G.R. No.

L-14628 September 30, 1960

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
Regino Hermosisima for petitioner.
F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision of Court of Appeals
modifying that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed with said of her child, Chris
Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of
child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant.
Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a
month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later on, said court rendered a
decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the natural
daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said child,
through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every month
sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for
actual and compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and
the further sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against
defendant.
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and
compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to
marry. The pertinent facts are:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga
Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around
together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she
gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her
and the petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his
cabin on board M/V "Escao," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised
petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was
born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant
married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was commenced on or about October 4, 1954.
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code of Spain permitted the recovery
of damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and 44 of said Code provides:
ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to contract marriage. No court
shall entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of such promise is sought.
ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by a minor with the
concurrence of the person whose consent is necessary for the celebration of the marriage, or if the banns
have been published, the one who without just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the other
for the expenses which he or she may have incurred by reason of the promised marriage.
The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers must be brought within
one year, computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the marriage.
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil.,
866), that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover
money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission charged with the drafting of
the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem it best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote from the report
of the Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:
Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these articles are not
enforced in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the Proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspect
treated of in said articles but also in other particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some
questions that might arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That authorizing the
adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage, and that creating liability for causing
a marriage engagement to be broken.1awphl.nt
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code, under Chapter I, Title III, Book I
thereof:
Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.
Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future spouses.
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent or guardian, be entered
into by a male between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or by a female between the ages of sixteen and
eighteen years. Without such consent of the parents or guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be the
basis of a civil action for damages in case of breach of the promise.
Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen years is not civilly actionable,
even though approved by the parent or guardian.
Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil responsibility of a male for
seduction shall not be affected.
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be brought.
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved party even though a minor
without the assistance of his parent or guardian. Should the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian
may institute the action.
Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and pecuniary losses but also
compensation for mental and moral suffering.
Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of the affianced parties, who
cause a marriage engagement to be broken shall be liable for damages, both material and moral, to the
engaged person who is rejected.
Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement shall be obliged to return
what he or she has received from the other as gift on account of the promise of the marriage.
These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth in the report of the
corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote:
The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been
definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United
States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and
unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit
in many of the American States.
See statutes of:
Florida 1945 pp. 1342 1344
Maryland 1945 pp. 1759 1762
Nevada 1943 p. 75
Maine 1941 pp. 140 141
New Hampshire 1941 p. 223
California 1939 p. 1245
Massachusetts 1938 p. 326
Indiana 1936 p. 1009
Michigan 1935 p. 201
New York 1935
Pennsylvania p. 450
The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression trend in legislation when it
provided for breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the creation of such causes of action at a
time when so many States, in consequence of years of experience are doing away with them, may well prove
to be a step in the wrong direction. (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the clear and manifest intent
of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by
the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals said award:
Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee,
overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she
being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral
damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs preceding and those
following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the
"seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the
Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that
petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the
complainant who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and
a life insurance agent are supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot,
but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had
the benefit of clergy."
The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly pension of P30.00 for the
support of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her
pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child, as actual and compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages;
and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 consisting
of P144.20, for hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and the balance
representing expenses incurred to support the child and increased the moral damages to P7,000.00.
With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed,
therefore, in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in this instance. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ.,
concur.




G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious
endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set
September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet
Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why That would only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the
clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the
costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial
and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their
attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving
at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition
thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a motion to
defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with
defendant in Cagayan de Oro City the latter's residence on the possibility of an amicable element. The court
granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September 8, 1955 but
that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and their
attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of
settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to this
Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside
the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an amicable
settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly
supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.)
Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid defense
against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event
and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or opinions
instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800,
December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because
the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of
court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of
designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the
Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was
declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance,
L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law.
The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry.
Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-
14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that
Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which
was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and
other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl
were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn.,
6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note
for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in
Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning
soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is raised as to the
award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary
damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be
adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under
the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive
manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with
costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.




G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the Decision
1
of the
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch
38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of
whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint
2
for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges
in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano
Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern
Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love
on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school
semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Baaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her
to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing
of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a
result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay
captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked
her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than
P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her
such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,
3
petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in
the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He
thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither
sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but
only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and
passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his
Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged
into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed
for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order
4
embodying the stipulated
facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant
is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since
September 1, 1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of
Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City
since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette,
Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a
decision
5
favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's
fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00)
pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00)
pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the
costs.
3. All other claims are denied.
6

The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were
lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d)
because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions made
some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g)
such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of
morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony
because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and
reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.
7

The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the private respondent
in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a
boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later
proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage
on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown of Baaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their
intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with
members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant
told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during the semestral
break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted him, they
agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their
house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and
defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in defendant's apartment.
However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he
went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the
whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became
pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live
with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could
not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left
defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the
barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by
the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant
insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the
truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his desire
to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception
by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the
forthcoming wedding.
8

Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R.
CV No. 24256. In his Brief,
9
he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and
legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision
10
affirming in toto the trial court's
ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following
analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years old at
the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior
to her unfortunate experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the
lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly
would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the
defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must
have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of defendant,
for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so
(sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe,
therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant
where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Baaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18,
1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette
on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother
who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City
where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in Baaga,
Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship between them? And this special
relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff,
communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the
restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also
knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the
reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's
proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must think
so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he
studied in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to
Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also
lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to
plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love
and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on
her.
11

and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue
and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as
these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy,
and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a
foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the
opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be
made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and
injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case.
12

Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single issue
of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.
13

It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury
or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs,
traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses
that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable
because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four
(4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral
character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized
in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner
claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should
also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be
assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such
acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not
actionable.
14

On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed his
Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that
questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this
jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter
court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of
testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect
the result of the case.
15

Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of
substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by
the parties before the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina
vs.Asistio, Jr.,
16
this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures
(Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap.
30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v.
Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of
Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings
of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33
SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case.
Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
17
Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set
forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has
been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia.
18
The history of breach of promise suits in
the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights
of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . .
19

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts
or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
20

As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by
positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims
of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the
Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil
Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old
daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl
becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of
age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable
moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed article,
she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to
provide for specifically in the statutes.
21

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known
in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or
common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but
international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general
scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil
Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code
while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
22
In between these
opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress.
Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code,
Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and
adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.
23

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise
to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that
promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to
entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the
willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should
have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love
for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on
the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage."
24
In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every
single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in
its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either
Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of
age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the
woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
25
this Court denied recovery of
damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he
is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who was around thirty-six (36)
years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are
supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also,
because the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals,
26
while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral
seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The following
enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction,
that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil.
595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducementand the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If
she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire,
there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to
depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and
wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her
person to ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer
(27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient
to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of
curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed
opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a
recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and
would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift
to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to
1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant,
with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly
there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise.
Hence, we conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of
action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the
complaint.
27

In his annotations on the Civil Code,
28
Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined
that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust.
(Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56
(sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE
be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there
was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way
around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding presentations
(See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino
29
is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos,
30
still subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation
of the present article
31
in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there
was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the
sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or
influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that
there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court,
however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the
circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute
deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a
resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law
and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake,
that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both
parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra
vs. Marcos,
32
the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as
stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because
of her own doing,
33
for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take
notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress
(TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give
her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18,
1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been offered by the
petitioner.
34

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if
not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he
was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have
even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly
intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would
want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly
believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and
security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect
Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant
disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled
by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of
moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she
found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with
the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault."
35
At
most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been
brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original
wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud.
36

In Mangayao vs. Lasud,
37
We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one against
the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only
where the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate
or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones
the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house
after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and
infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.



[G.R. No. 140420. February 15 , 2001]
SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner, vs. Spouses JOSE GUTIERREZ and ANGELA FORNILDA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Damnum absque injuria. Under this principle, the legitimate exercise of a persons rights, even if it causes loss to
another, does not automatically result in an actionable injury. The law does not prescribe a remedy for the loss. This
principle does not, however, apply when there is an abuse of a persons right, or when the exercise of this right is
suspended or extinguished pursuant to a court order. Indeed, in the availment of ones rights, one must act with
justice, give others their due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 21, 1999 Decision
[1]
of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 41451, which set aside the judgment
[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tanay, Rizal. The RTC had earlier dismissed the Complaint for damages filed by herein respondents against
petitioner. The dispositive portion of the challenged CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is SET ASIDE, and in its stead judgment is rendered ordering the defendant-
appellee Sergio Amonoy to pay the plaintiffs-appellants Bruno and Bernardina Gutierrez as actual damages the sum of
[t]wo [h]undred [f]ifty [t]housand [p]esos (P250,000.00).
[3]

Likewise assailed is the October 19, 1999 CA Resolution,
[4]
which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts

The appellate court narrated the factual antecedents of this case as follows:
This case had its roots in Special Proceedings No. 3103 of Branch I of the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased Julio Cantolos, involving six (6) parcels of land situated in Tanay, Rizal. Amonoy was the
counsel of therein Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. On 12 January 1965,
the Project of Partition submitted was approved and x x x two (2) of the said lots were adjudicated to Asuncion
Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. The attorneys fees charged by Amonoy was P27,600.00 and on 20 January 1965
Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said two (2) lots adjudicated
to them, in favor of Amonoy to secure the payment of his attorneys fees. But it was only on 6 August 1969 after the
taxes had been paid, the claims settled and the properties adjudicated, that the estate was declared closed and
terminated.
Asuncion Pasamba died on 24 February 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passed away on 2 July 1969. Among the heirs of
the latter was his daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez.
Because his attorneys fees thus secured by the two lots were not paid, on 21 January 1970 Amonoy filed for their
foreclosure in Civil Case No. 12726 entitled Sergio Amonoy vs. Heirs of Asuncion Pasamba and Heirs of Alfonso
Fornilda before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, and this was assigned to Branch VIII. The heirs opposed, contending that the
attorneys fees charged [were] unconscionable and that the agreed sum was only P11,695.92. But on 28 September
1972 judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days the P27,600.00 secured by
the mortgage, P11,880.00 as value of the harvests, and P9,645.00 as another round of attorneys fees. Failing in that,
the two (2) lots would be sold at public auction.
They failed to pay. On 6 February 1973, the said lots were foreclosed and on 23 March 1973 the auction sale was
held where Amonoy was the highest bidder at P23,760.00. On 2 May 1973 his bid was judicially confirmed. A
deficiency was claimed and to satisfy it another execution sale was conducted, and again the highest bidder was
Amonoy at P12,137.50.
Included in those sold was the lot on which the Gutierrez spouses had their house.
More than a year after the Decision in Civil Case No. 12726 was rendered, the said decedents heirs filed on 19
December 1973 before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal[,] Civil Case No. 18731 entitled Maria Penano, et al vs. Sergio Amonoy, et
al, a suit for the annulment thereof. The case was dismissed by the CFI on 7 November 1977, and this was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals on 22 July 1981.
Thereafter, the CFI on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which a notice to vacate was made on
26 August 1985. On Amonoys motion of 24 April 1986, the Orders of 25 April 1986 and 6 May 1986 were issued for
the demolition of structures in the said lots, including the house of the Gutierrez spouses.
On 27 September 1985 the petition entitled David Fornilda, et al vs Branch 164 RTC IVth Pasig, Deputy Sheriff Joaquin
Antonil and Atty. Sergio Amonoy, G.R. No. L-72306, was filed before the Supreme Court. Among the petitioners was the
plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. On a twin Musiyun (Mahigpit na Musiyon Para Papanagutin Kaugnay ng
Paglalapastangan, and Musiyung Makahingi ng Utos sa Pagpapapigil ng Pagpapagiba at Pananagutin sa
Paglalapastangan) with full titles as fanciful and elongated as their Petisyung (Petisyung Makapagsuri Taglay and
Pagpigil ng Utos), a temporary restraining order was granted on 2 June 1986 enjoining the demolition of the
petitioners houses.
Then on 5 October 1988 a Decision was rendered in the said G.R. No. L-72306 disposing that:
WHEREFORE, Certiorari is granted; the Order of respondent Trial Court, dated 25 July 1985, granting a Writ of
Possession, as well as its Orders, dated 25 April 1986 and 16 May 1986, directing and authorizing respondent Sheriff
to demolish the houses of petitioners Angela and Leocadia Fornilda are hereby set aside, and the Temporary
Restraining Order heretofore issued, is made permanent. The six (6) parcels of land herein controverted are hereby
ordered returned to petitioners unless some of them have been conveyed to innocent third persons.
[5]

