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THOMAS E. MONTGOMERY, County Counsel (State Bar No. 109654)
County of San Diego
By RICKY R. SANCHEZ, Senior Deputy (State Bar No. 107559)
1600 Pacific Highway, Room 355
San Diego, California 92101-2469
Telephone: (619) 531-4874; Fax: (619) 531-6005
E-mail: ricky.sanchez@sdcounty.ca.gov

Attorneys for Defendant County of San Diego (also erroneously sued herein as San
Diego County Sheriffs Department), and William D. Gore




IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA



CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR
FAMILIES AND CHILDREN, a
Delaware Corporation, LEXEVIA, PC, a
California Professional Corporation, and
COLBERN C. STUART, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY BAR
ASSOCIATION, a California Corporation;
et al.,

Defendants.

)
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No. 13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT





Date: January 24, 2014
Time: 2:00 p.m.
Ct rm: 4C
Honorable Cathy Ann Bencivengo



/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
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TOPICAL INDEX

Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................. iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................................ 1
STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL ......................................................................................... 1
I. ALL STATE TORT AND SECTION 1983 AND 1985 CLAIMS ARE BARRED
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ................................................................. 2

II. BECAUSE NO TIMELY GOVERNMENT DAMAGE CLAIM WAS FILED,
ALL STATE TORT CLAIMS ARE BARRED ........................................................ 3

III. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A RICO CLAIM ....................................... 4

IV. THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE A LANHAM ACT FALSE
ADVERTISING CLAIM IS STATED AGAINST DEFENDANTS ....................... 5

V. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE CLAIMS UNDER 42 U.S.C. SECTIONS
1985 AND 1986 ......................................................................................................... 6

VI. NO MUNICIPAL CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM IS STATED AGAINST THE
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO BECAUSE THE ALLEGATIONS DO NOT SHOW
A FACTUALLY PLAUSIBLE CLAIM ................................................................... 7

VII. NO TORT CLAIM NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION,CAN BE STATED BECAUSE
IT IS NOT A COGNIZABLE THEORY OF RECOVERY UNDER THE
CALIFORNIA TORT CLAIMS ACT (CTCA) ........................................................ 9

VIII. NO CLAIM IS STATED AGAINST WILLIAM E. GORE WHO WAS
UNINVOLVED IN ANY INCIDENT .................................................................... 10

IX. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ............................................. 10

X. SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT IS NOT A PROPER
DEFENDANT IN THIS ACTION .......................................................................... 11

XI. CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN (CCFC),
AND LEXEVIA LACK CAPACITY AND CANNOT MAINTAIN THIS
ACTION .................................................................................................................. 12

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TOPICAL INDEX
(Continued)

Page
A. CCFC And Lexevia Are Corporations That Cannot Proceed Without
Counsel. ......................................................................................................... 12

