Nietzsche and Eschatology

Author(s): Harry J. Ausmus

Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of Religion, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Oct., 1978), pp. 347-364
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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Nietzsche and
Eschatology
Harry J.
Ausmus / Southern Connecticut
State
College
In
Beyond
Good and
Evil,
Nietzsche held that in
dealing
with
any
philosopher
one should first raise the
question:
"What
morality
do
they
(or
does
he)
aim at?"1 If this
question
were directed to Nietzsche's own
philosophy,
one would discover that it too "contains a hidden
philosophical mythology,"
which "conceals a
philosophy"
where
"every
opinion
is also a
lurking-place, every
word is also a mask."2 That
Nietzsche's
philosophy
hides a
disguised
form of
Joachimite theology
of
history may
have been intuited
by many,
but it has
only
been
suggested
by
few and
fully
evaluated
by none.3
Such is the
purpose
of this
essay,
and its aim will be to show that Nietzsche's
philosophy
is a secularized
Joachimite eschatology.
In this
regard,
I am not
suggesting
that
Nietzsche's
philosophy
can be
equated
with
Joachim's,
that there is a
one-to-one
correspondence
between the two.
Rather,
I would
recom-
'Friedrich
Nietzsche,
Beyond
Good and
Evil,
in The
Complete
Works
of
Friedrich
Nietzsche,
ed.
Oscar
Levy (New
York: Russell &
Russell, 1964),
12:11. In order to facilitate
footnoting,
the
following
codes for the
Levy
edition of Nietzsche's work will be utilized:
Thoughts
out
of
Season
(TS);
The Dawn
of Day
(DD);
The
Joyful
Wisdom
(JW); Beyond
Good and Evil
(BG);
The
Genealogy of
Morals
(GM); Human,
All-Too
Human,
vol.
1 (HAH 1); Human,
All-Too
Human,
vol. 2
(HAH 2);
The Will to Power
(WP);
The
Anti-Christ (AC);
Ecce Homo
(EH);
and
Twilight of
the Idols
(TD).
In
addition,
the
following
translations were used: Friedrich
Nietzsche,
The
Will to
Power,
trans. Walter Kaufmann
(New
York:
Vintage
Books, 1967) (TP);
Friedrich
Nietzsche,
Thus
Spoke
Zarathustra,
trans. Walter Kaufmann
(New
York:
Viking
Press, 1966)
(SZ);
Friedrich
Nietzsche,
Schopenhauer
as Educator
(Chicago: Henry Regnery
Co., 1965)
(SE);
and Friedrich
Nietzsche,
The Use and Abuse
of History,
trans. Adrian Collins
(New
York:
Library
of Liberal
Arts,
Bobbs-Merrill
Co., 1957) (UA).
2
HAH
2:192;
see also
BG,
pp.
10-11,
258. Martin
Heidegger
has
suggested
a similar
notion about Nietzsche's
philosophy:
"Univocal
rejection
of all
philosophy
is an attitude
which
always
deserves
respect,
for it contains more of
philosophy
than it realizes"
(see
his
essay,
"Nietzsche as
Metaphysician,"
in Nietzsche: A Collection
of
Critical
Essays,
ed. Robert
Solomon
[Garden
City,
N.Y.: Anchor
Books, 1973],
p. 113).
3There
have been several
important
books written on Nietzsche's
philosophy
in the
past
thirty years. Among
the more
important
studies are F. A.
Lea,
The
Tragic Philosopher:
A
Study of
Friedrich Nietzsche
(London:
Methuen &
Co., 1957);
Walter
Kaufmann,
Nietzsche:
?
1978
by
The
University
of
Chicago. 0022-4189/78/5804-0001$01.51
347
The
Journal
of
Religion
mend that there is
essentially
a similar structure in their
respective
philosophies
and that Nietzsche's
philosophy
of
history
demonstrates,
in fundamental
agreement
with the view
expressed by
Norman Cohn
and Karl
L6with,
the
ongoing
tradition of
Joachimism,
the doctrine of
eternal recurrence
notwithstanding.4
Throughout
the course of his
life,
Nietzsche was concerned with the
nature of
history.
This can be witnessed from The Birth
of Tragedy,
which
can
readily
be viewed as an
essay
on a
historiographical problem,
to the
Nachlass,
where he asserted: "In
my
own
way,
I am
attempting
a
justification
of
history."
Similar to both
Augustine
and
Hegel,
Nietzsche's view was
essentially
concerned with the
problem
of
theodicy,
with
offering
a cure for the "disease of
history."5
And,
in fundamental
Philosopher, Psychologist,
Antichrist
(New
York:
Vintage
Books, 1968);
Tracy
B.
Strong,
Friedrich
Nietzsche and the Politics
of Transfiguration (Berkeley: University
of California
Press,
1975);
Arthur
Danto,
Nietzsche as
Philosopher
(New
York: Macmillan
Co., 1965).
Of
these,
none mention the
possible relationship
between Nietzsche's
philosophy
and
Joachim's.
Kaufmann dealt with Nietzsche's view of
history
but
only
in the context of Nietzsche's Use
and Abuse
of History
(see
pp. 141-52). Danto,
who rather
immodestly
subtitled his book "An
Original Study,"
nowhere mentions the
possibility
of Nietzsche's
"system" being
based on
historiosophy
rather than
philosophy per
se,
despite
the fact that Danto has some
expertise
in
philosophy
of
history.
Furthermore,
Danto rather
confidently
wrote: "I should not be
dismayed
... were someone to
say
that
any
construction
[of
Nietzsche's
philosophy]
is
misguided....
I should be amazed
only
were one to find a
system diferent
from the one I
just
sketched"
(p.
230).
If the reader will
pardon my immodesty,
I
think,
should Danto
read this
essay,
he would be "amazed." Of those authors who have
suggested
a
relationship
between Nietzsche and
Joachim,
I know of
only
two: Norman
Cohn,
in his
magnificent
study
of the
impact
of
Joachimite philosophy,
The Pursuit
of
the Millennium
(New
York:
Harper
&
Row,
Harper
Torchbooks, 1961),
referred to Nietzsche
only
in
passing
and in
the same context with Mikail Bakunin
(p. 150);
Karl
Lowith,
in his
Meaning
in
History
(Chicago: University
of
Chicago
Press, 1955),
is
keenly
aware of the
relationship,
but his
evidence is not as substantial as it could be
(see
pp.
214-22).
This
essay,
therefore,
is in
effect an extended footnote to L6with's
suggestion,
but with
greater
clarification and
substantiation.
However,
as will be
seen,
I do not
agree
with Lowith's
interpretation
of
Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence. I am in fundamental
agreement
with Kauf-
mann's assessment of Ldwith's book
(Nietzsches
Philosophie
der
Ewigen Wiederkunft
des
Gleichen)
that
his
view is "untenable"
(see Kaufmann,
p.
319n).
"I
maintain this
despite Henry
David Aiken's view:
"Nor,
as a naturalist who acknowl-
edged
the
reality
of this world as final and
absolute,
could he
[Nietzsche]
accept any
form
of Christian
eschatology"
("An
Introduction to
Zarathustra,"
in
Solomon,
p. 129).
Paul
Tillich is much closer to an
understanding
of Nietzsche than Aiken: "If he
[Nietzsche]
calls
this
age
'decadent,'
this
implies
a definite
interpretation
of
history,
in which his own
appearance-the appearance
of 'Zarathustra' before the
'great midday'-has
a definite
place.
This sense of
having
a
prophetic
mandate,
of
standing
at the most crucial moment of
history,
cannot be left out of the
picture."
Thus Tillich concluded: "It is in the
light
of this
'eschatological
consciousness' that we must understand Nietzsche's attack on
bourgeois
society"
("Nietzsche
and the
Bourgeois Spirit," Journal of
the
History of
ldeas
6
[June 1945]:
307-8).
n
As Nietzsche
wrote,
"I leave those
doubting
ones to
time,
which
brings
all
things
to
light;
and turn at last to that
great company
of
hope,
to tell them the
way
and the course of their
salvation,
their rescue from the disease of
history,
and their own
history
as
well,
in a
parable
whereby they may again
become
healthy enough
to
study history
anew
...."