But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the above-mentioned Decision, respondents house had already
been destroyed, supposedly in accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court.
Thus, a Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by respondents
against petitioner before the RTC on December 15, 1989.
In its January 27, 1993 Decision, the RTC dismissed respondents suit. On appeal, the CA set aside the lower
courts ruling and ordered petitioner to pay respondents P250,000 as actual damages. Petitioner then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, which was also denied.
Hence, this recourse.
[6]

The Issue

In his Memorandum,
[7]
petitioner submits this lone issue for our consideration:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in deciding that the petitioner [was] liable to the respondents
for damages
[8]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue: Petitioners Liability

Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a persons rights is a loss without
injury -- damnum absque injuria -- for which the law gives no remedy.
[9]
In other words, one who merely exercises
ones rights does no actionable injury and cannot be held liable for damages.
Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondents house. He
maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC.
We reject this submission. Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case.
True, petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents house on May 30, 1986 under the authority of a
Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. But the records show that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the
demolition of respondents house, was issued by the Supreme Court on June 2, 1986. The CA also found, based on the
Certificate of Service of the Supreme Court process server, that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself on
June 4, 1986.
Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO of this Court. We agree with the CA that he unlawfully pursued the
demolition of respondents house well until the middle of 1987. This is clear from Respondent Angela Gutierrezs
testimony. The appellate court quoted the following pertinent portion thereof:
[10]

Q. On May 30, 1986, were they able to destroy your house?
A. Not all, a certain portion only
x x x x x x x x x
Q. Was your house completely demolished?
A. No, sir.
Q. How about the following day?
A. It was completely demolished
x x x x x x x x x
Q. Until when[,] Mrs. Witness?
A. Until 1987.
Q. About what month of 1987?
A. Middle of the year.
Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court who completed the demolition?
A. The men of Fiscal Amonoy.
[11]

The foregoing disproves the claim of petitioner that the demolition, which allegedly commenced only on May 30,
1986, was completed the following day. It likewise belies his allegation that the demolitions had already ceased when
he received notice of the TRO.
Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance
of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he
not insisted on completing the demolition, respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit
before the RTC. Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had been
suspended when he received the TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986. By then, he was no longer entitled to proceed
with the demolition.
A commentator on this topic explains:
The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the
prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life, is repugnant to the modern
concept of social law. It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another x x
x. Over and above the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice x x x; and he who violates
them violates the law. For this reason, it is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others.
[12]

Likewise, in Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA,
[13]
the Court discussed the concept of abuse of rights as follows:
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which may be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The
law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct
set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
with norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible x x x.
Clearly then, the demolition of respondents house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an
abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this Courts
Order and wittingly caused the destruction of respondents house.
Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on the valid exercise of a
right.
[14]
Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal protection that the principle accords. And
when damage or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby, liability cannot be obscured, much less abated.
In the ultimate analysis, petitioners liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of ones act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not
punishable by law.
[15]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.




G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko)
1
and Ruby Lim assail the
Decision
2
of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 reversing the Decision
3
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution
4
of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July 2002 which denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the human relations provisions of the
New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name
"Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00 oclock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at
the lobby of Hotel Nikko,
5
he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached
him.
6
Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotels penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotels
manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.
7
Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which she replied: "of course."
8
Mr.
Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the latters present for the
celebrant.
9
At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the
party of Dr. Filart.
10
After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table
but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to
speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof.
11
In a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the
other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang
kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang").
12
Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.
13
Dr.
Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and
humiliation.
14
Not long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman
approached and asked him to step out of the hotel.
15
Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the
policeman.
16
Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral
and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorneys fees.
17

Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the ignominious
circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotels Executive Secretary for the past twenty
(20) years.
18
One of her functions included organizing the birthday party of the hotels former General Manager, Mr.
Tsuruoka.
19
The year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruokas party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and
extended invitations accordingly.
20
The guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruokas closest
friends and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited.
21
At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed
Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink.
22
Mindful of Mr. Tsuruokas wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim
approached Mr. Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited.
23
Mr.
Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart.
24
As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with
another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida
Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.
25
Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to
leave the party as he was not invited.
26
Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who
said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave.
27
When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a
Captain Batung whom she later approached.
28
Believing that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim
requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he
was not invited.
29
Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak
to him herself as there were no other guests in the immediate vicinity.
30
However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping
himself to the food, she decided to wait.
31
When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached
him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang
ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo."
32
She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would
show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened
to dump food on her.
33
1awphi1.nt
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also gave her version of the story to the
effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.
34
According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the
basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to
Altitude 49.
35
When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed
and was not invited.
36
All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the bar
talking to Col. Batung.
37
Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting.
38
She ignored Mr. Reyes.
39
She
was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she invited him.
40

After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,
41
giving more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim
that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes
assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited:
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He
assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was not invited by the host. Damages are
pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Thus, no
recovery can be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court
of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to
join her and took responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby
Lim must therefore fail.
42

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of belief the
testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several guests:
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not finish his food and to leave the
place within the hearing distance of other guests is an act which is contrary to morals, good customs . . ., for which
appellees should compensate the appellant for the damage suffered by the latter as a consequence therefore (Art. 21,
New Civil Code). The liability arises from the acts which are in themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to
morals or good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with impunity intentionally
cause damage to another in a manner contrary to morals or good customs.
43

The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several people to inquire into the
presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she should have approached Dr. Filart first
and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by appellee Lim was to approach appellee Mrs.
Filart and together they should have told appellant Reyes in private that the latter should leave the party as the
celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be the one to approach appellant because it
was she who invited appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filarts invitation, appellant could not have
suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally liable.
. . .
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of
one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil
Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for damages, especially if said acts were attended by malice
or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will
that partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603).
44

Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary obligation
to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral
damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorneys fees in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000).
45
On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as the
argument raised in the motion had "been amply discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be
reconsidered."
46

Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in
I.
NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY
BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER
II.
HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES
SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA "COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR
DR. FILARTS INVITATION"
III.
DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT
ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA
IV.
IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT
THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD
V.
IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANTS BRIEF, THEREBY DEPARTING
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made
liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and
humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury"
47
) refers to self-
inflicted injury
48
or to the consent to injury
49
which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and
voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.
50
As formulated by petitioners, however,
this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being
asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to
treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to
leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of
the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is
solidarily liable with her.
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts
and evidence of the case, this Court is left without choice but to use its latent power to review such findings of facts.
Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors
of law.
51
One of the exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court.
52
The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to
leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is
liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to leave the place
within hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filarts invitation
that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower courts findings of fact.
First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,
53
for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotels former
Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly uninvited (by the celebrant)
54
and who could not
just disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many, being an actor. While he was already spotted by the
organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant
was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrants instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally
want to get rid of the "gate-crasher" in the most hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a glitch in an
otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss. To unnecessarily
call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lims ability to follow the instructions
of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the hotels personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden
rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory explanation
why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-
examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very close. Close
enough for him to kiss:
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were at the buffet table? How close
was she when she approached you?
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she shouted?
A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang."
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?
. . .
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.
55

In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and
shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel
business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes
that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in
observing that
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was made
such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no
intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiffs reaction to the request that must have made
the other guests aware of what transpired between them. . .
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out.
56

Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyess version of the story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil
cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All his
witnesses Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him
to the party.
57

Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made
liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel
Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.
58

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
59
is not a panacea for all
human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.1awphi1.nt
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be responsible."
60
The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not
only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties.
61
These standards are the following: act
with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.
62
Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing
bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in
bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
63
When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages
is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of
law
64
which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on
the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 21
65
refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but
which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.
66

A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,
67
and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.
68

As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity
against him. These two people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr.
Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lims alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim,
being "single at 44 years old," had a "very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her
associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen."
69
The lameness of this argument need not be
belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has
nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane under
the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate courts declaration that Ms. Lims act
of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise
to a cause of action "predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only
protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity."
70
Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lims act of
by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filarts
companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.
71
If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment
which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made answerable
for exemplary damages
72
especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held
Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latters lowly station in life.l^vvphi1.net This
has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be established. Social equality is not sought by the
legal provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by
way of example or correction for public good and to avert further commission of such acts, exemplary damages should
be imposed upon appellees.
73

The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with the very facts of the case and the
evidence on hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not disputed that at the time of the incident in question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor of
long standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer Composer (MUSICO)
chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of
the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a number of humanitarian organizations of the
Philippines."
74
During his direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had income
75
and nowhere did he
say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any information as to the social and economic standing of
petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot withstand scrutiny as it is
without basis.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered
through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to
bear alone.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999
is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.



G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962
CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.
Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.
Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover moral, compensatory, exemplary
and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a defense that the facts alleged
therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.
After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with one Lolita Pe, an unmarried
woman, being a married man himself, declared that defendant cannot be held liable for moral damages it appearing
that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being aware of his marital status, deliberately and in bad faith tried to
win Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision dismissing the complaint.1wph1.t
Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues involved are purely of law.
The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of
her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works
as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in connection
with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of
a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their
family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in
1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary.
The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also
in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which
reveal not only their infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The
rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was
forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings
against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-B Espaa Extension,
Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left, her brothers and sisters checked up
her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper
inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a
handwriting recognized to be that of defendant's. In English it reads:
Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we will have a date on the
14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.
Reply
Love
The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the present there is no news
or trace of her whereabouts.
The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that defendant, being a married man,
carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy. But in spite of the fact that plaintiffs have clearly established that in illicit affair was carried on
between defendant and Lolita which caused great damage to the name and reputation of plaintiffs who are her
parents, brothers and sisters, the trial court considered their complaint not actionable for the reason that they failed
to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection Thus, the trial court said: "In the
absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it was the defendant who deliberately induced such
relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human
emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each other, not only without any
desire on their part, but also against their better judgment and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both of
them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant who is a
married man."
We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to
any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of
making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext
that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family
who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the
two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac
where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her
parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed
deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love
affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this
chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the
affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her
family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to
Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the
new Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.
Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.


