The Temporality of the Landscape

Author(s): Tim Ingold

Reviewed work(s):
Source: World Archaeology, Vol. 25, No. 2, Conceptions of Time and Ancient Society (Oct.,
1993), pp. 152-174
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/124811 .
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T h e te mporality of th e landscape
T imIngold
Prologue
I adh e re to th at sch ool of th ough t wh ich h olds th at social or cultural anth ropology,
biological anth ropology and arch ae ology f orma ne ce ssary unity
-
th at th e y are all part of
th e same inte lle ctual e nte rprise (Ingold 1992a: 694). I amnot conce rne d h e re with th e link
with biological or 'ph ysical' anth ropology, but wh at I h ave tosaydoe s be arce ntrallyon th e
unif ying th e me s of arch ae ology and social-cultural anth ropology. I want to stre ss two such
th e me s, and th e y are close ly re late d. First, h uman lif e is aproce ss th at involve s th e passage
of time . Se cond, th is lif e -proce ss is alsoth e proce ss of f ormation of th e landscape s in wh ich
pe ople h ave live d. T ime and landscape , th e n, are to mymind th e e sse ntial points of topical
contact be twe e n arch ae ology and anth ropology. Mypurpose , in th is article , is to bring th e
pe rspe ctive s of arch ae ology and anth ropology into unison th rough a f ocus on th e
te mporality of th e landscape . In particular, I be lie ve th at such a f ocus migh t e nable us to
move be yond th e ste rile opposition be twe e n th e naturalistic vie w of th e landscape as a
ne utral, e xte rnal backdrop to h uman activitie s, and th e culturalistic vie w th at e ve ry
landscape is a particularcognitive or symbolic orde ring of space . I argue th at we sh ould
adopt, in place of both th e se vie ws, wh at I call a'dwe lling pe rspe ctive ', according to wh ich
th e landscape is constitute d as an e nduring re cord of
-
and te stimony to
-
th e live s and
works of past ge ne rations wh o h ave dwe lt with in it, and in so doing, h ave le f t th e re
some th ing of th e mse lve s.
For anth ropologists, to adopt a pe rspe ctive of th is kind me ans bringing to be ar th e
knowle dge born of imme diate e xpe rie nce , by privile ging th e unde rstandings th at pe ople
de rive f romth e ir live d, e ve ryday involve me nt in th e world. Ye t it will sure ly be obje cte d
th at th is ave nue is not ope n to arch ae ologists conce rne d with h uman activitie s in th e
distant past. 'T h e pe ople ', it is said 'th e y're de ad' (Sah lins 1972: 81); only th e mate rial
re cord re mains f or th e ir succe ssors of our own time to inte rpre t as be st th e y can. But th is
obje ction misse s th e point, wh ich is th at th e practice of arch ae ology is itse lf a f orm of
dwe lling. T h e knowle dge born of th is practice is th us on aparwith th at wh ich come s f rom
th e practical activity of th e native dwe lle r and wh ich th e anth ropologist, th rough
participation, se e ks to le arn and unde rstand. For both th e arch ae ologist and th e native
dwe lle r, th e landscape te lls
-
or rath e r is
-
a story. It e nf olds th e live s and time s of
pre de ce ssors wh o, ove r th e ge ne rations, h ave move d around in it and playe d th e ir part in
its f ormation. T o pe rce ive th e landscape is th e re f ore to carryout an act of re me mbrance ,
and re me mbe ring is not so much a matte r of calling up an inte rnal image , store d in th e
World Arch ae ology Volume 25 No. 2 Conce ptions of T ime and Ancie nt Socie ty
?C Routle dge 1993 0043-8243/93/2502/152 $3.00/i
T h e te mporalityof th e landscape 153
mind, as of e ngaging pe rce ptually with an e nvironme nt th at is itse lf pre gnant with th e past.
T o be sure , th e rule s and me th ods of e ngage me nt e mploye d re spe ctive ly by th e native
dwe lle r and th e arch ae ologist will dif f e r, as will th e storie s th e y te ll, ne ve rth e le ss - in so f ar
as both se e k th e past in th e landscape - th e y are e ngage d in proje cts of f undame ntally th e
same kind.
It is of course part of an arch ae ological training to le arn to atte nd to th ose clue s wh ich
th e re st of us migh t pass ove r (lite rally, wh e n th e y are be low th e surf ace ), and wh ich make
it possible to te ll a f ulle r or a rich e r story. Like wise , native dwe lle rs (and th e ir
anth ropological companions) le arn th rough an e ducation of atte ntion. T h e novice h unte r,
f ore xample , trave ls th rough th e countrywith h is me ntors, and as h e goe s, spe cif ic f e ature s
are pointe d out to h im. Oth e r th ings h e discove rs f or h imse lf , in th e course of f urth e r
f orays, bywatch ing, liste ning and f e e ling. T h us th e e xpe rie nce d h unte ris th e knowle dge a-
ble h unte r. He can te ll th ings f romsubtle indications th at you orI, unskille d in th e h unte r's
art, migh t not e ve n notice . Calle d upon to e xplicate th is knowle dge , h e maydo so in af orm
th at re appe ars in th e work of th e non-native e th nograph e r as acorpus of myth s or storie s,
wh e re as th e arch ae ologist's knowle dge - drawn f romth e practice s of e xcavation rath e r
th an h unting - may appe ar in th e se e mingly auth oritative f ormof th e site re port. But we
sh ould re sist th e te mptation to assume th at since storie s are storie s th e y are , in some se nse ,
unre al or untrue , f or th is is to suppose th at th e only re al re ality, or true truth , is one in
wh ich we , as living, e xpe rie ncing be ings, can h ave no part at all. T e lling astory is not like
we aving a tape stry to cove r up th e world, it is rath e r a way of guiding th e atte ntion of
liste ne rs or re ade rs into it. A pe rson wh o can 'te ll' is one wh o is pe rce ptually attune d to
picking up inf ormation in th e e nvironme nt th at oth e rs, le ss skille d in th e tasks of
pe rce ption, migh t miss, and th e te lle r, in re nde ring h is knowle dge e xplicit, conducts th e
atte ntion of h is audie nce along th e same path s as h is own.
Following th at pre amble , I sh all now go on to layout th e burde n of myargume nt. T h is is
pre se nte d in f our principal se ctions. In th e f irst two, I atte mpt to spe cif y more pre cise ly
wh at I me an bymyke yte rms
-
landscape and te mporality. I argue th at te mporalityinh e re s
in th e patte rn of dwe lling activitie s th at I call th e taskscape . In th e th ird se ction I conside r
h ow taskscape re late s to landscape and, ultimate ly by dissolving th e distinction be twe e n
th e m, I proce e d to re cove r th e te mporality of th e landscape itse lf . Finally, I draw some
concre te illustrations of my argume nts f rom a we ll-known painting by Brue ge l, T h e
Harve ste rs.
Landscape
Le t me be gin bye xplaining wh at th e landscape is not. It is not 'land', it is not 'nature ', and it
is not 'space '. Conside r, f irstof all, th e distinction be twe e n land and landscape . Land is not
some th ing you can se e , any more th an you can se e th e we igh t of ph ysical obje cts. All
obje cts of th e most dive rse kinds h ave we igh t, and it is possible to e xpre ss h ow much
anyth ing we igh s re lative to any oth e r th ing. Like wise , land is a kind of lowe st common
de nominator of th e ph e nome nal world, inh e re nt in e ve ry portion of th e e arth 's surf ace ye t
dire ctlyvisible in none , and in te rms of wh ich anyportion maybe re nde re d quantitative ly
e quivale nt to any oth e r (Ingold 1986a: 153-4). You can ask of land, as of we igh t, h ow
154 T imIngold
much th e re is, but not wh at it is like . But wh e re land is th us quantitative and
h omoge ne ous, th e landscape is qualitative and h e te roge ne ous. Supposing th at you are
standing outdoors, it is wh at you se e all around: a contoure d and te xture d surf ace re ple te
with dive rse obje cts - living and non-living, natural and artif icial (th e se distinctions are
both proble matic, as we sh all se e , but th e y will se rve f or th e time be ing). T h us at any
particularmome nt, you can ask of a landscape wh at it is like , but not h ow much of it th e re
is. For th e landscape is aple num, th e re are no h ole s in it th at re main to be f ille d in, so th at
e ve ry inf ill is in re ality a re working. As Me inig obse rve s, one sh ould not ove rlook 'th e
powe rf ul f act th at lif e must be live d amidst th at wh ich was made be f ore ' (1979a: 44).
T h e landscape is not 'nature '. Of course , nature can me an many th ings, and th is is not
th e place f or a discourse on th e h istoryof th e conce pt. Suf f ice it to say th at I h ave in mind
th e rath e rspe cif ic se nse wh ose ontological f oundation is an imagine d se paration be twe e n
th e h uman pe rce ive r and th e world, such th at th e pe rce ive r h as to re construct th e world, in
consciousne ss, priorto anyme aningf ul e ngage me nt with it. T h e world of nature , it is of te n
said, is wh at lie s 'out th e re '. All kinds of e ntitie s are suppose d to e xist out th e re , but not
you and I. We live 'in h e re ', in th e inte rsubje ctive space marke d out by our me ntal
re pre se ntations. Application of th is logic f orce s an insiste nt dualism, be twe e n obje ct and
subje ct, th e mate rial and th e ide al, ope rational and cognize d, 'e tic' and 'e mic'. Some
write rs distinguish be twe e n nature and th e landscape in just th e se te rms
-
th e f orme ris said
to stand to th e latte r as ph ysical re ality to its cultural or symbolic construction. For
e xample , Danie ls and Cosgrove introduce a colle ction of e ssays on T h e Iconograph y of
Landscape with th e f ollowing de f inition: 'A landscape is aculturalimage , apictorial wayof
re pre se nting or symbolising surroundings' (1988: 1).
I do not sh are th is vie w. T o th e contrary, I re je ct th e division be twe e n inne r and oute r
worlds -
re spe ctive ly of mind and matte r, me aning and substance
-
upon wh ich such
distinction re sts. T h e landscape , I h old, is not apicture in th e imagination, surve ye d byth e
mind's e ye ; nor, h owe ve r, is it an alie n and f ormle ss substrate awaiting th e imposition of
h uman orde r. 'T h e ide aof landscape ', as Me inig write s, 'runs counte r to re cognition of any
simple binary re lationsh ip be twe e n man and nature ' (Me inig 1979b: 2). T h us, ne ith e r is
th e landscape ide ntical to nature , nor is it on th e side of h umanityagainst nature . As th e
f amiliardomain of our dwe lling, it is with us, not against us, but it is no le ss re al f or th at.
And th rough living in it, th e landscape be come s a part of us, just as we are a part of it.
