James A. Sonne, State Bar No. 250759 jsonne@law.stanford.edu Jared M. Haynie, State Bar No. 294375 jhaynie@law.stanford.edu Stanford Law School Religious Liberty Clinic Crown Quadrangle 559 Nathan Abbott Way Stanford, CA 94305 Phone: (650) 723-1422 Fax: (650) 723-4426
Attorneys for Plaintiff
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN DIVISION
Harbor Missionary Church Corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
City of San Buenaventura, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 2:14-cv-03730
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Notice of Hearing: Date: June 16, 2014 Time: 10:00 a.m. Judge: _______________
Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 1 of 24 Page ID #:31
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................. 2
A. Harbor begins its ministry. ............................................................................... 2
B. The City requires Harbor to apply for an additional permit to operate its ministry. ....................................................................................................... 3
C. Harbor applies for the permit and City Staff recommends granting Harbors request subject to conditions. ............................................................ 3
D. The Planning Commission denies Harbors permit, finding its ministry does not constitute religious exercise. ............................................................. 4
E. Harbor appeals to the City Council, which deadlocks 2-2. ............................. 5
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................ 5
I. Harbor is likely to succeed on the merits. ............................................................ 6
A. Harbor's ministry is religious exercise, which alone requires issuing an injunction against the Citys determination to the contrary. ............................ 7
B. The permit denial substantially burdens Harbors religious exercise by forbiding the church from practicing its faith and leaving the church with no ready alternatives. ............................................................................... 8
C. There is no compelling interest in closing Harbors ministry ....................... 10
D. There were less restrictive alternatives than denying the permit, but the City refused to consider the matter at all. ......................................... 13
II. Harbor will suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction. .................................. 15 Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 2 of 24 Page ID #:32
III. The burden imposed on Harbor outweighs any hardship an injunction may cause the City. ........................................................................................... 16
IV. An injunction is in the public interest. Indeed, the City's refusal to apply binding federal law violates established public policy. .................................... 17
Since 2009, Harbor Missionary Church Corporation has practiced its religious faith by inviting Venturas homeless citizens to visit its church for worship, meals, showers, and clothes. The City of San Buenaventura, however, denied Harbor an additional zoning permit that the City has declared Harbor needs to continue its ministry. Harbor requests a preliminary injunction against enforcement of this denial. At a minimum, Harbor urges this court to reject the Citys determination that Harbors ministry to the poor does not constitute protected religious exercise under federal law. Indeed, federal law plainly protects Harbor. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act bars local governments from making land-use decisions that burden a claimants religious exercise, unless doing so is the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling governmental interest. By denying Harbors permit, the City placed a substantial burden on Harbors religious exercise without adequate justificationand in doing so, violated federal law. A preliminary injunction is warranted. Without one, Harbor will be prevented from practicing its faith, and Venturas most vulnerable citizens will be refused access to basic necessities and their place of worship. Moreover, the City will be allowed to avoid its obligations to considermuch less applyapplicable federal law. Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 7 of 24 Page ID #:37
In 2004, Harbor purchased the property at 3100 Preble Avenue from a Quaker congregation. (Ex. 1 at 20.) Under a conditional use permit granted in perpetuity, the Quakers used the property as a place of communal worship and a daycare for up to 150 children. (Ex. 2 at 29, 96.) Because conditional use permits run with the land, Anza Parking Corp. v. City of Burlingame, 241 Cal. Rptr. 175, 177-78, 195 Cal. App. 3d 855, 858-60 (1987), Harbor inherited the Quakers permit. In 2007, Sam Gallucci became head pastor at Harbor. (Ex. 3 at 210.) The church focused its ministry on the homeless, following Jesus command to feed the hungry and clothe the naked. (Id.); see Matthew 25:34-40. The ministry was called Operation Embrace because the church embraces those who are struggling and gives them renewed hope and faith. (Id.) In April 2008, Harbor began its ministry to the poor (hereinafter ministry). (Id.) On weekdays, the churchs congregants gather for fellowship and meals and are able to take a hot shower, do their laundry, and receive new clothes, all of which is interspersed with songs, prayers, and scripture study. (Id. at 211.) Harbors ministry is open from approximately 8:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday; and from 8:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. on Fridays (Id. at 210.) Harbor Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 8 of 24 Page ID #:38
selected these times to avoid interfering with the neighboring elementary schools start and end times. (Id.) B. The City requires Harbor to apply for an additional permit to operate its ministry.
