41855132

Indian Political Science Association
THE PARTITION OF INDIA IN PERSPECTIVE

Author(s): N. G. Rajurkar
Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 2 (APRIL-JUNE 1982), pp. 34-53
Published by: Indian Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41855132 .
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I.
J. P. S. Vol. XLI1I No. 2
3
THE PARTITION OF INDIA IN PERSPECTIVE
-N. G.
Rajurkar
Like Charles' head,
the
controversy
in
regard
to the exact
cause or causes that ted to India's
partition,
raises its head
again
and
again.
While some hold the British
policy
of 'divide
and rule* in India
primarily responsible
for its ultimate division
into two
parts,
others take the view that it was the so-called
Congress
Policy
of 'Muslim
appeasement'
in India that
finally
led to
India's vivisection. A few others
put
forward the
argument
that
the
tragedy
of
partition
could have been averted if the
Congress
had been a little more
responsive
to the demands of the Mus-
lim
League.
Then there are still others who
vehemently
declare
that some
major
mistakes on the
part
of the
Congress
leaders
as also some tactical errors on their
part, ultimately
led to a
situation wherein
partition
of the
country
became inevitable.
There are also
quite
a
fw, who hold the
opinion
that the
change
in the attitude of one
person
vis-a-vis
political objec-
tives led to India's division- the
person being
Mohammed Ali
Jinnah. These
persons
feel that the riddle of India's
partition
could be solved if we could
decipher
the reasons
-
tempermental,
political
or
otherwise,
that converted Jinnah the Nationalist,
into
Jinnah the Communalist. Then there are those
(among muslims),
who
continue to hold the view that India's
partition
was in-
herent in the situation and as much
inevitable, since Muslims
constitute a nation
by
themselves.
The views that the British
policy
of 'divide and rule'
contributed in a considerable measure to India's
partition,
as
also the one that the so-called
Congress Policy
of 'Muslim
appeasement' was
responsible
for
it,
were so
frequently put
forward and
by
so
many
that
they
have become matters of
common
knowledge
and as such need no elaborate mention. It
is sufficient to state that most of the
political parties1
consi-
dered Britain the villain of the
piece
to a
greater
or lesser
extent,
where as the Hindu Mahasabha and other Hindu
orgnis-
ations
pointed
an
accusing finger
at the
Congress
for what
they
considered at its 'Muslim
appeasment policy'.
Thus, accord-
ing
to the leaders of these
parties
and
organisations the.
partition of india
3
tragedy
of
partition
could have been avoided but for this
suicidal
policy
of the
Congress.
Paradoxically
and
ironically enough,
some of those who
have written books on the
political aspect
of the
pre- Independence
period
in
India,
hold a view
diametrically opposite
to the one
held
by
the Hindu-oriented
political parties.
As stated
earlier,
they
feel that the
Congress
leaders went
wrong ( specially
in
1937),
in not
giving
to the Muslim
League
what was its
legiti-
mate
due, thereby hurting
Jinnah's
feelings. Kanji Dwarkadas,
Frank Moraes and J. H. Sahani are
among
those writers who
subscribe to this view. It would be
revealing
to the
people
with Hindu Mahasabha
leanings (who
accused the
Congress
of
pro-Muslim policies)
to know what Jinnah had stated while
referring
to the
Congress
leaders.
During
his talks with Lord
Mountbatten
(23rd April,
1
947, New
Delhi),
Jinnah said:
"Frankly,
your Excellency,
the Hindus are
impossible. They always
want
seventeen
annas for the
rupee.3" They
would be
equally surpri-
sed
by
George
Abell's
(Private Secretary
to the
Viceroy)
comment
on what Jinnah said: "I have a
feeling
this is true.
By
and
large
the Hindu's case is
probably
better than the
Muslims',
but
they always spoil
it
by over-bidding.3"
Before I deal with other matters
germane
to the contro-
versy relating
to India's
partition,
I would like to draw the
attention to a
very important
geographical
or
demographic
factor,
which more often than
goes
un
-
noticed and but
for it the
question
of
partitioning
the
country
would not have
arisen. Though
the
country
had Muslim minorities i different
parts,
there were certain
provinces
in the North
-
East and
North
-
West of India which had Muslims in a
majority.
If this
had not been the case,
neither Jinnah nor
anyone
else would
have been in a
position
to
put
forward a
plea
for the division
of the
country.
I
suppose
that it would be
appropriate
at this
stage,
to
trace those factors,
which in later
years
led to the demand
for India's
partition.
That,
Sir
Syed
Ahmed Khan,
the
great
19th century
leader of the Indian Muslims,
was the first
person
to
put
forward
the 'two nation theory'
is too well known a
fact to need
any proof
or evidence. Like Mohammed
Ali Jinnah
in later
years, Syed
also
emerged
on the
political
scene of
India as a leader
speaking
on behalf of the
people
of India
36
tH INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
as a
whole,
and
again,
tike
Jinnah,
it was in later
years
that
he
began talking
in a different
language, metaphorically speak-
ing.
A
speech
that he delivered in 1883 was
brimming
to the
full with nationalistic
sentiments,
as the
passage quoted
below
would show. Sir
Syed
said: "Just as the
high
caste Hindus
came and settled in this land
once, forgot
where their earlier
home was and considered India to be their own
country,
the Musl-
ims did
exactly
the same
thing
....
they
also left there climes
hundfeds of
years ago
and
they
also
regard
this land of India
as their own . . . Both
my
Hindu brethern and
my
Muslim co-
religionists
breathe the same
air,
drink the water of the sacred
Ganga
and Jamuna,
eat the
products
of the earth which God has
given
to this
country,
live and die
together
... I
say
with
conviction
that if we were to
disregard
for a moment our
conception
of Godhead then in all matters of
everyday
Hinuds and Muslims
really
belong
to one
nation, and
the
progress
of the nation is
possible only
if we have a union
of
hearts,
mutual
sympathy
and love.4"
If we
ignore
the factual
inaccuracy
in Sir
Syed's speech
about the Muslims
having
'left their climes'
(the over-whelming
majority
of them were converts from
Hinduism),
there is
every-
thing
in that
speech
to reveal him as a nationalist to the
very
core.
However, the
very
same Sir
Syed,
asked his co-
religionists
to
keep away
from the Indian National
Congress,
when that
organisation
was founded in 1885. In a
speech
that
Sir
Syed
delivered at Lucknow on December
28th, 1887, the
reasons for his advice to his
co-religionists
were
clearly spelt
out.
