Harbor Church V Buenaventura Memo

Plaintiffs Memorandum
in Supp. of Prelim. Inj.

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James A. Sonne, State Bar No. 250759
jsonne@law.stanford.edu
Jared M. Haynie, State Bar No. 294375
jhaynie@law.stanford.edu
Stanford Law School Religious Liberty Clinic
Crown Quadrangle
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305
Phone: (650) 723-1422
Fax: (650) 723-4426

Attorneys for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WESTERN DIVISION

Harbor Missionary Church
Corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

City of San Buenaventura, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:14-cv-03730

Plaintiffs Memorandum in
Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction

Notice of Hearing:
Date: June 16, 2014
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Judge: _______________

Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 6-1 Filed 05/15/14 Page 1 of 24 Page ID #:31


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... iv

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................. 2

A. Harbor begins its ministry. ............................................................................... 2

B. The City requires Harbor to apply for an additional permit to operate
its ministry. ....................................................................................................... 3

C. Harbor applies for the permit and City Staff recommends granting
Harbors request subject to conditions. ............................................................ 3

D. The Planning Commission denies Harbors permit, finding its ministry
does not constitute religious exercise. ............................................................. 4

E. Harbor appeals to the City Council, which deadlocks 2-2. ............................. 5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................ 5

ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 6

I. Harbor is likely to succeed on the merits. ............................................................ 6

A. Harbor's ministry is religious exercise, which alone requires issuing an
injunction against the Citys determination to the contrary. ............................ 7

B. The permit denial substantially burdens Harbors religious exercise by
forbiding the church from practicing its faith and leaving the church
with no ready alternatives. ............................................................................... 8

C. There is no compelling interest in closing Harbors ministry ....................... 10

D. There were less restrictive alternatives than denying the permit,
but the City refused to consider the matter at all. ......................................... 13

II. Harbor will suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction. .................................. 15


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III. The burden imposed on Harbor outweighs any hardship an injunction
may cause the City. ........................................................................................... 16

IV. An injunction is in the public interest. Indeed, the City's refusal to apply
binding federal law violates established public policy. .................................... 17

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 17



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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Anza Parking Corp. v. City of Burlingame,
241 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1987)...2

Bartnicki v. Vopper,
532 U.S. 514 (2001)..14

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520 (1993)..10

City of Chicago v. Morales,
527 U.S. 41 (1999)11

Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency,
218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002).....17

Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347 (1976)..15

Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York,
01 CIV. 11493 (LMM), 2004 WL 2471406 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2004)....9, 14

Golden Gate Rest. Assn v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco,
512 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2008)...17

Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,
546 U.S. 418 (2006)......10

Grace Church of N. Cnty. v. City of San Diego,
555 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (S.D. Cal. 2008).....15

Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. County of Sutter,
456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006)...8

Intl Church of Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro,
673 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2011)...8, 10



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Leigh v. Salazar,
677 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2012)...5

Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, Miss.,
697 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2012).....15

Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, in & for Cnty. of Carson City,
303 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2002)...15, 17

Shakur v. Schriro,
514 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2008)..7

Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963)......10

The Jesus Ctr. v. Farmington Hills Zoning Bd. of Appeals,
215 Mich. App. 54 (1996)...14, 15

U.S. Philips Corp. v. KBC Bank N.V.,
590 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2010).......16

Warsoldier v. Woodford,
418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005).........13

Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck,
504 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2007)........10, 13

W. Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment of D.C.,
862 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1994).7

XXL of Ohio, Inc. v. City of Broadview Heights,
341 F. Supp. 2d 765 (N.D. Ohio 2004).11

Statutes and Other Authorities

42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq..6, 7, 10, 13

Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code 1.150.020...............8

Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code 8.250.010.............14


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Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code 10.200..............14

Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code 24.520.070...3 n.1, 4

Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code 24.520.100...4 n.1

Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code 24.565.060...4 n.1

Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code 24.580.030.................8