More ove r, wh at goe s f or its h uman compone nt goe s f or oth e r compone nts as we ll. In a
world construe d as nature , e ve ry obje ct is a se lf -containe d e ntity, inte racting with oth e rs
th rough some kind of e xte rnal contact. But in alandscape , e ach compone nt e nf olds with in
its e sse nce th e totality of its re lations with e ach and e ve ry oth e r. In sh ort, wh e re as th e
orde r of nature is e xplicate , th e orde r of th e landscape is implicate (Boh m 1980: 172).
T h e landscape is not 'space '. T o appre ciate th e contrast, we could compare th e e ve ryday
proje ct of dwe lling in th e world with th e rath e r pe culiar and spe cialize d proje ct of th e
surve yor or cartograph e rwh ose obje ctive is to re pre se ntit. No doubt th e surve yor, as h e
goe s about h is practical tasks, e xpe rie nce s th e landscape much as doe s e ve ryone e lse
wh ose busine ss of lif e lie s th e re . Like oth e r pe ople , h e is mobile , ye t unable to be in more
th an one place at a time . In th e landscape , th e distance be twe e n two place s, A and B, is
e xpe rie nce d as a journe y made , a bodily move me nt f romone place to th e oth e r, and th e
gradually ch anging vistas along th e route . T h e surve yor's job, h owe ve r, is to take
T h e te mporalityof th e landscape 155
instrume ntal me asure me nts f romaconside rable numbe rof place s, and tocombine th e se
datato produce a single picture wh ich is inde pe nde ntof anypointof obse rvation. T h is
picture is of th e world as itcould be dire ctlyappre h e nde d onlybyaconsciousne ss capable
of be ing e ve rywh e re at once and nowh e re in particular(th e ne are stwe can ge t toth is in
practice is by taking an ae rialor 'bird's-e ye ' vie w). T o such a consciousne ss, at once
immobile and omnipre se nt, th e distance be twe e n A and B would be th e le ngth of aline
plotte d be twe e n twopoints th atare simultane ouslyin vie w, th atline marking one of any
numbe rof journe ys th atcould pote ntiallybe made (cf . Bourdie u 1977: 2). Itis as th ough ,
f roman imaginaryposition above th e world, I could dire ctth e move me nts of mybody
with in it, like a counte ron a board, so th at to say 'I amh e re ' is not to point f rom
some wh e re to mysurroundings, buttopointf romnowh e re toth e position on th e board
wh e re my body h appe ns to be . And wh e re as actual journe ys are made th rough a
landscape , th e board on wh ich allpote ntialjourne ys maybe plotte d is e quivale nttospace .
T h e re is atradition of ge ograph ical re se arch (e .g. Gould and Wh ite 1974) wh ich se ts out
f romth e pre mise th atwe are allcartograph e rs in ourdailylive s, and th atwe use ourbodie s
as th e surve yoruse s h is instrume nts, to re giste ra se nsoryinputf rommultiple points of
obse rvation, wh ich is th e n proce sse d byourinte llige nce into an image wh ich we carry
around with us, like amapin ourh e ads, wh e re ve rwe go. T h e mind, rath e rth an re ach ing
intoits surroundings f romits dwe lling place with in th e world, maybe like ne d in th is vie w
to a f ilmspre ad out upon its e xte riorsurf ace . T o unde rstand th e se nse of space th at is
implicate d in th is cartograph ic vie w of e nvironme ntal pe rce ption, it is h e lpf ultodraw an
analogyf romth e linguistics of Fe rdinand de Saussure . T ograspth e e sse nce of language ,
Saussure invite s us topicture th ough tand sound as twocontinuous and undif f e re ntiate d
plane s, of me ntaland ph onic substance re spe ctive ly, like twoside s of ash e e tof pape r. By
cutting th e sh e e tintopie ce s (words) we cre ate , on one side , asyste mof discre te conce pts,
and on th e oth e r, asyste mof discre te sounds; and since one side cannotbe cutwith outat
th e same time cutting th e oth e r, th e twosyste ms of division are ne ce ssarilyh omologous so
th at to e ach conce pt th e re corre sponds a sound (Saussure 1959: 112-13). Now wh e n
ge ograph e rs and anth ropologists write aboutspace , wh atis ge ne rallyimplie d is some th ing
close lyakin toSaussure 's sh e e tof pape r, onlyin th is case th e counte r-side toth ough tis th e
continuumnotof ph onic substance butof th e surf ace of th e e arth . And soit appe ars th at
th e division of th e world intoamosaic of e xte rnallybounde d se gme nts is e ntaile d in th e
ve ryproduction of spatialme anings. Justas th e word, f or Saussure , is th e union of a
conce ptwith ade limite d 'ch unk' of sound, soth e place is th e union of asymbolic me aning
with a de limite d block of th e e arth 's surf ace . Spatial dif f e re ntiation implie s spatial
se gme ntation.
T h is is notsoof th e landscape , h owe ve r. Foraplace in th e landscape is not'cutout' f rom
th e wh ole , e ith e ron th e plane of ide as oron th atof mate rialsubstance . Rath e r, e ach place
e mbodie s th e wh ole at a particularne xus with in it, and in th is re spe ctis dif f e re ntf rom
e ve ryoth e r. A place owe s its ch aracte rtoth e e xpe rie nce s it af f ords to th ose wh ospe nd
time th e re
-
toth e sigh ts, sounds and inde e d sme lls th atconstitute its spe cif ic ambie nce .
And th e se , in turn, de pe nd on th e kinds of activitie s in wh ich its inh abitants e ngage . Itis
f romth is re lationalconte xtof pe ople 's e ngage me ntwith th e world, in th e busine ss of
dwe lling, th ate ach place draws its unique signif icance . T h us wh e re as with space , me anings
are attach e d toth e world, with th e landscape th e yare gath e re d f romit. More ove r, wh ile
156 T imIngold
place s h ave ce ntre s - inde e d it would be more appropriate to say th at th e y are ce ntre s -
th e y h ave no boundarie s. In journe ying f romplace A to place B it make s no se nse to ask,
along th e way, wh e th e r one is 'still' in A or h as 'crosse d ove r' to B (Ingold 1986a: 155). Of
course , boundarie s of various kinds may be drawn in th e landscape , and ide ntif ie d e ith e r
with naturalf e ature s such as th e course of arive ror an e scarpme nt, orwith built structure s
such as walls and f e nce s. But such boundarie s are not acondition f orth e constitution of th e
place s on e ith e r side of th e m; nor do th e y se gme nt th e landscape , f or th e f e ature s with
wh ich th e y are ide ntif ie d are th e mse lve s an inte gral part of it. Finally, it is important to
note th at no f e ature of th e landscape is, of itse lf , a boundary. It can only be come a
boundary, or th e indicator of a boundary, in re lation to th e activitie s of th e pe ople (or
animals) f or wh omit is re cognize d or e xpe rie nce d as such .
In th e course of e xplaining wh at th e landscape is not, I h ave alre ady move d some way
towards a positive ch aracte rization. In sh ort, th e landscape is th e world as it is known to
th ose wh o dwe ll th e re in, wh o inh abit its place s and journe y along th e path s conne cting
th e m. Is it not, th e n, ide ntical to wh at we migh t oth e rwise call th e e nvironme nt? Ce rtainly
th e distinction be twe e n landscape and e nvironme nt is not e asy to draw, and f or many
purpose s th e y maybe tre ate d as practicallysynonymous. It will alre adybe appare nt th at I
cannot acce pt th e distinction of f e re d byT uan, wh o argue s th at an e nvironme nt is 'agive n,
a pie ce of re ality th at is simply th e re ', as oppose d to th e landscape , wh ich is a product of
h uman cognition, 'an ach ie ve me nt of th e mature mind' (T uan 1979: 90, 100). For th at is
me re lyto re produce th e dich otomy be twe e n nature and h umanity. T h e e nvironme nt is no
more 'nature ' th an is th e landscape a symbolic construct. Else wh e re , I h ave contraste d
nature and e nvironme nt bywayof adistinction be twe e n re alityof - 'th e ph ysical world of
ne utral obje cts appare nt only to th e de tach e d, indif f e re nt obse rve r', and re alityf or- 'th e
world constitute d in re lation to th e organismor pe rson wh ose e nvironme nt it is' (Ingold
1992b: 44). But to th ink of e nvironme nt in th is se nse is to re gard it primarilyin te rms of
f unction, of wh at it af f ords to cre ature s - wh e th e r h uman or non-h uman - with ce rtain
capabilitie s and proje cts of action. Re ciprocally, to re gard th e se cre ature s as organisms is
to vie w th e m in te rms of th e ir principle s of dynamic f unctioning, th at is as organize d
syste ms (Pitte ndrigh 1958: 394). As Le wontin succinctly puts it (1982: 160), th e e nviron-
me nt is 'nature organise d byan organism'.
T h e conce pt of landscape , bycontrast, puts th e e mph asis on f orm, in just th e same way
th at th e conce pt of th e body e mph asize s th e f ormrath e r th an th e f unction of a living
cre ature . Like organismand e nvironme nt, body and landscape are comple me ntary te rms:
e ach implie s th e oth e r, alte rnate ly as f igure and ground. T h e f orms of th e landscape are
not, h owe ve r, pre pare d in advance f or cre ature s to occupy, nor are th e bodily f orms of
th ose cre ature s inde pe nde ntly spe cif ie d in th e ir ge ne tic make up. Both se ts of f orms are
ge ne rate d and sustaine d in and th rough th e proce ssual unf olding of atotal f ie ld of re lations
th at cuts across th e e me rge nt inte rf ace be twe e n organismand e nvironme nt (Goodwin
1988). Having re gard to its f ormative prope rtie s, we may re f e r to th is proce ss as one of
e mbodime nt. T h ough th e notion of e mbodime nt h as re ce ntly come much into f ash ion,
th e re h as be e n a te nde ncy
-
f ollowing an ancie nt inclination in We ste rn th ough t to
prioritize f orm ove r proce ss (Oyama 1985: 13)
- to conce ive of it as a move me nt of
inscription, wh e re by some pre -e xisting patte rn, te mplate or programme , wh e th e r ge ne tic
orcultural, is 're alize d' in asubstantive me dium. T h is is not wh at I h ave in mind, h owe ve r.
