Judicial scrutiny of gender-based employment practices in the criminal

justice system

Claire Angelique R.I. Nolasco, Michael S. Vaughn

College of Criminal Justice, Institute for Legal Studies in Criminal Justice, Sam Houston State University, 816 17th Street, P.O. Box 2296, Huntsville, TX 77341-2296, United States
a b s t r a c t a r t i c l e i n f o
Available online 28 January 2011
Purpose: This article examines employment practices of criminal justice agencies within state and federal
court decisions that have interpreted sex discrimination claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Methods: After collecting and analyzing appellate court cases through the LEXIS-NEXIS and WESTLAW
databases, the article examines lower state and federal court decisions that have been applied by the U.S.
Supreme Court to criminal justice workplaces.
Results: The ndings show that employment practices are valid if the employer can demonstrate: rst, the
disputed discriminatory action is based on considerations not solely dependent on the plaintiff's gender; and
second, such considerations are more than mere pretext, making them justiable under the circumstances.
Conclusions: Courts have considered a wide range of employer practices in both law enforcement and
corrections agencies at various stages of the employment process, such as hiring, assignment of duties,
promotion, discipline, and termination. Title VII is violated when the employers adverse employment action
is motivated by discriminatory intent and is based on gender stereotypes. Even so, employment actions are
legal when employers prove their employment actions are not based on sex stereotypes, but are either
business-related or justied by legitimate, important, or compelling interests.
2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Despite recurring and long term efforts to recruit female ofcers
into law enforcement, recent statistics from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), show that as of 2004, only 11.6 percent of sworn
ofcers are female, while 88.4 percent are males in approximately
14,254 surveyed law enforcement agencies (U.S. Department of
Justice, 2004). Taking into account not only sworn ofcers, female
employees accounted for only 26.9 percent of law enforcement
employees in contrast to male employees who accounted for
73.1 percent (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004).
The entry of female employees in correctional facilities, in contrast,
has increased by as much as 40 percent, rising from108,913 in 1999 to
152,456 in 2007 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009). Approximately
15,000 women were employed as rst-line supervisors of correctional
ofcers (29 percent) compared with 37,000 men in 2006 (Nick, 2008).
Studies estimate that between 2006 and 2016, the number of
probation ofcers and correctional treatment specialists will increase
by 11 percent while the number of rst line supervisory staff for
corrections will increase by 13 percent (Nick, 2008; U.S. Census
Bureau, 2008).
These gures indicate that the advent of women in the criminal
justice workforce is still an ongoing, albeit slow, process that has been
at times hindered by certain socio-cultural and organizational barriers
as well as personal factors that have been the subject of academic
research.
Survey of literature
Inuence of Gender Stereotypes on Employment Patterns and Roles
Theorists explain that gender stereotypes are triggered by cultural
schemas (Bem, 1993; Fiske, 1998; Marler & Moen, 2005) or how a
particular society and individual members of that society categorize
certain roles (Heilman, 1983; Perry, Davis-Blake, & Kulik, 1994). In the
workplace, stereotypes of what constitutes male as well as female
roles tend to reinforce the employment practices of a specic
organization, particularly in the areas of hiring (Petersen et al.,
2000), assignment of job responsibilities, promotion, discipline and
termination (Di Maggrio & Powell, 1991; Eliasoph & Lichterman,
2003; Zuckerman, 1999).
Law enforcement, for example, has traditionally been viewed as a
masculine job (Balkin, 1988; Brown & Heidensohn, 2000; Evans,
Coman & Stanley, 1992; Seklecki & Paynich, 2007). Several reasons
have been proffered for denying women entry into the profession,
such as their allegedly inherent emotional weakness (Bell, 1982;
Homant & Kennedy, 1985; Martin, 1980; Morash & Greene, 1986;
Journal of Criminal Justice 39 (2011) 106119
An earlier version of the article was presented at the 2008 Academy of Criminal
Justice Sciences meeting, held in Cincinnati, Ohio.
Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 936 294 1349; fax: +1 936 294 1653.
E-mail address: mvaughn@shsu.edu (M.S. Vaughn).
0047-2352/$ see front matter 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2010.11.002
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Criminal Justice
Sherman, 1975; Tifn, 1995), lesser physical strength, inadequate
training, willingness to use force more often than male ofcers
(Charles, 1982), and perceived reduction of the masculine reputation
and status of the profession (Balkin, 1988).
Gender stereotypes also inuence role expectations of how each
gender should behave (van Worner, 1981). Female ofcers are
expected to perform as well as male ofcers without crossing the
line of not behaving within the established female stereotype
(Seklecki & Paynich, 2007, p. 20). Kanter (1977) explains that an
organization that has a low percentage of minority workers (i.e.,
tokens) makes them feel excessively scrutinized, placing multiple
pressures on them. Due to fear of failure (Wertsch, 1998), token
female police ofcers experience strong feelings of isolation and
intense stress (Buchanan & Fitzgerald, 2008; Lovrich & Stohr, 1993).
Stereotypes are sometimes applied to generalize the errors of one
female ofcer to all others (Martin & Jurik, 1996). Kanter (1977)
further found that token female police are categorized into one of four
roles: the mother who sympathizes and comforts men; the sex object
who seduces and provokes men to compete for her attentions; the kid
sister who supports male ofcers without being competitive; and the
women's liberationist who does not t into the three previous roles
and is treated with suspicion and hostility.
Studies conrm the existence of gender appropriate roles and
duties in police departments (Brown & Heidensohn, 2000; Butler,
Winfree, Jr., & Newbold, 2003). Examining a random sample of 531
female ofcers, Seklecki and Paynich (2007) found that a signicant
percentage (at least 30 percent) felt that they performed more
dispute resolution, desk writing, and witness/victim interview duties
than their male counterparts and signicantly less use of force duties
(47.1 percent) and high speed pursuits (37.2 percent). A signicant
portion of these female ofcers, on the contrary, felt that they
performed worse than their male colleagues in use of force (16.2
percent), while a majority reported feeling more or far more capable
in their ability to apply reason and interpersonal skills to the
situation (Seklecki & Paynich, 2007, p. 25).
Archbold and Schulz's (2008) qualitative sample of 129 sworn
police personnel in a Midwestern municipal police agency also
conrmed that female token ofcers experienced more stress, were
assigned more frequently to gender typecast duties, such as sexual
assault cases and interviews and searches of female suspects. These
women reported that they had to work harder than their male
colleagues to prove themselves to the department, were pressured
not to compete with or outperform male ofcers with respect to
writing tickets or responding to calls for service, and were excluded
from social outings among male ofcers outside of work hours.
Martin (1979) showed that female police ofcers in several
police departments in Washington D.C. were either categorized as
POLICEwomen or policeWOMEN. POLICEwomen sought to counter
negative female stereotypes by stressing professionalism, compet-
ing with men, performing patrol duties, and making arrests.
PoliceWOMEN accepted their unequal status to male ofcers,
avoided patrol duties, and conformed to gender stereotypes. Her
study showed that policeWOMEN were more readily accepted by
male ofcers because they were perceived as less of a threat than
POLICEwomen. She contended that the pool of women who sought
upward mobility and promotion was actually smaller than the
actual number of female ofcers since only POLICEwomen actively
sought promotion. Schulz (2003) conrmed that female ofcers
who actively sought promotion and rose from the ranks to the
position of police chiefs and sheriffs were more assertive, having
had higher education and having moved several times to various
police departments during their law enforcement careers.
Whetstone (2001), however, countered that it is normal for a large
proportion of qualied ofcers, whether male or female, to refuse to
participate in the promotion process. His study showed that a
signicant portion of eligible ofcers (83 percent of eligible women
and 76 percent of eligible men) did not seek promotion because of
anticipated loss of income due to lesser opportunities for overtime
work (for the men) and child care concerns, such as the need to make
costly child-care arrangements to accommodate possible changes in
assignments and shifts (for women). Whetstone and Wilson (1999,
p. 132) observed that women were more likely constrained in their
occupational upward mobility by gender-specic normative expecta-
tions and responsibilities.
Social, organizational and legal context of criminal justice employment
Social science research is replete with studies examining the
impact of gender in the workplace (Bem, 1993; Heilman, 1983; Perry
et al., 1994; Pogrebin & Pool, 1997; Soehnel, 2007). Some analysts
focus on the extent to which capital resources and other extraneous
factors inuence gender-based hiring and promotion practices
(Kalleberg & Reskin, 1995; Kay & Hagan, 1998; Petersen, Saporta, &
Seidel, 2000). Others focus on the social and organizational structures
that perpetuate and reinforce stereotypes in job allocation (Gorman,
2005; Ridgeway, 1997), as well as facilitate the entry of women into
criminal justice agencies, including law enforcement (Shadmi, 1993).
Although traditional gender stereotypes were particularly preva-
lent in the criminal justice system (Brown & Pechman, 1987), extant
research suggests that with the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
(Title VII) (Stivers, 1993), the onset of community policing with its
emphasis on community relations (H. Greene, 2000; R. Greene, 2000;
Skogan, 2004), and changes in environmental factors (Zhao, He, &
Lovrich, 2006), such as city population (Felkenes, Peretz, & Schroedel,
1993; Warner, Steel, & Lovrich, 1989) and liberalization of local
politics (Salzstein, 1986), females have gained more acceptance and
have constituted a larger part of the criminal justice workforce.
