13 32 1 78

The Manumission of Socrates: A Rereading of Plato's Phaedo
Author(s): Deborah Kamen

Source: Classical Antiquity, Vol. 32, No. 1 (April 2013), pp. 78-100
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DEBORAH KAMEN
Classical Antiquity. Vol. 32, Issue 1, pp. 78100. ISSN 0278-6656(p); 1067-8344 (e).
Copyright 2013 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please
direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of
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DOI:10.1525/CA.2013.32.1.78.
The Manumission of Socrates:
A Rereading of Platos Phaedo
This article argues we can better interpret key aspects of Platos Phaedo, including Socrates
cryptic nal words, if we read the dialogue against the background of Greek manumission.
I rst discuss modes of manumission in ancient Greece, showing that the frequent participation
of healing gods (Apollo, Asklepios, and Sarapis) reveals a conception of manumission as
healing. I next examine Platos use of manumission and slavery as metaphors, arguing that
Plato uses the language of slavery in two main ways: like real slavery, metaphorical slavery
could be good, if it reected a natural hierarchy, or bad, if it entailed an inversion thereof.
Accordingly, metaphorical manumission from good and bad slavery are shown to be bad and
good, respectively. Finally, I reread Platos Phaedo, showing that Socrates, a willing slave
of the gods, seeks the manumission/healing of his soul. It is in exchange for his complete
manumission, attainable only through the death of his body, that Socrates oers a cock to
the healing/manumission god Asklepios.
Platos Phaedo is a puzzling text in a number of ways, not least of which
is Socrates famous last words: Krito, we owe a cock to Asklepios. Pay it and
do not neglect it (Phd. 1118a). While the most common explanation is that
the cock is a thank-oering to Asklepios for healing Socrates from the sick-
ness of life,
1
Glenn Mosts objections to this interpretation are manifold: Plato
never asserts that life is an illness or death its cure; one passage (Phd. 95c-
d)in which Socrates questions Kebes view that the entrance of the soul into
the body causes its ruin, like a disease ()actually provides evidence
against such a notion; and because Socrates is fullling a vow, he must be re-
For their helpful comments at various stages of this project, I thank Ruby Blondell, Sandra Joshel,
Leslie Kurke, Sarah Levin-Richardson, Ron Stroud, and Classical Antiquitys two anonymous
reviewers. I also thank Leslie Kurke for inspiring the idea for this paper in the rst place. All
errors are of course my own.
1. See, perhaps most famously, Nietzsches The Problem of Socrates.
kmi: The Manumission of Socrates 79
ferring to a healing not in the future but in the past.
2
Most argues, instead, that
Socrates is thanking Asklepios for having healed someone. He contends that the
mention of Platos sickness in the dialogue (Phd. 59b), coupled with the facts
that the sickness must be one that aected the whole circleit is we who owe
a cockand that Plato is the obvious intellectual heir to Socrates, marks Plato
as the likeliest candidate.
3
Although this interpretation is certainly possible, I
would argue that there is no reason to assume that someone was literally healed.
In this respect, I agree with scholars who view this as a reference to allegor-
ical or metaphorical healing, though I dier in my explanation as to what has
been healed.
4
This article argues that an understanding of Greek manumission can help us
better interpret key aspects of this dialogue, including the mysterious cock to
Asklepios. After discussing the modes of manumission in ancient Greece, as well
as conceptions thereof, I next examine Platos use of manumission and slavery as
metaphors. Finally, I turn to a rereading of Platos Phaedo, showing the specic
ways in which manumission practices, conceptions, and metaphors underlie the
text, and ultimately providing answers to a number of contested questions: For
example, why does Plato align the philosopher Socrates with the sixth-century
nci fabulist Aesop? Why is Phaedo, a foreigner and a minor gure in the Socratic
circle, the dialogues narrator? And nally, what kind of healing is Asklepios
believed to have performed?
PRACTICES OF MANUMISSION
But rst: manumission.
5
Scholars have traditionally classied Greek man-
umission practices as either secular or sacral in nature, depending on whether
gods were thought to be involved. In what follows, I employ this categorization
for heuristic reasons, although there are many areas of overlap between the two
categories.
6
Secular manumission appears to have preceded, but was never en-
tirely supplanted by, sacral manumission, with the latter arising as a way of better
protecting the status of the newly freed slave.
7
2. Most 1993: 100104.
3. Most 1993: 10411.
4. See, e.g., Loraux 1989 (Asklepios saves the life of the logos [32]); Crooks 1998 (Socrates,
through his philosophy, cures his community from the illness of Pythagoreanism); Wilson 2007:
11318 (Socrates gives birth to his own death); and Leimbach 2008 (Asklepios saves Socrates
soul, that is, guarantees its immortality).
5. For a similar overview of manumission practices, see Kamen 2012.
6. See also Radle 1969: 6. On the lack of radical separation of sacred and secular more
broadly in ancient Greece, see Connor 1988; Samons 2000: 32529. For a recent categorization
of Greek manumission types, see Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 6999.
7. That secular manumission preceded sacral, see, e.g., Bomer 1960: 1011; Radle 1969 (cf.
Rensch 1908: 90; Sokolowski 1954; Lauer 1979: 205206). On the precarious status of freed
slaves, see Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005, esp. ch. 6.
cissici 1iqti1v Volume 32/ No. 1/ April 2013 80
The majority of our evidence for secular manumission comes from classical
Athens, especially from the fourth century nci, when rates of manumission began
to increase signicantly.
8
The simplest way to free a slave was through a masters
verbal declaration.
9
Slaves could also be freed in their masters wills,
10
a practice
best attested in the so-called philosophers wills of Diogenes Laertius.
11
Yet
another way of manumitting slaves was through ctive sale, in which a third
party (often the slaves lover) ostensibly bought the slave but actually paid for
the slaves freedom (see, e.g., Hyp. 3).
12
Slaves could, in addition, be freed
by means of a heralds proclamation, a practice that seems to have involved a
performative utterance in the theatre delivering the slave into freedom (Aesch.
3.4142).
13
Finally, in addition to individuals freeing their own (or others) slaves,
the polis itself sometimes performed manumissions. This generally happened in
times of crisis: for example, in wartime, when slaves could be manumitted for
providing military service,
14
and following major transgressions aecting the city
(e.g., the Mutilation of the Herms), when slaves were granted freedom for oering
up information.
15
Often when masters freed their own slaves, they mandated that the newly
freed slave performfurther obligations. For these obligations, we might cautiously
compare the following passage of Platos Laws:
vc c . o v. c j ` v-
c j j .c | c 7 . o o v-
c o j vc c|, c
o j 7 c | . v c. . . .
o j c c .
