Modern & Contemporary France (1997), 5(3), 309-317 The police and the deportation of Jews from the Bouches-du-Rhéne in August and September 1942 SIMON KITSON Universite de Paris-XH Abstract In the last 20 years, a number of scholarly studies have convincingly shown the responsibility of Vichy in the deportation of Jews from France. This article sets out to explore how this policy was interpreted lower down the administrative ladder. Hierarchical pressure was one of the major limitations on police resistance to this measure, but despite this many police officers were shocked by the reality behind the measures they were being asked to impose and implement. Coming into personal contact with the victims of deportation was a significant factor in shaping their reaction. ‘The first person fo raise the question of the transfer of Jews from the unoccupied zone in the Franco-German negotiations of 1942 was not a Nazi, but René Bousquet, the Vieby Police chief, who brought up the subject during Heydrich’s visit to Paris between 5 and 12 May. In response to Heydrich’s announcement that the deportation of stateless Jews from the occupied Zone to eastern Europe was imminent, Bousquet inquired whether it would be possible at the same time to send off those Jews intemed in the southem zone for the last 18 months. Bousquet’s initiative was inspired by the desire to rid Vichy of a group of refugecs it had been forced to accept in the summer of 1940 when the Nazis had expelled them from Baden-Palatinate. The May negotiations were inconclusive on this point because Heydrich was still waiting for the necessary rolling-stock for the transfer to the east, By July, when the question came up again, the tone of the negotiations had hardened. The Reich now made explicit its desire to see the progressive expulsion of Jews, implying that this measure would ultimately result in the wholesale deportation of all Jews including French ones. Believing that his Jewish compatriots faced what Bousquet termed ‘une menace directe et grave’, it was decided, first in negotiations between Bousquet and the SS chiefs on 2 July, then in talks between Laval and Knochen on 4 July, that the measures (963-94807971030309.09 © 1987 Assocation forthe Stuy of Modem & Contemporary France310. KITSON concerning foreign Jews should be extended, in the hope that the sacrifice of immigrant Jews would spare their French counterparts. Such calculations may have satisfied Bousquet and Laval's political position but from any humanitarian perspective they were odious.” : To ensure that the agreed discrimination by nationality was put into effect, Botisquet insisted that the French Police had exclusive control over these operations, which would thesefore become a test of obedience for his subordi- nates, and whose successful completion could restore much of the discredit lost Guring Resistance demonstrations of 14 July 1942, when the Police in Marseille and Aix-en-Provence tad clearly sided with the demonstrators, The SS-Ober sturmftlhrer Dannecker, responsible for the Gestapo in France, raised the stakes by calling into question the capacity of the French Police to resolve this question in a way which he considered to be in keeping with the interests of Europe. He Claimed that they were generally corrupt and understood nothing about “the Jewish question’. In reality, however, the Germans had little choice but to rely on the support of French forces in these operations. In mid-1942, the German Police in France comprised somewhere between 2500 and 3000 officials. If the number was sufficient with the help of French auxiliaries to ensure information- gathering missions, it was clearly inadequate for round-ups on the scale now ‘being proposed? ‘There were three essential phases in these deportations. For the first phase, long-term internees were to be assembled in the ‘camp des Milles’, an ancient brickworks between Aix and Marseille, which since 1940 had provided a forced residence in dusty and primitive conditions to many seeking emigration. On 30 May 1942, it contained 1331 foreigners. By the beginning of August, the number of intemees had increased to around 1500.3 On 3 August were added to this contingent 76 women previously interned in the ‘Bompard’ and “Terminus des Ports” hotels in Marseille, and a further group of women and children transferred from the ‘Hotel du Levant’. The chaplains of the camp and the charitable assistance organisations present persuaded parents to entrust their children to the ‘Quakers and the YMCA on § August.