He
thought
that the
Congress
could not
represent
the
Hindus
as well as the
Muslims,
as
they
were two different na-
tions, though they might
have
many things
in common. More
over,
he also stressed the fact that Muslirtfs would suffer at
the hands of the Hindu
majority
if
representative institutions
were introduced in
India,
as advocated
by
the
Congress. Finally,
he asked his
co-religionists
to realize that it was in their best
interests to
depend
on the British for their advancement.5 It is
not
necessary
for the
purposes
of this article to
go deeply
into the causes that resulted in a basic
change
in Sir
Syed's
stand on
political
matters. It would be sufficient to state that
he wanted the
help
of the British
government
in India to
pro-
mote western education
among
his
co-religionists
-
a
help
which
he knew would not be
forthcoming
if Muslims threw their
weight
with the
Congress (which
had lost Government favour after its
PARTITION OF INDIA
37
first two
sessions)
and his fear
(perhaps
instilled or nourished
in his mind,
by
Theodre Beck-the first
Principal
of the M.A.O.
College),
in
regard
to the
perpetual
domination of the Muslims
by
the Hindus
through representative
institutions,
because of
their
superior
numerical strenth.
Controversy apart,
in
regard
to the
precise
reasons that
brought
about a
change
in Sir
Syed's
political
stance,
what is
important
to remember is that he vehe-
mently
advocated the two
-
nation
theory
and was thus 'the
father of all that was to
happen, ultimately,
in Mohammed Ali
Jinnah's mind.'6
Eight years
after Sir
Syed's passing away,
that is, in 1
906,
the All India Muslim
League
came into
existence,
its founder
being
Sultan Mohammed Shah
Aga
Khan. Some of the leaders
of the
Congress
associated themselves with the
League
while
still
working
in the
Congress.
At this distance of time and in
retrospect
it sounds very surprising
that Mohammed Ali Jinnah
was not even remotely
connected with the
League during
the
first few
years
of its life
-
in fact he was
opposed
to it as the League
had demanded
separate
electorates
for the
Muslims,
which accor-
ding
to Jinnah amounted to dividing
the nation
against
itself.
The future founder of Pakistan
started
associating
himself
with the
League only
from
1913 onwards
-
though
he con-
tinued to work in the
Congress.
It was in that
year
that 'the
attainment of the
system
of self- Government suitable to India",
become
yet
another
objective
of the
League, resulting
in a
greater ideological affinity
between the
League
and the Congress.
Three
years
later,
when both the
parties
held their
respective
sessions at Lucknow at the same time
(December, 1916),
a
scheme of constitutional reforms was
jointly adopted by
the
Congress
and the
League,
which came to be known as the
Congress- League
scheme.7
It was at this session that the
Congress accepted
the
principle
of
separate
electorates for the Muslims.
Many
have
taken the view that one of the factors that contributed in a
great
measure to the
partition
of India was that of
separate
electorates for the Muslims and that the
Congress
commited
a
major
mistake in
lending
its
support
to it at its Lucknow
session of 1916. A careful examination of facts would show that
there is not much substance in this
charge
levelled
against
the
Congress.
It was on October 1, 1906, that a
deputation
of Muslims,
led
by
Sultan Mohammed Shah
Aga Khan,
had met the then
Viceroy
of India-Lord Minto,
at Simla.
During
that
meeting
the members of the
depuation
had
pleaded
for the
grant
of
separate
electorates for the Musliems and
the
Viceroy
in his turn was
quite
30 THE^
INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
happy
to
promise
them what
they
desired. In
fact,
the British
in India, consistent with their
policy
of 'divide and rule',
secretly encouraged
all such demands. This was how the
separate
electorates for Muslims became a
part
of the Indian Councils Act
of 1909.
While
passing
a
judgements
over the
Congress
decision
to
accept separate
electorates for the Muslims in 1916,
we
should not lose
sight
of the
important
fact that the
separate
electorates had
already
become a
part
of the Act of 1909 and
that
any attempt
on the
part
of the
Congress
leaders to
oppose
them at that
juncture
would have alienated the Muslims further
from the
Congress;
the British in their turn would then have
explo-
ited the situation
by telling
the Muslims that the Hindu
-
dominated
Congress
was
opposing
a concession
given
to them
by
the British on
their own
request
and on
by grounds
which the British considered
legitimate.
Thus,
the
Congress
leaders found themselves in a most
un-enviable
position,
wherein
they
had to lend their
support
to
sep-
arate electorates for the Muslims
inspite
of their awareness in
regard
to the
dangers
associated with it.
Though,
in
retrospect,
this decision
of the
Congress
leaders
appears
as an
improper one,
I wonder as to
whether
things
would have
shaped any
better if the
Congress
had
opposed
at that
stage
what was
already
a fait
accompli.
The non
-
cooperation
movement started
by Gandhiji
on the
Khilafat issue in
1920,
served the
purpose
of
bringing
the Hindus
and the Muslims
very
close to each other,
but
only
for a
very
short
time. The Hindu-Muslim
unity
was at its
peak during
this move-
ment-something
that
gave
a
fright
to the British rulers of
India,
who
had
consistently
formulated their
policies
in such a fashion as to
keep
the two communities
apart. However,
this
unity proved
to be
an
ephemeral
one and the
suspension
of the movement by Gandhiji
was followed
by
the
Moplah
massacre in Kerala and Communal riots
in other
parts
of the
country.
The reasons for this anti-climax were
many.
The constant
appeal
to the
religious
sentiments of the
Muslims
by
the leaders of the Khilafat Committee made them
gradually
more
communal.
Then there was the abolition of the
Caliphate
itself
by
the {Government
headed
by
Mustafa Kemal Pasha in 1924
-
something
that frustrated the Indian Muslims
greatly
and rendered them
more communal still. I am
saying
more communal
still,
as the
separate
electorates had
already
resulted in
rousing
communal senti-
ments
among
the Muslims and
things
had become worse because of
the
speeches
of the Khilafat leaders.
Thus,
the efforts of the Mahatma
to unite the
Hindus and the Muslims
through
the Khilafat movement
proved counter-productive.
PARTITION OF INDIA
39
Incidentally,
it
may
be noted that the Khiiafat movement
launched
by Gandhiji
is cited
by many
as an
example
of his
policy
of
'Muslim
appeasement'.