B. CCFC Does Not Have Standing to Sue. ........................................................ 13

C. Lexevia Is A Suspended Corporation Lacking Capacity To Sue ................. 13

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 14

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Alan Neuman Productions, Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1988) .................... 5
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) ...................................................................... 2, 5
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...................................................................... 1, 2, 8
Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1988) .................................... 1
Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468 (9th Cir. 1995) ................................................................ 6
Blake v. Dierdorff, 856 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1988) ............................................................ 4
Brockmeier v. Solano Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 2006 WL 3760276, *4 (E.D.Cal. Dec.18,
2006) ...................................................................................................................... 12
CTCA. Datil v. City of L.A., 263 Cal. App. 2d 655 (1968) ............................................... 9
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) ........................................................... 10
Cerrato v. S.F. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 26 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1994) ......................................... 7
Color-Vue, Inc. v. Abrams, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1599 (1996) .............................................. 14
De Villers v. Cnty. of San Diego, 156 Cal. App. 4th 238 (2007) ...................................... 9
Dilts v. Cantua Elem. Sch. Dist., 189 Cal. App. 3d 27 (1987) .......................................... 3
Fall River Joint Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 3d 431 (1988) ....... 3
Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651 (9th Cir. 2003) ... 2
Harris v. RHH P'rs, LP, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3 2009) ............ 12
ICR Graduate Sch. v. Honig, 758 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Cal. 1991) ................................. 11
Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................................. 2
Jay v. Med. Dept. of Fresno County Jail, 1:10-CV-00685-GBC PC, 2011 WL 3875523, at
*4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 1 2011) .................................................................................... 11
Jewett v. City of Sacramento Fire Dep't, No. CIV. 2:10-556 WBS KJN, 2010 WL
3212774, at *2 (E.D. Aug. 12, 2010) ..................................................................... 11
Jones v. Williams, 286 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2002) ........................................................... 10
Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dept, 839 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1988) ............................... 6, 7
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) ...................................................................... 10
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1991) ..... 4
Merco Constr. Engrs, Inc. v. Mun. Court, 21 Cal. 3d 724 (1978) ................................. 12
Michel v. Smith, 188 Cal. 199 (1922) .............................................................................. 10
Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1996) ............................................................. 10
Monell v. N.Y. City Dept of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) ..................................... 7, 8
Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 885 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1989) .................................. 5
Morales v. City of L.A., 214 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) ..................................................... 3
Morris v. State Bar of Cal., No. Civ. 09-0026 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 966423 (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 11, 2010) ....................................................................................................... 12
Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2009) ............................................... 2, 8
Navarro v. Block, 250 F. 3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001) ....................................................... 1
Nelson v. State, 139 Cal. App. 3d 72 (1982) ..................................................................... 3
Occupational-Urgent Care Health Sys., Inc. v. Sutro & Co., 711 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. Cal.
1989) ........................................................................................................................ 4
Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 2007) ................................................... 4
Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1993) .......................................................... 10
Paradise Creations, Inc. v. U V Sales, Inc., 315 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ................. 13
Pellum v. Fresno Police Dept., 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10698, [6-7] (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2,
2011) ................................................................................................................. 11, 12
Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) .................................................................... 7
Pers. Admr of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) ...................................................... 6
Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1993) ....................................... 6
RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................. 6
Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2001) ...................................... 7
Robbins v. P'ship for Bank Capital, L.P., 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 167, at *2
(Del. Ch. Jul. 23 2010) .......................................................................................... 12
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Sanders v. Aranas, No. 1:06-CV-1574 AWI SMS, 2008 WL 268972
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2008) ....................................................................................... 12
Searcy v. Hemet Unified Sch. Dist., 177 Cal. App. 3d 792 (1986) .................................... 9
Sekerke v. Kemp, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35041, at *33 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013)
(Moskowitz, J.) (citing Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626) ........................................ 7
Smith v. City and County of San Francisco, 68 Cal.App.3d 227, 230 (1977) ................... 3
Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2012) .................................... 6
Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981) ............................................................... 5
Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.) ............................................. 2
Sun Sav. & Loan Assn v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1987) .................................. 4
Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1989) .................................................................. 10
Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1993) ..................................... 2
United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2005) ................................................... 11
Usher v. Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1987) ......................................................... 2
Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ................................ 11
Wade v. Fresno Police Dept, No. Civ. 09-0588 AWI DLB, 2010 WL 2353525 (E.D. Cal.
June 9, 2010) .......................................................................................................... 11
Watson v. State, 21 Cal. App. 4th 836 (1993) ................................................................... 3
Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834 (1976) ...................................................................... 9
RULES/STATUTES
Cal. Corp. Code
Section 2205 ........................................................................................................... 14
California Civil Procedures Code
Section 335.1 ............................................................................................................ 2
Cal. Government Code
Section 810 .............................................................................................................. 9
Section 814 ............................................................................................................... 9
Section 815(a) ........................................................................................................... 9
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RULES/STATUTES
(Continued)
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Cal. Government Code
Section 820.8 .......................................................................................................... 10
Section 911.2 ............................................................................................................ 3
Section 945.4 ............................................................................................................ 3
Section 1962 ............................................................................................................. 5
Section 1983 .............................................................................................. 8, 9, 11, 12
Section 1985 ............................................................................................................. 7

California Revenue & Tax Code
Section 23301 ......................................................................................................... 14
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Rule 8(a)(2) .............................................................................................................. 1
Rule 12(b)(6) ........................................................................................................... 1
Rule 17(b)(2) ......................................................................................................... 12
15 U.S.C.
Section 1125 ............................................................................................................. 6
Section 1125(a) ......................................................................................................... 6
Section 1125(a)(l)(B) ................................................................................................ 7
42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 ................................................................................................... 4, 7, 12
Sections 1983, 1985 .................................................................................... 2, 3, 7, 12
Sections 1985(2) and (3) ...................................................................................... 4, 7
Section 1986 ............................................................................................................ 3

OTHER
Lanham Act, Section 43(a) ................................................................................................. 5