In December 2012, the City told Harbor it would need a separate conditional use permit to continue its ministry. (Id. at 211.) Though Harbor believed its existing permit authorized its ministry, Harbor complied with the Citys request. In February 2013, Harbor applied for the permit. (Ex. 4 at 217.) C. Harbor applies for the permit and City Staff recommends granting Harbors request subject to conditions.
After studying the issue and hosting a neighborhood meeting, City Staff issued a report recommending the Planning Commission grant the permit. 1 (Ex. 5 at 284.)
1 The City has a multi-step process for issuing a conditional use permit. First, City Staff conducts a thorough study of the application. Second, Staff presents its findings and recommendation to the City Planning Commission on two separate issues: (1) whether the Planning Commission ought to approve the application and, if so, subject to what conditions; and (2) whether approval of the application might have a significant effect on the environment, an analysis mandated by the California Environmental Quality Act. (See generally Ex. 5.) Third, the Planning Commission reviews Staffs findings and recommendations, and makes its own determinations. The four findings that must be made to grant a conditional use permit are: (1) the use conforms to the comprehensive plan and is consistent with the purposes and requirements of the zoning ordinance; (2) the use will not be detrimental to the public health, safety, and welfare; (3) the use will be compatible with the scale, mass, bulk, and orientation of the buildings and structures in the surrounding vicinity; and (4) the use will be compatible with, and will not adversely affect or be materially detrimentally to, uses, buildings, or structures in, or the general character of the surrounding vicinity. See Ventura Municipal Code, 24.520.070. The Planning Commissions determinations may be appealed to the Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 9 of 24 Page ID #:39
In order to recommend granting the permit, Staff was required to make four findings. Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code 24.520.070. Most significantly, Staff found that subject to conditions Harbors ministry was compatible with and would not adversely affect the surrounding uses or the general character of the neighborhood. (Id. at 283.) D. The Planning Commission denies Harbors permit, finding its ministry does not constitute religious exercise.
The Planning Commission held three hearings on Harbors permit application. (Ex. 6 at 315; Ex. 7 at 326; Ex. 8 at 224.) Without closely examining Staffs proposed conditions, the Planning Commission denied the permit. (Ex. 9. at 340- 43.) The Planning Commission based its denial on the erroneous conclusion that Harbors ministry was a secular land use[]. (Id. at 340.) In supporting the motion, Commissioner Francis stated that [l]aundry, food dispensary and showers are not in and of themselves religious in nature and compared Harbors ministry to laundromats, fast food places or a private club. (Ex. 8 at 335.) Contrary to the advice of the City Attorney, the Planning Commission also based its denial on the erroneous assertion that because Harbor objected to certain conditions, it would be unwilling to comply with any conditions. (Ex. 9 at 342.)
City Council. Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code 24.520.100. The City Council considers appeals from the Planning Commission de novo; its determination is final. Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code 24.565.060. Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 10 of 24 Page ID #:40
Harbor has always been willing to follow reasonable and legally imposed conditions. (Ex. 3 at 211.) E. Harbor appeals to the City Council, which deadlocks 2-2.
On November 25, 2013, Harbor filed an appeal to the City Council. (Ex. 10 at 347-48.) Separate appeals were filed by the Unitarian Universalist Church and the Ventura Interfaith Ministerial Association. (Ex. 11 at 352-353; Ex. 12 at 357-58.) One of the churchs homeless congregants also appealed to the City Council, but the City rejected his appeal because he could not afford the $1,000 appeal fee. (Ex. 13 at 362-64.) The City Council held three hearing sessions. (Ex. 14 at 373; Ex. 15 at 381.) At the conclusion of the third session, the four sitting Councilmembers deadlocked, 2- 2. Consequently, the City Council took no action, and the Planning Commissions decision and its reasoning stand. Ventura, Ca., City Council Protocols III.15 (Sept. 2013). SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Harbor satisfies the requirements for a preliminary injunction. It is likely to succeed on the merits; it will suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction; the balance of equities is in its favor; and injunctive relief is in the public interest. See Leigh v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892, 896 (9th Cir. 2012). Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 11 of 24 Page ID #:41
Harbor is likely to succeed on the merits. Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), a city may not implement a land-use regulation against a church that imposes a substantial burden on the churchs religious exercise unless the city can show its action is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(a)(1). In denying Harbor a conditional use permit, the City substantially burdens Harbors religious exercise. The church is forbidden from caring for the poor, as mandated by its faith and millennia of Christian tradition. Due to its modest financial resources, Harbor is unable to relocate at this point. In short, denial is tantamount to quashing Harbors ministry. This burden is substantial. No compelling interest justifies this burden. Even assuming the existence of a compelling interest, the denial of Harbors permit was not the least restrictive means in light of the Citys flat refusal consider alternatives. This refusalbased on the Citys offensive mischaracterization of Harbors ministry as an unprotected secular land useby itself requires an injunction to stop the effects of such a blatant disregard of federal law. ARGUMENT