G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992
CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision
1
of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on May 17, 1991 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 07054, entitled "Zenaida B. Cirilo vs. Conrado Bunag, Sr. and Conrado Bunag, Jr.," which affirmed in
toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XI at Bacoor, Cavite, and, implicitly, respondent court's resolution
of September 3, 1991
2
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Respondent court having assiduously discussed the salient antecedents of this case, vis-a-vis the factual findings of the
court below, the evidence of record and the contentions of the parties, it is appropriate that its findings, which we
approve and adopt, be extensively reproduced hereunder:
Based on the evidence on record, the following facts are considered indisputable: On the afternoon of
September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel
where they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-
appellant to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila,
where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On
September 10, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective
applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On
October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit
withdrawing his application for a marriage license.
Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag,
Jr., together with an unidentified male companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de
Dios Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped. The court a quo, which
adopted her evidence, summarized the same which we paraphrased as follows:
Plaintiff was 26 years old on November 5, 1974 when she testified, single and had
finished a college course in Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4, Nov. 5, 1974). It appears that on
September 8, 1973, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while she was walking
along Figueras Street, Pasay City on her way to the San Juan de Dios Canteen to take
her snack, defendant, Conrado Bunag, Jr., came riding in a car driven by a male
companion. Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, but two weeks
before September 8, 1973, they had a quarrel, and Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk matters
over with plaintiff, so that he invited her to take their merienda at the Aristocrat
Restaurant in Manila instead of at the San Juan de Dios Canteen, to which plaintiff
obliged, as she believed in his sincerity (t.s.n., pp. 8-10, Nov. 5, 1974).
Plaintiff rode in the car and took the front seat beside the driver while Bunag, Jr.
seated himself by her right side. The car travelled north on its way to the Aristocrat
Restaurant but upon reaching San Juan Street in Pasay City, it turned abruptly to the
right, to which plaintiff protested, but which the duo ignored and instead threatened
her not to make any noise as they were ready to die and would bump the car against
the post if she persisted. Frightened and silenced, the car travelled its course thru
F.B. Harrison Boulevard until they reached a motel. Plaintiff was then pulled and
dragged from the car against her will, and amidst her cries and pleas. In spite of her
struggle she was no match to the joint strength of the two male combatants because
of her natural weakness being a woman and her small stature. Eventually, she was
brought inside the hotel where the defendant Bunag, Jr. deflowered her against her
will and consent. She could not fight back and repel the attack because after Bunag,
Jr. had forced her to lie down and embraced her, his companion held her two feet,
removed her panty, after which he left. Bunag, Jr. threatened her that he would ask
his companion to come back and hold her feet if she did not surrender her
womanhood to him, thus he succeeded in feasting on her virginity. Plaintiff
described the pains she felt and how blood came out of her private parts after her
vagina was penetrated by the penis of the defendant Bunag, Jr. (t.s.n. pp. 17-24, Nov.
5, 1974).
After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked Bunag, Jr. once more to allow her
to go home but the latter would not consent and stated that he would only let her go
after they were married as he intended to marry her, so much so that she promised
not to make any scandal and to marry him. Thereafter, they took a taxi together
after the car that they used had already gone, and proceeded to the house of Juana
de Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s grandmother in Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila where they
arrived at 9:30 o'clock in the evening (t.s.n., p. 26, Nov. 5, 1974). At about ten (10)
o'clock that same evening, defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., father of Bunag, Jr. arrived
and assured plaintiff that the following day which was a Monday, she and Bunag, Jr.
would go to Bacoor, to apply for a marriage license, which they did. They filed their
applications for marriage license (Exhibits "A" and "C") and after that plaintiff and
defendant Bunag, Jr. returned to the house of Juana de Leon and lived there as
husband and wife from September 8, 1973 to September 29, 1973.
On September 29, 1973 defendant Bunag, Jr. left and never returned, humiliating
plaintiff and compelled her to go back to her parents on October 3, 1973. Plaintiff
was ashamed when she went home and could not sleep and eat because of the
deception done against her by defendants-appellants (t.s.n., p. 35, Nov. 5, 1974).
The testimony of plaintiff was corroborated in toto by her uncle, Vivencio Bansagan
who declared that on September 8, 1973 when plaintiff failed to arrive home at 9:00
o'clock in the evening, his sister who is the mother of plaintiff asked him to look for
her but his efforts proved futile, and he told his sister that plaintiff might have
married (baka nag-asawa, t.s.n., pp. 5-6, March 18, 1976). However, in the afternoon
of the next day (Sunday), his sister told him that Francisco Cabrera, accompanied by
barrio captain Jacinto Manalili of Ligas, Bacoor, Cavite, informed her that plaintiff
and Bunag, Jr. were in Cabrera's house, so that her sister requested him to go and
see the plaintiff, which he did, and at the house of Mrs. Juana de Leon in Pamplona,
Las Pias, Metro Manila he met defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., who told him, "Pare,
the children are here already. Let us settle the matter and have them married."
He conferred with plaintiff who told him that as she had already lost her honor, she would bear her
sufferings as Boy Bunag, Jr. and his father promised they would be married.
Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.
abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant on September 8, 1973. On the contrary, plaintiff-appellant and
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. eloped on that date because of the opposition of the latter's father to
their relationship.
Defendant-appellants claim that defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant had earlier
made plans to elope and get married, and this fact was known to their friends, among them, Architect
Chito Rodriguez. The couple made good their plans to elope on the afternoon of September 8, 1973,
when defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., accompanied by his friend Guillermo Ramos, Jr., met plaintiff-
appellant and her officemate named Lydia in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The
foursome then proceeded to (the) aforesaid hospital's canteen where they had some snacks. Later,
Guillermo Ramos, Jr. took Lydia to Quirino Avenue where she could get a ride home, thereby leaving
the defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant alone. According to defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr., after Guillermo Ramos, Jr. and Lydia left, he and plaintiff-appellant took a taxi to the
Golden Gate and Flamingo Hotels where they tried to get a room, but these were full. They finally got
a room at the Holiday Hotel, where defendant-appellant registered using his real name and residence
certificate number. Three hours later, the couple check out of the hotel and proceeded to the house of
Juana de Leon at Pamplona, Las Pias, where they stayed until September 19, 1873. Defendant-
appellant claims that bitter disagreements with the plaintiff-appellant over money and the threats
made to his life prompted him to break off their plan to get married.
During this period, defendant-appellant Bunag, Sr. denied having gone to the house of Juan de Leon
and telling plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. In fact, he
phoned Atty. Conrado Adreneda, member of the board of directors of Mandala Corporation,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.'s employer, three times between the evening of September 8, 1973
and September 9, 1973 inquiring as to the whereabouts of his son. He came to know about his son's
whereabouts when he was told of the couple's elopement late in the afternoon of September 9, 1973
by his mother Candida Gawaran. He likewise denied having met relatives and emissaries of plaintiff-
appellant and agreeing to her marriage to his son.
3

A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by herein private respondent Zenaida B.
Cirilo against petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag, Sr., as Civil Case No. N-2028 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor, Cavite. On August 20, 1983, on a finding, inter alia, that petitioner had forcibly
abducted and raped private respondent, the trial court rendered a decision
4
ordering petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay
private respondent P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of
temperate damages, and P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit. Defendant Conrado Bunag,
Sr. was absolved from any and all liability.
Private respondent appealed that portion of the lower court's decision disculpating Conrado Bunag, Sr. from civil
liability in this case. On the other hand, the Bunags, as defendants-appellants, assigned in their appeal several errors
allegedly committed by trial court, which were summarized by respondent court as follows: (1) in finding that
defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. forcibly abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant; (2) in finding that defendants-
appellants promised plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.; and (3) in
awarding plaintiff-appellant damages for the breach of defendants-appellants' promise of marriage.
5

As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing both appeals and
affirming in toto the decision of the trial court. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner Bunag,
Jr. is before us on a petition for review, contending that (1) respondent court failed to consider vital exhibits,
testimonies and incidents for petitioner's defense, resulting in the misapprehensions of facts and violative of the law
on preparation of judgment; and (2) it erred in the application of the proper law and jurisprudence by holding that
there was forcible abduction with rape, not just a simple elopement and an agreement to marry, and in the award of
excessive damages.
6

Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the trial and appellate courts failed to take into consideration the alleged
fact that he and private respondent had agreed to marry, and that there was no case of forcible abduction with rape,
but one of simple elopement and agreement to marry. It is averred that the agreement to marry has been sufficiently
proven by the testimonies of the witnesses for both parties and the exhibits presented in court.
This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and evidence presented by the parties
and the weight accorded thereto in the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In effect, what
petitioner would want this Court to do is to evaluate and analyze anew the evidence, both testimonial and
documentary, presented before and calibrated by the trial court, and as further meticulously reviewed and discussed
by respondent court.
The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves questions of fact. We are, therefore, once again constrained to
stress the well-entrenched statutory and jurisprudential mandate that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, as a
rule, conclusive upon this Court. Only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject to clearly settled exceptions in case law.
Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law
imputed to the latter, its findings of fact being conclusive. This Court has emphatically declared that it is not its
function to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that
might have been committed by the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are
totally devoid of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion, such findings must stand, for this Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and
documentary evidence submitted by the parties.
7
Neither does the instant case reveal any feature falling within, any
of the exceptions which under our decisional rules may warrant a review of the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals. On the foregoing considerations and our review of the records, we sustain the holding of respondent court in
favor of private respondent.
Petitioner likewise asserts that since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in awarding
damages.
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has
no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith
of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the
plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219
of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages.
9
Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the
statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes.
10

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent
and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape
criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days,
irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible
transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages,
pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on the basis of a
finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefor filed by
private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if
the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause
thereof.
11
Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist.
12

In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal
at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private
respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action
did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not between the same parties.
Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules as to the
competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State
must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action
it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only.
13
Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs.
Rillon,
14
we stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and
prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise
be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed judgment and resolution are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. and Padilla, J., concur.
Nocon, J., took no part.



PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
HEIRS OF EDUARDO
SIMON,
Petitioners,



-versus -




ELVIN
*
CHAN AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 157547

Present:

BRION, Acting Chairperson,
**

BERSAMIN,
ABAD,
***

VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

February 23, 2011

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of an unfunded
check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22(BP 22).

Antecedents

On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
(MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon. The accusatory portion reads:

That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Elvin Chan to apply on
account or for value Landbank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the
amount of P336,000.00 said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date
thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of
notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Elvin Chan the amount of the check or to
make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said
notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
[1]



More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC
in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal amount ofP336,000.00, coupled with an application for a
writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).
[2]
He alleged in his complaint the following:

xxx
2. Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation
encashed a check dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of P336,000.00 to the plaintiff assuring the
latter that the check is duly funded and that he had an existing account with the Land Bank of the
Philippines, xerox copy of the said check is hereto attached as Annex A;

3. However, when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored on the
ground that the account of the defendant with the Land Bank of the Philippines has been closed
contrary to his representation that he has an existing account with the said bank and that the said
check was duly funded and will be honored when presented for payment;

4. Demands had been made to the defendant for him to make good the payment of the value of
the check, xerox copy of the letter of demand is hereto attached as Annex B, but despite such
demand defendant refused and continues to refuse to comply with plaintiffs valid demand;

5. Due to the unlawful failure of the defendant to comply with the plaintiffs valid demands,
plaintiff has been compelled to retain the services of counsel for which he agreed to pay as
reasonable attorneys fees the amount of P50,000.00 plus additional amount of P2,000.00 per
appearance.

ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER
FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

6. The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty of fraud in contracting the obligation
upon which this action is brought and that there is no sufficient security for the claims sought in this
action which fraud consist in the misrepresentation by the defendant that he has an existing account
and sufficient funds to cover the check when in fact his account was already closed at the time he
issued a check;

7. That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and this action is one which falls under
Section 1, sub-paragraph (d), Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and the amount
due the plaintiff is as much as the sum for which the plaintiff seeks the writ of preliminary
attachment;

8. That the plaintiff is willing and able to post a bond conditioned upon the payment of
damages should it be finally found out that the plaintiff is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment.
[3]



On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which was implemented
on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon.
[4]


On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment
bond for damages,
[5]
pertinently averring:

xxx
On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the pendency of another action
between the instant parties for the same cause before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch
X (10) entitled People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon, docketed thereat as Criminal Case No.
275381-CR, the instant action is dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, xxx
xxx
While the instant case is civil in nature and character as contradistinguished from the said
Criminal Case No. 915-00 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10), the basis of the
instant civil action is the herein plaintiffs criminal complaint against defendant arising from a charge
of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as a consequence of the alleged dishonor in plaintiffs hands
upon presentment for payment with drawee bank a Land Bank Check No. 0007280 dated December
26, 1996 in the amount of P336,000- drawn allegedly issued to plaintiff by defendant who is the
accused in said case, a photocopy of the Criminal information filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor of
Manila on June 11, 1997 hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex 1.

It is our understanding of the law and the rules, that, when a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to
institute it separately xxx.


On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs
attachment bond for damages, stating:

1. The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiffs complaint is the alleged
pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause, contending among others
that the pendency of Criminal Case No. 275381-CR entitled People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo
Simon renders this case dismissable;

2. The defendant further contends that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the filing of the criminal action, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action which the plaintiff does not contest;
however, it is the submission of the plaintiff that an implied reservation of the right to file a civil
action has already been made, first, by the fact that the information for violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal
Case No. 2753841 does not at all make any allegation of damages suffered by the plaintiff nor is there
any claim for recovery of damages; on top of this the plaintiff as private complainant in the criminal
case, during the presentation of the prosecution evidence was not represented at all by a private
prosecutor such that no evidence has been adduced by the prosecution on the criminal case to prove
damages; all of these we respectfully submit demonstrate an effective implied reservation of the right
of the plaintiff to file a separate civil action for damages;

3. The defendant relies on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court
which mandates that after a criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted
until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action; however, the defendant overlooks and
conveniently failed to consider that under Section 2, Rule 111 which provides as follows:

In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of criminal case
provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.