T h e te mporalityof th e landscape 157
T o th e contrary, and adopting ah e lpf ul distinction f romConne rton (1989: 72-3), I re gard
e mbodime nt as amove me nt of incorporation rath e rth an inscription, not atranscribing of
f orm onto mate rial but a move me nt wh e re in f orms th e mse lve s are ge ne rate d (Ingold
1990: 215). T aking th e organism as our f ocus of re f e re nce , th is move me nt is wh at is
commonly known as th e lif e -cycle . T h us organisms may be said to incorporate , in th e ir
bodily f orms, th e lif e -cycle proce sse s th at give rise to th e m. Could not th e same , th e n, be
said of th e e nvironme nt? Is it possible to ide ntif y acorre sponding cycle , or rath e rase rie s
of inte rlocking cycle s, wh ich build th e mse lve s into th e f orms of th e landscape , and of
wh ich th e landscape may accordingly be re garde d as an e mbodime nt? Be f ore answe ring
th is que stion, we ne e d to turn to th e se cond of myke y te rms, name ly 'te mporality'.
T e mporality
Le t me be gin, once again, by stating wh at te mporality is not. It is not ch ronology (as
oppose d to h istory), and it is not h istory (as oppose d to ch ronology). By ch ronology, I
me an any re gular syste mof date d time inte rvals, in wh ich e ve nts are said to h ave take n
place . By h istory, I me an anyse rie s of e ve nts wh ich maybe date d in time according to th e ir
occurre nce in one or anoth e r ch ronological inte rval. T h us th e Battle of Hastings was an
h istorical e ve nt, 1066 was a date (marking th e inte rval of a ye ar), and re cords te ll us th at
th e f orme r occurre d in th e latte r. In th e me re succe ssion of date s th e re are no e ve nts,
be cause e ve ryth ing re pe ats; in th e me re succe ssion of e ve nts th e re is no time , as noth ing
doe s. T h e re lation be twe e n ch ronology and h istory, in th is conce ption, h as be e n we ll
e xpre sse d by Kuble r: 'With out ch ange th e re is no h istory; with out re gularityth e re is no
time . T ime and h istory are re late d as rule and variation: time is th e re gularse tting f or th e
vagarie s of h istory' (1962: 72).
Now in introducing th e conce pt of te mporality, I do not inte nd th at it sh ould stand as a
th ird te rm, alongside th e conce pts of ch ronology and h istory. For in th e se nse in wh ich I
sh all use th e te rmh e re , te mporality e ntails a pe rspe ctive th at contrasts radicallywith th e
one , outline d above , th at se ts up h istory and ch ronology in a re lation of comple me ntary
opposition. T h e contrast is e sse ntially e quivale nt to th at drawn by Ge ll (1992:149-55)
be twe e n wh at h e calls (f ollowing McT aggart) th e A-se rie s, in wh ich time is immane nt in
th e passage of e ve nts, and th e B-se rie s, in wh ich e ve nts are strung out in time like be ads on
a th re ad. Wh e re as in th e B-se rie s, e ve nts are tre ate d as isolate d h appe nings, succe e ding
one anoth e r f rame by f rame , e ach e ve nt in th e A-se rie s is se e n to e ncompass apatte rn of
re te nsions f romth e past and prote ntions f or th e f uture . T h us f romth e A-se rie s point of
vie w, te mporality and h istoricity are not oppose d but rath e r me rge in th e e xpe rie nce of
th ose wh o, in th e iractivitie s, carryf orward th e proce ss of social lif e . T ake n toge th e r, th e se
activitie s make upwh at I sh all call th e 'taskscape ', and it is with th e intrinsic te mporalityof
th e taskscape th at I sh all be principallyconce rne d in th is se ction.
We can make a start by re turning f or a mome nt to th e distinction be twe e n land and
landscape . As acommon de nominator in te rms of wh ich constitue nts of th e e nvironme nt
of dive rse kinds maybe re nde re d quantitative lycomparable , I compare d land with we igh t.
But I could e qually h ave drawn th e comparison with value or with labour. Value is th e
de nominator of commoditie s th at e nable s us to say h ow much any one th ing is worth by
158 T imIngold
comparison with anoth e r, e ve n th ough th e se two th ings may be quite unlike in te rms of
th e irph ysical qualitie s and pote ntial use s. In th is se nse , th e conce pt of value (in ge ne ral) is
classically distinguish e d f romth at of use -value , wh ich re f e rs to th e spe cif ic prope rtie s or
'af f ordance s' of any particularobje ct, th at comme nd it to th e proje ct of a use r (Ingold
1992b: 48-9, cf . J. Gibson 1979: 127; Marx 1930: 169). Cle arly, th is distinction, be twe e n
value and use -value , is pre cise lyh omologous toth at be twe e n land and landscape . But if we
turn to conside r th e work th at goe s into th e making of use f ul th ings, th e n again we can
re cognize th atwh ilst th e ope rations of making are inde e d as unlike as th e obje cts produce d
- involving dif f e re nt raw mate rials, dif f e re nt tools, dif f e re nt proce dure s and dif f e re nt
skills - th e y can ne ve rth e le ss be compare d in th at th e y call f or variable amounts of wh at
maysimplybe calle d 'labour': th e common de nominator of productive activitie s. Like land
and value , labour is quantitative and h omoge ne ous, h uman work sh orn of its particu-
laritie s. It is of course th e f ounding pre mise of th e labour th e ory of value th at th e amount
of value in ath ing is de te rmine d by th e amount of labourth at we nt into producing it.
How, th e n, sh ould we de scribe th e practice s of work in th e ir concre te particulars? For
th is purpose I sh all adopt th e te rm'task', de f ine d as anypracticalope ration, carrie d out by
a skille d age nt in an e nvironme nt, as part of h is or h e r normal busine ss of lif e . In oth e r
words, tasks are th e constitutive acts of dwe lling. No more th an f e ature s of th e landscape ,
h owe ve r, are tasks suspe nde d in avacuum. Eve ry task take s its me aning f romits position
with in an e nse mble of tasks, pe rf orme d in se rie s or in paralle l, and usuallybymanype ople
working toge th e r. One of th e gre at mistake s of re ce nt anth ropology - wh at Re ynolds
(1993: 410) calls 'th e gre at tool-use f allacy' - h as be e n to insist upon ase paration be twe e n
th e domains of te ch nical and social activity, ase paration th at h as blinde d us to th e f act th at
one of th e outstanding f e ature s of h uman te ch nical practice s lie s in th e ir e mbe dde dne ss in
th e curre nt of sociality. It is to th e e ntire e nse mble of tasks, in th e ir mutual inte rlocking,
th at I re f e rbyth e conce pt of taskscape . Justas th e landscape is an arrayof re late d f e ature s,
so-
byanalogy
- th e taskscape is an arrayof re late d activitie s. And as with th e landscape , it
is qualitative and h e te roge ne ous: we can ask of a taskscape , as of a landscape , wh at it is
like , but not h ow much of it th e re is. In sh ort, th e taskscape is to labourwh at th e landscape
is to land, and inde e d wh at an e nse mble of use -value s is to value in ge ne ral.
Now if value is me asure d out in units of mone y, and land in units of space , wh at is th e
curre ncyof labour? T h e answe r, of course , is time - but it is time of ave rype culiarsort, one
th at must be wh olly indif f e re nt to th e modulations of h uman e xpe rie nce . T o most of us it
appe ars in th e f amiliarguise of clock-time : th us an h ouris an h our, re gardle ss of wh at one
is doing in it, orof h ow one f e e ls. But th is kind of ch ronological time doe s not de pe nd upon
th e e xiste nce of artif icial clocks. It may be base d on any pe rf e ctly re pe titive , me ch anical
syste mincluding th at (putative ly) constitute d by th e e arth in its axial rotations and in its
re volutions around th e sun. Sorokin and Me rton (1937), in a classic pape r, call it
'astronomical' time : it is, th e y write , 'unif orm, h omoge ne ous; . . . pure ly quantitative ,
sh orn of qualitative variations'. And th e ydistinguish it f rom'social time ', wh ich th e yse e as
f undame ntallyqualitative , some th ing towh ich we can af f ix moraljudge me nts such as good
or bad, grounde d in th e 'rh yth ms, pulsations and be ats of th e socie tie s in wh ich th e y are
f ound', and f or th at re ason tie d to th e particular circumstance s of place and pe ople
(1937: 621-3). Adopting Sorokin and Me rton's distinction, we could pe rh aps conclude
th at wh e re as labour is me asure d out in units of astronomical time , or in clock-time
T h e te mporalityof th e landscape 159
calibrate d to an astronomical standard, th e te mporality of th e taskscape is e sse ntially
social. Be f ore we can acce pt th is conclusion, h owe ve r, th e ide a of social time must be
e xamine d alittle more close ly.
In my e arlie r discussion of th e signif icance of space , I sh owe d th at in th e cartograph ic
imagination, th e mind is suppose d to be laid out upon th e surf ace of th e e arth . Like wise in
th e ch ronological pe rspe ctive , time appe ars as th e inte rf ace be twe e n mind and 'duration' -
by wh ich is me ant an undif f e re ntiate d stre amof bodily activity and e xpe rie nce . T aking
time in th is se nse , Durkh e imf amously like ne d it to 'an e ndle ss ch art, wh e re all duration is
spre ad out be f ore th e mind, and upon wh ich all possible e ve nts can be locate d in re lation to
f ixe d and de te rminate guide line s' (1976[1915]: 10). Rath e r like Saussure 's sh e e t of pape r,
it could be compare d to astripof inf inite le ngth , with th ough t on one side and duration on
th e oth e r. By cutting th e stripinto se gme nts we e stablish a division, on th e one h and, into
cale ndrical inte rvals or date s, and on th e oth e r h and, into discre te 'ch unks' of live d
e xpe rie nce , such th at to e ve ry ch unk th e re corre sponds a date in a unif ormse que nce of
be f ore and af te r. And as e ve ry ch unk succe e ds th e ne xt, like f rame s on a re e l of f ilm, we
imagine ourse lve s to be looking on 'as time goe s by', as th ough we could take upapoint of
vie w de tach e d f romth e te mporal proce ss of our lif e in th e world and watch ourse lve s
e ngage d now in th is task, now in th at, in an une nding se rie s of pre se nt instants. Wh e nce ,
th e n, come th e divisions wh ich give ch ronological f ormto th e substance of e xpe rie nce ?
Durkh e im's answe r, as is we ll known, was th at th e se divisions- 'indispe nsable guide line s'
f or th e te mporal orde ring of e ve nts - come f romsocie ty, corre sponding to th e 'pe riodical
re curre nce of rite s, f e asts, and public ce re monie s' (ibid.). T h us f or Durkh e im, time is at
once ch ronological and social, f or socie ty itse lf is a kind of clock, wh ose moving parts are
individual h uman be ings (Ingold 1986b: 341).
