Currents and Crosscurrents of Radical Islamism

CSI S TRANSATLANTI C DI ALOGUE ON TERRORI SM 1
A REPORT OF THE CENTER FOR STRATEGI C AND I NTERNATI ONAL STUDI ES

TRANSATLANTI C DI ALOGUE ON TERRORI SM
April 2006
CURRENTS and
CROSSCURRENTS
of RADI CAL I SLAMI SM
2 CURRENTS AND CROSSCURRENTS OF RADI CAL I SLAMI SM
TABLE of CONTENTS
CURRENTS and CROSSCURRENTS of RADI CAL I SLAMI SM
A REPORT OF THE CSI S TRANSATLANTI C DI ALOGUE ON TERRORI SM April 2006
CENTER FOR STRATEGI C AND I NTERNATI ONAL STUDI ES
1800 K STREET, NW, WASHI NGTON, D. C. 20006
PH: ( 202) 887- 0200 FAX: ( 202) 775- 3199 WWW. CSI S. ORG
DESI GN: BI LLY SOUNTORNSORN
4 I NTRODUCTI ON
6 STI LL I N THE DARK: THE I NTEGRATI ON CHALLENGE
10 RECOMMENDATI ONS
11 LOCAL GRI EVANCES, GLOBAL JI HAD
14 RECOMMENDATI ONS
15 AL QAEDA S SOUTHEAST ASI AN AFFI LI ATE:
JEMAAH I SLAMI YAH
16 TERRORI ST USE OF THE I NTERNET
18 RECOMMENDATI ONS
19 LI TTLE UNDERSTOOD AND PROFOUNDLY FEARED:
SUI CI DE BOMBI NG

21 THE COMI NG THREAT? THE RETURN OF I RAQ S JI HADI STS
22 OUT OF THE SHADOWS: THE TRANSATLANTI C RELATI ONSHI P
AND THE FI GHT AGAI NST TERRORI SM
25 RECOMMENDATI ONS

26 THE EU S ROLE I N THE FI GHT AGAI NST TERROR
27 APPENDI X A > DI ALOGUE PARTI CI PANTS
I NTRODUCTI ON
The second phase of the Center for Strategic and International Studies
Transatlantic Dialogue on Terror took place against a backdrop of rapid
change. When the rst conference in this series took place in Berlin
in the spring of 2005, scholars and practitioners were still absorbing
the details of the previous years attacks against the Madrid light rail
system, the murder of Dutch artist Theo van Gogh and a host of other
attacks and foiled plots. Global radicalism continued to be shaped by
the deepening insurgency in Iraq, in which radical Islamists from inside
and outside that country play a pivotal role. In the months following
the Berlin meeting, the bombing of the London Underground, the
attacks in Sharm el-Sheikh and Amman, and a stream of revelations
about radical Islamist activity from Europe to the Middle East to South
Asia and Australia where a group of conspirators were arrested for
plotting an attack against that countrys sole nuclear facility had
also to be taken into account.
Complicating the picture was increasing evidence of the decline of the
core al Qaeda group. Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other
senior leaders were apparently contained in the forbidding border
region of Pakistan; other senior leaders were in Iran, where they seemed
to be largely, if not completely, restrained. Top operatives were being
hunted and captured with considerable efciency, preventing the
organization from reviving its network and carrying out terrorist strikes.
The juxtaposition of a weakened al Qaeda and continued terrorist
activity and a seemingly thriving radical milieu has compelled
observers to think hard about the state of terrorism today, which little
resembles anything in the past half century of non-state violence.
In the course of Transatlantic Dialogue conferences in Berlin,
Washington and The Hague, participants explored conceptions
of this new terrorism as being the product not of traditional
extremist, hierarchical organizations but rather a burgeoning social
movement. Networks have loosened and, in some cases, atomized.
But the activism continues, fueled by the spread of jihadist ideology.
Increasingly, we see that the key actors are not the established radical
organizations, which are under severe pressure from police and
intelligence services, but self-starter cells, which operate largely
without outside direction. The emergence of such small groups from
the grass roots forces us to examine more closely the phenomenon
of radicalization, the means of transmission of ideas as well as
tactics, and the conditions that may trigger a handful
of individuals to commit their lives to a cause with
which they have had little previous formal contact.
These issues provided the basis for a set for enormously
rich exchanges between distinguished European and
American researchers and ofcials, who were joined
by some of worlds foremost experts from such other
parts of the world as the Middle East and Australia.
Running through the sessions of the last year have been
two shared, overarching understandings: First, that the
transformation of the terrorist threat from one that
emanated from a network of organizations to one that is
rooted in a social movement indicates the durability of
the phenomenon. If individuals are turning to violence
without the familiar blandishments and psychological
seduction of traditional terrorist recruitment, then
the ideas of the global jihad must have a dangerous
resonance in the Muslim world. Second, while important
progress has been made in exploring the pathways of
radicalism, we are still very much in the early stages
of understanding the challenge before us. The eld of
terrorism studies, which was small and under-developed
before September 11, 2001, is expanding rapidly and
nding its balance. But the agenda of topics for future
examination is lengthening, and the boundaries of the
eld are nowhere in sight.
The Transatlantic Dialogue owes many debts. In the last
year, our principal funding came from the Robert Bosch
Foundation and the U.S. National Intelligence Council,
which have supported us generously and shared our
belief that the work of the Dialogue is essential both for
exploring key areas of the new terrorism and for building
bridges between leading researchers and institutions
on both sides of the Atlantic. We are grateful as well to
our conference partners: the Heinrich Bll Foundation
and the German Foreign Ministry, which hosted the
Dialogues meeting last spring in Berlin, and Clingendael,
the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, and
TNO, which hosted our December conference in The
Hague. Both conferences surpassed our expectations,
both in terms of the liveliness of exchange and the
fruitfulness of ideas because of these partners
superb preparation and substantive contributions.
At CSIS, we have also beneted from the strong support
of our president and CEO, John Hamre, Executive Vice
President Robin Niblett, who, as director of the Europe
Program, has been an invaluable help in coordinating
and strengthening our transatlantic activities, and
Senior Vice President and Director of the International
Security Program Kurt Campbell, within whose
ambit this program falls and who has been its most
dedicated champion. More members of the CSIS staff
have contributed to the Dialogue than could possibly
be mentioned, but two whose involvement has been
critical are Andrew Tabler, whose research, writing
and logistical support have been heroic, and Billy
Sountornsorn, who has been designer-in-chief of our
publications and a tremendous help in a wide variety of
other areas. We greatly appreciate all their assistance.
Daniel Benjamin
Senior Fellow
Aidan Kirby
Research Associate
Julianne Smith
Senior Fellow
STI LL I N THE DARK
the integration challenge
Over the last few decades, immigration has
transformed the demographic landscape of
Europe. The result has been the creation of
parallel societies that, up until recently, did
not appear to pose much of a problem for
European governments. Clashes between these
two societies, however, have grown in the last
few years both in frequency and severity, taking
many Europeans by surprise. While the arrival of
large numbers of Muslims in Europe in the 1950s
and 1960s to ll the postwar labor shortage
was no secret, few Europeans expected the
newcomers to stay. As such, governments did
little to integrate these individuals, especially
as many of the immigrant communities seemed
reluctant to embrace European lifestyles and
values.
For a time, ignoring the growing cleavages
in European societies suited both sides. But
as many of the economic opportunities that
drew the original generation of immigrants to
Europe dwindled, due in part to technological
advances, and the disappearance of low-
wage jobs, the socio-economic status of most
immigrants failed to improve signicantly.
Today, Muslims in Europe, many of them now
citizens, frequently live in ghettos, receive
second-rate schooling and suffer much higher
un- and under-employment than the general
population. Unemployment is 10% higher among
British Muslims than the national average and,
in the case of the Netherlands, the gure has
reached 60%.
The bombings in Madrid and London as well
as the murder of the Dutch lmmaker, Theo
van Gogh, in the Netherlands raised new
questions about the security threats European
governments may have inadvertently helped
create in ignoring their alienated and isolated Muslim
communities for so long. The attacks, together with the
spreading recognition that elements of the immigrant
communities had embraced radical sentiments, revealed
fundamental questions about issues of coexistence and
integration.
European nations have taken different approaches to
the challenge of integrating Muslims into their societies
for a variety of reasons. First, the Muslim community in
Europe is far from monolithic. Germanys Muslims are
predominantly Turkish, Frances Muslims come primarily
from North Africa and those in the United Kingdom
originated predominately in South Asia. Second, each
countrys distinctive history and political culture has
shaped its policy choices. France, for example, has
long stressed secularism while Britain has favored
multiculturalism. Third, legal systems differ as well,
determining at least in part how far a government can
go in terms of promoting integration and assimilation.
Until recently, conventional wisdom held that Britains
model of inclusive, pluralistic multiculturalism had
been among the most successful: There is a high rate
of political participation among British Muslims and, for
the most part, patterns of settlement have been more
diffuse than in other European nations. But the suicide
attacks by four British Muslims last July have generated
concerns about the dangers inherent in Britains
traditionally tolerant approach to radical preaching
by local imams and left many wondering about the
prospects for multicultural coexistence. Had the focus
on tolerance glossed over a number of pressing social
problems? Had good intentions produced bad policy?
Similar debates were ignited by the murder of the Dutch
lmmaker, Theo van Gogh, in 2004. The Netherlands
home to a sizable Muslim minority for decades had long
been viewed as a bastion of tolerance and a hospitable
environment for those of all faiths. Other Europeans
countries have looked at the Netherlands as a successful
case study. But both incidents the murder of van Gogh
and the London bombings involved young Muslims
who appeared, prior to their descent into violence,
to be reasonably well integrated into their societies.
In reality, they were quietly becoming radicalized and
ultimately embraced violence as a way to act on their
grievances.
Most experts agree that integration is a complex political
and social issue because it addresses the question of
identity. Integration depends on fostering an identity in
which one feels a connection to or a stake in the country
of residence. Oftentimes attempts to measure the extent
of integration focus on outwardly visible symbols such
as style of dress and the consumption of other products
of popular culture, which may not accurately reect
identity conceptions at a deeper level. Even community
involvement and residential settlement patterns are
limited in their value as indices of integration. As a
result, the fundamental challenge in seeking to promote
integration is that the most important qualities those
that relate to identity are the hardest to measure.
From a transatlantic perspective, it seems clear that
Europe faces the more profound integration challenge.
This is true for a number of reasons: First, Europe has
a much larger Muslim minority than the United States.
1

