Scheidell 1

Stephen Scheidell
Ethical Theory
10 February 2011
Reflection 3
Donagans account of common morality has strengths but it also has points of
concern! The content of his e"plication of common morality is #uite compelling and the
logic for it is $ery sound! %enerally the boo& is $ery helpful in thin&ing through the
possibility of a shared human morality! 'e$ertheless t(o points raise concern! First
can Donagan defend the conclusions of his formulation of common morality in the face
of a countere"ample) *n other (ords (ill his theory stand up if it can be sho(n that
aspects or conclusions of his common morality are inconsistent (ith particular moral
norms deri$ed from the same principle) *f so ho( is one to e$aluate this apparent
disagreement) Secondly one may be concerned by a (ant of clearer definitions at
times! For lac& thereof can lea$e too much open to interpretation thus lea$ing room for
immoral acts being consistent (ith such a +common morality!,
-ith regard to the first concern one may (onder ho( common this morality is
(hen counter.e"amples e"ist e$en in the tradition from (hich Donagan dra(s! /f
specific concern (ithin this response is the obser$ation that the duties to self and to
others 0p! 212 are not necessarily consistent bet(een the conclusions espoused by
Donagan and the same concerns in 'e( Testament passages such as 1 3orinthians
10425 and 21f!
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Donogans permissibility condition for the promotion of others (ell.
being 0162 rests on the principle of respect for another as a rational being 0352!
7o(e$er this does not seem to be the principle acti$e in the passages cited abo$e! The
inconsistency here leads to 8auls dictums to be treated as +supererogatory, rather than
imperati$es! To (hat conclusions does this inconsistency lead) *t (ould appear that the
first of the t(o fundamental assumptions identified in 92!1 are not al(ays at play in the
7ebre(.3hristian tradition or that it may be formulated other(ise!
This (ould naturally lead to the #uestion of (hether the Fundamental 8rinciple
can be formulated other(ise so as to put the duties to self and the duties to others on
1
+'o one should see& their o(n good but the good of others, 0$! 25 '*: 2010 ed!2 and +;ut if someone
says to you <This has been offered in sacrifice then do not eat it both for the sa&e of the one (ho told
you and for the sa&e of conscience! * am referring to the other persons conscience, not yours..., 0$! 21f
emphasis added2!
Scheidell 2
e#ual footing! For the imperati$es the 1 3orinthians 10 describes do not seem to be
offered as supererogatory! Rather they seem to be described as the normal duty gi$en
to that audience! Donagan may reply to this #uestion arguing that +normali=ing, the
supererogatory describes the unique duty of the 3hristian! Supposing (e grant that the
#uestion is no( of ho( (e get the basic duty of respect for human rationality! For the
description of autonomy tied to rationality gi$en on page 3> seems to be more deri$ed
Enlightenment philosophy than the (isdom literature of the /ld Testament! ?oreo$er
recent philosophic in#uiries ha$e seriously challenged the notion of autonomy!
For the second concern that regarding precision in definition one e"ample from
the te"t (ill be used! /n page 1> Donagan describes four constituents of duties one
can ha$e to(ards others! They can be summari=ed as follo(s4
1! To the upbringing of children by adults
2! To helping those (ho need it for achie$ement of their duties
3! To restoration of others to a state of independence and
5! To caring for those in need of sustained aid 0namely +those (ho are crippled
deaf or blind or are chronically ill or senile,2!
-hile these separations seem innocent and e$en appealing personal e"perience as
one (ho falls under 052 leads to important #uestions! First and foremost (hy is 052
distinct from 022 or 032) 8erhaps it can be argued that some persons are in need of
constant aid@e$en for mere sur$i$al! That much can be granted but Donagans chosen
e"amples call into #uestion ho( he ma&es such distinctions bet(een persons! Some
ha$e noted present student included that some of the greatest $iolences to
personhood ha$e been done (ith the spirit and intention of beneficence! -hile this does
not dissol$e stipulation 052 it does beg for a $ery careful philosophical anthropology to
be done to(ard the proAect of ho( to responsibly mo$e as many persons as possible
falling under 052 into one of the pre$ious t(o stipulations! -hile such may not al(ays be
possible responsible respect for the image of %od calls upon us to a$oid (hene$er
possible to not rob another of agency under the spirit and intention of beneficence!