T h is is not, h owe ve r, th e waywe pe rce ive th e te mporalityof th e taskscape . Forwe do so
not as spe ctators but as participants, in th e ve ry pe rf ormance of our tasks. As
Me rle au-Ponty put it, in re ckoning with an e nvironme nt, I am'at my task rath e r th an
conf ronting it' (1962: 416). T h e notion th at we can stand aside and obse rve th e passage of
time is f ounde d upon an illusion of dise mbodime nt. T h is passage is, inde e d, none oth e r
th an ourown journe y th rough th e taskscape in th e busine ss of dwe lling. Once again we can
take our cue f romMe rle au-Ponty: 'th e passage of one pre se nt to th e ne xt is not a th ing
wh ich I conce ive , nor do I se e it as an onlooke r, I e f f e ct it' (1962: 421, my e mph asis).
Re ach ing out into th e taskscape , I pe rce ive , at th is mome nt, aparticularvista of past and
f uture ; but it is avistath at is available f romth is mome nt and no oth e r (se e Ge ll 1992: 269).
As such , it constitute s mypre se nt, conf e rring upon it aunique ch aracte r. T h us th e pre se nt
is not marke d of f f romapast th at it h as re place d or af uture th at will, in turn, re place it; it
rath e rgath e rs th e past and f uture into itse lf , like re f ractions in acrystal ball. And just as in
th e landscape , we can move f romplace to place with out crossing any boundary, since th e
vista th at constitute s th e ide ntity of a place ch ange s e ve n as we move , so like wise can we
move f romone pre se nt to anoth e r with out h aving to bre ak th rough any ch ronological
barrie rth at migh t be suppose d to se parate e ach pre se nt f romth e ne xt in line . Inde e d th e
f e ature s th at Durkh e im ide ntif ie d as se rving th is se gme nting f unction
-
rite s, f e asts and
ce re monie s
- are th e mse lve s as inte gral to th e taskscape as are boundary marke rs such as
walls or f e nce s to th e landscape .
T h e te mporalityof th e taskscape is social, th e n, not be cause socie ty provide s an e xte rnal
160 T imIngold
f rame against wh ich particulartasks f ind inde pe nde nt me asure , but be cause pe ople , in th e
pe rf ormance of th e ir tasks, also atte nd to one anoth e r. Looking back, we can se e th at
Durkh e im's e rrorwas to divorce th e sph e re of pe ople 's mutual involve me nt f romth at of
th e ir e ve ryday practical activity in th e world, le aving th e latte r to be carrie d out by
individuals in h e rme tic isolation. In re al lif e , th is is not h ow we go about our busine ss. By
watch ing, liste ning, pe rh aps e ve n touch ing, we continually f e e l e ach oth e r's pre se nce in
th e social e nvironme nt, at e ve ry mome nt adjusting our move me nts in re sponse to th is
ongoing pe rce ptual monitoring (Ingold 1993: 456). Forth e orch e stral musician, playing an
instrume nt, watch ing th e conductorand liste ning toone 's f e llow playe rs are all inse parable
aspe cts of th e same proce ss of action: f orth is re ason, th e ge sture s of th e pe rf orme rs maybe
said to re sonate with e ach oth e r. In orch e stral music, th e ach ie ve me nt of re sonance is an
absolute pre condition f or succe ssf ul pe rf ormance . But th e same is true , more ge ne rally, of
social lif e (Rich ards 1991; Wikan 1992). Inde e d it could be argue d th at in th e re sonance of
move me nt and f e e ling ste mming f rompe ople 's mutuallyatte ntive e ngage me nt, in sh are d
conte xts of practical activity, lie s th e ve ryf oundation of sociality.
Le t me pursue th e analogybe twe e n orch e stral pe rf ormance and social lif e alittle f urth e r
since , more th an any oth e r artistic ge nre , music mirrors th e te mporal f orm of th e
taskscape . I want, by me ans of th is analogy, to make th re e points. First, wh ilst th e re ale
cycle s and re pe titions in music as in social lif e , th e se are e sse ntially rh yth mic rath e rth an
me tronomic (on th is distinction, se e Young (1988: 19)). It is f or pre cise ly th is re ason th at
social time , pace Durkh e im, is not ch ronological. A me tronome , like aclock, inscribe s an
artif icial division into e qual se gme nts upon an oth e rwise undif f e re ntiate d move me nt;
rh yth m, bycontrast, is intrinsic to th e move me nt itse lf . Lange rh as argue d th at th e e sse nce
of rh yth mlie s in th e succe ssive building upand re solution of te nsion, on th e principle th at
e ve ry re solution is itse lf apre paration f orth e ne xt building-up(1953: 126-7). T h e re mayof
course be re sts orsustaine d note s with in apie ce , but f arf rombre aking it upinto se gme nts,
such mome nts are ge ne rally one s of h igh te nsion, wh ose re solution be come s e ve r more
urge nt th e longe r th e y are h e ld. Onlyour last e xh alation of bre ath is not apre paration f or
th e ne xt inh alation - with th at, we die ; similarlywith th e last be at th e music come s to an
e nd. Social lif e , h owe ve r, is ne ve r f inish e d, and th e re are no bre aks in it th at are not
inte gral to its te nsile structure , to th e 'e bb and f low of activity' bywh ich socie ty itse lf se e ms
to bre ath e (Young 1988: 53).
Myse cond point is th at in music as in social lif e , th e re is not just one rh yth mic cycle , but a
comple x inte rwe aving of ve ry many concurre nt cycle s (f or an e xe mplary analysis of 'th e
rh yth mic structure s of e conomic lif e ', se e Guye r (1988)). Wh ilst it re f le cts th e te mporal
f ormof social lif e , music in f act re pre se nts a ve ry conside rable simplif ication, since it
involve s only one se nsory re giste r (th e auditory), and its rh yth ms are f e we r and more
tigh tlycontrolle d. In both case s, h owe ve r, since anyrh yth mmaybe take n as th e te mpo f or
anyof th e oth e rs, th e re is nosingle , one -dime nsional strand of time . As Lange rputs it: 'lif e
is always a de nse f abric of concurre nt te nsions, and as e ach of th e mis a me asure of time ,
th e me asure me nts th e mse lve s do not coincide ' (1953: 113). T h us th e te mporality of th e
taskscape , wh ile it is intrinsic rath e rth an e xte rnallyimpose d (me tronomic), lie s not in any
particularrh yth m, but in th e ne twork of inte rre lationsh ips be twe e n th e multiple rh yth ms
of wh ich th e taskscape is itse lf constitute d. T o cite ace le brate d anth ropological e xample :
among th e Nue r of south e rn Sudan, according to Evans-Pritch ard, th e passage of time is
T h e te mporalityof th e landscape 161
'primarilyth e succe ssion of [pastoral] tasks and th e irre lations toone anoth e r' (1940: 101-2;
my e mph asis). Each of th e se re lations is, of course , a spe cif ic re sonance . And so, just as
social lif e consists in th e unf olding of a f ie ld of re lationsh ips among pe rsons wh o atte nd to
one anoth e r in wh at th e y do, its te mporality consists in th e unf olding of th e re sultant
patte rn of re sonance s.
T h ird, th e f orms of th e taskscape , like th ose of music, come into be ing th rough
move me nt. Music e xists only wh e n it is be ing pe rf orme d (it doe s not pre -e xist, as is
some time s th ough t, in th e score , anymore th an a cake pre -e xists in th e re cipe f or making
it). Similarly, th e taskscape e xists only so long as pe ople are actually e ngage d in th e
activitie s of dwe lling, de spite th e atte mpts of anth ropologists to translate it into some th ing
rath e re quivale nt to ascore - akind of ide al de sign f ordwe lling - th at ge ne rallygoe s byth e
name of 'culture ', and th at pe ople are suppose d to bring with th e minto th e ir e ncounte r
with th e world. T h is paralle l, h owe ve r, brings me to a critical que stion. Up to now, my
discussion of te mporality h as conce ntrate d e xclusive ly on th e taskscape , allowing th e
landscape to slipf romvie w. It is now h igh time to bring it back into f ocus. I argue d in th e
pre vious se ction th at th e landscape is not nature ; h e re I claimth at th e taskscape is not
culture . Landscape and taskscape , th e n, are not to be oppose d as nature to culture . Soh ow
are we to unde rstand th e re lation be twe e n th e m? Wh e re doe s one e nd and th e oth e r
be gin? Can th e y e ve n be distinguish e d at all? If music be st re f le cts th e f orms of th e
taskscape , it migh t be th ough t th at painting is th e most natural me diumf or re pre se nting
th e f orms of th e landscape . And th is sugge sts th at an e xamination of th e dif f e re nce , in th e
f ie ld of art, be twe e n music and painting migh t of f e r some clue s as to h ow a distinction
migh t possibly be drawn be twe e n taskscape and landscape as f ace ts of th e re al world. I
be gin byf ollowing upth is sugge stion.
T e mporalizing th e landscape
At f irstglance th e dif f e re nce se e ms obvious: paintings do not h ave to be pe rf orme d, th e y
are pre se nte d to us as works th at are comple te in th e mse lve s. But on close r inspe ction, th is
contrast appe ars more as an arte f act of a syste matic bias in We ste rn th ough t, to wh ich I
h ave alre adyallude d, th at le ads us to privile ge f ormove r proce ss. T h us th e actual work of
painting is subordinate d to th e f inal product; th e f orme r is h idde n f romvie w so th at th e
latte r alone be come s an obje ct of conte mplation. In many non-We ste rn socie tie s, by
contrast, th e orde r of priorityis re ve rse d: wh at is e sse ntial is th e act of painting itse lf , of
wh ich th e products maybe re lative ly sh ort-live d -
bare lype rce ive d be f ore be ing e rase d or
cove re d up. T h is is so, f or e xample , among th e Yolngu, an Aboriginal pe ople of north e rn
Australia, wh ose e xpe rie nce of f inish e d paintings, according to th e ir e th nograph e r, is
limite d to 'image s f le e tingly glimpse d th rough th e corne rof th e ire ye s' (Morph y 1989: 26).
T h e e mph asis, h e re , is on painting as pe rf ormance . Far f rom be ing th e pre paration of
obje cts f or f uture conte mplation, it is an act of conte mplation in itse lf . So, too, is
pe rf orming orliste ning to music. T h us all at once , th e contrast be twe e n painting and music
se e ms le ss se cure . It be come s a matte r of de gre e , in th e e xte nt to wh ich f orms e ndure
be yond th e imme diate conte xts of th e irproduction. Musical sound, of course , is subje ct to
th e prope rtyof rapid f ading: spe e ding outwards f romits point of e mission, and dissipating
162 T imIngold
as it goe s, it is pre se nt only mome ntarily to our se nse s. But wh e re , as in painting, ge sture s
le ave th e irtrace s in solid substance , th e re sulting f orms maylast much longe r, albe it ne ve r
inde f inite ly.
