Detecting Gender and Racial Discrimination in Hiring Through

Monitoring Intermediation Services: The Case

of Selected Occupations in Metropolitan Lima, Peru
q
MARTI

N MORENO
Penn State University, USA
HUGO N

OPO
Inter-American Development Bank, USA
JAIME SAAVEDRA
World Bank, USA
and
MA

XIMO TORERO
*
IFPRI, USA
Summary. Inspired by audit studies methodology, we monitored a job intermediation service in Peru to detect gender and racial dis-
crimination in hiring. We capture individual racial information using the approach of N

opo, Saavedra, and Torero (2007), enabling a

richer exploration of racial dierences. Overall, the study nds discriminatory treatment in hiring only when comparing groups with
extremely dierent observable racial characteristics. We detect discriminatory treatment for female Indigenous applicants in secretarial
positions. In terms of aimed wages, females tend to ask for wages 7% below those of males with comparable skills (although this has no
negative impact on wages at hiring).
2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Key words eld experiments, discrimination, occupational segregation
1. INTRODUCTION
Despite social advances and a movement toward moderniza-
tion of labor markets, especially in Latin America, substantial
dierences in earnings and opportunities for individuals from
dierent gender and racial groups persist. A simple observa-
tion of job openings posted in local newspapers reects the
existence of occupations for which employers request only
male or only female employees. In other postings, the euphe-
mism good presence is used to refer to employers specic
racial preferences for particular job openings. Occupational
dierences that are linked to racial characteristics continue
due to the existence of stereotypes and prejudices. These biases
are reinforced by dierences in individuals access to education
and other assets. Furthermore, cultural dierences, often ob-
servable through behavior and mode of speech, should be
added to the dierences that are based on phenotypic charac-
teristics. Sometimes employers make their decisions using ra-
cial and ethnic characteristics as proxy measures for
attributes that they seek but that are harder to observe in a
job interview. As a result, some employers discriminate against
individuals on the basis of their racial characteristics, but not
because they have a taste for discrimination. Instead, these
employers discriminate because they use race as a signaling de-
vice, which is representative of statistical discrimination
(Coate & Loury, 1993; Yinger, 1998).
Gender dierences in occupations in Latin America are very
high when compared to the rest of the world (Blau & Ferber,
1992; Deutsch, Morrison, Piras, & N

opo, 2002). More specif-

ically, in Peru, there are substantial dierences in occupations
among gender and racial groups; and these dierences account
for earnings and wealth dierentials (N

opo et al., 2007). How-

ever, analyzing gures on segregation is not sucient in iden-
tifying whether this is a discriminatory outcome or not. This
study attempts to isolate and explore discrimination in
employers hiring decisions. It analyzes the hiring processes
for specic occupations using information from the job inter-
mediation service of the Peruvian Ministry of Labor and
Employment Promotion. The study focuses on three types of
occupations: salespersons, secretaries, and accounting and
administrative assistants. For this purpose, the experiment in-
volved monitoring the job postings in these occupations and
all corresponding processes in lling the vacancies (pre-screen-
ing of candidates, job interviews, and the nal hiring deci-
sions). For each job posting information was collected on
gender and racial characteristics of all applicants, as well as
q Previous versions of this paper circulated as Gender and Racial
Discrimination in Hiring: A Pseudo-Audit Study for Three Selected
Occupations in Metropolitan Lima.
*
We thank the Inter-American Development Bank and the Global Devel-
opment Network for their nancial support in a substantial component of
this project. The comments of Je Carpenter, Alberto Chong, Loujia Hu,
Jacqueline Mazza, Andrew Morrison, Claudia Piras, and Chris Taber, as
well as the assistance of Sebastian Calo nico, Deidre Ciliento, Cristina
Gomez, and Lucas Higuera are greatly acknowledged. Final revision acc-
epted: May 10, 2011.
World Development Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 315328, 2012
2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved
0305-750X/$ - see front matter
www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.05.003
315
the attributes that would make them employable for the occu-
pations for which they were applying. This study shares many
characteristics present in traditional audit studies, but it sur-
mounts some of the critiques highlighted by Heckman
(1998), although at a cost.
Following this brief introduction, the next section presents
some stylized facts about the labor markets in Peru, emphasiz-
ing occupational segregation, both by gender and race. In
addition, it introduces methodological considerations that
are necessary to take into account when analyzing racial dier-
ences in a post-colonial society like the Peruvian in which ra-
cial mix prevails and traditional ways of measuring race fail to
capture the vast heterogeneity behind this concept. Later,
Section 3 outlines the basic aspects of the audit studies meth-
odology, as well as its main criticisms, highlighting the similar-
ities and dierences between that methodology and the one
employed in this study. Section 4 describes the dataset, show-
ing the main characteristics of the sample of applicants and the
sample of rms. Results of the experiment are presented in
Section 5, which is followed by a conclusion in Section 6,
discussing the studys scope in the understanding of discrimi-
nation in the developing world.
2. OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION BY GENDER
AND RACE IN PERU
Measured by the Duncan Index, occupational segregation
by gender in Latin America is high relative to the rest of the
world; and Peru is not dierent from those of the region.
1
Using data from the Peruvian National Household Survey
from the year 2000 (ENAHO 2000), with a classication of se-
ven occupational groups,
2
the segregation index between
males and females reaches 0.3265; meaning that it would be
necessary for at least 32.65% of the working females to switch
occupations into those that have higher male representation,
or vice versa, in order to achieve a non-segregated work
force.
3
But, high occupational segregation in Peru occurs
not only by gender, but also by race. Just like the existence
of male-dominated and female-dominated occupations, the
study provides evidence on the existence of White-dominated
and Indigenous-dominated occupations.
The Peruvian ENAHO 2000 used in this study to show the
Duncan Index for gender segregation was complemented by a
module of ethnic and racial characteristics. N

opo et al. (2007)