In as much as the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines as it is based
on fraud, this action therefore may be prosecuted independently of the criminal action;

4. In fact we would even venture to state that even without any reservation at all of the right
to file a separate civil action still the plaintiff is authorized to file this instant case because the
plaintiff seeks to enforce an obligation which the defendant owes to the plaintiff by virtue of the
negotiable instruments law. The plaintiff in this case sued the defendant to enforce his liability as
drawer in favor of the plaintiff as payee of the check. Assuming the allegation of the defendant of the
alleged circumstances relative to the issuance of the check, still when he delivered the check payable
to bearer to that certain Pedro Domingo, as it was payable to cash, the same may be negotiated by
delivery by who ever was the bearer of the check and such negotiation was valid and effective against
the drawer;

5. Indeed, assuming as true the allegations of the defendant regarding the circumstances
relative to the issuance of the check it would be entirely impossible for the plaintiff to have been
aware that such check was intended only for a definite person and was not negotiable considering
that the said check was payable to bearer and was not even crossed;

6. We contend that what cannot be prosecuted separate and apart from the criminal case
without a reservation is a civil action arising from the criminal offense charged. However, in this
instant case since the liability of the defendant are imposed and the rights of the plaintiff are created
by the negotiable instruments law, even without any reservation at all this instant action may still be
prosecuted;

7. Having this shown, the merits of plaintiffs complaint the application for damages against
the bond is totally without any legal support and perforce should be dismissed outright.
[6]



On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to
charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages,
[7]
dismissing the complaint of Chan because:

xxx
After study of the arguments of the parties, the court resolves to GRANT the Motion to Dismiss
and the application to charge plaintiffs bond for damages.

For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must
concur: (a) identity of parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the
identity in the two (2) cases should be such that the judgment, which may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. xxx

A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as Sum of Money and the criminal case
for violation of BP Blg. 22 would readily show that the parties are not only identical but also the
cause of action being asserted, which is the recovery of the value of Landbank Check No. 0007280 in
the amount of P336,000.00. In both civil and criminal cases, the rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the reliefs being founded on the same facts, are identical.

Plaintiffs claim that there is an effective implied waiver of his right to pursue this civil case
owing to the fact that there was no allegation of damages in BP Blg. 22 case and that there was no
private prosecutor during the presentation of prosecution evidence is unmeritorious. It is basic that
when a complaint or criminal Information is filed, even without any allegation of damages and the
intention to prove and claim them, the offended party has the right to prove and claim for them,
unless a waiver or reservation is made or unless in the meantime, the offended party has instituted a
separate civil action. xxx The over-all import of the said provision conveys that the waiver which
includes indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages arising under Articles 32, 33, and 34
of the Civil Code must be both clear and express. And this must be logically so as the primordial
objective of the Rule is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act
or omission of the accused.

Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not waive or made a reservation as to his
right to pursue the civil branch of the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the defendant
herein. To the considered view of this court, the filing of the instant complaint for sum of money is
indeed legally barred. The right to institute a separate civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. xxx

Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiffs submission that the herein case for sum of
money is one based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior
reservation is required by the Rules, to wit:

In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of criminal case
provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:

1. Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of litis pendentia;

2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this court on August 14, 2000;

3. Charge the plaintiffs bond the amount of P336,000.00 in favor of the defendant for the
damages sustained by the latter by virtue of the implementation of the writ of attachment;

4. Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to RESTORE with utmost dispatch to the
defendants physical possession the vehicle seized from him on August 16, 2000; and

5. Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P5,000.00 by way of attorneys fees.

SO ORDERED.

Chans motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20, 2000,
[8]
viz:

Considering that the plaintiffs arguments appear to be a mere repetition of his previous
submissions, and which submissions this court have already passed upon; and taking into account
the inapplicability of the ratio decidendi in the Tactaquin vs. Palileo case which the plaintiff cited as
clearly in that case, the plaintiff therein expressly made a reservation to file a separate civil action,
the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of Chans complaint,
disposing:
[9]


WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for review,
[10]
challenging the
propriety of the dismissal of his complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.

In his comment,
[11]
Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith and malice in prosecuting his alleged
civil claim twice in a manner that caused him (Simon) utter embarrassment and emotional sufferings; and that the
dismissal of the civil case because of the valid ground of litis pendentia based on Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was warranted.

On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,
[12]
overturning the RTC, viz:

xxx
As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury
produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired through the imposition of the
corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which
injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity which is also civil in nature. Thus, every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission of
the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted with the criminal
action or is separately instituted.

Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective
on December 1, 2000, provides that:

(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Rule 111, Section 2 further states:

After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising
therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal
action.

However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been changed.

In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, the Supreme Court pronounced that only the
civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action. Speaking through Justice Pardo, the Supreme Court held:

There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil
action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the
civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil
liability under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately without a
reservation.

Rule 111, Section 3 reads:

Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently
of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.

The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to
independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable
to this case.

Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of
procedure. xxx

Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an independent civil action for damages on
account of the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the
Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its
filing.

It must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar with the instant suit. The complaint was
also brought on allegation of fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code and committed by the
respondent in the issuance of the check which later bounced. It was filed before the trial court,
despite the pendency of the criminal case for violation of BP 22 against the respondent. While it may
be true that the changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil
action became effective on December 1, 2000, the same may be given retroactive application and
may be made to apply to the case at bench, since procedural rules may be given retroactive
application. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.



In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is therefore an error to adjudge damages in
favor of the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 13, 2001 rendered by
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108 affirming the dismissal of the complaint filed by
petitioner is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simons motion for reconsideration.
[13]


Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA erroneously premised its decision on the
assessment that the civil case was an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code;
that the CAs reliance on the ruling in DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Velez
[14]
stretched the meaning and
intent of the ruling, and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case
was a simple collection suit for a sum of money, precluding the application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
[15]


In his comment,
[16]
Chan counters that the petition for review should be denied because the petitioners used the
wrong mode of appeal; that his cause of action, being based on fraud, was an independent civil action; and that the
appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case did not preclude the filing of his separate civil action.




Issue

The lone issue is whether or not Chans civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check (Civil Case No.
915-00) was an independent civil action.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

A
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the
Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22

The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can give rise to civil liability
in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr.,
[17]
holding:

xxx
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended
party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the
wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part
of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA
44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil 692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal
action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing,
repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil 265).
xxx
Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is entitled to
receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the
damage, she is entitled to recompense.

Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to
leave the offended private party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the
offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to
file a separate civil suit. To do so may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value
of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The
protection which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.
xxx

However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of
BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint
or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such
damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information,
the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual
damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the
criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action. (1a)

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall
be allowed.
[18]


Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full
the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently
awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If
the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of the
Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by
the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.


The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case
No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural
laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable.
The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws.
[19]
Any new
rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an
action has a vested right in the rules of procedure,
[20]
except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively
apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the
commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the
Constitution.
[21]

Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any assumed vested right,
because the new rule was adopted from Supreme Court Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997.

Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:

Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the following rules and
guidelines shall henceforth be observed in the filing and prosecution of all criminal cases under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 which penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check without funds or
credit:

1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed or recognized.
[22]

2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay
in full the filing fees based upon the amount of the check involved which shall be considered as the
actual damages claimed, in accordance with the schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and Section 8 (a),
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as last amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94 effective August
1, 1994. Where the offended party further seeks to enforce against the accused civil liability by way
of liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, he shall pay the corresponding filing
fees therefor based on the amounts thereof as alleged either in the complaint or information. If not so
alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the amount of such fees
shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying
the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with
the pertinent procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111 governing the proceedings in the
actions as thus consolidated.
4. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take
effect on November 1, 1997.


The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v.
Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation,
[23]
thus:


xxx
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly
instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present
revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. The reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer needed. The
Rules provide:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.

(a) x x x

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately
shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall
pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks
to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended
party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts
are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the
filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and
criminal actions.

The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states that
the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil
action. It also requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check
involved. Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the
civil action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon
the filing of the complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled
with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no
filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating
effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial
court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is
expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based
on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of
instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be
filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage
the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate
civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal
complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when
the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the
consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate
civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would only
prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would further delay
the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners
rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate
action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing
actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply
to the case at bar.
[24]


The CAs reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez
[25]
to give due course to the civil action of
Chan independently and separately of Criminal Case No. 275381 was unwarranted. DMPI Employees, which involved
a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours with this case, which is a prosecution for a violation of BP 22. Although the
Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and
violation of BP 22,
[26]
the procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are
different and non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a
separate civil action, or may institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil
Code,
[27]
as DMPI Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a
policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the
issuance of the bouncing check upon the reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, supra.

To repeat, Chans separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in the prosecution for the
violation of BP 22 could not be independently maintained under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the
aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.

B
Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action
on the ground of litis pendentia

Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 275381)
bar the filing of Civil Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC in PasayCity on the ground of litis pendentia?

For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following requisites
is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both
actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same
facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites,
the possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil.
[28]


A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that all the elements
of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in
Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information in Criminal Case No. 275381
and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280
worth P336,000.00 payable to cash, thereby indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as
the facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment
rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon
the same claim.

It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-00 on the ground
of litis pendentia through its decision dated October 23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming
the MeTC.

WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and, accordingly, we reverse and set aside the
decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. We reinstate the decision rendered on October 23,
2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City.

Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.

SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. 175256 August 23, 2012
LILY LIM, Petitioner,
vs.
KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 179160
KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Petitioner,
vs.
LILY LIM, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Is it forum shopping for a private complainant to pursue a civil complaint for specific performance and damages, while
appealing the judgment on the civil aspect of a criminal case for estafa?
Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review assailing the separate Decisions of the Second and Seventeenth
Divisions of the Court of Appeals (CA) on the above issue.
Lily Lims (Lim) Petition for Review
1
assails the October 20, 2005 Resolution
2
of the Second Division in CA-G.R. CV No.
85138, which ruled on the above issue in the affirmative:
Due to the filing of the said civil complaint (Civil Case No. 5112396), Charlie Co filed the instant motion to dismiss
[Lily Lims] appeal, alleging that in filing said civil case, Lily Lim violated the rule against forum shopping as the
elements of litis pendentia are present.
This Court agrees.
3

x x x x
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
4

On the other hand, Charlie Cos (Co) Petition for Review
5
assails the April 10, 2007 Decision
6
of the Seventeenth
Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395 for ruling on the same issue in the negative:
We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent judge. The elements of litis pendentia and forum-
shopping were not met in this case.
7

x x x x
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. This case is REMANDED to the court of origin
for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
8

Factual Antecedents
In February 1999, FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a cement manufacturing plant, issued several
withdrawal authorities
9
for the account of cement dealers and traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt. These
withdrawal authorities state the number of bags that the dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw from the plant.
Each withdrawal authority contained a provision that it is valid for six months from its date of issuance, unless
revoked by FRCC Marketing Department.
Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their administrative manager, Gail Borja (Borja), sold the withdrawal
authorities covering 50,000 bags of cement to Co for the amount of P3.15 million or P63.00 per bag.
10
On February 15,
1999, Co sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim allegedly at the price of P64.00 per bag or a total of P3.2 million.
11

Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement bags from FRCC on a staggered basis. She successfully
withdrew 2,800 bags of cement, and sold back some of the withdrawal authorities, covering 10,000 bags, to Co.
Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal
authorities. Lim clarified the matter with Co and Borja, who explained that the plant implemented a price increase and
would only release the goods once Lim pays for the price difference or agrees to receive a lesser quantity of cement.
Lim objected and maintained that the withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject to price fluctuations. Lim
sought legal recourse after her demands for Co to resolve the problem with the plant or for the return of her money
had failed.
The criminal case
An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion was filed against Co before Branch 154 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The accusatory portion thereof reads:
On or about between the months of February and April 1999, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused, with intent to defraud Lily Lim, with grave abuse of confidence, with unfaithfulness,
received in trust from Lily Lim cash money in the amount ofP2,380,800.00 as payment for the 37,200 bags of cement,
under obligation to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to said Lily Lim, but far from complying with his obligation,
misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own personal use and benefit the said amount of P2,300,800.00
[sic] and despite demands, the accused failed and refused to return said amount, to the damage and prejudice of Lily
Lim in the amount of P2,380,800.00.
Contrary to Law.
12