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STATEMENT OF CASE
As can be garnered from the complaint, plaintiff Stuart is disgruntled with the
California family law dissolution process as administered by the State judiciary, family
law practitioners, counselors and others. On April 15, 2010, plaintiff Stuart alleges he
was attending a seminar at the San Diego County Bar Association facility in the City of
San Diego, when he was ejected from the seminar. (Cmpl. 114, 117, 118, 119, 128,
135.) He alleges two deputy sheriffs and two off duty officers asked him to leave, and
when he refused he was handcuffed, and escorted out of the building where he was
released. (Cmpl. 135.) Otherwise, the complaint does not contain any specific factual
allegations describing any conduct by the County of San Diego or Sheriff William Gore
that was directed against plaintiff Stuart or others. The complaint contains twenty-two
counts none of which state any claim against defendants County of San Diego
(erroneously sued herein as San Diego County Sheriffs Department) and William
Gore.
STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether a plaintiffs claims are legally sufficient. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal
is appropriate when the complaint fails to allege a cognizable legal theory or sufficient
facts to support such a theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th
Cir. 1988). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain
a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,
and although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). [T]he tenet a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Id. at 678. Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice. Id. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations. Id. at 679. Also, the court is not obliged to
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accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by
exhibit or those which are merely conclusory, require unwarranted deductions or
unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th
Cir.) (citation omitted), amended on other grounds, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001); see
also Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (court need not accept as
true unreasonable inferences or conclusions of law cast in the form of factual allegations).
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, which when taken as true, demonstrates the claim is
plausible on its face." Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.
A claim has facial plausibility, the Court explained, when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)The plausibility standard is not akin to a
'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely
consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.' Id. (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).

Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
ARGUMENT
I
ALL STATE TORT AND SECTION 1983 AND 1985 CLAIMS ARE BARRED
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Claims brought under Sections 1983 and 1985 must be filed within the time
specified by the states statute of limitations for personal injury torts. Usher v. Los
Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 558 (9th Cir. 1987); Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d
710, 711-12 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that same limitations period applies to both 1983
and 1985 claims). California law sets a two-year statute of limitations for personal
injury claims. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 335.1; Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of
Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651, 655 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). Although state law determines the
length of the limitations period, federal law determines when a civil rights claim
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accrues. Morales v. City of L.A., 214 F.3d 1151, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2000). Under federal
law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or had reason to know of the
injury which is the basis of the action. Id. Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, and 16 of the complaint purport to allege claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, and
1986 based on the alleged assault of plaintiff Stuart on April 15, 2010. The statute of
limitations on these claims expired more than a year before this action was filed on
August 20, 2013. All said claims are therefore barred by the statute of limitations.
II
BECAUSE NO TIMELY GOVERNMENT DAMAGE CLAIM WAS FILED,
ALL STATE TORT CLAIMS ARE BARRED

The submission of a claim to a government entity is a condition precedent to any
claim for money damages against the entity or its employees. (Cal. Gov't Code 945.4.)
Pursuant to Cal. Gov't Code 911.2, the claim must be presented within six months of
accrual of cause of action. Statutes for commencement of actions against public entities
"'are mandatory and must be strictly complied with...'[citations omitted.]" Smith v. City
and County of San Francisco, 68 Cal.App.3d 227, 230 (1977). "[F]ailure to file a claim
is fatal to a cause of action." Dilts v. Cantua Elem. Sch. Dist., 189 Cal. App. 3d 27, 31
(1987). Each cause of action asserted in a complaint must correspond to the factual
circumstances reflected in the written government code claim. Watson v. State, 21 Cal.
App. 4th 836, 844 (1993); Nelson v. State, 139 Cal. App. 3d 72, 80 (1982). If a plaintiff
relies on more than one theory of recovery each must be reflected in a timely claim. Fall
River Joint Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 3d 431, 434 (1988).
Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7, purport to state tort claims. The alleged event upon which
those counts are premised is the April 15, 2010, ejectment of plaintiff from a family law
seminar. In the present matter there is no allegation that plaintiff filed a government
damages claim within six months of that event. As a result, all state tort claims are
barred for failure to comply with the claims filing requirement.
/ / /
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III
THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A RICO CLAIM