It is
easy enough
to come to that
conclusion,
but what is
important
to remember
is,
as
already
stated in the
pre-
vious
paragraph,
it was intended to be a counter
strategy
to that of
the British
(it
does not however mean that
Gandhiji's
interest in the
Khiiafat issue was not
genuine)
and if it did not serve the
intended
purpose,
all that could be said
against Gandhiji
is
that his calculations went
wrong, Many people
who think that
Tilak, un-like Gandhi,
did not follow a
policy
of 'Muslim
appeasement'
and
greatly
admire him on that count,
are not
aware of the fact that the manifesto of the
Congress
Democ-
ratic
Party (organized by
Tilak to contest elections to
legislative
councils which were to be set
up
as
per
the Act of
1919)
incorporated
the
following
sentence. "This
Party supports
the
claim of the Mahammedans for the solution of the Khiiafat
question according
to Mohammedan
dogmas
and beliefs in the
tenets of the Koran.8 It is not too unreasonable to believe
on the basis of the above
quoted
sentence that had Tilak been
alive,
he would have lent his
support
to the Khiiafat movement
started
by Gandhiji.
Thus what
Gandhiji
did vis-a-vis the
Khiiafat issue should not be
summarily
dismissed as 'Muslim-
appeasement', pure
and
simple,
and as
Tilak,
who was known for
his
political realism,
also held similar views.
It was
during
the
non-cooperation
movement that Jinnah left
the
Congress.
Neither was he enamoured of
Gandhiji
as a
person,
nor could he
approve
of the
techniques
that were
adopted by
the
Congress,
such as those of civil disobedience, non-cooperation,
etc.,
because of
Gandhiji's leadership.
Jinnah,
who was till then a
nationalist to the
very
core and who was described
by
no less a
person
than
Sarojini
Naidu as the 'ambassador of Hindu-Muslim
unity',
changed gradually
since
Gandhiji
became the
un-challenged
leader of the freedom movement.
He left the
Congress
to
join
the
League
and after a few
years
started
talking day
in and
day
out
about the 'two-nation
theory',
and
finally emerged
as the founder
of a
separate
state for Muslims-Pakistani
According
to M.C.
Chagla,
the reasons for a
change
in Jinnah went much
deeper
than his
disapproval
of Gandhian
political techniques
or his
personal allergy
for the Mahatma. This is what he has to
say
about it in his
autobiographical narrative,
'Roses in
December',
"Why
did Jinnah
40
THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
change?"
asks
Chagla
and comes out with his own
explanation
himself,
"There could be
many possible explanations
for this.
Jinnah's
besetting
fault was his obsessive
egoism.
He had to
be a
leader, and the
prime
mover in whatever cause he worked.
With the
emergence
of
Gandhiji
in Indian Politics,
Jinnah felt
that his
importance
would
gradually
diminish. Jinnah was the
complete
anti-thesis of
Gandhiji.
While
Gandhiji
believed in
religion
in abstract moral
values,
in non-violence,
Jinnah
only
believed in
practioal politics.
He could not
possibly give up
his
faultlessly
tailored suits and his
high
collars for the
simple
Khadi which
Gandhiji
wanted ....
"After he was
dropped
from the Third Round Table
Conference Jinnah became convinced that if he had to have a
place,
he would have to stand on communal
platform.
Jinnah's
transformation
really began
when it seemed to him that he was
beginning
to be considered as a man of little
consequence
so
much so that he could not find a
place
in the Third Round
Table Conference. Once he
adopted
the communal
platform
he
drifted
rapidly
and came to a
stop only
when he reached the
pinnacle
to become the leader of the communal
party
that the
Muslim
League ultimately
became.''9
To attribute India's
partition merely
to the
peculiarities
of
Jinnah's
temperment
would be
over-simplifying
facts. And it
must be
readily accepted
that even M. C.
Chagla
does not
try
to
explain
India's vivisection in
August,
1947, merely
in terms
of Jinnah's
temperment
and mental
make-up.
He is
objective
enough
to criticise some of the decisions of the
Congress
which
he considered
wrong
and which
according
to him should be
taken into account while
considering
the
question
of India's
partition.
It is
not, however, necessary
at this
stage
of discus-
sion to consider
Chagla's
comments in
regard
to the tactical
mistakes commited
by
the
Congress.
What is
important
to ,
remember is that Jinnah's nature and the
peculiarities
of his
temperment
should not be lost
sight of,
not
only
while
exploring
the causes for his
leaving
the
Congress,
but also while
analys-
ing
his
subsequent
actions and how he would
possibly
have
reacted in a
given hypothetical
situation.
After
leaving
the
Congress,
Jinnah threw his lot with the
League
and became its President in 1924. About three
years
PARTITION OF INDIA
4i
later,
in March
1927,
to be
very precise,
Jinnah
pursuaded
a
number of Muslim leaders to
agree
to the
giving up
of
separate electorates, provided
four conditions,
as
put
forward
by
him,
on behalf of the Muslims,
were fulfilled. These conditions
which came to be known as "Delhi Muslim
proposals",
were
evidently
considered reasonable
by
the
Congress Working
Committee,
which
accepted
them on the
whole,
without
delaying
matters, The conditions were
(1)
Sind should be constituted
into a
separate province; (2)
reforms should be introduced
in the North-western Province and Baluchistan;
(3)
in
the
Punjab
and
Bengal
the
proportion
of the Muslim
representation
should be in accordance with their
population;
and
(4)
in the Central
Legislature
the Muslim
representation
should not be less than one-third of the total.18 The decision
of the
Congress Working
Committee vis-a-vis the
acceptance
of
"Delhi Muslim
Proposals"
was endorsed
by
the All India
Congress
Committee with some minor modifications and it was
accepted by
the
Congress
when its session was held at Madras
in
December,
1927. However,
the All Parties Conference,
con-
vened in
early
1928, appointed
a Committee to determine
the
principles
of
Swaraj
constitution for India. This Committee did
not
give
its consent to these
proposals,
but made recommenda-
tions on differenr lines to solve the communal
problem, through
its
report,
which came to be known as the "Nehru
Report."
The
Report
was
accepted
at the convention of the All Parties
Conference,
which was held at Culcutta in
December, 1928.
The All Parties Convention was followed
by
an All Parties
Muslim
Conference
(engineered
and
encouraged by
the
British,
who
were
not
happy
at
Jinnah.s
readiness to
give up seperate
electo-
rates on certain
conditions)
in Delhi with
Aga
Khan as its President.