Ventura, Ca., City Council Protocols III.15 (Sept. 2013)..5


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INTRODUCTION

Since 2009, Harbor Missionary Church Corporation has practiced its religious
faith by inviting Venturas homeless citizens to visit its church for worship, meals,
showers, and clothes. The City of San Buenaventura, however, denied Harbor an
additional zoning permit that the City has declared Harbor needs to continue its
ministry. Harbor requests a preliminary injunction against enforcement of this
denial. At a minimum, Harbor urges this court to reject the Citys determination
that Harbors ministry to the poor does not constitute protected religious exercise
under federal law.
Indeed, federal law plainly protects Harbor. The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act bars local governments from making land-use
decisions that burden a claimants religious exercise, unless doing so is the least
restrictive means of advancing a compelling governmental interest. By denying
Harbors permit, the City placed a substantial burden on Harbors religious
exercise without adequate justificationand in doing so, violated federal law.
A preliminary injunction is warranted. Without one, Harbor will be prevented
from practicing its faith, and Venturas most vulnerable citizens will be refused
access to basic necessities and their place of worship. Moreover, the City will be
allowed to avoid its obligations to considermuch less applyapplicable federal
law.


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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Harbor begins its ministry.

In 2004, Harbor purchased the property at 3100 Preble Avenue from a Quaker
congregation. (Ex. 1 at 20.) Under a conditional use permit granted in perpetuity,
the Quakers used the property as a place of communal worship and a daycare for
up to 150 children. (Ex. 2 at 29, 96.) Because conditional use permits run with the
land, Anza Parking Corp. v. City of Burlingame, 241 Cal. Rptr. 175, 177-78, 195
Cal. App. 3d 855, 858-60 (1987), Harbor inherited the Quakers permit.
In 2007, Sam Gallucci became head pastor at Harbor. (Ex. 3 at 210.) The
church focused its ministry on the homeless, following Jesus command to feed the
hungry and clothe the naked. (Id.); see Matthew 25:34-40. The ministry was called
Operation Embrace because the church embraces those who are struggling and
gives them renewed hope and faith. (Id.)
In April 2008, Harbor began its ministry to the poor (hereinafter ministry).
(Id.) On weekdays, the churchs congregants gather for fellowship and meals and
are able to take a hot shower, do their laundry, and receive new clothes, all of
which is interspersed with songs, prayers, and scripture study. (Id. at 211.)
Harbors ministry is open from approximately 8:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., Monday
through Thursday; and from 8:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. on Fridays (Id. at 210.) Harbor


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selected these times to avoid interfering with the neighboring elementary schools
start and end times. (Id.)
B. The City requires Harbor to apply for an additional permit to operate
its ministry.

In December 2012, the City told Harbor it would need a separate conditional
use permit to continue its ministry. (Id. at 211.) Though Harbor believed its
existing permit authorized its ministry, Harbor complied with the Citys request. In
February 2013, Harbor applied for the permit. (Ex. 4 at 217.)
C. Harbor applies for the permit and City Staff recommends granting
Harbors request subject to conditions.

After studying the issue and hosting a neighborhood meeting, City Staff issued
a report recommending the Planning Commission grant the permit.
1
(Ex. 5 at 284.)

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The City has a multi-step process for issuing a conditional use permit. First, City
Staff conducts a thorough study of the application. Second, Staff presents its
findings and recommendation to the City Planning Commission on two separate
issues: (1) whether the Planning Commission ought to approve the application and,
if so, subject to what conditions; and (2) whether approval of the application might
have a significant effect on the environment, an analysis mandated by the
California Environmental Quality Act. (See generally Ex. 5.) Third, the Planning
Commission reviews Staffs findings and recommendations, and makes its own
determinations. The four findings that must be made to grant a conditional use
permit are: (1) the use conforms to the comprehensive plan and is consistent with
the purposes and requirements of the zoning ordinance; (2) the use will not be
detrimental to the public health, safety, and welfare; (3) the use will be compatible
with the scale, mass, bulk, and orientation of the buildings and structures in the
surrounding vicinity; and (4) the use will be compatible with, and will not
adversely affect or be materially detrimentally to, uses, buildings, or structures in,
or the general character of the surrounding vicinity. See Ventura Municipal Code,
24.520.070. The Planning Commissions determinations may be appealed to the


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In order to recommend granting the permit, Staff was required to make four
findings. Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code 24.520.070. Most significantly, Staff found
that subject to conditions Harbors ministry was compatible with and would not
adversely affect the surrounding uses or the general character of the neighborhood.
(Id. at 283.)
D. The Planning Commission denies Harbors permit, finding its ministry
does not constitute religious exercise.