I. Harbor is likely to succeed on the merits.
Under RLUIPA, a city may not implement a land-use regulation against a church that imposes a substantial burden on the churchs religious exercise Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 12 of 24 Page ID #:42
unless the city can show its action is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(a)(1). The denial imposes a substantial burden that the City cannot justify. A. Harbors ministry is religious exercise, which alone requires issuing an injunction against the Citys determination to the contrary.
RLUIPA defines religious exercise broadly to include any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief. 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-5(7)(A). All sincere religious beliefs are protected. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2008) ([I]t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants interpretations of those creeds.). Harbors ministry is religious. The church follows Jesus teaching to minister to the poor. Courts have recognized that such a ministry is in every respect religious activity and a form of worship. W. Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment of D.C., 862 F. Supp. 538, 546 (D.D.C. 1994). Indeed, the concept of acts of charity as an essential part of religious worship is a central tenet of all major religions. Id. at 544 (noting that Muslims, Hindus, Jews, and Christians all hold to such teachings). Nevertheless, the Planning Commission separated Harbors religion from its ministry, going so far as to compare its ministry to a laundromat or fast food restaurant. (Ex. 9 at 340; Ex. 8 at 335.) By virtue of the City Councils deadlock, Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 13 of 24 Page ID #:43
the Planning Commissions determination that Harbors ministry does not constitute religious exercise remains the Citys official position. B. The permit denial substantially burdens Harbors religious exercise by forbidding the church from practicing its faith and leaving the church with no ready alternatives.
The burden on Harbor is crushing. It effectively terminates the churchs ministry. A substantial burden is one that is oppressive to a significantly great extent or that puts substantial pressure on a church to modify [its] behavior and to violate [its] beliefs. Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Permit denials meet this standard when they leave a church with no ready alternatives, or where the alternatives require substantial delay, uncertainty, or expense. Intl Church of Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the practical considerations of finding another suitable property can amount to a substantial burden. Id. at 1068, 1069. Here, the permit denial forces Harbor to end its ministry under pain of criminal penalty. If Harbor defies the denial and continues its ministry, it risks a $1,000 fine and six months imprisonment. See Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code 1.150.020, 24.580.030. For Harbor, the choice is stark: it must obey either the Citys command or Christs. Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 14 of 24 Page ID #:44
Moreover, the denial leaves Harbor with no ready alternatives. Among other things, the church cannot afford to move. The church has studied the local real estate market and evaluated its options. (Ex. 3 at 211.) It estimates that, in addition to selling its current property, it will have to raise at least $1.5 million to make the move. (Ex. 16 at 393.) For a small church that ministers to the poor, this is a significant sum. Its cash on hand at the end of 2013 was only about $37,000. (Ex. 3 at 211.) Even if the church had the money, relocation would require substantial delay, uncertainty, and expense. Under the best conditions, moving takes timetime to find a new building; to navigate the permitting process; to fund the building, construction, and moving costs; to remodel; and finally to move the churchs belongings. Such a process cannot be completed in weeks or months. In the meantime, Harbors congregants need a church. If the church simply shuts its doors, its congregants will have nowhere to go. See Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 01 CIV. 11493 (LMM), 2004 WL 2471406 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2004) (recognizing a greater burden where ongoing religious practice is obliged to discontinue, in contrast to merely prohibiting services on a site [a] church did not yet own). These practical considerationsthe threat of criminal sanction, the time and expense needed to move to another suitable property, and the churchs humble Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 15 of 24 Page ID #:45
financial conditionamount to a substantial burden. They leave the church with no ready alternatives. At best, any potential alternativeseven distant ones require substantial delay, uncertainty, or expense. C. There is no compelling interest in closing Harbors ministry.