Re turning now f romth e contrast be twe e n music and painting to th at be twe e n taskscape
and landscape , th e f irstpoint to note is th at no more th an apainting is th e landscape give n
re ady-made . One cannot, as Inglis points out, 'tre at landscape as an obje ct if it is to be
unde rstood. It is a living proce ss; it make s me n; it is made by th e m' (1977: 489). Just as
with music, th e f orms of th e landscape are ge ne rate d in move me nt: th e se f orms, h owe ve r,
are conge ale d in a solid me dium- inde e d, to borrow Inglis's words again, 'a landscape is
th e most solid appe arance in wh ich a h istory can de clare itse lf ' (ibid.). T h anks to th e ir
solidity, f e ature s of th e landscape re main available f orinspe ction long af te rth e move me nt
th at gave rise to th e mh as ce ase d. If , as Me ad argue d (1977[1938]: 97), e ve ry obje ct is to be
re garde d as a 'collapse d act', th e n th e landscape as a wh ole must like wise be unde rstood as
th e taskscape in its e mbodie d f orm: a patte rn of activitie s 'collapse d' into an array of
f e ature s. But to re ite rate a point made e arlie r, th e landscape take s on its f orms th rough a
proce ss of incorporation, not of inscription. T h at is to say, th e proce ss is not one wh e re by
cultural de sign is impose d upon a naturally give n substrate , as th ough th e move me nt
issue d f romth e f ormand was comple te d in its concre te re alization in th e mate rial. For th e
f orms of th e landscape arise alongside th ose of th e taskscape , with in th e same curre nt of
activity. If we re cognize a man's gait in th e patte rn of h is f ootprints, it is not be cause th e
gait pre ce de d th e f ootprints and was 'inscribe d' in th e m, but be cause both th e gait and th e
prints arose with in th e move me nt of th e man's walking.
Since , more ove r, th e activitie s th at comprise th e taskscape are une nding, th e landscape
is ne ve r comple te : ne ith e r 'built' nor 'unbuilt', it is pe rpe tually unde rconstruction. T h is is
wh y th e conve ntional dich otomy be twe e n natural and artif icial (or 'man-made ') com-
pone nts of th e landscape is so proble matic. Virtuallybyde f inition, an arte f act is an obje ct
sh ape d to apre -conce ive d image th at motivate d its construction, and it is 'f inish e d' at th e
point wh e n it is brough t into conf ormity with th is image . Wh at h appe ns to it be yond th at
point is suppose d to be long to th e ph ase of use rath e rth an manuf acture , to dwe lling rath e r
th an building. But th e f orms of th e landscape are not pre -pre pare d f or pe ople to live in -
not bynature norbyh uman h ands - f orit is in th e ve ryproce ss of dwe lling th at th e se f orms
are constitute d. 'T o build', as He ide gge r insiste d, 'is itse lf alre ady to dwe ll' (1971: 146).
T h us th e landscape is always in th e nature of 'work in progre ss'.
Myconclusion th at th e landscape is th e conge ale d f ormof th e taskscape doe s e nable us
to e xplain wh y, intuitive ly, th e landscape se e ms to be wh at we se e around us, wh e re as th e
taskscape is wh at we h e ar. T o be se e n, an obje ct ne e d do noth ing itse lf , f or th e optic array
th at spe cif ie s its f ormto a vie we r consists of ligh t re f le cte d of f its oute r surf ace s. T o be
h e ard, on th e oth e r h and, an obje ct must active ly e mit sounds or, th rough its move me nt,
cause sound to be e mitte d byoth e r obje cts with wh ich it come s into contact. T h us, outside
my window I se e a landscape of h ouse s, tre e s, garde ns, a stre e t and pave me nt. I do not
h e ar any of th e se th ings, but I can h e ar pe ople talking on th e pave me nt, a carpassing by,
birds singing in th e tre e s, a dog barking some wh e re in th e distance , and th e sound of
h amme ring as a ne igh bour re pairs h is garde n sh e d. In sh ort, wh at I h e ar is activity, e ve n
wh e n its source cannot be se e n. And since th e f orms of th e taskscape , suspe nde d as th e y
are in move me nt, are pre se nt only as activity, th e limits of th e taskscape are also th e limits
T h e te mporalityof th e landscape 163
of th e auditoryworld. (Wh ilst I de al h e re only with visual and aural pe rce ption, we sh ould
not unde re stimate th e signif icance of touch , wh ich is important to all of us but above all to
blind pe ople , f or wh om it ope ns up th e possibility of acce ss to th e landscape - if only
th rough proximate bodily contact.)
T h is argume nt carrie s an important corollary. Wh ilst both th e landscape and th e
taskscape pre suppose th e pre se nce of an age nt wh o watch e s and liste ns, th e taskscape
must be populate d with be ings wh o are th e mse lve s age nts, and wh o re ciprocally'act back'
in th e proce ss of th e irown dwe lling. In oth e r words, th e taskscape e xists not just as activity
but as inte ractivity. Inde e d th is conclusion was alre ady f ore sh adowe d wh e n I introduce d
th e conce pt of re sonance as th e rh yth mic h armonization of mutual atte ntion. Having said
th at, h owe ve r, th e re is no re ason wh yth e domain of inte ractivitysh ould be conf ine d to th e
move me nt of h uman be ings. We h e ar animals as we ll as pe ople , such as th e birds and th e
dog in my e xample above . Hunte rs, to take anoth e r e xample , are ale rt to e ve ry sigh t,
sound orsme ll th at re ve als th e pre se nce of animals, and we can be sure th at th e animals are
like wise ale rtto th e pre se nce of h umans, as th e y are alsoto th at of one anoth e r. On alarge r
scale , th e h unte rs' journe ys th rough th e landscape , or th e ir oscillations be twe e n th e
procure me nt of dif f e re nt animal spe cie s, re sonate with th e migratory move me nts of
te rre strial mammals, birds and f ish . Pe rh aps th e n, as Re e d argue s, th e re is a f undame ntal
dif f e re nce be twe e n our pe rce ption of animate be ings and inanimate obje cts, since th e
f orme r - by virtue of th e ir capacity f or autonomous move me nt - 'are aware of th e ir
surroundings (including us) and be cause th e y act on th ose surroundings (including us)'
(Re e d 1988: 116). In oth e r words, th e y af f ord th e possibility not only of action but also of
inte raction (cf . J. Gibson 1979: 135). Sh ould we , th e n, draw th e boundarie s of th e
taskscape around th e limits of th e animate ?
T h ough th e argume nt is acompe lling one , I f ind th at it is ultimate ly unsatisf actory, f or
two re asons in particular. First, as Lange r obse rve s, 'rh yth mis th e basis of lif e , but not
limite d to lif e ' (1953: 128). T h e rh yth ms of h uman activitie s re sonate not only with th ose of
oth e r living th ings but also with awh ole h ost of oth e r rh yth mic ph e nome na
-
th e cycle s of
day and nigh t and of th e se asons, th e winds, th e tide s, and so on. Citing ape tition of 1800
f romth e se aside town of Sunde rland, in wh ich it is e xplaine d th at 'pe ople are oblige d to be
up at all h ours of th e nigh t to atte nd th e tide s and th e ir af f airs upon th e rive r', T h ompson
(1967: 59-60) note s th at 'th e ope rative ph rase is "atte nd th e tide s": th e patte rning of social
time in th e se aport f ollows upon th e rh yth ms of th e se a'. In many case s th e se natural
rh yth mic ph e nome na f ind th e irultimate cause in th e me ch anics of plane tarymotion, but it
is not of course to th e se th at we re sonate . T h us we re sonate to th e cycle s of ligh t and
darkne ss, not to th e rotation of th e e arth , e ve n th ough th e diurnal cycle is cause d by th e
e arth 's axial rotation. And we re sonate to th e cycle s of ve ge tative growth and de cay, not to
th e e arth 's re volutions around th e sun, e ve n th ough th e latte r cause th e cycle of th e
se asons. More ove r th e se re sonance s are e mbodie d, in th e se nse th at th e y are not only
h istorically incorporate d into th e e nduring f e ature s of th e landscape but also de ve lop-
me ntally incorporate d into our ve ry constitution as biological organisms. T h us Young
de scribe s th e body as 'an arrayof inte rlocking (or inte rf lowing) cycle s, with th e ir own
sph e re s of partial inde pe nde nce with in th e solar cycle ' (1988: 41). We do not consult th e se
cycle s, as we migh t consult awrist-watch , in orde rto time ourown activitie s, f orth e cycle s
are inh e re nt in th e rh yth mic structure of th e activitie s th e mse lve s. It would se e m, th e n,
164 T imIngold
th at th e patte rn of re sonance s th at comprise s th e te mporality of th e taskscape must be
e xpande d to e mbrace th e totalityof rh yth mic ph e nome na, wh e th e r animate or inanimate .
T h e se cond re ason wh y I would be re luctant to re strict th e taskscape to th e re almof
living th ings h as todowith th e ve rynotion of animacy. I do not th ink we can re gard th is as a
prope rty th at can be ascribe d to obje cts in isolation, such th at some (animate ) h ave it and
oth e rs (inanimate ) do not. For lif e is not a principle th at is se parate ly installe d inside
individual organisms, and wh ich se ts th e min motion upon th e stage of th e inanimate . T o
th e contrary, as I h ave argue d e lse wh e re , lif e is 'a name f or wh at is going on in th e
ge ne rative f ie ld with in wh ich organic f orms are locate d and "h e ld in place "' (Ingold
1990: 215). T h at ge ne rative f ie ld is constitute d by th e totality of organism-e nvironme nt
re lations, and th e activitie s of organisms are mome nts of its unf olding. Inde e d once we
th ink of th e world in th is way, as atotal move me nt of be coming wh ich builds itse lf into th e
f orms we se e , and in wh ich e ach f ormtake s sh ape in continuous re lation to th ose around it,
th e n th e distinction be twe e n th e animate and th e inanimate se e ms to dissolve . T h e world
itse lf take s on th e ch aracte r of an organism, and th e move me nts of animals - including
th ose of us h uman be ings - are parts or aspe cts of its lif e -proce ss (Love lock 1979). T h is
me ans th at in dwe lling in th e world, we do not act upon it, ordo th ings toit; rath e rwe move
along with it. Our actions do not transf ormth e world, th e y are part and parce l of th e
world's transf orming itse lf . And th at is just anoth e rwayof saying th at th e y be long totime .
For in th e f inal analysis, e ve ryth ing is suspe nde d in move me nt. As Wh ite h e ad once
re marke d, 'th e re is no h olding nature still and looking at it' (cite d in Ho 1989:19-20).