(UA, p.
71;
cf.
also
UA,
p.
70; TP,
p. 527).
348
Nietzsche and
Eschatology
agreement
with both
Hegel
and
Marx,
Nietzsche maintained that
"history
must solve the
problem
of
history.
. . ." Not
surprisingly,
there-
fore,
in
Human-All-Too-Human,
he concluded that "historical
philosophizing
is henceforth
necessary
...
."
The method
by
which Nietzsche
sought
to
accomplish
this task was
through
what he called "critical
history."
The
duty
of this kind of
history
is to
"bring
the
past
to the bar of
judgment, interrogate
it
remorselessly,
and
finally
condemn it.
Every past
is worth
condemning
...
." This,
in
short,
is a
prophetic
stance,
which Walter Kaufmann noted without
relating
it to Nietzsche's
understanding
of
history.6
Indeed,
it is his view
of
history
that marks Nietzsche's radical break with all his
precursors.
Whereas,
with
Augustine, Heilsgeschichte
was concomitant with but not
identical with the historical
process,
and
whereas,
with
Hegel
and
Marx,
Heilsgeschichte
was
equated
with the historical
process,
Nietzsche
rejected
both views and offered a new
interpretation
and a new division of the
sacred and the
profane.
For
him,
the
profane
was in the
past
and
present
which deserve
condemnation,
while the sacred would
only
be found in
the future.
Eschatology
is therefore not
merely
the ultimate end of
Heilsgeschichte,
but
eschatology
and
Heilsgeschichte
are
identical--"sacred
history"
is in the
future,
not in the
present
or the
past.
It is in this context
that Nietzsche can claim that a "lack of the historical
[prophetic]
sense is
the
hereditary
fault of all
philosophers.
..
."7
The manner in which Nietzsche delineated this view of
history
was
through
an
adaptation
of
Joachim
of Flora's
approach
to
history.
That
Nietzsche nowhere refers to
Joachim
is no
argument against
this
interpretation,
for
Joachim's
triadic,
eschatological,
and historico-
pantheistic
view
permeated
much of
nineteenth-century thought.8
But
6As Kaufmann
wrote, "... one
may
feel inclined to consider Nietzsche a
prophet
in the
true sense."
By
a
genuine prophet
Kaufmann meant one in the tradition of Hosea and
Jeremiah. Accordingly,
he concluded: "It is in this sense that one can
compare
Nietzsche
with the ancient
prophets" (pp. 98-99). Further,
as Lea
maintained, "this is what
constitutes his
[Nietzsche's]
unique
distinction. In no other
philosopher
is
mysticism
of so
high
an order combined with absolute
scepticism" (p.
168).
7
HAH 1:15.
Strong
has also
suggested
with
qualification
the
significance
of
eschatology
for Nietzsche's
thought:
"From his
writing,
he
[Nietzsche]
remains concerned with
questions
of an ultimate and almost
eschatological
nature
...
" (p.
ix;
italics
added).
However,
Strong
neither
recognized
the
similarity
of Nietzsche's
thought
to
Joachim's
nor
did he
seriously
consider the
three-stage
view of
history developed
below.
8As
Frank Manuel
wrote,
"By
the nineteenth
century
the triadic historical formula is so
commonplace
that one need not look for
specific Joachimite
influence"
(Shapes of Philosophi-
cal
History
[Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford
University
Press, 1967],
p.
44;
italics
added);
cf. also
my
article,
"Schelling
on
History:
1841,"
Connecticut Review
(Spring
1973),
pp.
16-24;
L6with's
appendix
in
Meaning
in
History,
entitled "Modern
Transfigurations
of
Joachim-
ism," pp.
208-13;
and Michael
Murray,
Modern
Philosophy of History:
Its
Origin
and Destination
(The
Hague:
Martinus
Nijhoff,
1970),
pp.
89-126.
349
The
Journal
of
Religion
more
significantly,
Nietzsche does refer to and
highly praises
the
Emperor
Frederick
II,
who was believed
by
some to be the Antichrist
and
by
others to be the
Joachimite
novus dux. For
example,
in his
autobiography,
Nietzsche wrote:
"...
I also shall found a
city
some
day,
as a memento of an atheist and
genuine enemy
of the
Church,
a
person
very closely
related to
me,
the
great
Hohenstaufen,
the
Emperor
Frederick
II" (EH,
p.
103).
Again,
in The
Anti-Christ,
he referred to
Frederick as "that
great
free
spirit,
that
genius among
German Em-
perors
...
"
In The
Genealogy of
Morals,
he considered Frederick
II
to be
even more
significant
than Frederick the Great.9 And in
Beyond
Good and
Evil,
Frederick
II
was lauded as the first of the
great Europeans
"according
to
my
taste...
" It is little wonder therefore that Nietzsche
could
identify
with another
Joachimite
novus
dux,
Christopher
Colum-
bus: "... not for
nothing
have I lived for
years
in the
city
of Colum-
bus."'1
To maintain that these references are
essentially mythological
disguises
of Nietzsche's own
philosophy
is not inconsistent with what he
himself wrote: "There is a
point
in
every philosophy
at which the
'conviction'
of the
philosopher appears
on the scene
... ."
A second and more basic
similarity
between
Joachim
and Nietzsche is
that
they
both share a
three-stage
view of
history." Identifying
the
Trinity
with the actual historical
process, Joachim
divided
history
into
three
stages:
the
age
of the
Father,
the
age
of the
Son,
and the
age
of the
Holy
Ghost. The first
age roughly
coincided with the Old Testament
period
of
history up
to the time of
Zechariah,
the father of
John
the
Baptist.
The second
age
covered the New Testament
period,
the Middle
Ages,
and
Joachim's
own
day. Calculating
on the basis of
forty-two
generations
from the time of Adam to the time of
Zechariah,
Joachim
predicted
that the third
age
would
begin
around 1260.
Immediately
prior
to the third
age
would be a transitional
period
characterized
by
decline, decadence,
and
disintegration, by
the rise of the
Antichrist,
and
by
the
coming
of the novus
dux,
whose
purpose
was to renovate
society
and
religion
in
preparation
for the
coming
of the
age
of the
Holy
Ghost.
9As Nietzsche
put
it:
"...
that much
greater
Frederick,
the
Hohenstaufen,
Frederick
II"
(GM,
p.
218).
"oChristopher
Middleton,
ed. and
trans.,
Selected Letters
of
Friedrich Nietzsche
(Chicago:
University
of
Chicago
Press, 1969),
p.
220,
also
p.
175;
cf. also
TP,
p.
503; DD,
p.
395.
"Concerning Joachim's philosophy,
there are several excellent sources in
English.
Already
mentioned are the works of Cohn and L6with. In
addition, cf.
Marjorie
Reeves,
Prophecy
in the Later Middle
Ages
(Oxford, 1969); Delno
C.
West, ed.,
Joachim of
Fiore in
Christian
Thought,
2 vols.
(New
York: Franklin &
Co., 1975).
For an extensive
interpretation
of the life of Frederick
II,
including
his
relationship
to
Joachimism,
see Ernst
Kantorowicz,
Frederick the
Second, 1194-1250,
trans. E.
O.
Lorimer
(New
York: Frederick
Ungar
Publishing
Co., 1931).
350
Nietzsche and
Eschatology
This
age
would be an era of
plenitudo
intellectus,
in which
people
will no
longer
"look
through
a
glass darkly,"
an
age
of monks and nuns bound
together,
not
by
institutions,
but
by
Christian love. The Law of the Old
Testament,
and the
Gospel
of the
New,
would be
superceded by
a New
Eternal
Gospel,
an unwritten
gospel
on the hearts of
everyone.
