IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION


JAMES DORMER BRENNER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
v. FILE NO. : 4:14-cv-107-RH/CAS

RICK SCOTT, in his official capacity as
GOVERNOR of Florida, et al.,

Defendants.
____________________________________________/

WASHINGTON COUNTY CLERK OF COURTS
MOTION TO DISMISS AND OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

COMES NOW, Harold Bazzel, Interim Clerk of Court for Washington County Florida,
by and through the undersigned counsel, and respectfully files this Motion to Dismiss and
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction, pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), and
in support thereof would state as follows:
INTRODUCTION
The Washington County Clerk of Court (the WCCOC), by the nature of the job, is in
the position of having been sued in this matter not because of anything he has done improper, but
merely for following current Florida Statutes and the Florida Constitution. The WCCOC is a
County Constitutional Officer whose duties are primarily ministerial, and, as such, must be
cautious not to exercise discretion in the performance of his statutory duties. Moreover, the
nature of the position requires that the WCCOC attempt to remain neutral in all matters pending
before the Court and to obey the law as written unless and until judicially determined otherwise.
It is not the primary function of the WCCOC, in his official capacity, to argue for or against
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public policy, including the issue of whether same sex couples should be afforded the
opportunity and privilege to get married. However, due the nature of the Complaint filed
against the WCCOC in this matter, the WCCOC will align its arguments with the State of
Florida in arguing that the Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against the WCCOC upon which
relief can be granted and to support its assertion that at all times during the facts of this case that
the WCCOC has acted in accord with his Constitutional and ethical obligations as the Clerk of
Court. The WCCOC would also cite the State Officials Motion to Dismiss and Incorporated
Memorandum of Law Supporting Dismissal and Opposing Preliminary Injunction Motions in
so far as said State Officials Motion addresses the applicable constitutional arguments being
brought forth by the WCCOC in this matter.
DISCUSSION
I. The Plaintiffs Claims are Not Redressable by the Clerk and Said Claims
Should Be Precluded by this Court.
The WCCOC at all times during the request by the Plaintiffs for a marriage license acted
in good faith and in accordance with clearly established law and the claims against the WCCOC
are not redressable by this Honorable Court.
A. The Role of the Clerk is Primarily Ministerial.
The Florida Constitution, which has governed Florida citizens for over 150 years,
established the Clerk and Comptroller as an elected public trustee in 1838 and established at the
county level a system of checks and balances that has served the public well during said period
of time. Specifically, the Constitution of the State of Florida Article I, Section 8, claims [a]
public office is a public trust. The people have the right to secure and sustain that trust.
Thereafter, Article VIII, Section 16 goes on to declare, [t]here shall be in each county a Clerk of
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the Circuit who shall be selected pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, Section I. Finally,
Article VIII, Section 1(d) mandates that [t]he Clerk of the Circuit Court shall be the Ex-Officio
Clerk for the Board of County Commissioners, Auditor, Recorder and Custodian of all County
funds.
The origin of the Clerk of Courts office extends into early English history. In time past,
the custody of court records was entrusted to one of the judges. However, it soon became
apparent that the judge alone was unable to preside over the argument, record the proceeding and
issue writs. Consequently, the Office of the Clerk of Courts was created. Subordinate judicial
officials were chosen from among the clergy, the only literate group at the time. Thus, the name
clerk is derived from the Latin clericus, meaning clergyman. In the English colonies, officers
of the common pleas courts were known as county clerks, a title that continues to be used in
most states, including Florida.
The primary purpose of said office is to place at the county level a system of checks and
balances as a public trustee. In Florida, a Clerk is not only the Clerk of Circuit Court but many
times serves as the County Treasurer, Recorder, Auditor, Finance Officer, and Ex-Officio Clerk
of the County Commission. The Clerk performs a wide range of record keeping, information
management, financial management for the judicial system and county government. Because the
Clerks duties affect the rights and property of county citizens, it is essential the Clerk remain
accountable for his actions.
B. The Clerks Role in the Marriage License Process.
Along with the functions set forth above, the WCCOC is responsible, pursuant to Florida
Statutes, to process marriage license applications and perform marriage ceremonies upon
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request. Specifically, Section 741.01 and 741.04, Florida Statutes, set forth the criteria for the
issuance of a marriage license. The Clerk lacks authority to issue marriage licenses in violation
of Chapter 741, Florida Statutes. Indeed, issuance of a marriage license in violation of the
criteria as set forth in 741.04, Florida Statutes, is a misdemeanor of the first degree, which is
punishable by definite term of imprisonment not to exceed one year and a fine of $1,000.
741.05, 775.082, 775.083, Fla. Stat.
The Clerk, pursuant to the Florida Constitution and Florida Statutes is duty-bound to
adhere to statutes as set forth by the Florida Legislature. Further, as a ministerial officer, he
technically should not be in the general business of challenging or defending the validity or
constitutionality of a statute, including this one. The Clerk is not a policy maker, nor should he
exercise discretion in the performance of his duties. The Clerk is not the person charged with
enforcing or promulgating policies relating the provisions of the Florida Statutes and Florida
Constitution. The Clerk does not have the broad authority to modify the form of a marriage
license. Nor does the Clerk have the ability to attempt to enforce law or create rules uniformly
throughout the State.
C. The Clerk Should be Exempt From This Suit.
Ultimately, the Plaintiffs fail to state a justiciable cause of action because their injuries
are not redressable by the WCCOC. The WCCOC should not, and cannot pursuant to Florida
Statutes, give the Plaintiffs the relief they seek. The Clerks only function with respect to this
matter is to issue marriage licenses pursuant to Section 741.01 and 741.04, Florida Statutes.
