Political Morality and the Friends of Scipio

Author(s): F. W. Walbank
Source: The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 55, No. 1/2, Parts 1 and 2 (1965), pp. 1-16
Published by: Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies
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POLITICAL MORALITY AND THE FRIENDS OF SCIPIO
By
F. W. WALBANK
I
The dramatic date is the Feriae Latinae of
129 B.C.,
the
consulship
of Tuditanus and
Aquilius,
the scene the
gardens
of
Scipio
Aemilianus,
the theme for discussion the Roman
state. Who could
expound
the
subject
better than Aemilianus himself
for, says Laelius,1
' not
only
is it
proper
that an eminent statesman rather than
anyone
else should discuss the
State,
but also I recollect that
you
used to converse
very frequently
with Panaetius on this
subject
in
company
with
Polybius-two
Greeks who were
perhaps
the best versed of them
all in
politics-and
that
you
assembled
many arguments
to
prove
that the form of
government
handed down to us
by
our ancestors is
by
far the best of all.' Here is Cicero's assurance
that sometime before
I29 Panaetius, Scipio
and
Polybius
used to discuss the Roman State
together-though
he does not tell us when or where.
According
to Velleius
2
Scipio kept
Polybius
and
Panaetius, praecellentis ingenio uiros,
beside him domi
militiaeque,
so
many
opportunities
for such conversations offered themselves. Was Panaetius
perhaps present,
like
Polybius,
at the
siege
of
Carthage
?
Possibly, though
there is no
proof.3
For it is now
generally agreed
that Panaetius'
voyage
with
Telephus'
fleet
4
and the two
years
devoted to
general
education
(rrpos piAoia&nrlCtv)-or
was it research ?-before he went to Athens
(which
we learn of from a
fragmentary passage
in the Index Stoicorum discovered at
Herculaneum)
5
have
nothing
to do with
any ships
the Rhodians
may
have sent to
help
Rome
during
the
siege
of
Carthage (as
Cichorius
thought),
but
belong
to Panaetius'
early
years.6
In fact we have no idea when Panaetius first made
Scipio's acquaintance
nor where;
but
they
must have been in contact for some time before the eastern embassy of
I40
7
when
Scipio
invited the Greek to
accompany
him on his visit to
Cyprus, Syria, Pergamum
and
Athens.8 There is
good
evidence for their
presence together
at
Rome,
where Panaetius
enjoyed
the
friendship
of
many
members of
Scipio's
circle-C.
Laelius,9
who had studied
under him at
Athens, Q.
Mucius Scaevola,10
who was later to become Cicero's
mentor,
C. Fannius,11 who,
like Scaevola, was Laelius'
son-in-law,
and
Q.
Aelius
Tubero,12
the son
of
Scipio's sister,
and the man to whom Panaetius dedicated several works. Since Panaetius
ventured in a
published
letter to Tubero to
express
an
opinion
on the merits of a
poem by
Appius
Claudius the
censor,13
it seems
only
reasonable to assume that he had an
adequate
knowledge
of
Latin;
and this too
probably implies
residence at Rome.
Finally, according
to the Herculaneum
papyrus,14
he lived
alternately
at Rome and
Athens, probably during
the decade
following
the eastern
journey
of
I40;
but
evidently
Cicero did not believe him
to be at Rome in
I29,15
the dramatic date of the de re
publica,
and after
Scipio's
death the
same
year,
if not
before,
he
appears
to have settled
permanently
at
Athens,
where he became
head of the Stoa,
and there
published
his book on
Duty
(YTEpi
TOU
Kc0OiaKOvTOs),
on which
Cicero drew for so much of the de
officiis.16
So much is
clear;
but it is not known when Panaetius first came to
Rome,
nor whether
he was there before
I40
(though
on the whole it seems
likely).
And
unfortunately
we are
equally
in the dark about
Polybius'
later movements. If Panaetius and
Polybius
were
1
Cic., rep. I,
34.
7
On the date of this see
Astin,
CPh
1959,
221 ff.;
2
Vell. Pat. I,
13, 3. Scullard, JRS I960, 69,
n.
43.
3
cf. Cichorius, Rh. Mus. I908, 220.
8
Plut.,
2Mor.
777A
=
FGH
87,
F
30;
cf.
87,
F 6
4
Perhaps the Rhodian mentioned in xxix, 10, 4
with
app.
crit.
[where no author is named, the references are to 9
Cic.,fin. II, 23
and
24.
Polybius]. Cf. Pohlenz, RE, 'Panaitios,'
col.
440;
10
Cic.,
de or.
I, 75.
von Gaertringen, RE, Suppl. v,
'
Rhodos,' col. 8oo.
11
Cic.,
Brut. ioi.
5
Stoicorum Index Herculanensis, col.
55-77,
con-
12
Cic., fin. IV, 23;
cf.
rep. I, I4.
veniently consulted in M. van Straaten, Panaetii
13
Cic.,
Tusc.
disp. IV, 4;
cf.
Pohlenz, RE,
Rhodii Fragmenta (Leiden, 1952), fg.
i. See for this ' Panaitios,' col.
423.
incident ? 56.
14
?63.
6
cf. Pohlenz, Antikes Fiihrertum (Berlin, 1934),
15
Cic., rep. I, 5.
130-I, n. 3 ; Tatakis, Panet&ius de Rhodes (Paris,
16
See
especially Pohlenz,
Antikes
Fiihrertum,
I931), 26 (against Cichorius, loc. cit.). 125-6,
who
argues convincingly
that it was
published
after
Scipio's
death.
present
with
Scipio
militiae,
as Velleius
says,
this must have been either in
Spain
in
151
(which
seems
very early
for
Panaetius),
at
Carthage
in
148-6 (when Polybius
was
certainly
present)
or at Numantia in
133 (when Scipio
was at
great pains
to call
up
his friends and
clients as a counter-blast
against
the obstruction of the
Senate,
and when
Polybius may
for
that reason have been
present-though
his Bellum Numantinum is the
only piece
of evidence
that this old man of
nearly seventy
made the
journey
from Greece to
Spain
on this
occasion).
Carthage
or Numantia-either is
possible,
or even
both;
and
there,
I
think,
one has to
leave it.
Somewhere,
at some
unspecified
date or
dates, Scipio
and the Greeks used to
hold
political
discussions.17
II
There is no direct account of the form these discussions
took;
but it is
possible
to draw
some conclusions from what the two Greeks wrote about the Roman state and about the
Roman
Empire.
As Greeks
they
were bound to be
especially
concerned with the relation-
ship
between Rome and their own
world,
for both Achaea and Rhodes had learnt from
experience
the
price
of Roman
displeasure. Polybius'
central theme is the
growth
of the
Roman
empire
and in
particular
the
qualities
of the Roman state which had enabled the
rulers of Rome to make themselves masters of the known world between Cannae and
Pydna.
Imperial
achievement is never far
away
from his mind.
Discussing
the
Spartan constitution,
for
instance,
he observes that 'for the
purpose
of
maintaining security
and freedom the
legislation
of
Lycurgus
is
amply sufficient,
and to those who admit this to be the
object
of
political
constitutions we must
grant
that there is not and never was
any system
or constitu-
tion
superior
to that of
Lycurgus
'. ' But,' he
continues,
'if
anyone
aims at
greater things
and
regards
it as finer and more
glorious
to be the leader of
many
men and to rule and lord
it over
many
and have the
eyes
of all the world turned to
him,
then it must be conceded that
from this
point
of view the Laconian constitution is
defective, while that of Rome is
superior
and better framed for the attainment of
power.'18
Does this second
point
of view
represent
that of
Polybius
himself ?
Although
in one
passage,19
where he
perhaps speaks primarily
as
an
Achaean,
he
gives
the
impression
that it would have been better had
Lycurgus
made the
Spartans
contented and moderate
(ac'raupKS
... Kcai
cCo5ppov)
in their
foreign policy
instead
of
ambitious, domineering
and
aggressive, clearly
his real
complaint against Lycurgus
was
that he neither rendered his
people
contented and
willing
to
forgo expansion
nor on the
other hand
provided
them with
adequate
means to
implement
an
aggressive policy.20
That
the Romans
successfully conquered
the world is a mark in favour of their
constitution, which
facilitated this
operation; Polybius
in fact admires and
approves
of
imperial ambition,
and
it is the
story
of Rome's successful career in that field that forms the central theme of his
work.
For his account of Roman
history
down to
Pydna Polybius
had a
single purpose-to
explain
how and thanks to what kind of constitution Rome had achieved her
imperial
success.21 But what
happened
after
Pydna
was another
story.
In Book
inI, therefore, Polybius
explains why
he
proposes
to extend his
History
to cover the next two
decades,
down to the
fall of
Carthage
and Corinth and their immediate aftermath. ' If from their success or
failure alone,' he writes,22 'we could form an
adequate judgement
of how far states and
individuals are
worthy
of
praise
or
blame,
I could here
lay
down
my pen, bringing my
narrative to a close with the last-mentioned events '-that is the Third Macedonian War
and Antiochus
Epiphanes'
attack on
Egypt-'
in accordance with the
plan originally
set
out.... But since
judgements regarding
either victors or
vanquished
based
purely
on the
actual
struggle (crrTcov
TOv
a&ycov-taicarcov)
are
by
no means final... I must
append
... an
account of the
subsequent policy
of the
conquerors
and their method of universal
rule, as
well as of the various
opinions
and
appreciations
of their rulers entertained
by
the
rest,
and
17
For various views
concerning
the date of
Polybius'
refusal to discuss Cleomenes' reforms and
Panaetius' arrival in Rome see Brink and
Walbank,
his treatment of the
king
as a
tyrant.