Laws 915a; see further 915bc
And a man may lead away a freedman, if he does not serve, or does not
suciently serve, those who have freed him. And the service (|)
consists in the freedman visiting three times a month the hearth of the
man who freed him, promising to do whatever is necessary of those things
8. On this increase, see, e.g., Ciccotti 1910 [1899]: 16667; Westermann 1955: 25; Bourriot
1974; Garlan 1988: 74; Patterson 1991: 134; Fisher 2001 [1993]: 70, 2006: 338, 2008: 125.
9. Radle 1969: 1012; Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 74.
10. Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 7475.
11. That the wills, despite the lateness of their source (probably third century ci), are likely
authentic, see Gottschalk 1972: esp. 317; Sollenberger 1992: 3860 with nn.341 and 342.
12. Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 8182.
13. Radle 1971: 36164; Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 7172, 2009: 305306; Mactoux 2008:
43751.
14. E.g., Battle of Marathon: see Hunt 1998: 27n.5 for bibliography; Battle of Arginousai: see
Hunt 2001; Tamiolaki 2008. See also the measures taken after the battles of Mounichia ([Arist.]
Ath. Pol. 40.2) and Chaironeia ([Plut.] Mor. 849A).
15. E.g., after the mutilation of the Herms and defamation of the mysteries: see Thuc. 6.27.2;
Andoc. 1.1218, 2728. That freedom was oered primarily in cases pertaining to religious oenses,
see Osborne 2000.
which are just and at the same time possible, and concerning marriage
to do what seems good also to his former master.
Even if we do not accept Platos laws as authentically Athenian, they do suggest the
types of service (|) that might have been dened for freedmen in classical
Athens.
16
Other evidence comes from the requirements specied in Diogenes
Laertius wills: in one instance, some slaves are freed unconditionally, while
others are required to remain (c) and perform further obligations for
the owners heir (D.L. 5.73).
This period of remaining service was not necessarily indenite. An end-point
could be spelled out in advance, or a master could decide at a certain point that
he wanted to grant his freedman full freedom. At least for a short period in late
fourth-century Athens (ca. 330322 nci), it appears that if a master wanted to
release a freed slave from his or her remaining obligations, one way he could do
so was by ling a private lawsuit called a dike apostasiou under the jurisdiction
of the polemarch ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 58.3; Harp. s.v. | v|).
17
Most
scholars believe that it is the (perhaps pre-arranged) acquittals of freedmen in
these trials that resulted in the so-called phialai exeleutherikai (freedmen bowls)
inscriptions. These inscriptions, set up prominently on the Acropolis, recorded
freed slaves dedications of silver phialai to the goddess Athena in exchange for
their complete freedom.
18
In addition to these (mostly) secular modes of manumission, the Greeks also
practiced sacral manumissionthat is, manumission involving the gods in one
way or another.
19
Epigraphic evidence for this practice comes from all over the
Greek world, ranging in date from the archaic period to the Roman, with most
inscriptions dating to the Hellenistic period. I would describe the main categories
of sacral manumission as general protection by a god, ctive consecration to a
god, and ctive sale to a god.
20
Of these three categories, the rst is the most exible, involving the gods in
a number of dierent roles.
21
So, for example, an inscription from Bouthrotos
(in Epiros), found on the supporting wall of the western parodos of the theatre
and dated to the third or second century nci, reads:
16. On Platos freedman laws, see Radle 1972.
17. For a recent discussion of the dike apostasiou, see Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 27492.
18. For these inscriptions, see IG II
2
155378, Ag. Inv. I 3183 (Lewis 1959); Ag. Inv. I 4665
(SEG XLVI.180); Ag. Inv. I 4763 (SEG XXV.178); Ag. Inv. I 5656 (Lewis 1968 #49 and 50; SEG
XXV.180); Ag. Inv. I 5774 (SEG XXI.561); and possibly Ag. Inv. I 1580 (SEG XLIV.68) (see
Meyer 2010: 14142). A new edition of all of these inscriptions, with commentary, can be found
in Meyer 2010; she argues, however, that these inscriptions record not prosecutions of freedmen
in dikai apostasiou but of metics in graphai aprostasiou (public suits for lacking a prostates).
19. On sacral manumission, see Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 8699, with bibliography.
20. For the earliest categorization of sacral manumission along these lines, see Calderini 1908:
9495.
21. On this category, see Inscr. Jur. II: 28889; Calderini 1908: 104107; Zelnick-Abramovitz
2005: 8791.
7 . c. | . .c | -
. . vc c | v o
.o c 7 c. |v o c vc . .
|. |. |.
22
With good fortune and for salvation. When Nikostratos, son of Nikanor,
was priest of Asklepios, those set free (vc c) before
() Asklepios, by Argea, daughter of Polemon, in accordance with the
lawon childless people, were Pardalis, Pythias, Dionysia, and Kleoteima.
The precise meaning of this law is uncertain, but it clearly refers to childless
masters.
23
Moreover, its frequent appearance in the manumission inscriptions
from Bouthrotos implies that the polis had some sort of vested interest in over-
seeing manumission practiceat the very least, in cases where the owner was
childless, as here. In addition to the polis secular involvement, this inscrip-
tion also contains sacral elements, including the naming (and perhaps implied
participation) of the priest of Asklepios and the freeing of the slaves (vc
c) before () the god. Presumably, Asklepios was thought to be
present in the theatre, at least during civic festivals, overseeing any acts of manu-
mission conducted there.
24
Temples and altars, like theatres, were also popular
venues for manumission, oering both human witnesses and the implied presence
of the gods.
25
Gods also played a role in ctive consecration, in which an owner nominally
consecrated or dedicated his slave to a god. The slave, however, rather than
actually entering into the gods possession, was in eect freed. Chaironea, a polis
in Boiotia, has yielded an enormous number of ctive-consecration inscriptions,
with slaves consecrated most commonly to the gods Sarapis or Asklepios.
26
To
take just one example, a typical inscription from the middle or end of the second
century nci reads:
|. o . |. -
c v|| o . | .o c [],
22. For this inscription, see Cabanes 2007: 86 no. 20 = Cabanes 1974: 125 no. VII; Darmezin
1999: 133 no. 169. On the manumission inscriptions from Bouthrotos, see further Bomer 1960:
7374; Cabanes 2007: 79174 no. 14169.
23. On this law, found in inscriptions from both Bouthrotos and Dodona, see Zelnick-
Abramovitz 2005: 14041, with bibliography. Sixty-two acts of manumission from Bouthrotos
are either declared the act of childless masters (), or are pronounced, as here, in accordance
with the law on childless people (Cabanes 1974: 115).
24. On the Greeks idea of divine surveillance, see, e.g., Herman 2007 (in the context of rituals
of evasion).