The Planning Commission held three hearings on Harbors permit application.
(Ex. 6 at 315; Ex. 7 at 326; Ex. 8 at 224.) Without closely examining Staffs
proposed conditions, the Planning Commission denied the permit. (Ex. 9. at 340-
43.)
The Planning Commission based its denial on the erroneous conclusion that
Harbors ministry was a secular land use[]. (Id. at 340.) In supporting the
motion, Commissioner Francis stated that [l]aundry, food dispensary and showers
are not in and of themselves religious in nature and compared Harbors ministry
to laundromats, fast food places or a private club. (Ex. 8 at 335.)
Contrary to the advice of the City Attorney, the Planning Commission also
based its denial on the erroneous assertion that because Harbor objected to certain
conditions, it would be unwilling to comply with any conditions. (Ex. 9 at 342.)

City Council. Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code 24.520.100. The City Council considers
appeals from the Planning Commission de novo; its determination is final. Ventura,
Ca., Mun. Code 24.565.060.


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Harbor has always been willing to follow reasonable and legally imposed
conditions. (Ex. 3 at 211.)
E. Harbor appeals to the City Council, which deadlocks 2-2.

On November 25, 2013, Harbor filed an appeal to the City Council. (Ex. 10 at
347-48.) Separate appeals were filed by the Unitarian Universalist Church and the
Ventura Interfaith Ministerial Association. (Ex. 11 at 352-353; Ex. 12 at 357-58.)
One of the churchs homeless congregants also appealed to the City Council, but
the City rejected his appeal because he could not afford the $1,000 appeal fee. (Ex.
13 at 362-64.)
The City Council held three hearing sessions. (Ex. 14 at 373; Ex. 15 at 381.) At
the conclusion of the third session, the four sitting Councilmembers deadlocked, 2-
2. Consequently, the City Council took no action, and the Planning Commissions
decision and its reasoning stand. Ventura, Ca., City Council Protocols III.15 (Sept.
2013).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Harbor satisfies the requirements for a preliminary injunction. It is likely to
succeed on the merits; it will suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary
injunction; the balance of equities is in its favor; and injunctive relief is in the
public interest. See Leigh v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892, 896 (9th Cir. 2012).


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Harbor is likely to succeed on the merits. Under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), a city may not implement a land-use
regulation against a church that imposes a substantial burden on the churchs
religious exercise unless the city can show its action is the least restrictive means
of achieving a compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(a)(1).
In denying Harbor a conditional use permit, the City substantially burdens
Harbors religious exercise. The church is forbidden from caring for the poor, as
mandated by its faith and millennia of Christian tradition. Due to its modest
financial resources, Harbor is unable to relocate at this point. In short, denial is
tantamount to quashing Harbors ministry. This burden is substantial.
No compelling interest justifies this burden. Even assuming the existence of a
compelling interest, the denial of Harbors permit was not the least restrictive
means in light of the Citys flat refusal consider alternatives. This refusalbased
on the Citys offensive mischaracterization of Harbors ministry as an unprotected
secular land useby itself requires an injunction to stop the effects of such a
blatant disregard of federal law.
ARGUMENT

I. Harbor is likely to succeed on the merits.

Under RLUIPA, a city may not implement a land-use regulation against a
church that imposes a substantial burden on the churchs religious exercise


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unless the city can show its action is the least restrictive means of achieving a
compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(a)(1). The denial imposes
a substantial burden that the City cannot justify.
A. Harbors ministry is religious exercise, which alone requires issuing an
injunction against the Citys determination to the contrary.

RLUIPA defines religious exercise broadly to include any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.
42 U.S.C. 2000cc-5(7)(A). All sincere religious beliefs are protected. Shakur v.
Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2008) ([I]t is not within the judicial ken to
question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of
particular litigants interpretations of those creeds.).
Harbors ministry is religious. The church follows Jesus teaching to minister to
the poor. Courts have recognized that such a ministry is in every respect
religious activity and a form of worship. W. Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of
Zoning Adjustment of D.C., 862 F. Supp. 538, 546 (D.D.C. 1994). Indeed, the
concept of acts of charity as an essential part of religious worship is a central tenet
of all major religions. Id. at 544 (noting that Muslims, Hindus, Jews, and
Christians all hold to such teachings).
Nevertheless, the Planning Commission separated Harbors religion from its
ministry, going so far as to compare its ministry to a laundromat or fast food
restaurant. (Ex. 9 at 340; Ex. 8 at 335.) By virtue of the City Councils deadlock,


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the Planning Commissions determination that Harbors ministry does not
constitute religious exercise remains the Citys official position.
B. The permit denial substantially burdens Harbors religious exercise by
forbidding the church from practicing its faith and leaving the church
with no ready alternatives.