CQ 1954, 103,
n.
3.
19
vI, 48, 7-8.
18
vi, 50, 2-5.
B. Shimron, Historia
I964, 147-55,
20
vi,
49,
8.
argues that in
reality
the
Lycurgan regime,
as
applied
21
cf. I, I, 5.
by
Cleomenes
III, was adapted to
expansion ; hence 22
Ill, 4,
I f.
2 F. W. WALBANK
POLITICAL MORALITY AND THE FRIENDS OF SCIPIO
finally
I must describe what were the
prevailing
and dominant tendencies and ambitions of
the various
peoples
in their
public
and
private
lives....
Contemporaries
will thus be
able to see
clearly
whether Roman rule is
acceptable
or the reverse and future
generations
whether their
government
should be considered to have been
worthy
of
praise
and admira-
tion or rather of blame.'
I have
quoted
this
passage
at
length
because of its
importance
for an
understanding
of
the later books of
Polybius.
The rise of Rome to
world-empire
reflected a transcendental
plan,
the work of
Tyche.
But that did not absolve the Romans from
submitting
their
subsequent
rule to the
judgement
of
present
and future
generations.
How does
Polybius
intend that
judgement
to
go
? Is he in fact for or
against
Rome in the final decision ? The
answer is not
easy;
but one
thing
is clear. In
defining
his
object
in these later books
Polybius
is
replying
to
expressed
criticism of Rome. From the time of the Hannibalic War
onwards there had been
plenty
of
people
in Greece
ready
to accuse the Romans not
only
of
having aggressive
intentions towards other
states,
and the desire to
subjugate them,
but
also of
exploiting
the
supposed grievances
of their allies in the interest of their
imperial
ambitions. A Rhodian ambassador to Aetolia in
207
is
reported
to have
alleged
that ' if the
Romans
get
the war in
Italy
off their
hands, they
will next throw themselves with their whole
strength
on Greek lands on the
pretext
that
they
are
helping
the Aetolians
against Philip,
but in
reality
with the intention of
conquering
the whole
country.'
23
In
i99
Macedonian
envoys
to the Aetolian council make the same
charge
and
quote past
incidents to
support
it:
' it was to
help
Messana that
they
first crossed into
Sicily;
the second time was in order to
liberate
Syracuse oppressed by
the
Carthaginians.
Both Messana and
Syracuse together
with the whole of
Sicily
are now in their hands and
they
have reduced it to a
tax-paying
province subject
to their rods and axes.'
24
The words are
Livy's,
the source is
Polybius.
A
yet
clearer case arises at the time of the Third Punic War. In accordance with his
undertaking
to recount ' the
opinions
and
appreciations
of their rulers entertained
by
the
rest'
Polybius
records four
points
of view
prevalent
in Greece
concerning
the
rights
and
wrongs
of Roman
policy
towards
Carthage.
This
passage
is discussed in more detail below.
For the
present
we
may
note that the two hostile views
given
there are those
accusing
the
Romans on the one hand of
sharp practice,
of
using awrrrrl
KcaI
86'os,
deceit and
fraud, to
break down the defences of
Carthage step by step,
and on the other hand of
pursuing
a new
policy
of terrorism-of not
being
content
merely
to
subjugate
their
enemies,
but of
setting
out rather to annihilate
them;
and this
policy,
it was
alleged,
had been initiated with the
Roman treatment of Perseus of
Macedon,
and had now been
completely
revealed in the
decision
concerning Carthage.25 Polybius
attributes these criticisms to the Greeks
; but
according
to a
passage
in
Livy
which is almost
certainly Polybian
26
the
sharp practice
directed
against
Perseus
by Q.
Marcius
Philippus
and
by
A. Atilius Serranus on the eve
of the Third Macedonian War encountered similar criticism
among
some of the senators
at Rome. ' It was not
by
ambushes and
night affrays,' they
are
reported
to have
said,
'
by
pretended flight
followed
by
sudden attacks
upon
an
enemy
who was off his
guard,
nor with
a
pride
in
trickery
rather than true
glory
that our ancestors had
waged
war.' These
phrases
are almost a direct translation of the
arguments
which
Polybius
attributes to the hostile
Greeks in
I46.
And these senators conclude
disapprovingly
that this is a new sort of
cleverness,
nova
sapientia.
III
Polybius reports
these views
faithfully,
even
if,
as the
repetition may
lead us to
suspect,
a little
schematically.27
But
where,
in this
dispute,
does he stand
personally
? Before an
attempt
can be made to answer
this,
we must examine his
general
attitude towards the
Romans
throughout
the later books
covering
the
period
after
168-7.
'
The final end achieved
by my history,'
he tells
us,
' will be to
gain knowledge
of what was the condition of each
23
xi, 6,
i f.
430; Walbank, JRS 1941, 82-93; J. Briscoe,
JRS
24
Livy xxxI, 29, 6. I964, 66-77.
25
xxxvI, 9, 5-8;
9-i i.
27
On the repetition of words
and phrases in his
26
Livy XLII, 47; see Kahrstedt,
Klio
1911, 415-
work see xxix, 12, O0.
3
people
after the
struggle
for
supremacy
was over and all had fallen under the dominion of
Rome,
down to the disturbed and troubled time that afterwards ensued, Ecos TrS p[ETa TaOcarc
TIraWv
EntyEvovEvnsr TrcapacX
KXi KilvICrECOS.
About this latter... I was induced to write as
if
starting
on a new work.' 28 Now there are two reasons
why
he treats this
period
of
TapcaXcl
Kca
Kivrc7is
as a new
work,
first because of the
magnitude
of the actions and the
unexpected
character
(-r6 rrapabSoov)
of the event contained in
it,
and
secondly
because he himself not
only
witnessed most of
these,
but also took
part
and was even the main
agent
in some. Thus
the fresh start
applies,
not to the
period
after
I68-7,
as some scholars have
thought,29
but
only
to these later
years
of' confusion and disturbance '.
Just
where
Polybius regarded
these
years
as
beginning
is not made
quite
clear. In the
chapter following
the
phrases
I have
quoted
30 he claims to summarize the events of the disturbed
years;
but he includes the
expulsion
of Ariarathes from
Cappadocia
which occurred as
early
as
I58.
In
fact,
it is hard
to
distinguish any rigid
line of
demarcation,
and it looks as if
Polybius regarded
the
period
from i68
onwards,
which is the aftermath of the
fifty-three years
of Rome's rise to
power,
as
gradually shading
off into one of confusion and disturbance as the
year I50 approached
and
as warfare culminated in the disasters which
enveloped Carthage,
Macedonia and Greece.
If one can draw a
line,
it
probably
was
envisaged
as
falling
about
I52-I.
For after
then,
as
Polybius says,
events became
Trapac5o~ov.
No
longer,
in his
view,
did
policy
now
obey
the
rules of reason. In
Macedon,
for
example,31
the
story
of the false
Philip appeared
at first
sight
to be
quite
inadmissible
(ovi' dvEKT-6S).
This
Philip
fallen from heaven into Macedonia
(aspoTrETis C(iAaTrrros)
had no
good
reason for his
campaign, yet quite unbelievably
he
won
victory
after
victory;
and the Macedonians,
after
being
well-treated at the hands of
Rome,
which had
brought them, as all confessed,
freedom instead of
slavery
and
put
an
end to internal
struggles,
rushed to
fight
for this
imposter
who
exiled,
tortured and murdered
them in
large
numbers. In such a situation one can
speak only
of a heaven-sent infatuation
(5aipovo3Xp?3Eia).32
The same is true of the disaster that befell the Greeks. For this was a
catastrophe
which was both universal and discreditable and without
any
of those
redeeming
features
which in earlier misfortunes of Greece had
given grounds
for
feelings
of consolation and
pride;
such
unmitigated
disaster was almost
unprecedented,
and indeed ' the whole
country
was visited
by
an
unparalleled
attack of mental disturbance, people throwing
themselves
into wells and down
precipices.'
33
Behaviour at that time was of such a
kind,
and
everyone
was so much the victim of madness and demoralization-a-vota Kail
aKpicria-such
as it would
be hard to discover even
among barbarians,
that one can
only
attribute the fact that Greece
did
ultimately emerge
to the success of some kind of resourceful and
ingenious good
fortune
(TUxrl TI.S
. . .
voupyoS
Kai
TrEXVIKt1)
in
countering
the aivota and
Ipavica
of the statesmen
in
charge.
That is how
Polybius
saw
it;
and it is not far to the conclusion that in these cases
SawtNiovoP3Aapeia
and
pacvia
describe
policies
which he could neither
accept
nor
understand;
for he
was,
as he has
said,
an active and interested
party
in the
politics
of those times. The
years
I50
to
I46,
it is
true,
do not reveal the
complete
and
abrupt change
in Roman
policy
which,
from the first
century
B.C.
onwards,
has
frequently
been attributed to them.34 But
they
do
represent
the climax of a new
trend,
and
they
also
represent
a
significant
and
welcome
change
in
Polybius' personal
situation. From
I67
to
151
he had been an exile at
Rome, comfortably
off no
doubt, mixing
in
agreeable
and influential
company,
but none
the less
deprived
of full freedom of movement and
personal
initiative. He was the victim
of Roman
policy,
unfair but
beyond challenge.
It was
during
those
years
that he
planned
and wrote a
good many
books of his Histories. At Rome he had
every
chance to meet
people,
to
discuss,
to assess. But he was
essentially
the
onlooker, considering
Roman
policy
objectively and,
we
might
well
expect, critically. Indeed,
books III to xxxIII furnish an
almost unbroken run of remarks hostile to Rome. I will mention
briefly
some of the more
striking.