The Conference
formulated a 13
point programme-covering
a vide
range
of Muslim demands. Jinnah realized
immediately
that the All
Parties Muslim Conference's 13 Point
Programm endangered
his
position
as the
principal protector
of the Muslim interests and in utter
desperation
decided to
go
one better then the Conference in cemm-
unalism,
and called a
meeting
of the
League.
The
League
passed
a 14- Point
Programme,
which was an
amalgamation
of the
demands of the
League
and those of the Muslim Conference.
Jinnah's efforts to outbid the Muslim Conference did not meet with
42
much success. As such' in a
disappoined
and frustrateed
mood he
decided in
December,
1931 to bid
good bye
to India and settel in
England.
Jinnah
spent
three
years
in
England, practising
at the
Privy
Council,
but was
pursuaded by Liaquat
Ali Khan
(future
first Prime
Minister of
Pakistan)
to return to India. The Jinnah that returned
to India in 1934 was a new Jinnah. determined to''embark on a
career
radically
different from that he had followed in his earlier
life"12
The Jinnah that
emerged
on the
political
scene of India in
1934, was Jinnah the master tactician.
Rajendra Prasad,
the then
President of the
Congress,
initiated talks with Jinnah at the inst-
ance of M. A. Ansari,
to arrive at some settlement with the Muslim
League
Chief over the communal
question.
The talks failed. In the
words of
Rajendra
Prasad
they
failed
because;
"His
(Jinnah's)
attitude had
undergone
a
change,
He wants the Muslim
League
to be
accepted
as the
only representative
of the Indian Muslims
while he classified the
Congress
as a
representative
of the
Hindus"13. The comment of D. P. Misra on the failure of talks serves
as a
key
to the
understanding
of Jinnah's
political
tactice from
that
year
onwards, till the
year
in which the
country
was
parti-
tioned. Misra
says:
"
The obvious conclusion to be drawn from the
failure of these
negotiations
is that Jinnah wanted to talk but not
to settle. Invitations to him to talk
by Congress
leaders added to
his
prestige
and therefoer
every
invitation was welcome to him... he
had decided even before the talks had started not to settle.14''
According
to
many16 noteworthy writers,
the
year
in which
the seeds of
partition
were
really
sown was the
year
1937. It was
in that
year
that
popular
ministries assumed office in the different
provinces
of British India,
as
per
the Act of 1935. Most of these
writers
put
forward the view that the
Congress
leaders infuriated
Jinnah
by
the manner in which
they
handled the
question
of
ministry
formation in U. P. and
Bombay.
These writers take the view
that had this
question been tackled with tact and wisdom
by
the
Congress leaders, Jinnah would not have become a bitter
person,
and in
consequence
the
partition
of India would not have taken
place. They
feel that
Congrees-league
coalition
governments
should have been formed in these
provinces
to avoid future
complications
and to win over
Jinnah,
but the
Congress
failed
to do what was
politically expedient
and desirable.
PARTITION OF INDIA
43
According
to
Kanji
Dwarkadas
(one
of those writers who
are
highly
critical of what the
Congress
leaders did in
1937),
Jinnah was infuriated
by
two
happenings
in
1937,
these were
-
1)
the refusal of Nehru to include two Muslim
League repre-
sentatives in the U. P.
ministry;
and
2)
the Chief Minister
designate
of
Bombay
-
B. G.
Kher, being
taken to task
by
the
Congress High Command, particularly by
Sardar
Patel,
for
having
requested
Jinnah to
suggest
the names of two Muslim
Leaguers,
who could be included in the
Bombay Ministry.
These two
actions, according
to
Kanji Dwarkadas,
were indicative of 'the
arrogance
and lack of
foresight'
of the
Congress
leaders.
They
repeated
such mistakes in future also and in
consequence
the
country
had to be
partitioned.16
Yet another
important
criticism
against Congress
leaders
vis-a-vis what
happened
in U. P. in 1937 is that
they
insisted
on the elected Muslim
League
members
signing
the
Congress
pledge,
as a
pre-condition
to the formation of a coalition
government.17
The
validity
of the criticism levelled
against
the
Congress
lea-
ders should
firstly
be examined in the context of the results of the
elections that took
place
in
February,
1937. Of the
1,585 seats
(in
the eleven
provinces
of British
India),
the
Congress
won 711 seats.
As for
separate
Muslim constituencies,
the
Congress
contested
only
58 seats out of 482 and won 26. In five of the eleven
provinces,
the
Congress
secured an absolute
majority
and was the
largest party
in three others.18 On the whole, the
Congress
did
very
well at the
polls, though
it fared
badly
in so far as the seats that were reserved
for the Muslims were concerned.
The Muslim
League
record in terms of seats obtained in vari-
ous
provincial
assemblies was far from
impressive.
It could secure
only
51 of the total of 482 seats,
reserved for the Muslims in
prov-
incial assemblies. In terms of
votes, the Muslim
League
could secure
just
4.8
percent
of the total
^Muslim
votes. Moreover,
the Muslim
League
did not succeed in
obtaining
a
majority
of seats in
any
of the
four Muslim majority provinces.
The election results made it
quite
clear that in British India as a
whole,
the Muslim
League
had little
support,
though
it'had done rather well in U.P. and
Bombay,
where it
secured 27 out of 64 and 20 out of 29 reserved Muslim
seats res-
pectively.
However,
in terms of the
totality
of results,
the
Congress
leaders could not be blamed for
taking
the view that
they
need not
bend backwards in order to
get
the
cooperation
of the
League,
even
in U.P. and
Bombay.
Now let us examine the criticism vis-vis the
refusal of Nehru to include two Muslim
League
members in the U. P.
ministry.
It is
surprising
to note that the U.P.
ministry
was to consist
of
only
seven members,
out of which the
League
wanted a share of
two.
44 tHE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
According
to Maulana Azad,
the leaders of the Muslim
League
in U.P.
-
Chaudhari
Khaliquzzaman
and Nawab Ismail
Khan, expected
'some share' in the new Government. However,
states
Maulana,
"the local
position
was such that neither of them could enter the
Government alone. Either both would have to be taken or neither."19
He held out
hopes
to them that both would be taken but Nehru took
a stand to the effect that
only
one could be included in the
Ministry
and it was for the Muslim
League
to decide as to who should be
included.
According
to Maulana this was a
very
un-wise move on
the
part
of Nehru of
which,
"Mr. Jinnah took full
advantage.