Some writers contend, for example, that the increased employment
of Black females in law enforcement is a result of social and
organizational factors, such as the growing participation of Blacks in
electoral politics (H. Greene, 2000; R. Greene, 2000; Lewis, 1989), size of
the minority population, location of the police stationhouse (Kim &
Mengistu, 1994), enactment of equal employment legislation, suchas the
1963 Equal Pay Act, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (H. Greene, 2000; R. Greene, 2000;
Kim & Mengistu, 1994; Martin & Jurik, 1996; Morash & Harr, 1995;
Townsey, 1982), and favorable court decisions, consent decrees, and
afrmative action plans, resulting from employment discrimination
lawsuits (Dreifus, 1982; Martin, 1991). Others, however, counter that
except in large police departments, Blacks and women are still
underrepresented in law enforcement (Kim & Mengistu, 1994),
especially insupervisory or commandpositions (Townsey, 1982). Martin
(1991) further found that sex discrimination increased, although racism
in several police departments in Washington, D.C., Birmingham, Detroit,
Phoenix, and Chicago diminished with high Black representation.
Sims, Scarborough, and Ahmad (2003) also examined the
relationship between police organizational culture and attitudes
toward women. Analyzing a sample of 560 sworn ofcers of the Little
Rock, Arkansas Police Department, they found that hostile sexism
(measured by old fashioned and stereotypical attitudes about
females) predicted support for both community and traditional
policing, while overt sexism (measured by support for differential
treatment of women and traditional gender roles) predicted support
for traditional policing models.
Not all studies are sanguine about the positive inuence Title VII
has had on the employment policies, practices, and customs of
criminal justice agencies, wherein stereotypical and gender-biased
beliefs and practices persist within the male-dominated line and
auxiliary staff and the good ole boy managerial command staff
(Easteal & Judd, 2008; Eschholz & Vaughn, 2001; Pina, Gannon, &
Saunders, 2009; Soonthornpasuch, 2008). A typical example of such
female stereotyping is reported by Pogrebin and Pool (1997), who
107 C.A.R.I. Nolasco, M.S. Vaughn / Journal of Criminal Justice 39 (2011) 106119
observed that male ofcers frequently referred to female deputy
sheriffs as honey, babe, and dear and subjected these ofcers to
physical abuse that included unwelcomed kissing, unwanted groping
of breasts, and unsolicited pinching of buttocks (Eschholz & Vaughn,
2001, p. 396).
Several organizational factors and personal attitudes appear to
hinder assertive responses to perceived sexual harassment in law
enforcement agencies. Chiyavej and Morash (2008) found that,
among a sample of 117 female ofcers from ve law enforcement
agencies in a Midwestern state, the existence of clear organizational
anti-sexual harassment policies signicantly predicted perceived
severity of harassing acts that in turn predicted assertive reactions
(i.e., reporting the incident, expressing displeasure to the offender,
rejecting the offender's behavior, and threatening the offender with
negative consequences). They also found that the less important the
ofcer's independent participation in decision-making, the higher the
concern for social reactions, which signicantly predicted passive
reactions to harassment (i.e., going along, ignoring or deecting the
attention, changing own behavior, and other avoidance mechanisms)
(Chiyavej & Morash, 2008).
To the extent that it contributed to the advent of females in the
labor market, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act has unquestionably
played a signicant role in promoting gender rights. The legislative
history of Title VII shows that it was enacted by the 88th Congress due
to the perceived need to make persons whole for injuries suffered on
account of unlawful employment discrimination, its primary objec-
tive, like that of any statute meant to inuence primary conduct, is not
to provide redress but to avoid harm (Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
1998, p. 806). As originally drafted by Congress, Title VII applied only
to discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin
(Washington v. Gunther, 1981), while the Equal Pay Act, enacted
earlier, applied to sex-based discrimination. The nal version signed
by President Johnson, however, included discrimination based on sex.
AlthoughTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits sex-based
employment discrimination, the last sentence of 703 (h) (the Bennett
Amendment) provides that it shall not be unlawful for an employer to
differentiate based on sex in determining wages if such practice is
authorized by the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (29 U.S.C. 206 [d]). The Equal
Pay Act prohibits sex discrimination by paying lower wages to
employees of one sex than members of the other sex for performing
equal work except whenthe wage differential is basedon(i) seniority
system; (ii) merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any
other factor than sex (Washington v. Gunther, 1981, p. 167). The U.S.
Supreme Court further held that the Bennett Amendment does not
restrict Title VII sex discrimination actions to claims for equal pay for
equal work (Washington v. Gunther, 1981). Instead, claims for sex-
based wage discrimination can also be led under Title VII, although
no member of the opposite sex holds an equal but higher paying job,
as long as the disputed wage differential is not exempted under the
Equal Pay Act's afrmative defenses due to seniority, merit, or any
other factor other than sex (Washington v. Gunther, 1981, p. 168).
Title VII was further amended in 1972 to make it applicable to
states and other governmental employers (Dothard v. Rawlinson,
1977), and in 1991, to incorporate U.S. Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1964 (Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, 1994).
Objectives
Scant research analyzes how federal and state courts have
interpreted Title VII sex discrimination claims in the employment
practices of criminal justice agencies. The focus of most social science
research has been on the development of theories of why sex
discrimination exists (Garcia, 2003) or on the incidence and
prevalence of sexual harassment (Collins & Vaughn, 2004). Focusing
on decisions of the federal and state courts, this article examines
specic employment practices in the criminal justice system litigated
under Title VII. Such an examination is necessary due to the impact of
court decisions on the actual decision-making policy formation of
criminal justice agencies. The article reviews U.S. Supreme Court
standards for gender-based discrimination, and then analyzes lower
federal and state court interpretation of these precedents within the
criminal justice workplace.
Judicial standards for gender-based discrimination
Intermediate scrutiny of gender based classications
The U.S. Supreme Court (Supreme Court), in a line of decisions,
has held that under the Equal Protection clause of the U.S.
Constitution, gender or sex-based classications initiated by the
government are subject to intermediate scrutiny or a heightened
standard of review (Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 1982;
Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 2003).
Where plaintiffs sue the government for sex-based discrimination,
to prevail defendants must show that: the challenged classication
serves important governmental objectives, and (2) [the] discrimina-
tory means employed are substantially related to [the] achievement of
those objectives (Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 1982, p.724;
Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 2003, p. 736; Tuan Anh
Nguyen v. INS, 2001, p. 2060; U.S. v. Virginia, 1996, p. 533; Weinberger
v. Weisenfeld, 1975, p. 636; Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 1980,
p. 150). The standard establishes a burden-shifting approach, wherein
each party to the sex discrimination suit is required to rebut the
presumptions and evidence offered by the other litigant. As illustrated
in Table 1, this intermediate or quasi-suspect standard of review is in
contrast to both the strict scrutiny test and the rational basis test
employed by the Supreme Court in other cases of disparate treatment
initiated by the government.
Under the rational basis test, government-initiated or govern-
ment-sponsored classications based on age, property, or other non-
suspect or non-fundamental rights are presumed valid under the U.S.
Constitution's Equal Protection clause unless the plaintiff proves that
Table 1
Levels of Scrutiny Applied by Courts to Challenges Based on the Equal Protection Clause
Strict Scrutiny Test Intermediate Scrutiny Test Rational Basis Test
When Used Fundamental Rights
Interstate Travel
Freedom of Speech and Religion
Privacy Rights
Right to Vote
Gender or sex
Illegitimacy
Non-fundamental Rights
Property Rights
Distinctions based on age, wealth, or business
Presumption Law or regulation presumed invalid Law or regulation presumed invalid Law or regulation presumed valid
Burden of Proof Government must prove validity Government must prove validity Plaintiff must prove invalidity
Elements of Proof Action or regulation is necessary to achieve
a compelling government or state interest
Action or regulation is substantially related
to an important governmental interest
Action or regulation is rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest
108 C.A.R.I. Nolasco, M.S. Vaughn / Journal of Criminal Justice 39 (2011) 106119
such classications are not rationally related to a legitimate
government interest (Bhagwat, 1997; Romer v. Evans, 1996).
Conversely, under the strict scrutiny test, government classications
violating fundamental rights, such as the right to interstate travel,
First Amendment freedom of speech and religious rights, right to
privacy, and the right to vote are presumed invalid unless the
government proves that such action is necessary to achieve a
compelling government interest (Adarand Constructors v. Pena,
1995; Pacic Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 1986).
Standard for sex-based discrimination claims under Title VII
In contrast, actions based on Title VII impose on the plaintiff the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, intentional
discrimination by the private employer. The courts have used two
theories that allow plaintiffs to prove sex discrimination claims:
disparate treatment and disparate impact (Jordan v. Wilson, 1986;
Schlei & Grossman, 1983).
Framework for analysis of disparate treatment sex-discrimination
In disparate treatment cases, Fig. 1 graphically highlights the
procedure for bringing a sex discrimination claim under Title VII:
First, the plaintiff must establish a presumption or prima facie case
of intentional discrimination by showing the following:
(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualied for
the position she sought; (3) she suffered an adverse employment
action; and, (4) others similarly situated but outside the protected
class were treated more favorably. (Alvarado v. Texas Rangers,
2007, p. 611; Bouman v. Block, 1991, p. 1223; Ptasnik v. City of
Peoria, 2004, p. 907; Willis v. Coca Cola Enters., Inc., 2006, p. 420;
Urbano v. Cont'l. Airlines, Inc., 1998, p. 206)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that the
plaintiff who alleges disparate treatment under Title VII must prove
that there were similarly situated male employees who were treated
differently from her (Ptasnik v. City of Peoria, 2004). The similarly
situated employee must be directly comparable in all material
respects (Ptasnik v. City of Peoria, 2004, p. 907). Plaintiff must show
that the employees not only reported to the same supervisor, engaged
in the same conduct, and had similar qualications, but also that there
were no differentiating or mitigating circumstances to distinguish the
employer's treatment of the employees (Ptasnik v. City of Peoria, 2004;
Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't., 1988; Thompson v. City of Memphis, 2004).
Second, the burden shifts to the employer, who must show a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the differential treatment
of the employees (Arway v. Norwalk Department of Police Service, 1997,
p. 5; Bouman v. Block, 1991, p. 1223; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 2000, p. 142; Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
1981, pp. 254-256).