The private complainant, Lily Lim, participated in the criminal proceedings to prove her damages. She prayed for Co
to return her money amounting to P2,380,800.00, foregone profits, and legal interest, and for an award of moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees.
13

On November 19, 2003, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 154, rendered its Order
14
acquitting Co of the estafa charge for
insufficiency of evidence. The criminal courts Order reads:
The first and second elements of the crime of estafa [with abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)] for
which the accused is being charged and prosecuted were not established by the prosecutions evidence.
x x x x
In view of the absence of the essential requisites of the crime of estafa for which the accused is being charged and
prosecuted, as above discussed, the Court has no alternative but to dismiss the case against the accused for
insufficiency of evidence.
15

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the accused is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa charged against him under the present information for insufficiency of
evidence.
Insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned, however, set this case for the reception of his evidence on the
matter on December 11, 2003 at 8:30 oclock [sic] in the morning.
SO ORDERED.
16

After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the Pasig City RTC also relieved Co of civil liability to Lim in its
December 1, 2004 Order.
17
The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered holding the accused CHARLIE CO not civilly liable
to the private complainant Lily Lim.
SO ORDERED.
18

Lim sought a reconsideration of the above Order, arguing that she has presented preponderant evidence that Co
committed estafa against her.
19

The trial court denied the motion in its Order
20
dated February 21, 2005.
On March 14, 2005, Lim filed her notice of appeal
21
on the civil aspect of the criminal case. Her appeal was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 and raffled to the Second Division of the CA.
The civil action for specific performance
On April 19, 2005, Lim filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before Branch 21 of the RTC of Manila.
The defendants in the civil case were Co and all other parties to the withdrawal authorities, Tigerbilt, Fil-Cement
Center, FRCC, Southeast Asia Cement, and La Farge Corporation. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-112396,
asserted two causes of action: breach of contract and abuse of rights. Her allegations read:
ALLEGATIONS COMMON
TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
x x x x
23. Charlie Co obligated himself to deliver to Lily Lim 50,000 bags of cement of P64.00 per bag on an x-plant basis
within 3 months from the date of their transaction, i.e. February 15, 1999. Pursuant to said agreement, Lily Lim paid
Charlie Co P3.2 Million while Charlie Co delivered to Lily Lim FR Cement Withdrawal Authorities representing 50,000
bags of cement.
24. The withdrawal authorities issued by FR Cement Corp. allowed the assignee or holder thereof to withdraw within
a six-month period from date a certain amount of cement indicated therein. The Withdrawal Authorities given to Lily
Lim were dated either 3 February 1999 or 23 February 1999. The Withdrawal Authorities were first issued to
Tigerbilt and Fil-Cement Center which in turn assigned them to Charlie Co. Charlie Co then assigned the Withdrawal
Authorities to Lily Lim on February 15, 1999. Through these series of assignments, Lily Lim acquired all the rights
(rights to withdraw cement) granted in said Withdrawal Authorities.
25. That these Withdrawal Authorities are valid is established by the fact that FR Cement earlier allowed Lily Lim to
withdraw 2,800 bags of cement on the basis thereof.
26. However, sometime 19 April 1999 (within the three (3)-month period agreed upon by Charlie Co and Lily Lim and
certainly within the six (6)-month period indicated in the Withdrawal Authorities issued by FR Cement Corp.), Lily
Lim attempted but failed to withdraw the remaining bags of cement on account of FR Cements unjustified refusal to
honor the Withdrawal Authorities. x x x
x x x x
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
BREACH OF CONTRACT
30. Charlie Co committed and is therefore liable to deliver to Lily Lim 37,200 bags of cement. If he cannot, then he
must pay her the current fair market value thereof.
31. FR Cement Corporation is also liable to deliver to Lily Lim the amount of cement as indicated in the Withdrawal
Authorities it issued. xxx FR Cement Corporation has no right to impose price adjustments as a qualification for
honoring the Withdrawal Authorities.
32. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borja as the original holders/ assignees of the Withdrawal Authorities
repeatedly assured Lily Lim that the same were valid and would be honored. They are liable to make good on their
assurances.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
33. Charlie Cos acts of falsely representing to Lily Lim that she may be able to withdraw the cement from FR Cement
Corp. caused Lily Lim to incur expenses and losses. Such act was made without justice, without giving Lily Lim what is
due her and without observing honesty and good faith, all violative of the law, more specifically Articles 19 and 20 of
the Civil Code. Such willful act was also made by Charlie Co in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy, in violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
34. FR Cement Corporations unjust refusal to honor the Withdrawal Authorities they issued also caused damage to
Lily Lim. Further, FR Cement Corporations act of withholding the 37,200 bags of cement despite earning income
therefor constitutes as an unjust enrichment because FR Cement Corporation acquired income through an act or
performance by another or any other means at the expense of another without just or legal ground in violation of
Article 22 of the Civil Code.
35. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borjas false assurances that Lily Lim would be able to withdraw the
remaining 37,200 bags of cement caused Lily Lim to incur expenses and losses. x x x Moreover, Fil-Cement Center
admitted receiving payment for said amount of cement, thus they are deemed to have come into possession of money
at the expense of Lily Lim without just or legal ground, in violation of Article 22 of the Civil Code.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES and
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT
22

Lim prayed for Co to honor his contractual commitments either by delivering the 37,200 bags of cement, making
arrangements with FRCC to allow Lim to withdraw the cement, or to pay for their value. She likewise asked that the
defendants be held solidarily liable to her for the damages she incurred in her failed attempts to withdraw the cement
and for the damages they inflicted on her as a result of their abuse of their rights.
23

Motions to dismiss both actions
In reaction to the filing of the civil complaint for specific performance and damages, Co filed motions to dismiss the
said civil case
24
and Lims appeal in the civil aspect of the estafa case or CA-G.R. CV No. 85138.
25
He maintained that
the two actions raise the same issue, which is Cos liability to Lim for her inability to withdraw the bags of
cement,
26
and should be dismissed on the ground of lis pendens and forum shopping.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Second Division in CA-G.R CV No. 85138
The appellate court (Second Division) favorably resolved Cos motion and dismissed Lims appeal from the civil aspect
of the estafa case. In its Resolution dated October 20, 2005, the CA Second Division held that the parties, causes of
action, and reliefs prayed for in Lims appeal and in her civil complaint are identical. Both actions seek the same relief,
which is the payment of the value of the 37,200 bags of cement.
27
Thus, the CA Second Division dismissed Lims appeal
for forum shopping.
28
The CA denied
29
Lims motion for reconsideration.
30

Lim filed the instant petition for review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 175256.
Ruling of the Manila Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 05-112396
Meanwhile, the Manila RTC denied Cos Motion to Dismiss in an Order
31
dated December 6, 2005. The Manila RTC held
that there was no forum shopping because the causes of action invoked in the two cases are different. It observed that
the civil complaint before it is based on an obligation arising from contract and quasi-delict, whereas the civil liability
involved in the appeal of the criminal case arose from a felony.
Co filed a petition for certiorari,
32
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, before the appellate court. He prayed for the
nullification of the Manila RTCs Order in Civil Case No. 05-112396 for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
33

Ruling of the Court of Appeals Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395
The CA Seventeenth Division denied Cos petition and remanded the civil complaint to the trial court for further
proceedings. The CA Seventeenth Division agreed with the Manila RTC that the elements of litis pendentia and forum
shopping are not met in the two proceedings because they do not share the same cause of action.
34

The CA denied
35
Cos motion for reconsideration.
36

Co filed the instant Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 179160.
Upon Cos motion,
37
the Court resolved to consolidate the two petitions.
38

Kou Co Pings arguments
Co maintains that Lim is guilty of forum shopping because she is asserting only one cause of action in CA-G.R. CV No.
85138 (the appeal from the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 116377) and in Civil Case No. 05-112396, which is for
Cos violation of her right to receive 37,200 bags of cement. Likewise, the reliefs sought in both cases are the same,
that is, for Co to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement or its value to Lim. That Lim utilized different methods of
presenting her case a criminal action for estafa and a civil complaint for specific performance and damages should
not detract from the fact that she is attempting to litigate the same cause of action twice.
39

Co makes light of the distinction between civil liability ex contractu and ex delicto. According to him, granting that the
two civil liabilities are independent of each other, nevertheless, the two cases arising from them would have to be
decided using the same evidence and going over the same set of facts. Thus, any judgment rendered in one of these
cases will constitute res judicata on the other.
40

In G.R. No. 179160, Co prays for the annulment of the CA Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, for a
declaration that Lim is guilty of forum shopping, and for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-112396.
41

In G.R. No. 175256, Co prays for the affirmation of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 (which dismissed Lims
appeal from the trial courts decision in Criminal Case No. 116377).
42

Lily Lims arguments
Lim admits that the two proceedings involve substantially the same set of facts because they arose from only one
transaction.
43
She is quick to add, however, that a single act or omission does not always make a single cause of
action.
44
It can possibly give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender (1) ex delicto or civil
liability arising from crimes, and (2) independent civil liabilities or those arising from contracts or intentional torts.
The only caveat provided in Article 2177 of the Civil Code is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission.
45
Because the law allows her two independent causes of action, Lim contends that it is not
forum shopping to pursue them.
46

She then explains the separate and distinct causes of action involved in the two cases. Her cause of action in CA-G.R CV
No. 85138 is based on the crime of estafa. Co violated Lims right to be protected against swindling. He represented to
Lim that she can withdraw 37,200 bags of cement using the authorities she bought from him. This is a fraudulent
representation because Co knew, at the time that they entered into the contract, that he could not deliver what he
promised.
47
On the other hand, Lims cause of action in Civil Case No. 05-112396 is based on contract. Co violated
Lims rights as a buyer in a contract of sale. Co received payment for the 37,200 bags of cement but did not deliver the
goods that were the subject of the sale.
48

In G.R. No. 179160, Lim prays for the denial of Cos petition.
49
In G.R. No. 175256, she prays for the reversal of the CA
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138, for a declaration that she is not guilty of forum shopping, and for the reinstatement
of her appeal in Criminal Case No. 116377 to the CA.
50

Issue
Did Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance and damages during the pendency of
her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa?
Our Ruling
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the
part of the offender
51
- (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code,
52
and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued
independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on "an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of
contract or for tort
53
). It may also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated
independently from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of defamation,
fraud and physical injuries").
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal
offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is
impliedly instituted with the criminal offense.
54
If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal
action.
55
The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that "the
act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist."
56

On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be pursued
independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,
such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
(Emphasis supplied.)
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied.)
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the
offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the
rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.
57
As explained in Cancio, Jr. v. Isip:
58

One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the instant case, it must be stressed that the action
filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution
based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the
culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of
action, i.e., culpa contractual.
In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases against the offender did not
amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases
filed by [the offended party] arose from the same act or omission of [the offender], they are, however, based on
different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection
is anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law
expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.
59

Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other sources of obligations are authorized by law to
proceed independently of each other, the resolution of the present issue hinges on whether the two cases herein
involve different kinds of civil obligations such that they can proceed independently of each other. The answer is in
the affirmative.
The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been instituted together with the criminal action.
60

On the other hand, the second action, judging by the allegations contained in the complaint,
61
is a civil action arising
from a contractual obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of rights). In her civil complaint, Lim basically alleges
that she entered into a sale contract with Co under the following terms: that she bought 37,200 bags of cement at the
rate of P64.00 per bag from Co; that, after full payment, Co delivered to her the withdrawal authorities issued by FRCC
corresponding to these bags of cement; that these withdrawal authorities will be honored by FRCC for six months
from the dates written thereon. Lim then maintains that the defendants breached their contractual obligations to her
under the sale contract and under the withdrawal authorities; that Co and his co-defendants wanted her to pay more
for each bag of cement, contrary to their agreement to fix the price at P64.00 per bag and to the wording of the
withdrawal authorities; that FRCC did not honor the terms of the withdrawal authorities it issued; and that Co did not
comply with his obligation under the sale contract to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to Lim. From the foregoing
allegations, it is evident that Lim seeks to enforce the defendants contractual obligations, given that she has already
performed her obligations. She prays that the defendants either honor their part of the contract or pay for the
damages that their breach has caused her.
Lim also includes allegations that the actions of the defendants were committed in such manner as to cause damage to
Lim without regard for morals, good customs and public policy. These allegations, if proven, would constitute tortious
conduct (abuse of rights under the Human Relations provisions of the Civil Code).1wphi1
Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves only the obligations arising from contract and from tort, whereas the appeal
in the estafa case involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from the offense charged. They present different
causes of action, which under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and independent"
62
from each other. Both
cases can proceed to their final adjudication, subject to the prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code.
63

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Lily Lims Petition in G.R. No. 175256 is GRANTED.1wphi1 The assailed October
20, 2005 Resolution of the Second Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 is REVERSED andSET
ASIDE. Lily Lims appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 is ordered REINSTATED and the Court of Appeals
isDIRECTED to RESOLVE the same with DELIBERATE DISPATCH.
Charlie Cos Petition G.R. No. 179160 is DENIED. The assailed April 10, 2007 Decision of the Seventeenth Division of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.