25. Some temples were even surrounded by theatre-like terracing, to accommodate large
audiences (Burkert 1985: 87). For the presence of gods in manumission at altars and temples,
see Radle 1969: 1416, 1971: 362.
26. For ctive-consecration inscriptions from Chaironea, see Darmezin 1999: #16108. Those
involving Sarapis: #1687; Asklepios: #103108.
| j ( . c vo j j c j v
| v | v o .
IG VII 3362
With Dexippos as archon, on the 15th of the month of Thyios, Sami-
chos, son of Hippomenes, consecrates (v|) his slave, Sosibios,
as sacred (.) to Sarapis, not belonging (() in any way to
anyone from this day on; conducting the consecration through the council
in accordance with the law.
As . to Sarapis, Sosibios has technically become the sacred property of
the god,
27
but this consecration is clearly ctive: the fact that Sosibios no longer
belongs (() in any way to anyone anymore means that he is now
free. Moreover, it should be pointed out that although this act of consecration
(v|) is primarily sacral, secular or civic involvement is also implied
through the presence of the council, as well as the mention of the laws.
Probably the most popular way of manumitting slaves fromthe second century
nci onwards was through ctive sale. In this mode of manumission, a master made
the pretense of selling his slave to a god, usually Apollo, for a certain price. The
ctive nature of the sale is made clear by the fact that the slave is said to be
sold (vc) to Apollo for freedom (c` c|). In this way, slaves,
who notionally could not earn or dispense money,
28
were allowed to pay for
their manumission via the god. After the sale, the slave became the property
of the god, with the understanding that the god would not exercise his right of
ownership.
29
This right was then transferred by default to the slave, who came
into possession of himselfthat is, became free.
30
Manumission through ctive sale is found predominantly in central Greece,
especially in Delphi.
31
Over a thousand recorded acts of manumission, dated
between 201 nci and ca. 100 ci, survive from Delphi, entailing the manumission
of over 1350 slaves. The inscriptions themselves fall into two main categories:
27. On the consecrated freedman as the sacred property of the god, see Koschaker 1931: 46;
Sokolowski 1954: 175; Klaenbach 1966: 86; Bomer 1960: 123. Cf. Burkert 1985: 269, who denes
. as that which belongs to a god or a sanctuary in an irrevocable way; Benveniste 1973: 460,
who says that . belongs to the domain of the sacred, whether this quality is attached to the
notion by a natural connexion or is associated with it by circumstance; and Bomer 1960: 123 and
Radle 1969: 41, who argue that . means untouchable by men.
28. For the gap between theory and practice in this instance, see Todd 1995: 18788 (cf. Radle
1969: 6566).
29. On the ctive nature of the sale, see Foucart 1896: 31; Calderini 1908: 102104 (symbolic
sale); Inscr. Jur. II 251; Samuel 1965: 268; Pringsheim 1950: 18487 (legal ownership belongs
to the god but in reality the slave is free [185]); Radle 1969: 6566. Cf. Bomer 1960: 32.
30. See, e.g., Bomer 1960: 32; see also Pringsheim 1950: 185.
31. The Delphic manumission inscriptions are collected in Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-
Inschriften (GDI 16842342) and Fouilles de Delphes (vol. 3), and now in Mulliez forthcoming.
For an overview of these inscriptions, see, e.g., Bloch 1914; Hopkins 1978: ch. 3; Kranzlein 1980;
Mulliez 1992. Fictive sale appears to have originated in Delphi: see Bomer 1960: 2729.
those granting full freedom, and those oering only conditional release. In the
former case, the entire price for the manumission was paid immediately, and the
freed slave was granted the formulaic four freedoms: mastery over himself
( .), protection from illegal seizure (vc), freedom
of choice of work (c o c), and the privilege of moving wherever he
wished (vc . c).
32
A number of slaves, however, were freed
conditionally. The most striking feature of conditional-freedom inscriptions is a
so-called paramone clause, mandating that the freedman remain (c)
and serve his former master, generally until the latters death.
33
Paramone did
not necessarily entail living in the ex-masters home, only that the freed slave
remain close enough to carry out his remaining obligations.
These, then, were the primary modes of sacral manumission. It must be
noted, in addition, that the particular gods involved in these practices are not
insignicant. Aristide Calderini categorized into three groups all of the gods
who appear in Greek manumission inscriptions: what he called local gods
(e.g. Zeus Naios in Dodona, Apollo in Delphi, Zeus in Olympia, and Posei-
don in Tainaron); helper gods (e.g. Sarapis, Asklepios, and Apollo); and
foreign gods (e.g. Artemis Gazoria, Ma, and Dea Syria).
34
Of these gods,
three appear much more frequently than the others: namely, Apollo, Askle-
pios, and Sarapis (along with Isis). Apollo shows up in the greatest number
of records, but this has to do in part with the vast numbers of manumission
inscriptions preserved in Delphi. Outside of Delphi, Sarapis and Asklepios ap-
pear much more often than Apollo does, especially in ctive consecrations.
35
They are even called upon in cities where some other deity was clearly the
more prominent local god, demonstrating that their appeal went beyond a matter
of convenience.
36
The conventional explanation for the prominence of these three gods (if
any is oered) is that it is their particular character as assistants of those under
duresswhether slave or freethat makes them particularly t for involvement
in manumission, a procedure involving a dicult transformation of status.
37
In
my opinion, this interpretation is not incorrect, but it does not represent the full
32. Westermann 1946: 92. On the four freedoms, see further Hopkins 1978: 142, 150.
33. On paramone, see Samuel 1965. Although the noun paramone is not attested prior to the
third century nci, paramone-like obligations existed as early as the classical period, as demonstrated
above.
34. Calderini 1908: 113. For the argument that the inscriptions in which these foreign gods
appear may represent not manumissions but true consecrations of slaves, see Bomer 1960: 132.
Sarapis does not qualify as a foreign god, since by the period of the bulk of these inscriptions, the
Alexandrian triad of Isis, Osiris, and Sarapis had been for the most part incorporated into the Greek
pantheon.
35. Sarapis, either alone or associated with Isis, appears in four dierent poleis and in 77 of
the surviving 205 records of ctive consecration; Asklepios appears in six poleis, in 52 records.
For these gures, see Darmezin 1999: 184.
36. Bomer 1960: 113.
37. See, e.g., Bomer 1960: 132 and Darmezin 1999: 184.
picture. Beyond being merely helper gods, Apollo, Asklepios, and Sarapis (along
with Isis) were especially well known for their ability to heal. In fact, these three
gods were thought of, collectively, as the primary healing gods (see, e.g., Cass.
Dio 78 (77).15.56). The evidence for these three gods as healers is abundant. So,
for example, Apollo was very early syncretized with the healing god Paian, as can
be seen in both the use of paian (healer) as an epithet and a role for Apollo,
and in the use of the paian-song addressed to the god.
