Word Count:

Does the unequal distribution of oil income result in violence? Discuss in

relation to at least one case.



Abstract
In this paper, I will address the question of whether is there a predisposition or
not to violence within a society when the distribution of oil income results
disproportional. To begin this discussion, I will present the situation of different
real cases where such dynamics takes place to portray a comparative analysis
among them on the basis of the nature and outcomes that derive from this
panorama as well as the possible justifications in political terms for such violent
events.
Introduction
Blood may be thicker than water, but oil is thicker than either (Perry Anderson,
2001:30 cited in Watts 2003). Since its discovery, oil has always been considered
a precious resource in terms of economic profit, but when it comes to socio-
political aspects, oil has also been labelled as the devils excrement, becoming a
complete curse for rentier states. Empirical studies have shown that on average,
oil and lootable resources favor violent conflict (Ross, 2004 cited in Basedau and
Lay, 2009: 758).
Rentier states suffering from a resource curse end up creating a dynamics of
rivalry between competing sectors of the society for the oil income. However,
when the dispute leaves the offices and cabinets to enter into the everyday life, it
may acquire a more physical nature, ultimately leading to violence. Is it then an
objective conclusion to correlate unequal distribution of oil income with
violence? This paper will discuss such idea, presenting a wide range of data from
different real cases to find a common explanation for these events. Also, in the
case of find such correlation, this paper will also address to a lesser extent,
another related question: Do those violent acts find any kind of justification in
political terms? In this case, different theoretical concepts will be addressed in
order to analyze whether such violent acts could ever be justified according to
the literature on this topic. Hard as it is to find legitimation for guerrilla war
against a recognised government, not only the aim but also the nature of these
conflicts may actually turn out to attract moral support from outside the
picture and we could then end up agreeing with Machiavelli when he said that
the end justifies the means.
The correlation between oil and violence
Of the different types of natural resources, oil is considered to particularly
increase the likelihood of violence (Ross 2004; Humphreys 2005 cited in
Mhler, 2009). Among other aspects, oil turns out to bring a curse instead of a
blessing, and rentier states, suffering from a paradox of plenty can eventually
develop a complete unstable economic system that may even lead to quite
negative repercussions in some regions, affecting their population. Studies have
shown that natural resources tend to develop both finance and motive for
armed conflict and to create indirect economic and institutional causes of
violence (Ross, 2006; Humphreys, 2005; Fearon, 2005 in Basedau and Lay,
2009: 757). However, when it comes to discuss the relationship between
resources and violence, not all resources produce the same consequences. No
previous study has been able to clearly link certain commodities or lootable
resources such as diamonds or narcotics with violence, instead only oil-
exporting countries such as Angola, Nigeria or Indonesia, present a singular
tendency to violent uprisings (Basedau and Lay, 2009). Thus, to better
comprehend the nature of this situation, and the following cases, we must first
address two basic concepts that determine the origins of the socio-economic
premises that create the scenario for violence.
On the one hand, we have the concept of rentier states. For the purpose of this
paper, it is essential to understand this term, since most states that experience
these violent conflicts due to the unfair distribution of oil income fall into this
category. Mahdavy (1970) define rentier states are those that develop their
economy around the rent of their natural resources to external clients. These
states, most frequently rich in petroleum, tend to present an authoritarian
regime where the evolution of democracy patterns finds multiple obstacles
(Smith 2004). Thus, in this panorama, oil income does not flow to the majority of
the population since the government is the principal recipient. The economic
power thus bestowed upon the few would allow them to seize political power as
well (Beblawi, 1990: 88). Therefore, this unfair distribution of income, leading
to a situation of horizontal inequality set the necessary conditions for social
agitation and eventual violent conflict.
The second concept to bear in mind is the resource curse or paradox of plenty.
This term was explained by Richard Auty (1993), who analysed how states that
had vast amounts of natural resources, mainly petroleum or gas, were not only
incapable of developing a strong economy, but they actually had enormous
difficulties to stimulate economic growth. As a matter of fact, these countries
experience a lower growth rate than those countries without such reserves of
natural resources. To explain this paradox it is also worth mentioning the
concept of Dutch Disease. This theory explains that those countries experiencing
a boom in the export of natural resources, first strengthen their currency, which
makes other exports more expensive for international trade, and second, other
sectors, such as agriculture or manufacturing can be undermined, provoking a
lack of domestic goods for the population. In this situation, the population do not
only suffer from an unequal allocation of oil revenues, but they are also hindered
from continuing their traditional economic activities, which ultimately leads to
the rise of unemployment and the subsequent mobilisation. However, to better
understand this dynamics it is convenient to discuss different cases where such
circumstances define the current political panorama.
Nowadays, Nigeria might be one of the best examples to witness the correlation
between a resource curse and the consequences it brings. Since the discovery of