28
II 4, 12-13.
31
XXXVI, I0.
29
cf. Thommen, Hermes
I885, I99; Susemihl,
32
xxxVI, 17, 12-I5.
Geschichte der
griechischen
Literatur in der Alexandri-
33
xxxvIII, i6, 7.
nerzeit ii, io8, n. 104.
34
See the
just comments of W.
Hoffmann,
30
III, 5.
Historia I960, 309-44.
4
F. W. WALBANK
POLITICAL MORALITY AND THE FRIENDS OF SCIPIO
A number of eminent but unnamed Romans
attempted
to incite Attalus to acts of
treachery against King Eumenes,
his
brother,
while at
Rome;
35
when
they
were thwarted
in
this,
thanks to the advice of the
physician Stratius,
the Senate broke its
promise
to hand
over Aenus and Maronea to
Pergamum
and instead liberated the two Thracian towns.
Prusias II of
Bithynia
came to Rome and behaved in an
utterly contemptible manner;
36
for this
very
reason he received a
kindly answer--XacpE
61'
caUrr6
ro TTO
tla&vepcowrov,
thus
demonstrating
that
servility
towards Rome
paid
dividends. When
shortly
afterwards
Eumenes arrived in
Italy,
the
Senate, feeling embarrassed, passed
a decree
forbidding
the
city
to all
kings, thereby humiliating
him and
ensuring
that the
Galatians, learning
of his
humiliation, would attack him.37
Polybius may
be
wrong
in
detecting
such
far-sighted
cunning
in the Senate's decision; but he
evidently
retails a belief current at
Rome,
and
he does so without comment. The Athenians sent an
embassy
to ask for the
possession
of
Delos,
Lemnos and Haliartus.
Polybius goes
out of his
way
to
expose
the
injustice
of the
claim to Haliartus as
being quite unworthy
of
Athens;
he records the Senate's decision
to accede to their
request, merely remarking
that the whole transaction
proved
less
profitable
to Athens than the Athenians had
anticipated.38 Obviously Polybius disapproves
of the
Roman
decision;
but as he does not mention the motives of the
Senate,
we cannot tell in this
case whether he believed them to have some Machiavellian
purpose
or
merely regarded
them
as the victims of Athenian
persuasiveness.
There are several other
passages
similar to this.
Thus,
the enemies of Ariarathes of
Cappadocia, Diogenes
and
Miltiades,
made
great headway against
him when his affairs
came before the Senate-since falsehood had no
difficulty
in
gaining
the
day.39
Here the
suggestion
is that the Senate were hoodwinked, just
as on another occasion
they
were hood-
winked
by Heracleides,
who
persuaded
them to
pass
a senatus consultum favourable to
Laodice and Alexander,
seduced
by
his
charlatanry (Trcas yorT-rcaiS),40
and as Ti.
Sempro-
nius Gracchus and his
colleagues
were deceived when
they
were sent to
investigate
the
situation in the Seleucid
kingdom.41
But sometimes the Senate
just
do not care about what
is
right,
as when the Prienians
appealed
to Rome about the demand of Ariarathes that
they
hand over to him the
money deposited
with them
by Orophernes,
and the Romans ov
TrpoacEXov
TroTs
AsyopEvots,42
or of course as on the numerous occasions when
they
refused
to allow the Achaean and other exiles to
return,43 persuaded by
men like
Charops
and
Callicrates. In these instances a combination of blindness and
negligence
leads to bad
decisions:
frequently, however,
as in the
expulsion
of
Eumenes,
Machiavellian motives
are
explicitly
attributed to the Senate.
IV
When the Senate
rejected
Demetrius'
appeal
to be restored to the Seleucid throne-
this was the Demetrius whom
Polybius
himself later
helped
to
escape
from
Rome-they
acted thus, cos Epoi SOKmEv, says Polybius,
because
they
were
suspicious
of a
young
man of
twenty-three
and
thought
that
they
would be better served
by
the
youth
and
incapacity
of
Antiochus IV's son.44 When the
younger
of the two
Ptolemy
brothers came to Rome
asking
for the
agreement
between himself and his elder brother to be
revised,
the Senate acceded
to his
request,
which coincided with their interests.
Here, exceptionally, Polybius
adds a
general
observation:
'
Many
Roman decisions are now of this kind:
profiting by
others'
mistakes
they effectively (TrpayplcxTiKcns)
increase and build
up
their own
power,
simul-
taneously doing
a favour and
appearing
to confer a benefit on the
party
at fault.' And in
this case
they
sent
legati
to ensure that their decision was
implemented
and that
Egypt
remained weak and divided.45 Self-interest was now usual in Roman decisions. In the
many appeals
which reached the Senate from
Carthage
and
Masinissa,
the
Carthaginians
always
came off second
best,
'
not because
they
had not
right
on their
side,
but because the
judges
were convinced that it was in their own interest to decide
against
them.'
46
35
xxx, I-3.
41
xx, 27 ; 30, 7-8.
36
xxx, i8, 7.
42
xxxiii, 6,
8.
37
xxx,
19,
12-I3.
43
e.g. xxx, 32.
38
XXX, 20.
44
xxxI, 2.
39
xxxII,
IO.
45
xxxI, 10.
40
XXXxxIII, 8,
IO.
46
XXXI, 21.
5
Sometimes,
as in the case of Eumenes'
expulsion,
one
may
feel that
Polybius goes
too
far in
attributing
a sinister
purpose
to the Senate. For
instance,
when
Leptines,
the murderer
of Cn.
Octavius,
was sent
by
Demetrius to Rome and admitted his crime
quite openly,
attempting
to
justify it,
the Senate almost
ignored
the
embassy,
and
kept
the
grievance open
because, 'js
Euoi
sOKEIV,
they
took the view that once the
guilty party
was
punished,
the
Roman
people
would
regard
the incident as
closed,
and
they preferred
to
keep
the
grievance
open
for future
exploitation.47
The same Machiavellian
attitude,
the nova
sapientia,
as some Senators had
styled it,48
appears
in Roman declarations of war at this time. In the case of the
Dalmatians,
in
157-6,
they had,
it is
true, good grounds.
A series of
outrageous
actions had led to
protests,
but
the Dalmatians had contested the
right
of Rome to interest itself in the
matter,
and had
treated the
envoys
with
discourtesy
and even violence. But the real motive behind the
Senate's decision to declare war on
them, according
to
Polybius,
was that
they judged
it a
suitable time for
making
war on
Dalmatia,
suitable both because the
army
was
growing
slack after twelve
years peace
since the Third Macedonian
War,
and also because
they thought
it
high
time for them to resume
activity
in
Illyria.
And so
by fighting
the Dalmatians
they
hoped
to
inspire
terror in the
Illyrians (Korrca7rTArlcEvot)
and cause them to
obey.49
' But
to the world at
large they
said it was because of the insult to their ambassadors.'
The case of
Carthage
is not dissimilar. There the
Romans,
we are
told,50
had
long ago
decided
upon
their
policy-our
text
says merely TroVrTO KEKvUpCIEov,O
but there can be little
doubt that war is
meant; however, they
were
looking
for a suitable occasion and a
pretext
that would
appeal
to
foreign
nations
(Kaipov
.. . eTrtT5?EtOV K(d i
rpo6paccv E?vXiJova wrpos
TOJS EKTOS).
'
For the Romans,'
Polybius adds,
'
paid great
attention to this matter, KaMrs
ppovo0vTrES-and
rightly '; and he
quotes
a
saying
of Demetrius of
Phalerum,
that
' when a war seems to be
just (6tKaic
... Eivacn
BoKocrac)
it increases the
profits
of
victory
and reduces the bad results of failure, while if it is
thought
to be
unjust,
this has the
opposite
effect '. So
strongly
were the Romans convinced of this that their
disputes
with each other
about the effect on
foreign opinion very nearly
made them desist from
going
to war.
The
only
debates
Polybius
here mentions on the eve of the Third Punic War concern
the
question
whether the
pretext
to hand was
sufficiently convincing
to make a reasonable
impression
on
foreign peoples. However,
his account is
only fragmentary
and can be
reasonably supplemented
from
Appian,
Plutarch and
Diodorus,51
who are
agreed
that
Scipio
Nasica
opposed
the
policy
of
annihilating Carthage
with the
argument
that fear of
an outside
enemy
was a
salutary
check on internal
disputes
and the
growth
of elements
hostile to the continued domination of the Senate. It has
recently
been
argued by
Hoffmann
52
that these debates are
apocryphal
and irrelevant to the real issues raised at Rome in the
years immediately
before
I50.
His two
strongest arguments are,
first that
according
to
Polybius
the Senate had
long ago
made
up
its mind and was
merely awaiting
a convenient
pretext
to declare war on
Carthage,
and
secondly
that the theme of a metus hostilis as a
salutary
curb on civil strife was a well-worn rhetorical cliche.
To take the last
point first,
it is
certainly
true that the theme that a threat from abroad
cements
unity
and concord at home
appears frequently
in both Greek and Latin
literature,
and that on
many
occasions when it was almost
certainly
not
employed.
For
example,
Hoffmann has shown
convincingly
that it was never used as an
argument by
the elder
Scipio
after Zama,
and that Cato never said it was.53 But in 202 such an
argument
is
clearly
stamped
as anachronistic. This is not true of the situation around
I50.
As Professor
Lily
Ross
Taylor
has shown in her
paper
on some 'forerunners of the Gracchi
',54
the Third
Punic War was
preceded
in
151
by
tribunician
activity concerning
the
military draft,
which
carried
revolutionary implications,
and
(if
the Lex Aelia and Lex Fufia
belong
to
I50,
as
she has
plausibly
argued)
by attempts
to counter tribunician
legislation by arming magis-
trates with new
powers
of obstruction.