Florida Statute 741.212 and Article I, Section 27, of the Florida Constitution prohibit this from
happening: marriage is the legal union of only one man and one woman as husband and wife,
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[and] no other legal union that is treated as marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof shall be
valid or recognized. Thus, even if the WCCOC issue a marriage license, as sought by the
Plaintiffs in this case, until otherwise as directed by the Legislature or a Court of competent
jurisdiction, said license would be void and not entitled to recognition for any purpose.
Moreover, it is arguable as to whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the
claims against the WCCOC. The Eleventh Amendment generally precludes suits in federal court
against the State and its agencies. Summit Medical Associates v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1336
(11
th
Cir. 1999). There is a narrow exception for suits, challenging the constitutionality of a
state officials action in enforcing state law, which shall not be deemed to be against the State.
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). However, said exception only applies when those
officers are responsible for a challenged action and have some connection to the unconstitutional
act at issue. Womens Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 949-950 (11
th
Cir. 2003). In
this case, the actions of the WCCOC do not rise to the level of circumventing the requirements of
the Eleventh Amendment, and are thus due to be dismissed.
The Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege Article III standing to assert a cognizable claim
against the WCCOC. Standing requires an injury, a causal connection to the challenged conduct,
and a likelihood that a favorable decision would redress the injury. Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). Failure to satisfy any of these three requirements is
fatal. I.L. v. Alabama, 739 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11
th
Cir. 2014). The Plaintiffs cannot satisfy said
criteria with respect to the WCCOC. In this case, the Plaintiffs have only alleged personal
discriminatory treatment - -which is abstract in nature- - and not the required concrete interest
with respect to which [the plaintiff] is personally subject to discriminatory treatment by the
WCCOC. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 437, 758 & n22 (1984). Ultimately, the Plaintiff has not
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alleged a concrete injury, but instead only generalized stigmatization and emotional harm caused
by the marriage laws.
Finally, even if the Court were to provide the relief sought against the WCCOC, said
relief would arguably not redress the alleged harm. In this respect, the WCCOC cannot give
them what they desire, a valid marriage license under the current State of Florida Statutes and
Constitution. A victory against the WCCOC would result in nothing more than a mere moral
victory, something the federal courts may not properly provide. Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75
(1982).
II. The Plaintiffs Claims Fail the Rational Basis Test.
While it is not the desire of the WCCOC to get into a policy debate, the Plaintiffs
complaint leaves the Clerk in a vulnerable position of having to align itself with the State of
Florida to assert its defense. Essentially, the WCCOC relies on the arguments as set forth in the
States accompanying Motion to Dismiss as a more thorough analysis regarding the
constitutionality of Floridas Defense of Marriage Law, which was passed on November 8, 2009.
That being said, the WCCOC would also set forth the law below as representative of why the
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b).
The Plaintiffs seek to judicially repeal Amendment 2 of the Florida Constitution, which
was enacted by Florida voters on November 4, 2008. Amendment 2 was codified as Fla. Const.
Art. I, 27: Inasmuch as marriage is the legal union of only one man and one woman as
husband and wife, no other legal union that is treated as marriage or the substantial equivalent
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thereof shall be valid or recognized. Ultimately, Plaintiffs are claiming that the definition as set
forth by Florida citizens in 2008, as well as the Statutes which set forth this recognition,
741.04 and 741.212, violates the United States Constitution.
A. The Rational Basis Test Should be Applied.
One of the primary arguments in this matter is whether the rational basis review should
apply in analyzing the argued law. The Plaintiffs argue that because the subject law classifies
based on sexual orientation it should be subject to heightened scrutiny. However, the governing
Courts in this matter, have never classified sexual orientation as a suspect or quasi-suspect class.
Marriage has not historically been treated as a fundamental right open to gay and lesbian
people. Such a right does not have a solid foundation in American history, legal traditions and
practices. When the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was added in
1868, it was clearly understood that marriage was the union between a man and a woman. Said
ideal has been in place for the prior 140 years and was reinforced by the vote of Florida Citizens
in 2008. Finally, regulation of marriage is an area that has long been regarded as a virtually
exclusive province of the States. Sonsa v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975); United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689-90 (2013) (By history and tradition the definition of
marriagehas been treated as being within the authority and realm of the separate States.).
Typically, under Equal Protection cases, there are only three levels of scrutiny. Strict
scrutiny is reserved for laws that classify based on race, alienage or national origin. City of
Cleburne, Tex. V. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). The next classification
standard, intermediate scrutiny, are classifications based on sex or illegitimacy. Clark v.
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Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). All other classifications generally trigger only rational basis
review.
The standard of review argument in this case is generally analogous to Baker v. Nelson,
409 U.S. 810 (1972). The Baker Court rejected for want of a substantial federal question an
equal protection challenge to Minnesotas statute defining marriage as a union between persons
of the opposite sex. Baker, 409 U.S. at 810. Although the Courts summary disposition did not
specify the level of scrutiny the Court applied, several following decisions illustrate the Court
applied the rational basis standard to review the Minnesota law. While said summary dismissal
was not reached after plenary review, it nonetheless carries a precedential effect and is a decision
on the merits. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curiam) (claiming that the