In other
words,
Augustinian eschatology
was transformed into a view of social
utopia,
in which
history
itself will
bring
salvation.12
Although
Nietzsche's
language
is
different,
he too believed in a
three-stage
view of
history, consisting
of the
premoral,
moral,
and
ultramoral
ages.13
As he wrote in
Beyond
Good and Evil:
Throughout
the
longest period
of human
history-one
calls it the
prehistoric
period
-the value or non-value of an action was inferred from its
consequences;
the action in itself was not taken into
consideration,
any
more than its ori-
gin.
... Let us call this
period
the
pre-moral period
of
mankind;
the
imperative,
"know
thyself!"
was then still unknown. In the last ten thousand
years ...
[there
has
arisen]
.. a
period
which
may
be
designated
in the narrower sense as the
moral one: the
first
attempt
at
self-knowledge
is
thereby
made
....
the
origin
of
an action was
interpreted
in the most definite sense
possible,
as
origin
out of an
intention....
Is it not
possible,
however,
that the
necessity may
now have arisen
of
again making up
our
minds
with
regard
to the
reversing
and fundamental
shifting
of
values,
owing
to a new self-consciousness and acuteness in man-is it
not
possible
that we
may
be
standing
on the threshold of a
period
which to
begin
with,
would be
distinguished negatively
as ultra-moral ... ?
[BG,
p. 46]
Similar to
Joachim,
the second and the third
ages
are
preceded by
transitional
periods.
But before
describing
these
stages
of
history,
it is
important
to recall three of Nietzsche's basic
presuppositions:
his criti-
cism of the real versus the
apparent
world,
his distinction between
religion
and
morality,
and his
understanding
of
progress.
With
respect
to the
first,
Nietzsche maintained that to
posit
a world of
12The immediate
impact
of this view of
history
was described
by
Cohn,
while the
long-range impact upon
the
philosophy
of
history specifically
was demonstrated
by
L6with.
13L6with,
in
Meaning
in
History (p. 211),
attempted
to substantiate a
relationship
between
Nietzsche and
Joachim by referring only
to the three
metamorphoses
in "Thus
Spoke
Zarathustra,"
namely,
the
camel,
the
lion,
and the
child,
each
representing
a
stage
in the
Joachimite
triadic vision of
history.
The camel
represented
the Old Testament
age
with
emphasis upon
"Thou
shalt";
the lion
represented
the New Testament
age
with
emphasis
upon
"I
will";
and the child
represented
the third
age
of the
Holy Spirit
with
emphasis
upon
"I am." While I can
agree
with
L6with's
comparisons,
I can do so
only
after
having
discovered the
greater
amount of evidence as
presented
in this
essay.
Moreover,
as
already
suggested
and as will be
demonstrated,
L6with
seemed to have missed
entirely
the
significance
of Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence in the
light
of a
third-age
concept.
351
The
Journal
of
Religion
appearance
versus a world of the
"beyond"
has been one of the most
fundamental lies of human
history.
That there is a consensus
sapientium
regarding
this
distinction,
as
Schopenhauer
would
hold,
does not
prove
its
validity.14
Such a distinction is derived from the desire to
explain
suffering
and is the result of
faulty reasoning:
"This world is
apparent:
consequently
there is a true
world;-this
world is conditional: con-
sequently
there is an unconditional
world;-this
world is full of con-
tradiction:
consequently
there is a world free of
contradiction;-this
world is a world of
becoming: consequently
there is a world of
being
...
"
(TP,
pp.
310-11).
This
interpretation erroneously
assumes
that if
concept
A
exists,
then its
opposite concept
B must also exist.
And,
yet,
this world of the
"beyond,"
this world of
x,
has been used
to criticize the "known world." This
approach, according
to
Nietzsche,
is the result of
sickness,
degeneracy,
decadence,
and even bad
digestion.
Consequently,
he declared war on such a view: "there is
only
one
world,
and this is
false, cruel,
contradictory,
seductive,
without
meaning-A
world thus constituted is the real world." But to abolish the world of
beyond,
the "true" and the "real"
world,
is also to abolish the world of
appearance.
In so
doing,
it is
necessary
to construct for mankind a new
goal,
a new
purpose,
a new aim. This is the task of Nietzsche's vision
of
history,
which
requires
a clarification of his
position
on
religion
and
morality.
Although
Nietzsche is rather
unsystematic
in his
usage
of the word
"religion,"
he
clearly distinguishes
it from
morality: "Religion, per
se,
has
nothing
to do with
morality
...""15
In
fact,
religion
has been
duped by
morality,
which must be annihilated because it is
"the
life-denying
instinct." The
problem
with
morality
is its
implicit immorality,
its will to
power. According
to
Nietzsche,
morality
is
only
one of the
many
interpretations
of life-there are no
intrinsically
moral
phenomena.16
Therefore,
to
impose, arbitrarily,
a
morality upon
life is to stand
beyond
good
and evil
themselves,
to take a
position
of
power,
in
short,
to be
"immoral."
In this
regard,
Nietzsche was the first to discover that the
word
"good" originally
referred to the
"powerful,"
the masters.17
Because of their resentment of the
masters,
the "herd"
perverted
the
14TD,
p.
10. For
Schopenhauer's understanding
of the consensus
sapientium,
see
my
article
on
"Schopenhauer's Philosophy
of
Language,"
in the Midwest
Quarterly
18,
no. 2
(Winter
1977):
170-73.
15WP,
p.
127. And as Nietzsche wrote in
Genealogy of
Morals:
".
..
I soon learned to
separate theological
from moral
prejudices
..
" (p.
14).
16TP,
p.
43; WP,
p.
214.
Or,
as he
wrote, ". ..
all
history
is indeed the
experimental
refutation of the
theory
of the so-called moral order of
things.
..
."
(EH,
p. 134).
17Cf.
Lea,
p.
234.
352
Nietzsche and
Eschatology
word into
meekness,
compassion,
and
feeling sorry
for
people.18
Accord-
ingly, morality
is the
"idiosyncrasy
of
decadents,
actuated
by
a desire to
avenge
themselves with success
upon
life." Nietzsche concluded
con-
sequently
that
morality
must be overcome so that the masters can "sit
firmly
on their thrones once more."
The
problem
of
morality
reveals the will to
power,
which is identical
with the will to freedom and which is basic to Nietzsche's
understanding
of the idea of
progress.
He,
of
course,
opposed
the Darwinian view of
progress
as well as the "inevitable"
progress expressed by,
for
example,
Condorcet. To
argue
that external circumstances will
necessarily
lead to
the
"good
life" is "tantamount to
condemning Life.
..
."
Nevertheless,
Nietzsche believed that
progress
is
possible:
"Herein lies buried one of
the
mightiest
ideas that men can
have,
the idea of a
progress
of all
progresses.-Let
us
go
forward
together
a few
millenniums,
my
friend!
There is still reserved for mankind a
great
deal of
joy,
the
very
scent of
which has not
yet
been wafted to the men of our
day!
...
[For
it will
occur]
... some
day,
when head and heart have learnt to live as near
together
as
they
are now far
apart"
(HAH2,
p.
285).
Progress
is
possible
precisely
because will to
power
means
growth,
accumulation,
appropria-
tion, domination, increase,
becoming
more,
"the
morality
of
Develop-
ment,"
"greater unities."'9
The
primum
mobile for
progress
is the indi-
vidual
ego,
and more
specifically
the collectivized
novus dux,
which
Nietzsche called the
Ubermensch,
the
higher types: "... humanity
as a
mass sacrificed to the
prosperity
of the one
stronger species
of Man-
that would be
progress."
These
higher types
are like creator
gods,
creating
order out of chaos and
sustaining
the order.
They
are the
"deviating
natures" who will transvaluate all
values,
a new Renaissance
type capable
of
producing
a
higher
culture,
while
acting independently
of the
majority
will. That this
higher type may
not succeed
is,
of
course,
a
possibility,
but not to
hope
for their success would
be,
to use Nietzsche's
words,
contrary
to life:
"...
we all
prefer
that
humanity
should
perish
rather than that
knowledge
should enter into a
stage
of
retrogression."
