would
be the preferred means of dealing with gross human rights violations. Perhaps trials
were preferred, but
(a) given that the apartheid bureaucracy remained in full power from 1990 until
1994, the evidence necessary to produce convictions, especially to the stan-
dards of due process, was absent, missing, or destroyed and/or believed to be
so (Harris 2000).
(b) the early prosecution of Defense Minister Magnus Malan for murders com-
mitted during the apartheid erawhich resulted in an acquittal in 1996
demonstrated the extraordinary financial and political costs (and perhaps
futility) of formal legal proceedings.
(c) the ANC had little if any choice in accepting amnesty since the apartheid
forces made amnesty a nonnegotiable demand in the bargaining during the
transition. The ANC was weakened by the loss of support from the Soviet
Union, the South African Defense Force was still a formidable institution,
and no one wanted to fight a full-scale civil war in South Africa. Widespread
trials were therefore simply not feasible.
(d) perhaps most important, early on in the process, the TRC decided that its
primary job was societal transformation, and it therefore sought to commu-
nicate with all segments of South African society. Trials may be good at
some things, but they are not a very effective means of telling stories under-
standable to ordinary people. In some sense, the fact-finding process imple-
mented by the TRC became a means to the greater end of societal
transformation and reconciliation.
The truth and reconciliation process therefore sought to implement universal
principles of human rights but without full-scale legalistic procedures.
POLITICAL PLURALISM
South Africaeven white South Africa under apartheidis characterized by
multiple, competing centers of political power. Among blacks, for instance, the
Traditional Leaders are a potent conservative force organized in the Congress of
Traditional Leaders in South Africa (Contralesa), and they often oppose the actions
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and positions of the ANC. From the left wing, the same might be said of Cosatu (the
Congress of South African Trade Unions). And of course, the Inkatha Freedom Party
(and other minor parties such as the Pan Africanist Congress) often stands in strong
opposition to the ANC.
Whites too are divided, reflecting in part longstanding enmity between English
and Afrikaans speakers (a cleavage reinforced by other factors as well, including
different and often contending mass media). Moreover, the density of activist
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is likely as high in South Africa as any-
where else in the world. And, unlike many countries, especially in Africa, the eyes
of the world (e.g., the BBC) are often focused on South Africa.
The consequence of this pluralism is that South Africas truth and reconciliation
process was heavily scrutinized by parties representing a variety of disparate inter-
ests, making deviations from impartiality costly. Because there are competing
centers of power in South African society, no single interest can run roughshod over
the others. Such a distribution of power, of course, serves legal universalism well.
The motivation to hold all parties to the same human rights expectations, coupled
with the dispersion of power across a broad ideological range, may well have
contributed to the effectiveness of the truth and reconciliation process.
AMNESTY
As I have noted, Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003) argue that the crucial element in
transitional justice processes is amnesty. Especially in instances of negotiated settle-
ments, in which neither side in the struggle emerges as hegemonic, the potential for
the representatives of the old regime to serve as spoilers for democratic reform is so
formidable that their allegiance to the new regime must be bought through amnesty.
It is difficult for reconciliation to get a foothold in the midst of legal struggles over
the sins of the ancien regime.
It is virtually impossible to distinguish between the truth and reconciliation
process in general and the amnesty process in particular. Undeniably, amnesty neu-
tralized the forces of apartheid, allowing the ANC to take control of the government
and smoothing the transitional process. But the truth and reconciliation process was
about far more than amnesty, and even amnesty hearings often turned into tutorials
on reconciliation and forgiveness. Moreover, perhaps the most important aspect of
the truth and reconciliation process was that victims were given voicethey were
provided the opportunity to come forth and tell their stories and receive acknowl-
edgment and, to some degree, a restoration of their dignity. In this sense, the amnesty
process turned attention to the victims, not mainly to the perpetrators, and thereby
provided a compelling set of human interest vignettes that captured the imagination
of all South Africans, black, white, Coloured, and Indian. According to Snyder
and Vinjamuri (2003), amnesty defuses the impact of spoilers. In South Africa, it
certainly did that, and to neutralize the pro-apartheid segment of the population was
no small feat. But amnesty did much more by humanizing the victims of the terrible
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deeds committed during the struggle over apartheid, making coexistence and tolerance
(if not full reconciliation) more likely.