38
Asklepios, the other
major paianic god,
39
in addition to being the son of Apollo, is perhaps the most
famous of the healing gods. Greeks from all over made pilgrimages to his healing
sanctuaries (Asklepeia), most famously those at Athens and at Epidauros, in order
to be healed from everything from aches and pains to life-threatening illnesses.
40
Finally, Sarapis too is a paianic god (D.L. 5.76), albeit a less prominent one
than Apollo and Asklepios. Sarapis connections with healing are clearest when
he is looked at alongside his sister and consort Isis, who is better attested as a
healing deity.
41
Furthermore, we can extrapolate certain conceptions about manumission from
the frequent involvement of these healing gods: in particular, that manumission
was thought by the Greeks to heal slaves from the sickness of slavery.
42
This conception is similar, though not identical, to the conception of slavery as
social death (and manumission as rebirth), which is found in many slave-holding
societies.
43
It is true that our documentary evidence for the involvement of these
healing gods derives primarily from the Hellenistic period (and later), but it is
certainly plausible that the conceptualization of manumission as healing was
already in place in late fth-/early fourth-century Athens.
SLAVERY AND MANUMISSION IN PLATO
In fact, I would argue that such practices and conceptions of manumission
were not unfamiliar to Plato. Tradition even holds (probably apocryphally) that
Plato, like a number of other philosophers, was himself once a slave. If true, this
would have been a temporary servitude, since he was quickly ransomed.
44
The
Greeks, averse (in principle) to the enslavement of other Greeks (see, e.g., Pl.
38. See, e.g., h.Ap. 51619; Il. 1.47274; A. Ag. 51213. On the Apolline paian, see Rutherford
2001: 2326.
39. On the paians role in the cult of Asklepios, see Rutherford 2001: 3842.
40. For a compendium of evidence attesting to Asklepios as healer, see Edelstein and Edelstein
1945.
41. See, e.g., D.S. 1.25.26; [Plut.] Mor. 364F, 357C; Artem. 2.39. See also Kockelmann 2008:
6366 on Isis role as a savior and divine healer.
42. I develop this argument at greater length in Kamen 2012.
43. Patterson 1982.
44. See, e.g., D.S. 15.7.1; Plut. Dion. 5.17, Mor. 471E; D.L. 3.1920. On the tradition of
Platos enslavement, see Riginos 1976: 8692; on the motif of the philosopher enslaved, see duBois
2003: 15357.
Rep. 469b-c), often ransomed their fellow citizens who were captured in war or
by pirates.
45
Although Plato, unlike Aristotle, does not present a formal theory of slavery,
46
he appears to agree with his disciple on at least three points: slavery is good both
for the slave (because he lacks logos, reason) and for the master; the dierence
in status between master and slave is due to a dierence in native endowment;
and this dierence in turn reects a larger cosmic hierarchy.
47
To my mind, these
views inevitably lurk behind Platos repeated use of metaphors of slavery and
manumission.
48
In what follows, I argue that Plato employs the language of slavery in two
main ways: like real slavery, metaphorical slavery could be good, both for the
slave and for the community as a whole, if it reected a natural hierarchy;
49
or bad, if it entailed an inversion of a natural hierarchy. For Plato, good slavery
generally involves the subjection of individuals or communities to external forces
like (good) laws and rulers (i.e., natural masters). Bad slavery, on the other
hand, involves either internal subjection (of the soul to the body, or one part of
the soul to another part), or external subjection (to a bad ruler or enemy state),
or some combination of the two. Accordingly, metaphorical manumission from
good and bad slavery will be shown to be bad and good, respectively.
50
It should
be noted at the outset that because the Greeks rarely use technical terminology
to refer to manumission, it is likewise the case that metaphors of manumission use
informal, non-technical language (e.g., c. . v).
45. For this aversion, see Garlan 1987: 1719 and 1988: 4753. For antidotes to the enslavement
of Greeks, see Garlan 1987: 1923.
46. For Plato on slavery, see, e.g., Morrow 1939; Vlastos 1981 [1941]; Vlastos 1981 [1968];
Despotopoulos 1970; Klees 1975: 14281; Calvert 1987; duBois 2003: ch. 7. For other ancient views
on slavery, see Garnsey 1996. Even Aristotles theory is notoriously full of seeming contradictions
(but cf. Millett 2007): so, e.g., while Aristotle argues for the existence of the slave by nature,
for whom it is good and just to be a slave (Arist. Pol. 1254a1719), he also grants that some
peoplethose captured in warare slaves by law rather than by nature (Arist. Pol. 1255a57).
47. For these points, see Vlastos 1981 [1941]: 161.
48. Glenn Morrow rst pointed out the signicance of the slave metaphor in Plato (1939:
18687), followed shortly thereafter by Vlastos important article on the topic (1981 [1941]). In
a later postscript (1959), Vlastos retracted a bit: As for the slave metaphor in Plato, I do believe
that it illuminates important aspects of Platos thought which do not otherwise make sense or as
good sense. But I would gladly confess that there are many, and equally important, aspects of
Platos thought which this metaphor does not illuminate. I would not wish to suggest that slavery
is the key to Platos philosophy. There are many locks in this marvelously complex and delicate
mechanism, and I know of no one key, or set of keys, that opens all of them (Vlastos 1981 [1941]:
163). For a critique of Vlastos retraction, see duBois 2003: 166. On the metaphor of slavery
more broadly in Greek thought and literature, see Mactoux 1981; Just 1985; Brock 2007; Hunt
2011: 2325.
49. On good metaphorical slavery, see Vlastos 1981 [1941]: 15051; Pohlenz 1966: 8388;
Patterson 1991: 15661; Brock 2007: 215.
50. Cf. Hansen 2010: 26, who argues that in Plato, the dierence between the good and the bad
form of freedom depends on who is your master (despotes): your rationality which instructs you
to obey the laws, or your desires which tempt you to indulge your inclinations.
Let us start by looking at Platos treatment of good slavery. According to the
Laws, although the best state is one without laws (as portrayed in the Republic),
the second-best state is governed by a good lawgiver. In the latter case, the
law is master, and the people, comparatively decient in logos, its slaves.
51
The demos, like a good slave, does whatever the laws order.
52
Moreover, one
is beautied (|)that is, one looks good in the eyes of ones
fellow citizensby being a good slave (c c ) to the laws,
since this is slavery (|) to the gods (Laws 762e; see also [Pl.] Epist.
355a). The Laws Athenian Stranger says, with admiration, that under Solons
constitution the Athenians lived willingly as slaves to the laws (,
Laws 698b; see also Laws 700a).