show a description of such module and explore the role of ra-
cial mixing on earnings in urban Peruvian labor markets. An
innovative element of the racial module is the way in which
information on race was captured. Instead of using the tradi-
tional classication in which each individual falls into one and
only one racial category, the module proposes the use of inten-
sities along two basic dimensions of race that are prevalent
in Peru (White/Caucasian and Indigenous). The intensity scale
ranges from 0 to 10 and corresponds to a series of observable
individual characteristics that make them resemble a particu-
lar racial group. The higher the intensity, the higher the resem-
blance of an individual with a typical member of a racial
group. For example, an individual with intensities 9 and 1 in
the corresponding White/Caucasian and Indigenous dimen-
sions would resemble a typical White individual; analogously,
an individual with intensities 1 and 8 would represent a typical
Indigenous, whereas an individual with intensities 4 and 6, for
example, would resemble a typical Mestizo.
4
Next, we use racial intensities along the two basic dimen-
sions to illustrate some of the patterns of racial dierences in
occupations. Figure 1 shows the proportion of White-collar
workers, by racial intensity, of the urban Peruvian population
in 2000. As individuals are categorized with higher intensities
in the White dimension, the likelihood that they are employed
in White-collar occupations rapidly increases. Only one out of
ve individuals, with White intensity 0, works in White-collar
occupations, while nearly 100% of individuals with White
intensity 10 are employed in such occupations. The relation-
ship is the opposite in the case of Indigenous dimension: the
higher the intensity, the lower the proportion of white-collar
workers.
Analyzing the seven occupational categories described
above, the study computes the Duncan Indices that result from
the comparison of those individuals with racial intensity zero
with dierent groups of higher intensities, separating the com-
parison by gender. The results of comparison in the Indigenous
dimension are presented in Figure 2.
Dierences in individuals racial characteristics and occupa-
tions increase simultaneously. Moreover, this result is more
pronounced among females than males. In order to achieve a
non-segregated work force, it would be necessary for at least
16% of females reporting Indigenous intensity 1 switch their
occupations with the group that has Indigenous intensity 0.
The equivalent gure for males is 6%. A similar White dimen-
sion analysis produces results that show that the levels of occu-
pational segregation increase relatively more when comparing
individuals that report characteristics making thembe perceived
as indisputably White. These results are reported in Figure 3.
In summary, national statistics report that Peruvian labor
markets are segregated, by both gender and race. From the
information provided so far, it is not possible to distinguish
whether these results are the outcome of a series of individual
decisions of self-segregation, or the result of employers dis-
criminatory practices of either statistical or taste-based nature.
The following section presents the methodology employed in
this study to unravel possible explanations behind these na-
tional outcomes.
3. DESIGN OF THE PSEUDO-AUDIT STUDY
According to the taxonomy of experiments proposed by
Harrison and List (2004), this study could be classied as a
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
Indigenous White
Figure 1. Proportion of White collars by racial intensities. Note: The
horizontal axis captures the racial dierences resulting from a score-based
procedure carried out by pollsters (see Torero et al. (2004); N

opo et al.
(2007) for details). Each individual received an independent score of 010
from a pollster in each of four categories: Asian, White, Indigenous, and
Blackgroups that people readily recognize as distinct racial groupswith
zero indicating no physical characteristics that resembled a specic race and
10 indicating most features of that group. For example, an individual with
intensities 2 (White), 8 (Indigenous), 0 (Black), and 1 (Asian), would be
considered predominantly Indigenous. Thus, the horizontal axis captures the
proportion of individuals within each indigenous intensity that where
White collar.
316 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Natural Field Experiment (NFE). It is a NFE and not a tradi-
tional Field Experiment (FE) in the sense that we did not have
the ability to exogenously randomize treatments across the
population under study, it just naturally happened from the
functioning of the market, as it will be shown next in this sec-
tion. Our approach to detect discrimination in hiring practices
was inspired by the audit studies literature.
5
The audit studies
try to verify the hypothesis of discriminatory behavior of a
decision-maker, simulating the interviews of a group of
observably similar applicants called auditors. The simulation
is repeated for many decision makers, and when the outcome
statistically favors, or hurts, individuals with a particular set of
characteristics the conclusion is that individuals who show
such characteristics are discriminated in favor, or against.
As mentioned earlier in this paper, the audit methodology
has received some criticisms.
6
Generally, the auditors are indi-
viduals hired for the purposes of the study; they are mostly
college students that view their participation as a source of in-
come. They arrive at job interviews with similar resumes that
are specically tailored for the study; therefore, auditors
applying for the same position present comparable informa-
tion to decision makers. They are trained to show up for inter-
views and pretend to be interested in getting a job. In addition,
they are required to act as if they have the education and expe-
rience that their resumes claim. In order to keep to a minimum
the possible dierences in observable characteristics, the occu-
pations examined in these studies typically require minimal
skills. Finally, the designers of the study nd the job openings
in newspapers.
These characteristics of the audit studies imply the following
problems:
(1) An auditor does not necessarily put in the same level of
eort to get a job as a real job-seeker would. Also, it is not
possible to ensure that the auditor will experience the same
pressure and anxiety that would be present in a real job
interview.
(2) The auditor knows the purpose of the study and, as it is
documented in experimental psychology literature, this
may generate incentivesconscious or notto skew the
results toward the desired outcome of the researchers
(Lindzey & Aronson, 1975; Rosenthal, 1976).
(3) Descriptions of job requirements that appear in news-
papers are rarely exhaustive. Therefore, the role of unob-
servable characteristics, that would be of interest to
employers during interviews, but that designers of audit
studies do not take into account when forming auditor
groups, can be important.
Hence, there are some reasons to be suspicious about the re-
sults that come from audit studies, as there are many sources
of statistical noise that could challenge the results. Some of the
problems mentioned above are addressed during the audit
with a slight modication of the approach: using the resumes
of ctitious job applicants instead of having face-to-face (or
telephone) interviews. The drawback of this strategy is the
inability to test for the nal hiring decisions. It only allows
us to test for hypothetical hiring decisions of the employers
(van Beek, Koopmans, & van Praag, 1997) or for a one-step
advancement of the applicants in the hiring process (Bertrand
& Mullainathan, 2004), although perhaps the most important
one (Zegers de Beijl, 2000).
This study overcame some of these critiques by designing a
NFE in which, instead of hiring auditors to go to the job inter-
views, we selected them from a pool of applicants at the job
intermediation service of the Ministry of Labor and Employ-
ment Promotion in Lima, Peru, the CIL-PROEMPLEO net-
work.
7
With more than 10 years of functioning, this
network is the biggest public job intermediation service in
Lima, Peru. It receives around 500 job seekers per day, inter-
mediating approximately 40,000 positions per year. It has a
well established reputation among rms for the speed and
quality of the services they provide. A brief description of its
functioning follows.
Every morning, the intermediation specialists interview job
applicants at the oces of CIL-PROEMPLEO. After each
interview the information of the applicant is entered into a
database and remains there for a time-window of up to
3 months. If at the moment of the interview there is a
vacancy for which the applicant is qualied, he/she is
immediately sent to the rm that posted the vacancy, with
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to 10
Intensities
D
u
n
c
a
n

I
n
d
e
x
Females Males
Figure 3. Duncan Index of occupational segregation by intensities in the
White dimension (base group = intensity 0). Note: The Duncan Index was
calculated for each race intensity for males and females within the White
dimension. Each individual received an independent score of 010 from a
interviewer in each of four categories: Asian, White, indigenous, and
blackgroups that people readily recognize as distinct racial groupswith
zero indicating no physical characteristics that resembled an specic race
and 10 indicating most features of that group. Thus, the horizontal axis
captures the Duncan Index for each level of intensity for the White
category. For example, a female with intensity 4 (White) will have a
Duncan Index of 0.24.
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to 10
Intensities
D
u
n
c
a
n