28
THE EXTENT OF INJURIES INFLICTED DURING
THE STRUGGLE WITH THE PRIOR REGIME
In societies such as Rwanda, in which vast proportions of the population were
affected in one way or another by human rights atrocities, reconciliation seems a dis-
tant dream. In South Africa, however, the proportion of the population directly
injured by apartheid was large but far from enormous. When asked in a general
query whether they suffered any harm under apartheid, fully 68 percent of the black
respondents in a national survey claimed not to have been injured by apartheid
(Gibson 2004). This is an astounding figure. Of course, when provided with specific
examples of injuries, the percentages are higher, but it is noteworthy that (at the two
extremes) only a small proportion of these respondents was actually imprisoned by
the authorities (9.9 percent), while 43.7 percent claim to have been harmed by not
being permitted to associate with people of different races or colors. Lack of access
to education is another widely experienced harm. Still, a large minority of Africans
(39.4 percent) claims no specific injuries from this set of comprehensive questions
on apartheid injuries. Indeed, only slightly more than one-third claim to have been
subjected to the infamous pass laws.
My intention is not to depreciate the tremendous damage that apartheid did to South
Africans, especially black South Africans. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the strug-
gle over apartheid was not a civil war, and vast proportions of blacks, whites, Coloured
people, and those of Asian origin were not directly engaged in or perhaps even directly
affected by the struggle over apartheid. This no doubt makes reconciliation a less
demanding task. The foregoing suggests the general hypothesis that the larger the pro-
portion of the population that was essentially bystanders during the conflict, the more
likely is reconciliation. If this is so, then truth and reconciliation processes may not be
very effective in polities in which historical grievances are commonplace.
STRONG AND INDEPENDENT LEADERSHIP
The TRC has been criticized for being hijacked by Archbishop Desmond Tutu
and especially for placing a strong religious veneer on its activities (e.g., Wilson 2001).
Whatever the validity of that criticism, few would doubt that Archbishop Tutu had
strong and independent views of the nature of the mandate extended to the TRC. At
the same time, Nelson Mandela was an inveterate supporter of the TRC, even when it
released its final report, in which the ANC was subjected to some intense criticism.
The success of the truth and reconciliation process undoubtedly reflects the promi-
nence and charisma of Tutu and Mandela. In particular, Tutus religious ideology fits
28. It is beyond the scope of this article (but not of Gibson 2004) to consider reconciliation com-
prehensively. In my view, the necessary condition of reconciliation is tolerance, not forgiving, nor accep-
tance, nor even the suspension of hatred. In a society rent by intense political conflict, tolerance is
typically the maximal realistic outcome possible.
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well with dominant notions of reconciliation, especially reconciliation involving
forgiveness. Perhaps more important was Tutus relative independence, especially
from the ANC. Tutu was quite effective at casting blame in all directions, with
Mandelas support of the TRC providing an important part of the political cover
required to maintain the commissions independence. Without independence, victors
justice might prevail, with the ability to blame all sides for their human rights abuses
severely constrained.
SUMMARY
There can be little doubt that a truth and reconciliation process reflects the attrib-
utes of the political system and the culture implementing it. Because South Africans
hold a relatively strong commitment to the rule of law, legal universalism became an
elemental principle of the truth and reconciliation process, and this universalism led
to a willingness to blame all human rights violators irrespective of party or ideology.
It seems quite likely that institutional arrangements not compatible with dominant
cultural values would have little chance of success (e.g., a process based on legal
universalism in a culture in which the rule of law is not highly regarded). As a
process of societal transformation, the truth and reconciliation process obviously is
dependent on the countrys culture.
At the same time, however, the success of South Africas truth and reconciliation
process was far from preordained by its political culture. For instance, the commis-
sion was often under intense pressure from the government and the ANC, and it
typically (but not invariably) refused to succumb to that pressure. The outcome could
easily have been different. Nothing in the political culture made it inevitable that
whites would begin to accept some blame for the sins of apartheid, that blacks would
recognize that human rights were also sacrificed in the name of liberation, or that all
South Africans would agree to coexist, to tolerate, to at least some extent. On the
contrary, all of this came about as a result of the revelations of the TRC; without the
TRC, it is unclear how these revelations could have been made and so widely pub-
licized. Certainly, the truth and reconciliation process capitalized on existing cultural
predispositions, but it is also quite likely that the culture changed as a result of the
actions and revelations of the process itself. Thus, I posit an interactive (multiplica-
tive) effect between a systems political culture and the efforts of a truth commis-
sion: each is dependent on the other, just as each is necessary to the effectiveness
of the process. And I acknowledge that these cultural requisites may limit the
generalizability of the South African experience.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Causal inferences, even under the best of circumstances, are never certain; estab-
lishing a consensus on causality in the sociopolitical world is always a demanding if
not intractable task. For instance, does HIV cause AIDS? In South Africa, President
Mbeki has denied that HIV is a cause of AIDS (citing poverty as the causal agent),
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while the Catholic bishops have proclaimed that AIDS is caused by the use of
condoms! Did the fall of communism in the Soviet Union cause the democratic tran-
sition in South Africa? Certainly a case can be made that the ANC felt less certain
of winning a civil war against apartheid without Soviet support and therefore became
more inclined to accept a seat at the bargaining table. But alternative causal
processes are plausible as well. When we address even larger questions such as
whether truth causes reconciliation, the fainthearted are tempted to either throw up
their hands or toss a coin since research on large processes of societal transforma-
tion can rarely if ever provide unequivocal evidence on what causes what. The best
those determined to draw conclusions about causality can do is to suggest a plausi-
ble causal structure for the key variables that is not contradicted by available empir-
ical evidence.