Wh at appe artous as th e f ixe d f orms of th e landscape , passive and unch anging unle ss acte d
upon f romoutside , are th e mse lve s in motion, albe it on a scale imme asurably slowe r and
more maje stic th an th at on wh ich our own activitie s are conducte d. Imagine a f ilmof th e
landscape , sh ot ove r ye ars, ce nturie s, e ve n mille nnia. Sligh tly spe e de d up, plants appe ar
to e ngage in ve ry animal-like move me nts, tre e s f le x th e ir limbs with out any prompting
f romth e winds. Spe e de d uprath e rmore , glacie rs f low like rive rs and e ve n th e e arth be gins
to move . At ye t gre ate rspe e ds solid rock be nds, buckle s and f lows like molte n me tal. T h e
world itse lf be gins to bre ath e . T h us th e rh yth mic patte rn of h uman activitie s ne sts with in
th e wide r patte rn of activity f or all animal lif e , wh ich in turn ne sts with in th e patte rn of
activity f or all so-calle d living th ings, wh ich ne sts with in th e lif e -proce ss of th e world. At
e ach of th e se le ve ls, coh e re nce is f ounde d upon re sonance (Ho 1989: 18). Ultimate ly,
th e n, byre placing th e tasks of h uman dwe lling in th e irprope rconte xt with in th e proce ss of
be coming of th e world as awh ole , we can do awaywith th e dich otomy be twe e n taskscape
and landscape
-
only, h owe ve r, by re cognizing th e f undame ntal te mporality of th e
landscape itse lf .
T h e Harve ste rs
In orde r to provide some illustration of th e ide as de ve lope d in th e pre ce ding se ctions, I
re produce h e re apainting wh ich , more th an anyoth e r I know, vividly capture s ase nse of
th e te mporality of th e landscape . T h is is T h e Harve ste rs, painte d by Pie te r Brue ge l th e
Elde r in 1565 (se e Plate 1). I amnot an art h istorian or critic, and my purpose is not to
analyse th e painting in te rms of style , composition or ae sth e tic e f f e ct. Nor amI conce rne d
T h e te mporalityof th e landscape 165
*1
pt V
*
< ;'kKI
- '-'-V
9
Plate I T h e Harve ste rs (1565) by Pie te rBrue ge lth e Elde r. Re produce d by pe rmission of th e
Me tropolitan Muse umof Art, Roge rs Fund, 1919 (19.164).
with th e h istorical conte xt of its production. Suf f ice it to say th at th e picture is be lie ve d to
be one of ase rie s of twe lve , e ach de picting amonth of th e ye ar, out of wh ich only f ive h ave
survive d (W. Gibson 1977: 147). Each pane l portrays a landscape , in th e colours and
appare l appropriate to th e month , and sh ows pe ople e ngage d in th e tasks of th e
agricultural cycle th at are usual at th at time of ye ar. T h e Harve ste rs de picts th e month of
August, and sh ows f ie ld h ands at work re aping and sh e af ing a luxuriant crop of wh e at,
wh ilst oth e rs pause f or a midday me al and some we ll-e arne d re st. T h e se nse of rustic
h armony conve ye d in th is sce ne may, pe rh aps, re pre se nt some th ing of an ide alization on
Brue ge l's part. As Walte rGibson points out, Brue ge l was incline d to 'de pict pe asants ve ry
much as a we alth y landowne r would h ave vie we d th e m, as th e anonymous te nde rs of h is
f ie lds and f locks' (1977: 157-8). Any landowne r would h ave h ad cause f or satisf action in
such a f ine crop, wh e re as th e h ands wh o swe ate d to bring it in may h ave h ad a rath e r
dif f e re nt e xpe rie nce . Ne ve rth e le ss, Brue ge l painte d during a pe riod of gre at mate rial
prospe rity in th e Ne th e rlands, in wh ich all sh are d to some de gre e . T h e se we re f ortunate
time s.
Rath e rth an vie wing th e painting as awork of art, I would like to invite you - th e re ade r-
to imagine yourse lf se t down in th e ve ry landscape de picte d, on a sultry August day in
1565. Standing alittle wayof f to th e righ t of th e groupbe ne ath th e tre e , you are awitne ss
to th e sce ne unf olding about you. And of course you h e ar it too, f or th e sce ne doe s not
unf old in sile nce . So accustome d are we to th inking of th e landscape as a picture th at we
can look at, like a plate in a book or an image on a scre e n, th at it is pe rh aps ne ce ssary to
166 T imIngold
re mind you th at e xch anging th e painting f or 're al lif e ' is not simply a matte r of incre asing
th e scale . Wh at is involve d is a f undame ntal dif f e re nce of orie ntation. In th e landscape of
our dwe lling, we look around (J. Gibson 1979: 203). In wh at f ollows I sh all f ocus on six
compone nts of wh at you se e around you, and comme nt on e ach in so f aras th e y illustrate
aspe cts of wh at I h ave h ad to say about landscape and te mporality. T h e y are : th e h ills and
valle y, th e path s and tracks, th e tre e , th e corn, th e ch urch , and th e pe ople .
T h e h ills and valle y
T h e te rrain is age ntlyundulating one of low h ills and valle ys, grading of f to ash ore line th at
can just be made out th rough th e summe rh aze . You are standing ne arth e summit of ah ill,
f romwh e re you can look out across th e inte rve ning valle y to th e ne xt. How, th e n, do you
dif f e re ntiate be twe e n th e h ills and th e valle y as compone nts of th is landscape ? Are th e y
alte rnating blocks or strips into wh ich it may be divide d up? Any atte mpt at such division
plunge s us imme diate ly into absurdity. For wh e re can we draw th e boundarie s of a h ill
e xce pt along th e valle y bottoms th at se parate it f romth e h ills on e ith e r side ? And wh e re
can we draw th e boundarie s of a valle y e xce pt along th e summits of th e h ills th at mark its
wate rsh e d? One way, we would h ave a landscape consisting only of h ills, th e oth e r way it
would consist only of valle ys. Of course , 'h ill' and 'valle y' are oppose d te rms, but th e
opposition is not spatial or altitudinal but kinae sth e tic. It is th e move me nts of f alling away
f rom, and rising uptowards, th at spe cif y th e f ormof th e h ill; and th e move me nts of f alling
away towards, and rising up f rom, th at spe cif y th e f orm of th e valle y. T h rough th e
e xe rcise s of de sce nding and climbing, and th e ir dif f e re nt muscular e ntailme nts, th e
contours of th e landscape are not so much me asure d asf e lt- th e y are dire ctlyincorporate d
into our bodily e xpe rie nce . But e ve n if you re main roote d to one spot, th e same principle
applie s. As you look across th e valle y to th e h ill on th e h orizon, your e ye s do not re main
f ixe d: swive lling in th e ir socke ts, or as you tilt your h e ad, th e ir motions accord with th e
move me nt of your atte ntion as it f ollows its course th rough th e landscape . You 'cast your
e ye s' f irstdownwards into th e valle y, and th e n upwards towards th e distant h ill. Inde e d in
th is ve rnacular ph rase , to 'cast one 's e ye s', commonse nse h as once again graspe d
intuitive ly wh at th e psych ology of vision, with its me taph ors of re tinal image ry, h as f ound
so h ard to acce pt: th at move me nt is th e ve ry e sse nce of pe rce ption. It is be cautse , in
scanning th e te rrain f romne arby into th e distance , your downward glance is f ollowe d by
an upward one , th at you pe rce ive th e valle y.
More ove r some one standing wh e re you are now would pe rce ive th e same topograph ic
panorama, re gardle ss of th e time of ye ar, th e we ath e r conditions and th e activitie s in wh ich
pe ople maybe e ngage d. We mayre asonablysuppose th atove r th e ce nturie s, pe rh aps e ve n
mille nnia, th is basic topograph y h as ch ange d but little . Se t against th e duration of h uman
me mory and e xpe rie nce , it mayth e re f ore be take n to e stablish abase line of pe rmane nce .
Ye t pe rmane nce , as Gibson h as stre sse d, is always re lative ; th us 'it is be tte r to spe ak of
pe rsiste nce unde r ch ange ' (J. Gibson 1979: 13). Alth ough th e topograph y is invariant
re lative to th e h uman lif e -cycle , it is not itse lf immune to ch ange . Se a-le ve ls rise and f all
with global climatic cycle s, and th e pre se nt contours of th e country are th e cumulative
outcome of a slow and long drawn out proce ss of e rosion and de position. T h is proce ss,
more ove r, was not conf ine d to e arlie r ge ological e poch s during wh ich th e landscape
T h e te mporalityof th e landscape 167
assume d its pre se nt topograph ic f orm. For it is still going on, and will continue so long as
th e stre am, just visible in th e valle y bottom, f lows on towards th e se a. T h e stre amdoe s not
f low be twe e n pre -cut banks, but cuts its banks e ve n as it f lows. Like wise , as we h ave se e n,
pe ople sh ape th e landscape e ve n as th e y dwe ll. And h uman activitie s, as we ll as th e action
of rive rs and th e se a, contribute signif icantlyto th e proce ss of e rosion. As you watch , th e
stre amf lows, f olk are at work, alandscape is be ing f orme d, and time passe s.
T h e path s and tracks
I re marke d above th at we e xpe rie nce th e contours of th e landscape by moving th rough it,
so th at it e nte rs - as Bach e lard would say- into our 'muscularconsciousne ss'. Re living th e
e xpe rie nce in our imagination, we are incline d to re call th e road we took as 'climbing' th e
h ill, or as 'de sce nding' into th e valle y, as th ough 'th e road itse lf h ad muscle s, or rath e r,
counte r-muscle s' (Bach e lard 1964: 11). And th is, too, is probablyh ow you re call th e path s
and tracks th at are visible to you now: af te rall, you must h ave trave lle d along at le ast some
of th e mto re ach th e spot wh e re you are curre ntlystanding. Ne are st at h and, a path h as
be e n cut th rough th e wh e at-f ie ld, allowing sh e ave s to be carrie d down, and wate r and
provisions to be carrie d up. Furth e r of f , a cart-track runs along th e valle y bottom, and
anoth e r winds upth e h ill be h ind. In th e distance , path s criss-cross th e village gre e n. T ake n
toge th e r, th e se path s and tracks 'impose a h abitual patte rn on th e move me nt of pe ople '
(Jackson 1989: 146). And ye t th e y also arise out of th at move me nt, f or e ve ry path or track
sh ows upas th e accumulate d imprintof countle ss journe ys th atpe ople h ave made
-
with or
with out th e ir ve h icle s or dome stic animals
-
as th e y h ave gone about th e ir e ve ryday
busine ss. T h us th e same move me nt is e mbodie d, on th e side of th e pe ople , in th e ir
'muscular consciousne ss', and on th e side of th e landscape , in its ne twork of path s and
tracks. In th is ne twork is se dime nte d th e activity of an e ntire community, ove r many
ge ne rations. It is th e taskscape made visible .
