Democratic Values, Student Engagement and Democratic Leadership

Ethics and Educational Purposes

2002

Introduction

Democratic transformational pedagogies focused on issues of

social justice, exemplified in the works of Paulo Freire, have recently
articulated the need for a coherent ethical position in relation to
teaching and the administration of schools. This ethical position stands
in opposition to claims of academic impartiality in the construction of
social knowledge related to the economic conditions of our
communities.

In the context of educational policymaking, David Corson of OISE

in Toronto argues for the need to achieve a system wide consensus in
policymaking to establish universal norms that operate as principles at
the system level to increase the scope and capacity for meeting social
justice needs and goals. (Corson 1995).1 Toward the construction of a
common ethic, Corson considered the clarification of principles to
involve, finding a realistic set of shared values that overarch all the
various social and cultural groups that the political system contains.
(Smolicz, 1984).2

Frameworks for a Standard

Conservative, liberal, and democratic educational purposes

represent particular worldviews that differ mostly in their
understanding of the “self” and the nature of our connection to others.
Each perspective advocates for a different set of dominant institutional
1
p.134. David Corson. Power and the Discourses of Policy and Curriculum : An Introduction in Discourse
and Power in Educational Organizations, Ed. Corson (OISE Press, Toronto) 1995.
2
P.134. ibid Corson on Smolicz, J. (1984). Multiculturalism and an overarching framework of values.
European Journal of Education, 19, 11-24.

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purposes, whether those purpose direct activity toward the promotion
of market skills, autonomous individuals, or citizens capable of
democratic transformation.

In western society, educational purposes have traditionally been

articulated within a liberal democratic framework that claims to be
guided by respect for liberty and equality. This paper attempts to
construct a set of core ethical concepts capable of guiding individual
and institutional action within our de facto legal and political system in
the form of clearly articulated policy purposes derived from principles
of respect.

This paper is intended to be a first person hermeneutical

clarification of liberal ethical concepts arguing for the construction and
application of a simple ethical proposition in the decision making
processes of individuals and institutions. In other words, this paper
proposes rooting a broad consensus for educational purposes in a
choice between respect and violence.

In the style of a moral entrepreneur, this paper challenges the

reader to consider hastening the “end of violence” by implementing
ethical reasoning and standards in our daily relations and within public
institutions that intervene and act in our community. In moral theory
the standard is expressed as a distinction between decisions that
account or discount the preferences and/or interests of others. In
behavioural terms, it is the difference characterized by an attitude of
humility or superiority. This principle is in effect a command to respect
others on the basis of the belief that all people are of equal worth.

The Conflict of Liberalism

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 In Charles Taylor’s famous essay entitled The Politics of
Recognition, Taylor presents a conflict between competing conceptions
of liberalism represented by a difference between a “politics of dignity”
and a “politics of difference.” Taylor claims that both types of liberalism
are based on the notion of equal respect, expressed together with
other competing values and interests that evidently create
contradiction. In the end, he claims that a “politics of dignity” remains
uneasy about elevating ethnic or cultural identities over the uniform
application of universal rights, while a “politics of difference” protest
the application of uniform standards which result in unequal
consequences for different groups.

Habermas claims that harmony between this apparent

contradiction is possible through an understanding of the internal
connection between the individual rights of private persons and the
public autonomy of citizens who participate in making the laws.
(Habermas 1994).3 This paper attempts resolve the issue by
implementing ethical educational purposes within an independent
democratic framework borrowing from the intellectual heritage of
western liberalism, so influential in the application of positive law
principles and our understanding of institutional purposes.

Rights and Needs

By way of introduction to Taylor’s essay, Amy Gutman argues

that the ideal of human dignity points in at least two directions, the
protection of basic rights and the acknowledgment of particular needs.
According to Taylor, both positions are rooted in a “politics of equal
recognition” that promote in different ways the ideal of equal respect,

3
p.114. Habermas, J. Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State, in Multiculturalism
(1994).