In this article, I have identified a causal process through which truth might have
led to reconciliation in South Africa. The process produced a truth that stimulated
many South Africans to reconceptualize the struggle over apartheid as something
other than a clash between infinite good against unremitting evil. In rethinking the
battle over apartheid, many South Africans came to appreciate the unfair harms
experienced by their longtime foes, began to accept that at least some of the justifi-
cations for the opposing side were legitimate, and therefore began to accept that tol-
erance was justified and ought to prevail. Putting the past behind through social
amnesia is unlikely to generate such salutary effects. Nor is victors justice. South
Africa is not a fully reconciled society (by a long shot), but the truth and reconcili-
ation process gave reconciliation a strong initial impetus that may well carry the day.
Discussions about truth commissions often contrast two polar opposites: vindi-
cating the past by strict enforcement of human rights regulations through prosecu-
tions of miscreants versus pragmatic amnesties recognizing the greater importance
of the future than the past (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003 quite appropriately refer to
these as stressing either the logic of appropriateness versus the logic of conse-
quences). In this article, I have identified a third, compromise pathway: strict con-
demnation of all who violate universal human rights standards but without extensive
prosecution (perhaps to be called a logic of rational hypocrisy). In this fashion, the
principle of universalism is compromised to a lesser degree, while pragmatic con-
siderations prevail in documenting the past but preparing for the future.
Must the truth of truth and reconciliation be true? This is a difficult question to
answer in the abstract. But the truth I find to be most efficaciousthat all sides in
the struggle did horrible thingsis a truth available in virtually all conflicts. Surely
there are limits to what people will accept, but evenhandedness in establishing the
truth about atrocities is often attractive to people and therefore can be persuasive.
Evenhandedness provides truth commissions with legitimacy, and legitimacy is
crucial to getting a collective memory accepted by the population.
Are alternative causal structures also possible? In this article, I have admitted
the possibility that truth may have had little to do with reconciliation. Instead, the
expressed commitment to the rule of law, coupled with fairly substantial political
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pluralism, may have given rise to a truth process emphasizing legal universalism and
evenhandedness, just as these cultural characteristics made the findings of the com-
mission palatable and thereby enhanced reconciliation. From this vantage point, the
truth and reconciliation process had questionable independent influence on societal
reconciliation.
Most likely, a complex causal structure accounts for the South African outcome. It
may well be that the nature of the truth and reconciliation process was in fact influ-
enced by the political culture of the country (including the prominent role assigned to
legally trained people and theologians). But the effectiveness of the truth and recon-
ciliation process was not therefore preordained. The truth and reconciliation process
had to stick to its commitment to legal universalism and evenhandedness, even
despite intense political pressure to the contrary. The TRC itself had to develop and
execute a strategy of involving all segments of society in its work. The decision to
eschew strictly legal proceedings may not have been based on the explicit desire to
maximize the influence of the process on the broader society, but, I contend, the con-
sequence of that decision was that ordinary South Africans found the process engag-
ing and compelling. Perhaps the political culture of the country did prepare South
Africans for a successful truth and reconciliation processby predisposing people to
resonate with the TRCs appeals, by providing political capital for the commissioners
but because the process could have turned out otherwiseby blaming the apartheid
government exclusively for their crimes against humanityI argue that the truth
and reconciliation process had independent agency in South Africas transition.
Complex causal processes always involve multicollinearityindependent variables
that are themselves intercorrelated to the extent that the independent contribution of
each independent variable is difficult if not impossible to discern.
Jack Snyder (personal communication, 2004) has suggested two critical factors
that might assist in unraveling the causal process. First, did the rival parties make a
solid agreement settling their differences and then simply go through the motions of
creating a truth and reconciliation process with the power to grant amnesty? Is so,
then the initial agreement is probably the primary causal agent. Second, did the pre-
vailing political coalition monopolize publicity about the truth and reconciliation
process and spin the findings for its own purposes, or did public views of the
process emerge on the basis of pluralistic debate and free reporting?