oil in the 1960s, Nigerias economy has extensively flourished, but this
prosperity has not benefited the majority since 70% of the population living on
less than 1 dollar a day, and 90% on less than 2 dollars (United Nations, 2006).
This horizontal unequality gave place to the mobilisation of different ethnic
groups, specially in the Niger Delta region, which decided to take arms and
pursue violent activities due to the complete inefficiency of dialogue and the
deployment of soldiers by the government to quell community protests against
oil companies (Ukiwo, 2007). From the 1990s the inhabitants of Ogoniland, Ijaw
land and other ethnic groups began an ambitious program of disrupting oil
production, which would ultimately lead to the occupation and shutting of oil
facilities, abduction of MCN staff, hijack and seizure of MCN helicopters and
boats, stoppage of production and other related activities undertaken by youth,
women and community activists (Ikelegbe, 2005: 215). Violence has reached an
extreme scope and in the Niger Delta we can see the youths, embarked on
guerrilla warfare, showing their anger through violence, using guns, cutlasses,
and kidnapping (Ukeje, 2002: 25).
However, the conflict do not only arise from the insufficient income that the
region obtains from oil extraction. Ecological impacts from oil spillage and gas
flaring are also agitating the populations distress (Watts 2003). According to
Eckersleys (2007) notion of ecocide, the destruction of the ecosystem is highly
affecting the population due to the repercussions that such ecological distress is
having not only on basic needs for survival, but also on some of the most
important resources that were the basis for the regions exports and traditional
economy, such as those of cocoa, cotton or rubber (Okonta and Douglas, 2001).
Thus, Nigeria present a perfect example of a political scenario where the unfair
allocation of oil income and the consequences this natural resource brings, such
as defined social hierarchies and the impact of oil extraction on the ecosystem,
leads to violence. As Hebst (1996) once said, oil made of the Nigerian state the
greatest single development tragedy in the world today.
However, in most cases, conflict specifically derives from economic factors. In
rentier states, the control over the petroleum industry not only provides huge
economic profit, but it also empowers those in command. Thus, the unfair
distribution of oil income and all the socio-economic benefits that it provides
leads certain sectors of a society to take arms and confront the authorities, as we
can see in Iraq with the Islamists, or in Libya with diverse militias fighting for
power.
In Iraq, the sectarian violence and the Sunni-Shiite divide that has disturbed the
country for the last decade has highly affected its oil output (Defterios, 2013).
During the last years, however, the escalation of terrorist attacks had decreased
until 2013, when the intense sectarian conflict in Iraq was reactivated by the
Syrian war, due to the ethnic and cultural relation between both countries
(Shaaban and Smith, 2013). However, one could ask how that situation can be
beneficial for any group. Islamists of Al-Qaida are presumed to be responsible for
this endless scenario of violence, and following the Marxist-Leninist doctrine
they could be trying to destroy the present to create a better future (Salhani,
2013). Since the departure of American forces, Al-Qaida has reinitiated its
activities in Iraq and expanded into Syria, and now that they have established
their based there, they are sending terrorists to Iraq, at a rate of 30 to 40 each
month (Gordon and Schmitt, 2013). Given this situation, as Bauman (2006)
believes, terrorist acts dot not only seek to infringe terror on the population, but
they instrumentalise the already existing dynamics of terror, which in this case,
would come from the recent war and the complete instability that has been
dominating the country for the past decade. Moreover, Arendt (1970) explained
that violence can be used as a mean to corrode social cohesion, a statement that
can be perfectly applicable to this particular case as explained by the remark of a
UN special envoy to Iraq, Nikolay Mladenov, when advised the Iraqi government
to act to thwart attempts by terrorists to destroy the social fabric of Iraqi
society (Smith, 2013).
On the other hand, oil is also boosting the levels of corruption around the
country. As Wahab (2006) explains, the security emptiness that followed the
departure of American troops increased economic opportunities for the existing
mafia, as well as for new criminal gangs around the country. And insurgents are
using oil revenues to finance violence, just as Saddam did. Thus, being oil the
basis for the Iraqi economy, it gives the perfect opportunity to create a violent
atmosphere that affects not only the states economy but also its social structure.
A similar case can be seen in Libya, where as Saleh (2013) states, different
militias across the country are fighting to get their share of power after the
political emptiness left after Gaddafis death. Thus, armed groups are blocking
key oilfields and ports-hijacking the government of its main source of revenue
(Jawad, 2013). However, the most problematic conflict lies in the east, where
revolutionaries are calling for the autonomy of region and control of oil fields
due to the lack of competence by Tripoli to face the armed gangs operating
across the country (Wheeler, 2013). Among the conditions they ask for in order
to reopen the occupied ports, we find the investigation by a judicial panel of the
management of oil revenue, formation of a commission by Libyas three main
provinces to supervise oil exports, and adherence to a 1951 constitution that
enshrined a federal system (Faucon and Said, 2013), constitution which
established the share of oil revenues among the three regions and which was
abolished by Gaddafi in 1969. Thus, we can see how in this case, oil plays again
an extremely important role when comes to find the origins of violence. Distress
may be originated by a political crisis, but most armed groups and
revolutionaries interest is either to get a fair share of the oil revenues for their