Second, in contrast to the European experience, Muslim
immigrants in the United States have historically been
better educated than the norm, and, in fact, Muslims in
the United States typically earn more than the average
American. Third, there is the issue of political culture
and identity formation. The United States, a nation of
immigrants, has made it easier for Muslims to forge a
hybrid identity (Muslim-American), something that
is far more challenging for Muslims living on European
soil. (This is not to say that the United States does not
face its own problems with Muslim discontent, as we
shall see below. However, thus far, it is fair to say that
the Muslim community has been a bulwark against the
spread of radicalism in the United States.)
There is a two-fold problem in dealing with immigration.
In pursuing policies aimed at assimilating minorities,
governments must deal with both the desire of immigrant
communities to retain their culture and traditional
practices, and the level of receptivity on the part of the
native culture, which may see elements of the newcomers
culture as antithetical to Western values gender
The real issue is not structural
assimilation were interested in
identity assimilation: do immigrants
identify with the country of residence as
being their own?
Robert Leiken
Director, Immigration & National Security
Program, The Nixon Center
issues are a good example. As Robert Leiken discussed
during his participation in the Transatlantic Dialogue:
an immigrant community that is very retentive and a
local culture that is less than receptive make successful
integration difcult. But even if desire for integration is
strong on one side, progress can be painful. Based on his
research on immigration patterns, Leiken has found that
alienation can be most acute when individuals are ready
and willing to adopt a new identity, but they continue
to be regarded as immigrants. Some analysts regard
American culture, with its privileged place for religion
the Christian roots notwithstanding as inherently
more compatible with the orientation of most Muslim
immigrants than more secular European societies.
The generational dimension of integration presents an
interesting question in the context of radicalization.
Undoubtedly, the sense of limitations on educational and
economic opportunity that European Muslims possess
witness the French riots of 2005 are a central
cause of alienation and, by extension, contribute to
radicalization. Both European and American experts
also seem to agree that the failure of many younger,
European-born Muslims to integrate more fully than their
parents results from their sense of freedom to explore
their religious identities. In a period in which young
Germans, Britons, Italians and Spaniards are identity-
shopping as never before, considering themselves at
times to be more European than anything else, young
Muslims are doing the same. Instead of turning either to
a European identity with which they feel little afnity,
they often gravitate towards a more religion-based
identity. This stands in contrast to their immigrant
parents or grandparents, who typically focused on
seeking economic security and fundamental acceptance
and downplayed their religious and cultural afliations.
Although the United States has since 9/11 been spared
further violence, and the Muslim community has
generally decried terrorism, the assumption that the
U.S. Muslim community is untroubled and satised with
its hybrid identity is not held by all. In her research
about the American-Muslim community, Geneive Abdo
has described a climate of suspicion that has affected
how some Muslims view their identity. She observes a
trend towards the pursuit of a more pronounced Islamic
identity, though this alone does not imply a growing
radicalism. This trend has manifested itself in many
forms; employees requesting accommodation for prayer
time, more girls wearing head-scarves and students
lobbying for mosques on university campuses.
One of the challenges in assessing the success of
integration of American Muslims is the diversity
of the community. There is a much greater ethnic
heterogeneity among American Muslims than is found in
the communities of individual Europe states. However,
according to journalist Paul Barrett, who has also done
extensive research into the Muslim communities in the
United States, a handful of consistent themes seem
to animate many of the debates. First and foremost,
there is concern over American policy towards Israel,
especially in the context of American policy toward
the rest of the Middle East. There is a sense that Israel
and Jewish interests play an outsize role in shaping
American foreign policy. And there is an acute sense of
victimization based not so much on direct experience
but the plight of Muslims elsewhere in the world.
2