..and
started an offensive which led to Pakistan."30
From what has been stated
above,
it should become clear
that the demand for two seats in the
Ministry
was not based on
considerations of fair
representation,
but on those of some internal
problems
which the
League
was
facing.
This in turn would mean
that but for this
difficulty
the Muslim
League
would not have had
any objection
to
only
one of the members
being
included in the
Ministry.
If that be
so,
why
should the
Congress
or Nehru for that
matter be blamed for the
League's inability
to choose one of the two
for the
representation
in the
Ministry.
It
may
also be remembered in this connection that out of the
six members of the
Congress Ministry
which
eventually
came to
to
power,
two were Muslims. This was
by any
standards a fair
representation
in the
Ministry
to the Muslim
community,
unless one
accepted
the
extraordinary
claim of Jinnah that
only
the members of
the Muslim
League
could be the true
representatives of the Muslim
community.
The most
appropriate way
of
looking
at the
happenings
in
U. P. and
Bombay,
is the one of
looking
at them in the context of
the overall
League strategy
and tactics and not in
isolation. Shocked
by
the election reverses, Jinnah became
acutely
aware of the fact
that the
only way
of
strengthening
the Muslim
League
was the one
of
rousing
the
religious passions
of the Muslims. It is safe to infer
on the basis of the
permanently negative
attitude31 that Jinnah
adop-
ted,
specially
since his return from
England,
that even if coalition
ministries had been formed in U. P. and
Bombay, they
would not
have survived for
long,
as Jinnah's men would have come out of
their
respective
ministries
by precipitating
some
crisis,
with the avo-
wed inteniton of
bringing
further
notoriety
to the
Congress
as an
organisation opposed
to Muslim interests. It is instructive to remem-
ber in this connection that even the
Congress
resolution of October
1937,
which reiterated its attitude towards Minorities and funda-
mental
rights,
left Jinnah
completely
cold and un-moved.
PARTITION OF INDIA
45
To sum
up
in the words of D.P. Mishra. "The Muslim
League
having
been
utterly rejected
in the elections
except
in
Bombay
and
U.P. and Jinnah
having
no base for his
operations,
found that he and
his Muslim
League
would be left
high
and
dry
in the
provincial
mini-
stries about to be formed all over India under the new Government of
India Act. He had
expected
that the
Congress
would not be able to
sweep
the
polls
and in the Hindu
majority provinces
it would need
the
League's co-operation
to
capture power.
In
short,
he had tried to
capture
as
many
Muslim seats as
possible
in these
provinces
with a
view to
playing
the same decisive role in them as he had been
playing
in the central
assembly
since 1923.
Although
his calculations had
miscarried, yet
he tried to
bargain
for
position
in U.P. and
Bombay by
putting
forward the idea of a "united front". When the
Congress
did
not fall into his
trap
he
got
furious and he and his friends,
started
propagating
that the
Congress spurned
his
cooperation
because the
election results had intoxicated its leaders. If Jawaharlal in U. P.
and Sardar in
Bombay
had allowed Jinnah's men to enter the mini-
stries formed in these
provinces,
the
Congress high
command would
have had a fore-taste of the
ugly
situation that arose in 1946-47 in
the interim
government
formed
by
Jawaharlal."83
From 1937 onwards,
till the
Congress
Ministries
resigned
from
office in
1939, Jinnah was
solely occupied
with the work of
levelling
bogus charges against
the
Congress
Ministries
regarding
the ill-
treatment of the Muslims and
injustices
done to them,
as also with
rousing
their
religious
sentiments in different
ways.
The
Congress
by
that time had commited itself
(through
various
resolutions)
to the
protection
of the
rights
of Muslims vis-a-vis
political, religious,
social and cultural matters and had even swallowed the bitter
pill
of
Mac Donald Award. Further,
Dr.
Rajendra
Prasad,
the then
Presi-
dent of the
Congress
had
agreed
in his
negotiations
with Jinnah to
reserve seats for the Muslims in the
Punjab
and
Bengal.
All that
was left for Jinnah after that was to
adopt purely negative
tactics of
criticising
the
Congress
all the time and
yet
not
spelling
out the details in
regard
to then ature of his demands. Sincc he
had
nothing really
to
specify
in terms of demands,
he insisted on the
League being recognized
as the
only representative
of the Muslims,
as a
pre-condition
to
any negotiations
with the
Congress.
The Con-
gress very rightly
and
understandably
refused to
accept
this
pre-con-
dition and the stalemate continued.
The Second World War that
began
in
Europe
in
September,
1939, profoundly
influenced the
political
situation in India. The
British Government declared India to be a
belligerent country
without
consulting
either the Central
Assembly
or for that matter the Provin-
cial Governments. As a
consequence
to this,
a
long
statement was
46
issued
by
the
Congress Working
Committee,
through
which the Bri-
tish Government was asked to
explain
their war
aims,
more
particu-
larly vis-a-vis, British
imperialism.
Did the British
"Recognize
the
independence
of India and her
right
to frame her own Constitution
through
a Constituent
Assembly
? What immediate
steps
would be
taken to introduce
popular
control of the Central Government ? Later
in order to meet
every possible objection
of
any minority group,
the
idea behind the Constituent
Assembly
was further
amplified.
It was
stated that the
minority
claims would be settled in this
Assembly
with the consent of the
minority
concerned,
and not
by
a
majority
vote. If such
agreement
was not
possible
in
regard
to
any issue,
then this was to be referred toan
important
tribunal for final decision.
This was an unsafe
proposal
from a democratic
point
of view but
the
Congress
was
prepared
to
go
almost
any length
in order to
allay
the
suspicions
of minorities."83
The
response
of the the British Government to the statement
of the
Congress Working
Committee left no doubt about the fact that
they
were neither
prepared
to
spell
out their war aims nor were
they
ready
to hand over the control of the Government to the
repre-
sentatives of the
people.
As such,
the
Congress
Ministries,
resigned,
as
they
were not
agreeable
to lend their
co-operation
on
theseterms in the
prosecution
of the war.
Incidentally,
it
may
be mentioned that the
Congress
statement
was
exceedingly
fair to the minorities,
and Jinnah could not have
possibly
asked for a better assurance,
but then, by
that time,
Jinnah's mind was
moving
in another direcrion.
Some eminent men hold the view that the
Congress
made a
big
tactical mistake in
asking
its Ministries to
resign
at the
commencement of the Second World War.