Against
this
background
of
political
unrest
Scipio
Nasica's
appeal
to the
salutary
bond of an external threat makes
reasonably good
sense.
47
xxxII, 3,
II-I
3.
Phil. 193I, 284-5
=
KI. Schr. II, 39-72 ; Strasburger,
48
Livy XLII, 47, 9. below, 42, n. 23.
49
XXXII, I3.
52
Historia
i960, 340.
50
xxxvI, 2.
3
ib., 319-22.
51
Plut., Cato mai. 27, 3; App., Lib.
69;
Diod.
54
L. Ross Taylor, JRS I962, 19-27, especially
XXXIV, 33, 4-6 (based on Poseidonius). See Gelzer, 21 ff.
6 F. W. WALBANK
POLITICAL MORALITY AND THE FRIENDS OF SCIPIO
As
regards
the
argument
that the Romans
had, according
to
Polybius, already
made
up
their
minds,
this does not seem to exclude the other discussion and indeed
Appian gives
both. The
Senate,
he
says,55
had decided to make
war,
but
delayed
for the moment the
actual resolution for war
through
lack of a
prophasis-which
is of course
precisely Polybius'
argument.
This
gave
a
breathing space during
which the rival
arguments
of Cato and
Nasica could be thrashed
out;
and it is
specifically
with the
question
of
keeping
a
salutary
threat,
and not with the
question
of
having
a
plausible
excuse for
war,
that
Scipio
Nasica's
name is linked. In
fact, however,
both
Polybius
and
Appian may
well be
exaggerating
the
firmness of the Senate's decision in the late
5o's
to make
war,
for there is an earlier occasion
in the
history
of Rome and
Carthage
where
Polybius oversimplifies
the Senate's
position.
I refer to the outbreak of the war with Hannibal. ' The
Romans,' says Polybius,56
' when
the news of the fall of
Saguntum
reached
them,
most
certainly
did not hold a debate on the
question
of
war,
as some authors
allege
.... For how could the
Romans,
who a
year ago
had announced to the
Carthaginians
that their
entering
the
territory
of
Saguntum
would be
regarded
as a casus
belli,
now when the
city
itself had been taken
by assault,
assemble to
debate whether
they
should
go
to war or not ?' On this occasion the annalistic tradition
(less jealous
than
Polybius
for the
reputation
of
Rome)
records considerable
opposition
to
the war before and after the fall of
Saguntum;
57
and Hoffmann has himself demonstrated 58
that the
embassy
to
Carthage
will not have left Rome before
i5th
March
218, though
Saguntum
fell in late autumn or
early winter, 219. But such
delay
did not fit
Polybius'
picture
of Roman
policy
at the time
(probably
derived from
Fabius),
hence he discounted it.
Similarly,
his
picture
of Roman motivation in
I5o-clearly
a much-debated and contro-
versial
question,
as his outline of the Greek views about Roman
policy
makes
clear-may
well have been tailored to fit a
general theory
of Roman action at this time. Nasica's views
were almost
certainly
not those of
Aemilianus, nor were
they
those of his friend
Polybius.
Nasica had
argued
that
Carthage
must be maintained so as to ensure internal
harmony
at
Rome.
Polybius,
on the
contrary,
in the course of his discussion of the Roman constitution,
which was
probably published
all about the same
time, asserted that ' when the Romans
are freed from fears from abroad
(TrCv
EKTOS p63cov)
and
reap
the
consequent prosperity,
any tendency
to excess and
disproportion
is countered
by
the checks of the mixed constitu-
tion, which
automatically
restores the
equilibrium.'59 Thus, in his
opinion,
the Roman
mixed constitution itself contained sufficient built-in
guarantees
to
preserve
internal
harmony
so
long
as it was maintained intact. And so he let his account of the outbreak of the Third
Punic War follow the
pattern already
outlined for the Dalmatian war-a united Senate clear
on the
desirability
of
fighting
and concerned
primarily
to find a
pretext
that would look
most
convincing
to
foreigners
who
might
judge
Roman
policy. Whether, like
Appian,
he
also mentioned Nasica's
arguments,
we cannot tell;
59a
but he is
unlikely
to have
given
them
much
prominence,
for the reason I have
just suggested.
V
Concerning
the attitude he attributed to the Senate, Polybius carefully
refrains from
expressing
his own
approval
or
disapproval;
for even if we assume the words nova et nimis
callida
sapientia
in
Livy
to be
adapted
from
Polybius-and
this seems
reasonably
certain-
they
are
given only
as the view of the older
patres,
veteres et moris
antiqui
memores,
who hark
back with
regret
to those
days
of
high principle,
when the Senate would turn over a
potential
poisoner
to
Pyrrhus,
and
always
declared war before
waging it;
60
they
do not
necessarily
represent
the view of
Polybius. Clearly
he believed that Roman
practice
had
changed;
this
is admitted both
by
the more conservative section of the Senate and by the Greeks who
criticize Roman actions in the Third Punic
War;
and it is at first
sight tempting
to link this
change
with the moral
loosening
which
Polybius
also detects in Rome after she has
begun
to
fight
and win her overseas wars in Greece.
This moral
change
had of course been detected earlier:
Polybius
did not need
lynx-
eyes
to reveal it. As
early
as
i84
Cato's
censorship
had been celebrated
by
the erection of
55
App., Lib. 69. Gnomon 1957, 409 (= Ki. Schr. in, 21I),
who argues
56
III, 20,
i
ff. that the names of the legates are invented.
57
Livy xxi, 6, 7; i6,
2; Dio, fg.
55
; Zon. viii, 59 vi, 8, 5-8.
22 ; Otto, Hist. Zeit.
145 (1932), 5I3.
59a
xxxvi, i,
i is perhaps against it.
58
Hoffmann, Rh. Mus. 1951, 77 ff.: contra Gelzer,
60
Livy XLII, 47, 9 if.
7
a statue in the
temple
of Salus with an
inscription stating
that ' when the Roman state was
tottering
to its
fall,
he was made censor and
by helpful guidance,
wise restraints and sound
teachings
restored it
again
'.61 Restored
it, yes,
but not
permanently. Nearly twenty years
later,
when Aemilianus was a
young man,
his virtue was
already exceptional.
Most
youths,
Polybius
tells
us,62
no doubt with some
exaggeration
in the interest of
Scipio,
had at this
time abandoned themselves to love affairs with
boys
or taken to
frequenting
the
company
of
prostitutes; they spent
their time at concerts and
dinner-parties
and
generally
led
extravagant lives, paying
a talent for a
boy-favourite
and
300
drachmas for a
jar
of caviare.
At this
point Polybius sententiously quotes
a
saying
of Cato
deducing
the
likely
ruin of the
republic
from such
goings-on. Obviously
these were all
danger-signals
and
Polybius
with
his
strong
moral
purpose
is
quick
to
point
them out and to contrast them with the kind of
behaviour he admires : in the individual this means the
qualities possessed by
Aemilianus-
moderation
(cppoo6uvr ), generosity
and
integrity
in
money
matters
(iTEpi
TOc
XpeCrc
EyeyacovuXfc
Kcxic
KCi
c
KaapoTl)
and
courage (v58pEia) ;63
and in a nation
political stability
64
in the face of inside or outside
threats,
and a
capacity
for
building
an
empire.65 Naturally
these
qualities
in the state derive from the
right qualities
in its
citizens;
indeed
Polybius
is
disposed
to assess these
personal qualities
on a utilitarian
standard, just
as for
example
the
possession by
Rome of a well-established
state-religion
is
judged
on the basis of its social
usefulness.66 A man who is
open
to bribes
(as
most Greeks were
67)
is an unreliable
guardian
of his
country's
interests
;
and without a
strong religion,
the
people get
out of hand and
no one
displays any
financial
integrity.68
These
things
were
important
TOO TAr100'ou XapV,
for the sake of the
people.
There is no evidence that
Polybius regarded
their absence from
an individual or a state as
laying
them
open
to condemnation on
purely
ethical
grounds,
or
was indeed in the least interested in that
aspect.
In
fact,
in
judging any
action of a
government,
the criterion
Polybius adopts
is
generally
utilitarian : was it conducive to the
stability
or
power
to
expand
of the state in
question
?
And since that is
so, there is no reason to
suppose
that he
regarded
what
may
look to
us,
and
certainly
looked to some
contemporaries,
as Machiavellian decisions on the
part
of
Rome,
as indicative of moral decline. With this in mind, let us now examine in more detail
the
arguments
which he
quotes
as
having
been
brought
forward
by
the Greeks in their
assessment of Roman
policy
towards
Carthage.69
VI
Four
arguments
are
reported.
The first view is
sympathetic
to the Roman action in
destroying Carthage.
The
Romans,
it was
urged,
had acted in a wise and statesmanlike
manner in defence of their
empire (ppovi,cos Kcai
TrpayaorirtKos
uovuEcaaaOal
TrEpi TTp
S
buvcaorcEia).
Carthage had
frequently disputed
the
supremacy
with them
(rplicrP3rT1-nKvicav
. V.T.
1iJrp
Tr
iyEIovica)
and
might
do so
again.
To secure the dominion of their own
country
(TrIv
&pxi2v)
was the act of
far-sighted
men. This is not a
question
of
security
: it is not the
safety
of Rome that is at stake-that is nowhere the view to which
Polybius
subscribes-but
her
empire.
The
reply
to
this, which
Polybius quotes next, is that the destruction of
Carthage
is a
departure
from the
principles
(wTpoaipEcyts)
which had
previously governed
Roman
policy.