53
The Persian Wars frightened them into being
slaves (|. . .; Laws 698c), even more so than before, to their
leaders and laws, thereby increasing their commitment to each other and to their
polis. This sort of metaphorical slavery, then, clearly was good: like literal slavery,
it beneted not only the slaves themselves but also society as a whole.
54
But this metaphorical good slavery did not last forever in Athens. With time,
the Athenian Stranger says, a new type of freedom (c|) arose, by which
men became overly self-assured and fearless. Out of this (bad) freedom came
the peoples refusal to be slaves () to rulers, parents and elders, laws,
oaths, pledges, and the gods (Laws 701a-b). Put another way, the people wanted
to be free and did not want anyone or anything to be master () over them
(Rep. 563d). Plato presents such bad freedom as characteristic of democratic
Athens. Thus in the Republic, Plato has Socrates describe the democratic city,
full of freedom (c|) and free speech (|), consisting of free men
(c), each of whom has the liberty to do whatever he wants (. o
) and to arrange his own life however he wishes (j
. | c .j. j c vc) (Rep. 557b).
55
These libertiesto live and act as one chooseslikely reminded Platos readers of
the characteristic freedoms granted to the slave upon his manumission (and spelled
out in later manumission inscriptions): namely, doing whatever he wishes and
going wherever he wishes.
The problem here, as Plato presents it, is not freedom per se, but excessive
freedom on the part of those who were naturally slaves. In Athens, his Socrates
claims, this bad freedom has driven children to disrespect their parents; metics
51. See also Ober 2005 [2000], who argues that for Platos Socrates, being a slave to the
laws was fully compatible with pursuing personal freedom.
52. Cf. Hdt. 7.104: the Spartan king Demaratos tells Xerxes that law is master ()
[for the Spartans] . . .. they do whatever it commands.
53. See also Laws 700a: under these old laws, the demos in a certain way was a willing slave
(c) to the laws.
54. Cf. Thuc. 2.37.3: in his funeral oration, Pericles says that obedience (v) to those
in authority and to the laws is one of the things that makes Athenian society so successful.
55. For the conception of democracy as the freedom to live and act as one chooses, see Liddel
2007: 2024 and passim.
and foreigners to be made equal to citizens; and at the furthest extreme (c),
purchased slaves to be as free (c) as those who bought them (Rep. 563b).
That is, this freedom not only entails disrespect for the authorities (laws, parents,
rulers, etc.) to which one should (naturally) be subject, it also causes a disruption of
social hierarchies on the largest possible scale, exemplied by the worst possible
inversion: literal slaves as free as their masters! The oligarchically inclined
Pseudo-Xenophon claims to have observed precisely this inversion occurring in
fourth-century Athens (Ath. Pol. 1.1012).
Slavery to the laws (and rulers, parents, gods, etc.), then, is meant to
evoke for Platos audience the best aspects of the slaves condition vis-a`-vis his
master: a mutually benecial relationship with a natural superior. Manumission
from these external forces, on the other hand, creates chaos in the social order
just as real manumission involved the introduction (anxiety-producing to many
Athenians) of outsiders into the civic body.
56
In addition to this positive sense of metaphorical slavery, Plato also uses it in a
negative sense.
57
For example, in the Symposium, Socrates voices the words of the
priestess Diotima, who says that being content with the beauty of particularsa
beautiful boy or man or anything else
58
is being a slave, just like a household
slave (c .c. . ., Symp. 210c-d). The vividness of Diotimas
descriptionparticularly the juxtaposition of the metaphorical with
the literal .ccalls to mind the status of a real slave, the household slave, to
whom nearly every Greek could put a face. Unlike good slavery, then, which
suggests the mutual benets accruing to both slave and society from the slaves
condition, bad slavery evokes the concrete reality of the slaves condition in
order to convey its inappropriateness for a free person.
In Plato, bad slavery often takes the form of internal subjection (i.e.,
slavery of the soul or parts thereof), itself sometimes analogized to external
subjection (e.g., slavery to a tyrant). In his discussion of the tripartite soul
in the Republic (made up of reasoning, spirited, and appetitive parts), Plato has
Socrates say that the naturally superior part (o c ) of a persons soul
(namely, the reasoning part) should be in control of the inferior part(s) of the
soul ( |).
59
If, however, the inferior part is master over the superior,
the person in question is reproachable as subjected to himself (j c,
Rep. 431a-b). That is, if the naturally masterful part of the soul is enslaved
to the lower parts of the soulrepresenting a reversal of the natural order of
thingsthis constitutes bad slavery.
56. On the anxiety caused by manumission in classical Athens, see Kamen 2009.
57. On Plato and internal freedom (i.e., freedom from bad slavery), see, e.g., Pohlenz 1966:
8896; Patterson 1991: 17380.
58. Bad slavery in fact often describes the behaviors and attitudes of lovers vis-a`-vis their
beloveds: see, e.g., Phdr. 238e, 252a; Symp. 183a, 184c; cf. Symp. 219e.
59. On the tripartite soul in the Republic, see Ferrari 2007. On Platos changing conception of
the parts of the soul (and their relationship to one another) over time, see Bobonich 2002: ch. 3 and 4.
Later in the Republic, to illustrate the degeneration from a timocratic regime
to an oligarchic one, Socrates gives the analogy of a boy who, having seen his
once-successful father suer some setback, devotes himself entirely to making
money, promoting to king the appetitive part of the soul and thereby reducing
to slavery () the rational and spirited parts of his soul (Rep.
553c-d). Likewise, the soul of a man who lives in a city ruled by a tyrant is
itself full of slavery and unfreedom (| . v|), with the
best parts (cc) of the soul enslaved (), and the most evil
and insane part ( . c) as master () (Rep.
577d). Finally, in a striking association of real slavery with metaphorical slavery,
Socrates likens enslaving () the best part (o c) of
ones soul to the worst (c ) to selling ones own children into
slavery (c) to horrible men (Rep. 589d-e).
It is in cases like these, where the naturally superior parts of the soul are
(wrongly) enslaved, that Plato encourages manumission. In his discussion
of the charioteer model of the soul in the Phaedrus, Socrates declares that if
the better elements of ones mind prevail, they enslave () that
which causes evil (|) in the soul and set free (cc) that
which causes virtue (v()here probably reason (Phdr. 256b). The impli-
cation seems to be that reason, once liberated, in a sense obtains free rein in
the soul. This is good manumission, akin to freeing a slave who has earned
his or her right to freedom. Similarly, in the Republic, Socrates says that in a man
who has committed an injustice and been appropriately punished, the beastly part
(c) of himis tamed and the gentle part (j) set free (c).
In this way, the entire soulakin to a societyreturns to its best nature
(Rep. 591b).