Third, if the employer satises his/her burden, the plaintiff's prima
facie case is rebutted; however, the plaintiff can still prevail by showing
that either: (1) the employer's proffered reason is not true but is
instead a pretext for discrimination; or, (2) that the employer's reason,
whiletrue, is not theonlyreasonfor its conduct, andanother motivating
factor is the plaintiff's protected characteristic (Bouman v. Block, 1991,
p. 1223; Guand Santorov. BostonPolice Department, 2002, p. 11; Rachid v.
Jack in the Box, Inc., 2004, p. 308; Richmond v. Johnson, 1997, p. 4).
According to both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, a plaintiff can
demonstrate that the employer's reason is mere pretext by showing
any of the following:
the proffered reason (1) has no basis in fact, (2) did not actually
motivate the defendant's challenged conduct, or (3) was
insufcient to warrant the challenged conduct. If a plaintiff
can show that the defendant's proffered, non-discriminatory
reason is pretextual, the trier of fact may infer discrimination.
Nevertheless, the ultimate burden of proof to show discrimination
remains on the plaintiff at all times. (James v. Sheanan, 1998,
p. 1007; Tysinger v. Police Department of the City of Zanesville, 2006,
p. 576)
In the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, the discriminatory motive must be
a signicant factor for the employment decision (Walsdorf v. Board
of Commissioners for the East Jefferson Levee District, 1988, p. 1052,
footnote 1). On the other hand, in the First, Third, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuits, the plaintiff must show that he or she would have received
the job absent the discriminatory motive (Walsdorf v. Board of
Commissioners for the East Jefferson Levee District, 1988, p. 1052,
footnote 1), but in the Eight Circuit, the employer may be liable upon
mere proof that an unlawful motive played some part in the
employment decision (Bibbs v. Block, 1985, p. 1323).
Framework for analysis of disparate impact sex-discrimination
Disparate impact cases require a different judicial analysis (See
Fig. 2): First, the plaintiff must showa substantial adverse impact on a
protected class (Kent County Sheriff's Association v. County of Kent,
1987, p. 1492). Second, then the burden shifts to the employer, who
must prove a business-necessity for the adverse employment decision
or practice, such as job-relatedness.
Title VII permits sex-based discrimination where sex is a bona de
occupational qualication reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise (42 U.S.C.
2000e-2[e]). The Fifth Circuit stated in Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co. (1969, p. 235) that an employer can rely on the bona de
occupational qualication defense by showing that they had
reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that
No Sex Discrimination
Sex Discrimination
Plaintiff:
Pretextual Reason
of Defendant
Plaintiff: Prima
Facie Intentional
Discrimination
Defendant: Legitimate
Non-discriminatory
Reason
NO
NO
NO YES
YES YES
Fig. 1. Disparate Treatment Sex Discrimination.
109 C.A.R.I. Nolasco, M.S. Vaughn / Journal of Criminal Justice 39 (2011) 106119
all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and
efciently the duties of the job involved. Also, discrimination based
on sex is valid only when the essence of the business operation would
be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively (Diaz v.
Pan American World Airways, 1971, p. 388). Federal courts, however,
prohibit employment discrimination based on traditional gender
stereotypes (Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 1969; Gillin v. Federal Paper
Board Co., 1973; Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 1971; Meadows v. Ford
Motor Co., 1975; Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacic Co., 1971). Third, the
plaintiff must then prove that there are other feasible alternatives
with less adverse impact.
The Sixth Circuit explained the difference between disparate
treatment and disparate impact cases:
When proceeding under a disparate treatment theory, the case
usually focuses on an individual, and the focus of the contest is on
the employer's motivation for the different action taken, with the
plaintiff attempting to prove intentional bias and [the] employer
contending that its actions were based on a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason (citations omitted). In adverse impact (or
disparate impact) cases, there is an attack on a specic [facially
neutral] employment practice, such as a written scored test, or a
specic objective requirement, such as a high school diploma
requirement or a height and weight requirement. (Kent County
Sheriff's Association v. County of Kent, 1987, p. 1492)
Although private employers may rebut a prima facie case of
discrimination under Title VII through proof of a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason, public employers may be subjected to more
stringent requirements. To rebut the presumption of discrimination,
public employers, such as the state and federal criminal justice
agencies, may be required to show that such classications are
substantially related to an important government interest. Analysis of
dozens of decided cases show that some U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals
have applied the standards used under the Equal Protection clause to
Title VII actions, rather than automatically applying the Supreme
Court's intermediate or quasi-suspect standard of review. Federal and
state court decisions on the rebuttal proof required from public
employers, however, have varied across jurisdictions, with some
applying the rational basis test, while others applying the strict
scrutiny standard of review.
The remainder of the article analyzes federal court decisions at the
U.S. Supreme Court, Circuit, and District Court levels, as well as state
court cases, to ascertain what interests and rights are deemed
adequate to rebut the employee's prima facie case of discrimination.
It also analyzes the standard of reviewused by federal and state courts
when examining gender-based classications within criminal justice
agencies. Employment practices in the criminal justice system are
classied depending on the stage of the employment process: hiring
decisions, terms and conditions of actual employment (such as pay
and benets, job assignments, promotions, and transfers) and
termination of employment. The article concludes by identifying the
circumstances under which the courts have held that a given
employment policy or employee treatment is or is not deemed sex
discrimination.
Methods
The LEXIS-NEXIS and WESTLAW databases contain electronic
copies of all published and unpublished court decisions. A keyword
search was conducted in both of these databases to gather cases
decided by the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, U.S. District Courts, and
state appellate courts, using the following keywords: sex discrimi-
nation AND police AND Title VII; sex discrimination AND
corrections AND Title VII. The study employed inductive doctrinal
legal methodology to identify courts that rule sex was a bona de
occupational qualication for employment in criminal justice agencies
(Nolasco, Vaughn, & del Carmen, 2010). Based on the analysis, the
article discusses convergence and divergence within the various
federal and state courts.
Cases involving sex discrimination due to disparate impact
Under the disparate impact theory of sex discrimination, various
federal and state courts have used Title VII to examine the legality of
employment practices by criminal justice agencies. The legal analysis
centers on whether the burden-shifting procedures have been met in
cases involving job segregation exclusion and job limitation policies,
minimum height and weight requirements, strength and physical
tness tests, oral interviews, written examinations, educational
requirements, and grooming policies.
The plaintiffs in disparate impact sex-discrimination cases are rst
required to prove disparate impact through statistical or other
evidentiary means. The Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson (1977), for
example, noted that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of
unlawful sex discrimination because the height (5 feet 2 inches) and
weight (120 pounds) requirements would exclude 33.29 percent of
the U.S. female population, while excluding less than 1 percemt of the
male population. The Court further stated that although women
14 years of age or older compose 52.75 percent of the Alabama
Fig. 2. Disparate impact sex discrimination.
110 C.A.R.I. Nolasco, M.S. Vaughn / Journal of Criminal Justice 39 (2011) 106119
population and 36.89 percent of its total labor force, they hold only
12.9 percent of its correctional counselor positions (Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 1977, p. 329).
The defendants can then prove that the employment practice is a
bona de occupational qualication that is reasonably necessary for
the normal operation of the employment activity within the criminal
justice agency. Finally, the plaintiffs may rebut through proof of other
feasible alternatives with less disparate impact. Courts conclude that
no sex discrimination occurred if plaintiffs fail to show disparate
impact or availability of feasible alternatives. Conversely, failure of
defendants to prove business-necessity leads courts to rule that sex
discrimination is present.
Job exclusion due to threat to security of agency and third party safety
In several cases, females have been excluded from certain criminal
justice jobs because the agency proved the business-necessity or job-
relatedness of the positions. In Dothard v. Rawlinson (1977, p. 335),
the Supreme Court ruled that the possibility of female employees
being subjected to sexual assault by inmates, by itself, did not justify
their exclusion from prison jobs since it is the purpose of Title VII to
allowthe individual woman to make that choice for herself. The issue
in Dothard, however, involved more than the safety risks to the female
correctional ofcers since the job involved contact with maximum-
security male prisoners. The Court explained that the likelihood that
inmates would assault a woman because she was a woman would
pose a real threat not only to the victim of the assault but to the basic
control of the penitentiary and protection of inmates and the other
security personnel (Dothard v. Rawlinson, 1977, p. 335). Due to the
accessibility and high amount of contacts between corrections ofcers
and inmates, lack of manpower to maintain security, and the random
distribution of sex offenders among the inmate population, employing
female correctional counselors would pose a substantial security risk
to the penitentiary; thus, exclusion of women from these jobs was
justied. Lower federal courts have similarly held that certain policies
of hiring only females to correctional positions are necessary to
protect the essence of the business of correctional facilities, including
jail security, safety, privacy and rehabilitation of inmates and
efciency and morale among deputies (Ambat v. City and County of
San Francisco, 2010).
At the state court level, the courts have upheld the exclusion of
females from the position of corrections ofcer due to the need to
protect correctional ofcers (Iowa Dept. of Social Services, Iowa Men's
Reformatory v. Iowa Merit Employment Dept., 1977), inmates, and the
corrections facility itself (Long v. State Personnel Board, 1974). Courts
have ruled that an employer was not required to alter substantially
his facility and procedure to suit the sex of the person involved (Long
v. State Personnel Board, 1974, p. 1015).