"8JW, p.
161. In
opposition
to the socialists of his
day,
Nietzsche
wrote,
"Morality
has
therefore
always taught
the most
profound
hatred and
contempt
of the fundamental trait
of character of all
rulers-i.e.,
their Will to Power.
....
If the sufferer and the
oppressed
man were to lose his belief in his
right
to condemn the Will to
Power,
his
position
would be
desperate....
The
oppressed
man would then
perceive
that he stands on the same
platform
with the
oppressor,
and that he has no individual
privilege,
nor
any higher
rank
than the latter"
(WP,
pp. 50-51).
19WP,
p.
103; TP,
pp.
367-68; Lea,
p.
264. As Nietzsche maintained:
"... every
strengthening
and increase of
power opens up
new
perspectives
and means
believing
in
new horizons-this idea
permeates my writings"
(TP,
p. 330). And,
in other words:
"Folly,
rascality
increase: that is
part
of
'progress'" (TP,
p.
394).
Again:
". . . we must
go
forward,--that
is to
say step by step
further and further into decadence
(-this
is
my
definition of modern
'progress')"
(TD,
p. 101).
353
The
Journal
of
Religion
That Nietzsche believed that there would not be
retrogression
can be
demonstrated
by
the
three-stage
view of
history
which he shares with
Joachim.
The
premoral age,
or the
stage
of the
"morality
of
custom," was
characterized
by cruelty, sexuality,
and
intoxication,
"the oldest festal
joys
of mankind
...
." The
people
of this era lived in constant
danger
while
believing
that
punishment purifies
and that their
gods
looked
joyously upon suffering
and
cruelty.
Indeed,
in contrast to the modern
world which wallows in its
suffering,
this
ancient, barbarian,
and noble
caste "were more
complete
men,"
not because of their
physical
but their
psychical power. Thereby, they
"established the character of mankind.
..."
Because
they
identified with
nature,
the first
government
was not
derived from a social contract but rather
through
"a
ghastly tyranny,
a
grinding
ruthless
piece
of
machinery.
..
."
Yet,
in the midst of
cruelty,
suffering,
and
tyranny,
these
people
knew how to
rejoice.
It is little
wonder, therefore,
that some of them were transformed into
gods.
Whereas
Joachim
concentrates
mainly
on Old Testament
society,
Nietzsche held that the
highest example
of this first
stage
is found in the
Homeric and
pre-Socratic
culture. Homer's
great
achievement was to
have liberated the Greeks from Asian influences. He introduced the
"grand style" whereby
the
Greeks,
with their noble
tastes,
viewed their
gods
as the most
perfect examples
of themselves.
Consequently,
the
gods
and man were not in
opposition
to each
other,
and neither had reason to
be ashamed of the other. If a Greek made a
mistake,
it was not
considered a "sin" but the fault of the
gods.
Similar to that
"deeply
irreligious"
Homer,
the Greeks knew that
"through
art alone
misery
might
be turned into
pleasure." They
even considered disease a
god,
thereby contributing
to a
healthy
outlook on life.
Greek culture reached its
apex during
the time of Demosthenes and
with the
philosophies
of
Heraclitus, Democritus,
and
Protagoras,
all of
whom reflect a modern attitude. Heraclitus was
especially appreciated
for
having
shown that the
"apparent"
world is the
only
world. These and
other
pre-Socratic philosophers,
such as the
Sophists,
were
among
the
great
"immoralists" and thus the
greatest
"realists" known in
history
because
they
were aware of the
"agonal
instinct" within themselves and
consequently glorified
their own abilities.
Indeed,
they
knew the true
meaning
of
tragedy.20
But the Greeks were
always
in
danger
of
relapsing
into
"Asianism,"
and the Greek
polis
was too distrustful of the
growth
of
culture. This was
displayed
in the "decadence" of Socrates and
Euripides,
who
began
to teach virtue and the means of
achieving
it. This
led to the decline of Greece.
Accordingly,
the Greeks should be
greatly
20
See
explanation by Strong, pp.
154,
161.
354
Nietzsche and
Eschatology
appreciated
but not
emulated,
for "we must
surpass
even the Greeks!"21
With the death of
Socrates,
a transition
period
to the second
stage
of
history begins.
Or,
as Nietzsche wrote: "When Nero and Caracalla sat
up
there,
the
paradox
arose,
'the lowest man is worth more than that man
up
there!'
And the
way
was
prepared
for an
image
of God that was as
remote as
possible
from the
image
of the most
powerful-the god
on the
cross!"
(TP,
p.
468).
The transition
period
lasted
roughly
from the time
of Socrates to the third
century
A.D.
During
this
period,
there was
only
one
bright light, Epicurus,
who has "lived in all
periods,
and lives
yet
...
." Hebrew-Christian
morality,
that
great
transvaluation of all
ancient
values,
begins
to dominate in the era of "bad conscience." This
condition, however,
is like
pregnancy,
for without it
"man
would have
remained an animal."
22
The second and moral
stage
of
history,
which
Joachim
called the
Age
of the
Son,
is characterized
by
the
increasing
dominance of slave
morality
and
consequently,
for
Nietzsche,
by
an increase in
decadence,
degeneration,
and
decay:
"The whole
morality
of
Europe
is based
upon
the values which are useful to the herd .. " The basic cause of this
morality
is
fear,
specifically
of those of a noble caste of
mind,
the
masters.23 Indeed,
the slaves' resentment
against
the masters is the
source of the ideas
concerning good
and
evil,
with the masters
being
associated with the latter. Priests and ministers have
provided
the slaves
with their
ideology,
which is
expressed
in such terms as "the
triumph
of
righteousness,"
"the last
judgment,"
and "the
kingdom
of God." Because
of its
implicit
will to
power,
this
ideology
is further described in such
terms as
utility,
dialectics, caution,
patience,
dissimulation,
and
mimicry.
Thus,
as Nietzsche would
maintain,
it is
absolutely
nonsensical to
speak
of
good
and
evil,
of intrinsic
right
or
wrong,
because the most essential
and fundamental fact of all
history
is
exploitation.
The historical foundation of slave
morality
is found in the Hebrew and
Christian traditions.
Having great praise
for the
history
of
Judaism,
Nietzsche nevertheless maintained that
Christianity
was the "rational
21]W,
p.
270; WP,
p.
357. As
Strong
has
rightly
maintained on this
point,
"no matter how
admiring
his
posture,
Nietzsche never advocates
'returning'
to the
Greeks,
nor
making
modern
society
over in their
image" (p.
136);
see also
Strong, pp.
29,
34.
22
HAH
1:62; GM,
p.
106.
Interestingly,
even in this
frequently quoted metaphor,
Nietzsche shows his trust in the idea of
progress.
23BG,
p.
124.
By distinguishing
between a master
morality
and a slave
morality,
Nietzsche is not
attempting,
like some
Marxists,
to set off one
group
of
people against
another
group.
For
example,
he wrote: "There is a
master-morality
and a slave-
morality;-I
would at once
add, however,
that in all
higher
and mixed
civilizations,
there
are also
attempts
at the reconciliation of the two
moralities;
but one finds still oftener the
confusion and mutual
misunderstanding
of
them, indeed,
sometimes their close
juxtaposition--even
in the same
man,
within one soul"
(BG, p. 227).
355
The
Journal
of
Religion
outcome" of Hebrew
thought, making
the individual "the
judge
of
everything
and
everyone; megalomania
almost became a
duty
...
." Both
are
responsible
for the
"holy
lie" about a monotheistic
God,
and
Christianity
in
particular
is intent
upon "judaizing"
the world.