respective regions, or if that is not accomplished, take control of the oil fields,
acquiring not only the economic benefit that oil creates but also the political
power that it provides.
Can these violent acts find any kind of justification in political terms?
Justification is a broad abstract term that does not always finds its exact
definition or nature through academic literature. However, after a detailed
analysis of nature and context of a given conflict, one may find a set of variables
that supports an always-subjective conclusion towards the possible justification
of the conflict in different socio-economic terms.
In Nigeria, ethnic groups from the Niger Delta are not only fighting for economic
profit but to defend their land and way of living. By fighting the oil multinationals
and the so-considered capitalist puppet government of Nigeria, the conflict in
that region could be labelled as anti-colonialist. According to Fanon, if states use
violence, then there is a justification for the use of violence in response (Fanon,
1967). And by the ju jitsu technique, Ijaws and Ogonis base their tactics on
guerrilla warfare, targeting relevant oil infrastructures across the region and
defending themselves from the national military repression based on the use of
terror operations such as village raids (Terminski, 2011).
Regarding the case of Iraq, we can discuss Arendts theory on Revolution.
According to it, there are some premises to be accomplished for a revolution to
be successful, among which we can find the establishment of a totally new form
of government or the distribution of power into many collective groups (Arendt,
2006). In Iraq, it seems unrealistic that such events will take place if a Sunni
Islamist government takes control of the country, since the sectarian division
will not only stop, but it will actually be likely to worsen. Thus, according to
Arendt, the use of violence in this case would not find any political justification,
at least through the Western democratic point of view, since as mentioned
before, justifications are subjective and so, an anti-colonial approach could also
be followed from the Muslim perspective. According to this point, on a basis of a
colonialist approach, we could analyze the Sunni Islamist point of view, which
considers a Shiite government as a U.S. puppet, leading not only to an increase of
the ancestral ethnic rivalry, but also to a constant indirect control by The West.
AS a perfect example, we can see how the U.S is militarily equiping the current
Iraqi government with Hellfire missiles, and there is even a possibility of also
using low-tech surveillance drones (Gordon and Schmitt, 2013). If this situation
actually takes place, we could be witnessing the beginning of a virtual war
leading to, as Ignatieff (2001) believes, delicate consequences such a virtual
realities where nobody is responsible and thousands of people end up death.
Finally, in the case of Libya, we can find broad similarities. During the Iraq war,
U.S. occupation forces came to the conclusion that Libyans composed one of the
biggest groups within al-Qaida there in Iraq (UPI, 2012). Therefore we can also
find the presence and considerable importance of this group in Libya and, for
that reason, Prime Minister Ali Zeidan seems to be also looking for Western
support, with the creation of a new Libyan army, armed and trained by the US
though AFRICOM (Nasser, 2013). Thus, we come to the conclusion that in both
cases, the justification of these violent acts perpetrated in both countries relies
on the perspective from where the context is analysed.
Conclusion
It is true that some countries do manage to correctly administrate its natural
resources and do not fall into any spiral of violence and social conflict. Some
governments are able to administrate large resource revenues to maintain
internal peace by developing a set of policies that establish a huge security
apparatus and a fair distributional method. However, such policies are expensive
and these countries must bear a high threshold of per capita wealth for them to
work (Basedau and Lay, 2009). Moreover, in countries such as the U.S, Canada or
Norway, the structural stability of these societies also provides a safety net
against the outbreak of violence among different sectors of the population.
Inequality is still present, but it is handled in a way that social unrest does not
overstep the limits of democracy.
However, after analysing the cases exposed in this paper, all of which are pure
rentier states, we can come to the conclusion that generally in this type of
country, given their unstable socio-economic structures, there is a high
connection between the unfair allocation of oil revenues and the eventual
emergence of violent conflicts. First, the unequal distribution of the economic
profit that oil provides can lead to the affected population to take arms and fight
for what they think they deserve. Second, as we could see in the Niger Delta, the
extreme ecological impacts that oil extraction produces, generally in
underdeveloped countries, can also awake the initiative from certain groups to
ultimately use violence to protect their land, either by attacking oil
infrastructures or by fighting those who protect them. Finally, we can also find a
correlation between oil and violence when it comes to the desire of certain
sectors of a society to take control over the oil industry, which in rentier states
such as Iraq or Libya, is the key to power and political control. Oil can be a
blessing or a curse depending on how is managed, although it might be inevitable
for a country to perfectly allocate all the income. After all, according to the Pareto
optimality, for the distribution of resources it is not possible for one party to
improve without making another partys situation worse. Inequality has been an
unavoidable characteristic of human society since its very beginnings, and when
it is mixed with oil, the consequences can be disastrous. As Mills (2012), a
journalist from The National newspaper of the United Arab Emirates said: Oil
can be the glue that holds a country together or the lubricant that lets it slip
apart.