They argue
that this ill-
advised
step gave
the
opportunity
to the
League
to
strengthen
its
position greatly,
and in this
they
were
helped
and
encouraged by
the
British. It is
certainly
true that the
League
increased its
strength
immeasureably during
the war
period,
when the
top Congress
leaders
were behind
prison
bars and when the
younger
leaders of the
Congress
were
busy
in
leading
and
guiding
the
underground
movement,
which came to be known as the
quit
India Movement.
However,
it is not
easy
to see as
tP
how the
Congress
Ministries
would have found it
possible
to remain in office and extend their
hand of
co-operation
to the British in their war efforts,
when the
latter had not
agreed
to
any
of the
Congress
demands.
The resolution
demanding
a
separate
state for the
Muslims,
that
is, Pakistan,
was
passed
at the historic Lahore session of the
PARTITION OF INDIA
47
Muslim
League,
in 1940. However,
the idea of India's
partition
took
birth in
1930,
through
Sir Mohammed
Iqbal's
Presidential address at
the session of the Muslim
League. Iqbal put
forward the view that
the
Punjab,
North-West Frontier
Province,
Sind and Baluchistan
should constitute a
single
state.34 It
may
be that what
Iqbal
had in
his mind was not a
separate sovereign
state for the Muslims but a
single
unit of North-West
areas, constituting
an
integral part
of an
All-India federation.25 A direct
suggestion
in
regard
to the
partition
of the
country, however,
came in
January 1933, through
a leaflet
circulated
privately by
a few
young
Indians
(Muslims)
in
England
entitled,
'Now or Never'. The authors declared that India was not
the name of one
single country
nor was it the home of one
single
nation. It
was,
in
fact,
the name
given
to a state created for the
first time in
history by
the British .."our national customs and calen-
ders,
even our diet and dress are different...
(we)
demand the reco-
gnition
of a
separate
national status."36
At the Madras Session of the Muslim
League
in
1941,
Jinnah
reiterated the idea of a
separate
state for the
Muslims,
incorporated
in
the Lahore resolution. He stated
very categorically
that the Muslim
League
would not rest till the
goal
of a
completely independent
state
.
for Indian Muslims was reached. That
State, according
to
Jinnah,
was to be in the North-West and Eastern Zones of India.37
It is
interesting
to remember as to what Jinnah the
protector
of
the interests of the Indian Muslims had to
say
about the Muslims that
would be left behind behind in India after
partition.
To
quote
M.C.
Chagla
: "It is absurd to think of a home for the
Muslims,
when
as
many
as 60 million Muslims were left behind in India. I remember
once
asking
Jinnah : You are
fighting
for Pakistan
mainly
in the
interest of the Muslim
majoity states,
But what
happens
to the
Muslims in the States
particulary
like Uttar Pradesh where
they
are
in a small
minority?
I will never
forget
the answer he
gave
me. He
looked at me for a while and said:
'They
will look after themselves.
I am not interested in their fate.'28
While Jinnah aimed at
Pakistan,
he was
hardly
sure of
getting
it in view of the
very strong Congress opposition
to it. As
such,
he
was
mentally prepared
to settle for
something
less than
Pakistan,
inspite
of the fact the
League
had consolidated its
position immensely
during
the the war
period (because
of British
Patronage, encourage-
ment and active
help,
as also because of the absence of the
Congress
leaders from the
political scene)
and
notwithstanding
the
good per-
formance of
League during
the 1945 General Elections. The
League,
it
may
be
remembered, succeeded in
capturing
almost all the Muslim
seats in the Central as well as Provincial
Legislatures
with the
excep-
tion of the North-West Frontier Province. It was also able to from
Ministries in
Bengal
and
Sind-though
its
majority
in the latter was
precarious.
48
Jinnah,
the shrewd and clever tactician, gave
his
support
to the
Wavell
plan
at Simla in
May, 1946,
but
surprised everybody by
changing
his mind the
very
next
day. Referring
to theis
incident,
Durga
Das
says
: "I asked him
(Jinnah) why
he had
spurned
the
Wavell
plan
when he had won his
point
of
parity
for the
League
with
the
Congress,
His
reply
stunned me for a moment. 'Am I a fool to
accept
this when I am offered Pakistan on a
platter.9
In this con-
nection,
Durga
Das also states that
Jinnah,
who was about to make
an announcement
indicating
his
acceptance
of the Wavell
Plan,
changed
his mind because of the
message
that he received from some
British Civil servants and those in
England
who were hostile to the
Indian
aspirations.30
It
may
be remembered in this connection that
Winston Churchill was Britain's Prime Minister at that time. Jinnah's
rejection
of the Wavell
pin points
the fact that the British also were
responsible
from time to time in
preventing
a settlement
among
the
Indian
political parties.
Jinnah's determination in the
subsequnt
months to have Paki-
stan at
any
cost is attributed
by many, including
Maulana
Azad, to
what Nehru had stated at a Press Conference in
Bombay
on
July 10,
1946. Azad in his book India wins Freedom, refers to that Press
Conference as "one of those unfortunate event which
changed
the
course of
history."31
Nehru who was
pleading
for a
sovereign
consti-
tuent
Assembly
to decide India's future since a decade earlier asserted
emphatically
at the Press Conference that the
"Constituent
Assembly
would never
accept any
dictation or
any
other directive from the
British Government."33 This
assertion,
as D.P. Mishra
rightly points
out, "had
nothing
to do with the Muslim
League,
which was to be a
part
of this
body
and could
easily
have
joined
its voice in
support
of
what Nehru was
saying."33
The
sovereign
status of the Constituent
Assembly
was
subject
to two limitation as
per
the Cabinet
Mission,
they being
tha
problem
of minorities and a
treaty
between
England
and India and Nehru
clearly accepted
that
position
at the Press
Conference. In so far as Nehru's observations on
grouping
of
pro-
vinces in sections were concerned, "he was
only giving
uttera nee to
what the
Congress Working
Committee had itself decided
by
its resolu-
tion of 25th June that it would stick to its own
interpretation
of
paras
15 and 19 of the Cabinet Mission's statement."34 It is as such not
easy
to
comprehend
as to what the Maulana had in his mind when
he criticised Nehru's Press statement of
July 10,
1946.
The traumatic
experiences
of Nehru and Patel in the Interim
Government
(1946) gradually
made them
painfully
aware of the fact
that the
partition
of India was
possibly
the
only way
out of the situa-
tion, that was created
by
Jinnah and his
followers.