Hitherto
they
had been satisfied to
fight only
until their
opponents
had submitted and
agreed
to
obey
(avyXcopacyai
... O'r 5&ET TrEiOEOeci
cqici).
The new
policy,
first adumbrated
in their elimination of the
kingdom
of
Macedonia, was to annihilate their
opponents-in
this case
despite
the fact that
Carthage
had
accepted
all the conditions
put
to them. In
adopting
these methods Rome was
giving
herself
up
to a lust for domination like Athens
and
Sparta
and would end like
them-presumably, Polybius means, as a
tyrannical city,
for
I do not think, with Hoffmann,70 that
Polybius
is here
attributing
to his
spokesmen
a
forecast of the ultimate fall of Rome.
61
Plut., Cato mai. 19, 3 ; cf. Walbank, Commentary
67
XVIII, 34, 7.
on Polybius I, 647-8.
68
vI, 56, 11-15.
62
XXXI, 25, 3
ff.
69
XXXVI, 9.
63
XXXI, 25, 2; 25, 9; 29, I. 70
Historia I960, 311 ;
it is of course true that
64
cf. Book
VI
passim,
and
especially 56, I-5. neither Athens nor Sparta maintained her dominant
65
VI, 50, 3-6. position for long ;
that of Sparta lasted only twelve
66
VI, 56,
6 if. years (i, 2,
3).
8 F. W. WALBANK
POLITICAL MORALITY AND THE FRIENDS OF SCIPIO
The
policy
which the second
group
advocate is one which the Romans themselves had
in the
past
claimed to follow. In the conference
following Cynoscephalae
it was
specifically
advocated
by Flamininus,
who remarked 71 that the Romans never exterminated their
adversaries after a
single war,
and that brave men
ought
to be hard on their enemies in
battle,
if
conquered they
should be
yEvvacot KCti
PEycaX6povES
and if victorious
moderate, gentle
and
humane, IUErplOi
Kcai
TrpcEiS
KCXi
qPliAvepcoiToi.
At first
sight
this
might appear
to be
Polybius'
view too. For in a
passage criticizing
the behaviour of the
Carthaginians
in
Spain
after the death of the two
Scipios
72 he remarks that
they
made the mistake of
treating
the natives in an
overbearing
manner-' for
they imagined
that there is one method
by
which
power
should be
acquired
and another
by
which it should be
maintained; they
had
not learnt that those who preserve their
supremacy
best are those who adhere to the same
principles by
which
they originally
established it.' The reason of course is that ' with a
change
of character in the rulers the
disposition
of their
subjects changes
likewise
',
and from
being
allies and friends
they
turn to enemies. This
clearly
commits
Polybius
to
approval
of a
policy
of mild rule-on utilitarian
grounds:
and it is because of these utilitarian
grounds
that one
may
not conclude that he was therefore
opposed
to Roman
policy against
Carthage
in the Third Punic War. For
obviously
if
you propose
after
defeating
a
people
to
make them
your subjects
and
go
on
ruling
them-as the Romans had done in
Italy-a
generous policy
of
parcere
subiectis
may yield
the best results. But if instead of
governing
your
defeated
enemy you decide,
on
general grounds
of
policy,
to exterminate him,
as the
Athenians had exterminated the Melians, that is
quite
another matter,
and from a utilitarian
point
of view
may prove equally
effective and so
praiseworthy.
The
reply
of the second
group
of Greeks is in fact based
ultimately
on ethical
grounds-exterminating your
defeated
enemy
is to behave like a
tyrant,
and to behave like a
tyrant
is a bad
thing.
It does not
begin
to meet the
arguments
of the first
group,
which are based on self-interest,
but
attempts
to
shift the basis of the discussion. It is hard to believe that it
represents Polybius'
view.
The third
argument put
forward
by
the Greeks is
again
one critical of Rome,
and is
really only
a variant on the second. It is almost word for word the criticism levelled
by
the
older Roman senators
against Q.
Marcius
Philippus
on the eve of the Third Macedonian
War-namely
that the Romans had hitherto
prided
themselves on certain
principles
in the
declaring
and
waging
of
war, excluding night
attacks and ambushes and all kinds of deceit
and
sharp practice.
But
against Carthage they
had used both, at once
offering
and
concealing
things simultaneously
until
they
had forced their
enemy
into a false and
disadvantageous
position.
' This savoured more of the
procedure
of a
tyrant
than of a civilized state,
and could
only
be described as
impiety
and
treachery (&crEo3-rma
Kaci
Trapacr-Tr6ov81a.).'
This accusation
is an
attempt
to
judge
Rome in the
light
of her own
professions
and
against
the
background
of the iustum bellum and
integrity
of
policy
which had counted for so much in the Roman
iTpoacipEcns
and had enabled the Senate to make
great capital
of their
charges
of
perfidia
Punica. In
Polybius'
text it is
developed
at some
length
and takes
up
sixteen lines. The fact
that the fourth
group,
who
reply
to
it,
are allowed
just
over
thirty
lines for their answer is an
indication of its seriousness and
perhaps
even more of where
Polybius'
own
sympathies lay.
The
reply
once more takes the well-known form of
shifting
the
ground
of the accusation.
This was based
fundamentally
on moral issues-on a moral code and whether or not it
had been
kept.
The answer of the
supporters
of Roman
policy
reduces the
question
to
one of
legality.
The
Carthaginians,
it is
pointed out,
had handed themselves over in
fidem
populi
Romani and in so
doing
had of course
given away
all their
right
to
challenge
the
Roman
orders;
hence there was no
question
of
impiety (a&c'3rlaE
)
or
treachery (Trapacirov-
8rina).
Indeed some
people argued
that there was not even a
question
of
injustice.
The text
then
goes
on to
analyse
the nature of adcrEpla-a sin
against
the
gods, against parents
or
against
the
dead,
of
TrapacxcaT6v5lTla-a
violation of sworn or written
agreements,
and
of
&diKrla-
what is done
contrary
to law and custom. It was an
easy
matter to show that
the Romans had not sinned
against
the
gods, against
their
parents
or
against
the dead
(which
ruled out
impiety)
and that
they
had not violated
any
sworn
agreement
or
treaty
(which
ruled out
treachery).
Indeed it was the
Carthaginians
themselves who had broken
the
treaty
when
they
attacked Masinissa!
Nor, finally,
did the Romans break
any
laws or
71
XVii, 37
, 2 f.
; 7-
9
72
x, 36,
2f.
customs or their word:
they simply
received an act of deditio and when the
Carthaginians
refused to
obey
their
orders, they
resorted to force. The whole
weight
of the moral issue
is thus
neatly
thrust aside
by
an
apparent
resort to sweet reason and
logical
definition. The
intangibles-the long
series of
unjust decisions,
the Numidian
provocation,
the
atmosphere
in which
Carthage
was led into a false
step
and then
buoyed up
with the
illusory hope
of
generous
treatment-all these are left out. The Romans were in a
morally impregnable
position,
so
long
as one
kept
to strict
definitions,
which seem almost
designed
to facilitate
the dismissal of the
charges
made.
It must have been
along
these lines that the
supporters
of a ' firm '
policy
towards
Carthage attempted
to counter the
charges
made
by
those
opponents
who
argued,
not like
Nasica that the destruction of
Carthage
was
contrary
to Roman
interest,
but that the
way
it was
being engineered
was discreditable to Rome's
reputation
as a state founded on moral
principles.
The
supporters
of that
policy
included
Scipio Aemilianus,
who was the
agent
of its
implementation,
and
Polybius,
who followed the whole
operation through
from
Scipio's headquarters,
will
certainly
have
sympathized
with it. We saw earlier that in
analysing
the
period following Pydna
Polybius
drew a distinction between the immediate
aftermath and the
period
of
TrcpoaX)i
KOai KivrlcYt
about which he wrote ' as if
starting
on a
new work'
;
and we saw that this later
period
coincided with his own release from his
restrictions as a detainee in
Italy
and the
opportunity
which this
brought
to
play
a more
active
part
in world
politics
at
Carthage
and in Greece. In his account of the first
period
his attitude towards Rome is
cynical
and
detached; in the second,
when he is
emotionally
committed,
he sees the
policy
of Rome's
opponents
as irrational and insane. This has
already
been illustrated from what he has to
say
about the Macedonians and the Greeks.
The
Carthaginians
come out of it
hardly any
better. Hasdrubal,
their
leader,
is described
as an
empty-headed braggart lacking
in statesmanlike or
military capacity.73
His lack of
realism in
facing
the
certainty
that
Carthage
was doomed strikes no chord of
sympathy
in
Polybius,
who thinks he is
simply
a
fool,
and
goes
out of his
way
to describe his
unlovely
personal appearance-pot-bellied
and red in the face because he had continued his
feasting
amid his
people's
distress. The Greeks and
Carthaginians
were alike in their leaders at
this time of crisis.
There can, therefore,
be little doubt that
Polybius accepts
the Roman case over
Carthage;
and this creates a
strong presumption
that in
general
he
accepted
the ' new
diplomacy
'
as the
legitimate
instrument of an
imperially-minded state, including
the elimi-
nation of
dangerous
or
intransigent opponents.
Flamininus had outlined the older
policy
of
parcere
subiectis in his defence of Roman
policy
in Macedonia
against
Aetolian criticism.
To
Polybius
its
practicability
was
dubious,
as another
passage
makes
plain.