‘ Long-term intemces account for most of the 260 persons transferred from the ‘camp des Milles’ to Draney by the convoy of 11 August, as well as a majority of the 538 individuals sent on the same journey on 13 August. The second stage began when 144 Jewish members of the Groupements de travailicurs étrangers (GTE) in Mandelieu, Vidauban, Aubagne, Salins-de-Giraud and Beaucaire were transferred to the camp for the convoy of 23 August.’ The involvement of Police officers in these two phases took various forms, The sealing-off and the guarding of the “camp des Milles’ between 2 and 12 August were carried out by 180 gardiens of the Groupe Mobile de Réserve (GMR) ‘Provence’. The GMR and the gendarmerie thereafter shared this task, ‘The drawing-up of the lists of those to depart using criteria of age, date of entry to France and French relations was undertaken by Police officers in conjunction with the staff of the camp." Searches of dormitories and the accompanying of trains from the camp to the northern zone also fell to the Police and the gendarmerie.DEPORTATION OF JEWS FROM BOUCHES-DURHONE 311 Tc was in the third stage, which began in earnest on 26 August, that the Police were asked to perform their most active role and this time the activity was {generalised to other branches. This involved the arrest of foreign Jews living in French towns and cities, especially those of central or eastern European origin, fas well as any from other categories whose situation was found to be irregular ack of identity card, expired carte de séjour, etc.). Besides round-ups in the street, there were also controls of passengers artiving in or leaving from bus and train stations, checks of hotel registers and searches of convents and religious boarding schools with a view 10 uncovering concealed children.” In addition, there were visits to the addresses of those known to the authorities, either through lists established by the “Police aux questions juives', the Police or the Prefecture, or of those who had been assigned to residence in 1941. Police officers and gendarmes were to present themselves in pairs, often comprising bificers from different services who did not know each other, at the homes of those indicated, to give them an hour to prepare their suitcases and then to bring those arrested into their Commissariats or gendarmeries from whence they were transferred to the “camp des Milles’, Once again, the guarding of the internees fell to the GMR and gendarmerie, both in the camp and on the trains subse- quently transfecring them to the northern zone. Those arrested by the Police in the last week of August and the first week of September account for the majority df the 574 Jews transferred from Aix to Drancy on 2 September and of the 594 Gino were sent the same way on 11 September by the last of the five convoys to leave the ‘camp des Milles’. It would be of little comfort to the victims of these measures, but figures of those arrested during these operations establish that they were a relative failure. For the Marseille region, the central services had forecast the arrest of 1170 of tne 1700 Jews appearing in the August 1942 census; 706 had been caught in the round-ups.® Bousquet called the attention of his Prefeets to the insufficiency of these results and instructed them to intensify the Police operations with all ‘available personnel and reduced the number of categories of exemptions from 11 to six? André Kaspi has listed four possible reasons for this shortfall: the cxaggerated statistics of the census of Jews; clandestine departores and changes ok address: the warnings to Jews broadcast by British radio; acts of resistance by the Police and gendarmerie.” To this list should be added above all the severe practical difficulties posed by the enormity of this measure against the Jews, but Figo the resistance activities of the civilian population and charitable organisa- tions, without whose cooperation and the shelter they could provide, any results achieved by other means of resistance would have been short lived. This is not the place to assess the exact weight of each of these factors, but it is worth noting before assessing its extent that any Police resistance was only one factor in this list, ‘Through their institutional position in the forefront of anti-Semitic per~ secution, the Police bad the possibility to spearhead resistance to these measures Some Police officers seized these opportunities. Certain types of Police resist: lance on this issue had begun before the August operations. A number of officers312s. KITSON in the second arrondissement of Marseille testified that their superior, the Commissaire Vincentelli, had passed