In Long v. State Personnel Board (1974), exclusion of females from
the position of Protestant Chaplain at an all-male state youth
correctional facility was allowed. The court stated that, by itself, the
possibility of sexual assault of the female chaplain would not justify
the exclusion of females from the job. Other factors, however, made
the exclusion of females from the job necessary. Thus, the court
considered the following: (1) effect on the ward and the possibility
that he will become a recidivist if he commits sexual assault on the
ofcer; (2) erosion of public condence in the security and order of
the facility; and (3) the effectiveness of the prison's programs in
rehabilitating the wards if a case of sexual assault occurs within its
premises. The court also rejected the argument that adjustments,
such as the hiring of security guards, the extension of alarm systems,
the moving of buildings, and the changing of procedures, could be
made to prevent sexual attacks, stating that an employer was not
required to alter substantially his facility and procedure to suit the sex
of the person involved (Long v. State Personnel Board, 1974, p. 1015).
The above cases show that initially, the criminal justice plaintiff
can claim that the employment measure constitutes sex discrimina-
tion through proof of its disparate impact on the female workforce.
The criminal justice defendant-employer, however, can rebut its
discriminatory impact through proof that the measure is a bona de
occupational qualication or it is job-related. Once the defendant
employer established the business-necessity or job-relatedness of the
particular practice, the criminal justice plaintiff can then counter by
showing that there are other feasible alternatives with less disparate
impact. The mere possibility of assault of a female ofcer does not
justify exclusion from the job if additional protective measures could
be easily implemented without any real burden on the employer
(Manley v. Mobile County, Alabama, 1977; Tracy v. Oklahoma Dept. of
Corrections, 1974).
Thus, in one case where a female applicant was denied the position
of identication assistant ofcer in a county jail, the county tried to
justify the exclusion of females by stating that, additional security
would have to be furnished to a female identication assistant ofcer
(Manley v. Mobile County, Alabama, 1977, p. 1358). The District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama rejected the jail's argument,
ruling that there would be no real burdensome staff problem for a
male ofcer to remain with any persons in custody or prisoners who
were perceived as a physical threat to a female identication ofcer
during the ve- to 15-minute identication process (Manley v. Mobile
County, Alabama, 1977, p. 1358). The district court further explained
that the bona de occupational defense does not apply. Unlike
Dothard (1977) which involved a contact position in a maximum-
security prison where the hiring of females would undermine prison
security, the position of identication assistant ofcer in this case is a
minimum contact position, and the county jail in question is not a
maximum security facility.
Job exclusion in criminal justice due to violation of inmates' right to
privacy
Another reason accepted by the courts for the gender-based job
exclusion of females in criminal justice agencies is the need to protect
inmate privacy (Berl v. The County of Westchester, 1986; Carey v.
New York State Human Rights Appeal Board, 1978; Iowa Dept. of Social
Services, Iowa Men's Reformatory v. Iowa Merit Employment Dept.,
1977; Long v. State Personnel Board, 1974; Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania
Human Relations Com., 1973; Rider v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
1988; Terry v. Mercer County Board of Chosen Freeholders, 1980). In
these cases, the defendant employer was able to prove that despite
the disparate impact on female criminal justice employees, the policy
was a business-necessity and was job-related. Here, the employer
satised the burden of proof, while the plaintiff was unable to prove
the availability of feasible alternatives.
In other cases, however, federal courts ruled that inmates do not
possess an unqualied Constitutional right of privacy (Bagley v.
Watson, 1983; Grifn v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 1982). The
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that
connement and the needs of the penal institution, by their nature,
impose certain limitations on any Constitutional right to privacy,
which may have been retained by inmates (Grifn v. Michigan Dept. of
Corrections, 1982, p. 701). An inmate's right to privacy must thus be
weighed against the legitimate penological objective of providing
equal job opportunities regardless of sex (Avery v. Perrin, 1979; Forts
v. Ward, 1980; Grifn v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 1982, p. 702). In
Grifn v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections (1982, pp. 701-702), the
Supreme Court further noted that, inmates do not possess protected
rights under the Constitution against being viewed while naked by
correctional ofcers of the opposite sex. Hence, female applicants
should not be excluded from correctional jobs because of any alleged
invasion of inmates rights of privacy.
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The federal courts also rejected claims of sex-based job exclusion
when procedures were already in place that sufciently protected
inmates privacy rights, without the need for a bona de occupational
qualication plan (Torres v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Social
Services, 1986) or when existing practices contradicted the need for
inmate privacy (e.g., video cameras used in jails to supervise and
observe inmates in their cells were operated by female dispatchers)
(U.S. v. Gregory, 1989). In Torres (1986), the Seventh Circuit further
noted that defendant employer failed to prove that the privacy rights
of inmates would be seriously compromised by hiring members of
both sexes and that any infringement could not be remedied through
alternatives with less discriminatory impact (e.g., reassignment of
duties to ofcers of the same sex as inmates in cases involving strip
searches and shower and toilet surveillance).
Other courts, however, allowed limitation of job assignments (but
not job exclusion) and duties of certain correctional jobs to protect
inmate privacy (Everson v. Michigan Department of Corrections, 2002;
Forts v. Ward, 1978; Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 1980; In
re Long, 1976; Reynolds v. Wise, 1973; Sterling v. Cupp, 1980). In Forts v.
Ward (1978), the court sought to protect female inmates privacy
rights by limiting the duties of correction guards as follows: no male
guard should be assigned to a station in the inrmary where in the
normal course of hospital procedure would be likely to observe a
female in the nude; that inmates should be told ve minutes before
the morning count that the count would occur and that under normal
circumstances no male guard should enter the housing unit corridors
during this ve-minute period; and that during the nighttime period
no male guard should have duties which would require him under
normal circumstances to observe a female inmate through her cell
window (p. 1102).
In another case, an Oregon court allowed job limitations of female
correctional personnel by prohibiting prison ofcials from assigning
them duties, which included frisking male prisoners, except in an
emergency situation. The court noted that the searches were brief in
duration apparently lasting about 30 seconds, were carried out
randomly in order to locate contraband, and involved some touching
of genital and anal areas through clothing (Sterling v. Cupp, 1980, p.
207). Since the frisks conducted by female guards were at least as
intrusive as the visual surveillance by opposite-sex guards considered
impermissible in Forts v. Ward (1978) and In re Long (1976), the
Oregon Court of Appeals ruled that if a prisoner was entitled, absent
an emergency, to be free of visual inspection by prison personnel
while in the nude, the prisoner was equally entitled to be free fromthe
tactile equivalent of the nude inspection that is, manual examina-
tion of the anal-genital area through clothing (Sterling v. Cupp, 1980,
p. 208).
In Hardin v. Stynchcomb (1982), the Eleventh Circuit, taking into
consideration the privacy rights of inmates, ruled that excluding all
females from deputy positions in the sheriff's department was
improper sex discrimination, unjustied as a bona de occupational
qualication. The court noted that the system of job assignments
could be modied to avoid clashes between privacy rights and equal
employment opportunities without either substantially affecting
efcient operation of the sheriff's department or undermining its
essential functions (Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 1982, p. 1373). Job
responsibilities could be rotated so that female deputies assigned to
the male section of the jail would not have to performduties (i.e., strip
searches and observation of inmates use of shower and toilet
facilities) that impose upon male inmate's privacy rights.
Females could not be excluded from jobs if the criminal justice
employer failed to prove that the gender-based adverse employment
practice was not a bona de occupational qualication under Title VII
(Rucker v. City of Kettering, Ohio, 2000; U.S. v. Gregory, 1989). The
plaintiff could further rebut the defendant's bona de occupational
qualication defense through proof of available and feasible alter-
natives that could be implemented by the criminal justice employer.
In one case, the court disallowed job exclusions on the basis of
gender due to feasible measures that could be offered by the
corrections facility to accommodate inmate privacy, such as:
(1) covering the window of prison cells for 15-minute intervals at
night to enable inmates to change their clothes or use the toilet; and
(2) furnishing of appropriate sleepwear to help inmates conceal
private parts of their bodies. According to the court, these proposals
appeared to be an acceptable way of accommodating both the
inmates' privacy interests and the employees' equal employment
rights (Forts v. Ward, 1980, p. 1102).
On the other hand, in Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory
(1980, p. 1086), the Eight Circuit ruled that in addition to showing
that the hiring of women would undermine the essence of the prison
administration, the corrections facility must reasonably rearrange
job responsibilities so as to minimize the clash between privacy
interests of the inmates and the nondiscrimination principle of Title
VII. In this case, at a men's medium security reformatory, females
were excluded from positions above the Correctional Ofcer I (CO I)
level (Soehnel, 2007). The court compared the functions of COI and
COII, noting that both contained almost the same number of duties
that can be performed without invading inmate privacy rights. The
female applicant for COII, who was currently employed as a COI, was
assigned limited functions as a COI to protect inmate privacy rights.
The court reasoned that since female ofcers were subject to
administrative changes that limited job functions at the COI level,
the same administrative changes could be done for COII level
applicants.
Minimum height or weight requirements in criminal justice agencies
When the plaintiff proved disparate impact on the female criminal
justice employees and the criminal justice employer failed to prove a
business-necessity, the courts rule that the requirements were
discriminatory. In one case, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the
disparate impact of minimum height and weight requirements on the
entire U.S. female population instead of merely considering the effect
at the local and state level (Dothard v. Rawlinson, 1977). In Dothard ,
the Court declared illegal Alabama's minimum height and weight
requirements for correctional counselor positions, noting that
although women 14-years of age or older comprised 52.75 percent
of the Alabama population and 36.89 percent of its total labor force,
females held only 12.9 percent of its correctional counselor positions.
The Court also relied on the factual ndings of the district court that
the combination of the height and weight restrictions excluded 41.13
percent of the United States female population, while excluding less
than 1 percent of the male population. The Court further rejected the
State's policies as job-related since the state did not prove that the
height and weight requirements adequately measured the strength of
applicants.
Federal courts permit the use of minimum height and weight
requirements for corrections and law enforcement personnel (Jones v.
City of Mount Vernon, 2000; Kentucky Com. on Human Rights v.