Just as overly optimistic assumptions about the American
Muslim community need to be guarded against, so too
is it a mistake to conclude that Europeans are doing
nothing to better integrate their Muslim minorities. It
is clear that this problem has rapidly become a higher
priority albeit often a political difculty for
European governments. More European media outlets
are addressing the issue and a growing number of
politicians are willing to openly discuss the integration
challenge. While turning well-intentioned rhetoric into
practice is not easy, a number of initiatives have been
launched in recent years, including some that promote
the local training of imams, which is designed to better
attune the religious leadership to local concerns instead
of distant grievances. According to Dialogue participant
Jytte Klausen of Brandeis University, who conducted
extensive interviews with Muslim elites across Europe,
the issue of the imams is a high priority. Many fear
their children being exposed to radical sentiments, and
it is clear that imams play a key role in determining
what Islam is and what values should be promoted
in a European context. Other initiatives include the
promotion of Muslim Councils that aim to give Muslims
a stronger voice in dealing with the state, ghting
discrimination, creating educational programs that
teach the basics of Islam in public schools and, more
broadly, seeking educational and economic opportunity.
Non-governmental organizations have also been very
active in the integration arena.
3
Frances approach towards the integration challenge
what has been called an aggressive secularism
has probably received the most attention to date.
The decision of December 2003 to ban overt religious
symbols from the classroom was controversial, and
many believed it would invite a backlash. Although
the protests petered out, the riots of last October and
November (although not explicitly inspired by religious
grievances) conrm that France, like all of the countries
in Europe, continues to face a profound challenge in the
effort to better integrate its growing Muslim minority.
Although there are signicant differences between the
situations in Europe and the United States with respect
to integration policies, the Transatlantic Dialogue on
Terrorism has highlighted both the need to continue
examining this issue as partners and the value of
sustained exchange. To date, the United States has not
faced the clash of cultures seen in Europe in recent
months, but as immigration patterns shift and political
contexts change, it is not unreasonable to assume that
American policymakers may be faced with similar issues
in the years to come.
After 9/11, Muslims began creating
their own subculture in America as a
response to the increase in hostility toward
them. This ef fort is taking many forms,
including the increase in mosques, Islamic
schools, and social, political and religious
organizations. The result will be a well-
defined Muslim-American identity. It is
an open question whether this will lead
to more or less integration of Muslims in
American society.
Geneive Abdo, Liaison for the Alliance of
Civilizations at the United Nations, author of
forthcoming, Mecca and Main Street:
Muslim Life in America after 9/11.
1 Estimates of the Muslim of the Population in France: 5-6 million (8-9% of the total population), Netherlands: 945,000 (5.6%), United Kingdom: 1.6 million (2.8%) and Ger-
many 3 million (3.6 %). The estimated population of the Muslim community in the Unites States is somewhere between 5 and 7 million (or between 1.7 and 2.4%).
2 Paul M. Barrett, who is writing a book on American Islam that will be published by Farrar, Straus & Giroux in January 2007, discussed these themes at the meeting of the
Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism in Washington, September 23, 2005.
3 Some of the more innovative initiatives have been carried out by non-governmental institutions. During a visit to The Hague in late 2005, the Transatlantic Dialogue on Ter-
rorism participants visited SPIOR, an organization based in Rotterdam that promotes the integration of Muslims into Dutch society and combats radicalism. SPIOR, founded in
1988, has developed a wide variety of programs to undertake its mission including: integration courses, the translation of religious services into the Dutch language, education
for parents about forced marriage, homework support and educational guidance, various programs to encourage youth community involvement and education about religious and
ethnic discrimination in employment.
I Political elites, particularly those in Western European countries, should actively promote national
dialogues on integration issues.
At a time when European citizens are increasingly worried about rising unemployment, shrinking demographics,
national identity, and crime which is often associated with Muslims political leaders have been hesitant to
promote multiculturalism, costly integration policies and interfaith dialogues. But recent attacks and outbreaks of
violence across the European continent have shown the consequences of continuing to ignore integration issues.
Public opinion surveys both in Europe and the United States suggest growing alienation and fear among Muslims,
as well as strong anti-Muslim sentiment in the non-Muslim communities. Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic must
engage their publics in a constructive discussion aimed at breaking down stereotypes, promoting coexistence and
identifying new ways to improve the socio-economic opportunities for Muslims. Much more debate is also needed on
the delicate balance between respecting cultural traditions and preserving the basic values of western society.
II European nations should establish a forum for sharing best practices with one another.
In addition to opening up the channels of communication between Americans and Europeans, the Transatlantic Dialogue
on Terrorism has enabled a considerable amount of intra-European exchange on a wide variety of terrorism-related
issues. It has become clear that few opportunities exist for European practitioners and policymakers to compare
notes with one another. While the integration challenges that each individual country faces differ, greater exchange
on such questions as the best way to provide multicultural training for police ofcers, broaden youth participation
in integration initiatives or identify bilingual teachers for educational programs would be valuable for any European
country. European governments, either through the European Union or a more informal forum, should create
opportunities for integration experts to share best practices and learn from one anothers successes and failures.
III Governments should actively support community-based non-governmental organizations that have
demonstrated success in promoting integration.
Throughout Europe, non-governmental organizations are tackling the integration challenge, some of which have been
working on promoting integration and cross-cultural exchange for many years. As national governments strive to
create new integration initiatives, they should consult with and support existing NGOs that have already established
their effectiveness. Such organizations often employ local community leaders, and as a result, usually have a more
nuanced understanding of the communitys needs.
RECOMMENDATI ONS
LOCAL GRI EVANCES
global Jihad
A central and recurrent theme of the Transatlantic
Dialogue has been the relationship between the local
and the global. Before Osama bin Ladens appearance
as a global gure, Islamist violence was characterized
overwhelmingly by a focus on local grievances and
local responses. The radicals of the Egyptian al-Jihad
group, which assassinated Anwar Sadat, the Muslim
Brotherhood activists of Syria, who were crushed by the
Assad regime in the early 1980s, the Algerian extremists
who carried out the atrocities in that nations civil war
in the 1990s all these and many other groups directed
their opposition against the near enemy, as the
theorists of al-Jihad termed the secularist autocracies
of the Muslim world.
Bin Ladens strategic revolution was to turn radicals
away from the local struggles, in which the mukhabarat
(domestic security service) of these countries routinely
out-numbered these extremists. The Saudis notion
of turning against the far enemy principally the
United States but also its allies in Western Europe and
Israel and employing catastrophic violence, changed
all that. The stunning events of September 11, 2001
to a signicant degree recast the Islamist challenge
along the lines of bin Ladens vision of a global conict
between Islam and the West.
Bin Ladens strategic revolution forces scholars to
assess some key questions today: To what extent has al
Qaedas reorientation been reected in the thinking of
ordinary Muslims around the world? How can we describe
the matrix of global and local motivations among those
who have turned to violence or support those who
commit terrorist acts? Almost four years after 9/11, the
crosscurrents between local and global grievances and
local and global activism have still only been sketched
out in a preliminary fashion. Hard data remains scarce
and confusing, if not downright opaque.
At the broadest level, many researchers are cautious
about the degree of mobilization in Muslim communities
that has been achieved by emphasizing the global
grievances. Alison Pargeter of Kings College has found
in her extensive research on North African diasporic
communities in Europe that there is still a considerable
emphasis on national concerns. Specically, in Pargeters
view, radicals primary motivation seems to be rooted in
discontent or anger with the situation in their countries
of origin and the focus on these national discontents
is probably even stronger among more moderate
immigrants.It is questionable whether these North
Africans aspire to the same political goals of bin Laden.
Rather, these extremists tend to have more specic
national concerns; national, and to a lesser extent,
regional issues drive them. North African extremists in
Europe may make common cause with al Qaeda, but
they dont necessarily have the same vision or goals.
There are many political grievances shared between
moderates and radicals. She adds that: Although
some motivations transcend national priorities, they
do not all appear to be part of the new transnational
movement. To be sure, many share the canonical view
of radical Islamists that much of the blame for dismal
conditions in home countries lies with Western nations
that are seen to be propping up repressive Maghreb
regimes. But for many, that has not yet translated into
a belief in an all-consuming and necessarily violent
struggle between the West and the Muslim world.
Among individuals who actually do commit violence or
seek to do so, there appears to be a greater sense of
the inseparability of global and local grievances. Many
Dialogue participants have echoed the generalization
of former German Chancellory counterterrorism ofcial
Guido Steinbergs assessment that Local motivations
are key in what we call the global terrorist threat, but
these local factors have diminished in recent years and
are being replaced by international inspirations, by the
international jihad. As one European participant put
it, recruitment takes place at a local level, but the
motivations that guide the group can be both local, such
as unemployment, discrimination, etc., and global, such
as Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo. In Steinbergs
formulation, the intermingling of local and global was
reected in the cell from 9/11, for example, which
was actually a combination of the Hamburg cell