down instructions not to bother the Jews and had personally undertaken the fabrication of false identity cards. Similar work was undertaken in the Service des Etrangers."' Police resistance also existed at each stage of the operations themselves. The importance of discreet svarnings of the imminence of round-ups of the non-artest of ‘déportables’ needs ho underlining. One intemee at the ‘camp des Milles’, Hans Fraenkel, has indicated that although the Police guard around the camp was rigorous, their fattempts to flush out Jews hidden in cellars in the camp were lethargic. Moreover, he described how another internee caught after having made his way through the perimeter fence was congratulated on his attempt by a Police officer swho then personally escorted him back to the assembly point and made sure that he was placed amongst those who were aot to be deported.” During the transit of one convoy which left the ‘camp des Milles’, an intemee escaped in Circumstances suggesting the complicity of the gendarmerie accompanying the irain: not only had a carriage been left open (despite strict instructions 10 the contrary) but the senior gendarme present did not report the escape to the GMR officer in charge of the convoy until any thought of recapture was problematic. Despite the multiplicity of the forms of Police resistance on this question, such behaviour should not be exaggerated. If the round-ups in the southern zone fell short of their targets, Vichy still manages to transfer a large number of Jews into the hands of the Nazis. As Marrus and Paxton point out, “disciplinary problems ddid not seriously hamper these operations, Not until August 1943 were German Officials having to take account in their planning for a general unreliability of the French Police in serious cases’."* Police resistance on this issue remained the activity of individuals and never assumed the proportions of rebellion, "Any attempt to understand the limits of this resistance would necessari to the attitude of the senior administration. There can be no doubting Vi desire to achieve the maximum number of arrests. The almost daily reduction in the range of exemptions that Donald Lowry noted was, as Marrs and Paxton Claim, an attempt t0 ‘catch more Jews in the Police net’. Bousguet’s instructions were to be as thorough as possible. He has been quoted as saying: “it is preferable to arrest all the Jews in a single round-up rather than 10 go ahead with Peveral isolated round-ups that will enable the Jews to hide or flee’. To Prefects he underlined his desire to liberate their regions totally of those foreign Jews whose inferment was programmed.!® He ordered the maximum mobilisation of personnel, an order which was not overlooked by local services. A Swiss Riimess, noting the massive mobilisation of the Police in Marseille, claimed that Within two hours she was asked to prove her identity five times."* To stimulate the zeal of local services, Bousquet sent out a circular on 20 August reminding Protects of the illegal activities of Jews, who were said to engage in the black market and anti-governmental propaganda, and instructing a constant surveillance of Jews in their regions.” In the Bouches-du-Rhéne, the senior Police hierarchy feeded no prompting, During an inspection of internment camps carried oat inDEPORTATION OF JEWS FROM BOUCHES-DU-RHONE 313 July 1942, SS-Obersturmfihrer Dannecker had included de Rodellee du Poszic, the intendant de police for the region, in the category of the intermediary hierarchy of the French administration who were favourable to a rapid resolution i the Jewish question and were just waiting for instructions to this effect. Once these instructions were received, his cooperation knew no bounds. In a Conversation with the Protestant pastor, Henri Manen, the intendant justified the Police measures claiming that although the measures taken against these Jews ‘were harsh they were nonetheless in French interests.” A number of the Categories of exemptions authorised were not respected: men aged over 60 were Sroladed in the departures.” Most witnesses underline that the convoy of 2 September included carriages made up of the sick and ntransportable, Although this is generally attributed to the infendant’s personal initiative, the provision of those two carriages featured in a government instruction of 28 August.” "To focus too exclusively on the attitude of the senior administration, however, would be to overlook the fact that it was not Bousquet who knocked on the doors Bt Jows to be arrested, it was not de Rodellee da Porzic who carried out the faentity checks