At a difficult
moment in the Third Macedonian War Perseus sent
envoys offering
terms. ' It was
unanimously decided,' Polybius records,74
' to
give
as severe a
reply
as
possible,
it
being
in
all cases the traditional custom of the Romans to show themselves most
imperious
and
severe in times of defeat and most lenient after success. That this is noble conduct
(KcxAov),'
he adds,
'
everyone
would admit, but
perhaps
it is
open
to doubt if it is
possible
under
certain circumstances.' It is not
quite
clear whether it is the
feasibility
of
toughness
in time
of trouble or of lenience in time of
success-parcere
subiectis-that
Polybius
finds
dubious;
perhaps
both.
For,
besides the
arguments
I have
already quoted,
there is evidence which
points
to his
having
believed that in some circumstances an
imperial
state was
justified
in
adopting
a
policy
not of mildness but of
frightfulness
or terrorism.
In
chapters
2 and
4
of book xxxii, Diodorus has some
interesting
remarks on Roman
policy,
for which Gelzer has
convincingly argued
75
that
Polybius
was the
original
source.
According
to this
passage,
which
probably belongs
to the introduction to the
book, Diodorus
states that
'
those whose
object
is to
gain hegemony
over others use
courage
and
intelligence
(&V5pEica
Kicxi
ovvcET)
to
acquire it, moderation and consideration for others
(-rrtEKEi
Ki<ca
piAcavepcowTfi)
to extend it
widely,
and
paralysing
terror
(qp63oS
Kaci
KacrrtnTAirts)
to secure
it
against
attack'. Two
chapters
further on Diodorus
gives
as
examples
in
support
of this
73
xxxvIII, , 7 ; see further on Hasdrubal 290 ff.
=
Kl. Schr. II, 64 iff.; Adcock, Camb. Hist.
XXXVIII, 20.
Journ. I946, 127-8; Bilz, Die Politik des P. Cornelius
74xxvii, 8, 8. Scipio Aemilianus
(Wiirzburg, 1935), 3I ; Astin,
75
Diod. xxxII, 2 and
4;
cf. Gelzer, Phil.
I931,
Latomus
1956, i8o; Strasburger, below, 46,
n.
58.
IO F. W. WALBANK
POLITICAL MORALITY AND THE FRIENDS OF SCIPIO
doctrine the careers of
Philip
II and Alexander of
Macedon,
and the
Romans;
and
though
it is clear from the instances
quoted
from
Philip
and Alexander that the three
stages-
acquisition,
extension and
securing
of
empire-are
not
necessarily envisaged
as
always
following
that
chronological order,
in the case of Rome the use of
paralysing
terror coincides
with the third
stage
when
they
razed Corinth to the
ground,
rooted out the Macedonians
(Perseus
is
meant), destroyed Carthage
and the Celtiberian
city
of
Numantia,
and cowed
many by
terror.
Book
xxxII of Diodorus covers the Third
Punic,
Fourth Macedonian and Achaean
Wars,
for which
Polybius
is his
source;
it seems
virtually
certain that these
general
remarks are
also from him. As Adcock
plausibly observes,76
'
Polybius probably yielded
to the
tempta-
tion to defend Roman
frightfulness by treating
it as
though
it followed some kind of natural
law'. He had a
strong
incentive to do so. The elimination of Perseus was the direct result
of the
victory
of Aemilius
Paulus,
who
subsequently
carried out a more direct
programme
of terrorism in
Epirus; Carthage
and Numantia were
destroyed by Polybius'
friend and
pupil, Scipio Aemilianus,
the latter on his own initiative without
waiting
for the decision of
the
Senate;
and if the fall of Corinth had no direct connection with
Polybius'
friends,
it
was the outcome of a
policy
in Achaea for which he
expresses
his
unmitigated
condemna-
tion,
and the
prelude
to a
period
of reconstruction in which he was to
play
a most effective
and
flattering
role.
I
think, then, we
may
take it as established that
Polybius
saw Roman
policy
from the
time of the Third Punic War onwards as
intelligently organized
to maintain the
empire
which a
happy
combination of
Tyche
and Roman merit had
successfully acquired; very
properly
it did not
pay
too much
regard
to sentiment where
political
interests were con-
cerned, and took account of such traditional
concepts
as the bellum iustum and
proper
fetial
procedure
in the declaration of wars
only
in so far as these had their
practical repercussions
on
public opinion.
It is a
pretty
ruthless
approach;
but
Polybius
was ruthless,
and success
was
apt
to be his main criterion. This can be seen from his lack of
sympathy
for failure in
peoples
or individuals. Politics is a
risky game
and if, like those Greeks who had made the
mistake of
backing
Perseus of Macedon and
carrying
their cities with them, you lost,
then
the
right
course was to face the situation and
perish bravely;
77
no one,
he
says,
could
approve
men like the brothers
Hippocritus
and Diomedon at Cos, or Deinon and
Polyaratus
at Rhodes, who were known to have done all
they
could to further Perseus' cause, yet
could
not
bring
themselves to commit suicide.
They
did not leave to
posterity
the
slightest ground
for
pitying
or
pardoning
them.
Similarly generals
who have staked all on success and failed
and then cannot resolve to
perish
on the field add
disgrace
and shame to their disaster:
Hasdrubal earns
praise
for
avoiding
this fate at the Metaurus.78 The same ruthlessness in
demanding consistency
of action can be illustrated from
Polybius'
account of what
happened
when
Philip
was
attacking Abydus
and the citizens had sworn that if fortune went
against
them
they
would
slaughter
all the women and children and die
fighting;
after the most
horrible scenes of
carnage
in battle Glaucides and
Theognetus
called
together
a few of the
elder citizens and, Polybius says,
' sacrificed in the
hopes
of
personal advantage
all that was
splendid
and admirable in the resolution of the citizens
by deciding
to save the women and
children alive and to send out . . . the
priests
and
priestesses
to
Philip
to
beg
for
mercy
and surrender the
city
to him '.79 It is
interesting
to observe that when he tells this
story
from
Polybius Livy
cuts out all
praise
of the
Abydene resolve; to his
Augustan sensibility
the whole affair was one of unrelieved horror.80
VII
So much for
Polybius'
moral criteria. We can now return to his
programme.
As we
saw,
he had
appended
his account of Roman
policy
after
Pydna
with the
express purpose
of
enabling readers, both now and in the
future, to
judge
Roman rule,
and to estimate not
merely
how successful it was from the
point
of view of Roman
security
and the
preservation
of
empire but, to
repeat
his own words, so that
'
contemporaries
will be able to see
clearly
76
1.c.
(n. 75).
79
XVI, 3 I-3.
77
xxx, 7, 2-4.
80
Livy xxxi, I7.
78
XI, 2, I-I I .
II
whether Roman rule is
acceptable
or the reverse and future
generations
whether their
government
should be considered
worthy
of
praise
and admiration or rather of blame'.
Acceptable
or the
reverse, q)EUcriv q r ToIavriov
aipE?Tnlv:
acceptable
to whom ? The
implication
of these words is that the Roman
empire
is to be
judged
from the
point
of view
of the
subject peoples-to
which
Polybius
himself
belongs;
and his somewhat
cynical
and
detached attitude towards the evidence for Roman
policy
which he
quotes
for the
years
between I68
(or earlier)
and about
15
1
might
seem to
give
some basis for such a
judgement.
From the
point
of view of the
vanquished
this would
hardly
have been favourable to
Rome,
for
throughout
these
years,
as we
saw,
Rome
pursued
her own ends
by
the most Machiavel-
lian
means,
wars were entered into
(as
in
Dalmatia)
at the time Rome chose and to further
Roman
ends;
and Roman decisions were
given
to suit her own
private
interests rather than
the course of
justice.
But with the time of
TcapoXpc(
KOa KivracYi there is a subtle but unmistak-
able
change
in
Polybius' judgement.
From this
point
onwards he becomes more and more
identified with Roman
policy
of the most ruthless kind. All discussions
concerning
the
rights
and
wrongs
of this
policy,
for
example
the Greek views on the Third Punic
War,
approach
the
question
from the
point
of view of Rome.
Despite Polybius'
concern with
whether the Roman
empire
was
TEpvKT1r
a . . .
opET-r,
the
presentation
remains
obstinately
centred on the
ruling power,
and one is nowhere
given
the
grounds
on which one can draw
a conclusion
concerning
the
acceptability
of the Roman
empire
to the
people living
under it.
' Neither rulers themselves '
says Polybius,81
'
nor their critics should
regard
the end of
action as
being merely conquest
and the
subjection
of all to their
rule; since no man with
any intelligence goes
to war with his
neighbours simply
for the sake of
crushing
an
adversary.'
What then in
Polybius' opinion
is the end of
imperial
action ? What is the further criterion
other than the
subjection
of other states and the maintenance of one's
empire
in
safety
?
The
question
is
posed:
but nowhere in the Histories will
you
find the answer. For that the
Romans had to wait for Panaetius.
But before
considering
Panaetius' contribution it is
legitimate
first to
enquire
what
view the Romans themselves had taken of this
problem. Strictly speaking, they
had taken
no view of it at
all,
since the idea of
justifying
their
growing empire
was not one that had at
first occurred to them.
Why
should it ? Certain
things
were understood. The aristocratic
traditions of the
early republic
assumed that Rome never went to war without
good
reason;
all Roman wars conformed to the definition of the
'just
war ', provoked by
offences com-
mitted
against
either Rome or her
allies,
whose defence was an
obligation
due to
fides,
and
aggravated by
refusal to make due
reparation;
such a war was declared with due formalities
by
the
fetiales
and the Romans entered it sustained
by
a useful conviction of
self-righteous-
ness. This was an ancient
conception,
as
simple
and Roman in its
way
as
Polybius' picture
of almost automatic
expansion
from one
position
of
strength
to another was
simple
and
Greek;
and Gelzer has demonstrated
82
that it was
part
and
parcel
of the Roman
propa-
ganda presented
in the
pages
of Fabius Pictor and the other
early
senatorial historians. But
the rather different issues involved in the
possession
of an
empire hardly
reached the
consciousness of the Romans until the middle of the second
century.