I
n
d
e
x
Females Males
Figure 2. Duncan Index of occupational segregation by intensities in the
indigenous dimension (base group = intensity 0). Note: The Duncan Index
was calculated for each race intensity for males and females within the
Indigenous dimension. Each individual received an independent score of 0 to
10 from a interviewer in each of four categories: Asian, White, indigenous,
and blackgroups that people readily recognize as distinct racial groups
with zero indicating no physical characteristics that resembled an specic
race and 10 indicating most features of that group. Thus, the horizontal axis
captures the Duncan Index for each level of intensity for the indigenous
category. For example, a female with intensity 4 (indigenous) will have a
Duncan Index of 0.27.
GENDER AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING THROUGH MONITORING INTERMEDIATION SERVICES 317
a letter of recommendation from the intermediation service,
for a job interview at the rm. If there is no suitable vacancy
at the moment, the applicant is asked to go home and wait
until one appears. When such vacancy appears, the applicant
is called by phone and asked to show up at the CIL-PRO-
EMPLEO oces to receive the recommendation letter and
go to her/his job interview. The vacancies are received on a
continuous basis, online or by phone, by the same intermedi-
ation specialists and immediately entered into the database
(which is shared by all intermediation specialists). The dat-
abases of applicants and vacancies are linked using software
that helps the intermediation specialists in their matching
tasks. Such software also facilitates the monitoring of the
rms and applicants matching processes such that the inter-
mediation system always has up-to-date information about
open and closed vacancies, and active and inactive job seek-
ers. Note that one rm may post more than one vacancy on
the system at the same time. Additionally, one applicant can
apply to more than one posting, as long as s/he satises the
requirements of each posting.
With the permission from the Ministry of Labor, a pool of
monitors at the CIL-PROEMPLEO oces was installed for
the purposes of this study, so that before the applicants were
sent to the rms for their nal job interviews, they were inter-
viewed for this project. Such interviews made it possible to col-
lect complementary information about applicants, in addition
to what was already registered in the administrative databases
of the intermediation service. The applicants were asked about
additional labor and socio-demographic characteristics
(including their aimed wages at the job for which they were
applying), a picture of them was taken and their racial inten-
sities were registered in our database. Such racial intensities
were based on observable characteristics, such as the skin col-
or, hair color, and shape and color of eyes, among others (see
Torero, Saavedra, N