in the street. This does not mean that the pressure exerted on junior personnel had no importance in determining Police behaviour. Bousqirt ‘had asked the Prefects and their delegates, the intendants, to supervise personally anti-Semitic operations and had insisted that they should smash any resistance (0 these measures which they might observe in the civilian population, and report any indiscretion, passivity or disobedience among their civil servants, He Ordered the internment of anyone caught hindering the execution of his instruc- tions Ordering Prefects to give strict instructions to Police services underlined the degree of hierarchical pressure exerted, but also implies a distinct lack of faith in Police personnel. Tn the event, even if there were examples of Police resistance, many officers attempted to pass the initiative of saving Jews on 10 ‘Others. Thus, the Protestant parson in Aix, Pasteur Manen, rememibers the case Sfia Police officer who, overcome by emotion, had solicited the clergyman’s help, announcing that he had had to arrest someone and asking Manen 9 intervene on their bebaif?? Others made no attempt to recognise what made these round-ups different from those of the period 1939-41. One Inspecteur Slaimed that he was unable t0 say what had happened to the Jews he had crested, because they were immediately passed to the GMR who escorted them to the “camp des Milles’ Such ignorance was, of course, an inevitable Consequence of the tradition where the involvement of Police officers in a case frequently stopped at the moment of the arrest, subsequent enquiries being anied out by specialist branches. ‘The specific circumstances surrounding the rrests of Jews during the summer of 1942 should have alerted Police officers tothe fact that these were no ordinary arrests, BBC warnings, widespread public Knowledge of the handing over of Jews to the Germans, and the horror on the faces of those arrested, all ought to have helped Police awareness in this sense. ‘The weight of hierarchical pressute, combined with the general sense of urgency in these operations, caused many to reject the most basic initiatives and at best to content themselves with expressions of sympathy.314s. KITSON ‘These expressions of sympathy coexist with numerous accounts of maltreat- ment of Jews by the Police, of insults to interees or simply a lack of respect for their dignity, as in the case of policemen who made women to be arrested get dressed in front of them during the home visits.” Both Hensi Manen and the epresentative of the Union générale des Israélites de France (UGIF), R-R- Lambert, reported that Jews loaded onto the convoy of 12 August were subjected to brutalities2> Moreover, during a roll-call of internees in the ‘camp des Milles’ ‘on 10 August, the Police, together with staff of the camp, carried out a search of the dormitories after which 154 thefts of internees’ possessions, ranging from gold watches to pairs of shoes, were reported.” The brutalities ‘commitied might be attributed to the boredom of those guarding the camp, in much the same way that riot Police lash out at demonstrators after long hours of waiting for something to happen; the thefts might be explained by a Potice desize to improve their own material conditions; but in both cases the specific circumstances of the summer of 1942 lead to the conclusion that such atrocities were underpinned by a certain degree of anti-Semitism. There were still signs of such a current amongst the rank and file. A gardien de la paix involved in the operations in the “camp des Milles’ took the initiative of denouncing to his superiors the activities at the “Bar du nord’ in proximity to the camp, claiming that the bar was a meeting place for Jews interned at the ‘camp des Milles’ who would spend their Weekends there with their wives and mistresses, and underlining that the bar was ‘a centre of prostitution and suspect goings-on.” Despite the existence of this current of blatant anti-Semitism in the Police, it would be wrong to portray it as representative of the attitudes of the majority of officers that suramer. The internee Hans Fracnkel, addressing the attitude of the Police in his account, claimed that hard-line anti-Semites were rare, although the intendant de police and his assistant, Robert Auzanneau, could be considered as such? The Rabbi Israét Salzer remembers that in the evening following the theft df internees’ possessions, he overheard the conversation of a group of CMR who ‘were saying that this theft was unacceptable and that they must find the culprits so that they would not all be accused