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expressed as the difference between treating people in a difference-
blind fashion versus agreeing on a special status for minorities whose
identity may be threatened within an adverse dominant culture.

The first type of Liberalism (Liberalism 1), based on a “politics of

dignity” is given expression by constitutional guarantees in the form of
universal individual basic rights. In this view, the role of the state is to
be neutral between competing conceptions of the good life and may
not promote particular cultural or religious projects but must deal
equally with all. They argue that “equality” between people is ensured
through the application of uniform rights and entitlements that provide
a framework for equal citizenship. In this view, human dignity consists
largely in the ability of each person to determine for themselves a
conception of the good life. Here, the notion of dignity is used in a
different manner then I intend to use it in this paper.

The second type of liberalism (Liberalism 2) has its foundations

in a “politics of difference” and as such advocates for public
recognition of a particular cultural or religious identity in order to
protect or promote a specific difference, as given by the example of
Quebec’s language laws that exist notwithstanding federal laws that
protect freedom of expression in Canada. A “politics of difference”
argues that the application of difference-blind standards favours the
majority culture, and therefore they are willing to promote collective
goals in favour of marginalized groups at the expense of the principle
of equal treatment and non-discrimination so popular in a “politics of
dignity.”

Liberalism 1 is satisfied with the promotion of individual equal

rights as the means to protect universal human dignity and to realize
universal human potential, while Liberalism 2 suggests that recognition

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of unique identities and equitable rights is a necessary condition for
forming and defining one’s own identity as it relates to minority
cultures within dominant cultures.

It appears to be a unique condition for Liberalism 2 that a breach

of equal rights or promotion of special status is made only on behalf of
historically disadvantaged groups. In Canada that exception is
recognized in s.15 (2) of the Canadian Charter or Rights and Freedoms.
I doubt whether the advocates in favour of Liberalism 2 would maintain
their arguments in favour of collectivist goals of dominant groups,
although dedicated Quebequois nationals, the supporters of Israel,
and various Islamic governments would likely disagree.

Underneath the Conflict

At issue between Liberalism 1 and Liberalism 2 are arguments

about access to wealth and power. Liberalism 1 prefers “equal” rights,
while Liberalism 2 demands systemic advantage for disadvantaged
groups. I find neither position satisfactory because both uncritically
accept a paradigm of “wealth and power” that I argue is the source of
systemic inequalities and basically incompatible with the ethical
imperative to humbly respect the dignity of others.

Discourses surrounding a “politics of difference” recognize that

gender, race, and class disparities result from circumstances of social
prejudice, but these arguments stop short of critiquing liberal market
values designed to create such disparity in the first place or to suggest
interventions that might dislodge this dominant discourse. They appear
satisfied to pursue gaining wealth and power for minorities rather than
critiquing differences of wealth and power and presumptions of private
production methods.

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 Both views of Liberalism take for granted that equal respect is to
be expressed in a liberal society through the application of basic rights,
and neither theory identifies liberal economic assumptions designed to
create marginalized groups within our communities as being an issue
in the debate. Behind the political debate between these two forms of
Liberalism is an agreement to ignore poverty and the inequalities
created by late stage capital economic policies designed to maximize
the exploitation of resources in favour of corporate control and
consumption with few limitations or social responsibilities.

I believe that acceptance of “equal worth” entails ethical

imperatives for personal and institutional behaviour that are in conflict
with the idea of market driven production as relates to the production
of basic necessities. In other words I argue in favour of a theoretical
move beyond a liberal conception of “equal dignity” in order to
recognize two ethical imperatives derived from the idea of “equal
worth.”

On this basis it is necessary to revisit the core liberal conception

of a “politics of equal recognition” in order to uncover the ethical
imperatives implicit in that discourse prior to the application of liberal
legal and economic assumptions.

Equal Worth

Building on the work of Immanuel Kant, the proposition that all

individuals are of “equal worth” ensures that each person deserves
respect. What is “of worth” in each person deserving respect,
according to Kant, is the recognition of universal human potential,
rather than what a person may have made of it. Kant’s construction of

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“equal worth” includes a presumption in favour of the autonomy of
each person within a liberal framework limited by binding moral
imperatives.