Here,
a
distinction between
Christ,
on the one
hand,
and
Christianity
and the
Church,
on the
other,
should be made. The
message
of Christ was to
show
people
how
they ought
to
live,
without
resentment,
and with
freedom and
superiority,
"not to defend one's
self,
not to show
anger,
not to hold
anyone responsible.
.
.."24
This
message,
however,
was
perverted by
Paul,
"one of the most active
destroyers
of
primitive
Christianity,"
and this
perversion
was continued
by
the Church. Con-
sequently,
Nietzsche held that there was
only
one Christian and he died
on the cross. He
insisted, nevertheless,
that
genuine Christianity
is still
possible.
But in order to
accomplish
this,
one must also overcome Christ
who,
like
Socrates,
finally yielded
to
life-denying
forces and
willingly
submitted to death: "The two
greatest judicial
murders in world
history
are ... concealed suicides."
The
major
characteristic of the Church and
Christianity
is that it has
kept
man on a lower level.
Taking
root on the
degenerating grounds
of
classical culture after
Socrates,
Christianity
became a monumental
"pseudo-humanity,"
indeed "a crime
against
life."
Through
the medium
of the
Church,
it has
produced
a
morality
which is
impossible
to follow
and
consequently lapses
into that error of
thought
called
"sin"
in order
to
explain
this
incapacity. Through
this notion of
sin,
Christianity
"desires to
destroy,
break,
stupefy, confuse,-only
one
thing
it does not
desire,
namely,
moderation,
and therefore it is in the
deepest
sense
barbaric, Asiatic,
ignoble
and un-Greek."25 The Church has
simply
promoted
the Pauline
perversion
of the
Gospel,
and,
as a
consequence,
everything
that is called "Christian"
today
is
precisely
that which Christ
had
opposed. Accordingly,
Nietzsche held that there should be constant
warfare
against
this
"most
fatal and seductive lie" called
Christianity.
On the other
hand,
Nietzsche does not
totally denigrate
the
impact
of
Christianity and
the Church. The
Church,
for
example,
has been and
still is a "nobler institution" than the state. Given Nietzsche's belief that
Christianity
is
"judaizing"
the
world,
he can
maintain,
rather
optimisti-
cally,
that the "mission of
Europe"
is
being accomplished.
More
impor-
24AC,
pp.
174,
181. As Nietzsche
put
it in another
context,
"Jesus
said to his
Jews:
'The
law was for
servants;-love
God as I love
him,
and his Son! What have we Sons of God to
do with morals"'
(BG, p.
99).
25HAH 1:124. When
reading
Nietzsche's criticism of
Christianity,
the
proper
context
should be
kept
in mind: "For thus it has
always
been and will ever be: one cannot do a
thing
a better service than to
persecute
it and to run it to earth....
This--I
have done"
(WP,
p.
264).
356
Nietzsche and
Eschatology
tant,
Christianity
is
responsible
for two
significant developments:
through
its
emphasis upon
"truth,"
it called into
question
Christian
morality
itself;
and
by
its
emphasis upon
a "second
innocence,"
"one
of
the finest inventions of
Christianity,"
a new
hope
is now
possible.26
The
overwhelming impact
of
Christianity,
however,
has led to deca-
dence,
pessimism,
and fellow
feeling
in almost
every
area of life.
Music,
especially Wagnerian
music,
has become decadent.
Education,
based on
Christian
morality, gives precedence
to the mediocre. Science
still
presupposes metaphysical
beliefs.
Philosophy
has become so decadent
that it can
only
await a "new order of
philosophers,"
for,
since
Socrates,
it
has been dominated
by morality
to the
point
that even
Kant,
not to
mention
Schopenhauer,
is an "underhanded Christian." And
democracy
and socialism are
quite simply
secularized forms of Christian
morality.27
There
is, however,
a second tradition in the Western world that
gives
cause for
hope, namely,
the Renaissance: "It was the Golden
Age
of the
last thousand
years
in
spite
of all its blemishes and
vices."28 The
Protestant Reformation made some
progress, though
it
generally
re-
sulted in the
democratizing
of the Western world. But with the En-
lightenment,
with
Montaigne,
Fontonelle, Voltaire,
and even
Napoleon,
the Western world was once
again
reunited with the Renaissance and
with the "last centuries before Christ. .. ."
The most
singular
characteristic of the nineteenth
century
is the death
of
God,
a
cataclysmic
event which can
only
result in all
falling
"into the
decay
of the modern
state," where,
as Zarathustra
said,
"the slow suicide
of all is called 'life.'
"29
The state becomes the "new
idol,"
the coldest of
monsters. As a
consequence,
Nietzsche maintained that the state has
taken over the function
formerly
held
by
the Church and "we are still in
the
glacial
stream of the Middle
Ages
....",30
This has resulted in the
26
DD, p. 273; cf. also
WP, pp. 4-5; BG, p. 3;JW, p.
164. In this context is also
significant
to note two other
equally powerful
statements
by
Nietzsche: "To love mankind for God's
sake-this has so far been the noblest and remotest sentiment to which mankind has
attained"
(BG,
p. 79).
Again:
"What
...
has
really triumphed
over the Christian God?
...
the Christian
morality
itself.
. . ."(GM,
p.
208).
27
TP, pp. 398, 461; BG, p. 127; GM, p. 88; WP,
pp.
274-75;
cf. also letter to Peter
Gast,
October
5, 1879,
in
Middleton,
p.
170.
28 HAH
1:41, 220;
letter to Franz
Overbeck,
October
1882,
in
Middleton,
p.
195;
and
to
Georges
Brandes, November
20, 1888,
p.
327.
29
SZ, p. 50; and
esp. BG, p. 74,
where Nietzsche wrote: "Once
upon
a time men sacrificed
human
beings
to their God. ...
Then,
during
the moral
epoch
of
mankind,
they
sacrificed
to their God the
strongest
instincts
they possessed,
their 'nature':
....
Finally,
what still
remained to be sacrificed? ... Was it not
necessary
to sacrifice God himself... . To sacrifice
God for
nothingness-this paradoxical mystery
of ultimate
cruelty
has been reserved for
the
rising generation. ..."
30SE,
40. As Nietzsche maintained: "The world has become skilled at
giving
new names
to
things
and even
baptizing
the devil. It is
truly
an hour of
great danger" (UA,
p. 62).
On
this
point,
Nietzsche was in full
agreement
with
Schopenhauer (see
my
article,
357
The
Journal
of
Religion
"euthanasia
of
Christianity"
in which there are no
shepherds
and
only
one herd. The
spirit
of
God, therefore,
has been
replaced by
the
spirit
of
the
rabble,
and the "decadent
type"
has
triumphed.
But this condition
will not last
long.
A
superior
culture will arise out of the
rabble,
and
it
will be
accomplished
in the same manner that the Renaissance was able
to overcome the Middle
Ages-through
a
"great
amount of admitted
immorality."
The third
age,
the ultramoral
stage
of
history,
is,
similar to
Joachim's,
also
preceded by
a
period
of
transition,
the
"intermediary period
of
nihilism,"
which is a
necessary
movement before the
"only
world" can be
deified and called
"good."
Since
history
heretofore has had no
meaning,
the
primary
task of this transitional
period
is to introduce
meaning
into
history
for the first time. This is the
phase
of the
"modesty
of conscious-
ness,"
in which
emphasis upon
the
body begins
to
replace
the older
emphasis upon
the
soul,
in which
psychology, morality,
nature,
social
institutions,
history,
and even
God,
are
purified
of the
concepts
of
guilt,
sin,
and
punishment.31
The
major requirement
for this
purification
is
that the next centuries be centuries of
war,
a kind of secularized
baptism
by
fire. These events will create the conditions for the dissolution of that
covertly
nihilistic
religion, Christianity.
And even
socialism,
that
politicized Christianity
which is a
reactionary
force
preventing
the
coming
of the new
Renaissance,
will wither
away.
All of this is a
necessary
phase
in "mankind's transit into
completely
new conditions of existence."