The burden on Harbor is crushing. It effectively terminates the churchs
ministry. A substantial burden is one that is oppressive to a significantly great
extent or that puts substantial pressure on a church to modify [its] behavior
and to violate [its] beliefs. Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. County of Sutter,
456 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Permit denials meet this standard when they leave a church with no ready
alternatives, or where the alternatives require substantial delay, uncertainty, or
expense. Intl Church of Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d
1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
the practical considerations of finding another suitable property can amount to
a substantial burden. Id. at 1068, 1069.
Here, the permit denial forces Harbor to end its ministry under pain of criminal
penalty. If Harbor defies the denial and continues its ministry, it risks a $1,000 fine
and six months imprisonment. See Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code 1.150.020,
24.580.030. For Harbor, the choice is stark: it must obey either the Citys
command or Christs.


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Moreover, the denial leaves Harbor with no ready alternatives. Among other
things, the church cannot afford to move. The church has studied the local real
estate market and evaluated its options. (Ex. 3 at 211.) It estimates that, in addition
to selling its current property, it will have to raise at least $1.5 million to make the
move. (Ex. 16 at 393.) For a small church that ministers to the poor, this is a
significant sum. Its cash on hand at the end of 2013 was only about $37,000. (Ex. 3
at 211.)
Even if the church had the money, relocation would require substantial delay,
uncertainty, and expense. Under the best conditions, moving takes timetime to
find a new building; to navigate the permitting process; to fund the building,
construction, and moving costs; to remodel; and finally to move the churchs
belongings. Such a process cannot be completed in weeks or months. In the
meantime, Harbors congregants need a church. If the church simply shuts its
doors, its congregants will have nowhere to go. See Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church
v. City of New York, 01 CIV. 11493 (LMM), 2004 WL 2471406 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29,
2004) (recognizing a greater burden where ongoing religious practice is obliged to
discontinue, in contrast to merely prohibiting services on a site [a] church did not
yet own).
These practical considerationsthe threat of criminal sanction, the time and
expense needed to move to another suitable property, and the churchs humble


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financial conditionamount to a substantial burden. They leave the church with
no ready alternatives. At best, any potential alternativeseven distant ones
require substantial delay, uncertainty, or expense.
C. There is no compelling interest in closing Harbors ministry.

Absent a compelling interest, the permit denial violates RLUIPA. 42 U.S.C.
2000cc. It is the governments burden to prove a compelling interest. Id.;
Foursquare Gospel, 673 F.3d at 1070. Nothing but interests of the highest order
or the gravest abuses endangering paramount interests are sufficient to qualify as
compelling interests. Foursquare Gospel, 673 F.3d at 1071 (citing Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546, 113 S. Ct. 2217,
124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993)); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406, 83 S. Ct. 1790,
1795, 10 L. Ed. 2d. 965, 971-72 (1963). General concerns about the public health,
safety, or welfare are not sufficient; rather, courts must look beyond broadly
formulated interests . . . and scrutinize[] the asserted harm of granting specific
exemptions to particular religious claimants. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1220, 163 L.
Ed. 2d 1017 (2006); see also, e.g., Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck,
504 F.3d 338, 353 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that vague assertions of threats to public
safety and welfare are not compelling interests). No compelling interest supports
the Citys permit denial.