opo, & Escobal (2004) for details on the

methodology to measure racial intensities). The monitors were
trained to homogenize the criteria used to translate the obser-
vable characteristics into intensities in the four-dimensional
scale.
8
In the cases in which the applicant was sent to a job
interview from an oce other than the headquarters, the pool
of monitors visited the applicant at home.
The monitors were also sent to the rms that posted the
vacancies in order to apply a questionnaire to the job inter-
viewers. Under the guise of conducting a survey about the
quality of services of CIL-PROEMPLEO, the monitors ob-
tained information about personal characteristics of interview-
ers, such as schooling, tenure, and age. This information
complemented the one that CIL-PROEMPLEO already had
about rms and vacancies characteristics.
Therefore, as opposed to taking the demand side of the
labor market as a given and simulating the supply side with
auditors, this study monitored both sides of the market.
There was no need to hire a pool of auditors, only a pool
of monitors. This is crucial in avoiding problems related
to points 1 and 2 mentioned earlier regarding audit studies.
On the other hand, since the CIL-PROEMPLEO network
has direct contact with the rms that post the job openings,
they have near perfect information of the requirements at-
tached to each job posting. The information related to the
observable characteristics that rms require is more com-
plete than the information that one could obtain from read-
ing a job posting in the newspaper. By having a richer set of
information about observable characteristics, the room for
those that are unobservable, in the sense enunciated in point
3 above, is substantially smaller. Hence, CIL-PROEMPLEO
can send homogeneous groups of applicants to interviews,
more than what could have been expected from a traditional
audit study (Table 1).
9
4. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
This study examines three occupations with the highest vol-
umes of intermediation through CIL-PROEMPLEO: account-
ing and administrative assistants, secretaries, and
salespersons.
10
There were 1,557 applicants interviewed be-
tween September 2002 and March 2003, who submitted 2,650
applications for 435 job postings oered by 202 dierent rms.
On average, each individual applied to 1.7 openings. The infor-
mation for 43% of the applicants was not used because the ini-
tial postings were canceled by the rm, either because the rm
hired someone from outside of the system or because the open-
ing was closed without any hiring. Also, for some other post-
ings, CIL-PROEMPLEO sent only one applicant to the rm,
either by the request of the rm or because there were no other
qualied applicants at the moment of the posting. These obser-
vations were also left out because it is not possible to detect dis-
crimination when an applicant has no competitors. For those
reasons, the number of observations was initially reduced to
882 applicants, 1713 applications and 292 postings (referred
as the Valid Sample in Table 2). An additional group of 55
of the 202 surveyed rms were excluded from the study because
of missing observations for one or more of the applicants. Fi-
nally, combining the restrictions imposed on the data, there
were 91 rms left, 113 postings, 565 applicants, and 760 appli-
cations (referred as constrained sample in Table 2).
(a) The sample of applicants
The sample of individuals for this study was composed of
technicians and professionals from the middle and lower in-
come classes of metropolitan Lima. They were relatively
young and generally had more than a high school education.
The average number of years of schooling was 13.6, with a
standard deviation of 1.9. Only 20% of the individuals did
not study after high school while 23% graduated from a pri-
vate high school. Their parents education was on average less
than their own. A majority of the parents only nished high
school.
Table 1. Entire sample
Total sample
a
Valid sample
b
Constrained sample
c
Applications 2650 1713 760
Individuals 1557 882 565
Postings 435 292 113
Firms 202 146 91
a
Includes applicants sent to postings that were canceled by the rm or to
postings with only one applicant.
b
Includes postings for which we have information about all the applicants
sent.
c
Includes postings for which we have information about all the applicants
and the interviewers.
Table 2. Sample by occupations
Frequency % Accumulated
Salespersons 227 29.9 29.9
Accounting/administrative
assistant
183 24.1 54.0
Secretary 350 46.1 100.0
Total applications 760 100
318 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Almost all the applicants had some work experience, 87%
worked during the last twelve months as a dependant and
50% were self-employed. This overlap reveals the presence of
individuals with secondary occupations. Among those who
worked as dependants, the average monthly earnings in their
last occupation exceeded the minimum wage by 50% and were
close to the average monthly earnings in metropolitan Lima.
The average unemployment spell of applicants was 3.5 months.
Of all applicants, 36% reported having the required on-the-job
experience for the position, and those gures were substantially
higher among secretaries and accounting assistants.
Two thirds of the applicants were females. In the sample, fe-
males were, on average, one year younger than males and
came from families with a higher average income, although
this dierence is not signicant. The percentage of females
who experienced at least one unemployment period during
the last 12 months was smaller than the percentage of males.
Household and per-capita income were generally higher for
individuals who attended high school at a private institution,
had done some technical or professional studies at a univer-
sity, and whose parents received post-high-school diplomas,
either at universities or vocational institutions. The individuals
who attended private institutions for their technical or profes-
sional degrees had earnings that, on average, were not sub-
stantially above the earnings of those who had attended
public institutions for the same degree.
11
Regarding racial characteristics, individuals with high inten-
sities along the Indigenous dimension are prevalent among
both applicants and interviewers. Table 3 illustrates the distri-
bution of the applicants racial intensities.
In order to make the racial categorizations somewhat com-
parable to those found in traditional surveys, it is necessary to
dene a criterion to classify the population. As a result, the
sample is divided into three racial groups: Indigenous, White,
and Mestizo. Considering that the population under study
represents a particular segment of the national population, a
relative cut-o criterion was used. The cut-o is dened using
the distribution of racial characteristics of the sample in the
following way:
(1) If an individuals Indigenous intensity variable has a
value greater than a cut-o c and her/his White intensity
variable is smaller than the same cut-o c, s/he will be
considered Indigenous.
(2) Similarly, if an individuals White intensity variable has
a value greater than a cut-o c and her/his Indigenous
intensity variable is smaller than the same cut-o c, s/
he will be considered White.
(3) An individual that is considered neither Indigenous nor
White will be considered Mestizo.
For the main results, the medians of distributions of race
intensities in the White and Indigenous dimensions are used,
respectively, as cut-o points, c. Further, Section (c) will
analyze the sensitivity of these results for other possible cut-
o points. Using the median cut-o, 45% of the population
can be classied as Indigenous, 10% as Mestizo, and 45% as
White. There was a prevalence of Indigenous applicants apply-
ing for accounting and administrative assistant positions and a
prevalence of White individuals applying for salespersons and
secretarial positions (Table 4). Figure 4 presents a set of indi-
vidual and family characteristics for males and females, as well
as for the three occupations under study. For most variables, a
comparison of applicants from dierent gender groups does
not denote the existence of clearly dened patterns. However,
the study found some dierences in the asset ownership of the
households, the applicants type of education (public/private)
and the parents schooling for dierent racial groups (not
shown in the table).
(b) The sample of interviewers
The main demographic, education, and labor characteristics
of the interviewers that were surveyed, suggest that they consti-
tute a relatively homogeneous group. However, some dier-
ences in these characteristics were linked to the size of the
rm for which they worked. Overall, interviewers were equally
split by gender, but as the rm size increased, the prevalence of
males increased as well (60% in large rms as compared to 40%
in small rms). The average age showed a similar pattern. The