If, on the other hand, the naturally inferior parts of the soul are enslaved,
they should remain that way and not be manumitted. As an analogy for the
(negative) change from an oligarchic to a democratic regime, Socrates describes
a boy who has been raised in a stingy manner, able to fulll only the most
necessary desires, who then gets a taste of pleasure. This sort of boy exchanges
his prudent upbringing for the manumission (cc) of his unnecessary
and useless desires (Rep. 561a). But these base desireslike bad slaves
should not be liberated, since they might then become, contrary to their nature,
masters of the soul. Indeed, this boy will be overcome by beliefs that, having
just been released from slavery (c | c, Rep. 574d; see also
cc, Rep. 575a), now rule alongside Eros. Previously, the boy was
under the control of (.) his father and the laws; now he is under the tyranny
(|) of Eros (Rep. 574e). That is, he has replaced good slavery
with bad, the latter of which is analogized to political subjection. This interplay
of good and bad metaphorical slaverynot to mention internal and external
subjectionis particularly prominent in Platos Phaedo, to which I now turn.
We will see that Socrates is a willing slave of the gods (i.e., good slavery),
while simultaneously seeking the manumission of his soul from his body (i.e.,
manumission from bad slavery).
REREADING PLATOS PHAEDO
Both in the Phaedo and elsewhere, Socrates is represented as having a special
relationship with Apollo.
60
Early on in the dialogue, Socrates says that he has
been composing a hymn to Apollo (Phd. 60d),
61
and in the Apology, we learn not
only that Apollo deems Socrates the wisest man in Greece (Apol. 21a-b), but also
that Socrates, at least in his nal moments, possesses the mantic power of Apollo
(Apol. 39c). Again in the Phaedo, Socrates shows prophetic capacity, aligning
himself with the swans of Apollo.
62
Swans sing best when they are about to die,
he says, because they are going to the god whose servants () they are
(Phd. 85a).
63
Indeed,
v . o. | c . . v c
vv . c c| j c
j c c c . cc c . .o o
. c . .o . . . . . c|
j j c v . .c .c
| v.
Phd. 85b
Since, I think, they are Apollos birds, they are prophetic, and having
foreknowledge of the good things in Hades, they sing and rejoice on
that day more than in previous time. And I think that I am myself a
fellow-slave (o) of the swans, and that I am sacred (.) to
the same god and have received from our master () prophetic
power not inferior to theirs, and that I am separated (v)
from life no more melancholy than they are.
Beyond sharing the swans power of prophecy, Socrates also gures himself as
the slave (o) and the sacred (.) possession of Apollo. It is tempting
to compare this to the language used of freed slaves in the sacral manumission
inscriptions (described above), who are often described as hieroi of the god.
60. Thus, e.g., on the day before Socrates trial, a ship was sent to Delos because of a civic
vow to Apollo; this is why Socrates spends so long in prison between the trial and his death (Phd.
58b). On the many connections between Socrates and Apollo, see Kurke 2011: 11112, 25455, 327.
61. On Socrates composing paians, see also D.L. 2.42, Epict. 4.4.22.
62. Cf. Plato as Socrates swan (!): Socrates has a dream of a swan perched on his knees;
the next day, Plato is introduced as his student (see D.L. 3.5).
63. Cf. Apol. 23b, in which Socrates says that he is poor because of his service (|) to the
god. Although (like .c) is often translated as (personal) servant, in the classical
period it refers only to unfree people (see also Osborne 1995: 32).
At least in this dialogue,
64
Socrates refers to the gods, in general, as masters
(), and mortals as their chattel (().
65
Thus he says:
o c . c v( . .c . c c
7 c . . . . j co c
.` v. c c | | . . .
. c vv c .. c c. . c. o `
. c ` cc . 7 ` vc c c
. . ..
Phd. 62b
Now, the account told in secret concerning these things, that we mortals
are in a kind of phroura and must not in fact free ourselves () from
this or run away (v), seems to me over-great and not easy to
understand. Nevertheless, this at least, Kebes, seems to me to be said well,
that the gods are our guardians (cc) and that we mortals are
one of the chattel (() of the gods.
In this way, then, every human being, including Socrates, is a slave to the gods,
and this is a good slavery
66
comparable to slavery to the laws.
But Plato is using not only the language of slavery here. As Nicole Loraux has
demonstrated, phroura has many simultaneous meanings in this passage.
67
This
word is most often translated as prison,
68
a meaning that well suits Socrates
literal context. In addition, given the metaphorical language of slavery employed
thus far, one of the words other meanings, a pen for slaves, is likely also
in play. Moreover, since, as Loraux has pointed out, Socrates often conates the
language of slavery and war,
69
phroura here may also have its sense of garrison
service. That is, Socrates may be drawing on yet another conceptual metaphor
namely that souls are hoplite soldiers, staying where they are stationedin the
service of his larger argument.
70
If so, this is similar to the language Socrates
uses in the Apology, when he says that it would be terrible if, having stayed
(c) where the (mortal) generals at Potideia and Amphipolis and Delion had
stationed him, he now left his post (| j ), having been stationed
64. Rowe 2001 apud 62b78 points out that the notion of mortals as slaves of the gods is not
P.s usual view; Burnet 1959 ad loc. suggests an Orphic-Pythagorean origin for the passage.
65. On mortals as chattel and the gods as masters, see also Phd. 62d (c. . .(),
63a (), 63c (), 69e (). Cf. Arist. Pol. 1253b32, who calls slaves chattel
with souls (j c).
66. As the author of a pseudo-Platonic letter puts it, measured slavery is good, and slavery to
god (c) is measured (Epist. 354e355a).
67. My discussion of phroura here closely follows Loraux 1989: 2729.
68. Cf. Burnet 1959 ad loc. (prison or watch).
69. Loraux 1989: 2728.
70. This conceptual metaphor is especially useful in its immediate context, in which Socrates is
explaining why a philosopherdespite considering death a good thingshould not commit suicide
(see Loraux 1989: 2829). For the term conceptual metaphor, see Lako and Johnson 1980.
by the god (Apol. 28d-e).
71
The multivalent language in the Phaedo passage
continues with luein, a verb that can refer to any kind of release, and especially
with apodidraskein, which is used of both runaway slaves (e.g. Pl. Crit. 52d)
and deserting soldiers (see LSJ s.v.).
In addition to good service to the godsconceptualized as the obedience
simultaneously of a slave to his master and of a soldier to his generalmortals also
face bad slavery. Bad slavery in this dialogue entails submission to ones body,
a condition from which manumission is desirable. Indeed, Socrates repeatedly
stresses that the soul is, unfortunately, often the slave of the body: We are
slaves to its service ( j |), he says (Phd. 66c; see
also 83d).
72
In order to attain manumission of the soulsomething that is fully
realized only through literal deathone must devote oneself to philosophizing
and to becoming master of oneself.