G.R. No. L-19331 April 30, 1965
VICTORIA G. CAPUNO and JOSEPHINE G. CAPUNO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JON ELORDI, defendants-appellees.
Federico Andres for plaintiffs-appellants.
Vicente J. Francisco for defendants-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This appeal (in forma pauperis), certified here by the Court of Appeals, is from the order of the Court of First Instance
of Tarlac dismissing appellant's complaint in Civil Case No. 3315 for recovery of damages for the death of Cipriano
Capuno.
The case arose from a vehicular collision which occurred on January 3, 1953 in Apalit, Pampanga. Involved were a
Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. The collision proved fatal to the
latter as well as to his passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras.
On January 5, 1953 Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga (criminal case No. 1591). The information was subsequently amended to include claims for
damages by the heirs of the three victims.
It is urged for the applicant that no opposition has been registered against his petition on the issues above-discussed.
Absence of opposition, however, does not preclude the scanning of the whole record by the appellate court, with a
view to preventing the conferment of citizenship to persons not fully qualified therefor (Lee Ng Len vs. Republic, G.R.
No. L-20151, March 31, 1965). The applicant's complaint of unfairness could have some weight if the objections on
appeal had been on points not previously passed upon. But the deficiencies here in question are not new but well-
known, having been ruled upon repeatedly by this Court, and we see no excuse for failing to take them into
account.1wph1.t
On October 1, 1953, while the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed
a civil action, also for damages, in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the
Philippines and Jon Elordi (civil case No. 838). Included in the complaint was a claim for indemnity in the sum of
P2,623.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the Estate of Buan the former being appellants herein were
represented by their respective counsel as private prosecutors: Attorney Ricardo Y. Navarro and Attorneys Jose W.
Diokno and Augusto M. Ilagan. In view of the filing of the civil action the accused Jon Elordi moved to strike out the
appearances of these private prosecutors in the criminal case. Grounds for the motion were (1) that as the Capuno
heirs were concerned, they no longer had any interest to protect in the criminal case since they had already claimed
and received compensation for the death of their decedent; and (2) that on the part of the Estate of Buan its right to
intervene in said case had been abated by the civil action.
The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno and Ilagan was disallowed by the Court in an order dated
September 23, 1953, and that of Attorney Navarro was disallowed in an amending order dated October 23, 1954. No
appeal was taken from either of the two orders.
On June 11, 1958 the parties in Civil Case No. 838 entered into a "Compromise and Settlement." For P290,000.00 the
Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages, including the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2,623.00 previously
paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's Compensation Act." The Court approved the compromise and
accordingly dismissed the case on the following June 17.
At that time the criminal case was still pending; judgment was rendered only on April 15, 1959, wherein the accused
Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him. Prior thereto, or on September 26, 1958, however, herein appellants
commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. This
is the action which, upon appellees' motion, was dismissed by the Court a quo in its order of February 29, 1960, from
which order the present appeal has been taken.
The grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissal and which the Court found to be "well taken"
were; (1) that the action had already prescribed; and (2) that appellees had been released from appellants' claim for
damages by virtue of the payment to the latter of the sum of P2,623.00 by the Buan Estate under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, which sum, in turn, was sought to be recovered by the said Estate from appellees in Civil Case No.
838 but finally settled by them in their compromise.
The ruling of the court below on both points is now assailed by appellants as erroneous. In our opinion the question of
prescription is decisive. There can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of damages based on
a quasi-delict, which action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code). Appellants originally
sought to enforce their claim ex-delicto, that is, under the provisions of the Penal Code, when they intervened in the
criminal case against Jon Elordi. The information therein, it may be recalled, was amended precisely to include an
allegation concerning damages suffered by the heirs of the victims of the accident for which Elordi was being
prosecuted. But appellants' intervention was subsequently disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's order
to the effect. And when they commenced the civil action on September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still pending,
showing that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code, for otherwise that action would
have been premature and in any event would have been concluded by the subsequent judgment of acquittal in the
criminal case.
In filing the civil action as they did appellants correctly considered it as entirely independent of the criminal action,
pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which read:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as
a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result
of the latter.
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death (Dyogi v. Yatco, G.R. No. L-9623, Jan.
22, 1957, 22 L.J. 175). In other words, the civil action for damages could have been commenced by appellants
immediately upon the death of their decedent, Cipriano Capuno, on January 3, 1953 or thereabouts, and the same
would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence. But the
complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958, or after the lapse of more than five years.
In the case of Diocosa Paulan, et al. vs. Zacarias Sarabia, et al., G.R. No. L-10542, promulgated July 31, 1958, this Court
held that an action based on a quasi-delict is governed by Article 1150 of the Civil Code as to the question of when the
prescriptive period of four years shall begin to run, that is, "from the day (the action) may be brought," which means
from the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed.
The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that the four-year period of prescription in this case
was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived the civil
action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Such reservation was not then necessary; without having made
it they could file as in fact they did a separate civil action even during the pendency of the criminal case (Pacheco
v. Tumangday, L-14500, May 25, 1960; Azucena v. Potenciano, L-14028, June 30, 1962); and consequently, as held
in Paulan v. Sarabia, supra, "the institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of
a civil action based on a quasi-delict."
As to whether or not Rule 111, Section 2, of the Revised Rules of Court which requires the reservation of the right to
institute a separate and independent civil action in the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of the
Civil Code affects the question of prescription, we do not now decide. The said rule does not apply in the present case.
Having found the action of appellants barred by the statute of limitations, we do not consider it necessary to pass
upon the other issues raised in their brief.
The order appealed from is affirmed, without costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.


G.R. No. L-15315 August 26, 1960
ABUNDIO MERCED, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CLEMENTINO V. DIEZ, ETC. ET AL., respondents.
Pedro A. Bandoquillo for petitioner.
Fulvio Pelaez for respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari with prohibition to prohibit the judge presiding the Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental, Hon. Clementino V. Diez, from proceeding further in the Criminal Case No. V-6520, entitled People of
the Philippines vs. Abundio Merced until after final termination of Civil Case No. R-5387, for the annulment of the
marriage of petitioner Abundio Merced with Elizabeth Ceasar, also pending in same court.
The record disclose the following proceedings in the court a quo: On January 30, 1958, Abundio Merced filed a
complaint for annulment of his second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar. The complaint is docketed as Civil Case No. R-
5387. The complaint alleges that defendant Elizabeth Ceasar and her relatives forced, threatened and intimated him
into signing an affidavit to the effect that he and defendant had been living together as husband and wife for over five
years, which is not true; that this affidavit was used by defendant in securing their marriage of exceptional character,
without the need for marriage license; that he was again forced, threatened and intimated by defendant and her
relatives into entering the marriage with her on August 21, 1957 before Municipal Judge Medardo A. Conde; that
immediately after the celebration of the marriage plaintiff left defendant and never lived with her; that the defendant
wrote him on October 29, 1957, admitting that he was forced into the marriage and asking him to go to Cebu to have
the marriage annulled, but he refused to go for fear he may be forced into living with the defendant. Merced prays for
annulment of the marriage and for moral damages in the amount of P2,000. On March 3, 1958, Elizabeth Ceasar filed
her answer to the complaint. In her answer, she denies the material allegations of the complaint and avers as
affirmative defenses that neither she nor her relatives know of plaintiff's previous marriage to Eufrocina Tan; that
sometime in July, 1957, plaintiff asked her mother to intercede on their behalf to secure her father's consent to their
marriage as plaintiff could not concentrate on his studies without marrying Elizabeth, but that her mother advised
him to finish his studies first; that sometime in April, 1957, defendant learned that plaintiff was engaged to marry
Eufrocina Tan, but plaintiff, upon being confronted with such discovery, showed her a letter which he wrote breaking
off his engagement with Tan. As a counterclaim defendant asks P50,000 as moral damages for the deceit, fraud and
insidious machinations committed upon her by plaintiff.
On February 19, 1958, after had filed Civil Case No. R-5387 defendant Elizabeth Ceasar filed a criminal complaint for
bigamy 39 3 against plaintiff Abundio Merced with the office of the City Fiscal of Cebu. On April 7, 1958 the Assistant
City Fiscal filed Criminal Case No. V-6520, charging Merced with bigamy for the second marriage. The information
reads.
The undersigned Assistant Fiscal of City of Cebu accuses Abundio Merced of the crime of bigamy, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of August, 1957, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused Abundio Merced, being previously united in lawful marriage with
Eufrocina Tan, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved did then and there wilfully
unlawfully, feloniously contract a second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar.
Contrary to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. (Annex "2".)
Abundio Merced filed a motion to hold to trial of said criminal case in abeyance until final termination of Civil Case No.
R- 5387. Reason alleged for the motion is that the Civil Action involves facts which if proved will determine the
innocence of the accused. After an opposition thereto was filed by the assistant provincial fiscal, the court granted the
motion. However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the fiscal, the order was set aside and another entered
denying the motion of accused for suspension of the criminal proceedings, which last order is the one sough herein to
be annulled. The court held in its last order that inasmuch as by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of People vs. Mendoza, 95 Phil., 50 Off. Gaz. [10], 4767, judicial declaration of nullity of a second and bigamous
marriage is not necessary, there is no need in this case to decide the nullity of the second marriage, or to determine
and declare the existence of the grounds for annulling the same, but that said grounds should be used as a defense in
the criminal action. A motion to reconsider the second order of the court having been denied, petition herein was filed.
When the petition for certiorari with prohibition was filed, the petitioner secured from this Court a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin respondent judge from proceeding further in the criminal case.
Before this Court the sole question raised is whether an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question
in a prosecution for bigamy.
The definition and the elements of a prejudicial question have been set forth by us as follows:
Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which arises in a case, the resolution of which (question) is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another Tribunal
(Cuestion prejudicial, es 3o 3 la que surge en un pleito o causa cuya resolucion sean antecedente logico de la
cuestion-objeto del pleito o causa y cuyo conocimiento corresponda a los Tribunales de otro orden o
jurisdiccion. Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 228). The prejudicial question must be determinative of the
case before the court; this is its first element. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another
tribunal; this is the second element. In an action for bigamy for example, if the accused claims that the first
marriage is null and void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another tribunal, the civil action for
nullity must be first decided before the action for bigamy can proceed, hence, the validity of the first marriage
is a prejudicial question. (People vs. Aragon, 94 Phil., 357; 50 Off. Gaz., No. 10, 4863).
In order that a person may be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the second and subsequent marriage must have all
the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. This was the ruling of
this Court in People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil., 246, where we said:
It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. It appearing that the marriage
alleged to have been contracted by the accused with Sabdapal, her former marriage with Hassan being
undissolved, can not be considered as such, according to Mohameddan rites, there is no justification to hold
her guilty of the crime charged in the information. (People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246).
One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the contracting parties must be freely
and voluntarily given. Without the element of consent a marriage would be illegal and void. (Section 29, Act No. 3613,
otherwise known as the Marriage Law.) But the question of invalidity can not ordinarily be decided in the criminal
action for bigamy but in a civil action for annulment. Since the validity of the second marriage, subject of the action for
bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless the elements
of the second marriage appear to exist, it is necessary that a decision in a civil action to the effect that the second
marriage contains all the essentials of a marriage must first be secured.
We have, therefore, in the case at bar, the issue of the validity of the second marriage, which must be determined
before hand in the civil action, before the criminal action can proceed. We have a situation where the issue of the
validity of the second marriage can be determined or must be determined in the civil action before the criminal action
for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question,
because determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede the
criminal action for bigamy.
Spanish jurisprudence, from which the principle of prejudicial question has been taken, requires that the essential
element determinative of the criminal action must be cognizable by another court. This requirement of a different
court is demanded in Spanish jurisprudence because Spanish courts are divided according to their jurisdictions, some
courts being exclusively of civil jurisdiction, others of criminal jurisdiction. In the Philippines, where our courts are
vested with both civil and criminal jurisdiction, the principle of prejudicial question is to be applied even if there is
only one court before which the civil action and the criminal action are to be litigated. But in this case the court when
exercising its jurisdiction over the civil action for the annulment of marriage is considered as a court distinct and
different from itself when trying the criminal action for bigamy.
Our conclusion that the determination of the validity of the marriage in the civil action for annulment is a prejudicial
question, insofar as the criminal action for bigamy is concerned, is supported by Mr. Justice Moran in his dissenting
opinion in De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil., 207 thus:
La regla general es que cuando hay una cuestion civil y otra criminal sobre un mismo delito u ofensa, la
segunda debe verse antes que la primera, por la razon de que las formas de un juicio criminal son las mas a
proposito para la averiguacion de un delito, y no las de un juicio civil. Esta regla tiene, sin embargo, una
excepcion, y es la que se refiere a una cueston civil prejudicial. Una cuestion civil es de caracter prejudicial y
debe resolverse antes que una cuestion criminal, cuando versa sonbre un hecho distinto y separado del delito,
pero tan intimamente ligado a el que determina la culpabilidad o inocencia del acusado. Por ejemplo, una
accion criminal por bigamia.
The majority decision in said case of De Leon vs. Mabanag also sustains the theory that when a civil action is pending
in court, in which a validity of a document claimed to be false and fictitious is in issue, the fiscal may not prosecute the
person who allegedly executed the false document because the issue of the validity of the instrument is sub judice and
the prosecuting officer should be ordered to suspend the criminal action until the prejudicial question has been finally
determined. Thus the Court said"
Hablando en terminos generales la facultad del Fiscal y su deber perseguir los delitos no deben ser
controlados ni coartados por los tribunales; pero no hay duda que esa facultad puede ser regulada para que
no se abuse de ella. Cuando un miembro del Ministerio Fiscal se desvia de la ley y entorpece la recta
administracion de justicia procesando a una persona por hechos constituvos de delito que se encuentran sub-
judice y de los cuales se propone una cuestion prejudicial administrativa, es deber de los tribunales llamarle
la atencion y obligarle que suspenda toda accion criminal hasta que la cuestion prejudicial administrativa se
haya decidido finalmente. (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil., 207.)
The case of People vs. Mendoza, supra, upon which the trial court and the respondents rely, presents a different sets of
facts from the case at bar. So is the ruling therein as contained in the syllabus. In the case of People vs. Mendoza,
Mendoza was charged with and convicted of bigamy for a marriage with one Carmencita Panlilio, contracted in
August, 1949. Mendoza was married for the first time in 1946 with Josefa de Asis; then married for the second time
with Olga Lema; and then married for the third time to Panlilio in 1949. On February 2, 1943, Josefa de Asis died. The
court citing the provisions of Article 29 of the marriage law, held that the second marriage of the appellant Mendoza
with Lema was operation of law null and void, because at the time of the second marriage in 1941, appellant's former
wife Josefa de Asis was still living. This marriage of appellant with Lema being null and void at the time the appellant
contracted the said marriage, the impediment of the second marriage did not exist. Hence the appellant was acquitted
of bigamy for the 1949 marriage because his previous marriage with Lema in 1941, by operation of law, was void ab
initio.
In the case at bar, in order that the petitioner be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the marriage which she contracted
for the second time with Elizabeth Ceasar, must first be declared valid. But its validity has been questioned in the civil
action. This civil action must be decided before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed.
For the foregoing considerations, the petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted.
The order of the court denying the petition of the herein petitioner to prohibit the Fiscal from prosecuting the case for
bigamy, criminal case no. V-6520, entitled People vs. Abundio Merced, is hereby set aside and the preliminary
injunction issued by this court to that effect is hereby made permanent. So Ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.