In the South African case, few would argue that the TRC was simply going
through the motions; indeed, the contrary view that the process spun completely out
of control of its creators is entirely more plausible. Moreover, information about the
truth and reconciliation process was extraordinarily diverse and prevalent and com-
pletely outside the control of even the commission itself. That the findings of the
TRC were so widely and vigorously attacked (politically and legally) by all major
political forces in the country suggests that the process attained independent agency.
In the South African case, the argument that the truth and reconciliation process had
little or no impact on society and that reconciliation would have taken place anyway
is simply unpersuasive in light of the logical and empirical evidence adduced here.
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Perhaps it is useful to close this article by reiterating the necessary conditions for
reconciliation that I believe emerge from the South African case:
Truth and reconciliation processes should not lose sight of the goal of societal
transformation. Providing justice to victims and perpetrators is important, but
larger political issues are typically at stake.
The legitimacy of truth and reconciliation agencies is crucial to their influence
and should never be squandered (as the South African TRC did on a couple of
occasionse.g., the blanket amnesty granted to the ANC senior leadership).
Blame almost always can be, and always should be, allocated to all sides in
the conflict. The just war thesis should not be allowed to trump condemnation
of gross human rights abuses. The benefits of evenhandedness far outweigh
the costs of exposing atrocities by the victors.
The retributive justice deficit created by granting amnesty to gross human
rights violators can be compensated for with other forms of justicejustice is
a multidimensional concept. Truth and reconciliation processes must be mind-
ful of the justice needs of citizens and act accordingly.
Perhaps the single most important policy implication of this discussion is that
systematic, comparative efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of reconciliation
institutions and processes must be undertaken.
Although I argue that these factors are valuable to the truth and reconciliation
process, I am less certain whether each factor is indispensable to the success of the
process. For instance, in a society in which human rights victimization is wide-
spread, perhaps none of the other factors can overcome the unwillingness of victims
to reconcile. Complex interactions may be at work with these variables, and perhaps
some conditions exist in which the variables are in conflict with themselves (e.g., a
truth process that reveals widespread victimization not theretofore recognized). And
with complex relationships, one can simply never be certain whether the results from
a single country can be generalized to other contexts. I am certain, however, that
additional research on this issue is necessary and is of high priority.
Finally, is reconciliation possible without truth? Can democracy be consolidated
without truth? Answering these questions goes beyond the scope of this study, which
is of course limited to the South African case. But I certainly do not contend that the
only successful road to democratization requires some sort of truth and reconcilia-
tion process. Democracy can be imposed by outside force (e.g., Iraq), or authoritar-
ianism can collapse of its own weight (e.g., Spain). And losing factions can be
entirely destroyed and/or expelled from the country. But some sort of reconciliation
commitment to tolerance, rule of law, and so onis essential for most democracies
to be consolidated; democratic consolidation cannot take place without at least the
rudiments of a democratic political culture. And a democratic culture grounded in
reconciliation is likely to be more stable than one that is not.
Nor is it always necessary to focus on the truth about the past to create reconcil-
iation. I note (Gibson 2004) several processes through which reconciliation is
JCR287115.qxd 4/11/2006 7:59 PM Page 430
enhanced without relying on understandings of the past. And does truth inevitably
lead to reconciliation? Certainly not, as it has not for certain segments of the South
African population.
But if societal change is to take place, some exogenous force must convince ordi-
nary people to rethink their views about the contentious past. Perhaps pathways
other than truth and reconciliation are possible. But those formerly at war with each
other must be convinced to fight their struggle at the ballot box, not on the battle-
field. Strategies for creating political tolerance are necessary in all transitional
systems. The evidence from South Africa is that it is easier to put up with ones polit-
ical foes if one has some understanding of why they acted as they did and how they
have suffered, and telling the story of the struggle in an evenhanded and human way
contributes to forming this understanding.
REFERENCES
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Adam, Heribert, and Kanya Adam. 2000. The politics of memory in divided societies. In After the TRC:
Reflections on truth and reconciliation in South Africa, edited by Wilmot James and Linda van de
Vijver, 32-47. Athens: Ohio University Press.
Boraine, Alex. 2000. A country unmasked: Inside South Africas Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
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Buntman, Fran Lisa. 2003. Robben Island and prisoner resistance to apartheid. New York: Cambridge
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de Kock, Eugene. 1998. A long nights damage: Working for the apartheid state. Saxonwold, South
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