Bibliography
Arendt, H. (2006) On revolution. New York: Penguin Books.

Arendt, H. (1970) On Violence. London: Allen Lane; Orlando; London: Harcourt.

Auty, R. (1993). Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource
Curse Thesis. London: Routledge.

Basedau, M. and Lay, J. (2009) Resource Curse or Rentier Peace? The Ambiguous
Effects of Oil Wealth and Oil Dependence on Violent Conflict. Journal of Peace
Research. Vol. 46, No. 6 [Online]. Available at:
http://relooney.fatcow.com/0_NS4053_3.pdf [Accessed 13 November 2013].
Bauman, Z. (2006) Liquid Fear. Cambridge: Polity.
Beblawi, H. (1990) The Rentier State in the Arab World. In Luciani, G. (Ed). The
Arab State. London: Routledge, pp. 85-98.

Defterios, J. (2013) Iraq: Why violence and oil don't mix. CNN. [Online]. Available
at: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/13/business/iraq-oil-violence-
defterios/index.html?iref=allsearch [Accessed 15 November 2013].

Eckersley, R (2007) Ecological Intervention: Prospects and Limits. Ethics and
International Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 293-317.

Fanon, F. (1967) The wretched of the earth. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Faucon, B. and Said, S. (2013) Libyan Rebel Leader Won't Let Oil Ports Reopen.
The Wall Street Journal. [Online]. Available at:
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230417370457925996
0725206506 [Accessed 13 November 2013].
Gordon, M. and Schmitt, E. (2013) U.S. Sends Arms to Aid Iraq Fight With
Extremists. The New York Times. [Online]. Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/26/world/middleeast/us-sends-arms-to-
aid-iraq-fight-with-extremists.html?_r=1& [Accessed 13 November 2013].