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Many of the Citys reasons for deniale.g., preventing people from waiting
outside the church, preventing people from remain[ing] in and around the
neighborhood when services are not being provided, or addressing a perceived
detrimental impact on property valuesare simply not compelling. (Ex. 9 at
340-42); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1857, 144
L. Ed. 2d 67 (1999) (right to remove from one place to another and to remain in
a public place of [ones] choice are fundamental rights protected by the U.S.
Constitution); XXL of Ohio, Inc. v. City of Broadview Heights, 341 F. Supp. 2d
765, 789-90 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (The ordinance makes clear that the interests
served by the ordinance are traffic safety, aesthetics, and the protection of property
values and neighborhood character. No court has found any of these concerns to
be a compelling government interest sufficient to withstand strict scrutiny.).
The City also asserted an interest in protecting public health and safety. (Id.) No
doubt, such interests may qualify as compelling. But not here. The City relied on
police data that tracked calls for service to the Preble neighborhood. (Id. at 342.)
The data revealed a general increase in calls for service to the neighborhood in the
last five years (i.e., from 2009 through 2013), but it is far from conclusive that
Harbor is responsible for this trend.
It is perhaps no surprise that certain types of callse.g., calls for suspicious
circumstances, disturbances, and municipal code violationsincreased since


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Harbor began its ministry. As noted by Planning Commission Chairman Long, the
increase in calls was to be expected because the neighbors are really keeping an
eye and trying to get more calls in order to show that this is a problem. (Ex. 17 at
404.) Crucially, an increase in calls does not establish an increase in criminal
activity.
But even assuming a rise in crime, the City did not show Harbors ministry was
directly responsible for any such increase. Evidence linking Harbors ministry to a
general rise in crime was unconvincing. Not a single police report was presented or
examined. To the contrary, evidence was presented of other factors that could
explain the increase in police calls, including alleged drug use and distribution (in
the park and at homes within the neighborhood) by suspects wholly unconnected
with the church or its congregants. (Ex. 18 at 409-10.) There was also evidence of
public sex acts, drug use, and rampant teenage mischief in the park and
neighborhood involving individuals unaffiliated with the church. (Id.)
Finally, even assuming Harbor was responsible for any rise in criminal activity,
the evidence did not show the increase was so substantial as to amount to a
compelling interest. City Staff determined unequivocally that any purported
increase has been accommodated within the parameters of normal police and fire
service call operations. (Ex. 5 at 303.) And the Ventura Unified School District
likewise affirmed that Blanche Reynolds Elementary School [next door to


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Harbor] has not experienced a disproportionate number of issues as a result of the
Harbor Church. (Ex. 19 at 443.)
In sum, the City has merely alleged a broadly formulated interest; it has not
shown a compelling interest specific to Harbors ministry.
D. There were less restrictive alternatives than denying the permit, but the
City refused to consider the matter at all.

Even where a government has proven a compelling interest, it may not
substantially burden religious exercise unless doing so is the least restrictive means
of advancing its interest. 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The city cannot meet its burden to
prove least restrictive means unless it demonstrates that it has actually considered
and rejected the efficacy of less restrictive measures before adopting the
challenged practice. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2005).
Moreover, a permit denial does not constitute the least restrictive means where a
city ha[s] the opportunity to approve [a permit] subject to conditions, but refuse[s]
to consider doing so. Westchester, 504 F.3d at 353; see also The Jesus Ctr. v.
Farmington Hills Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 215 Mich. App. 54, 68 (1996)
(concluding that least restrictive means requires city officials to work with a
homeless ministry to develop guidelines for its operation of the shelter to mitigate
community concerns.).
Here, less restrictive means were available, but NONE was considered by the
City. Most obviously, the City can address its public health and safety concerns by


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enforcing laws that are already on the books. See Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code
10.200 (loitering, public urination); 8.250.010 (littering). The normal method of
deterring unlawful conduct is to impose an appropriate punishment on the person
who engages in it. If the sanctions . . . do not provide sufficient deterrence, perhaps
those sanctions should be made more severe. But it would be quite remarkable to
hold that [constitutionally protected activity] by a law-abiding [citizen] can be
suppressed in order to deter conduct by a non-law-abiding third party. Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529-30, 121 S. Ct. 1753, 1762, 149 L. Ed. 2d 787, 803
(2001).
Indeed, in cases involving homeless outreach, courts have found it
constitutionally problematic and troubling where cities adopt a group
approach to individual violations of the law, taking adverse action against all
homeless persons . . . based upon individuals misconduct. Fifth Ave.
Presbyterian Church, 2004 WL 2471406, at *6. Enforcing the municipal code,
rather than restricting a churchs religious exercise, is plainly a less restrictive
means of achieving the Citys interest.
Furthermore, the City rejectedwithout adequate explanationstaffs earlier
recommendation that Harbor be granted a permit with conditions. (Ex. 9 at 340-
43.) On multiple occasions, City Staff concluded that the use permit would be
compatible with the surrounding neighborhood subject to conditions. (Ex. 5 at 284;


