1 of 7

Talia Kostal
June 10, 2013
Disaster Science
Final Paper

Looking Back: What the Exxon Valdez Spill Has Taught Us

The Exxon Valdez spill in 1989 was the first major oil spill in US waters to
necessitate a massive response, and to generate a great deal of public attention. In
the years following the incident, both the spill itself, as well as the response methods
employed have been subject to in-depth research and analysis. This paper seeks to
investigate and evaluate the response measures employed in reaction to the Exxon
Valdez spill, and the subsequent environmental impacts to the native animal species
of those measures. The paper will also evaluate the success of the response and the
lessons that were learned, and how both ultimately informed future policy for spill
response. The response to the Exxon Valdez spill had many operational and
circumstantial issues. However through deeper analysis it can be seen that the
problems encountered, and the mistakes made, by both response teams and the
federal government have had positive effects for future policy change.
Background:
On March 24, 1989 the T/V Exxon Valdez was grounded on the Blige Reef in
the Prince William Sound, Alaska. After the grounding, the vessel released
approximately 250,000 barrels of North Slope Crude oil almost instantaneously
(Galt, 1991, p. 202). The cause of the accident is cited as fault of the crew. More
specifically, as documented by the National Transportation safety Board, the captain
was intoxicated, which is cited as the proximate cause of the accident ("Then &
now," 2009). The larger determinates which led to the circumstances of the crash
are complex, and blame falls on many different parties.
At the time of the spill there was little wind and wave activity. This resulted
in the oil spreading due to both the gravity and surface tension on the water (Galt,
1991, p. 205). However, on March 26, the third day after the spill, a large storm hit
the region. This caused the predicted fate of the oil to change, as well as the
weathering patterns that had been anticipated. With the storm came a large amount
of wave and wind action, emulsifying and dispersing the oil into the water column.
Additionally the oil was broken into smaller slicks (Galt, 1991, p. 206). This
increased the volume of the oil remaining, as well as the total surface area covered
by the spill. In the weeks following, much of the oil continued to move to the
southwest shores of Prince William Sound, heavily oiling and impacting both natural
and human resources (Galt, 1991, p. 208).
2 of 7
Natural Resources at Risk:
The Exxon Valdez incident put many natural resources at risk immediately
following the spill. When a large spill occurs in a location as remote and naturally
pristine as the Prince William Sound in Alaska, the sensitivities and vulnerabilities
of many different shorelines and animals must be assessed.
In the days following the spill researchers were deployed to evaluate who
and what was most at risk, and to begin developing strategies to restore the damage.
According to researchers, seabirds, seals, and sea otters were the three species
initially hit hardest by the spill. The primary roots of exposure affecting these
animals included inhalation and smothering, both of which were further
complicated by habitat displacement (Peterson, 2003, p. 2082). The combination of
these impacts created high rates of initial morbidity and mortality in these
populations.
In addition to species at risk, over a thousand miles of shoreline were oiled,
most of which were mixed sand and gravel beaches. According to the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), mixed sand and gravel beaches
are classified as a level 5 on the Environmental Sensitivity Index (ESI) scale
("Shoreline assessment manual," 2000). This means that shorelines such as these
are moderately sensitive to oiling, and that special considerations must be taken
when considering clean up options. More specifically, mixed sand and gravel
beaches present a special challenge when considering cleanup methods due to the
way oil behaves on these beaches: oil on these beaches can penetrate deep into the
substrate (up to 50cm), which makes removal cumbersome, and presents the issues
of long term leaching of weathered oil if recovery is not possible ("Shoreline
assessment manual," 2000).
The Spill Response: Immediate and Long Term
Oil spills in remote locations, such as the Prince William Sound, require that
the response time and window of opportunity be considered when determining how
to most effectively and safely organize a response. In documents released by the US
Coast Guard (USCG) in the years following the spill, the chaos of the initial on water
response is chronicled. The initial chaos was further complicated by the storm that
hit three days after the spill, significantly weathering and beaching the oil (Galt,
1991, p. 206). It has been documented that seventeen hours following the first
report of oil leaking from the ship, booms and skimmers were still not deployed and
effectively working ("Then & now," 2009). The closest response barge was
undergoing repairs at the time of the spill, and other necessary equipment could not
be easily accessed. Despite the fact that the weather conditions were optimal for
booming and skimming during the first three days following the spill, the slow and
ineffective corralling of resources meant that little oil was actually recovered before
the storm hit ("Then & now," 2009).
In addition to a chaotic, and somewhat difficult on water response, in the
days and weeks following the accident crews worked tirelessly to clean the miles of
3 of 7
shoreline affected. Initially the spill response was quite aggressive, the primary
method being high-pressure hot water washing of the intertidal zone (Wells, 1995,