G.R. No. L-5930 February 17, 1954
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABELO ARAGON, defendant-appellant.
Amadeo D. Seno for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon and Solicitor Ramon L. Avancea for appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
The defendant in the above-entitled case is charged in the Court of First Instance of Cebu with the crime of bigamy, for
having contracted a second marriage with one Efigenia C. Palomer on September 21, 1947, while his previous valid
marriage with Martina Godinez was still subsisting and had not been dissolved. The information is dated May 22,
1951. On October 11, 1951, while the case was pending trial, Efigenia C. Palomer filed a civil action in the same Court
of First Instance of Cebu against the defendant -appellant, alleging that the latter "by means of force, threats and
intimidation of bodily harm, forced plaintiff to marry him", and praying that their marriage on September 21, 1947 be
annulled (Annex A). Thereupon and on April 30, 1952, defendant-appellant filed a motion in the criminal case for
bigamy, praying that the criminal charge be provisionally dismissed, on the ground that the civil action for annulment
of the second marriage is a prejudicial question. The court denied this motion on the ground that the validity of the
second marriage may be determined in the very criminal action for bigamy. Against this order this appeal has been
presented to this court.
It is contended that as the marriage between the defendant-appellant and Efigenia C. Palomer is merely a voidable
marriage, and not an absolutely valid marriage, it can not be attacked in the criminal action and, therefore, it may not
be considered therein; consequently, that the civil action to annul the second marriage should first be decided and the
criminal action, dismissed. It is not necessary to pass upon this question because we believe that the order of denial
must be sustained on another ground.
Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which arises in a case, the resolution of which (question) is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal (Cuestion
prejudicial, es la que surge en un pleito o causa, cuya resolucion sea antecedente logico de la cuestion objeto del pleito
o causa y cuyo conocimiento corresponda a los Tribunales de otro orden o jurisdiccion X Enciclopedia Juridica
Espaola, p. 228). The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court; this is first element.
Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal; this is the second element. In an action for
bigamy, for example, if the accused claims that the first marriage is null and void and the right to decide such validity
is vested in another tribunal, the civil action for nullity must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed;
hence, the validity of the first marriage is a prejudicial question.
There is no question that if the allegations of the complaint on time the marriage contracted by defendant-appellant
with Efigenia C. Palomer is illegal and void (Sec. 29, Act 3613 otherwise known as the Marriage Law). Its nullity,
however, is no defense to the criminal action for bigamy filed against him. The supposed use of force and intimidation
against the woman, Palomer, even if it were true, is not a bar or defense to said action. Palomer, were she the one
charged with bigamy, could perhaps raise said force or intimidation as a defense, because she may not be considered
as having freely and voluntarily committed the act if she was forced to the marriage by intimidation. But not the other
party, who used the force or intimidation. The latter may not use his own malfeasance to defeat the action based on
his criminal act.
It follows that the pendency of the civil action for the annulment of the marriage filed by Efigenia C. Palomer, is
absolutely immaterial to the criminal action filed against defendant-appellant. This civil action does not decide that
defendant-appellant did not enter the marriage against his will and consent, because the complaint does not allege
that he was the victim of force and intimidation in the second marriage; it does not determine the existence of any of
the elements of the charge of bigamy. A decision thereon is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It
is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
There is another reason for dismissing the appeal. The order appealed from is one denying a motion to dismiss and is
not a final judgment. It is, therefore, not appealable (Rule 118, secs. 1 and 2).
The order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against defendant-appellant. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.



G.R. No. L-22579 February 23, 1968
ROLANDO LANDICHO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question before the Court is
whether or not the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the instance of the second wife against
petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the first spouse for the annulment of the first
marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against him. Respondent, Judge Relova
answered in the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the petition follow. On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. It was
alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not
been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe
Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance ofBatangas, likewise
presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and voidab
initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its
allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint,
against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-
party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she
compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.
Thereafter, on October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending the
decision on the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit. Respondent Judge on
November 19, 1963 denied the motion for lack of merit. Then came a motion for reconsideration to set aside the
above order, which was likewise denied on March 2, 1964. Hence this petition, filed on March 13, 1964.
In a resolution of this Court of March 17, 1964, respondent Judge was required to answer within ten (10) days,
with a preliminary injunction being issued to restrain him from further proceeding with the prosecution of the bigamy
case. In the meanwhile, before the answer was filed there was an amended petition for certiorari, the amendment
consisting solely in the inclusion of the People of the Philippines as another respondent. This Court admitted such
amended petition in a resolution of April 3, 1964.
Then came the answer to the amended petition on May 14 of that year where the statement of facts as above
detailed was admitted, with the qualifications that the bigamy charge was filed upon the complaint of the first spouse
Elvira Makatangay. It alleged as one of its special and affirmative defenses that the mere fact that "there are actions to
annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that 'prejudicial questions are
automatically raised in said civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy."
1
The answer
stressed that even on the assumption that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the
fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. It continued, referring to Viada, that "parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, according to Viada, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage incurs the penalty provided for in this
Article. . . ."
2

This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit in authoritative decisions of this Court. In Merced v.
Diez,
3
what was in issue was the validity of the second marriage, "which must be determined before hand in the civil
action before the criminal action can proceed." According to the opinion of Justice Labrador: "We have a situation
where the issue of the validity of the second marriage can be determined or must first be determined in the civil
action before the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the validity of the second marriage is,
therefore, a prejudicial question because determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the
civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy." It was the conclusion of this Court then that for
petitioner Merced to be found guilty of bigamy, the second marriage which he contracted "must first be declared
valid." Its validity having been questioned in the civil action, there must be a decision in such a case "before the
prosecution for bigamy can proceed."
To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v. Mendoza.
4
As explained in the opinion of Justice
Dizon: "We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. . . . The
prejudicial question we further said must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try
the same must be lodged in another court. . . . These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question for
annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that,
according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it is
obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he
was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the
second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. . . ."
The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February
27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then on March 15,
1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil action,
filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and
void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in the answer of respondent Judge
relying on Viada, parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent
courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question.
A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion to indulge in the probability that the third-party
complaint against the first wife brought almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy was started could have
been inspired by the thought that he could thus give color to a defense based on an alleged prejudicial question. The
above judicial decisions as well as the opinion of Viada preclude a finding that respondent Judge abused, much less
gravely abused, his discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of preliminary injunction issued dissolved. With
costs.1wph1.t
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.