Commonwealth, Dept. of Justice, etc., 1979; Mieth v. Dothard, 1976;
Schick v. Bronstein, 1978; Smith v. Troyan, 1976; Vanguard Justice Soc. v.
Hughes, 1979) if sufcient justication was offered for these
requirements (Blake v. Los Angeles, 1979; Brace v. O'Neill, 1979;
Costa v. Markey, 1982; Hardy v. Stumpf, 1974; Horace v. City of Pontiac,
1980; Hornick v. Duryea, 1980; Ofcers for Justice v. Civil Service Com.,
1975; U.S. v. Chicago, 1976; U.S. v. North Carolina, 1981; U.S. v. Virginia,
1980). Several courts, for instance, ruled that the minimumheight and
weight standards for police patrol ofcers violated Title VII because
(1) no attempts at professional validations of either of the tests had
been made (Peltier v. Fargo, 1975, p. 728) and (2) the police
department had failed to introduce sufcient justication for the
disproportionate impact on women (U.S. v. Buffalo, 1978, p. 623).
112 C.A.R.I. Nolasco, M.S. Vaughn / Journal of Criminal Justice 39 (2011) 106119
Strength or physical tness tests in criminal justice agencies
In several cases, courts ruled that the use of certain strength or
physical agility tests for applicants for law enforcement or corrections
employment did not constitute illegal sex discrimination (Burney v.
Pawtucket, 1983; Hardy v. Stumpf, 1974; Soehnel, 2007; U.S. v. Wichita
Falls, 1988) due to the job-relatedness of these tests (Patrolmen's
Benev. Asso. v. East Brunswick, 1981; Simon v. St. Louis County, MO,
1981). To be valid, however, the tests must be professionally validated
(Blake v. Los Angeles, 1979; Brace v. O'Neill, 1979; Harless v. Duck, 1980;
Maine Human Rights Com. v. Auburn, 1979; Moore v. San Jose, 1980;
Pietras v. Board of Fire Commissioners, 1999; Thomas v. Evanston, 1985;
U.S. v. Buffalo, 1978; U. S. v. New York, 1979; U.S. v. Philadelphia, 1978)
and must not possess any disparate impact on the female population
(Eison v. Knoxville, 1983; Maine Human Rights Com. v. Auburn, 1979;
Ofcers for Justice v. Civil Service Com., 1975; Pietras v. Board of Fire
Commissioners, 1999; U.S. v. Yonkers, 1984). Written examinations,
including strength and physical tness tests must be predictive of or
signicantly correlated with important elements of work behavior,
which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates
are being evaluated (U.S. v. Buffalo, 1978, p. 623). Validation studies
(i.e., criterion, content, and concept validation) are relevant to show
the relationship between test results and job performance (U.S. v.
Buffalo, 1978; Zalmen v. City of Cleveland, 1988).
The oral interview in criminal justice employment
Questions during the oral interview must be job-related and must
ow from the business-necessity rule (Bannerman v. Department of
Youth Authority, 1977; Wells v. Civil Service Com., 1967).
Conversely, several courts have ruled that the use of a particular
type of oral interview for employment as a probation or police ofcer
constituted illegal sex discrimination due to the following reasons:
rst, lack of objective criteria on the part of the interviewing ofcer
whose subjective assessments of candidates could potentially be
arbitrary (Harless v. Duck, 1980; Riffelmacher v. Board of Police Comrs.,
1989; Woody v. West Miami, 1979); second, lack of professional
validation (Peltier v. Fargo, 1975; Williams v. San Francisco, 1979);
third, lack of job-relatedness (Harless v. Duck, 1980; Maine Human
Rights Com. v. Auburn, 1979; Woody v. West Miami, 1979); fourth,
disparate impact on female applicants (Harless v. Duck, 1980; Williams
v. San Francisco, 1979); and fth, discriminatory intent or animus
(Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 2007; King v. New Hampshire Dept. of
Resources & Economic Development, 1977).
The Fifth Circuit ruled that oral interviews per se are not invalid, and
that the employer may base his or her decision for not selecting a
candidate on an oral interview. The employer's subjective assessment
of the candidate's performance in an interview, may serve as a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the candidate's non-selection
(Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 2007, p. 616), but only if the employer
articulates a clear and reasonably specic basis for its subjective
assessment (Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 2007, p. 616; Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 1981, pp. 258). According to the court, the
criminal justice employer may not merely state that the employment
decisionwas basedonthe hiringof the best qualiedapplicant, but must
articulate specic reasons for that applicant's qualication, such as
seniority, lengthof service inthe same position, personal characteristics,
general education, technical training, experienceincomparable work, or
any combination of such criteria (Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 2007,
p. 618). Thus, oral interviews must be basedonspecic andclear criteria
to serve as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the criminal
justice agency's refusal to hire the female candidate. Mere allegation of
poor performance of the rejected candidate during the oral interview is
not enough. During the selection process, the criminal justice agency
must explain to the court and produce evidence of the scoring and
grading criteria to disprove discriminatory intent.
In another case, the First Circuit held that the hiring ofcer
displayed discriminatory animus toward the female applicant
during herinterview by asking whether she could wield a sledge
hammer, whether she had any construction industry experience, and
whether she could run someone in, none of which related to a bona
de occupational qualication of a police ofcer (King v. New
Hampshire Dept. of Resources & Economic Development, 1977, p. 83).
The court added that due to evidence of discriminatory intent, the
government defendants had to identify a legitimate nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the non-hiring of the female applicant (King v. New
Hampshire Dept. of Resources & Economic Development, 1977, p. 83).
Written examinations and/or education requirements in criminal justice
In several cases, courts have held that the use of a written
examination or a college credit requirement in law enforcement
employment didnot constituteillegal sexdiscriminationduetostatistical
proof of the absence of any disparate impact on female ofcers
(Bannerman v. Department of Youth Authority, 1977; Davis v. Dallas,
1979; Harless v. Duck, 1980; Smithv. Troyan, 1975; Vingi v. State, 1997). On
the contrary, these writtentests violate Title VII if there is statistical proof
of substantial or signicant disparate impact on the female population
(Bishop v. Gainer, 2001; Bouman v. Block, 1991; San Francisco Police
Ofcers Association v. City and County of San Francisco, 1987; U.S. v. New
York, 1979; Williams v. San Francisco, 1979), and such tests are not
professionally validated, job-related, or necessary for the efcient
operations of police work (Bouman v. Block, 1991; Peltier v. Fargo, 1975).
Grooming requirements in criminal justice agencies
The New Hampshire Supreme Court and a federal district court in
Georgia have held that non-selective enforcement of grooming
requirements of a police ofcer (such as length of hair) did not
constitute illegal sex discrimination (Ashley v. Macon, 1974; Planchet v.
New Hampshire Hospital, 1975). In determining the validity of the
grooming requirement, the courts examine whether the requirement
is selectively enforced or was based on gender stereotypes. Hence, in
one case, a court ruled that female security guards at the National Art
Gallery survived summary judgment on their Title VII claim, where
they claimed discriminatory enforcement of a uniform grooming
policy when male ofcers were permitted to tuck their ponytails into
their coats and jackets, while females were required to cut their
ponytails completely off (Batson v. Powell, 1996, pp. 574-575). In
another case, female sheriff's deputies successfully brought a Title VII
lawsuit for sex discrimination against defendants who: (a) required
them to cut their hair to be considered for employment; (b) said that
they should become teachers or secretaries instead; and (c) were
refused to be transferred because the sheriff believed it was good
public relations to have pretty woman working in the downtown
district (Richardson v. Byrd, 1983, p. 1022).
Cases involving sex discrimination due to disparate treatment
In disparate treatment cases of sex discrimination, various federal
and state courts employ a different-burden shifting legal decision-
making model. The plaintiff must initially establisha prima facie case of
sex discrimination by showing that she is a qualied member of a
protected class and has suffered an adverse employment action, while
others similarly situated received more favorable treatment. The
defendant employer must then rebut through proof of a legitimate
non-discriminatory reasonfor the action. Once again, the burdenshifts
to the plaintiff who can show that the employer's reason is merely a
pretext for a discriminatory motive. The courts have examined
whether the burden-shifting procedures have been met in disparate
treatment cases involving the following: assignment of duties,
113 C.A.R.I. Nolasco, M.S. Vaughn / Journal of Criminal Justice 39 (2011) 106119
transfer, promotion and demotion, unequal pay or benets, practices
concerning pregnant employees, and termination of employment.
Adverse employment actions
One of the elements for a Title VII sex discrimination claim is an
adverse employment action on the part of the criminal justice
employer. The First and Fifth Circuits identify several types of
adverse employment actions, including denials of promotion,
discharges, demotions, refusals to hire, refusals to promote, and
reprimands (Breaux v. City of Garland, 2000, p. 157; Gu & Santoro v.
Boston Police Department, 2002, p. 14). Reduction in pay and a loss of
seniority are also considered adverse employment actions. Similarly,
assignment of duties that severely restrict the employment opportu-
nities of female correctional ofcers, such as gaining valuable job
experience in other aspects of jail management in the booking and
processing of inmates, lack of access to the more desirable day shift
and weekends off are also prohibited within the ambit of Title VII
(Sims v. Montgomery County Commission, 1990, p. 1064).
The Second Circuit also ruled that lesser actions may qualify as
adverse employment actions if the plaintiff is able to show that the
total circumstances of her working environment changed to become
unreasonably inferior and adverse when compared to a typical or
normal, not ideal or model workplace (Philipps v. Bowen, 2002,
p. 109). Relatively minor incidents may qualify as adverse employ-
ment actions if they occur often and over a longer period of time,
such that they attain the critical mass of unreasonable inferiority
(Philipps v. Bowen, 2002, p. 109). The Fifth Circuit further claried the
test for determining whether a lateral transfer could be considered a
demotion, so as to qualify as an adverse employment action (Forsyth v.