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Ex. 19 at 441; Ex. 20 at 447, 452.) But the City concluded otherwise without
adequately addressing whether its interest could be met with conditions attached to
the permit. See Grace Church of N. Cnty. v. City of San Diego, 555 F. Supp. 2d
1126, 1141 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (finding RLUIPA was violated when a city rejected
staffs earlier recommendation without sufficient explanation).
At the very least, employing the least restrictive means requires working with
Harbors ministry to develop guidelines for its operation, The Jesus Ctr., 215
Mich. App. at 68, rather than simply forbidding Harbor from practicing its religion.
II. Harbor will suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction.

Harbor will suffer irreparable harm unless this court issues a preliminary
injunction. The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of
time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury . . . . Sammartano v. First
Judicial Dist. Court, in & for Cnty. of Carson City, 303 F.3d 959, 973 (9th Cir.
2002) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). This logic applies with
equal force to the violation of RLUIPA rights because RLUIPA enforces First
Amendment freedoms, and the statute requires courts to construe it broadly to
protect religious exercise. Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, Miss.,
697 F.3d 279, 295 (5th Cir. 2012).


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Forcing Harbor to abandon its religious exercise constitutes irreparable harm.
The permit denial forces the church to close its ministry and abandon its doctrine,
belief, and practice.
III. The burden imposed on Harbor outweighs any hardship an
injunction may cause the City.

The balance of the equities favors Harbor. The purpose of a preliminary
injunction is to preserve the status quo and the rights of the parties until a final
judgment issues in the cause. U.S. Philips Corp. v. KBC Bank N.V., 590 F.3d
1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010). In this case, if an injunction is not issued, Harbor will
be forced to abandon a major part of its religious exercise. By contrast, if an
injunction does issue, it will merely preserve the status quo and cause the City only
minimal inconvenience.
Harbor has been ministering to the poor at its current location continuously for
almost six yearssince April 2008. (Ex. 3 at 210.) The City was aware of
Harbors ministry at 3100 Preble Avenue from the beginning. Yet the City did not
notify Harbor until December 2012 that it thought Harbor needed to apply for a
separate conditional use permit. (Id. at 211.) And, tellingly, the City continued to
allow Harbor to operate even during the Citys own permit application
proceedings, both at the Planning Commission stage and during the appeal to the
City Council. The ministrys uninterrupted operation throughout the permit
application process demonstrates that the City will face no significant hardship


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from the churchs continued operation. In any event, whatever hardship the City
might face under an injunction will be far less than the irreparable harm the church
will face if one is not issued.
IV. An injunction is in the publics interest. Indeed, the Citys refusal to
apply binding federal law violates established public policy.

Granting a preliminary injunction will serve the public interest. Courts have
consistently recognized the significant public interest in upholding First
Amendment principles. Sammartano, 303 F.3d at 974. Likewise, the public
interest may be declared in the form of a statute. Golden Gate Rest. Assn v. City &
Cnty. of San Francisco, 512 F.3d 1112, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Cottonwood
Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1230-31
(C.D. Cal. 2002) (By passing RLUIPA, Congress conclusively determined the
national public policy that religious land uses are to be guarded from interference
by local governments to the maximum extent permitted by the Constitution.).
Here, an injunction will serve the public interest because it will allow Harbor to
continue practicing its religious exercise protected under RLUIPA.
CONCLUSION

Harbor respectfully requests that this Court grant a preliminary injunction
restraining Defendants from bringing any enforcement action against the church
resulting from Harbors denied application for a permit to continue its ministry at
3100 Preble Avenue.


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Dated: May 15, 2014
Respectfully submitted,

STANFORD LAW SCHOOL
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLINIC

By: /s/ James A. Sonne
James A. Sonne
jsonne@law.stanford.edu
Jared M. Haynie
jhaynie@law.stanford.edu
Stanford Law School
Religious Liberty Clinic
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305
(650) 723-1422

Counsel for Plaintiff

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in Supp. of Prelim. Inj.

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