G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953
RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent.
Agrava, Peralta & Agrava for petitioner.
Leonardo Abola for respondent.
TUASON, J.:
This three proceedings was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila in the summary settlement of states of
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro, deceased. All of them
having been heard jointly, Judge Rafael Amparo handed down a single decision which was appealed to the Court of
Appeals, whose decision, modifying that the Court of First Instance, in turn was elevated to the Supreme Court for
review.
The main question represented in the first two courts related to the sequence of the deaths of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his
wife, and their children, all of whom were killed in the massacre of civilians by Japanese troops in Manila in February
1945. The trial court found the deaths of this persons to have accurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls, named
Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro,
Sr. The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court except that, with regard to Angela Joaquin de Navarro and
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have survived his mother.
It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being contested by the petitioner. The importance of
the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact that it
radically affects the rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an acknowledged natural
child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin
Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.
The facts, which is not disputed, are outlined in the statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
"On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and
Angela Joaquin, together with their three daughters, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro,
Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club, at
the corner of San Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City. During their stay, the building was packed with refugees,
shells were exploding around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the
people inside the building, especially those who were trying to escape. The three daughters were hit and fell of the
ground near the entrance; and Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer
heaven. They could not convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them; and son Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son,
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Angela Conde, and a friend and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed
out of the burning edifice. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and
immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes
later, the German Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably including Angela Joaquin.
"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby, the
stayed there about three days, until February 10, 1915, when they were forced to leave the shelter be- cause the
shelling tore it open. They flied toward the St. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately met
Japanese Patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his daughter-in-law.
"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife Angela Joaquin was about 67 years old;
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar Navarro was two or three years older than her brother; while the other sisters,
Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were between 23 and 25."
The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco Lopez, who miraculously survived the
holocaust, and upon them the Court of Appeals opined that, "as between the mother Angela Joaquin and the son
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence of the survivorship is uncertain and insufficient" and the statutory presumption
must be applied. The appellate Court's reasoning for its conclusion is thus stated:
"It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot be established by proof of the death of only one of the
parties; but that there must be adequate proof that one was alive when the other had already died. Now in this case
before us, the testimony of the sole witness Lopez is to the effect that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot and died shortly
after the living the German Club in the company of his father and the witness, and that the burning edified entirely
collapsed minutes after the shooting of the son; but there is not a scintilla of evidence, direct or circumstantial, from
which we may infer the condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin, during the appreciable interval from the instant his
son turned his back to her, to dash out to the Club, until he died. All we can glean from the evidence is that Angela
Joaquin was unhurt when her son left her to escape from the German Club; but she could have died almost
immediately after, from a variety of causes. She might have been shot by the Japanese, like her daughters, killed by
falling beams from the burning edifice, overcome by the fumes, or fatally struck by splinters from the exploding shells.
We cannot say for certain. No evidence is available on the point. All we can decide is that no one saw her alive after
her son left her aside, and that there is no proof when she died. Clearly, this circumstance alone cannot support a
finding that she died latter than her son, and we are thus compelled to fall back upon the statutory presumption. In
deed, it could be said that the purpose of the presumption of survivorship would be precisely to afford a solution to
uncertainties like these. Hence the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have survived his mother,
Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).
"The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of the question whether she and her
deceased children perished in the same calamity. There being no evidence to the contrary, the only guide is the
occasion of the deaths, which is identical for all of them; that battle for the liberation of Manila. A second reason is that
the law, in declaring that those fallen in the same battle are to be regarded as perishing in the same calamity, could not
overlooked that a variety of cause of death can ( and usually do) operate in the source of combats. During the same
battle, some may die from wounds, other from gages, fire, or drowning. It is clear that the law disregards episodic
details, and treats the battle as an overall cause of death in applying the presumption of survivorship.
"We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which the members of the Navarro-Joaquin family met their end is as
follows: first, the three daughters Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad; then the mother Angela Joaquin; then the son
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and days later (of which there is no doubt), the father Joaquin Navarro, Sr."
Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of whether section 334(37) of Act No. 129, now section 69 (ii) of Rule
123 of the Rules of Court, has repealed article 33 of the civil code of 1889, now article 43 of the New Civil Code. It is
the contention of the petitioner that it did not, and that on the assumption that there is total lack of evidence, as the
Court of Appeals said, then Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, under article 33, be held to have died at
the same time.
The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left open for the consideration when obsolute necessity there for
arises. We say irrelevant because our opinion is that neither of the two provisions is applicable for the reasons to be
presently set forth.
Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
When two person perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle or conflagration, and it is not (1) shown
who died first, and there are no (2) particular circumstances from when it can be inferred, the survivorship is
presumed from the probabilities resulting from the strength and ages of the sexes, according to the following
rules:
x x x x x x x x x
Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:
Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or more persons who would inherent one
from the other, the persons who alleges the prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the absence of
proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time, and no transmission of rights from one to the
other shall take place.
Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as a substitute for lacks and so are not to be available
when there are facts. With particular reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation which it present is one in
which the facts are not only unknown but unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no specific evidence as to the time of
death . . . ." . . . it is assumed that no evidence can be produced. . . . Since the facts are unknown and unknowable, the
law may apply the law of fairness appropriate to the different legal situation that arises." (IX Wigmore on Evidence,
1940 ed., 483.)
In In re Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court of Appeals cited the applied with the respect to the deaths of
the Navarro girls, pointing out that "our rule is taken from the Fourth Division of sec. 1936 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure," the Supreme Court of California said:
When the statue speaks of "particular circumstances from which it can be inferred" that one died before the
other it means that there are circumstances from which the fact of death by one before the other may be
inferred as a relation conclusion from the facts proven. The statue does not mean circumstances which would
shown, or which would tend to show, probably that one died before the other. Grand Lodge A.O.W.W. vs.
Miller, 8 Cal. App. 28, 96 Pac. 22. When by circumstantial evidence alone, a party seeks to prove a
survivorship contrary to the statutory presumption, the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the
survivorship must be such as are competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of evidence in
civil cases. The inference of survivorship cannot rest upon mere surmise, speculation, or conjecture. As was
said in Grand Lodge vs. Miller, supra, "if the matter is left to probably, then the statue of the presumption."
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the foregoing decision that the evidence of
the survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts, known or
knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of
preponderance of evidence controls.
Are there particular circumstances on record from which reasonable inference of survivorship between Angela
Joaquin and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' testimony competent and sufficient for this purpose? For a
better appreciation of this issue, it is convenient and necessary to detail the testimony, which was described by the
trial court as "disinterested and trustworthy" and by the Court of Appeals as "entitled to credence."
Lopez testified:
Q. You said you were also heat at that time as you leave the German Club with Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. and the latter's wife?- A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you fall? A. I fell down.
Q. And you said you fell down close to Joaquin Navarro, Jr.? A. Yes, sir.
Q. When the German Club collapsed where were you? A. We were out 15 meters away from the building
but I could see what was going on.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. Could there have been an interval of fifteen minutes between the two events, that is the shooting of Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. and the collapse of the German Club? A. Yes, sir, I could not say exactly, Occasions like that, you
know, you are confused.
Q. Could there (have) been an interval of an hour instead of fifteen minutes? A. Possible, but not probable.
Q. Could it have been 40 minutes? A. Yes, sir, about 40 minutes.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. You also know that Angela Joaquin is already dead? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court when did Angela Joaquin die? A. Well, a few minutes after we have
dashed out, the German Club, which was burning, collapsed over them, including Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. From your testimony it would appear that while you can give positive evidence to the fact that Pilar,
Concepcion and Natividad Navarro, and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died, you can not give the same positive evidence
to the fact that Angela Joaquin also died? A. Yes, sir, in the sense that I did not see her actually die, but
when the building collapsed over her I saw and I am positive and I did not see her come out of that building so
I presumed she died there.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. Why did you have to dash out of the German Club, you, Mr. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Mr. Joaquin Navarro Jr.
and the latter's wife? A. Because the Japanese had set fire to the Club and they were shooting people
outside, so we thought of running away rather than be roasted.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. You mean to say that before you jumped out of the German Club all the Navarro girls, Pilar, Concepcion,
and Natividad, were already wounded? A. to my knowledge, yes.
Q. They were wounded? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were they lying on the ground or not? A. On the ground near the entrance, because most of the people
who were shot by the Japanese were those who were trying to escape, and as far as I can remember they
were among those killed.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. So you noticed that they were killed or shot by the Japanese a few minutes before you left the place? A.
That is what I think, because those Japanese soldiers were shooting the people inside especially those trying
to escape.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. And none of them was not except the girls, is that what you mean? A . There were many people shot
because they were trying to escape.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. How come that these girls were shot when they were inside the building, can you explain that? A. They
were trying to escape probably.
It is our opinion that the preceding testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of survivorship
between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed
that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it must be noted that this possibility is
entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other way around.
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the German Club.
Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in five seconds or less, and so died within that
interval from the time he dashed out of the building. Now, when Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife started
to flee from the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and unhurt, so much so that the Navarro father and son tried hard to
have her come along. She could have perished within those five or fewer seconds, as stated, but the probabilities that
she did seem very remote. True, people in the building were also killed but these, according to Lopez, were mostly
refugees who had tried to slip away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. It was not very likely that Mrs. Joaquin
Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to escape. She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her husband and son from leaving
the place and exposing themselves to gun fire.
This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well give an idea, at the same time, of a
condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the moment her husband, son, and daughter-in-law left her. It strongly
tends to prove that, as the situation looked to her, the perils of death from staying were not so imminent. And it lends
credence to Mr. Lopez' statement that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro
the son was shot in the head and dropped dead, and that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. The Court
of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes".
Even so, it was much longer than five seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that Mrs. Angela Joaquin was sill
alive when her son expired
The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the collapse of the building, by which Mrs. Navarro could
have been killed. All these are speculative , and the probabilities, in the light of the known facts, are against them.
Dreading Japanese sharpshooters outside as evidenced by her refusal to follow the only remaining living members of
her family, she could not have kept away form protective walls. Besides, the building had been set on fire trap the
refugees inside, and there was no necessity for the Japanese to was their ammunition except upon those who tried to
leave the premises. Nor was Angela Joaquin likely to have been killed by falling beams because the building was made
of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause instantaneous death;
certainly not within the brief space of five seconds between her son's departure and his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Section 69(ii) of Rule 123 does not require
that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein provided be certain. It is the "particular
circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be certain as tested by the rules of
evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but if may be
plain enough to justify a finding of fact." (In re Bohenko's Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427, citing Tortora vs. State of New York,
269 N.Y. 199 N.E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N.Y.). 622.) As the California courts have said, it is enough
that "the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the survivorship must be such as are competent and sufficient
when tested by the general rules of evidence in civil cases." (In re Wallace's Estate,supra.) "Juries must often reason,"
says one author, "according to probabilities, drawing an inference that the main fact in issue existed from collateral
facts not directly proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence. The vital question in such cases is the cogency
of the proof afforded by the secondary facts. How likely, according to experience, is the existence of the primary fact if
certain secondary facts exist?" (1 Moore on Facts, Sec. 596.) The same author tells us of a case where "a jury was
justified in drawing the inference that the person who was caught firing a shot at an animal trespassing on his land
was the person who fired a shot about an hour before at the same animal also trespassing." That conclusion was not
airtight, but rational. In fact, the circumstances in the illustration leave greater room for another possibility than do
the facts of the case at hand.
In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is based purely on surmises,
speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. the opposite theory that the mother
outlived her son is deduced from established facts which, weighed by common experience, engender the inference
as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by, which civil cases are decided,
this inference ought to prevail. It can not be defeated as in an instance, cited by Lord Chief Justice Kenyon, "bordering
on the ridiculous, where in an action on the game laws it was suggested that the gun with which the defendant fired
was not charged with shot, but that the bird might have died in consequence of the fright." (1 Moore on Facts, 63,
citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.)
It is said that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which the appellant impugns, and which has been discussed,
involves findings of fact which can not be disturbed. The point is not, in our judgment, well considered. The particular
circumstances from which the parties and the Court of Appeals drew conclusions are, as above seen, undisputed, and
this being the case, the correctness or incorrectness of those conclusions raises a question of law, not of fact, which
the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to look into. As was said in 1 Moran Commentaries on the Rules of ?Court, 3rd Ed.
856, 857, "Undisputed evidence is one thing, and contradicted evidence is another. An incredible witness does not
cease to be such because he is not impeached or contradicted. But when the evidence is purely documentary, the
authenticity of which is not questioned and the only issue is the construction to be placed thereon, or where a case is
submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the
correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law which may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court."
The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory presumption is to be invoked is a question of
law.
The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence refers to decisions supported by
substantial evidence. By substantial evidence is meant real evidence or at least evidence about which reasonable men
may disagree. Findings grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures come within the exception to the
general rule.
We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the distribution of the decedents' estates
should be made in accordance with the decision of the trial court. This result precludes the necessity of passing upon
the question of "reserva troncal" which was put forward on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death
preceded that of her son. Without costs.
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.