educated, sophisticated individuals and Saudi muscle
(tribal, disenfranchised individuals). As a functional
matter, moreover, this mixture is essential because
members of the Diaspora are key to the success
of terrorist operations, their education is necessary
for the preparation and organization of attacks.
An oft-cited example of how local and global grievances
merge, the case of Mohammed Bouyeri, the young Dutch
Muslim who murdered Theo van Gogh is frequently
cited. In the manifesto-cum-poem that Bouyeri pinned
to the chest of his victim, outrage was expressed at
the United States, for the invasion of Iraq, and Israel
for the plight of the Palestinians, and, interestingly,
comparable animus was directed against the Dutch state
for considering a proposal to screen Muslim applicants
for public sector jobs for radical leanings.
It is noteworthy that those who have been drawn to
Islamist violence in recent years tend to be younger
than their predecessors, particularly among pre-9/11
al Qaeda activists and those from related groups. The
increased importance of the global jihad for these
younger activists may partially be explained by the
growing importance of the Internet, which has become
a key vector of transmission for fundamentalist Islam,
and, in particular, sala thinking. With its strong
emphasis on Muslim universalism and the existence
of the new Umma that scholars such as Olivier Roy
have described, salasm inculcates a sense of solidarity
among geographically disparate believers. The
American scholar Marc Sageman summed up this chain
of developments by observing:
In the Berlin district of Neuklln, the number of
Internet cafes in the neighborhood is amazing, one
on every block. But the mosques are not as visible.
Most people read just the headlines on the Internet,
but few articles at length. Reading just the headlines
necessarily leads to a supercial, sound byte view
of the world. The risk is the same for understanding
Islam and Muslim politics, leading to a sound byte
version of Islam. The Internet has now become the
ideological battleeld of radical Islam. Different
people from different countries will project their
social views and backgrounds in their interpretation
of events and news. This type of view, available all
over the Internet, distorts ones view of the world
and can lead to extremist opinions.
French sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar took this analysis
a step further with his analysis of the emotional makeup
of suicide bombers with his description of the radicals
humiliation by proxy and sense of a globalized,
imagined humiliation. These feelings are powerfully
informed by a psychological immersion in such distant
arenas as Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conict and
Kashmir. The belief in a total denial of dignity and
recognition culminates in a determination to impose
oneself on the West through an act of terror.
Interest in the connections between the global and
local jihads has not been conned in the Transatlantic
Dialogue to the motivations of Muslim immigrants in
the West. In a series of sessions spread out over several
conferences, the question of how the global jihad
has affected conicts such as those in the Caucasus,
Kashmir, Afghanistan and various parts of Southeast
Asia and vice versa has been examined (see page
15). Mark Kramer of Harvard described in depth how
the instability that began in Chechnya and is spreading
through much of the region has been exacerbated by
the increasingly religious nature of a conict that was
principally ethno-nationalist in its origins. So much is
evident not only in the rhetoric of Muslim combatants
but also in tactics. Thus, Kramer noted a staggering rise
in the number of suicide attacks carried out by militants,
something absent from the rst phase of the conict
in the mid-1990s, and a growing inclination to attempt
spectaculars that kill large numbers of innocents the
examples of the Moscow theater attack and the Beslan
school disaster are cases in point. Although the actual
number of ghters from outside the region remains
relatively small as does the overall number of militants
their inuence has been sizable in an area that has
been subject to unimaginable destruction and trauma.
Another example of the nexus between local and global
is the evidence that Chechen ghters have turned up
in the Pakistani tribal regions. Chechens were present
in fairly small numbers among the foreign ghters in
Afghanistan before 2001. But the possibility that more
will migrate out of the Caucasus to participate in the
global jihad remains an ominous possibility.
In Pakistan, it was observed by a number of participants,
jihadists have increasingly sought to achieve greater
mobilization through frequent reference to events
outside of South Asia the American invasion and
occupation of Iraq above all. In this sense, the global
jihad has become a more important part of Pakistani
Islamist discourse. And while reports of the actual
participation of Pakistani radicals in ghting in Iraq
remain at best apocryphal, Pakistan continues to play
a role as a source of training and indoctrination for
radicals from outside the country. (An example of this is
the case of Willy Brigitte, who was born in Guadeloupe,
converted to Islam in France, trained in a Pakistani
terrorist camp and apprehended in Australia, where he
was preparing an attack.) This point was underscored
by one expert, who emphasized that the nature of
Pakistani radicalism has been more conditioned by
unacknowledged state support, particularly from the
nations military intelligence agency, ISI, than is the
case anywhere else. The provision of funding and other
resources to organizations such as Lashkar-e-Tayba
ensures both the continued existence of such groups
and their availability to the state as proxies for combat
in Kashmir and Afghanistan, though they also provide
some restraint. In addition to these semi-ofcial groups,
others that view most of the historic jihadist groups as
insufciently ardent have appeared, including some
that have targeted U.S. and other Western facilities.
I Strengthen diplomatic efforts to resolve local conicts.
As with so many other areas, globalization especially in communications is changing individual sensibilities
in ways that policymakers will nd extraordinarily difcult to inuence. The way in which Muslims in the Western
diaspora identify their own sense of alienation from their environment with perceived injustices done to other
Muslims thousands of miles away is a case in point.
Nonetheless, more concerted diplomatic efforts to resolve some of the conicts that feed this sense of universal
grievance could help reduce the sense that the West conducting a war against Islam. These conicts in Israels
Occupied Territories, the Caucasus, Kashmir and the southern Philippines, are old and intractable. Some like
Chechnya pose a further difculty insofar as they take place within a single sovereign country, and therefore new
outside initiatives will face concerns about meddling in internal affairs. Still, the case needs to be made that in the
era of globalization, local conicts can have global consequences, and therefore the West has a stronger interest
than ever in achieving peaceful resolutions. Progress in this area would undoubtedly help ameliorate the sense of
embattlement that some individual Muslims feel, and therefore reduce the likelihood that they would turn to violence.
It would also help eliminate training grounds that are helping to provide tomorrows soldiers in the global jihad.
II Advance a democratization and reform agenda in the Muslim world.
Democratization and reform will not end terrorism any time soon, and pressing these goals is a perilous activity that
could bring to power hostile groups. Nonetheless, over the long term, pursuing these goals will be essential. How
strong democracies serve to contain and diminish dissent is a subject for others. But it should not be forgotten that
a central tenet of the jihadist argument is that the West uses the autocracies of the Muslim and especially Arab
world to undermine and destroy Islam.
As we have seen above, many who are not jihadists today have similar feelings and resent the West for its support of
these governments. Pushing for reform and democratization in a careful, measured way one that does not mistake
elections alone for democracy will help over the long term to erode those sentiments and reduce the terrorist threat.
RECOMMENDATI ONS
AL QAEDA S SOUTHEAST
ASI AN AFFI LI ATE:
Jemaah Islamiyah
In Southeastern Asia, we are confronted with a patchwork of conicts in which local and global
concerns are inextricably bound. The best known of the regional groups, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), is a
group that grew out of longstanding local grievances, had close ties with al Qaeda long before 9/11.
The leadership and senior members of JI trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980s. (JI has also been
strongly inuenced by members who studied in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.) Veterans of the Afghan jihad
then went on to groom a new generation of mujihideen when they set up their rst camp in Mindanao
in 1996. The group, which is most famous for the Bali bombings of 2002, signed on so wholeheartedly
with bin Ladens global agenda that it has, in the view of participating experts, undermined its
viability and elicited a crackdown from which it has not recovered. Over 300 of the organizations
leadership were arrested and a looser more autonomous structure was left as a result. But, despite
signicant advances by law enforcement and intelligence, JI has staged a number of major attacks
since the Bali bombing including at the Marriott in Jakarta in August 2003 and the Australian Embassy
in Indonesia in September 2004. It is worth noting that the ties that bind the JI network are varied,
and this helps to reinforce its strength. Beyond the ideological afnity, JI is united by an intricate web
of inter-marriage and reinforced by extensive nancial
networks. JIs ranks are supplemented with recruits from
a number of pesantren (Muslim boarding schools).
JI apparently continues to benet from ties to the Moro
Islamic Liberation Force, which has despite efforts to
distance itself rhetorically from JI allowed the primarily
Indonesian group to train on Mindanao, its major redoubt.
The connection hints at a growing tie between the
traditionally focused MILF and the global jihad. Similarly,
in southern Thailand, tensions between minority Muslims
and non-Muslims and the authorities on the other side,
have been taking on an increasingly jihadist hue.
Although this classic conict over inequitable distribution
of resources and discrimination is locally rooted, there
has been a growing adoption by some local activists of
global Islamist rhetoric. An increasing number of reports
of opportunistic involvement by radicals associated with
JI and even al Qaeda suggest that if poorly managed,
Southern Thailand could become a eld of jihad that
the global movement could effectively exploit.
TERRORI ST USE
of the internet
The Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism devoted multiple sessions
to the issue of terrorist exploitation of the Internet because of
the central role that this tool plays in terrorism related activity.
Although there are a limited number of experts working on this
issue, we were fortunate to secure the participation of those at
the cutting edge of research in this area, and their multimedia
presentations and insights had a powerful impact on other
Dialogue participants who do not work directly on Internet-
related research.