average age in the sample was 40 years; however, the average
age of males was higher than that of females, 42 and 35 years,
respectively. In small rms the average age of interviewers was
higher than the average age of those in medium and large
rms. Furthermore, 80% of the interviewers received a college
degree and this percentage was higher among large rms. The
distribution of professional degrees varied by rm size. In
small rms the interviewers area of expertise coincided with
areas for which they required applicants: accounting, adminis-
tration, economics, or engineering. Meanwhile, in large rms,
the interviewers area of expertise was related to positions that
were typically in charge of personnel selection processes: psy-
chologists or industrial relations professionals. Males had
longer job tenure (7 years) and experience (5 years) than fe-
males (5 and 4 years, respectively). Finally, the interviewers
racial intensities in the Indigenous dimension are concentrated
around six, while in the White dimension they are around three
(Table 5). Applying the same cut-o criterion that was used to
classify the applicants, the sample of interviewers was divided
into three groups: 13% of the interviewers were Mestizo, 46%
White, and 41% Indigenous, as seen in Table 5.
5. RESULTS OF THE NATURAL FIELD EXPERIMENT
(a) Gender and racial dierences in hiring
Out of 760 applications in the constrained sample, 127
individuals who were interviewed for jobs were hired. This is
translated into a success rate of 16.71%. Looking separately
at the three occupations under consideration, the study can
Table 3. Percentage of applications and individuals by race group
Total applications Total individuals
Total Salesperson Secretaries Assistants Total Salesperson Secretaries Assistants
Indigenous 45.3 39.6 33.9 54.9 45.1 42.0 32.3 55.5
Mestizo 10.1 5.7 13.1 11.4 8.0 5.9 11.3 7.9
White 44.6 54.6 53.0 33.7 46.9 52.2 56.4 36.6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
GENDER AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING THROUGH MONITORING INTERMEDIATION SERVICES 319
report success rates of 14.54% for the salespersons positions,
20.22% for the secretaries, and 16.29% for the assistants.
12
The design of the eld experiment requires that all appli-
cants who are sent to the same job interview satisfy a minimum
set of requirements, which are established by the posting rm
and veried by CIL-PROEMPLEO. However, it is not possi-
ble to ensure that all the applicants that go to the same inter-
view have exactly the same set of observable characteristics. If
applicants for the same position dier in observable character-
istics, it is necessary to control for them. For that purpose, the
study estimates discrete models (logit) where the explained
variable is whether the individual was hired or not. This hiring
outcome is explained by a set of observable characteristics:
applicants sex and race, interviewers characteristics (race,
Table 4. Household and individual characteristics of the applicants by gender and occupations
Gender of the applicant Occupations
Total Male Female Salesperson Secretary Accounting/administrative
assistants
Demographic characteristics
Females 71% 0% 100% 57% 100% 69%
Age (in years) 28.01 29.21 27.52 27.04 28.54 28.61
Migratory experience
Born in Lima 75% 71% 77% 75% 77% 77%
Born in Lima and never migrated 68% 62% 70% 66% 68% 73%
Socio-economic characteristics
Household size (persons) 4.94 4.57 5.09 4.88 4.87 5.31
Monthly household income (S/.) 1339.27 1237.31 1379.13 1125.33 1421.43 1496.84
Monthly household income, per-capita (S/.) 298.35 297.21 298.80 252.03 327.99 307.61
Household assets
Microwave oven 20% 20% 20% 15% 28% 18%
Washing machine 33% 36% 32% 27% 46% 30%
Dryer 3% 2% 3% 2% 5% 4%
Car 17% 13% 18% 14% 16% 19%
Educational background (individual)
Years of education 13.56 13.71 13.50 12.46 12.61 14.93
Attended high school in a
Public institution 77% 81% 75% 79% 69% 79%
Private institution 23% 19% 25% 21% 31% 21%
Pursued superior studies in
Public University 16% 21% 14% 7% 3% 35%
Private University 17% 19% 16% 12% 9% 23%
Public Technological Institute 13% 8% 15% 8% 8% 22%
Private Technological Institute 28% 31% 27% 27% 38% 19%
Others 5% 6% 4% 9% 12% 0%
Without superior studies 21% 16% 23% 37% 31% 2%
Educational background (family)
Fathers educational level
Elementary 24% 24% 24% 20% 20% 26%
High school 45% 45% 45% 50% 44% 41%
College or higher 31% 31% 31% 30% 36% 33%
Mothers educational level
Elementary 34% 31% 35% 28% 32% 37%
High school 46% 47% 45% 50% 43% 46%
College or higher 21% 22% 20% 22% 25% 16%
Labor history
Has worked once in his life 99% 100% 99% 100% 99% 99%
Labor experience (in years) 3.85 4.34 3.66 3.44 4.49 3.80
Worked as a dependent during the last 12 months 87% 82% 90% 85% 88% 88%
Monthly Earnings in their last dependent occupation 645.07 704.45 622.87 547.97 675.57 708.76
Last employment spell (years) 13.41 14.66 12.95 11.78 13.99 12.69
Worked as a self-employed in the last 12 months 49% 61% 44% 53% 37% 54%
Job searching
Unemployment spell (months) 3.64 4.03 3.49 4.06 3.21 3.22
Months looking for a job 2.22 2.56 2.09 2.53 1.77 2.02
Applications sent to PROEMPLEO 1.35 1.26 1.38 1.22 1.83 2.33
Has prior experience at the job 34% 26% 37% 17% 46% 43%
Hired (%) 18% 15% 19% 15% 20% 16%
Number of observations 565 163 402 227 183 350
320 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
gender, age, educational level, and job experience), human
capital characteristics of the applicant (educational level), per-
sonal characteristics of the applicant (age, marital status, a
dummy indicating whether the applicant is head of a house-
hold or not, and another dummy for migratory status), labor
market characteristics of the applicant (employment status,
unemployment spell, and occupational experience), rms
characteristics (number of workers and economic sector) and
applicants family controls (education of their parents).
In addition, in an attempt to capture unobservable charac-
teristics related to the productivity and expectations of the
individuals, the analysis incorporated two variables: the loga-
rithm of their wages at their last job and the logarithm of their
aimed wages. It is understandable that these last two variables
are possibly highly correlated, there was no attempt to inter-
pret the resulting logit coecients for these two variables,
and they are included in the regressions merely as additional
controls. Also, in an attempt to account for the characteristics
of the competitors that every individual faced at each job
opening, the following controls were added: the percentage
of male competitors and the percentage of White competitors
(at the job posting). Table 6 show the marginal eects for se-
lected coecients of the estimations for dierent models com-
bining the set of characteristics listed above.
The eects attributable to the gender of the applicants as
well as to the gender and racial characteristics of the interview-
ers, although relevant in expected value, do not seem to be sta-
tistically dierent from zero and these results are consistent
across the eight specications. As more controls are incorpo-
rated into the logit regressions, the logarithm of aimed wages
shows a higher eect on hiring, up to the point when it gets
statistically signicant for the last specication. Nonetheless,
the study refrains from interpreting such coecients in an iso-
lated way. The estimators for the eects of having more White
or male competitors are not statistically signicant. As one
would expect that the presence of more White or male compet-
itors in the job search process would aect negatively hiring
chances of an individual, this can be thought of as rst evi-
dence of the lack of discriminatory practices among employ-
ers.
The results shown in Table 6 correspond to the pool of
occupations that were studied (salespersons, secretaries and
assistants). One of these occupations is clearly female-
dominated, so it deserves special attention. Table 6 reports
the equivalent econometric analysis with eight specications
by occupation. Two results deserve special attention. On
one hand, there seems to be a certain positive discrimination
of females among the applicants for salespersons. On the
other handand this is independent of the regression spec-
icationamong applicants for secretarial positions, being
indigenous perfectly predicts failure in getting the job (see
footnote (g) in Table 7). This reveals some sort of discrim-
ination among indigenous females when applying to an
occupation for which the euphemism good presence is
regularly a requisite for the position. It is interesting to
note, however, that interviewer characteristics (including
their race and gender) do not seem to play an important
role on the explanation of the success of failure of
applicants.
13
Applicants
Indigenous
0
100
200
300
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Intensity
N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