dismissal was a decision reject[ing] the specific challenges presented in the statement of
jurisdiction and prevent[s] lower courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise
issues presented.). The Supreme Court has not expressly overruled Baker, and before Windsor,
federal appellate courts that considered the holding in the context of State definitions of marriage
regularly recognized that it controls. See, e.g., Mass. v. HHS, 682 F.3d 1, 8 (1
st
Cir. 2012); Perry
v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1082 n.14 (9
th
Cir. 2012).
In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Supreme Court considered an equal
protection challenge to a sexual orientation classification involving Colorados Amendment 2.
Amendment 2 prohibit[ed] all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or
local government designed to protect the named class of homosexual persons or gays and
lesbians. Id. at 624. After the Colorado Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to invalidate
Amendment 2, the United States Supreme Court reviewed Amendment 2 under the rational basis
test, which applies when a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class.
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Id. at 631. In applying said test, the Court found that the legislation should be upheld so long as
it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end. Id. In Romer, it was evident that the Court
was applying the conventional rational basis review, and not any form of heightened scrutiny, to
the sexual orientation classification set forth in the Colorado law.
Again, in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the United States Supreme Court
consciously chose not to apply a heightened level of scrutiny in a similar case. In Lawrence,
Texas had created a statute that criminalized intimate sexual conduct between two persons of the
same sex, while not reaching opposite-sex couples engaging in the same conduct. The Supreme
Court did not address the different treatment under the Equal Protection Clause, but instead
addressed the statute under the Due Process Clause, ultimately invalidating the Texas statute.
Said Court emphatically specified the narrow nature of the due process holding and specifically
stated that it was not holding that the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. Id. at 578. However, an analysis was
provided in the opinion which addressed the levels of scrutiny which would be used had it been
decided on Equal Protection grounds. In preferring to decide the matter pursuant to the Equal
Protection Clause, Justice OConner applied the rational basis review. In an important insight
into the Courts thinking, Justice OConner explained that the analysis of the law did not mean
that other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals would similarly fail under
rational basis review. Id. at 585. Further, she went on to proclaim that the State cannot assert
any legitimate state interest here, such aspreserving the traditional institution of marriage. Id.
The Plaintiffs would argue that a higher threshold of scrutiny be used, but binding
precedent precludes this argument. The Eleventh Circuit has rejected the theory that laws relating
to or guided by sexual orientation implicate a fundamental right or a suspect class. See Lofton v.
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Secy of DCF, 358 F.3d 804, 815-16, 18 (11
th
Cir. 2004). The rights that the Plaintiffs are
alleging are not fundamental rights and liberties which are objectively, deeply rooted in this
Nations history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
720-21 (1997). Ultimately, neither the United States Supreme Court, nor the Eleventh Circuit
has recognized the special rights and classifications argued by the Plaintiffs which would subject
this case to heightened standard of review.
B. The Florida Law Fulfills the Requirements of the Rational Basis Test.
This Honorable Court should be cognizant of its role in subjecting the Florida law to the
Rational Basis standard. [J]udicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how wisely
we may think a political branch [or an electorate of voters] has acted. Vance v. Bradley, 440
U.S. 93, 97 (1979). Ultimately, the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will
eventually be rectified by the democratic process and not by the Courts dictating policy from
the bench. Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). Ultimately, the rational basis review should act
as a paradigm of judicial restraint (FCC v. Beach Commcns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14
(1993) because said test is the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 26 (1989). Because of the
deference given, the Florida law should enjoy a strong presumption of validity, and the
challenger bears the burden to negative every conceivable basis which might support it without
regard to whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the
legislature [or electorate]. Beach, 508 U.S. at 314-315 (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto
Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973). Finally, [i]t is a familiar principle of constitutional law
Case 4:14-cv-00107-RH-CAS Document 49 Filed 05/12/14 Page 10 of 16
that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged
illicit legislative motive. United States v. OBrien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
In 1997, in response to Congress passing the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), the
Florida Legislature passed 741.212, which defined marriage to mean only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife. In November, 2008, the citizens of the
State of Florida voted 4,890,883 (61.9%) to 3,008,026 (38.1%) to approve Amendment 2,
which defines marriage in Florida as limited to a man and a woman. This no doubt was in
response to other state supreme courts striking down their states traditional definitions of
marriage based on interpretations of their constitution. Many States Legislatures, including our
United States Congress, have recognized that the institution of marriage as between a man and a
woman.
Marriage between a man and woman is an institution so valued in virtually every society,
modern or ancient, that it has always been defended to challenges and accepted as the societal
norm. This was evidenced as recently as 1972, when the Baker Court stated that a couples
challenge to traditional marriage law did not even raise a substantial federal question. Baker,
409 U.S. at 810. Moreover, the United States Constitution does not forbid the government, at
any level, from taking steps to preserve marriage in its traditional form. In fact, as late as 1996,
no state at any time in American history [had] permitted same-sex couples to enter into the
institution of marriage. House Judiciary Committee Report on the Defense of Marriage Act at 3
(July 9, 1996). Florida has an unbroken history of defining marriage as between a man and