In th e irjourne ys along path s and tracks, h owe ve r, pe ople alsomove f romplace toplace .
T o re ach a place , you ne e d cross no boundary, but you must f ollow some kind of path .
T h us th e re can be no place s with out path s, along wh ich pe ople arrive and de part; and no
path s with out place s, th at constitute th e ir de stinations and points of de parture . And f or
th e h arve ste rs, th e place to wh ich th e y arrive , and wh e nce th e y will le ave at th e e nd of th e
day, is marke d by th e ne xt f e ature of th e landscape to occupy your atte ntion....
T h e tre e
Rising f rom th e spot wh e re pe ople are gath e re d f or th e ir re past is an old and gnarle d
pe ar-tre e , wh ich provide s th e mwith both sh ade f romth e sun, a back-re st and a propf or
ute nsils. Be ing th e month of August, th e tre e is in f ull le af , and f ruit is ripe ning on th e
branch e s. But th is is not just anytre e . Forone th ing, it draws th e e ntire landscape around it
into a unique f ocus: in oth e r words, by its pre se nce it constitute s a particularplace . T h e
place was not th e re be f ore th e tre e , but came into be ing with it. And f or th ose wh o are
gath e re d th e re , th e prospe ct it af f ords, wh ich is to be h ad nowh e re e lse , is wh at give s it its
particular ch aracte r and ide ntity. For anoth e r th ing, no oth e r tre e h as quite th e same
conf iguration of branch e s, dive rging, be nding and twisting in e xactly th e same way. In its
168 T imIngold
pre se nt f orm, th e tre e e mbodie s th e e ntire h istoryof its de ve lopme nt f romth e mome nt it
f irst took root. And th at h istory consists in th e unf olding of its re lations with manif old
compone nts of its e nvironme nt, including th e pe ople wh o h ave nurture d it, tille d th e soil
around it, prune d its branch e s, picke d its f ruit, and - as at pre se nt - use it as some th ing to
le an against. T h e pe ople , in oth e r words, are as much bound upin th e lif e of th e tre e as is
th e tre e in th e live s of th e pe ople . More ove r, unlike th e h ills and th e valle y, th e tre e h as
manif e stly grown with in living me mory. T h us its te mporality is more consonant with th at
of h uman dwe lling. Ye t in its branch ing structure , th e tre e combine s an e ntire h ie rarch yof
te mporal rh yth ms, ranging f rom th e long cycle of its own ge rmination, growth and
e ve ntual de cay to th e sh ort, annual cycle of f lowe ring, f ruiting and f oliation. At one
e xtre me , re pre se nte d by th e solid trunk, it pre side s immobile ove r th e passage of h uman
ge ne rations; at th e oth e r, re pre se nte d by th e f ronde sce nt sh oots, it re sonate s with th e
lif e -cycle s of inse cts, th e se asonal migrations of birds, and th e re gular round of h uman
agriculturalactivitie s (cf . Davie s 1988). In ase nse , th e n, th e tre e bridge s th e gapbe twe e n
th e appare ntly f ixe d and invariant f orms of th e landscape and th e mobile and transie nt
f orms of animal lif e , visible proof th at all of th e se f orms, f romth e most pe rmane nt to th e
most e ph e me ral, are dynamically linke d unde r transf ormation with in th e move me nt of
be coming of th e world as awh ole .
T h e corn
T urning f romth e pe ar-tre e to th e wh e at-f ie ld, it is no longe r a place in th e landscape but
th e surrounding surf ace th at occupie s your atte ntion. And pe rh aps wh at is most striking
about th is surf ace is its unif ormityof colour, agolde n sh e e n th at cloaks th e more e le vate d
parts of th e countryf oras f aras th e e ye can se e . As you know, wh e at take s on th is colour at
th e particulartime of ye arwh e n it is ripe f orh arve sting. More th an anyoth e r f e ature of th e
landscape , th e golde n corn gath e rs th e live s of its inh abitants, wh e re ve r th e y maybe , into
te mporal unison, f ounde d upon acommunion of visual e xpe rie nce . T h us wh e re as th e tre e
binds past, pre se nt and f uture in asingle place , th e corn binds e ve ry place in th e landscape
with in a single h orizon of th e pre se nt. T h e tre e , we could say, e stablish e s a vivid se nse of
duration, th e corn an e qually vivid se nse of wh at Fabian (1983: 31) calls coe valne ss. It is
th is distinction th at Bach e lard h as in mind wh e n h e contrasts th e 'be f ore -me , be f ore -us' of
th e f ore st with th e 'with -me , with -us' of f ie lds and me adows, wh e re in 'my dre ams and
re colle ctions accompany all th e dif f e re nt ph ase s of tilling and h arve sting' (Bach e lard
1964: 188). You may suppose th at th e sle e pe r be ne ath th e tre e is dre aming of corn, but if
so, you may be sure th at th e pe ople and th e activitie s th at f igure in h is dre amare coe val
with th ose of th e pre se nt and do not take h imback into an e ncounte r with th e past. (Note
th at th e distinction be twe e n coe valne ss and duration, re pre se nte d byth e corn and th e tre e ,
is not at all th e same as th e classic Saussurian dich otomy be twe e n synch rony and
diach rony: th e f orme r be longs to th e pe rspe ctive of th e A-se rie s rath e rth an th e B-se rie s,
to th e te mporality of th e landscape , not to its ch ronology (Ingold 1986b: 151).)
Wh e re th e corn h as be e n f re sh lycut, it pre se nts ash e e r ve rtical f ront, not f arsh ort of a
man's h e igh t. But th is is not a boundary f e ature , like a h e dge or f e nce . It is an inte rf ace ,
wh ose outline is progre ssive ly transf orme d as th e h arve ste rs proce e d with th e ir work.
He re is a f ine e xample of th e way in wh ich f orme me rge s th rough move me nt. Anoth e r
T h e te mporalityof th e landscape 169
e xample can be se e n f urth e rof f , wh e re a man is e ngage d in th e task of binding th e wh e at
into ash e af . Each comple te d sh e af h as are gularf orm, wh ich arise s out of th e co-ordinate d
move me nt of binding. But th e comple tion of a sh e af is only one mome nt in th e labour
proce ss. T h e sh e ave s will late rbe carrie d down th e path th rough th e f ie ld, to th e h aycartin
th e valle y. Inde e d at th is ve ry mome nt, one woman is stoope d almost double in th e act of
picking up a sh e af , and two oth e rs can be se e n on th e ir way down, sh e ave s on th e ir
sh oulde rs. Many more ope rations will f ollow be f ore th e wh e at is e ve ntually transf orme d
intobre ad. In th e sce ne be f ore you, one of th e h arve ste rs unde rth e tre e , se ate d on ash e af ,
is cutting a loaf . He re th e cycle of production and consumption e nds wh e re it be gan, with
th e produce rs. For production is tantamount to dwe lling: it doe s not be gin h e re (with a
pre conce ive d image ) and e nd th e re (with af inish e d arte f act), but is continuouslygoing on.
T h e ch urch
Not f ar of f , ne stle d in a grove of tre e s ne ar th e top of th e h ill, is a stone ch urch . It is
instructive to ask: h ow doe s th e ch urch dif f e r f romth e tre e ? T h e y h ave more in common,
pe rh aps, th an me e ts th e e ye . Both posse ss th e attribute s of wh at Bakh tin (1981: 84) calls a
'ch ronotope ' - th at is, aplace ch arge d with te mporality, one in wh ich te mporality take s on
palpable f orm. Like th e tre e , th e ch urch by its ve ry pre se nce constitute s a place , wh ich
owe s its ch aracte rto th e unique wayin wh ich it draws in th e surrounding landscape . Again
like th e tre e , th e ch urch spans h uman ge ne rations, ye t its te mporality is not inconsonant
with th at of h uman dwe lling. As th e tre e burie s its roots in th e ground, so also pe ople 's
ance stors are burie d in th e grave yard be side th e ch urch , and both se ts of roots mayre ach to
approximate lyth e same te mporal de pth . More ove r th e ch urch , too, re sonate s to th e cycle s
of h uman lif e and subsiste nce . Among th e inh abitants of th e ne igh bourh ood, it is not only
se e n but also h e ard, as its be lls ring out th e se asons, th e month s, birth s, marriage s and
de ath s. In sh ort, as f e ature s of th e landscape , both th e ch urch and th e tre e appe ar as
ve ritable monume nts to th e passage of time .
Ye t de spite th e se similaritie s, th e dif f e re nce mayse e mobvious. T h e ch urch , af te rall, is
a building. T h e tre e by contrast, is not built, it grows. We may agre e to re se rve th e te rm
'building' f or any durable structure in th e landscape wh ose f ormarise s and is sustaine d
with in th e curre nt of h uman activity. It would be wrong to conclude , h owe ve r, th at th e
distinction be twe e n buildings and non-buildings is an absolute one . Wh e re an absolute
distinction is made , it is ge ne rally pre mise d upon th e se paration of mind and nature , such
th at built f orm, rath e rth an h aving its source with in nature , is said to be supe rimpose d by
th e mind upon it. But f rom th e pe rspe ctive of dwe lling, we can se e th at th e f orms of
buildings, as much as of anyoth e r f e ature s of th e landscape , are ne ith e r give n in th e world
nor place d upon it, but e me rge with in th e se lf -transf orming proce sse s of th e world itse lf .
With re spe ct to any f e ature , th e scope of h uman involve me nt in th e se proce sse s will vary
f romne gligible to conside rable , th ough it is ne ve r total (e ve n th e most 'e ngine e re d' of
e nvironme nts is h ome to oth e r spe cie s). Wh at is or is not a'building' is th e re f ore are lative
matte r; more ove r as h uman involve me nt mayvaryin th e 'lif e h istory' of a f e ature , it may
be more or le ss of abuilding in dif f e re nt pe riods.
Re turning to th e tre e and th e ch urch , it is e vide ntly too simple to suppose th at th e f orm
of th e tre e is naturally give n in its ge ne tic make up, wh e re as th e f orm of th e ch urch
170 T imIngold
pre -e xists, in th e minds of th e builde rs, as aplan wh ich is th e n 're alize d' in stone . In th e
case of th e tre e , we h ave alre adyobse rve d th atits growth consists in th e unf olding of atotal
syste mof re lations constitute d byth e f actof its pre se nce in an e nvironme nt, f romth e point
of ge rmination onwards, and th atpe ople , as compone nts of th e tre e 's e nvironme nt, playa
notinsignif icant role in th is proce ss. Like wise , th e 'biograph y' of th e ch urch consists in th e
unf olding of re lations with its h uman builde rs, as we ll as with oth e rcompone nts of its
e nvironme nt, f romth e mome ntwh e n th e f irststone was laid. T h e 'f inal' f ormof th e ch urch
mayinde e d h ave be e n pre f igure d in th e h uman imagination, butitnomore issue d f romth e
image th an did th e f ormof th e tre e issue f romits ge ne s. In both case s, th e f ormis th e
e mbodime ntof a de ve lopme ntalor h istoricalproce ss, and is roote d in th e conte xt of
h uman dwe lling in th e world.