c
a
s
e
White
0
100
200
300
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Intensity
N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

c
a
s
e
Interviewers
Indigenous
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Intensity
N
u
m
e
b
e
r

o
f

c
a
s
e
N
u
m
e
b
e
r

o
f

c
a
s
e
White
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Intensity
Figure 4. Racial intensity distributions of applicants and interviewers. Note: The horizontal axis reects the racial intensity that each individual received. The
intensity varies from an independent score of 010 from an interviewer in each of two categories: White and Indigenous. Zero indicates no physical
characteristics that resembled a specic race and 10 indicating most features of that group.
Table 5. Number of interviewers by race group
Total interviewers
Total Salespersons Secretaries Assistants
Indigenous 83 22 26 31
Mestizo 26 7 5 13
White 93 32 25 33
Total 202 61 56 77
GENDER AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING THROUGH MONITORING INTERMEDIATION SERVICES 321
(b) Race, gender, and aimed wages
One of the questions that the pool of monitors asked the job
applicants, after they knew the position for which they were
applying, and the rms identity and location, was about the
wages they expected to get at the new job. These are not nec-
essarily the wages that they would get if they were oered the
job, nor are they would be their reservation wages; however,
the information about aimed wages provides a good indicator
about expectations in the labor market.
It is possible to think of a situation in which agents in this
system (employers, employees and job seekers) make their
decisions based on the assumption that there is some sort of
statistical discrimination in the market. Then, at the equilib-
rium, it would not be surprising to nd dierences in the dis-
tribution of wages oered by gender and race. The individuals
that belong to a discriminated group, anticipating dierenti-
ated treatment, adjust their beliefs and as a consequence go
on their job search processes by choosing reservation wages
that are below those of the non-discriminated group. On the
other side of the market, employers assume the same prior
common beliefs, and know that individuals from the discrim-
inated groups are willing to accept lower wages. In such a way,
when equilibrium is achieved, the beliefs of the individuals are
conrmed ex-post creating a self-fullling prophecy.
The data obtained from this study enable exploring, at least
partially, some of the complex relationships outlined above.
Information about the individuals wages in their previous jobs
as well as their aimed wages for the jobs for which they were
applying was collected. Table 8 shows the results from regres-
sions for the aimed wages of the individuals on a set of individ-
ual characteristics, including gender and race. With the
purpose of reducing some possible statistical noises, the analy-
sis was restricted to those individuals with no more than 12
months of unemployment and who did not work as self-em-
ployed in their last job. The controls in bold have statistically
signicant impacts in determining aimed wages. The study
found dierences in aimed wages by gender, but not by race.
Males ask for wages that are approximately 7% higher than
those of females, other things held equal. Overall, occupational
experience, college degree, and age of the applicants, as well as
mothers education are important explanatory variables. Those
applying for positions of secretaries and assistants have aimed
wages above than that of those applying for salespersons. Ta-
ble 9 disaggregates the results by occupation and show that
most of the gender dierences in aimed wages occur among
the applicants for salespersons positions. For that group males
tend to ask for wages that are around 16% above than that of
females, other things held equal.
(c) Sensitivity analysis for aimed wages and hiring outcomes
The analysis of previous sections was carried out using the
partition criterion of racial groups with cut-os on the 50th
Table 6. Marginal eects on hiring for all the occupations. Selected coecients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mestizo applicant 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.07 0.061 0.062 0.06 0.082
(1.25) (1.28) (1.27) (1.33) (1.15) (1.15) (1.13) (1.66)
White applicant 0.08 0.08 0.071 0.077 0.06 0.062 0.063 0.108
(0.98) (0.99) (0.87) (0.93) (0.75) (0.77) (0.78) (1.18)
Female applicant 0.024 0.024 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.004 0.001 0.004
(0.64) (0.68) (0.04) (0.04) (0.17) (0.08) (0.02) (0.07)
LN last earnings at the main occupation 0.038 0.037 0.035 0.025 0.039 0.035
(1.52) (1.40) (1.18) (0.77) (1.23) (1.05)
LN aimed wages 0.064 0.093 0.081 0.088 0.097 0.126
(1.05) (1.39) (1.21) (1.28) (1.41) (1.94)
% of male competitors 0.058 0.061 0.046 0.047 0.034 0.035
(0.83) (0.88) (0.67) (0.69) (0.53) (0.56)
% of White competitors 0.041 0.059 0.071 0.074 0.052 0.051
(0.50) (0.72) (0.93) (0.97) (0.69) (0.68)
Observations 760 760 732 732 726 721 720 720
Additional controls in the regressions
Occupation type controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interviewer characteristics
a
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Human capital controls
b
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal characteristics
c
No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Labor market experience
d
No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls
e
No No No No No No Yes Yes
Applicants family control
f
No No No No No No No Yes
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
Clustered standard errors (at the job posting).
*
Signicant at 5%.
**
Signicant at 1%.
Notes:
a
Interviewer characteristics: race, gender, age, educational level and job experience.
b
Human capital controls: level of education attained by the applicant.
c
Personal characteristics: age, marital status, head of household, migration status.
d
Labor market experience: unemployment spell, occupational status at the time of interview and experience as a self-employed worker.
e
Firm controls: rm size and economic sector of the rm.
f
Applicants family controls: level of education attained by both applicants parents.
322 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Table 7. Marginal eects on hiring for each occupation. Selected coecients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Salespersons sample
Mestizo applicant 0.069 0.048 0.028 0.019 0.049 0.002 0.028 0.032
(0.70) (0.64) (0.34) (0.23) (0.42) (0.02) (0.22) (0.24)
White applicant 0.042 0.003 0.029 0.031 0.071 0.04 0.048 0.047
(0.28) (0.03) (0.31) (0.35) (0.96) (0.36) (0.57) (0.57)
Female applicant 0.106 0.064 0.133 0.106 0.099 0.101 0.089 0.08
(1.74) (1.22) (1.82) (1.50) (2.01)
*
(1.95) (2.28)
*
(1.95)
LN last earnings at the main occupation 0.021 0.025 0.004 0.006 0.019 0.008
(0.79) (0.87) (0.20) (0.28) (1.10) (0.39)
LN aimed wages 0.206 0.202 0.114 0.056 0.017 0.045
(2.30)
*
(2.32)
*
(1.77) (0.80) (0.31) (0.65)
% of male competitors 0.076 0.047 0.086 0.09 0.1 0.101
(0.73) (0.46) (1.22) (1.27) (1.72) (1.66)
% of White competitors 0.149 0.095 0.035 0.018 0.046 0.036
(1.33) (0.77) (0.54) (0.26) (0.97) (0.73)
Observations 227 227 214 214 212 211 210 210
Secretaries sample
g
White applicant 0.034 0.044 0.035 0.03 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.035
(0.50) (0.64) (0.50) (0.42) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.54)
LN last earnings at the main occupation 0.131 0.136 0.142 0.149 0.156 0.116
(1.64) (1.63) (1.80) (1.84) (1.89) (1.44)
LN aimed wages 0.006 0.028 0.051 0.076 0.099 0.162
(0.04) (0.17) (0.32) (0.47) (0.60) (0.97)
% of White competitors 0.1 0.13 0.128 0.147 0.146 0.171
(0.78) (1.01) (1.07) (1.22) (1.20) (1.47)
Observations 177 177 169 169 169 161 161 161
Assistants sample
Mestizo applicant 0.037 0.037 0.032 0.036 0.027 0.039 0.047 0.079
(0.60) (0.57) (0.49) (0.58) (0.42) (0.62) (0.77) (1.61)
White applicant 0.062 0.061 0.049 0.056 0.044 0.061 0.07 0.174
(0.59) (0.57) (0.48) (0.53) (0.43) (0.54) (0.60) (1.23)
Female applicant 0.039 0.044 0.048 0.04 0.022 0.029 0.028 0.021