City of Dallas, 1996). A purely lateral transfer is not an adverse
employment action unless it was a demotion, such as when the new
position is objectively worse such as being less prestigious or less
interesting or providing less room for advancement (Serna v. City of
San Antonio, 2001; Click v. Copeland, 1992).
In one case, a female Sergeant in the Special Crimes Service of the
Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) was denied lateral transfer as
a Sergeant in the Rangers Division. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the
plaintiff produced objective evidence of an adverse employment
action, showing that:
(1) the Rangers are an elite unit within the DPS and have a unique
and illustrious history; (2) an appointment to the Rangers is,
according to the DPS, one of the most competitive goals to which
a law enforcement ofcer may aspire; (3) the promotion and
selection process is complex and rigorous; (4) the competition to
become a Ranger is erce as evidenced by the large number of
applicants for the few available positions, and is steeper than the
competition for positions with any other DPS's divisions; (5) the
minimum qualications for becoming a Ranger Sergeant are
higher than the minimum qualications for becoming a Sergeant
with Special Crimes; (6) the Rangers work under less supervision
and have greater job responsibilities, including being the primary
investigators of homicides and handling other major high prole
and sensitive cases; (7) although DPS regulations do not ofcially
classify Ranger appointments as promotions because they do not
entail an increase in pay, receiving an appointment to the Rangers
is generally viewed within DPS as a promotion; and (8) newly
appointed Rangers are honored at a special ceremony in Austin.
(Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 2007, p. 615)
The court stated that the Texas Rangers refusal to transfer its female
employee in a lateral position could be construed as a demotion and an
adverse employment action even if the lateral position did not offer a
higher pay or additional benets but was objectively a better position.
Factors to be considered consisted of whether the position involves
greater job responsibilities or better job duties; provides greater
opportunities for career advancement; requires greater skills, higher
education, or more experience; is obtained through a complex
competitive selection process; or is objectively otherwise more
prestigious (Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 2007; Click v. Copeland, 1992;
Ptasnik v. City of Peoria, 2004; Serna v. City of San Antonio, 2001; Sharp v.
City of Houston, 1999; Forsyth v. City of Dallas, 1996).
Hiring, assignment of duties, promotion, and demotion in criminal
justice agencies
Several courts have found no sex discrimination when plaintiff
police ofcers dispute the sex-segregation, promotion, and assign-
ment policies of law enforcement and corrections agencies: rst,
absence of disparate treatment between plaintiff and similarly
situated employees (Ptasnik v. City of Peoria, 2004); second, lack of
evidence of similarity of training, qualications, and skills (Berni v.
Leonard, 1972; Smith v. City of Dayton, 1994); third, need to protect
inmate rights and proof that such classication was necessary to
inmate privacy (Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 1980,
p. 1087); fourth, court's belief that the defendant institution was not
required to substantially adjust its physical plant or procedure to
support the imposition of such classication (Iowa Dept. of Social
Services, Iowa Men's Reformatory v. Iowa Merit Employment Dept., 1977,
p. 167); fth, unsatisfactory performance (Rogers v. McCall, 1980;
Windom v. St. Louis, 1977); sixth, existence of afrmative action plans
to remedy past discrimination against females (Finney v. Mabry,
1982); seventh, business-necessity (Simon and Dellick v. City of
Youngstown, 1995), such as the need to comply with state regulations
that required state jails to have a female deputy on duty when female
prisoners were lodged in jail (Reed v. County of Casey, Commonwealth
of Kentucky, 1999).
In Edwards v. Department of Corrections (1985, p. 809), however,
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama held that
femaleness is not a bona de occupational qualication for the
position of shift commander at the state's Julia Tutwiler Prison for
Women because a male employee had previously held the position for
nearly a year without any apparent difculty. In Edwards (1985), a
male ofcer held the position of acting shift commander; he was
refused promotion and then transferred due to departmental policy
restricting the position to women. The court pointed out that prison
conditions were generally peaceful and orderly instead of rampant
or violent, and that the Department failed to prove that it was not
possible to rearrange job responsibilities to eliminate the clash
between the privacy of inmates and the employment opportunities of
ofcers as shift commanders (Edwards v. Department of Corrections,
1985, p. 810).
With respect to assignment and promotion policies, the Fifth
Circuit ruled that law enforcement and corrections departments
violate Title VII when they practice gender bias or perpetuate
stereotypes of women (Blake v. Los Angeles, 1979; Moore v. San Jose,
1980; Shortt v. County of Arlington, 1978; Walsdorf v. Board of
Commissioners for the East Jefferson Levee District, 1988). The court
considered the employer's sexual bias that women should remain at
home to make the beds and cook the food and, you know, do the
things that's necessary as proof of discriminatory intent when it
refused to promote a female police ofcer to Assistant Superintendent
II in the school police department (Walsdorf v. Board of Commissioners
for the East Jefferson Levee District, 1988, p. 1053).
Another case involved a female police ofcer who, unlike male
ofcers, was promoted to class II salary designation without serving
one-year patrol duty. The female ofcer was subsequently demoted
back to a class I salary designation and to patrol duty after male
ofcers complained (Shortt v. County of Arlington, 1978). The Fourth
Circuit held that the police department discriminated on the basis of
sex in violation of Title VII. The court examined the departmental
114 C.A.R.I. Nolasco, M.S. Vaughn / Journal of Criminal Justice 39 (2011) 106119
policy, noting that female ofcers were assigned non-patrol duties
during their probationary year due to the belief that they could not
adequately perform patrol work because of their physical character-
istics. Subsequent complaints from male ofcers, however, led to a
policy requiring all employees (including females) to serve at least
one-year as a patrol ofcer before consideration for promotion to the
Investigations Division (Shortt v. County of Arlington, 1978, p. 781).
The court found that the department was motivated by a discrimi-
natory purpose in demoting a female police ofcer due to complaints
from male co-workers and in adopting a retroactive patrol duty
requirement for promotion (Shortt v. County of Arlington, 1978).
Unequal pay or benets in criminal justice agencies
In several cases, courts have allowed lesser salaries and benets to
female lawenforcement ofcers because of different: rst, job positions
and job responsibilities (Carver v. Wichita Falls, 1968; Cunningham v.
Board of County Comrs., 1972; Kopp v. Salt Lake City, 1973; Moore v. San
Jose, 1980; Turner v. Baytown, 1974); and, second, training, qualications,
and skills actually required for the position of police ofcer (Rufn v.
County of Los Angeles, 1979). Lower pay for meter maids is valid when
they assist male patrol ofcers by giving tickets to vehicles parked
overtime at parking meters. Since meter maids are not police ofcers,
the lower pay did not constitute sex discrimination (Commonwealth,
Human Relations Com. v. Beaver Falls City Council, 1976).
In Peltier v. Fargo (1976, p. 725), however, the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of North Dakota ruled that female employees
designated as car markers in the City of Fargo Police Department are
entitled to an equal opportunity to qualify and become police
ofcers, but are not entitled to automatic employmentwithout
ever making application. In Peltier (1976), the police department
created the position of car markers who were assigned duties
connected with parking control in order to release fully trained and
qualied patrol ofcers from parking control duties. Prior to the
creation of the car marker classication, police ofcers who performed
parking control duties were classied as patrol ofcers and received
commensurate wages. The position of car markers, however, was
assigned the lowest pay range on the City scale or approximately twice
as less than the salaries received by regular patrol ofcers. The
plaintiffs in Peltier (1976) who were hired as car markers did not apply
as patrol ofcers nor did they fulll any of the requirements for patrol
ofcers. The district court denied the female ofcers claim for back
pay, but required the police department to adopt an afrmative action
program to recruit more females, and to adopt validated employment
tests that were compliant with Title VII and other federal laws.
In other cases, courts declared that unequal pay was discrimina-
tion (Howard v. Ward County, 1976), notwithstanding the alleged
differences in duties and job responsibilities of male and female law
enforcement ofcers. In these cases, the courts found that the duties
performed were substantially equal (Marcoux v. Maine, 1986,
p. 1105), and that the differences were minimal since the additional
duties given to male ofcers were rarely performed, consumed
minimal amount of time, and were incidental to the duties actually
assigned and performed by both ofcers (Gibbs v. Pierce County Law
Enforcement Support Agency, 1986; Janich v. Sheriff of Yellowstone
County, 1977; Marcoux v. Maine, 1986; U.S. v. Milwaukee, 1977; Wood
v. Mills, 1975).
Practices regarding pregnant employees in criminal justice agencies
Employees who are pregnant present challenges to criminal justice
managers, and such employees are specically protected by a host of
federal and state laws against sex discrimination in employment. The
Iowa Supreme Court ruled that the police department's treatment of
pregnant employees cannot be considered sex discrimination due to
absence of disparate treatment between male and female ofcers
(Atwood v. Des Moines, 1992). The pregnant employee received the
same treatment as similarly situated non-pregnant male employees.
Another case illustrates the notion that a pregnant employee who
is not treated differently from other employees is not being
discriminated against despite her request for separate treatment
and benets due to her pregnancy. In Tysinger v. Police Department of
the City of Zanesville (2006), the plaintiff, a patrol ofcer in the City of
Zanesville, Iowa Police Department, requested for assignment to light
duty when she discovered that she was pregnant. The Chief of Police
informed her that there was no light duty assignment in the
department, and that she had to le for a leave of absence until she
was able to return to full active duty. After giving birth, she led a
complaint for sex discrimination, alleging that the police department
denied accommodation of her pregnancy, despite having suitable
positions available, and despite having accommodated other similarly
situated, non-pregnant workers in the past (Tysinger v. Police
Department of the City of Zanesville, 2006, p. 571). The Sixth Circuit
ruled that plaintiff must prove the following elements for a claim of
pregnancy discrimination under Title VII:
(1) she was pregnant, (2) she was qualied for her job, (3) she
was subjected to an adverse employment decision, and (4) there
is a nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment
decision. (Tysinger v. Police Department of the City of Zanesville,
2006, p. 573)
The court explainedthat to prove the second element (that she was
qualied for her job), her qualications must be assessed prior to and
independent of the events that led to the adverse action (Tysinger v.