woman. See, e.g., Coogler v. Rogers, 7 So. 391, 393 (Fla. 1889) (defining marriage as a
contractby a man and a women, reciprocally engaging to live [as] husband and wife). This
history of marriage in Florida is due to be preserved. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
Case 4:14-cv-00107-RH-CAS Document 49 Filed 05/12/14 Page 11 of 16
723 (1997) (If a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common consent, it will
need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it.).
There are numerous appellate courts that have considered the federal constitutionality of
a State law limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples under rational basis review and have
consistently upheld the law. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 308 (D.C.
1995)(per curiam); Citizens for Equal Prot. V. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 871 (8
th
Cir. 2006).
Floridas law, similarly, is historically rooted and rationally related to traditional marriages
historic purpose. Historically, there has been an essential connection between marriage and
procreation and childbearing. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2715, 2718 (Alito, J., dissenting) ([T]here is
no doubt that, throughout human history and across many cultures, marriage has been viewed as
an exclusively opposite-sex institution and as one inextricably linked to procreation and
biological kinship.); Skinner v. State of Okl. Ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.);
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 630-31 (Md. 2007) ([M]arriage enjoys its fundamental status
due, in large part, to its link to procreation.); Dean v. Dist. Of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 332-33
(D.C. 1995) (holding that the right to marriage is deemed fundamental because of its link to
procreation; concluding there was no right to same-sex marriage); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d
1187, 1197 (Wash. App. 1974) ([M]arriage is so clearly related to the public interest in
affording a favorable environment for the growth of children that we are unable to say that there
is not a rational basis upon which the state may limit the protection of its marriage laws to the
legal union of one man and one woman.)
Clearly, the interest in the State for the promotion of stability and continuity of the family
unit can be argued to be a legitimate state interest. See Nordinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 17
Case 4:14-cv-00107-RH-CAS Document 49 Filed 05/12/14 Page 12 of 16
(1992). The Eleventh Circuit has noted its importance and stated that it is hard to conceive an
interest more legitimate and paramount for the state than promoting an optimal social structure
for educating, socializing, and preparing its future citizens to become productive participants in
civil society. Lofton v. Secy, Dept of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 819 (11
th
Cir.
2004). The law being challenged in this matter has a direct and rational relationship to societys
legitimate interest in increasing the likelihood that children will be born to and raised by the
mothers and fathers who produced them in stable and enduring family units. See Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) ([M]arriage is the foundation of the family in our society.).
Ultimately, the Plaintiffs assertion that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the
definition of marriage must further a legitimate state interest is incorrect. Where the inclusion
of one group promotes a legitimate governmental purpose, and the additional of other groups
would not, the law should be upheld. See Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 383 (1974).
Further, the fact that the exclusion of one group may preclude that group from receiving certain
benefits does not render the law unconstitutional. Specifically, if the law has a rational basis
then there is no right to obtain the benefits designated to participants in the institution legally
created. See Bruning, 455 F.3d at 868; accord Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108-09 (1979).
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The case law is clear that to receive a preliminary injunction, the Plaintiffs are burdened
with illustrating a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, a balance of equities in
their favor, and that the requested injunctive relief would serve the public interest. Winter v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). First, the Plaintiffs in this matter have not clearly
illustrated what harm is truly irreparable and which would require the granting of a preliminary
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injunction. Typically, monetary damages, such as loss of income, are not irreparable injury and
cannot provide a basis for temporary injunctive relief. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 89-90
(1974). Similarly, embarrassment, humiliation, and damage to [] reputation fall far short
of the type of irreparable injury which is a necessary predicate to issuance of a temporary
injunction. Id. at 91-82. Moreover, and as set forth above (and also as stated in the States
Motion to Dismiss), the Plaintiffs in this matter cannot show a likelihood of success on the
merits.
It is critical that this Honorable Court, prior to granting the Plaintiffs injunctive request,
consider the effect of granting a preliminary injunction and enjoining Floridas current definition
of marriage. The slippery slope of such a ruling would arguably throw Floridas pension and
insurance programs, and other State and local programs, into a state of chaos. It would also have
a confusing affect on the manner in which the WCCOC, and other clerks, would need to process
marriage applications. Further, an injunction in this matter would cause irreparable harm as it
would essentially enjoin democratically enacted legislation and restrict the will of the people.
New Motor Vehicle Bd. V. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1351 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in
chambers) ([A]ny time a State is enjoined by a Court from effectuating statutes enacted by
representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury.).
Finally, if this Honorable Court determines that it should grant the requested preliminary
injunction, the WCCOC respectfully request that this Court narrowly tailor said injunction to the
allegations of the Plaintiffs complaint and stay that injunction pending appeal. Typically, any
federal injunctions effectuated against a States traditional marriage law as of the date of this
filing have been stayed, either by the courts issuing those injunctions or by the courts reviewing
them. See, e.g., Tanco v. Haslam, Case No. 14-5297 (mem. Order) (6
th
Cir. Apr. 25, 2014);
Case 4:14-cv-00107-RH-CAS Document 49 Filed 05/12/14 Page 14 of 16
Bourke v. Beshear, Case No. 3:13-CV-750-H, 2014 WL 556729 (mem. op.) (W.D. Ky. March
19, 2014).
[continued on next page]