A number of different trends have characterized the presence
of terrorist networks on the Internet in recent years. Perhaps
the most dramatic has been the sheer proliferation of terrorist-
related websites. All major terrorist organizations, including both
religious and nationalist movements, are now represented on the
Internet, the largest complement of these belonging to al Qaeda.
After losing its sanctuary in Afghanistan, al Qaeda has utilized
the World Wide Web so extensively that analysts describe the
phenomenon as a migration from physical space to cyberspace.
Experts have observed the further trend of segmentation the
movement away from indiscriminate broadcasting to the focus
on specic audiences. Many terrorist websites are now crafted
carefully to target a particular demographic. For example,
Hamas and Hezbollah have created numerous websites designed
specically to attract children. Homepages are adorned with
cartoons and childrens stories, but by following the links provided,
the visitor is ultimately led to graphic pictures of maimed bodies
and gloried images of suicide bombers. As Gabriel Weimann
pointed out, executions carried out by radicals, especially in
Iraq, have routinely been posted online and only days after the
posting of one such video, a video of Arab children imitating the
execution appeared online. The precise posing of the children
to match the actual execution was nothing less than astonishing.
Internet use by terrorists has become much more wide-ranging
as more sophisticated technology has become available. Where
they once accessed the Internet for purposes of communication
or nancial transactions, international networks now conduct
every aspect of the global online jihad, including presenting
targeting guidance, propaganda, psychological warfare,
recruitment, networking, fundraising, data-mining and
intelligence collection, the distribution of instruction
manuals and even highly sophisticated Web-based
training in bomb-building techniques.