Without
going
into the details in
regard
to the difficulties and
annoyances
that the
Congress
leaders had to
put up
with
(in
the Interim
Government)
PARTITION OF INDIA 49
cause of a "mental alliance between the
League
and senior British
officials"35 as Nehru
put it,
and without
expatiating upon
the com-
munal
frenzy
let loose
by
Jinnah in the
country,
the
political
trend in
the
country
made the
Congress
leaders wonder as to whether there
was
any point
in
sticking
to the idea of
keeping
the
political integrity
of the
country
in tact.
Referring
to the
period
when he functioned
as the Vice-President of the Interim Government,
Nehru stated
(in
the context of how be had
colleagues
started
thinking
in term s of
partition),
"I think the real facts were the situation itself and the
bitterness and conflicts that were
growing
in the communal field and
the
feeling
that even if some
arrangement
could be arrived at to
prevent partition,
those contlicts and inner
disruptions
would
continue
and
might
come in the
way
of
any
marked
progress
of the
economy
of the
country
later... this
overwhelming
sensation that
any
kind of union,
if it came about,
would first of all not
put
an end to
these inner
pulls, secondly,
it would leave the Federal Government
so weak-with the transfer of
power
to its various constituent units-
the central Federation would be so weak that it would not be able to
act
properly
or
adopt any
effective measures. These were the real
reasons which ultimately
induced us to
agree (to partition)."35
In terms of
partition,
the last straw that broke the camel's
back as the
expression goes,
was the historic statement of clement
Attlee,
the Prime Minister of Great
Britain,
on
February
20, 1947,
in the House of Commons. To
prevent
the
partition
of the
country
thereafter was almost an
impossibility.
In that statement,
Attlee
gave expression
to the firm decision of the British Government to
transfer
power
into Indian hands not later than June, 1948,
irres-
pective
of the fact as to whether
any agreement
was reached
among
the
political parties
of India or not. In the absence of
any
settlement
by
that time,
stated
Attlee, the British Government
would "have to
consider to whom the
powers
of the Central Government
in British
India should be handed over,
on the due date,
whether as a whole
to some form of Central Government for British India,
or in some
areas to the
existing
Provincial Governments,
or in such other
way
as
may
seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the Indian
people".37
The
political
condition in India
during
that
period
had become
highly explosive.
The
only
alternatives after Attlee's statement were
Pakistan or chaos. Lord
Ismay,
who had
accompanied
Lord
Mountbatten to
India,
likened the
political
situation in India at that
time to that of *'a
ship
in mid-ocean with a fire on the deck and
ammunition in the hold".38 Whatever little
hope
or desire the
Congress
leaders had of
avoiding partition
became almost extinct
after Attlee's announcement. In the words of H.V. Hudson,
"the
creation of Pakistan
(was) implicitly
written in the statement of
50
20th
February.
In the context of Indian Politics it
(was)
thus an
open
license for Pakistan in some form or other".39
According toCompbell-
Johnson,
Patel was th first
amongst
the
Congress
leaders to realize
that Attlee's statement of 20th
February, implied
the
partition
of the
country.40
The resolution that was
passed by
the
Congress Working
Committee on 2nd
March, 1947,
demanding
the
partition
of the
Punjab
into
Muslim-majority
and
Hindu-majority
zones was
clearly
indicative of the fact that the
Congress High
Commandwere
getting
prepared
for the
partition
of the
country.
In his letter to
Gandhiji,
Nehru,
spelled
out the details in
regard
to the factors that
prompted
the
Congress Working
Committee to
pass
the resolution
demanding
the
partition
of the
Punjab
and stated :
Indeed, this is the
only
answer to
partition
as demanded
by
Jinnah."41 Patel too wrote a
letter to
Gandhiji, through
which he assured the Mahatma that the
resolution,
"was
adopted
after the
deepest
deliberation."4' Incide-
ntally,
I
may
state for the information of such of those who hold
the view that Nehru
agreed
to
partition
because of
Lady
Mount-
batten's influence on
him,
that the
Punjab
resolution
signalling
the
preparedness
of the
Congress
leaders to
accept partition
was
passed
twenty days
before
lady
Mountbatten arrived in India
along
with her
husband.43
The
popular
belief that
Gandhiji opposed
the idea of India's
partition
till the
very
and is hot
supported by
facts. He had
Opposed
it
during
the
meeting
of the
Congress
working Committee,
but when
the All-India
Congress
Committee met at
Bombay
on 14th June,
1947,
Gandhiji
told the members
that, ''they
would be ill-advised
to throw out or amend the
Working
Committee's resolution on
partition."44 The fact that even
Gandhiji
had to reconcile himself
to the idea of the
partition
of the
country, inspite
of his acute
opposition
to it
earlier,
indicates as to how severe was the
compulsion
of events and how dire the overall situation.
In
conclusion,
I
may
state that the
partition
of India was a
result of a
highly complex political
situation that had
developed
in
India and as such cannot and should not be attributed to the
operation
of one
single
factor or,
for that
matter,
to a
particular
policy
or dcision of
any party
or even to the utterances and
pronouncements
of individuals or
any
individual. As I had stated
carwe the
question
of India's
partition
would
just
not have risen
but for the
geographical
or
demographic
factor of the existence of
Muslim
majority provinces
in the Northern
part
of British India.
Similarly,
it has to be borne in mind that
religion
has
always
been
a
very strong binding
factor
amongst
the Muslims and has created
in them a
feeling
of
identity
as a social
group
-
a
feeling
that Jinnah
exploited
to
the utmost after 1937. In all fairness to the
Congress
PARTITION OF INDIA
51
leaders,
it should be
pointed
out that
they
did their best to remove
from the minds of the Indian Muslims those
legitimate
fears and
apprehensions
that are natural and understandable in the members of
any minority group.
In
fact, sometimes,
while
meeting
Muslim
demands, they
went a little farther than was
strictly necessary
in
terms of
justice
and
fairplay, primarily
because the British were
making
a constant endeavour to create dissensions
amongst
the
Hindus and the Muslims
(in
order to
perpetuate
their
rule),
and
that had to be
effectively
check-mated. A
change
in Jinnah's
attitude vis-a-vis Indian
politics,
for reasons
psychological,
political
or
otherwise, played
a
very important
role in
bringing
about the
partition
of the
country,
as he was in a class
by
himself in
statecraft,
and if and when he was in a mood for settlement
(which
was on
very
few
occasions)
the British were
always
there to
prevent
it.