For the purposes of this paper I will restate this value in what I
call the principle of equal worth : all human beings deserve respect
due to their human potential, whether they actualize it or not.

Many modern ideologies, ancient religions, and spiritual

perspectives contain a similar foundation. Liberal ideology is not the
only group to have created a system based on the idea of respect for
the equal worth of people. The early writings of Eastern Hindu and
Buddhist cultures contain spiritual perspectives relating to life and
death, and in particular ethical conceptions relating to relationships
and action. Early Greek and Roman texts are concerned with
articulating the foundations of ethical behaviour in laws that justify
punishment and exile. The Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition is primarily
constructed around ethical imperatives within the context of a
monotheistic “absolute” religion, while native American spiritualism
makes an equal claim to respect all of creation.

The main variation of the first principle within these various

worldviews is the extent to which respect is granted to others. Some
people limit recognition of equal worth to a particular in-group based
on relations of kin, gender, race, class, or nation. Recently many have
argued in favour of extending the principle to all living things, such as
animals and biospheres, as a response to environmental deterioration.
It is possible that acceptance of respect for all people is the first
psychological step toward developing a perspective of humility as
articulated by Freire. It is also possible that to not respect a group of

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people makes one generally indifferent to the application of violence
toward that excluded group.

Respect for Potential

It is only in reference to the idea of “potential” that we gain

further insight into the nature of the concept of “respect.” The concept
of potential appears to be a consequence of our experience of the
world, and in particular the experiences of growth and decay. We
observe that physical conditions can limit or expand the growth or
decay of living beings. Being reflects the conditions that support it. The
possibility of changing conditions generates our understanding of the
concept of potential.

Applied in a personal context, we are confronted with the

knowledge that certain conditions in the world are better or worse in
relation to our personal growth as well as the growth of others. A
presumption in favour of autonomy further asserts that individuals are
best situated to determine which conditions are desirable in relation to
their potential. If we decide to value our personal growth, physical and
mental, then we are additionally confronted with the need to
determine whether to respect the growth of others or not.
Dignity and Autonomy

If one chooses to adopt the ethical position that all people are of
“equal worth” one is likely to consent to institutional policies that
discourage violence and encourage respect for all people. Toward this
end, if one intends to avoid contradiction with the proposition of equal
worth then, one must both respect “the dignity of others” and “the
autonomy of others.” These two co-original secondary principles,
constructed by inference from the principle of equal worth, give

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expression to the idea of respect for potential as applied within an
existential framework recognizing both being and nothingness, or a
material/mental, tangible/intangible duality.

In other words, to respect “the dignity of others” requires

addressing the actual material conditions or physical dependencies of
people, while to respect “the autonomy of others” requires addressing
conditions for independent thinking, and dependencies of an intangible
nature.

The imperative to promote dignity within an administrative or

educational context suggests to me that ethical democratic institutions
have a duty to establish minimum living conditions for people who are
unable or unwilling to provide themselves with basic material
conditions.

The imperative to promote autonomy within an administrative or

educational context suggests to me, a duty to promote independent
thinking and argumentation on issues relating to forms of coercion and
manipulation that serve to reduce autonomy, including the fear of
poverty.

In other words, I argue that to respect “the dignity of others”

requires that one address physical dependencies in relation to each
individual. To respect “the autonomy of others” is likewise to be
committed to ensuring conditions for independent thinking and to
challenge ideas that would limit self-government or autonomy.

In our societies schools regularly undertake exercises that fit with

purposes related to respect for the autonomy of individuals, however
neo-liberal economic theory opposes any idea of socially directed

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production even if for the benefit of dignity. Social justice critiques
directed at schools acknowledge the need in some districts to focus
resources on providing disadvantaged “ghetto” children with material
supports like breakfast programs and remedial school supplies. It is my
position that to implement the principle of respect for the dignity of
others within educational institutions is to mandate production aimed
at the production of necessities for the general population.