Absent a compelling interest, the permit denial violates RLUIPA. 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. It is the governments burden to prove a compelling interest. Id.; Foursquare Gospel, 673 F.3d at 1070. Nothing but interests of the highest order or the gravest abuses endangering paramount interests are sufficient to qualify as compelling interests. Foursquare Gospel, 673 F.3d at 1071 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993)); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 1795, 10 L. Ed. 2d. 965, 971-72 (1963). General concerns about the public health, safety, or welfare are not sufficient; rather, courts must look beyond broadly formulated interests . . . and scrutinize[] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1220, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (2006); see also, e.g., Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 353 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that vague assertions of threats to public safety and welfare are not compelling interests). No compelling interest supports the Citys permit denial. Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 16 of 24 Page ID #:46
Many of the Citys reasons for deniale.g., preventing people from waiting outside the church, preventing people from remain[ing] in and around the neighborhood when services are not being provided, or addressing a perceived detrimental impact on property valuesare simply not compelling. (Ex. 9 at 340-42); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1857, 144 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1999) (right to remove from one place to another and to remain in a public place of [ones] choice are fundamental rights protected by the U.S. Constitution); XXL of Ohio, Inc. v. City of Broadview Heights, 341 F. Supp. 2d 765, 789-90 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (The ordinance makes clear that the interests served by the ordinance are traffic safety, aesthetics, and the protection of property values and neighborhood character. No court has found any of these concerns to be a compelling government interest sufficient to withstand strict scrutiny.). The City also asserted an interest in protecting public health and safety. (Id.) No doubt, such interests may qualify as compelling. But not here. The City relied on police data that tracked calls for service to the Preble neighborhood. (Id. at 342.) The data revealed a general increase in calls for service to the neighborhood in the last five years (i.e., from 2009 through 2013), but it is far from conclusive that Harbor is responsible for this trend. It is perhaps no surprise that certain types of callse.g., calls for suspicious circumstances, disturbances, and municipal code violationsincreased since Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 17 of 24 Page ID #:47
Harbor began its ministry. As noted by Planning Commission Chairman Long, the increase in calls was to be expected because the neighbors are really keeping an eye and trying to get more calls in order to show that this is a problem. (Ex. 17 at 404.) Crucially, an increase in calls does not establish an increase in criminal activity. But even assuming a rise in crime, the City did not show Harbors ministry was directly responsible for any such increase. Evidence linking Harbors ministry to a general rise in crime was unconvincing. Not a single police report was presented or examined. To the contrary, evidence was presented of other factors that could explain the increase in police calls, including alleged drug use and distribution (in the park and at homes within the neighborhood) by suspects wholly unconnected with the church or its congregants. (Ex. 18 at 409-10.) There was also evidence of public sex acts, drug use, and rampant teenage mischief in the park and neighborhood involving individuals unaffiliated with the church. (Id.) Finally, even assuming Harbor was responsible for any rise in criminal activity, the evidence did not show the increase was so substantial as to amount to a compelling interest. City Staff determined unequivocally that any purported increase has been accommodated within the parameters of normal police and fire service call operations. (Ex. 5 at 303.) And the Ventura Unified School District likewise affirmed that Blanche Reynolds Elementary School [next door to Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 18 of 24 Page ID #:48
Harbor] has not experienced a disproportionate number of issues as a result of the Harbor Church. (Ex. 19 at 443.) In sum, the City has merely alleged a broadly formulated interest; it has not shown a compelling interest specific to Harbors ministry. D. There were less restrictive alternatives than denying the permit, but the City refused to consider the matter at all.