Chat rooms allow individuals around the globe to
converse, air grievances and transmit radical ideologies.
As one participant pointed out, Internet exchanges
allow for the development of a surprising degree of
intimacy. In addition, some online gatherings serve
as virtual mosques, which are led by a new breed of
self-appointed imams, who are often self-educated and
dismissive of mainstream Muslim tradition. The various
tools of Internet communication allow extremists to
circulate their ideology instantly and widely, reaching
an exponentially growing audience with the click
of a button. And, as noted above, the Internet has
had a profound effect in creating a new sensibility
that fuses local and global grievances the plight of
the Chechnyans, for example, with the indignity of
unemployment in the Parisian suburbs thus heightening
the possibility of radicalization.
One of the most remarkable uses to which the Internet
has been put in this regard has been in Iraq, where it
has become an essential ideological and operational
tool for the insurgency. Militants have carried out a
sophisticated media strategy through the use of video
cameras, laptops and other wireless technologies.
As one expert pointed out in the course of presenting
footage from Iraq in a Dialogue session, it is routine
now for an insurgent attack to include not only forces to
carry out an ambush after, say, a roadside bombing but
also to deploy multiple cameramen to record the event.
Consequently, there is a vast amount of graphic material
available online that documents the daily horrors of
Iraq. For those who cannot travel to participate in the
actual jihad taking place there, a virtual experience
is readily available. Videos of humvees exploding and
gruesome executions are paired with carefully selected
music and captions to create a heroic drama for viewers.
These materials ensure that the radicalizing impact of
the war in Iraq will reach far beyond its borders.
The spread of jihadist material on the Web begs
the question of whether the ght against terror
needs to be taken into cyberspace, but formulating
an approach has been a daunting task. Within the
scholarly and the intelligence communities, there
is considerable debate about the policy goals for
dealing with the exploitation of the Internet by
terror groups. Efforts to simply shut down terrorist-
related websites have proven difcult, labor intensive
and frustrating. Typically, once sites are removed,
they reappear elsewhere, sometimes within hours.
Some analysts, such as Dialogue participant Aimee
Ibrahim David, believe that greater benets can be
derived from vigilant monitoring of radical sites,
rather than attempting to remove them, because of
the vast amount of information that can be extracted.
In 1998 there were 12 known terrorist
websites, today there are more than 4,800
terrorist websites or sites
supporting terrorists.
Gabriel Weimann
Professor, Haifa University
Those who have the necessary language skills and
technological expertise can track important advances
in terrorist tradecraft and changes in strategy. For
example the patterns of development and innovation
in the construction of Improvised Explosive Devices
in Iraq have been discerned from the sites that post
online training videos. At the tactical level, sometimes
key evidence becomes available as in the case where
a perfect ngerprint was captured on the lens of the
camera being used to lm an attack. Whatever area
of specialization Internet counterterrorism analysts
are involved in, however, a high degree of training is
required. As Gabriel Weimann, points out, It is not
enough to just know Arabic and its not just Arabic
speakers we need. The numerous dialects of Arabic are
an issue, and even then its not enough to just know
the dialects. We also need to know and understand the
culture. We need to understand the people and their
practices and their traditions.
The most ef fective method of
determining terrorist targeting
strategies and evolving tactics is to
read their materials. In fact, terrorist
online communications often reveal
operational means and methods that
can assist us in our counterterrorist
ef forts, such as the steps they take to
conceal their identities online, the
techniques by which they transfer
funds, the methods they use to obtain
raw materials to build improvised
devices, and even safe routes across
international borders.
Aimee Ibrahim David, Principal, DFI
Government Services
I Training for monitoring and extracting information must become a priority.
Given the degree to which radical Islamists depend on the web, Western governments must nd ways to cultivate the
specic technological and linguistic expertise to better penetrate these valuable intelligence sources. Training new
experts in this eld is not easy. It can take years even for native speakers to acquire the necessary online uency to
understand and interpret chat room vernacular. Experts also need an unusually high degree of technical know-how in
order to nd information that is hidden in concealed, fragmented, and encrypted les. Therefore, training programs
should be viewed as a long-term investment. In addition, every effort needs to be made to advance development of
electronic translation tools.
II Europe and the United States should foster greater exchange in this area.
Very few forums exist where European and American can exchange information on the role of the Internet in combating
terrorism. Greater efforts should be made to share information across the Atlantic on this complex challenge.
RECOMMENDATI ONS
LI TTLE UNDERSTOOD
AND PROFOUNDLY FEARED
suicide bombing
Few aspects of the new terror have had the unnerving
effect on observers, whether ordinary citizens or
high government ofcials, of suicide bombings. The
spectacle of an individual turning himself into a
weapon without regard for the preservation of his
own life suggests a level of commitment and an
undeterrability that is hard for most Westerners to
comprehend.
The tactic of suicide bombing, of course, predates
the attacks of September 11. It has been used to
considerable effect by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka,
Hezbollah and various Palestinian groups. But since
the coordinated suicides of the 19 hijackers, the
tactic has taken on an iconic quality and immediacy
for Americans shared by Europeans after the Madrid
and London bombings that it did not have before.
The urgency of the issue of suicide bombings has been
heightened by the spectacular rise in recent years of
the incidence of such attacks due to the spread of
jihadist terror, above all in Iraq.
Much time has been devoted to the subject of suicide
bombing in various sessions of the Transatlantic
Dialogue. It has become clear in the course of these
exchanges that every effort at creating a prole of
the suicide operative has failed. Analyses that try to
explain the phenomenon on the basis of such factors
as gender, marital status, age, economic background
and social status have proved incorrect. Many factors
may play a role, but there is no single type of the
suicide bomber. This nding makes efforts by law
enforcement and intelligence to prevent such attacks
forbiddingly difcult.
More fruitful, however, has been the work on group
dynamics pioneered by Dialogue participants Marc
Sageman, who has focused on radical Islamists, and
Ami Pedahzur, whose research has dealt primarily
with Palestinian terrorists. In their presentations,
they have demonstrated the importance of ties of
kinship and friendship, and thus underscored the value
of network analysis in this area both for scholars and,
ultimately, for counterterrorism efforts.
Pedahzur has discussed how the valorization of
martyrdom has led to the emergence of cultures of
death, and, within these communities, hubs emerge
which drive terrorist and especially suicidal activity.
(For instance, motivated by the death of a teammate, a
soccer team in a Palestinian neighborhood was recruited,
trained and assisted by their coach to commit seven
suicide bombings.) Sageman, moreover, has addressed
at length how members of a particular circle of radicals
motivate themselves to perform acts that might
otherwise be inconceivable if contemplated without any
peer intervention. The admixture of in-group love and
out-group hate has a powerful explanatory value.
The inner life of suicide operatives has also been
illuminated in the Dialogue from another perspective by
Farhad Khosrokhavar, who has discussed how a profound
perception of personal humiliation can drive an individual
to see his only chance for selfrealization is through
death. Here, the sense of the personal and the communal
the feeling that the entire community of Islam is under
attack combine and prompt the individual to carry out
an act that is felt to have a transcendent, global impact.
The rate of suicide bombings shows little sign of slowing down
1982 1984 1985 1988 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
80
60
40
20
0
Source: Ami Pedahzur University of Haifa
THE COMI NG THREAT?
the return of Iraqs Jihadists
Amidst discussions about Iraq and how the war there has affected the global jihadist movement,
the future of insurgents causes considerable anxiety. Intelligence services throughout the West have
already devoted signicant resources to the question of how to cope with those foreign ghters who
survive combat in Iraq and return to their native countries afterward. Although the presence in Iraq
of foreign ghters is well known, hard data on the number of foreigners remains elusive. The largest
group of these militants comes from Saudi Arabia, with other signicant cohorts coming from Muslim
countries. Western government ofcials believe that the actual numbers of jihadists of European
origin present are small, but there are no reliable statistics, and, in any case, a terrorist threat can be
increased dramatically when only a few more capable operatives are added to a cell or organization.