(1.02) (1.18) (0.79) (0.67) (0.37) (0.46) (0.45) (0.36)
LN last earnings at the main occupation 0.06 0.061 0.053 0.035 0.035 0.028
(1.94) (1.82) (1.50) (0.83) (0.83) (0.64)
LN aimed wages 0.065 0.104 0.096 0.114 0.121 0.176
(0.79) (1.11) (1.07) (1.18) (1.23) (1.98)
*
% of male competitors 0.058 0.046 0.035 0.033 0.041 0.025
(0.83) (0.65) (0.49) (0.46) (0.61) (0.37)
% of White competitors 0.233 0.212 0.223 0.214 0.209 0.216
(1.29) (1.24) (1.28) (1.27) (1.33) (1.40)
Additional controls in the regressions
Interviewer characteristics
a
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Human capital controls
b
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal characteristics
c
No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Labor market experience
d
No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls
e
No No No No No No Yes Yes
Applicants family control
f
No No No No No No No Yes
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
Clustered.
*
Signicant at 5%.
**
signicant at 1%.
Notes:
a
Interviewer characteristics: race, gender, age, educational level and job experience.
b
Human capital controls: level of education attained by the applicant.
c
Personal characteristics: age, marital status, head of household, migration status.
d
Labor market experience: unemployment spell, occupational status at the time of interview and experience as a self-employed worker.
e
Firm controls: rm size and economic sector of the rm.
f
Applicants family controls: level of education attained by both applicants parents.
g
Since being indigenous perfectly predicts failure, we calculated this panel of the table using only the sample of Mestizos and Whites, so in this case
Mestizo is the base category.
GENDER AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING THROUGH MONITORING INTERMEDIATION SERVICES 323
percentile. However, there are many other interesting candi-
dates for cut-o values. This sub-section is devoted to the sen-
sitivity analysis. Here the results for aimed wages and hiring
for dierent cut-o points are replicated. The higher (lower)
the cut-o point the more (less) pronounced the racial dier-
ences between the Indigenous and White groups. But at the
same time, the higher (lower) the cut-o points the more likely
it is to have fewer (more) observations in the Indigenous and
White groups. This fact imposes some restrictions on the range
of possible values for cut-o points. For instance, using the
95th percentile as a cut-o value leads to a partition in which
the White group represents only 1% of the sample. On the
other hand, using the 14th percentile as cut-o value leads
to a partition in which there is no individual left within the
White group. For this reason, the sensitivity exercise is carried
out only for a set of possible cut-o points. The interval that
goes from the 15th percentile to the 94th is selected exploring
all possible integer percentiles.
For each possible racial group partition the analysis repli-
cates the hiring regressions reported in Figure 5 (only the last
specication: the one that controls for occupation, labor mar-
ket experience, human capital, personal and familial charac-
teristics of the applicants, as well as rm characteristics).
Figure 5 provides the marginal eect of being Mestizo and that
of being White, computed at the mean (for the pooled sample).
The x-axis of each graph represents the set of possible cut-
o values and the y-axis represents the eect of the corre-
sponding dummy variable on aimed wages. The bold line
shows the average eect while the doted lines illustrate a
95% condence interval for the estimators. The results show
that discriminatory behavior does not prevail in hiring out-
comes for most of the cut-o values. Nonetheless, when fairly
high cut-o values are used, the study nds evidence of statis-
tically dierent hiring outcomes between Indigenous and Mes-
tizos (and also between Indigenous and Whites). Since the
high cut-o values are linked to more pronounced dierences
in racial intensities between the Indigenous and White groups,
ndings in this study suggest that there is some evidence of dis-
crimination only at the extremes of the racial diversity spec-
trum for this sample of job seekers in Lima, Peru. With a
cut-o at the 90th percentile or above, those labeled as White
are about 100% more likely to get a job than those labeled as
Indigenous. Also, individuals labeled as Mestizos are about
30% more likely to get a job than those labeled as Indigenous.
A similar exercise for the aimed wages regression reported in
Table 6 (pooling the three occupations, only the specication
without racegender interactions) was also performed. Fig-
ure 6 shows these results. There are no statistically signicant
dierences in aimed wages among White, Mestizos, and Indig-
enous, except for the partitions at the highest percentiles. In
those cases, White and Mestizo individuals have aimed wages
that are around 20% lower than that of comparable Indige-
nous individuals.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This study explores the role that gender and race play in the
job search and hiring process. This is done by using informa-
tion on real applications and job interviews obtained from the
CIL-PROEMPLEO network, the job intermediation system of
the Ministry of Labor and Employment Promotion in Lima,
Peru. The study analyzes the relative performance in the job
seeking process of comparable individuals of dierent genders
and observable racial characteristics. Applicants for
Table 8. Determinants of the aimed wages
Without
interactions
With
interactions
Mestizo applicant 0.011
(0.31)
White applicant 0.006
(0.14)
Male applicant 0.069
(2.67)
**
Male and Indigenous applicant 0.008
(0.10)
Male and Mestizo applicant 0.023
(0.29)
Male and White applicant 0.067
(0.78)
Female and Mestizo Applicant 0.045
(0.62)
Female and White Applicant 0.048
(0.66)
Human capital controls
Incomplete non-college post-secondary studies 0.01 0.01
(0.31) (0.31)
Non-college post-secondary degree 0.042 0.043
(1.60) (1.66)
Incomplete college studies 0.013 0.014
(0.48) (0.50)
College degree 0.162 0.163
(5.83)
**
(5.85)
**
Personal characteristics
Age 0.059 0.058
(4.35)
**
(4.24)
**
Age^2 0.001 0.001
(3.60)
**
(3.54)
**
Single 0.018 0.017
(0.77) (0.73)
Household head 0.003 0
(0.10) (0.02)
Applicants family controls
Mother has a high-school degree 0.058 0.059
(3.43)
**
(3.47)
**
Mother has a non-college post-secondary degree 0 0
0.00 (0.02)
Mother has a college degree 0.04 0.04
(1.00) (0.96)
Labor market experience
Occupational experience 0.036 0.036
(4.11)
**
(4.01)
**
Occupational experienced 0.002 0.002
(3.46)
**
(3.33)
**
Unemployment spell (top-coded at 12 months) 0.001 0.001
(0.14) (0.20)
Was red from his last job 0.278 0.242
(5.44)
**
(3.62)
**
Quit from his last job 0.243 0.204
Left his last job for other reasons 0.225 0.187
(4.77)
**
(2.75)
**
Had a job at the moment of the application 0.014 0.011
(0.20) (0.15)
Worked as a dependant during the last 12 months 0.05 0.048
(1.21) (1.15)
Occupation type controls
Occupation (secretaries) 0.171 0.175
(5.73)
**
(5.85)
**
Occupation (assistants) 0.144 0.147
(4.91)
**
(4.95)
**
Constant 4.901 4.987
(23.73)
**
(21.18)
**
Observations 736 736
R-squared 0.39 0.39
Robust t statistics in parentheses.
*
Signicant at 5%.
**
Signicant at 1%.
324 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Table 9. Determinants of the aimed wages for each occupation
Salespersons Secretaries Assistants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mestizo applicant 0.003 0.095 0.036
(0.06) (0.78) (0.75)
White applicant 0.007 0.115 0.019
(0.14) (0.93) (0.34)
Male applicant 0.152 0.001
(5.93)
**
(0.04)
Male and Indigenous applicant 0.132 0.127
(1.76) (1.16)
Male and Mestizo applicant 0.145 0.102
(2.54)
*
(0.97)
Male and White applicant 0.135 0.179
(1.59) (1.24)
Female and Mestizo applicant 0.014 0.118
(0.21) (1.08)
Female and White applicant 0.001 0.087
(0.02) (0.80)
Human capital controls
Incomplete non-college post-
secondary studies
0.005 0.007 0.074 0.001 0.024
(0.11) (0.15) (1.14) (0.00) (0.10)
Non-college post-secondary
degree
0.049 0.053 0.015 0.17 0.175
(0.83) (0.93) (0.33) (3.03)
**
(2.93)
**
Incomplete college studies 0.037 0.037 0.086 0.023 0.024