73
Only in this way can one begin the process
of freeing the soul from the body. As Socrates says, true philosophers especially,
and they alone, are always most eager to release () the soul, and the care
of the philosophers is thisthe release () and separation () of the
soul from the bodyis it not? (Phd. 67d).
74
Philosophy, then, is conceived of as preparation of the soul for the bodys
death.
75
As Socrates says,
j j j j j vo c v(. .
. o . . c vo j j vc .o
` .o o c c. . c j j vo c
v. .j ` .j .
Phd. 64c
Is death anything other than the separation (v() of the soul from
the body? And is this not what being dead is: the body, separated apart
from (. . . .vc) the soul, has become alone by itself (`
.o); and the soul, separated apart from (.. . .v.) the
body, is alone by itself (` .()?
The language used here to describe death, along with the attendant freeing
of the soul, is very similar to the language of manumission. So, for exam-
ple, the lexicographer Harpocration says that freedmen live by themselves,
71. But cf. Loraux 1989: 28, who draws a contrast between phroura (garrison service) and taxis
(order in the ranks).
72. That the soul is in general the slave of the body (because of the latters physical demands)
does not preclude the seeming opposite from obtaining simultaneously in good people, namely that
the soul is in a dierent way the master or ruler of the body: see, e.g., Phd. 80 ( . ),
Tim. 34c ( . ); and Vlastos 1981 [1941]. Cf. a similar notion in Aristotle: see,
e.g., Ar. Pol. 1254a3436, 1254b34.
73. See [Pl.] Def. 415a: free is ruling oneself (c o .).
74. For philosophy as a freeing of the soul from the body, see also Phd. 66a (v|),
66d (vc), 83a (), 84a (. ).
75. Thus, e.g., the true philosophers practice dying (Phd. 67e); see also Phd. 80e.
apart from their manumitters (. v ` .` c. . c
v).
76
In addition, forms of the verb v (and the
related noun v() show up a remarkable number of times in the dialogue,
77
and while it can simply mean depart from or be separated from, it is frequently
used in Greek texts in conjunction with the noun | to indicate a release
from slavery.
78
Through the process of philosophizing, then, Socrates becomes his soul,
79
and
through his death he becomes a manumitted soul, free to go where he pleases. It is
particularly striking, in light of the manumission practices discussed above, when
Socrates says,
c( . o |. c. j c| c j
. o ` v ]7. . c v ] j .
.. c ] j j . c( cv v. vv
.( v.
Phd. 115d
Give a pledge for me to Krito, the opposite of what he [Krito] gave the
judges; for he gave a pledge that I would remain (c), but you,
give a pledge that I will not remain (c) when I die, but going
away will be gone (.( v).
Like a real freedman, Socrates seeks a guarantee that after his masters (i.e.
bodys) death he will be unconditionally free, his soul not subject to paramone.
80
Moreover, the emphasis here on Socrates departure (.( v) calls
to mind one of the dening features of freed slaves, namely freedom of movement
(e.g., vc . c). In these ways, Plato co-opts the most positive
elements of manumissionincluding complete freedomfor the deserving slave
to frame the transition of Socrates soul in death.
As suggested earlier in this article, Platos use of metaphors of slavery and
manumission also sheds new light on certain perplexing aspects of the dialogue.
First, there is the question of why Socrates repeatedly calls attention to Aesop.
The fourth-century ci Greek rhetorician Libanius wrote, Who, unless theyre
being contentious, would compare Aesop the Phrygian with your (fellow-citizen)
Socrates? (Lib. Socr. Apol. 181), but Plato does precisely this: he has Socrates
not only versify Aesops fables (Phd. 60d, 61b), but also invent an Aesopic fable
76. Harp. s.v. ` . .. Although Harpocration is admittedly late (second century
ci), he is glossing a phrase found in Demosthenes (Dem. 4.3637).
77. Verbs/nouns related to v: Phd. 63a, 64c (3X), 66a, 66d, 67a, 68a, 70a (3X),
77b, 80d, 80e (2X), 81a, 81b, 81c, 84b (2X), 107c (2X), 114b (paired with c). Cf.
verbs/nouns related to : Phd. 67a, 67d (3X), 83a, 84a (2X); |: Phd. 66e, 67d.
78. See, e.g. Hdt. 1.170; Thuc. 4.87.3, 5.100; Isok. Plat. 18; [Pl.] Epist. 336a.
79. Cf. Loraux 1989: 32: Socrates is, of course, his soul. See also Pohlenz 1966: 66: The
Socratic soul is nothing other than the true self of man.
80. Cf. c (and its derivatives) used metaphorically in Xenophon to evoke literal para-
mone (on which see Tamiolaki 2010: 327n.221).
about the interconnectedness of pleasure and pain (Phd. 60c). Scholars have in
the past either ignored the presence of Aesop in this text, or have, somewhat
unsatisfactorily, explained it as a way of oering up a poetic alternative to the
philosopher;
81
of assimilating Socrates (unjust) trial and death to Aesops;
82
or of
presenting a negative contrast to the portrait of Socrates.
83
More convincingly, Leslie Kurke has recently argued that Plato (both in the
Phaedo and elsewhere) invokes Aesops challenge to the wisdom tradition and
his dialogic style of speaking in order to fashion an Aesopic Socrates.
84
I
would add that calling upon a paradigmatic freed slave like Aesopwho was
freed, like Socrates, for his skill in interpreting omens (Vita G, ch. 8990)was
particularly useful for the aims of this dialogue: namely, painting Socrates as a
guratively manumitted slave. In fact, the notion of Socrates as a slave might
have contributed to the tradition that he was once literally a slave: according to
the Greek historian Duris of Samos, Socrates was a slave () who did
stonework (D.L. 2.19).
A second curious aspect of the Phaedo is the choice of Phaedo as the
eponymous narrator. Why is he the one entrusted with the important task of
narrating the nal moments of Socrates life? George Boys-Stones has argued
that it was because Phaedo was not only himself a writer of Socratic dialogues,
but also one whose beliefs about the soulor at least what little we know of
themprovided a particularly good basis for the ideas Plato wants to convey in
this dialogue.
85
But while this may in part explain Platos choice, we should not
downplay the signicance of Phaedos biographical tradition. Diogenes Laertius
tells us that:
| .. c .c. j | . ]
j c` .( vv o . . .
c .o c ` . j |
. . c| c. c ` c c .
cj .o ..
D.L. 2.105
Phaedo, a native of Elis, born of a noble family, was taken captive along
with his city, and was forced to be a prostitute. But closing the door he
used to join with (.) Socrates, until Socrates urged Alcibiades or
Krito, with their friends, to ransom (c) him; and from that
time on, he studied philosophy like a free man (c|). Hieronymos
in his work On Suspense of Judgment, attacking him, called him a slave
().