Jinnah, by
his
permanently negative
attitude
(particularly
after his
return from
England
in 1
934,)
not
only exasperated
the
Congress
leaders,
but also succeeded in
creating
an
essentially
false
impre-
ssion that
they
were
antagonizing
the Muslims
by
their unfair
attitude towards them. While the
agonizing experiences
of the
Congress
leaders in the Interim Government created in them the
overwhelming feeling
that
they
better
accept partition
and have an
independent
India with a
strong
centre,
Attlee's statement of
February 20, 1947,
killed whatever little
hope
there was of
avoiding
the
partition
of the
country.
I shall end
my
article
by reproducing
the
concluding part
of the
reply given by
Nehru to a
question
that was
put
to him in a Press Conference,
vis-a-vis Azad's criticism of his
(Nehru's)
statement of
July 10, 1946,
because in a
way
it sums
up
what I have
tried to
convey through
this article.
"
I would
say
this",
said Nehru,
"that Maulana Sahib thinks too much in individual
terms, sometimes,
and not in terms of historic forces at work.
Individuals make a difference and have made a difference but some-
times individuals are
only symbols
of forces at work."45
52
THE INDIAN JOURNAL F POLITICAL SIN
NOTS & REFERENCES
1. There is
ample proof
to show that the British in India not
only
embarked
upon
a
policy
of 'divide and rule' but also
prevented many
a
political
settlement by
subtle
secret manoeuvres.
2. Alan
Compbell
-
Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten,
Robert Hale Limited,
London, 1951, P. 70.
3. Ibid., Loc. cit.
4. Quoted
by
Dr. V. P. Varma in his book Modern Indian Political
Thought,
Second
Edition, Agra, 1964,
P. 413.
5. S. Abid
Hussain, The
Destiny
of Indian Muslims , Bombay, 1965, P. 155.
6. Hector
Bolitho, Jinnah, London, 1954,
P. 381.
7.
Sarojini Naidu, who was
present at the historic Lucknow session of the
Congress,
made a
pun
on the word
Lucknow,
to
give expression
to her
joy
at the
agreement
between the
Congress
and the
League.
"We are", said
Sarojini Naidu, "at Lucknow"/
8. Quoted
by
J. P. Suda in his book
Main Currents of Social and Political
Thought
of Modern India,
Vol. I, Meerut, 1963, P. 431.
9. M. C.
Chagla, Roses in December , Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan,
Bombay,
1974, P.79.
10. Based on an account given by
D. P. Mishra in his book
Living an Era
,
Vol. I, Vikas
Publishing
House Pvt. Ltd., 1975, P. 124.
11. Pandit Motilal Nehru was the Chairman of this Committee.
12. Khalid B.
Sayeed,
as
quoted by
D. P. Mishra in his book
Living
an
ra.
Vol. I(
PP.247 -48.
13. Ibid., PP. 248-49.
14. Ibid.,
PP. 249.
15. Beni Prasad, Durga Das, Frank Maraes, Kanji
Dwarkadas J. H. Sahani and
many
others subscribe to this view.
16. Kanji Dwarakadas,
India's
Fight
for freedom, 1913-1937, Bombay, 1966, PP466-
467.
17. M. C. Chagla,
Roses in December, P.82.
18. The
Congress
success was in fact more
impressive
than what the
figures indicate,
because
only
657 out of 1585 were 'General' or
open
seats.
19. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, Bombay, 1959, PP 160-61.
20. Ibid., P. 161.
21. In one of his talks with Lord
Mountbaten, Nehuru attributed the tremendous
success of Jinnah in later
years
to his
capacity
to take a
'permanently negative
attitude'.
Jinnah, according
to Nehru, did that with a
singlenss
of
purpose
ever since 1935.
Allen
compbell
-
Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, P. 44.
PARTITION OF INDIA
53
22. D. P.
Mishra,
Living
an Era , Vol.
I,
P.250.
23. Jawaharlal Nehru, An
Autobiography.
London, 1953, P. 608.
24. As for
Iqbal's advocacy
of a
separate
state for the Muslims, this is what Nehru
has to
say
in his
Discovery of India- He writes:
'
Edward Thomson has written that,
in the course of a conversation, Iqbal told him that he had advocated Pakistan because
of his
position as the President of the Muslim
League Session, but he felt sure that
it would be
injurious
to India as a
whole and to Muslims
specially. Probably,
he had
changed his
mind, or he had not
given
much
thought
to the
question previously,
as it
had assumed no
importance
then. His whole outlook ? life does not fit in with
subsequent developments
of Pakistan or divison of India". Jawaharlal Nehru,
Discovery
of
India, Signet Press.
Calcutta,
Fourth
Printing, September. 1948, P.293.
25. Presidential
Address, All India Muslim
League,
Allahabad
Session, December
1930, Delhi, 1945, Edition,
P.12.
26, R. Coupland, The Indian Problem
(1836
-
1942),
Printed in Great Britain, P. 199.
27.
F. Akhtar, The March of a Nation ;
A Collection of the most
important speeches
of
Qaid-i-Azam, M. A.
Jinnah, P.101.
28. M. C.
Chagla,
Roses in
December, P.81.
29.
Durga Das, India From Curzon to Nehru and
After, London, 1969, P.216.
30.
Ibid., Loc. cit.
31 Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins
Freedom, Bombay, 1959, P. 181.
32. D. P.
Mishra,
Living
an
Era, Vol. II, P.513.
33.
Ibid., Loc. cit.
34. Ibid,, PP 513-14.
35. Ibid., P.535.
36.
Dorothy Norman, Nehru, The First
Sixty
Years ,
Vol. II, Asia
Publishing House,
1965, P. 240.
37. Allen
Campbell
-
Johnson. Mission with
Mountbatten,
P.22.
38.
Ibid., P.354.
39.
H.V.Hudson, The Great
Divide, London, 1969, PP.200 & 203.
40. Allen
Compbell
-
Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten ,
P.1 1 7.
41.
Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi
-
The Last
Phase,
Vol.
II, Ahmedabad, 1958, P.34;
42. Ibid., P.35.
43. The Mountbattens arrived in India on 22nd
March, 1947
44.
Pyarelal,
Mahatma Gandhi
-
The Last
Phase, Vol. II, P.251.
45.
Dorothy Norman, Nfehru. The First S
xty Years ,
Vol. II P.241.

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THE PARTITION OF INDIA IN PERSPECTIVE

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