p. 11). Other methods included manual removal of debris, chemical cleaning, and
mechanical removal of the oil. The aggressive high-pressure hot water washing was
the onshore response that received the most backlash from both researchers and
the public alike. According to NOAA, high-pressure hot water washing is
recommended for use in the removal of highly weathered oil that is vicious and
solidly adhered to surfaces along the shoreline ("Shoreline assessment manual,"
2000). Simply from the descriptive standpoint, the circumstances of recommended
use seem to fit with the conditions on the ground. However, in the chaos of the
initial response, the environmental trade-offs for this highly employed method were
either overlooked or neglected. In the NOAA guidelines, it is also specifically states
that this method is not recommended for use in the intertidal zone ("Shoreline
assessment manual," 2000). However, that is exactly where the responders
employed the method. The environmental trade-off for such actions include
displacing, and often times killing all animals in the path of the water in the
intertidal zone, as well as pushing oil into shallow waters where many animals feed
("Shoreline assessment manual," 2000). In the decades since the spill and initial
response phase, researchers continue to discuss the environmental impacts of such
an aggressive response, and many ponder what environmental damage was caused
directly by the oil itself and what was actually propagated by the response.
The second phase of the spill response encompasses the long-term
monitoring programs employed by both independent research scientists and the
federal government. In the years following the spill, NOAA created a monitoring
program to assess the recovery and restoration of the resources impacted. NOAA
defines what it means to be considered fully recovered, which is a notion that is
more complex than one might assume. According to NOAA, A commonly used
definition [of being fully recovered], the return to conditions as they were before
the spill, is neither practical nor ecologically realistic for dynamic intertidal systems
such as those in Prince William Sound, Alaska ("Implications for spill," 2013). When
measuring the long-term impacts and recovery of the environment in the Prince
William Sound, NOAA researchers use a statistical method known as parallelism.
This method seeks to identify if the environment experiences the same changes, at a
similar rate, as before the spill ("Implications for spill," 2013). Scientists have
consistently found that shorelines, as well as the animals that inhabit them, that
were exposed to high-pressure hot water washing have showed slower rates of
recovery ("Implications for spill," 2013). The official NOAA monitoring program
ended in 2000. However, long-term studies continue to be conducted by
independent researchers, and the effects of the oil and the response methods
continue to be documented and debated.
Environmental Impacts: Scientific Research Then & Now
The environmental disaster created in the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill
opened many opportunities for research into the environmental impacts of oil on
sensitive species and shorelines. Researchers have delineated two phases of impact:
4 of 7
acute phase mortality and chronic exposure. Acute Phase Mortality can be
defined as the immediate impacts on marine environments, and on the population
death following a large spill. Chronic Exposure can be defined as the long-term
effects of oil persistence in the environment (Peterson, 2003, p. 2082). Initially
researchers overlooked the fact that a large amount of the oil would persist in the
environment in the decades following the Exxon Valdez spill (Peterson, 2003, p.
2083).
In a study conducted by Preston (2003) researchers examined the acute and
chronic environmental impacts on the species exposed to the oiling of the waters
and shorelines in the Prince William Sound. Researchers found that in the days
immediately following the spill, mass mortalities were reported among sea otters,
seabirds, and seal populations. According the researchers, approximately 3000 sea
otters, 300 harbor seals, and upwards of 250,000 seabirds were reported deceased
(Peterson, 2003, p. 2085). These animals are considered particularly vulnerable to
the oil present on the water surface due to their on water behavioral patterns.
The researchers in Preston (2003) also discuss the long-term effects of the oil
continuing to leach into the environment and the subsequent effects on population
trajectories for species present in the area. According to the study, seabirds have
had the greatest continuing health and mortality impacts in the years following the
spill. Seabirds that feed primarily on fish and other benthic organisms that were
chronically exposed to sedimented oil pushed into the intertidal zone by high
pressure hot water washing showed greater rates of species decline than compared
to unexposed organisms (Peterson, 2003, p. 2087). Such exposure falls into the
category of sub-lethal exposure, which has been documented to have lasting impacts
on health, growth, and reproduction within an affected species (Peterson, 2003, p.
2088).
Evaluation of the Response:
When examining the Exxon Valdez oil spill and the massive federal response
that ensured, past and current research continues to be valuable resources in
evaluating the effectiveness and overall success of the response. In the years
following the spill, researchers have documented numerous lessons which were
learned both in the response and the recovery phase. Ultimately it is though the
reflection on and critical evaluation of past actions that future procedures and
policies can be designed and implemented to create better outcomes.
There are many competing viewpoints in the scientific community aimed at
addressing the key question of how clean is clean enough? When and how to stop