The immediate
future, therefore,
is bleak. But
precisely
because we
are aware of the
impending catastrophe,
it can be averted
through
the
efforts of a
higher type
of
man,
the
Ubermensch. 32 This new man will arise
out of those democratic and socialist societies created
by
the mass
man,
the "last
man."33
The Ubermensch are "free
spirits"
whose common
characteristic is an
"extravagant honesty"
and who are the "wicked
men,"
the "lords of the
earth,"
who will create a
Dionysian,
"ecstatic nihilism"
"Schopenhauer's
View of
History:
A
Note,"
History
and
Theory
15,
no. 3
[1976]: 144;
and
also,
"Schopenhauer
and
Christianity:
A
Preliminary Investigation," Illinois
Quarterly 36,
no. 4
[April
1974]: 26-42).
31TP, p. 402;
GM, pp. 166,
183;
TD, p.
42; DD,
p.
19.
Speaking
of "this
period
of
Nihilism and
destruction,"
Nietzsche wrote: "The value of such a crisis is that it
purifies...
thus
taking
the first
step
towards a new order of rank
among
forces from the
standpoint
of
health:
recognizing
commanders as
commanders,
subordinates as subordinates
...
."
(WP,
p. 53).
32
HAH
1:229; TP,
pp.
471, 504, 537; TD,
p.
272.
13
To mention
only
a few notable sources for this
assertion,
see
AC,
pp.
176, 220;
HAH
1:4, 40-41;
and
esp.
the
following:
"A
stronger type
in which all our
powers
are
synthetically
correlated-this constitutes
my
faith. ...
Apparently, everything
is deca-
dence. We should so direct this movement of decline that it
may provide
the
strongest
with
a new form of existence"
(TD,
p. 260).
358
Nietzsche and
Eschatology
which will
bring
about this new order of
life.34
Having
the
power
of
a
"Roman Caesar with Christ's
soul,"
these
"exceptional
men" will convert
the
suffering
and
passion
of mankind into "sources of
joy."35
Like
creator
gods, they
will
attempt
to humanize the
world,
to transform
institutions into better institutions of
higher
culture,
and to
develop
a
greater knowledge
of the "instincts" in order to become more
properly
adapted
to the
environment.36
As Nietzsche would
say,
what is
necessary
is to transform the belief "it is thus and thus" into the will "it shall become
thus and thus." In this
manner,
the weak nihilism of the
present stage
of
history
will be
superseded by
a new eternal
gospel,
what Nietzsche called
the
"Evangel
of the
Future,"
creating
an
entirely
"new world"
where
"everything
is innocence
...
."
If one is
looking
forward to the
coming
of a
new,
higher
order,
whether it be a transcendent heaven or an imminent future
age,
then not
surprisingly
Nietzsche,
similar to the saints of all
higher religions,
can
denigrate
almost
everything
within the
past
and
present stages
of human
history
(nil admirari).
In
agreement
with
Voltaire,
there have been a few
moments of
light
in the
"spirit"
of the
Greeks,
the Renaissance
humanists, and,
for
Nietzsche,
Napoleon.
The actual ideas and institu-
tions of these eras were nevertheless
inadequate.
The third
age,
how-
ever,
will set
everything
in correct
perspective,
and one will no
longer
"look
through
a
glass darkly."
And the
"spirit"
of individualism found in
these eras will be
completed
and fulfilled in Nietzsche's third
age.
The third
age,
like
Joachim's Age
of the
Holy Spirit,
will
complete
the
transvaluation of all
values,
by
which the individual will arrive at a
perfection
which could not otherwise be achieved. This
age
is
"beyond
good
and
evil,"
beyond
the
"human-all-too-human,"
the
"great
noon" of
humankind in which there are no
shadows,
in which a
person's
words
and deeds will be identical because one's character will be one's
destiny,
without
feelings
of
guilt
and sin.
Indeed,
it will be "our
great
distant
human
kingdom,
the Zarathustra
kingdom
of a thousand
years."
And
Nietzsche can
say:
"We know a new
happiness
... "--redemption
will
have occurred when this new
age
arrives. In such an
age,
the state and
the Church would either be
drastically
transformed,
or there would
34DD,
p.
28; TP,
p.
544; WP,
pp.
7, 108,
384. Nietzsche himself conceived of
establishing
such a
community
of individuals
(see Middleton,
p. 74;JW, pp.
343, 351, 391).
Nietzsche
clearly
believed himself to be
preparing
the
way
for the
coming
of the Ubermensch
(see
HAH 1:13, GM,
p.
207; TD,
p.
270).
The obvious
religiosity
of such a view can be
witnessed in
TP,
pp.
458, 517, 531, 538,
and
esp.
WP,
p.
249.
35 TP, p. 513; HAH
2:217. As Nietzsche
believed,
". . the noble man also
helps
the
unfortunate,
but not-or
scarcely-out
of
pity,
but rather from an
impulse generated by
the
super-abundance
of
power" (BG, p. 228).
36 BG, p. 82; TD, p. 96; TP,
p. 329; WP,
p. 100;
HAH 1:40-41.
Interestingly,
Nietzsche
equates
the word "instinct" with the word "faith"
(cf. BG,
pp.
111-12, 162; GM,
p.
123;
and
also
Strong, p. 258).
359
The
Journal
of
Religion
actually
be no need for
them.37
Whatever the status of the state and
Church,
the inhabitants of this
age
will be "free
spirits,"
freed, that is,
from all beliefs and
convictions,
similar to the
philosophical position
of
the
"critical"
historian mentioned above.
Just
as
Joachim predicted
that
the third
age
would be an
age
of
plenitudo
intellectus,
Nietzsche looked
forward to that
day
in which the individual will
embody knowledge
itself
and
knowledge
will become
instinctive,
thereby creating
the
highest
culture
possible.
It will be an
age
in which all will love each
other,
in which
one will feel
unhistorically
(i.e.,
nonneurotically),
in which the end of
history
is no
history.38 Accordingly,
Nietzsche is not
predicting
that in
the ultramoral
stage
there will be no
morality
but
only
the
overcoming
of
the old
morality,
for
"replacement
of
morality by
the will to our
goal"
becomes the basis of the new
morality. Presumably,
this new
morality
would be similar to the Renaissance
emphasis upon
virtu",
but "free from
all moralic acid
...
."
The third
age
is, furthermore,
the
age
of the resurrected
body,
with
emphasis upon
one's diet because the word "soul" is
simply
another
word for the
body.
"Resurrection" refers not to life after death but
rather to entrance into the "true
life,"
in which one comes to
respect
one's
self as one's
body.
It will be an
age
of
cheerfulness,
of
laughter,
of
freedom,
which means a realization of one's
powers,
in which one will
follow one's
instincts,
which is to
say,
one's own faith. In other
words,
it
will be a
"fellowship
of
joy"
where
every
man and woman will be his or
her own
adherent,
following
his or her own
categorical imperative.39
Death will be overcome
or,
as Nietzsche
said,
it will be "transformed into
a means of
victory
and
triumph."
Genuine
Christianity
would thus be
established,
resulting
in a new
justice,
a new
philosophy,
a new
morality,
a new
concept
of
God.40 In short,
this
age
constitutes
"the
innocence of
7
My uncertainty
on this
point
is due in
large part
to
Nietzsche's own unclearness. In
general,
it would be safe to assume that he looked forward to the total abolition of both
state and Church. For the
difficulty,
cf.
SZ,
p.
51; SE,
pp.
65-66; HAH 1:37, 349;
HAH 2:345; TP, p. 411;
and also
Strong, pp.
59, 195; Lea,
pp.
305-6.
"8In UA,
p.
6,
Nietzsche wrote: "But in the smallest and
greatest happiness
there is
always
one
thing
that makes it
happiness:
the
power
of
forgetting,
or,
in more learned
phrase,
the
capacity
of
feeling 'unhistorically' throughout
its duration."
Again,
in
SZ,
p.
280: "In
my
home and
house,
nobody
shall
despair. ..