Police Department of the City of Zanesville, 2006, p. 573). This meant that
the plaintiff was qualied to perform her duties prior to becoming
pregnant. The court ruled, however, that the plaintiff failed to show
disparate treatment against similarly situated employees. In particu-
lar, two male employees who were previously injured were not given
preferential treatment. Despite their injuries and inability to perform
all the duties required by their positions, they continued reporting for
full active duty and were not assigned lighter duties. In contrast,
plaintiff did not present herself to her employer as capable of fullling
all the required duties of her position despite her pregnancy. On the
other hand, she requested for lighter job assignments due to her
pregnancy; thus, she failed to show disparate treatment.
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit held that the city police department's
failure to assign lighter duties to a pregnant police ofcer did not
constitute sex discrimination in violation of Title VII (Roller v. San
Mateo, 1977). With respect to the ofcer's Title VII claim, the court
stated that the city presented a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for its denial of light duty to the female ofcer since its actions were
done in compliance with the city manager's directive that all
employees must be physically t to perform full duty, and that no
employee on sick leave or disability was to be assigned modied or
limited work (Roller v. San Mateo, 1977, p. 1313).
In another case, the Eighth Circuit ruled that certain employment
practices that pertain to the discharge of or type of leave given to
pregnant police ofcers constituted disparate treatment between
male and female ofcers (Adams v. Nolan, 1992). An example comes
from Police Dept. of New York v. New York State Human Rights Appeal
Board (1978), in which disparate treatment existed when pregnant
female ofcers were required to apply for a minimum six-month
unpaid leave of absence prior to the sixth month of pregnancy,
whereas male ofcers on sick leave remained on the payroll. In
another case, U.S. v. Philadelphia (1978), the Third Circuit declared
that the discharge of a pregnant ofcer was sex discrimination. The
court accepted the termination letter as evidence of discriminatory
intent, noting that the reasons for the discharge was that her
pregnancy prevented her from participating in the study the City
was conducting concerning the performance of female police ofcers
115 C.A.R.I. Nolasco, M.S. Vaughn / Journal of Criminal Justice 39 (2011) 106119
(U.S. v. Philadelphia, 1978, p. 810). The employers applied a
stereotyped presumption without medical examination that preg-
nant women are unable to work (U.S. v. Philadelphia, 1978, p. 810).
Termination: last-hired, rst-red policies in criminal justice agencies
When police ofcers are laid off pursuant to a last-hired, rst-red
policy, the federal courts have held that under certain circumstances
retroactive seniority was an appropriate remedy for female police
ofcers where illegal sex discrimination existed (U.S. v. Philadelphia,
1980; Acha v. Beame, 1978). In Schaefer v. Tannian (1976), the Sixth
Circuit remanded the case for the lower court to determine the
appropriateness of an award of retroactive seniority to female police
ofcers to prevent their layoff pursuant to a last-hired, rst-red
policy. The court noted an intervening U.S. Supreme Court decision
(Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 1976) that required individual
assessments (and not wholesale assessments) of remedial seniority
status to be given to victims of sex discrimination. On remand, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan ordered retroactive
seniority to the date of their rst written application for employment.
Termination for Cause in Criminal Justice Agencies
Where plaintiff police ofcers allege sex discrimination in their
employers termination policies, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits examine
whether the defendant employer has legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons (Gunther v. Washington County, 1979), including: rst,
substantial distinctions between the female and male employees
(Hoskins v. Oakland County Sheriff's Dept., 2000); second, deciency in
basic skills or training or unsatisfactory performance (Thiel v. Village of
Libertyville, 1996; Vermett v. Hough, 1986); third, other valid grounds
not based on gender such as incompetent leadership, malfeasance in
ofce, or inexcusable negligence (Spencer v. Byrd, 1995; Timm v.
Illinois Department of Corrections, 2009); fourth, noncompliance with
the one-year patrol duty requirement for promotion to police
sergeant (that the city refused to waive) (McCosh v. Grand Forks,
1980); and, sixth, sound economic considerations, such as the need to
alleviate overcrowding in the men's facility by eliminating the
disproportionately more expensive women's facility (Gunther v.
Washington County, 1979, p.1315), or failure to obey lawful orders of
the employer (Snow v. Nevada Dept. of Prisons, 1984).
Other courts found that the termination of plaintiff police ofcers
constitutes illegal sex discrimination due to the following reasons: rst,
disparate treatment between two police ofcers who were engaged in
an illicit relationship, where the female ofcer was red, while the male
ofcer was suspended for 10-days without pay (Krzyzewski v.
Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 1976); second, disparate evalua-
tion and performance standards between male and female police ofcer
trainees (Fadhl v. Police Dept. of City and County of San Francisco, 1984);
and, third, gender bias and stereotypes by the police department (Fadhl
v. Police Dept. of City and County of San Francisco, 1984).
Conclusion
Federal and state courts examine employment practices in
criminal justice agencies under two theories of sex discrimination:
disparate impact and disparate treatment. Both classications require
different procedures and burdens on the part of the plaintiff-
employee or the defendant-criminal justice employer.
The courts apply disparate impact requirements to job exclusion
and job limitation policies, minimum height and weight require-
ments, strength and physical tness tests, oral interviews, written
examinations, educational standards, and grooming requirements. In
these instances, the courts examine whether the burden-shifting
procedures of both the plaintiff and the defendant have been met.
Thus, the criminal justice employee must rst prove disparate impact
through statistical or other evidentiary means. The criminal justice
agency is then required to show the business-necessity or job-
relatedness of the requirements. Some of the reasons considered by
the courts as valid include: job exclusion and job limitation due to the
possibility of sexual assault by inmates on female employees; need to
protect the interests of the corrections facility and the inmates;
professional validation of minimum height and weight requirements
and strength or physical agility tests; presence of objective criteria for,
and professional validation of, oral interviews; and non-selective
enforcement of grooming requirements as a police ofcer.
Once the criminal justice employer offers proof of job-relatedness
or business-necessity, the plaintiff must rebut through proof of other
feasible alternatives with less disparate impact. Failure of the plaintiff
to prove disparate impact or availability of feasible alternatives
through adequate evidence leads the courts to rule that there is no sex
discrimination. Conversely, failure of the defendant to prove business-
necessity leads the courts to rule that there is sex discrimination.
Federal and state courts employ a different burden-shifting
procedure with disparate treatment cases of sex discrimination,
involving assignment of duties, transfer, promotion, and demotion,
unequal pay or benets, practices concerning pregnant employees,
and termination of employment. In these cases, the plaintiff must
initially establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination by showing
that she is a qualied member of a protected class and has suffered an
adverse employment action, while others similarly situated received
more favorable treatment. The criminal justice employer must then
rebut through proof of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the
action, such as lack of evidence of similarity of training, qualications,
and skills; existence of afrmative action plans to remedy past
discrimination against females; differences in job positions and job
responsibilities; and differences in training, qualications, and skills
required for the job actually performed by the ofcers.
The policy implications for criminal justice agencies are clear. When
formulating and implementing various employment practices and
policies, agencies must keep in mind the requirements for the legal
validity of these practices. Agencies must be aware of and comply with
both the requirement of disparate impact and disparate treatment
classications of sex discrimination. In particular, when implementing
job exclusion and job limitation policies, the agency must identify the
business necessity or job-relatedness of the requirements, including the
need to protect the privacy of inmates or the need to protect females
from sexual assault. Also, the agencies must ensure that minimum
height or weight requirements, oral interviews, strength or physical
agility tests, and grooming requirements are professionally validated,
based on clear objective criteria, and not selectively enforced. The
business necessity of these policies must be real and not pretextual.
Conversely, when a criminal justice agency assigns work duties;
makes employment decisions such as transfer, promotion and
demotion; implements a system of unequal pay or benets; engages
in practices concerning pregnant employees; and terminates employ-
ment, the agency must identify a legitimate non-discriminatory reason
for the action, such as existence of afrmative action plans to remedy
past discrimination against females; differences in job positions and
job responsibilities; and differences in training, qualications, and
skills required for the job actually performed by the police.
This article focused on drawing legal principles and standards from
relevant court decisions on gender-based employment practices in
criminal justice agencies. The research was largely descriptive, compar-
ative, and qualitative. Future studies in the area of gender-based
discrimination should quantitatively analyze case variables in different
circuit anddistrict courts that determinetheoutcomeof TitleVII claims of
sex discrimination. Aside from Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, a
plaintiff may le a complaint for gender-based discrimination based on
other federal or state laws. While this article limited itself to complaints
ledunder Title VII, sex discriminationlitigationbasedonother state and
federal laws shouldsimilarly be examinedat the federal andstate level to
116 C.A.R.I. Nolasco, M.S. Vaughn / Journal of Criminal Justice 39 (2011) 106119
determine the standards andlevels of reviewappliedby various courts in
analyzing such claims. A lot more research needs to be done.
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Finney v. Mabry, 546 F.Supp. 628 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
Forsyth v. City of Dallas, 91 F.3d 769 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 816 (1997).
Forts v. Ward, 434 F.Supp. 946 (S.D. N.Y.), rev'd, 566 F.2d 849 (2nd Cir. 1977), on
remand, 471 F. Supp. 1095 (S.D. N.Y. 1978), vacated in part, 621 F.2d 1210 (2nd Cir.
1980).
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
Gibbs v. Pierce County Law Enforcement Support Agency, 785 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1986).
Gillin v. Federal Paper Board Co., 479 F.2d 97 (2nd Cir. 1973).