Even where a government has proven a compelling interest, it may not substantially burden religious exercise unless doing so is the least restrictive means of advancing its interest. 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The city cannot meet its burden to prove least restrictive means unless it demonstrates that it has actually considered and rejected the efficacy of less restrictive measures before adopting the challenged practice. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). Moreover, a permit denial does not constitute the least restrictive means where a city ha[s] the opportunity to approve [a permit] subject to conditions, but refuse[s] to consider doing so. Westchester, 504 F.3d at 353; see also The Jesus Ctr. v. Farmington Hills Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 215 Mich. App. 54, 68 (1996) (concluding that least restrictive means requires city officials to work with a homeless ministry to develop guidelines for its operation of the shelter to mitigate community concerns.). Here, less restrictive means were available, but NONE was considered by the City. Most obviously, the City can address its public health and safety concerns by Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 19 of 24 Page ID #:49
enforcing laws that are already on the books. See Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code 10.200 (loitering, public urination); 8.250.010 (littering). The normal method of deterring unlawful conduct is to impose an appropriate punishment on the person who engages in it. If the sanctions . . . do not provide sufficient deterrence, perhaps those sanctions should be made more severe. But it would be quite remarkable to hold that [constitutionally protected activity] by a law-abiding [citizen] can be suppressed in order to deter conduct by a non-law-abiding third party. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529-30, 121 S. Ct. 1753, 1762, 149 L. Ed. 2d 787, 803 (2001). Indeed, in cases involving homeless outreach, courts have found it constitutionally problematic and troubling where cities adopt a group approach to individual violations of the law, taking adverse action against all homeless persons . . . based upon individuals misconduct. Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church, 2004 WL 2471406, at *6. Enforcing the municipal code, rather than restricting a churchs religious exercise, is plainly a less restrictive means of achieving the Citys interest. Furthermore, the City rejectedwithout adequate explanationstaffs earlier recommendation that Harbor be granted a permit with conditions. (Ex. 9 at 340- 43.) On multiple occasions, City Staff concluded that the use permit would be compatible with the surrounding neighborhood subject to conditions. (Ex. 5 at 284; Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 20 of 24 Page ID #:50
Ex. 19 at 441; Ex. 20 at 447, 452.) But the City concluded otherwise without adequately addressing whether its interest could be met with conditions attached to the permit. See Grace Church of N. Cnty. v. City of San Diego, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1141 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (finding RLUIPA was violated when a city rejected staffs earlier recommendation without sufficient explanation). At the very least, employing the least restrictive means requires working with Harbors ministry to develop guidelines for its operation, The Jesus Ctr., 215 Mich. App. at 68, rather than simply forbidding Harbor from practicing its religion. II. Harbor will suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction.
Harbor will suffer irreparable harm unless this court issues a preliminary injunction. The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury . . . . Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, in & for Cnty. of Carson City, 303 F.3d 959, 973 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). This logic applies with equal force to the violation of RLUIPA rights because RLUIPA enforces First Amendment freedoms, and the statute requires courts to construe it broadly to protect religious exercise. Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, Miss., 697 F.3d 279, 295 (5th Cir. 2012). Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 21 of 24 Page ID #:51
Forcing Harbor to abandon its religious exercise constitutes irreparable harm. The permit denial forces the church to close its ministry and abandon its doctrine, belief, and practice. III. The burden imposed on Harbor outweighs any hardship an injunction may cause the City.
The balance of the equities favors Harbor. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo and the rights of the parties until a final judgment issues in the cause. U.S. Philips Corp. v. KBC Bank N.V., 590 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010). In this case, if an injunction is not issued, Harbor will be forced to abandon a major part of its religious exercise. By contrast, if an injunction does issue, it will merely preserve the status quo and cause the City only minimal inconvenience. Harbor has been ministering to the poor at its current location continuously for almost six yearssince April 2008. (Ex. 3 at 210.) The City was aware of Harbors ministry at 3100 Preble Avenue from the beginning. Yet the City did not notify Harbor until December 2012 that it thought Harbor needed to apply for a separate conditional use permit. (Id. at 211.) And, tellingly, the City continued to allow Harbor to operate even during the Citys own permit application proceedings, both at the Planning Commission stage and during the appeal to the City Council. The ministrys uninterrupted operation throughout the permit application process demonstrates that the City will face no significant hardship Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 22 of 24 Page ID #:52
from the churchs continued operation. In any event, whatever hardship the City might face under an injunction will be far less than the irreparable harm the church will face if one is not issued. IV. An injunction is in the publics interest. Indeed, the Citys refusal to apply binding federal law violates established public policy.
Granting a preliminary injunction will serve the public interest. Courts have consistently recognized the significant public interest in upholding First Amendment principles. Sammartano, 303 F.3d at 974. Likewise, the public interest may be declared in the form of a statute. Golden Gate Rest. Assn v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 512 F.3d 1112, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1230-31 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (By passing RLUIPA, Congress conclusively determined the national public policy that religious land uses are to be guarded from interference by local governments to the maximum extent permitted by the Constitution.). Here, an injunction will serve the public interest because it will allow Harbor to continue practicing its religious exercise protected under RLUIPA. CONCLUSION
Harbor respectfully requests that this Court grant a preliminary injunction restraining Defendants from bringing any enforcement action against the church resulting from Harbors denied application for a permit to continue its ministry at 3100 Preble Avenue. Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 23 of 24 Page ID #:53
By: /s/ James A. Sonne James A. Sonne jsonne@law.stanford.edu Jared M. Haynie jhaynie@law.stanford.edu Stanford Law School Religious Liberty Clinic 559 Nathan Abbott Way Stanford, CA 94305 (650) 723-1422
Counsel for Plaintiff Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 24 of 24 Page ID #:54