(0.84) (0.83) (1.34) (0.38) (0.37)
College degree 0.156 0.155 0.057 0.076 0.07
(2.15)
*
(2.11)
*
(0.64) (1.51) (1.35)
Personal characteristics
Age 0.037 0.037 0.052 0.072 0.073
(0.92) (0.91) (2.66)
*
(1.54) (1.57)
0 0 0.001 0.001 0.001
Age^2 (0.71) (0.71) (2.34)
*
(1.20) (1.29)
0.037 0.036 0.019 0.04 0.044
Single (1.01) (0.95) (0.39) (0.77) (0.81)
Household head 0.048 0.046 0.115 0.046 0.04
(0.90) (0.88) (2.73)
**
(1.34) (1.15)
Applicants family controls
Mother has a high-school degree 0.046 0.048 0.076 0.066 0.07
(2.09)
*
(2.24)
*
(2.40)
*
(2.18)
*
(2.39)
*
Mother has a non-college post-
secondary degree
0.112 0.116 0.054 0.041 0.042
(2.27)
*
(2.31)
*
(1.24) (0.93) (0.95)
Mother has a college degree 0.13 0.134 0.156 0.036 0.037
(3.07)
**
(3.15)
**
(2.19)
*
(0.57) (0.59)
Labor market experience
Occupational experience 0.048 0.048 0.008 0.014 0.017
(3.32)
**
(3.35)
**
(0.39) (1.11) (1.37)
Occupational experience^2 0.004 0.004 0 0 0
(3.32)
**
(3.36)
**
(0.24) (0.66) (0.69)
Unemployment spell (top-coded
at 12 months)
0.009 0.009 0.007 0.013 0.014
(1.55) (1.55) (1.02) (2.01)
*
(2.08)
*
Was red from his last job 0 0 0.052 0.38 0.463
(.) (.) (0.91) (4.12)
**
(3.74)
**
Quit from his last job 0.054 0.054 0.012 0.336 0.415
(1.33) (1.30) (0.23) (4.56)
**
(3.72)
**
Left his last job because the
contract nished
0.031 0.029 0.016 0.329 0.41
(0.55) (0.53) (0.29) (4.96)
**
(3.87)
**
Left his last job for other reasons 0.055 0.053 0 0.315 0.403
(continued on next page)
GENDER AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING THROUGH MONITORING INTERMEDIATION SERVICES 325
accounting and administrative assistants, salespersons, and
secretaries were the focus of this study. The racial heterogene-
ity of the sample enabled grouping of individuals into three ra-
cial categories: White, Mestizo, and Indigenous. The creation
of these groups was based on a cut-o criterion.
Inspired by audit studies, this paper controls for dier-
ences in observable characteristics in a detailed way, not
only during the eldwork through the formation of the
groups of applicants per job posting, but also in the econo-
metric models. However, as in most natural eld experi-
ments, these gains come at a cost: external validity. One
has to be cautious before trying to extrapolate the ndings
of this study to the whole Peruvian, or even Limenian, labor
markets. Nonetheless, the ndings are interesting, thought
provoking, and consistent with a story of discriminatory
outcomes that arise as a result of information failures.
This study led to two sets of ndings: one regarding hiring
outcomes and the other on expectations of applicants. First,
the study found evidence of dierences in treatment based
on gender and based on racial characteristics, but only when
using the partition criterion that compared groups with great-
er dierences in observable racial characteristics. Mestizos
seem to perform better in the segment of the labor market
studied here. In terms of specic occupations analyzed in
Table 9Continued
Salespersons Secretaries Assistants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1.76) (1.62) (.) (4.23)
**
(3.36)
**
Had a job at the moment of the application 0.128 0.129 0.139 0.08 0.06
(1.14) (1.16) (1.01) (0.64) (0.47)
Worked as a dependant during the last 12 months 0.112 0.114 0.044 0.147 0.137
(1.60) (1.66) (0.63) (2.20)
*
(1.99)
Constant 5.317 5.325 5.474 5.002 4.999
(9.61)
**
(9.73)
**
(15.15)
**
(7.10)
**
(6.83)
**
Observations 213 213 178 345 345
R-squared 0.43 0.43 0.22 0.35 0.35
Robust t statistics in parentheses.
Clustered standard errors (at the posting).
*
Signicant at 5%.
**
Signicant at 1%.
Mestizo Applicant
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Cut-off Value
White Applicant
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Cut-off Value
Figure 5. Marginal eects on hiring for dierent cut-o values.
326 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
metropolitan Lima, there was evidence of positive discrimina-
tion for females in salespersons occupations (although not
robust to all specications) and negative discrimination for
indigenous females when applying to secretarial positions
(with the basic partition criterion, being indigenous perfectly
predicted a failure in the hiring regressions). Second, the study
found gender dierences in expectations, measured by aimed
wages. When job applicants were asked, How much would
you like to earn in the position for which you are applying?,
females responses were on average 7% below those of compa-
rable males, after controlling for a rich set of observable char-
acteristics of the applicants and the rms. Even though, there
were no dierences in wage expectations according to dierent
racial groups.
NOTES
1. This index is interpreted as the minimum percentage of individuals of
one of the comparing groups that should change their occupations in
order to equalize the distributions of individuals across occupations for
both groups. See Fluckiger and Silber (1999) for a detailed description of
the segregation measures, including the Duncan Index.
2. These groups are: Professionals and Technicians, Managers, Admin-
istrative Personnel, Merchants and Salespersons, Service Workers, Agri-
cultural Workers and Non-Agricultural Workers.
3. In this case, a non-segregated work force is dened as a situation in
which the distributions of males and females across occupations are the
same.
4. Mestizo is a term that refers to those of mixed race and hence is
not considered as one of the basic dimensions.
5. The literature on audit studies is vast. See Riach and Rich (2002) for
an interesting survey of this literature in dierent market settings. Also
refer to Goldin and Rouse (2000) on the impact of blind auditions.
6. See Heckman (1993, 1998) and Heckman and Siegelman (1993) for a
critical description of the results from a detailed analysis of the
identication assumptions behind the audit study model.
7. CIL stands for Centro de Intermediacion Laboral (Center of Job
Intermediation) for further details see (http://www.sil.org.pe).
8. In addition, to validate the pollsters racial scores, a random sample
was taken from the pool of applicants. The pictures of these individuals
were independently scrutinized by three other equally-trained pollsters.
The score comparison of the original pollsters and the control pollsters
showed no dierences.
9. However, all these advantages come at a cost: selection. On one hand,
the rms and job seekers participating at the intermediation service could
be a non-random sample of the population; and on the other hand, the job
seekers send to the nal job interview could be a non-random sample of all
the applicants. While the rst type of selection somewhat limits the
external validity of our results, the second type of selection can not happen
because the public intermediation system is explicitly prohibited (by law)
to perform any type of discrimination.
Mestizo Applicant
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Cut-off Value
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l

E
f
f
e
c
t
White Applicant
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Cutt-off Value
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l

E
f
f
e
c
t
Figure 6. Marginal eects on aimed wages for dierent cut-o values.
GENDER AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING THROUGH MONITORING INTERMEDIATION SERVICES 327
10. Initially, data-entry assistants were also considered for selection, but
the number of posted job openings into the system was too small to be
considered.
11. This is related in the fact that the public and private institutions that
this segment of the population typically attend have similar qualities.
Graduates from elite universities do not use the services of PROEMPLEO
in their job search processes.
12. The standard errors for these success rates are 2.3%, 3.0%, and 2.0%
for salespersons, secretaries, and assistants, respectively.
13. In other specications, we also included interactions of the appli-
cants and interviewers gender and racial characteristics and found no
signicant coecients in the hiring regressions.
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