Communication and Production

So far I have suggested two ethical educational purposes capable

of uniting divergent political perspectives and providing an ethical
direction for educational institutions. I have also suggested that
schools have a strong sense of respect for autonomy but are incapable
of addressing respect for dignity without the authority to engage in
social production.

From an institutional perspective, the goals of autonomy and

dignity might best be divided between the study of communication and
the study of production. From a pedagogical view the goals might be
divided between the study of art and the study of science. Such a
suggestion is based on an idea for an adult educational institution
organized around communication and production, art and science, to
reflect the dual purposes of autonomy and dignity respectively. 4

The suggestion for an adult educational institution involved in

the production of necessities, might converge municipal, provincial or
federal resources, include health care, housing, employment services,
hydro, transportation, food services or other alternatives as directed by

4
In previous papers I have advocated in favour of graduating children from public school in Grade 10 and
constructing an adult educational sector open to all members of the community.

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democratic councils and institutions for the benefit of securing the
autonomy and dignity of the least advantaged, the resourceless, and
the dispossessed.

The study of communication might entail the construction of an

open communications network responsible for hosting a debate over
resource management and the production of basic necessities coupled
with an educational undertaking to teach adults critical thinking skills
in relation to personal or public issues under debate, and to teach self-
defence from interventions of persuasion and manipulation whether
sponsored by friends, teachers, the media, the state, or the economy
combined together under the study of art and science, communication
and production. To my mind these are some of the logical
consequences of implementing ethical purposes within public
institutions.

I do not anticipate agreement over the exact content of the

concept of “necessary conditions” in the above propositions, but I do
anticipate that assent to the basic proposition is acceptable to a large
group of people. If we could dispel the current belief in favour of
creating exclusive corporate dependencies we might consider
implementing a system of social production in response to the ethical
imperative to respect the dignity and autonomy of others.

People may not agree over the scope of a minimum standard for
dignity or the scope of conditions required for independent thinking,
but I expect they could agree at a minimum over the difference
between violence and respect and the need for public institutions to
act accordingly.

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Ethics and Rights

In the political realm, conflict over the equal or equitable

application of rights serves to point out the inadequacy of translating
ethical imperatives into positive legal rights. Such an argument
suggests that ethical imperatives should be expressed independently
of the protection of rights.

The full implications of the concept of equal worth in political

philosophy has generally been ignored in favour of rights rather than
dignity and autonomy. In early democratic capitalists states, like 15th
Century England, restricting the social purposes of public institutions to
the protection of rights would serve to exclude the interests of the poor
and benefit a particular in-group, including the judiciary who built the
laws of commerce and property hand in hand with the advancement
rights. On this basis then liberalism has limited its conception of
institutional purposes to the protection and mediation of rights rather
than what would otherwise be legitimate institutional purposes directly
related to the realization of ethical principles.

Conclusion

The claim for political and educational institutions to have clear

goals has been dealt with in relation to the promotion of ethical
standards relating to conditions for the dignity and autonomy of all
people. If a person believes in the equal worth of all people they must
agree to respect the dignity and autonomy of all people, expressed not
only by the creation of rights, but also as assent to ethical principles
for policy purposes within political institutions, and in particular the
domain of education.

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 Dignity and autonomy can best be protected by the construction
of a dynamic public institution of social production and communication
that openly advocates for ethical standards and the use of social
capital to promote self-government. To ignore groups of people who
claim to be without the means to live above a “minimum standard of
dignity” is a form of applied violence, akin to not feeding a caged
animal. A similar argument could be made on the basis of creating
dependencies that reduce independent thinking.

In a nutshell, if one accepts the “equal worth” of all then one

must commit to respect the dignity and autonomy of others which is
linked to a proposal for an adult educational system divided into the
study of art and the study of science, both addressing the ethical
imperatives represented by communication and production.

Overall, this paper advocates for “the end of violence” through

implementing institutional and educational policies that recognize a
public duty to protect the dignity and autonomy of each citizen in order
to promote social justice goals and equal opportunities within a
democratic society.

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