of such a crime.” The hierarchy’ attempt to instill the lower ranks with their anti-Semitism were less likely to be greeted wwith success, as Police officers came increasingly into personal contact with the Vietims of anti-Semitic persecution. Giving evidence concerning the orders, which the GMR accompanying the convoys had received, a gardien of this unit Claimed that an afficier de paix had issued oral instructions portraying the “Juifs allemands’ that they were 0 transfer as extremely dangerous individuals who Should be sent to their destination dead or alive. This representation was contradicted by what this gardien saw with his own eyes when he realised during the journey that there were only pitiful individuals in the wagon.” “The effect of seeing these events at first band cannot be over-stressed. Lambert remembers that many Police officers made 20 attempt to hide their disgust at having to carry out such a mission.” The reports concerning Police attitudes to these measures feature a number of high points of emotion. Following the separation of adulis and children in the camp on 8 August 1942,DEPORTATION OF JEWS FROM 01 Pasteur Manen noted that the offcecs around him were pale ‘The following day Paste hein approached him, saying that during his service i China and the rr eles he had seen massacres, wars and famines. but noun he had seen was sorGreadfal as what he was now witnessing. ‘The events themselves caused @ a ereaple progression in Police attitudes. Commenting on the preparations for the departure of 2 September, Pasteur Manen covld by then write of the aoe able attitude of all the Police officers present, claiming Ut they were full Of compassion, trying their best to help the interess ‘and overtly happy when @ Sew mas released. From this Manen concluded that they jad been touched by 28 sments of humanity. Lambert remembers seeing Police officers ery while this departure was going on. Resistance sources talk of some officers resigning in Protes) OV the inhuman- ity of these procedures. The directeur ide la Police nationale, Henri. Cado, did Rieowledge in September that a large number of uniformed officers were resigning and taking up posts in other administrations, and indeed that this Teaetion of personnel had reached such levels that he Was imposing measures deirenit it before it caused 100 much disruption of Police Serve While it is fikely thatthe anti-Semritie measures accounted fo" Or encouraged some of these ree rut of the institution, Cado's letter makes plain that the main desti- dre for those transferring as the Gendarmerie Nationale, ‘whose involvement Patfne operations of summer 1942 was certainly no less ‘important than that of ihe Police.” Hence, the majority of these resignations were ‘undoubtedly more AE fovult of desire to change status in order to improve working conditions the he sign of a protest, Such discontent was summed UP by the Inspection générale des services administratifs in Septembes ‘who claimed that the demands ane Roaeliee at Porzic, coupled with those of the central administration, were creating 2 weariness amongst the personnel: it semble qa’2 top demander an personne des serves actifs, on POO lassitude, i ee ation prend une importance patcuiée par ie fat ae We Ges de M, Germonetce aggravent Ie mécontentement engendr€ par /2 ‘multiplicité des tiches poems par Tadeinistation centrale. Depuis quclgies tei es Cpe de Police gjrelle demande se sont atccéées rapidement. Le personne est dans tn état de tension Goutenue. 1 ne connait pas de détente* Jn any event, any resignations inspired by att- Semitic persecutions took place Mice abe operations and in no way represented an initiaive undermine the aifcieney of these measures, The disgust felt within Police ranks did not stop Sacicricing part in subsequent operations aimed at Jews, ane’ ip particular the rreind-ups which accompanied the destruction of the off district of Marseille at the beginning of 1943. But it is noticeable that during these later round-ups, the ine ce of the Police was most polarised in the branches of the GMR and Gondarmerie, the very branches who fad witnessed first-hand the distress of serefuring the 1942 deportations. This suggests that fe 1942 operations had repercussions on the round-ups six months [ater causing those officers who had316 8. KITSON seen the horror more vividly than their colleagues from other branches £0 be seteh more definite in their reactions. either for of against the Jews, Notes and references 1. Areives Nanas heneforh AN] 3W 91 OS), MEWS _Adhres Earangbres di Reich, Pais Aine i ii Cage de Dosaneniaton a se