It was in
156-5,
more than a decade after
Polybius
had established himself in the
family
circle of
Scipio Aemilianus,
that a famous trio of Greek
philosophers
arrived in Rome to
plead
on behalf of Athens for the remission of a fine of
500
talents
imposed by
a court of
arbitration for the
plunder
of
Oropus. They
were Carneades, the leader of the
Academy,
the Stoic
Diogenes
and Critolaus the
Peripatetic;
and
they
took the
opportunity provided
by
their
stay
in Rome to lecture on
philosophical topics.83
Carneades was a
great
master
of
eloquence-Lucilius
in one of his
poems
made
Neptune
remark of a
very knotty problem
that it could not be solved even if Orcus were to send Carneades
up again
! 84-and the
Roman
intelligentsia,
the
q)AoAoycOTrrroi
TCOV
vEavioricov,
as Plutarch calls
them,85
had never
heard
anything
like his two lectures on
Justice
and its
application
to international affairs,
81
i, 4, 9-10. Gell. VI,
I4,
8 f.; XVII, 21, 48 ; Pliny, Nat. hist. vii,
82
Gelzer, Hermes
I933,
129-I66
==
Kl. Schr. III, 30, 112.
5I-92.
84
Lucilius I, 31 Marx,' non Carneades si ipsum ...
83
Plut., Cato mai. 22
; Cic., Acad. ii, 137;
de Orcus remittat.'
orat.
II, 155 ;
Tusc.
Disp. iv, 5 ;
ad Att.
xiI, 23
;
85
Plut.,
Cato mai. 22.
12 F. W. WALBANK
POLITICAL MORALITY AND THE FRIENDS OF SCIPIO
delivered on two successive
days,
on the second of which the
speaker
refuted all the theories
which he had
put up
as an Aunt
Sally
on the
previous day.
Carneades'
devastating
attack on
justice
is known to us from L. Furius'
reproduction
of its
arguments
in Cicero's De re
publica
III
86
and from the sketch
given
in Lactantius'
Divinae Institutiones
v,
entitled de
iustitia;
87 Cicero made C. Laelius answer
Carneades,
but Lactantius
exposes
some of the weaknesses in Laelius' case. The demolition of
justice
as a
guide
to follow in international affairs was
accomplished fairly straightforwardly by
an
appeal
to the
concept
of
self-interest,
r6
onpypepov,
as
developed by
the
sophists
and
by
Thrasymachus
in Plato's
Republic
I. It was not therefore
really
new. But
expounded
in the
brilliant rhetoric of
Carneades,
which was violenta et
rapida,88
his
arguments
seemed
devastating;
and the cautious
Cato, taking
the view that
speeches
of this kind made it
impossible
to sift falsehood from
truth,89 urged
the Senate to settle the matter of the
Athenians' fine with all
speed
' so that these men
may
return to their schools and lecture
to the sons of
Greece,
while the
youth
of Rome
give
ear to their laws and
magistrates,
as in
the
past
'.90
Polybius
was in the audience at these
lectures;
91 but there is
nothing
in the Histories
to
suggest
that he was shaken or worried
by
what Carneades had to
say.
To a Greek
already
preoccupied
with the
question
of
empire
the idea of TO
Ucrvoqppov
as a criterion of conduct
was of course familiar, and
Polybius
will have
regarded
much of Carneades' thesis as
consisting
of truisms. But for the Romans it was different. Cato's alarm was
genuine
and is
likely
to have been
widely
felt. Rome now
possessed
an
empire.
Was it indeed based on
injustice,
as Carneades said ?
Suddenly
the Romans found themselves
desperately
in need
of a
philosophy
of
empire. Polybius caught
a
glimpse
of the
problem
but that was all. As
we saw, he raised the
question
of
judging
the Roman achievement;
and
although
he
nowhere
says
that the interest of the
subject peoples
is to be
part
of the criterion in
assessing
Roman rule, on the other hand he does not
say
that he is
merely
concerned with the interest
of Rome. And indeed, if it is
only
the interest of Rome that matters, why
bother to consider
the condition of the
conquered peoples
at all ? So
Polybius
did in fact come within
measuring
distance of
formulating
the
problem;
but he failed to do so because, when he did move
beyond
the somewhat
cynical
and
objective position
of the 6o's and
50's,
it was to
identify
himself
closely
with Roman
policy
in its most ruthless
phase; consequently
both Roman
frightfulness
and Roman mansuetudo are
judged by Polybius solely
in terms of Roman
self-interest.
As
Capelle
showed
many years ago,92
Panaetius
gave
the Romans what
they
were
looking for;
and what
immediately
follows draws
widely
on his
arguments.
As a
philosopher
and
especially
as a Stoic Panaetius felt the need not
merely
to take account of the Roman
world-empire,
but also to
explain
it in moral terms. Both the Index Stoicorum
93
and Cicero
in the de
legibus94
inform us that Panaetius
published
a work on
politics;
and Cicero contrasts
it with earlier Stoic
writings
on the
subject
as
being designed
ad usum
popularem
et ciuilem.
It was
probably
this work which contained Panaetius' views on the Roman
empire;
and it
is
generally agreed
that it was Panaetius'
argument
that Cicero attributed to C. Laelius in
the De re
publica,95
as a
reply
to Carneades' views
(for
which L. Furius had served as
mouthpiece),
and that St.
Augustine
discussed in the De civitate Dei.96
Empire,
he claims,
is
just
and in accordance with nature because for certain sorts of men servitude is useful
and to their own
advantage,
in as much as it
deprives
the wicked of the
power
to do
wrong,
and makes them better
by subduing
them. The rule of an
imperial power
over its
conquered
subjects
is
comparable
to the rule of
god
over man, of the mind over the
body,
and of reason
over
passion:
it follows what is
virtually
a universal law-ueluti a natura
sumptum
nobile
exemplum. Although
he had raised the
question
of how the Roman
empire
was to be
judged,
Polybius
had failed to
lay
down
any
other criterion than the self-interest of the
imperial
power; consequently
he left the matter where Carneades left it. But Panaetius' answer
86
Cic., rep. III, 6
ff.
92
W. Capelle, Klio 1932, 86-113.
87
Lact., Div. inst. v,
14
f., especially 17 ad fin.
93
? 62.
88
Gell. vi, 14, 8-io
(quoting
Polybius and Rutilius
94
Cic., leg. III, I4.
Rufus); cf. Macrob. I, 5.
95
Cic., rep. III, 33-4I, especially 36; cf. Schmekel,
89
Pliny, Nat. hist. vII, 30. Die
Philosophie der mittleren Stoa,
55
ff. For a
90
Plut., Cato mai. 22, 5. dissenting view, see Strasburger, below, 45,
n. 50.
91
Gell. vi, 14, 10.
96
Aug., Civ. Dei. XIX, 21.
I3
rests, ostensibly,
on
justice,
if we
accept
that definition of
justice
which is common to Plato
and the Stoics,97 viz. the
assigning
to each
party
of what is
appropriate
to it and in accordance
with its deserts.
This
theory,
as
Capelle showed, goes
back in essentials to the doctrines of Plato and
Aristotle on
slavery.98
Both these
philosophers
found a
justification
for
slavery
in the belief
that some men are
designed by
nature to be slaves
(piocrE1 5o0Uoi),
while others are
naturally
fitted to be their masters. Stoicism had refused to
recognize
such distinctions as
real;
and
therefore it
represents
a modification of Stoic doctrine when Panaetius
employs
this Aristo-
telean ethic
governing
the relations between men as individuals as the basis of a
theory
justifying
the domination of whole
peoples by
others. One need not
necessarily accept
Pohlenz's view
99
that Panaetius was
acting
as the
mouthpiece
of the
Scipionic circle;
but
we
may
be sure that his views were welcome to the aristocratic Roman
group
in which he
moved. His
philosophical exposition
coincided
conveniently
with the traditional
pattern
of
caste distinctions and the mutual relations of
patrons
and clients which coloured so
large
an area of Roman
thought
and
custom,
and which, as Badian has shown,100 had
already
made its
impression upon
one field of
foreign policy,
that in which the amicitia which bound
several small
powers
to Rome was conceived as the
relationship
of clients towards their
patrons.
There are such obvious flaws both in Panaetius'
theory
of
empire
and in the
theory
of
slavery
on which it was based that we
experience
some
difficulty
in
regarding
either as
wholly
sincere. But these should not blind us to the
importance
of his formulation. This
gave
the Roman
aristocracy
a
justification
of the Roman
empire
which satisfied their
consciences and flattered their
feelings
of self-esteem, and it
provided
a doctrine which can
be traced in later
years.
The
precise relationship
of Poseidonius' views to those of his
teacher Panaetius is a well-known
crux;
101
but
Capelle
seems to have established the fact
that Poseidonius
approved
both Panaetius'
general theory
and its
application
to the Roman
empire.
In the first
place
he was able to
support
it with a concrete and relevant
example
of a
people
not
only designed by
nature to be
subjected
but-what is more unusual-itself
aware of the fact.102 For the
Mariandyni,
Poseidonius related in the eleventh book of his
Histories, recognizing
their innate weakness of intellect
(6ia
T6
T-rs iacxvoiak
acr0evEs)
delivered themselves
up voluntarily
into servitude to more
intelligent
men and became the
serfs of the
people
of Heraclea
Pontica, on condition that their needs should be satisfied
and
they
should not be sold outside the
territory
of the
city.