Instructions for those interested in waging jihad in Iraq are easily available on the Internet. Online
magazines and bulletin boards post everything from optimal travel routes to tips on ways to dress
inconspicuously and spend money discreetly. Although some European Muslims involved in the Iraqi
insurgency are likely motivated by the prospect of martyrdom, it is reasonable to assume that some will
survive the war and seek new opportunities elsewhere. A worst case scenario envisions an individual who
travels to Iraq to take part in the jihad, absorbs the ideological zeal and the instruction in operations
and returns to European states with a network of contacts, positioned to assume a leadership role.
The circumstances under which the returnees arrive home will undoubtedly also make a signicant
difference: If the coalition forces are seen as having been defeated by the insurgency, the returnees
will be imbued with a dangerous triumphalism and grand ambitions much as the founding generation
of al Qaeda emerged after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.
A series of arrests over the last year suggests that even
before hostilities in Iraq diminish, the heat of the events
there may be felt far aeld. In Spain, more than a
dozen radicals said to be afliated with insurgent leader
Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi have been apprehended, and in
Germany, there have been number of arrests of members
of Zarqawis Ansar al-Islam network.
This issue is likely to remain a key concern for European
security ofcials for a long time to come, but it is also a
looming problem for the United States. In a real sense,
much of Europe is within Americas security perimeter. Visa
waiver programs and other measures designed to enhance
the ease of travel between Europe and the United States
clearly make this threat a transatlantic challenge.
OUT OF THE SHADOWS
the transatlantic relationship and
the fight against terrorism
Three years ago, differences over the central
characteristics of catastrophic terrorism were
casting a dark shadow over the transatlantic
relationship. Europeans questioned Iraqs relevance
to the broader ght against terrorism, accused the
United States of unilateral action and called for a
greater transatlantic focus on root causes and the
Arab-Israeli conict. In return, Americans pointed
their collective nger at Europeans for inaction
and underestimating the risk that terrorism poses
to Western society. Americans also cautioned
their European friends against blind allegiance
to multilateralism in the face of pressing security
challenges. Today, debates over leadership, mission
and tactics in the ght against terrorism still hamper
the transatlantic relationship, but the evidence
indicates that some gaps are narrowing.
The frank and open exchanges during the
Transatlantic Dialogue have made it clear that many
Europeans and Americans in the respective policy
communities see the threat of terrorism in much
the same way. Both sides of the Atlantic agree that
combating terrorism is one of the biggest if not the
biggest foreign policy challenges of our time. As Dr.
Klaus Scharioth, then State Secretary at the Foreign
Ministry and now German Ambassador to the United
States, said in opening of the Berlin session of the
Transatlantic Dialogue, The target is not the U.S., it
is not Spain it is the open society we jointly stand
for. It is human rights, respect for life, religious and
cultural tolerance, the equality of all human beings,
of men and women, the rule of law and democracy.
Europe and the United States also generally share
the same goals vis--vis the threat: pursue terrorists
and prevent attacks in the short term and address the
factors that contribute to terrorism in the long term.
Terrorism is a common and urgent
threat for both Europe and America.
We are in it together. It will be a long
and painful struggle for all of us.
All the more reason to work closely
together.
Gijs de Vries
EU Counterterrorism Coordinator
To be sure, differences still exist on the best means
to combat terrorism. Many European participants in
the Dialogue place a heavy emphasis on prevention,
diplomacy and other non-military instruments while
urging their American counterparts to use force as
a last resort. But even in this well-trodden area of
disagreement, there is an increasing recognition on both
sides of the Atlantic that ghting terrorism requires a
full range of tools and wise choices on which to base
their use. If Iraq has provided a painful lesson in the
limitations of military power, the attacks in Madrid and
London brought with them a unwelcome wake-up call
alerting Europeans to the need for tighter surveillance,
stronger counterterrorism legislation and greater focus
on the continents alienated Muslim minorities.
Equally potent now is the recognition that the
transatlantic partners cannot afford to allow their
disagreements to derail their cooperation. As the EU
Counterterrorism Coordinator Gijs de Vries put it,
Both sides have learned that it pays to work directly
together. The two sides may not concur on all aspects
of strategy. But with enormous and enduring challenges
in Iraq and Afghanistan, a continuing wave of terrorist
attacks around the world, and growing anti-Western
sentiment in much of the Muslim world, Europe and the
United States have a more pragmatic, results-oriented
relationship than was possible just three years ago.
Several examples, including NATOs new role in
Afghanistan, deepened law enforcement cooperation,
EU-U.S. joint efforts on container security and
extradition, demonstrate just how much has been
achieved. Much of this transatlantic counterterrorism
relationship remains out of public view. Few French or
American citizens know, for example, that in Djibouti,
U.S., French, and British troops are working together to
disrupt terrorist activity and promote regional stability.
Even fewer know anything about the multinational
maritime task force positioned off Somalias coast
to thwart terrorist activity or the joint U.S.-French
counterterrorism intelligence analysis center, Alliance
Base, based in France.
Cooperation has been deepest where there are well-
functioning institutions through which to structure
responses and in which there has been sustained high-
level political buy-in and signicant resources devoted
to common initiatives. Some Dialogue participants
also stress the importance of keeping transatlantic
cooperation below the radar, outside intense media
and public scrutiny. In a period of highly charged public
opinion, the best results are attained when there is a
In order to reverse this trend, the
transatlantic community needs to focus on
its relations with the Muslim world. What
is needed is a Partnership for Progress
and Reform, a partnership that seeks
to intensify cooperation and dialogue
with the countries of the region in the
economic, social, political and cultural
fields with the aim to help these countries
reform and modernize and to promote
the ideals of political pluralism and
democracy.
Dr. Georg Witschel
Commissioner, International Cooperation Against
Terrorism, German Foreign Ministry
shared sense that too much is at stake for bombast or
an insistence on marginal tactical differences.
There are a number of reasons, though, why
cooperation sometimes fails. Transatlantic cooperation
has faltered when Europeans have felt they are being
handed diktat instead of being genuinely consulted.
Style, European Dialogue participants tell their
American partners, matters. In addition, because the
war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular with ordinary
Europeans, any perceived link with the U.S. agenda in
Iraq can make joint undertaking difcult or impossible.
For example, U.S. calls for deeper transatlantic
cooperation in the area of democratization have been
interpreted by Europeans as a cloaked U.S. effort to
gain more support for missions like Iraq.
Undoubtedly, the greatest damage has been caused
by recriminations over cases of torture and abuse
as U.S. facilities and the continued existence of the
Guantanamo detention camp, which Europeans, along
with many Americans, perceive as inconsistent with the
rule of law. Press revelations about secret U.S. prisons
in Europe and subsequent investigations by national
and European institutions have also cast a pall over
relations. While transatlantic intelligence remains
robust and the unsung success story of the period since
September 11, European political leaders are coming
under increasing pressure to distance themselves
from the United States. Over time, this poses a
considerable threat to joint intelligence activity.
Terrorists are not subject to the
bureaucratic liabilities that we are;
they exploit all of our freedoms to
destroy them and then want them all
back once they are caught. There are
no easy answers on how to treat these
individuals.
Professor Bowman H. Miller
Joint Military Intelligence College
I Europe and the United States should hold a transatlantic strategic dialogue on counterterrorism.
The transatlantic partners currently lack a forum to conduct a comprehensive and strategic dialogue on terrorism.
The EU-U.S. Summits have tried to serve in this capacity but these half-day gatherings, which are usually pre-scripted,
light on content and emphasize economic issues. NATO has been prohibited from conducting such a dialogue because
some members oppose turning the defensive alliance into a political debating society. Some have suggested that the
EU and NATO jointly host such a dialogue, but their relationship has traditionally been limited to discussions of the
Balkans and military capabilities, with some modest exchanges on Darfur and energy issues. This begs the question:
Do the transatlantic partners have the institutions they need to discuss their differences on threat perceptions,
international law, democracy promotion and the use of force? Where can they discuss the role of the Internet, how to
counter terrorists technical innovations or how to best prevent suicide bombings? What is urgently needed is a forum
where policymakers can continue to increase their understanding and initiate more decisive policy initiatives.
II Act now to prevent damage to the transatlantic intelligence relationship.
The United States should take seriously international concerns about Guantanamo and other questionable practices.
At minimum, it should begin evaluating ways of closing the facility and releasing those prisoners who pose little threat
of future terrorist activity and it should avoid the perpetuation of existing legal gray zones or the creation of new
ones. European leaders should resist exploiting the issue of human rights abuses for political gain.
III Americans and Europeans should share best practices as partners.
What works in one country may very well not work in another. As a number of government ofcials in the Dialogue
noted, legal, security, political and historical frameworks vary considerably both within Europe and between Europe
and the United States. But most countries working to combat the threat of international terrorism have spent the
last few years learning lessons from which their neighbors and partners could no doubt learn a great deal. As such,
American and Europeans should make greater efforts to share best practices especially in the areas of, integration of
minorities, law enforcement and crisis response.
RECOMMENDATI ONS
THE EU S ROLE I N THE
fight against terror
Within the space of ve years, the European Union has launched a number of initiatives designed
to prevent, prepare for and respond to terrorism. The results of those initiatives to date have been
mixed. On the positive side, the EU has introduced a European wide arrest warrant, strengthened
legislation that cracks down on terrorist nancing, appointed an EU Counterterrorism Coordinator,
launched an action plan to ght terrorism and negotiated agreements with the United States on
container security, passenger data, extradition and legal assistance. It has also done much to improve
the security of airports and maritime facilities throughout Europe.
Despite these achievements, the EU faces tough challenges. First, member states (as well as a number
of partner countries, including the United States) have an almost schizophrenic attitude about the
EUs role in the ght against terrorism. One day, members call for the EU to take on a greater
operational role; the next they cry foul, accusing
the EU of infringing on national sovereignty. The
end result, as Daniel Keohane of the Centre for
European Reform put it at the Dialogue in The
Hague, has been the creation of a shopping list but
no strategy.
Second, legal systems vary considerably among the
EUs 25 members, making it politically, logistically
and/or nancially difcult for some to implement
the commitments they have made on paper.
Third, most EU initiatives in this area, including
the ofce of the Counterterrorism Coordinator,
are woefully underresourced. To date, the EU
has invested 15 million euros in security-related
research, a paltry sum for a continent of over 500
million people. Finally, EU decisions are taken
by consensus, meaning, as is the case for many
large organizations, statements and declarations,
particularly on terrorism-related issues, are often
watered down and tepid.
As a number of Dialogue participants stressed in their
exchanges, the EU will ultimately need to make a
choice. Is it willing to radically alter its structures,
culture, processes and budget to ght terrorism
effectively? Or will it wait for another terrorist
attack to dislodge the current political blockages?
Morten Aasland
Embassy of Norway in the United
States
Geneive Abdo
Liaison for the Alliance of
Civilizations, United Nations
Mahan Abedin
Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism
Monitor
Zachary Abuza
Simmons College
Nick Alexander
Embassy of the United Kingdom in
Germany
Jon Alterman
Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Haizam Amirah-Fernndez
Elcano Royal Institute for
International and Strategic
Studies
Susanne Babl
German Federal Criminal Police
Ofce
Shmuel Bar
Institute for Policy and Strategy
at the Interdisciplinary Center
Herzliya in Israel
Nikica Bardek
German Federal Intelligence
Service
Paul Barrett
Business Week
Daniel Benjamin
LeeAnn Borman
Glenn Carle
U.S. National Intelligence Council
Jocelyne Cesari
Harvard University
Sarah Connolly
UK Foreign Commonwealth Ofce
Rik Coolsaet
University of Gent
David Crawford
The Wall Street Journal
Aimee Ibrahim David
DFI Government Services
Roger Davies
Hazard Management Solutions
Ltd.
Stephan de Spiegeleire
TNO/Clingendael Center for
Strategic Studies
Ulrich de Taillez
Ministry of Interior, Bavaria
Gijs de Vries
EU Counterterrorism Coordinator,
Council of the European Union
Rob de Wijk
Clingendael, Netherlands
Institute of International
Relations Studies
Paul Dercon
Dutch Ministry of Internal Affairs
Twan Erkens
Dutch Ofce of National
Terrorism Coordinator
Philippe Errera
French Foreign Ministry
Christine Fair
United States Institute of Peace
Jose Fernando
Fernandez-Aguayo
Royal Spanish Embassy in
Germany
Ralf Fcks
Heinrich Bll Foundation
The Hon. Baltasar Garzon
NYU Law Center on Law and
Security
Reuel Gerecht
American Enterprise Institute
Anne Giudicelli
TERRORISC
APPENDI X A > PARTI CI PANTS
Karen Greenberg
NYU Law Center on Law and
Security
Gabriela Guellil
German Foreign Ministry,
Dialogue with The Islamic World
John Hamre
Christian Hnel
Robert Bosch Foundation
Patrick Heinz
German Foreign Ministry,
Dialogue with The Islamic World
Mathias Hellmann
German Federal Ministry of
Justice
Jamaluddin Hoffman
Islamic Supreme Council of
America
Toby Jones
International Crisis Group
Daniel Keohane
Centre for European Reform
Muqtedar Khan
University of Delaware
Farhad Khosrokhavar
Lcole des Hautes tudes en
Sciences Sociales
Aidan Kirby
Jytte Klausen
Brandeis University
Jan Kortekaes
Dutch Ofce of National
Terrorism Coordinator
Holger Krmer
German Foreign Ministry, Ofce
of International Cooperation
Against Terrorism
Mark Kramer
Harvard University
Robert Leiken
The Nixon Center
David Low
U.S. National Intelligence Council
Marla Luther
Arab Western Summit of Skills
Volker Mabmann
German Federal Criminal Police
Ofce
Nemanja Malisevic
OSCE
Rob Malley
International Crisis Group
Ted McNamara
George Washington University
Maria Merklin
Service
Bowman Miller
Joint Military Intelligence College
Sascha Mller-Kraenner
Henrich Boll Foundation
Peter Nesser
Norwegian Defense Research
Establishment
Robin Niblett
Lidewijde Ongering
Dutch Ministry of Justice
Alison Pargeter
Kings College
Priya Patel
UK Joint Terrorism Analyst Centre
Ami Pedahzur
University of Texas
Elaine Pressman
University of Massachusetts
Michel Rademaker
TNO/Clingendael Center for
Strategic Studies
Tilo Reichelt
Service
Ambassador Dennis Richardson
Embassy of Australia in the
United States
Ewald Riks
Dutch Ministry of Justice
Marc Sageman
Foreign Policy Research Institute
APPENDI X A > cont i nued. . .
Tom Sanderson