." Note also
SZ,
p.
178; WP,
p. 146;JW, p.
280;
TD,
p.
271; BG,
p.
98; TP,
p.
523;
HAH
1:67;
HAH
2:337; GM,
pp.
93-94.
39JW, p.
268;
HAH
1:312; TP,
p.
419; Middleton,
p.
168. It is in this context that
Nietzsche recommended a kind of
self-imposed
behavioristic
technique
(see DD,
pp.
83,
159, 275, 363;
also
Strong, p. 274).
40 WP,
pp.
133-34, 140, 175-76, 181, 291;
HAH
1:127, 150,
217;JW, p.
223; TD,
p.
263; WP,
pp.
324, 340, 388-89, 512, 534;
HAH
1:248; TD,
p.
22.
Sounding very
much
like Karl
Barth,
Nietzsche
wrote,
"God conceived as an
emancipation
from
morality, taking
into himself the whole fullness of life's antitheses
and,
in a divine
torment,
redeeming
and
justifying
them: God as
beyond
and above of the wretched loafers'
morality
of
'good
and
evil'
"
(TP, p. 533);
see also Barth's The
Epistle
to the
Romans,
trans.
Edwyn
C.
Hoskyns
(London:
Oxford
University
Press, 1933),
pp.
86-87.
360
Nietzsche and
Eschatology
all existence." The movement toward this fulfillment would
begin
in
Europe
and
eventually spread
to the rest of the world: ".. . when
Israel shall have
changed
its eternal
vengeance
into an eternal benedic-
tion of
Europe:
then that seventh
day
will once more
appear
when
old
Jehovah may rejoice
in
Himself,
in His
creation,
in His chosen
people-
and
all,
all of
us,
will
rejoice
with Him!"
(DD,
pp.
213-14).
What was
almost
totally profane
in the
previous
two
ages
will be transformed
into
the
totally
sacred.
In order to fulfill the
apocalyptic prophecy
of the
coming
third
age,
and in order to be consistent with
Joachim's interpretation
of
history,
the
archetypes
of the
prophetic precursor
and the Antichrist must
be
discovered. Both are to be
distinguished
from the novus
dux,
a
position
which
Nietzsche reserved for the
Obermensch.
For
example, Joachim
considered Saint Benedict as a
precursor
of the third
age
because of his
emphasis upon
asceticism and
monasticism,
but he was not considered to
be the
novus
dux.
Clearly,
Nietzsche,
as well as
Zarathustra,
plays
this
role:
"...
only
after
my
time could we once more find
hope,
life-tasks,
and roads
mapped
out that lead to
culture--I
am the
joyful harbinger
of
this culture."
Simultaneously,
Nietzsche reserves for himself the role of
Antichrist.
Writing
to Malwide von
Meysenbug
in
1883,
he said: "Do
you
know a new name for me? The
language
of the church has one-I
am
..
. the
Anti-Christ."
Significantly,
one of his
major
works has the
same title. It is not
surprising,
therefore,
when Nietzsche announced
that he
himself,
like "the
Crucified,"
had divided the
history
of mankind:
"...
I am afraid that I am
shooting
the
history
of mankind into two
halves."
Although
he
preferred
not to be called a
"saint,"
he nevertheless
believed that he
represented something "holy"
and could
consequently
begin
his
autobiography
with "On the first
day
of the
year
one. .4
..41
By
fulfilling
both the roles of Antichrist and
precursor, by being
"at once a
decadent and a
beginning,"
Nietzsche has
paved
the
way
for the
coming
of the collectivized novus
dux,
the Ubermensch. The one
major
doctrine
which he
bequeaths
to his
progeny
is his
incomplete
but nevertheless
significant
doctrine of eternal recurrence: "Its
place
in
history
...
[is] ...
a
mid-point."
This is doubtless the most curious and controversial idea to be found
in Nietzsche's
philosophy,
but it can
only
be understood in
light
of the
third
age
described above. For
example,
it is in view of the third
age
that
Nietzsche can remark that this doctrine is "the
religion
of
religions"
41See
L6with,
p.
211.
Although L6with
cited this from
EH,
I was unable to locate it.
However,
there are numerous other similar
passages by
Nietzsche
(see EH,
pp.
131-32;
WP,
pp.
2, 102; Middleton,
p.
132;
also
L6with,
"Nietzsche's Doctrine of Eternal Recur-
rence,"Journal of
the
History of
Ideas 6
[July
1945]: 284).
361
The
Journal
of
Religion
which will
require many generations
before it can become
fruitful.42 For
this reason Nietzsche could be both ecstatic about the idea and
yet
could
also
cautiously recognize only
the
probabilities
of
it,
referring
to it
merely
as a
"prophecy."43
Indeed,
as Nietzsche wrote: "To endure the
idea of recurrence one needs: freedom from
morality.
.
."
But freedom
from
morality
can
only
be found in the ultramoral
stage
of
history.
Thus,
the doctrine of eternal recurrence has been
eschatologized
also.
Consequently,
it is a
misunderstanding
of Nietzsche's
philosophy
to
discuss the doctrine of eternal recurrence as
compatible
with either the
Hebrew-Christian linear view or a Greek
cyclical
view of
history.
In the
third
age,
neither view is
applicable.44
And
despite
Nietzsche's desire to
make it
so,
it is fruitless to consider this doctrine from a scientific
point
of
view because
only
the
purified
and redeemed science of the third
age
can
adequately
deal with the
topic.45
Nor
is it
adequate
to assert that the
doctrine can be existentialized in
any age,
for the doctrine can
only
be
existential in the third
age.46
Therefore,
the doctrine of eternal recur-
rence can
only
be understood in connection with his view of
soteriology,
for,
as Nietzsche
believed,
after this idea starts to
prevail
"a new
history
will
begin."
It is not a doctrine for the
present age.
42
TD, pp. 255-56. It should be
emphasized
here that Nietzsche in no
way
considered his
understanding
of the doctrine of eternal recurrence to be
complete
and finished. As he
wrote: "For the
mightiest thought
of all
many
millenniums
will be
necessary,-long, long,
long
will it remain
puny
and weak!"
(TD,
p.
256;
cf. also Rose
Pfeffer,
"Eternal Recurrence
in Nietzsche's
Philosophy,"
Review
of Metaphysics
19,
no. 2
[December
1965]:
289n.;
also
Strong, p. 289).
43TP, pp.
544-45; TD,
p.
253. Hans
Vaihinger
has
suggested
the fictional
probability
of
the doctrine: "Nietzsche has so little
against
such
myths
[i.e.,
Christian
myths]
that he
makes a demand for a
'myth
of the future.' . . . As a test of such a
future-myth
we can
interpret
the idea of 'eternal recurrence.' True
enough,
Nietzsche meant this at first as
hypothetical,
then as
dogmatic,
but,
in the
end,
he himself
appears
to have
interpreted
it
merely
as a useful fiction. In this sense he
says
of this idea:
'Perhaps
it is not true.' And it is
thus
possible
that
O.
Ewald
(Nietzsches
Lehre in ihren
Grundbegriffen)
was
right
in
interpreting
this
thought
as a
pedagogical-regulative
idea,
as G. Simmel also does. The idea of the
'superman,'
too,
is a
heuristic-pedagogical-Utopian
fiction of this sort"
("Nietzsche
and his
Doctrine of Conscious
Illusion,"
in
Solomon,
p. 103n.);
cf. with Kaufmann
(n. 3),
p.
126n.
44SeeJW, pp.
151-52; Tillich,
p.
307;
Strong, pp.
265, 267, 276;
cf.
esp.
Ivan
Soll,
"Reflections on Recurrence: A Re-Examination of Nietzsche's
Doctrine,
Die
Ewige
Wider-
kehr des
Gleichen,
in
Solomon,
pp.
336-37.