81. Loraux 1989: 2021. This interpretation is unsatisfactory in part because Aesop is not in
fact a poet (see Kurke 2011).
82. Compton 1990: 34041, 2006: ch. 15.
83. Schauer and Merkle 1992.
84. See Kurke 2011, esp. 25164, 32560.
85. See Boys-Stones 2004.
Phaedos story is much like that of many prostitutes: enslaved in war, forced to
sell his body, and nally ransomed by a man, possibly his lover.
86
But why would
someone of this sort necessarily be a good narrator? E. I. McQueen and C. J. Rowe
make the attractive suggestion that:
given that at least part of Platos purpose in writing the Phaedo was
to encourage its hearers and readers to follow Socrates example and
become philosophers, and also that one of its chief themes is about the
way in which philosophy frees its practitioners from body concerns
(as it frees Socrates from concern about his physical imprisonment and
impending death), it would be a happy coincidence if its narrator turned
out to be someone whom Socrates had actually freed and converted to
the philosophical life.
87
I think they are completely right that Phaedos status as a freedmanhis body
freed by Socrates agency and his soul by Socrates philosophyis signicant. I
would argue further that Phaedos status not only frames the dialogue but also
underlies, and helps explain, certain facets of the text.
So, for example, Phaedo at one point states that he admired Socrates because
the philosopher healed (.) us well, and, as it were, recalled us from our
ight () and defeat and turned us around to follow him and examine
the argument with him (Phd. 89a). As in 62b discussed above, Plato is employing
two simultaneous conceptual metaphors here. More obvious, perhaps, is the battle
metaphor, but the language of slavery is also in play. It is likely in connection
with the latter metaphor that Socrates is gured as a healer:
88
that is, Socrates
manumitted Phaedo, both literally and guratively, thusby the conceptual
metaphor of manumission as healing (see above)healing him. As a result,
Phaedo is no longer a (runaway) slave. Moreover, by calling attention to Socrates
healing powers, Phaedo highlights Socrates already-emphasized connection with
Apollo, suggesting that it might be to Apollo in his capacity as healing god that
Socrates is . (Phd. 85b5).
A nal, and perhaps the most important, element of the text illuminated by an
understanding of Platos use of slavery and manumission metaphors is Socrates
controversial last words. When Socrates nally drinks the hemlock, his soul on the
cusp of freedom, he tells Krito to pay the cock that we owe to Asklepios (Phd.
118a). As mentioned above, Most believes that Socrates is thanking Asklepios
for healing the sick Plato. It is true that Platos sickness is worth marking, but
86. On Phaedo as a ransomed prostitute, see also D.L. 2.31, Gell. 2.18. Whether we take
Socrates as Phaedos erastes depends on how we interpret two things: the verb . in D.L. 2.105
and Socrates playing with Phaedos hair in Phd. 89b.
87. McQueen and Rowe 1989: 3. See also Dusani c 1993 on the enslavement and liberation
of Phaedo.
88. Cf. Plato as healer: Asklepios is a doctor of the body, just as Plato is of the immortal
soul (D.L. 3.45).
perhaps it is part of a larger narratological strategy: it removes him from the scene
of Socrates death (where one might have expected him to be present), allowing
him to foreground the freed slave Phaedo. For the reasons already discussed,
Phaedo is a particularly good gure to frame a dialogue about philosophy and
the manumission/healing of the soul.
I would therefore like to propose another reading of Socrates last words,
one taking into account the metaphors of slavery and manumission permeating
the text: namely, that the cock is a thank-oering to Asklepios, the healing god
par excellence in classical Athens,
89
for securing the manumission of Socrates
soul. After all, a manumitted soula soul that has experienced v(is a
healed soul. In fact, we nd the phrase vj c (relief from ills or
toils) in the context of both genuine healing
90
and of metaphorical and literal
manumission.
91
It is presumably in thanks for their being healed that departing
souls are said to sing paians.
92
This reading also explains the choice of a cock,
rather than another sacricial animal. A common gift to Asklepios,
93
the cock
possesses a special relationship with the god, one seemingly parallel to Apollos
swan-.
94
If we can trust Aelians designation of the cock as a member
of Asklepios paianic chorus, as well as his servant and attendant (
. .c) (Ael. fr. 98),
95
we might consider the cock a payment, on behalf
of the community, for Socrates freedomthat is, a replacement, or exchange, of
one servant of the gods for another.
96
Just like the conditionally freed slaves who
dedicated phialai to Athena in exchange for their full-edged freedom, Socrates
makes a dedication to Asklepios when his soul nally attains complete freedom
from his body.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, I have shown that by examining the ways in which slaves
were freed, as well as the ways in which Plato deploys metaphors of slavery
and manumission, we can better understand some of Platos narrative strategies
89. See Wikkiser 2008 on the popularity of Asklepios in Athens starting in the late fth century
nci.
90. See, e.g., SEG IX 347, line 4, a sacred law found in an Asklepeion.
91. See, e.g., Aesch. Ag. 1, 20. This passage of the Agamemnon, in which the (servile) watchman
begs to be released from his service (c` vj , 1; vj , 20)namely his
watch (7, 2)is a provocative parallel for the language used by Plato to describe Socrates
manumission. I thank one of Classical Antiquitys anonymous reviewers for directing my attention
to this passage.
92. See Olymp. In Phd. p. 244, 14 (Edelstein and Edelstein 1945: 297 T527).
93. On the cock as a common gift, see Edelstein and Edelstein 1945: 29669 T52331; Herod.
4.1118; Liban. Decl. 34.36.
94. I thank Leslie Kurke for suggesting to me the cock/swan parallel.
95. Edelstein and Edelstein 1945: 26566 T466.
96. Slaves, as commodities (Kopyto 1986), can be exchanged for other commodities of
equivalent value. On manumission as part of a system of exchange, see Patterson 1982: 21119.
and philosophical ideas in the Phaedo. Put quite simply, it has been argued that
for Plato, at least in this dialogue, the soul can be freed from bad slavery to
the body both through philosophy and through good slavery to the gods. It is,
however, only with the bodys death that the soul is completely freed from bad
slaveryno longer subject to paramoneand thus in a sense healed.
University of Washington
dkamen@uw.edu
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The Manumission of Socrates: A Rereading of Plato's Phaedo

Author(s): Deborah Kamen

pire 2, Inscriptions de Bouthrotos. Athens.

ber einige griechische Rechtsurkunden aus den ostlichen Randge-

sop und Sokrates. In N. Holzberg, ed., Der

sop-Roman: Motivgeschichte und Erzahlstruktur, 8596. Tubingen.

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