a response was, and continues to be, a hotly contended topic. Through the lens of
the Exxon Valdez oil spill, there were a variety of studies released in the years
following the incident to address this question. It can be interesting to note that
many of the studies (paid for by Exxon Valdez) suggest that there was little long-
term impact from the spill, while independent researchers, as well as government
funded research suggest that the environmental impacts of the spill are still present,
even decades later, in the Prince William Sound. Such competing viewpoints
5 of 7
illustrate the complex nature of blame and responsibility, as well as the difficultly in
determining when an area or resource can be considered completely recovered.
Lesson Learned
As one of the first major spills in US waters, Exxon Valdez has proved to be a
continued learning experience for all those involved in spill response and
restoration. Three primary lessons learned during the spill fall under the general
topics of organization and communication, environmental impacts, and unforeseen
impacts of response methods. Exxon Valdez required the largest response on record,
and as was stated earlier, according the US Coast Guard reports released to the
public in the years following the incident, the response was, at first, chaotic and
unorganized. The primary issues presented were problems in the distribution of
information to the public, as well as clear communication and coordination between
the multiple teams of responders (Lescnlne, 1993, p. 550). Such issues made it clear
that in the future better contingency plans needed to be in place to ensure a more
succinct response.
Additionally, researchers learned that the environmental impacts resulting
from a spill of this magnitude are long lasting. It can take years for shorelines,
especially mixed sand and gravel beaches, to recover. Such difficulties in recovery
can be particularly attributed to beach erosion and other inadvertent damage to the
environment caused by the cleanup, as well as the unavoidable fact that complete
recovery of the oil will never be possible ("Implications for spill," 2013).
In the same vein, responders, policy makers, and environmentalists alike
learned that aggressive response methods, particularly high-pressure hot water
washing, may do more harm than good to the environment ("Implications for spill,"
2013). Following the well-documented damage which occurred as a result of the
aggressive tactics used by the onshore response teams, it became clear that
responders needed to weigh the risks against the benefits of each response method
for the entire ecosystem. It must be recognized however that such a task can be
quite difficult to do when the public is demanding solutions, and time is of the
essence.
Future Policy Implications
As a result of the lessons learned by the researchers and policy makers
following the Exxon Valdez spill, major policy changes were implemented. The most
prominent policy change was the creation and implementation of the Oil Pollution
Act (OPA) of 1990. The OPA created two major changes in the response to oil spills.
First, the OPA clearly delineates the financial responsibility during a spill of both the
federal government, as well as the responsible party (United States Environmental
Protection Agency). This provision came following the USCG report evaluating the
effectiveness of the Exxon Valdez response, which outlined the need for a singular
team that is both politically and operationally efficient (Lescnlne, 1993, p. 553).
During the Exxon Valdez spill difficulties were encountered due to the remote
location and inadequate resources immediately available. Additionally, decisions
6 of 7
driven by competing motives and pressures, as well as the complex and sizable
financial and economic considerations, served to further complicate the response.
The creation of a clear economic plan helped ensure that in the future the resources
needed to effectively respond to and mitigate the adverse effects of an oil spill
would be available within the given window of opportunity (Environmental
Protection Agency).
Additionally the OPA served to create new requirements for the state and
government contingency plans. The federal government became responsible for
oversight of all public and private spill response measures. Area Committees
which consisted of federal, state, and local officials, were created to design area
contingency plans to address the specific resources at risk and response
recommendations for a specific location (Environmental Protection Agency).
Additionally, the OPA stipulated that operators of vessels that are considered high
risk must create and have current Facility Response Plans (Environmental
Protection Agency). The new, stricter provisions sought to create a clear delineation
of responsibility, both economic and operational, so as to mitigate the chaos and
break down of communication which occurred during the Exxon Valdez spill of
1989.
The Conclusion:
Determining the successes and failures of the Exxon Valdez spill response is a
complex task. The initial phase of response was clearly riddled with operational
challenges and mistakes. However, the Exxon Valdez response can be considered a
success in terms of what it taught spill responders, and the policy changes which
ensued. Through tough federal regulations, as well as multiple environmental
committees composed of both researchers and citizens alike, new contingency plans
have been made, and responders are now more prepared to handle large spills. With
awareness gained from the Exxon Valdez disaster, we now have the knowledge to
respond with greater care and precision in the future. The real value of this spill is
what it caused us to learn in the process, and the drive that new knowledge created
for policy change.