In th e case of th e ch urch , more ove r, th atproce ss did not stopwh e n its f ormcame to
match th e conce ptualmode l. Foras long as th e building re mains standing in th e landscape ,
itwillcontinue - as itdoe s now - tof igure with in th e e nvironme ntnotjustof h uman be ings
butof amyriad of oth e rliving kinds, plantand animal, wh ich willincorporate it intoth e ir
own lif e -activitie s and modif yitin th e proce ss. And itis subje ct, too, toth e same f orce s of
we ath e ring and de composition, both organic and me te orological, th ataf f e cte ve ryth ing
e lse in th e landscape . T h e pre se rvation of th e ch urch in its e xisting, 'f inish e d' f ormin th e
f ace of th e se f orce s, h owe ve rsubstantialit maybe in its mate rials and construction,
re quire s are gularinputof e f f ortin mainte nance and re pair. Once th is h uman inputlapse s,
le aving it at th e me rcyof oth e rf orms of lif e and of th e we ath e r, it willsoon ce ase tobe a
building and be come aruin.
T h e pe ople
Sof arI h ave de scribe d th e sce ne onlyas you be h old itwith youre ye s. Ye t you donotonly
look, you liste n as we ll, f orth e airis f ullof sounds of one kind and anoth e r. T h ough th e
f olk be ne ath th e tre e are toobusye ating totalk, you h e arth e clatte rof woode n spoons on
bowls, th e slurpof th e drinke r, and th e loud snore s of th e me mbe rof th e partywh ois
outstre tch e d in sle e p. Furth e rof f , you h e arth e swish of scyth e s againstth e cornstalks and
th e calls of th e birds as th e yswooplow ove rth e f ie ld in se arch of pre y. Farof f in th e
distance , waf te d on th e ligh twind, can be h e ard th e sounds of pe ople conve rsing and
playing on agre e n, be h ind wh ich , on th e oth e rside of th e stre am, lie s acluste rof cottage s.
Wh atyou h e aris ataskscape .
In th e pe rf ormance of th e irparticulartasks, pe ople are re sponsive notonlytoth e cycle
of maturation of th e crop, wh ich draws th e mtoge th e rin th e ove rallproje ctof h arve sting,
butalsotoe ach oth e r's activitie s as th e se are apportione d byth e division of labour. Eve n
with in th e same task, individuals donotcarryon in mutualisolation. T e ch nically, it take s
onlyone man towie ld ascyth e , butth e re ape rs ne ve rth e le ss work in unison, ach ie ving a
dance -like h armonyin th e irrh yth mic move me nts. Similarlyth e two wome n carrying
sh e ave s down intoth e valle yadjustth e irpace , e ach in re lation to th e oth e r, so th atth e
distance be twe e n th e mre mains more orle ss invariant. Pe rh aps th e re is le ss co-ordination
be twe e n th e re spe ctive move me nts of th e e ate rs, h owe ve rth e ye ye e ach oth e rinte ntlyas
th e yse t aboutth e irre past, and th e me al is ajoint activityon wh ich all h ave e mbarke d
toge th e r, and wh ich th e ywillf inish toge th e r. Onlyth e sle e pe r, oblivious to th e world, is
T h e te mporalityof th e landscape 171
out of joint- h is snore s jarth e se nse s pre cise lybe cause th e y are not in anykind of rh yth mic
re lation towh at is going on around. With out wake f ul atte ntion, th e re can be nore sonance .
But in atte nding to one anoth e r, do th e pe ople inh abit a world of th e ir own, an
e xclusive ly h uman world of me anings and inte ntions, of be lie f s and value s, de tach e d f rom
th e one in wh ich th e ir bodie s are put to work in th e ir se ve ral activitie s? Do th e y, f rom
with in such adomain of inte rsubje ctivity, look at th e world outside th rough th e window of
th e ir se nse s? Sure ly not. For th e h ills and valle y, th e tre e , th e corn and th e birds are as
palpably pre se nt to th e m (as inde e d to you too) as are th e pe ople to e ach oth e r (and to
you). T h e re ape rs, as th e y wie ld th e ir scyth e s, are with th e corn, just as th e e ate rs are with
th e irf e llows. T h e landscape , in sh ort, is not atotalityth at you oranyone e lse can look at, it
is rath e rth e world in wh ich we stand in taking upapoint of vie w on our surroundings. And
it is with in th e conte xt of th is atte ntive involve me nt in th e landscape th at th e h uman
imagination ge ts to work in f ash ioning ide as about it. For th e landscape , to borrow a
ph rase f romMe rle au-Ponty (1962: 24), is not so much th e obje ct as 'th e h ome land of our
th ough ts'.
Epilogue
Concluding an e ssay on th e ways in wh ich th e We ste rn Apach e of Arizona discove r
me aning, value and moral guidance in th e landscape around th e m, Basso abh ors th e
te nde ncy in e cological anth ropology to re le gate such matte rs to an 'e piph e nome nal' le ve l,
wh ich is se e n to h ave little or no be aring on th e dynamics of adaptation of h uman
populations to th e conditions of th e ir e nvironme nts. An e cology th at is f ully cultural,
Basso argue s, is one th at would atte nd as much to th e se miotic as to th e mate rial
dime nsions of pe ople 's re lations with th e ir surroundings, bybringing into f ocus 'th e laye rs
of signif icance with wh ich h uman be ings blanke t th e e nvironme nt' (Basso 1984: 49). In
rath e r similar ve in, Cosgrove re gre ts th e te nde ncy in h uman ge ograph y to re gard th e
landscape in narrowly utilitarian and f unctional te rms, as 'an impe rsonal e xpre ssion of
de mograph ic and e conomic f orce s', and th us to ignore th e multiple laye rs of symbolic
me aning or cultural re pre se ntation th at are de posite d upon it. T h e task of de coding th e
'many-laye re d me anings of symbolic landscape s', Cosgrove argue s, will re quire a
ge ograph y th at is not just h uman but prope rly h umanistic (Cosgrove 1989: 120-7).
T h ough I h ave some sympath ywith th e vie ws e xpre sse d by th e se write rs, I be lie ve th at
th e me taph ors of cultural construction wh ich th e y adopt h ave an e f f e ct quite opposite to
th at inte nde d. For th e ve ry ide a th at me aning cove rs ove r th e world, laye r upon laye r,
carrie s th e implication th at th e way to uncove r th e most basic le ve l of h uman be ings'
practical involve me nt with th e ir e nvironme nts is by stripping th e se laye rs away. In oth e r
words, such blanke ting me taph ors actuallyse rve to cre ate and pe rpe tuate an inte lle ctual
space in wh ich h uman e cology or h uman ge ograph y can f lourish , untrouble d by any
conce rns about wh at th e world me ans to th e pe ople wh o live in it. We can sure lyle arn f rom
th e We ste rn Apach e , wh o insist th at th e storie s th e y te ll, f arf romputting me anings upon
th e landscape , are inte nde d to allow liste ne rs to place th e mse lve s in re lation to spe cif ic
f e ature s of th e landscape , in such away th at th e ir me anings maybe re ve ale d or disclose d.
Storie s h e lp to ope n upth e world, not to cloak it.
172 T imIngold
And such ope ning up, too, must be th e obje ctive of arch ae ology. Like th e We ste rn
Apach e - and f or th at matte r any oth e r group of pe ople wh o are truly 'at h ome ' in th e
world - arch ae ologists study th e me aning of th e landscape , not by inte rpre ting th e many
laye rs of its re pre se ntation (adding f urth e rlaye rs in th e proce ss) but byprobing e ve r more
de e ply into it. Me aning is th e re to be discove re d in th e landscape , if only we know h ow to
atte nd to it. Eve ry f e ature , th e n, is apote ntial clue , a ke y to me aning rath e rth an ave h icle
f orcarrying it. T h is discove ryproce dure , wh e re in obje cts in th e landscape be come clue s to
me aning, is wh at distinguish e s th e pe rspe ctive of dwe lling. And since , as I h ave sh own, th e
proce ss of dwe lling is f undame ntally te mporal, th e appre h e nsion of th e landscape in th e
dwe lling pe rspe ctive must be gin f roma re cognition of its te mporality. Only th rough such
re cognition, by te mporalizing th e landscape , can we move be yond th e division th at h as
af f licte d most inquirie s up to now, be twe e n th e 'scie ntif ic' study of an ate mporalize d
nature , and th e 'h umanistic' study of a de mate rialize d h istory. And no discipline is be tte r
place d to take th is ste p th an arch ae ology. I h ave not be e n conce rne d h e re with e ith e r th e
me th ods or th e re sults of arch ae ological inquiry. Howe ve r to th e que stion, 'wh at is
arch ae ology th e studyof ?', I be lie ve th e re is no be tte r answe r th an 'th e te mporality of th e
landscape '. I h ope , in th is article , to h ave gone some way towards e lucidating wh at th is
me ans.
10.iii.93 De partme ntof Social Anth ropology
Unive rsityof Manch e ste r
Note
An e arlie r ve rsion of th is pape r was pre se nte d to th e se ssion on 'Place , time and
e xpe rie nce : inte rpre ting pre h istoric landscape s', at th e Conf e re nce of th e T h e ore tical
Arch ae ology Group, Unive rsity of Le ice ste r, De ce mbe r 1991.
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Abstract
Ingold, T .
T h e te mporality of th e landscape
Landscape and te mporalityare th e majorunif ying th e me s of arch ae ologyand social-cultural
anth ropology. T h is pape ratte mpts tosh ow h ow th e te mporalityof th e landscape maybe unde rstood
bywayof a 'dwe lling pe rspe ctive ' th at se ts out f romth e pre mise of pe ople 's active , pe rce ptual
e ngage me ntin th e world. T h e me aning of 'landscape ' is clarif ie d bycontrasttoth e conce pts of land,
nature and space . T h e notion of 'taskscape ' is introduce d tode note apatte rn of dwe lling activitie s,
and th e intrinsic te mporalityof th e taskscape is sh own tolie in its rh yth mic inte rre lations orpatte rns
of re sonance . Byconside ring h ow taskscape re late s to landscape , th e distinction be twe e n th e mis
ultimate lydissolve d, and th e landscape itse lf is sh own tobe f undame ntallyte mporal. Some concre te
illustrations of th e se argume nts are drawn f romapainting byBrue ge l, T h e Harve ste rs.