Ambassador Klaus Scharioth
Embassy of Germany in the
United States
Kirsten Schulz
UK Foreign and Commonwealth
Ofce
Mark Sell
Service
Emmanuel Sivan
The Hebrew University
Julianne Smith
Matthias Sonn
German Foreign Ministry
Paul Stares
United States Institute of Peace
Guido Steinberg
German Federal Chancellery
Jonathan Stevenson
Navy War College
Jrgen Storbeck
German Federal Ministry of Interior
May-Britt Stumbaum
German Council on Foreign
Relations
Michael Taarnby
The Danish Institute for
Andrew Tabler
Jean Tillie
University of Amsterdam, Institute
for Migration and Ethnic Studies
Mustapha Tlili
New York University, Dialogues:
Islamic World-U.S.-The West

Yaroslav Tromov
Author, Faith at War
Tonya Ugoretz
FBI
Dirk van de Wiel
Dutch Ofce of National Terrorism
Coordinator
Lousewies van der Laan
Dutch Parliament
Joos van Ettro
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Terrorism and New Threats
Department
Ran van Reedt Dortland
EU Council Secretariat
Jaap van Till
HAN University
Karin von Hippel
Katharina von Knop
Leopold-Franzens University
Martin von Simson
German Federal Ministry of Interior
Hans-Josef Vorbeck
German Federal Chancellery
Gabriel Weimann
University of Haifa
Marvin Weinbaum
Middle East Institute
Susanne Welter
German Foreign Ministry, Ofce of
International Cooperation Against
Terrorism
Cees Wiebes
University of Amsterdam
Peter Wilkitzki
German Federal Ministry of Justice
Georg Witschel
German Foreign Ministry, Ofce of
International Cooperation Against
Terrorism
Philip Zelikow
U.S. Department of State
Marianne Zepp
Heinrich Bll Foundation
Doron Zimmerman
Center for Security Studies
Klaus Zuch
Berlin Senate
ABOUT CSI S
PHOTO CREDI TS
COVER Reuter s, i Stock I nter nat i onal , U. S. Depar t ment of Defense
PAGE 4 i Stock I nter nat i onal
PAGE 19 NATO
PAGE 22 NATO
PAGE 24 NATO
PAGE 26 European Par l i ament ( CSI S)
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a nonprot, bipartisan public policy
organization established in 1962 to provide strategic insights and practical policy solutions to decision
makers concerned with global security. Over the years, it has grown to be one of the largest organizations
of its kind, with a staff of some 200 employees, including more than 120 analysts working to address the
changing dynamics of international security across the globe.
CSIS is organized around three broad program areas, which together enable it to offer truly integrated
insights and solutions to the challenges of global security. First, CSIS addresses the new drivers of global
security, with programs on the international nancial and economic system, foreign assistance, energy
security, technology, biotechnology, demographic change, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and governance.
Second, CSIS also possesses one of Americas most comprehensive programs on U.S. and international
security, proposing reforms to U.S. defense organization, policy, force structure, and its industrial
and technology base and offering solutions to the challenges of proliferation, transnational terrorism,
homeland security, and post-conict reconstruction. Third, CSIS is the only institution of its kind with
resident experts on all the worlds major populated geographic regions.
CSIS was founded four decades ago by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke. Former U.S. Senator
Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999, and since April 2000, John J. Hamre
has led CSIS as president and chief executive ofcer. Headquartered in downtown Washington, D.C., CSIS
is a private, tax-exempt, 501(c) 3 institution.
CENT ER F OR ST RAT EGI C AND I NT ERNAT I ONAL ST UDI ES
1800 K ST REET , NW, WASHI NGT ON, D. C. 20006
PH: ( 202) 887- 0200 F AX: ( 202) 775- 3199
WWW. CSI S. ORG

Currents and Crosscurrents of Radical Islamism

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Currents and Crosscurrents of Radical Islamism

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CSI S TRANSATLANTI C DI ALOGUE ON TERRORI SM 1

A REPORT OF THE CENTER FOR STRATEGI C AND I NTERNATI ONAL STUDI ES

You might also like