Tnesceforls CDIC] CC™ neo ous Oberg, depron de Bowsquet, ODS, RLARSFELD, S., ViehyAuschite (ayer, 1983), vol. 1 v9 ap ne Sail de Het Kaos, SUT: ETSON. ST Marsile Police in her content pW onto iberton, DP ess See Tals 1595), pp. 105-8; GRANDIONC. J Fo Poet (doy Zone ome, 3033 104 (ALES 9.330; MARRUS, M. and sd GRUNDY Prone an the Jer, Bas Bony 198 3 PREG. 8, Le Caen dele pedeaton des Mo T5046 (Les Fils et Filles des BLA FEE Fane, 199), 23 BOT, 2 marseille ot dans In 30m apr use Fm tn lo C- OPPERTT. (ol, Marts Wel” Tes Nazis CAmiale 028 es ie td caps de Sse LP Oar ee and GRUNDINES op. ct 8 20 ET Pe ote 5, p. 102 Fao ety 102: AN 3W 3 eS Se ‘UNI es Pris Région, ROBOT MAS 9 Seas Gel 3 Poe AN Petes Regionnas, 10. 12519, i812 6 MII oy, pts cabin a Pee, Mare, ar no ES Archives Departemental des AN IW 2) hous ener AD BDR) 300 10) ‘Chiaeciai, 4/5, Fone ee 103-5 MARKUS a8 PAXTON, 3 p,258 AD BDR SW 378, EBT fd Oo Commis Sc, sun, Gee ‘Chace, 2062, BE tres ate by KASD hy Le re eae (Geail, 1991), pp. 2401 Tes Enda de police n Marie, Wg OS SO Shay of round aps inthe Acct ye owt de Rhone Ce et PO Soparments of the region) tho cept of OS ern in 1D ae iva of 9 Ne PAN IW 91, bandit note rT sce, DIN, Accoing © 2 Mae 8 ‘of Bousquet’ bine, by 28 oe rhe owe db He ieportoment, 705 fo the rior: AN apa se re esigcnens ‘loots, 287082, 15 Ney SS SRiave fur, he ceca 3 9 ae een of te operas nto Se Op ‘September, ie ect services saves ede sa bce anete te TO 6026 SSS hat 70 ofthese ad been ws mig Tago of Se. Aner 100 wee Sd 1 a Tareste inthe region afer 26 rele afer Seton do la Pace Tes ct > Dede PE pour My He Seeaie General a Police, WOH 0 te oh Sereae trl bla Police aux Pres Regions -yyeta; AN 3W 91, Nowe de 18 Direction de Ia Police, 39/2. i tote pp. 20-1, Aes Coen is en fact that the round-ups ‘touebsiont ASP ot Repos on mitt © LES a Tr pepaton euviroanane's Ae POP das ales fl cone’; ie mang native = icon: and COHEN, A. Persteations ce awezages (Cass, 1993), 9-295, oa Oe 5D BDH 5GW 87. See also LABERNEDE KS rs Suives & Marelli AD IDIONG and GRUNDINER, oi a8 F119 eae ome Taser Hens Mason in GRANDIONS ot GRUNDINER, op, cit, note 2p. 3625 Eien fom Pat 1, p25: POLIAKON, Le LAN (Mazarne, 1981). p. 56 12 SOREN, oa fags Rexel in GRANDIONC a GRUNDINER, 0. ote 2. 7-388. 1 MRARRCOS ant PAXTON. op. ci, mote 2, . 260 1a, MARRUS et UO, op in note 3p. 105, CDIC COE 15. i TER Sane cluen,pbied n, Bernr, Ta ‘quoted in GRANDIONC ad at ER ope nose 2p. 342, Police rents conta Oe “obilisaton of pesoonst: AD Ser Conc Spiel es Pots La Grande BESS PH tquotsien, 278142 7 eS ae comer eat a MM. es Pies no 488, PE SS S82, 1 Qpye XRVE 87, Rapport de Denner, 2/710 38, I TGRANDIONC an GRUNDINER, oP its 28 > B 358, 30, RIBOT, op. cit, note 3, p. 103.a. 2 4 6 28. 20. a 32 33. 3A 3s. 46 DEPORTATION OF JEWS FROM BOUCHES-DU-RHONE 317 KLARSFELD, S, Le Transfert de Jf deta région de Marseille (hes Fils et Filles des déports ui de France, 192), GRANDIONC and GRUNDINER, op cit, note 2, pp. 343, AN 3W OE, Secrtaie Gena ila Pole aus Préfts Répionau, ge. go. (2776, 2XR142; AN 3W 9) Soerétre Gacral la Police aux Prefets Regionsus, els. no, 12640, 20°02, Pasteur Manen in GRANDJONC and GRUNDTNER, op, ci, note 7, 0.368 [AD BDR S6W 47, déposiion un Inspecteur de la Police Répinale "Etat, 972146 Pastor Manen in GRANDIONC sod GRUNDTNER, op. cit, note 2, p. 367 LAMBERT, RR Comets d'wn s2motn, 1940-413 (Fayard, 1989), p. 185; Pasteur Manea in GRAND- SONC and GRUNDTNER op. cit, note 2, pp 362, 367 Pastcar Mania in GRANDIONC aad GRUNDTNER, op. lt, note 2, p.361; Isa Salzer in ibid, 7p. 398-6 [AD BDR SW 368, proots-verbal no. 111, 38/2, Hans Fraenkel in GRANDIONC and GRUNDTNER, op. cit, noe 2 p. 388, Israel Salzer i iid, p. 385. AD BDR S6W 10, ‘prosiyverbal de Joseph C.,ex-Gantion des GMR, 31/5/45, LAMBERT. op cit note 26 p. 18S. Ct. also Hans Fracakel, who rember that a number of Potice bficcey commented on what s painfo tick they were falling; GRANDIONC apd GRUNDTNER, ep ft te 2 388, Pastour Manen in GRANDIONC and GRUNDTNER, op. cit, note 2, pp.359, 372 The anonymous work La Libération de la pensée francaise. Alger Paris 1943-44, published by che docementation cente ofthe French Press aod Information service. New York, gives the example of a bendarme's resignation inthe Auverpnc in direct protest to dese round-eps (Ione this reference to Karen ‘Adler Ch also AN Els 3972, CNT, docament o. 226VRNA-Z. 1/17. ANF 14908 {732}, Secreaire Général la Police 3 MM, les Prefts Region, 00 9-Pol. 2, 107043. ‘AN Fla 4525, GSA, Rapport no. 111, 25)982; see also AD BDR M6 11052, le Socrétaie General la Police & MM. is Préfes Revionaus, 11/9/42, 73,