Grifn v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 654 F.Supp. 690 (E.D. Mich. 1982), aff'd, 5 F.3d
186 (6th Cir. 1993).
Gunther v. Washington County, 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 449 U.S. 950
(1980), aff'd, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
966 (1980).
Gu & Santoro v. Boston Police Department, 312 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2002).
Hardin v. Stynchcomb, WL 18636 (N.D. Ga. 1980), rev'd, 691 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1982).
Hardy v. Stumpf, WL 2608 (Cal. Superior 1972), rev'd, 112 Cal. Rptr. 739 (Cal. App. 1st
Dist. 1974).
Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 872 (1980).
Horace v. City of Pontiac, 624 F.2d 765 (6th Cir. 1980).
Hornick v. Duryea, 507 F.Supp. 1091 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
Hoskins v. Oakland County Sheriff's Dept., 44 F.Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 1999), aff'd, 227
F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 2000).
Howard v. Ward County, 418 F.Supp. 494 (D.C. N.D. 1976).
In re Long, 127 Cal. Rptr. 732 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 1976).
Iowa Dept. of Social Services, Iowa Men's Reformatory v. Iowa Merit Employment Dept., 261
N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1977).
James v. Sheanan, 137 F.3d 1003 (7th Cir. 1998).
Janich v. Sheriff of Yellowstone County, WL1838 (D. Mont. 1977).
Jones v. City of Mount Vernon, 114 F.Supp. 2d 274 (S.D. N.Y. 2000).
Jordan v. Wilson, 649 F.Supp. 1038 (M.D. Ala. 1986).
Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3rd Cir. 1971).
Kent County Sheriff's Association v. County of Kent, 826 F.2d 1485 (6th Cir. 1987).
Kentucky Com. on Human Rights v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Justice, etc., 586 S.W.2d 270
(Ky. App. 1979).
King v. New Hampshire Department of Resources & Economic Development, 420 F.Supp.
1317 (D. N.H. 1976), aff'd, 562 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1977).
Kopp v. Salt Lake City, 506 P.2d 809 (Utah 1973).
Krzyzewski v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, WL 735 (M.D. Tenn. 1976), aff'd,
584 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1978).
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
Long v. State Personnel Board, 41 Cal. App. 3d 1000 (Cal. App. 3rd Dist. 1974).
Maine Human Rights Com. v. Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253 (Me. 1979).
Manley v. Mobile County, Alabama, 441 F.Supp. 1351 (D.C. Ala. 1977).
Marcoux v. Maine, 797 F.2d 1100 (1st Cir. 1986).
McCosh v. Grand Forks, 628 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1980).
Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F. 2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975).
Mieth v. Dothard, 418 F.Supp. 1169 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
Moore v. San Jose, 615 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1980).
Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
Ofcers for Justice v. Civil Service Com., 395 F.Supp. 378 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
Pacic Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
Patrolmen's Benev. Asso. v. East Brunswick, 433 A.2d 813 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1981).
Peltier v. Fargo, 396 F.Supp. 710 (D. N.D. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 374
(8th Cir. 1976).
Philipps v. Bowen, 115 F.Supp.2d 303 (N.D. N.Y. 2000), aff'd, 278 F.3d 103 (2nd Cir.
2002).
Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Com., 300 A.2d 97 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1973).
Pietras v. Board of Fire Commissioners, 180 F.3d 468 (2nd Cir. 1999).
Planchet v. New Hampshire Hospital, 341 A.2d 267 (N.H. 1975).
Police Dept. of New York v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Board, 409 N.Y.S.2d 408
(Sup. Ct. A.D. 1st Dept. 1978).
Ptasnik v. City of Peoria, 93 Fed. Appx. 904 (7th Cir. 2004).
Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004).
Reed v. County of Casey, Commonwealth of Kentucky, 184 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 1999).
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F.Supp. 145 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
Richardson v. Byrd, 709 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983).
Richmond v. Johnson, 134 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 1997).
Rider v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 982 (3rd Cir. 1988).
Riffelmacher v. Board of Police Comrs., 535 N.E.2d 1280 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
Rogers v. McCall, 488 F.Supp. 689 (D.C. D.C. 1980).
Roller v. San Mateo, 399 F.Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 572 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1977).
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacic Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
Rucker v. City of Kettering, Ohio, 84 F.Supp. 2d 917 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
Rufn v. County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951
(1980).
San Francisco Police Ofcers Association v. City and County of San Francisco, 812 F.2d.
1125 (9th Cir. 1987), withdrawn, 842 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir.) amended and
superseded, 869 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989), on
remand, 979 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1004 (1993).
Schaefer v. Tannian, 538 F.2d 1234 (6th Cir.), on remand, WL 621 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
Schick v. Bronstein, 447 F.Supp. 333 (S.D. N.Y. 1978).
Serna v. City of San Antonio, 244 F.3d 479 (5th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 254 F.3d 72
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 951 (2001).
Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1999).
Shortt v. Arlington County, Va., 589 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1978).
Simon and Dellick v. City of Youngstown, 73 F.3d 68 (6th Cir. 1995).
Simon v. St. Louis County, Mo., 656 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976
(1982), on remand, 563 F.Supp. 76 (E.D. MO. 1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir.
1984).
Sims v. Montgomery County Commission, 766 F.Supp. 1052 (M.D. Ala. 1990).
Smith v. City of Dayton, 830 F.Supp. 1066 (S.D. Ohio 1993), aff'd, WL 540666 (6th Cir.
1994).
Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934, reh'g denied,
429 U.S. 933 (1976).
Snow v. Nevada Dept. of Prisons, 582 F.Supp. 53 (D. Nev. 1984).
Spencer v. Byrd, 917 F.Supp. 368 (M.D. N.C. 1995).
Sterling v. Cupp, 607 P.2d 206 (Or. App. 1980), aff'd and modied, 625 P.2d 123 (Or.
1981).
Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't., 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 462 U.S. 1105
(1983), rev'd, 467 U.S. 561 (1984), on remand, 762 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir.) rev'd, 774
F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1985), appeal after remand, 858 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1988).
Terry v. Mercer County Board of Chosen Freeholders, 414 A.2d 30 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1980).
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
Thiel v. Village of Libertyville, 947 F.Supp. 377 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
Thomas v. Evanston, 610 F.Supp. 422 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
Thompson v. City of Memphis, 86 Fed. Appx. 96 (6th Cir. 2004).
Timm v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 335 Fed. Appx. 637 (7th Cir. 2009).
Torres v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Social Services, 838 F.2d 944 (7th Cir. 1986).
Tracy v. Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections, WL 258 (W.D. Okla. 1974).
Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
Turner v. Baytown, 516 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 14th Dist. 1974).
Tysinger v. Police Department of the City of Zanesville, 463 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2006).
U.S. v. Buffalo, 457 F.Supp. 612 (W.D. N.Y. 1978), aff'd and modied, 633 F.2d 643 (2nd
Cir. 1980).
U.S. v. Chicago, 411 F.Supp. 218 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd in part rev'd in part, 549 F.2d 415
(7th Cir.), on remand, 437 F.Supp. 256 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 567 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 932 (1978).
U.S. v. Gregory, 871 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1020 (1990).
U.S. v. Milwaukee, 441 F.Supp. 1371 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
U.S. v. New York, 475 F.Supp. 1103 (N.D. N.Y. 1979), motion denied, 593 F. Supp. 1216
(N.D. N.Y. 1984), modied, 711 F.Supp. 699 (N.D. N.Y. 1989).
U.S. v. North Carolina, 512 F.Supp. 968 (E.D. N.C. 1981).
U.S. v. Philadelphia, 573 F.2d 802 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978).
U.S. v. Philadelphia, 499 F.Supp. 1196 (E. D. Pa. 1980).
U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, on remand, 96 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 1996).
U.S. v. Virginia, 620 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021, on remand, 88 F.R.D.
656 (D. Va. 1980).
U.S. v. Wichita Falls, 704 F.Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
U.S. v. Yonkers, 592 F.Supp. 570 (S.D. N.Y.), motion denied, 609 F.Supp. 1281 (S.D. N.Y.
1984).
Urbano v. Cont'l. Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 1998).
118 C.A.R.I. Nolasco, M.S. Vaughn / Journal of Criminal Justice 39 (2011) 106119
Vanguard Justice Soc. v. Hughes, 471 F.Supp. 670 (D. Md. 1979), decision supplemented,
592 F.Supp. 245 (D. Md. 1984).
Vermett v. Hough, 627 F.Supp. 587 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
Vingi v. State, 991 F.Supp. 44 (D. R.I.) aff'd, 132 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524
U.S. 954 (1998).
Walsdorf v. Board of Commissioners for the East Jefferson Levee District, 857 F.2d 1047 (5th
Cir. 1988).
Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
Wells v. Civil Service Com., 225 A.2d 554 (Pa.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
Williams v. San Francisco, 483 F.Supp. 335 (N.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 685 F.2d 450 (9th Cir.
1982), on remand, WL 30384 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
Willis v. Coca Cola Enters., Inc., 445 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2006).
Windom v. St. Louis, MO., 427 F.Supp. 806 (E.D. MO.), aff'd, 568 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1977).
Wood v. Mills, WL 321 (S.D. W.Va. 1973), aff'd, 528 F.2d 321 (4th Cir. 1975).
Woody v. West Miami, 477 F.Supp. 1073 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
Zalmen v. City of Cleveland, 686 F.Supp. 631 (N.D. Ohio 1988).
Statutes Cited
Equal Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codied as amended at 29 U.S.C. 206[d]).
TitleVII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(codiedas Subchapter VI of Chapter 21of 42U.S.C.
2000e [2] et seq).
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 80 Stat. 662 (1972).
119 C.A.R.I. Nolasco, M.S. Vaughn / Journal of Criminal Justice 39 (2011) 106119