Resources:

1. Galt, J. A., Lehr, W. J., & Payton, D. L. (February 01, 1991). Fate and transport
of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Part 4. Environmental Science & Technology, 25,
2, 202-209.

2. Lescnlne, T. U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Transportation. (1993).
Federal on scene coordinator's report: T/V Exxon Valdez oil spill, volume 1
(DOT-SRP-94-01). Retrieved from website:
http://www.arlis.org/docs/vol1/B/31206602/31206602v1.pdf

7 of 7
3. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Office of Response and
Restoration (2013). Implications for spill response. Retrieved from website:
http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/oil-and-chemical-spills/significant-
incidents/exxon-valdez-oil-spill/implications-response.html

4. Office of Response and Restoration, Hazardous Materials Response Division.
(2000). Shoreline assessment manual (2000-1). Retrieved from National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration website:
http://docs.lib.noaa.gov/noaa_documents/NOS/ORR/72_manual_shore_asse
ss.pdf
5. Peterson, C. H. (December 19, 2003). Long-Term Ecosystem Response to the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. Science, 302, 5653, 2082-2086.

6. (2009). Then & now: Changes in prince william sound crude oil
transportation since the exxon valdez oil spill. Prince William Sound Regional
Citizens Advisory Council, Retrieved from
http://www.arlis.org/docs/vol1/A/422650552low.pdf

7. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Emergency Management
(1990). Oil pollution act overview. Retrieved from website:
http://www.epa.gov/osweroe1/content/lawsregs/opaover.htm

8. Wells, P. G., Butler, J. N., Hughes, J. S., & Symposium on Environmental
Toxicology and Risk Assessment. (1995). Exxon Valdez oil spill: Fate and
effects in Alaskan waters. Philadelphia, PA: ASTM.