45
Thus,
L6with missed the
eschatological
nature of Nietzsche's doctrine when he wrote:
"...
wherever he
[Nietzsche]
tries to
develop
his doctrine
rationally
it breaks asunder in
two irreconcilable
pieces:
in a
presentation
of eternal recurrence as an
objective
fact,
to be
demonstrated
by physics
and
mathematics,
and in a
quite
different
presentation
of it as a
subjective hypothesis
to be demonstrated
by
its ethical
consequences.
It breaks asunder
because the will to eternalize the chance fact of the modern
ego
does not fit into the
assertion of the
impersonal
eternal
cycle
of the natural world"
(L6with,
"Nietzsche's
Doctrine,"
pp.
283-84).
Both Ivan Soll and Arnold Zuboff miss this
point
as well
(see
Solomon,
pp.
342 and
357,
respectively).
46Thomas J. J.
Altizer has
attempted
one of the better existential
interpretations
of
Nietzsche's doctrine
by associating
it with the studies of Mircea Eliade. As he
concluded,
"Finally, Yes-saying
and Eternal Recurrence are identical: the
deepest
affirmation of
362
Nietzsche and
Eschatology
The ecstatic moment in 1881 in which Nietzsche discovered the
significance
of the doctrine of eternal recurrence is itself an
example
of
that doctrine. He described it as
being
"six thousand feet
beyond
men
and time." Because of this
experience,
he can warn
against seeking
"distant and unknown states of bliss" since he himself had
already
had a
momentary
foretaste of that bliss. To
recognize
the
psychological
implications
of eternal recurrence is itself "a tremendous moment.
..
."
And to strive for such a "moment" is the new
goal
of each individual
because the
"redemption
of mankind will reach its last act in
your-
selves.""47 That all will not achieve this
redemption,
however,
is clear: "The
history
of the future: this
thought
[eternal recurrence]
will tend to
triumph
ever more and
more,
and those who disbelieve it will be
forced,
according
to their
nature,
ultimately
to die out.
....
He, alone,
who will
regard
his existence as
capable
of eternal recurrence will remain over:
but
among
such as these a state will be
possible
of which the
imagination
of no
utopist
has ever dreamt!"
(Explanatory
Notes,
in
AC,
p.
253).
The
doctrine of eternal recurrence will
become,
to use
Joachim's phrase,
the
"unwritten
gospel
on the hearts of
everyone."
Or,
in other
words,
the
"kingdom
of God" will be within those who achieve this
age.48
In the
meantime, however,
one should live "as if" he would live
again-"for
in
any
case
you
will live
again!"
Here,
one is reminded not of a Greek
cyclical
view of
history,
which Nietzsche
rejected,49
but rather of the
words of
Jesus:
".... this
do,
and thou shalt live"
(Luke 10:28).
To "live"
is to live in
ecstasy,
in a state of
consciouslessness,
whereby
the end of
history
is not to have
history,
in which the child of innocence becomes a
"self-propelled
wheel...
.." In this
manner,
history
will have solved the
problem
of
history.
That Nietzsche was in
many
cases accurate in his criticism of the
ecclesiastical
concepts
of faith and of love can be doubted
only by
the
existence can
only
mean the
willing
of the eternal recurrence of all
things,
the will of this
life,
of this
moment,
of this
pain,
in such a manner as to will that it recur
eternally,
and
recur
eternally
the same. We find here no
metaphysical cosmology,
no
Weltanschauung,
no idea of eternal
recurrence;
but rather the
deepest
existence
(Dasein)
in the
Now,
in the
Here and
There,
in the Center that is
everywhere" (Mircea
Eliade and the Dialectic
of
the
Sacred
[Philadelphia:
Westminster
Press, 1963],
p. 189).
What Altizer fails to
point
out is
that the "Center" for Nietzsche is
eschatological,
is in the future. In the
present
state of
history,
there is no
meaning
to
history-the meaning
is
yet
to come. Karl
Jaspers
has
provided
a similar
interpretation,
but he seems to be more concerned in
bolstering
his own
philosophy
of Existenz rather than in
interpreting
Nietzsche on this
point (Jaspers,
Nietzsche: An Introduction to the
Understanding of
His
Philosophical Activity [Chicago: Henry
Regnery
Co., 1965],
pp. 352-70).
`DD,
p.
83. Nietzsche
opposed
the idea of a cosmic final
purpose-there
are
only
individual
purposes (cf. WP,
pp.
48-49; TP,
p.
403; Middleton,
p. 199).
48See
WP,
pp.
133-34, 136; AC,
pp.
172,
182.
49TD,
p.
247;
cf. also
Strong, pp.
184,
265.
363
The
Journal
of
Religion
most ardent enthusiast of the Church. But that he retained the
hope
imparted
to him
by
the Hebrew-Christian
tradition,
and more
specific-
ally
the
Joachimite
tradition,
is clear.
Just
as the Hebrew-Christian God
created the world ex
nihilo,
Nietzsche seeks a new
age
created ex nihilism.
In this
respect,
Nietzsche was most unclassical in his
approach,
for,
as
Karl L6with has
rightly
maintained,
"no Greek was concerned with
man's distant future."50 What Nietzsche desired was the fulfillment of a
hope brought
about
through
the individual's own
striving,
not
by
"inevitability"
or
by
the collective actions of the "last man."
Through
the
individual,
humanity
as a whole could achieve a new world: "Mankind
must set its
goal
above itself-not in a false
world, however,
but in one
which would be a continuation of
humanity" (Explanatory
Notes,
in
AC,
p.
269).
The third
age,
therefore,
is
only
a
greatly
to be
hoped
for
possibility.5'
And herein lies Nietzsche's
greatest
weakness-he
was
unable to endure and to affirm life without
hope.52
For
this
reason,
he
too-was a
"preacher
of death." To believe in a
"beyond,"
whether a
transcendental heaven or a heaven on
earth,
whether an
inevitability
or
only
a
possibility,
is in either case an
"imaginary teleology...."
Accord-
ing
to
Nietzsche,
history
will be
justified through Dionysian "hope."
But,
if
so,
Nietzsche was
by
his own definition a
weak,
not a
strong,
nihilist.
Nietzsche was closer to the truth than
he
himself
imagined
when he
wrote: "The whole world still believes in the
literary
career of the
'Holy
Ghost,'
or is still influenced
by
the effects of this belief
...
"
Unwittingly,
Nietzsche himself was
captured by
the
apocalyptic images
of a
Joachim-
ite third
age
of the
Holy Spirit.53
As a
consequence,
his
philosophy
is a
product
of that
"slave"
morality
which he abhorred so much. It is for this
reason that Nietzsche's name has been associated with other believers in
a
third-age concept,
such as the National Socialists. The words he wrote
against
Strauss, therefore,
are
equally
attributable to himself: "The
Philistine as founder of the
religion
of the future-that is the new belief
in its most
emphatic
form of
expression.
The Philistine becomes a
dreamer
...
"
Nietzsche is to be
appreciated,
however,
for
having
shown
that the last
god
to be overthrown is the
god
of
"hope."
5oL6with,
Meaning
in
History, p.
221.
References
to
the idea of
"hope"
in Nietzsche's
works are
legion.
I will cite
only
a few
prominent
ones: HAH
1:3;JW, p.
331; SZ,
pp.
44,
293. That Nietzsche
occasionally
had
contrary feelings
can be seen in
Middleton,
pp.
139,
148.
51As
Nietzsche
wrote,
"There is
absolutely
no
knowing
what
history may
be some
day"
(JW, p. 74).
52For,
as he
wrote,
"...
man will wish
nothingness
rather than not wish at all"
(GM,
p.
211);
see also
GM, p.
121.
53
See
Middleton,
p.
177; TP,
p.
434;
and
Lea,
pp.
324-25. Herein lies one of the
major
differences between
Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche. The latter
yielded
to
"Christendom,"
at
least
through adopting
the
Joachimite
tradition,
whereas the former would have con-
demned it. In this
respect,
Nietzsche never
really
attained the
position
of a "critical
historian."
364