Ignatieff, M. (2001) Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond. London: Chatto and Windus.

Jawad, R. (2013) Why gunmen have turned off Libya's oil taps. BBC News.
[Online]. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24051371
[Accessed 13 November 2013].

Mahdavy, H. (1970) The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in
Rentier States: The Case of Iran. In Cook, M. A. (Ed). Studies in the Economic
History of the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 428-467.

Mhler, A. (2009) Oil in Venezuela: Triggering Violence or Ensuring Stability? A
Context-sensitive Analysis of the Ambivalent Impact of Resource Abundance.
GIGA Research Programme: Violence and Security. No 112.
Mills, R. (2012) Libya's oil could leave the country on a slippery slope. The
National. [Online]. Available at: http://www.thenational.ae/business/industry-
insights/energy/libyas-oil-could-leave-the-country-on-a-slippery-slope
[Accessed 13 November 2013].

Nasser, N. (2013) Libya almost Imploding, Status Quo Unsustainable: Oil
Industry Target of Violent Attacks. Centre for Research on Globalization. [Online].
Available at: http://www.globalresearch.ca/libya-almost-imploding-status-quo-
unsustainable-oil-industry-target-of-violent-attacks/5358064 [Accessed 13
November 2013].
Okonta, I. and Douglas, O. (2001). Where vultures feast : shell, human rights and
oil in the Niger Delta. London ; New York : Verso.

Saleh, H. (2013). Oil industry left with legacy of violence in Libya after Gaddafi.
The Financial Times. [Online]. Available at:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3b30d756-a744-11e2-bfcd-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2lC4O6cAl [Accessed 15 November 2013].
Salhani, C. (2013) More Violence, Less Oil? OilPrice.com. [Online]. Available at:
http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Is-There-a-Correlation-Between-
the-Level-of-Violence-and-the-Output-of-Oil.html [Accessed 12 November 2013].

Shaaban, Z. and Smith, A (2013) War-weary Iraqis scared to leave homes as
violence reaches levels not seen since 2008. NBC News. [Online]. Available at:
http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/10/28/21139521-war-weary-
iraqis-scared-to-leave-homes-as-violence-reaches-levels-not-seen-since-
2008?lite [Accessed 13 November 2013].

Smith, B. (2004) Oil Wealth & Regime Survival in the Developing World: 1960-
1999. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, Issue 2, 232-246.

Smith, A. (2013) Bloody October: 30 Iraqi civilians killed every day in deadliest
month since 2008. NBC News. [Online]. Available at:
http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/11/01/21276375-bloody-
october-30-iraqi-civilians-killed-every-day-in-deadliest-month-since-2008?lite
[Accessed 16 November 2013].

Terminski, T. (2011) Oil-induced displacement and resettlement. Social problem
and human rights issue. Conflictrecovery.org. [Online]. Available at:
http://www.conflictrecovery.org/bin/Bogumil_Terminski-Oil-
Induced_Displacement_and_Resettlement_Social_Problem_and_Human_Rights_Is
sue.pdf [Accessed 16 November 2013].

United Nations Development Programme (2006). Human Development Report
2006: Beyond ScarcityPower, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis. Basingstoke,
United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.
United Press International (2012) Libyan violence threatens oil Recovery. United
Press International. [Online]. Available at:
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2012/09/26/Libyan-
violence-threatens-oil-recovery/UPI-73801348692042/ [Accessed 13
November 2013].
Wahab, B. (2006) How Iraqi Oil Smuggling Greases Violence. Middle East
Quarterly. [Online]. Available at: http://www.meforum.org/1020/how-iraqi-oil-
smuggling-greases-violence [Accessed 13 November 2013].

Watts, M. (2003) Economies of Violence: More Oil, More Blood. Economic and
Political Weekly, Vol. 38, No. 48, pp. 5089-5099. [Online]. Available at:
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/4414347?uid=3738032&uid=2129&ui
d=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21102978006531 [Accessed 14 November 2013].
Wheeler W. (2013). Libyan militias' new strategy: Occupy Oil Field. Global Post.
[Online]. Available at: http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-
blogs/groundtruth/militias-new-strategy-libya-occupy-oil-field [Accessed 13
November 2013].