Case 4:14-cv-00107-RH-CAS Document 49 Filed 05/12/14 Page 15 of 16
WHEREFORE, the Washington County Clerk of Court, ask that this Honorable Court
dismiss the Complaint against it and deny the preliminary injunction motion pending in this
matter. In the event the Court grants Plaintiffs any relief, the Washington County Clerk of Court
respectfully request that the Court stay all relief pending appellate review.

Respectfully submitted,
JEFF GOODMAN, P.A.



/s/ James J. Goodman, Jr. .
James J. Goodman, Jr.
Florida Bar No. 0071877
946 Main Street
Chipley, Florida 32428
850-638-9722 Phone
850-638-9724 Fax
office@jeffgoodmanlaw.com

Counsel for Washington County Clerk of Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12
th
day of May, 2014, a true copy of the foregoing
has been filed with the Court utilizing its CM/ECF system, which will transmit a notice of said
electronic filing to the plaintiff counsel of record, who are registered with the Court for that
purpose; and that a true copy of the foregoing was served by first-class mail on Samuel
Jacobson, Esquire, at Bledsoe, Jacobson, Schmidt, Wright, Lang & Wilkinson, 1301 Riverplace
Boulevard, Suite 1818, Jacksonville, Florida 32207.

/s/ James J. Goodman, Jr.
James J. Goodman, Jr.
Case 4:14-cv-00107-RH-CAS Document 49 Filed 05/12/14 Page 16 of 16