What the Heracleotes were able
to do
peaceably,
thanks to the
co-operation
of the inferior
people,
the Romans had done in
many parts
of the world more
violently,
but
equally
to the mutual
advantage
of both
parties-as
Poseidonius was able to show in the case of several
Spanish peoples
now
profiting
from the
pax
Romana.103
In
support
of this
interpretation
of Poseidonius'
thought Capelle
also
quotes
one of
Seneca's letters
(90)
in which Poseidonius is
specifically quoted
for the view that in the
golden age power
was in the hands of
sapientes
who
protected
the weak and rendered it
unnecessary
to have those laws which were instituted once
corruption
had set in and
king-
ship
had
changed
into
tyranny.
In this letter Seneca asserts that' naturae . . . est, potioribus
deteriora submittere ', and illustrates the
point
both from the world of nature where the
tallest
elephant
leads the herd, and from the world of men where
'
pro
summo est
optimum'
and where
early
man entrusted himself to the best, commissi melioris arbitrio. There can,
I
think,
be little doubt that Poseidonius is the source of all this and not
only
for the remark
about the
golden age.104
It is true that there is a difference between the rule of the
stronger
and the rule of the better, but it is a difference which can be
bridged
by
such an
evolutionary
97
Plato, rep. I, 33I f.; SVF III, fg. 262; it is also 101 cf. Seel, Ronisches Denken und r6mischer Staat
known to Aristotle, Eth. Nic. v, 5, II3ob, 31; vi, (Berlin, 1937), 96; see, however, Strasburger, below,
I I
3 a, 24 (but
he regards it as only
one form of
justice). 44
if.
Cf. Walbank, Commentary, on vi, 6, I I.
102
Athen. vi, 263C
=
FGH 87, F 8
;
cf.
Capelle,
98
For Plato slavery is not a problem: cf.
rep. v, op.
cit.
(n. 92), 99-100.
469 B-C; legg. 766B, 778A. For a defence of the
103
cf. Strabo III, 144; 154; I56 (cf. i63);
institution see Arist., Pol. I, especially 3-7. Capelle, loc. cit.
99
Pohlenz, RE,
'
Panaitios,' cols. 437-8.
104
cf. T. Cole, Historia I964, 451, who, however,
100
cf. Foreign Clientelae (Oxford, I958),
I, f., draws a distinction between Poseidonius' view and
55
ff. that of Polybius.
I4
F. W. WALBANK
POLITICAL MORALITY AND THE FRIENDS OF SCIPIO
concept
as we find in
Polybius'
account of
political development
in his sixth book.105 There
the
primitive
monarchos shifts the basis of his
power
from sheer
might
to moral
pre-eminence
and
thereby
becomes a basileus: and the reference in this letter of Seneca to the
perversion
of
regnum
into
tyrannis
shows that Poseidonius was
dealing
with a similar
range
of ideas.
Seel has
argued,
in criticism of
Capelle's view,
first that
only
the reference to the
golden
age
in this letter of Seneca
belongs
to
Poseidonius,
and
secondly
that Poseidonius saw
the
identity
of
might
and
right,
which lies behind Panaetius'
theory
of
imperialism,
as a
characteristic
only
of the
golden age.106
Neither
argument is,
I
think, cogent.
I am not
impressed by
Seel's
attempt
to
distinguish
in Letter 90 Seneca's own views from those of
Poseidonius. And the fact that Poseidonius saw this rule potioribus deteriora submittere
exemplified
in a
particularly
refined and Platonic form in the saeculum aureum need not
exclude its existence in other forms at other
times,
for instance in the cases of the
Spaniards
and the
Mariandyni.l106
Seel is I think
right
when he
argues
that if
pushed
to its
logical
extreme Panaetius'
theory
could become an
argument against
the
legitimacy
of Roman
predominance.
For the
Greeks,
whose culture and
humanity
were at least
equal
to if not
greater
than that of the
Romans,
would
by
that token be
justified
in
claiming independence
from Roman
subjection;
107 and if
indeed,
as
Capelle argued,
Panaetius saw the ultimate
end of the
imperial relationship
as one in which the
subject peoples
were raised to the moral
level of their rulers,
then it had within it the seeds of its own destruction.
This is
ultimately true, as modern
experience
has shown. For where
imperialism
has
been
interpreted
in this Panaetian
sense,
it has
undoubtedly
assisted the movement of
colonial
peoples
to
independence.
It was also
ultimately
true for
Rome, for,
as I
hope
to
indicate below, the Panaetian
theory
of
empire
was to be a factor in the
changing relationship
between Rome and the
provinces
which is so
striking
a characteristic of the
Principate.
But
this is not an
argument against
the view that Panaetius'
theory
was welcomed
by
the
Romans,
for it fulfilled an immediate need and
gave
the answer to an instant and
pressing problem.
In such circumstances it is not in human nature to work out the ultimate
implications
of
what one is
accepting;
and it is
only,
it
seems, by
a
pure paradox
that Panaetius'
theory
can
be
regarded
as a threat to the
security
of the
empire
in the second
century
B.C. It was
certainly widely accepted. Livy
108
describes how the
loyalty
of the Roman allies in
Italy
in the face of war and devastation at the hands of Hannibal was to be
explained
' because
they
were ruled
by
a
just
and moderate
imperium and,
what constitutes the one bond of
loyalty
(fides),
they
did not refuse to
obey
their betters (melioribus parere)
'.
Panaetius' doctrine of
imperialism
as a beneficial
symbiosis
of victors and
vanquished
carried
far-reaching
implications.
It
helped
the Romans
gradually
to assume the
obligations
that
empire imposes.
The Roman
principles
enunciated
by
Flamininus to the Aetolians
and recorded with
personal
reservations as to their
practicability by Polybius-namely
that
you
treated
your enemy mildly
once he was beaten-could now be
developed
with all the
support
of a formal
philosophical doctrine;
and if this was slow to find
practical application
under the
republic,
the
setting up
of the
Principate brought
its full
expression
as an
imperial
ideal, especially
when the
original
notion of the mutual
advantage
of rulers and ruled was
transmuted and vitalized
by
the
specifically
Roman notion of
progressive Romanization,
leading step by step
to a
proportionately greater
share in
privilege.
When Petillius Cerialis
harangues
the Gauls in A.D.
70
after their
revolt,
these are the
arguments
Tacitus
puts
into his mouth:
109
'All is common between us. You often
command our
legions.
You
govern
these and other
provinces.
There is no
privilege,
no
exclusion.... Therefore love and cherish
peace
and the
city
in which we
enjoy
an
equal
right, conquered
and
conquerors
alike.' This is a long
way
from the
Mariandyni surrendering
themselves as serfs to the Heracleotes,
or even from the Gauls' own
experience
of Caesar's
wars. But common both to Poseidonius'
story
and to Cerialis'
imperial programme
is the
concept
of a
relationship
of mutual
advantage,
such as could never have
developed
out of the
unilateral view of
empire,
which Carneades
expounded
and
Polybius
found himself unable
105
VI, 5, 9-7, 3.
107
So Seel, op. cit. 64 ff.
106
cf. Seel, op. cit. (n. ioi), 64 ff. 108 Livy xxii, 13, II ; cf. Capelle, op. cit. (n. 92),
106a
Naturally it need not represent Poseidonius' 97.
total
judgement on the role of Rome (see Strasburger,
109
Tac., Hist. IV, 74.
below, 40 ff.).
I5
POLITICAL MORALITY AND THE FRIENDS OF SCIPIO
to transcend. From
Panaetius,
more
directly,
these ideas of
empire
and the moral
duty
of
the ruler towards the ruled were
passed
down to Lactantius and
Augustine
and
through
them,
as
Capelle
has
observed, they
exercised a
by
no means
negligible
influence on mediaeval
thought; and,
as I have
suggested,
it is
perhaps
not
wholly
naive to detect them
lurking
behind the
theory
of
trusteeship
towards less
developed peoples,
which has
helped
to
transform
imperialism
and has
played
a
part
in its eradication in
many parts
of Africa.
VIII
Our
conclusion, then,
is somewhat ironical.
Polybius,
the student of
practical politics
and the observer of what men think and
do, interpreted
the Roman
empire
as an
expression
of men's natural
behaviour, self-seeking
and
utilitarian;
he tried on that basis to extract
some sort of lesson from the
years
after
Pydna.
His
attempt
to find a criterion for
judgement
which went
beyond
mere
conquest
and domination
proved
sterile,
because he was
increasingly
tied to the
point
of view of the
imperial power,
and it is
symbolic
that his
history
should
end,
like
Xenophon's,
in
years
of
Taparl
Kc
Ki
ivrlcr. Panaetius,
on the other hand, produced
a
picture
of the
imperial relationship
which was
manifestly
a
piece
of
special pleading
and
was
being openly disproved
before men's
eyes
as evidence of Roman
misgovernment
multiplied
and even the Senate was driven to set
up
a
permanent quaestio
de
repetundis.
Yet,
because what men believe to be their motives
may ultimately prove
the decisive factor
in
shaping
their
conduct,
the
myth
of Panaetius
eventually
became
something
like a blue-
print
for
generations
of
trustworthy
Roman civil
servants,
who lived laborious and strenuous
lives in distant
provinces,
and whose achievements are
preserved
to
posterity only by
the
chance survival of an
inscription
here and there. It was
largely
to them that the Roman
empire
owed its
greatness;
and
pondering
on what
they did,
one is made aware in a
salutary way
of the limitations of
political
realism.110
University of
Liverpool.
110
A
paper
read at the Fourth International
Congress
of Classical
Studies, Philadelphia,
on 28th
August, I964.
i6