The complaint contains thirteen Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) claims, the second of which is directed against all defendants, with the remaining
directed against various groups of defendants.
The complaint fails to state a RICO claim against the County of San Diego, (also
erroneously sued as San Diego County Sheriffs Department), because as a government
entity it is incapable of forming mens rea necessary to perform an act of racketeering, it is
not subject to vicarious liability for alleged RICO violations of natural persons, and is
immune to actions for treble damages which RICO provides. Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v.
Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 404 (9th Cir. 1991).
The complaint also fails to state a plausible RICO claim against Sheriff Gore.
"[T]he following are essential elements of any civil RICO action: (1) the existence of a
RICO 'enterprise'; (2) the existence of a 'pattern of racketeering activity'; (3) a nexus
between the defendant and either the pattern of racketeering activity or the RICO
'enterprise'; and (4) resulting injury to plaintiff, in his 'business or property."'
Occupational-Urgent Care Health Sys., Inc. v. Sutro & Co., 711 F. Supp. 1016, 1021
(E.D. Cal. 1989).
To establish the existence of ... an enterprise, a plaintiff must provide both
evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and evidence that the various
associates function as a continuing unit. Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 552
(9th Cir. 2007). To satisfy RICO's pattern requirement, a plaintiff must allege two or
more predicate acts of racketeering in furtherance of a criminal scheme. Sun Sav. &
Loan Assn v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1987). The plaintiff must plead such
acts with specificity and identify the individual actions of each defendant sufficient to
constitute a pattern of racketeering activity. Blake v. Dierdorff, 856 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th
Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit has applied Rule 9(b )' s particularity requirements to
RICO claims under Section 1962. Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 885 F.2d 531, 541
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(9th Cir. 1989); see also Alan Neuman Productions, Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388,
1392-93 (9th Cir. 1988) (default on RICO claim overturned because the allegations of
predicate acts in the complaint were entirely general, and no specifics of time, place,
or nature of the alleged communications are pleaded).
With respect to the enterprise element, the Complaint alleges the existence of
three enterprises purportedly involving these moving defendants: the Domestic Dispute
Industry Criminal Enterprise, the San Diego Family Law Community Domestic
Dispute Industry Criminal Enterprise, and the Domestic Dispute Industry Intervention
Advocate Criminal Enterprise. (Cmpl. 273-283.) Absent from the Complaint,
however, are any allegations concerning the participation of William Gore or the County
and its Sheriffs Department in these purported enterprises. And as concerns the
racketeering element, the complaint alleges no facts specifying conduct by William Gore,
let alone any pattern of crime. Accordingly, the RICO claims should be dismissed.
IV
THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE A LANHAM ACT FALSE
ADVERTISING CLAIM IS STATED AGAINST DEFENDANTS

Count 21 of the Complaint purports to assert a false advertising claim against
defendants under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125. According to the Complaint,
unspecified advertisements, promotions, sale and offer for sale of their legal
services are false and misleading. (Cmplt. 261, 265.) Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act prohibits the use of false designations of origin and false descriptions or
representations in the advertising and sale of goods and services. Smith v. Montoro, 648
F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1981); 15 U.S.C. 1125(a) (2006). A false advertising claim
requires the plaintiff to allege commercial injury based upon a misrepresentation about a
product, and also that the injury was competitive, i.e., harmful to the plaintiff's ability to
compete with the defendant. Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1995).
1
No

1
A false advertising claim under the Lanham Act has five elements: (1) a false
statement of fact by the defendant in a commercial advertisement about its own or
another's product; (2) the statement is actually deceived or has the tendency to deceive a
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claim is stated because the County of San Diego and the Sheriff of the County of San
Diego do not engage in the advertisement or sale of goods or services; are not involved in
interstate commerce; and the County defendants do not compete with plaintiffs in any
commercial activity. And the complaint does not allege facts to the contrary. The
complaint therefore fails to state a Lanham Act claim against the County of San Diego
and Sheriff Gore.
V
THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE CLAIMS
UNDER 42 U.S.C. SECTIONS 1985 AND 1986

Counts 12, 13, 14 and 15 are based on sections 1985(2) and (3), which prohibit
conspiracies to interfere with the civil rights of others. Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police
Dept, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). An allegation of racial or class-based
discrimination is required to state a claim for relief under either subsection. See RK
Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002); Portman v. Cnty. of
Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 909 (9th Cir. 1993). Discriminatory purpose . . . implies
more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences . . . . It implies that
the decision maker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.
Pers. Admr of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). Conclusory allegations are
insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 15 U.S.C. 1985 claim must allege
facts to support the allegation that defendants conspired together. A mere allegation of
conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626.
To establish existence of a conspiracy, a plaintiff is required to produce concrete
evidence of an agreement or meeting of the minds between defendant and others to

substantial segment of its audience; (3) the deception is material, in that it is likely to
influence the purchasing decision; (4) the defendant caused the statement to enter
interstate commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a result of
the false statement, either by direct diversion of sales from itself to defendant or by
lessening of the goodwill associated with its products. Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi,
673 F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012); 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(l)(B).
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deprive the plaintiff of one of plaintiffs constitutional rights. Radcliffe v. Rainbow
Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2001). The complaint alleges nothing more than
the defendants conspired together in committing the so-called Stuart Assault. (Cmplt.
203, 205, 207, 209), and fails to alleges with specificity facts showing a meeting of the
minds sufficient for conspiracy, or facts establishing racial or class-based discrimination.
The complaint fails to state any claim under section 1985.
Count 16 of the complaint alleges a violation of 1986, which authorizes a
remedy against state actors who have negligently failed to prevent a conspiracy that
would be actionable under 1985. Cerrato v. S.F. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 971
n.7 (9th Cir. 1994). A conspiracy under 1985 is therefore a prerequisite to a valid claim
under 1986. Sekerke v. Kemp, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35041, at *33 (S.D. Cal. Mar.
12, 2013) (Moskowitz, J.) (citing Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626). Because the
complaint does not state a section 1985 claim, the section 1986 claim also fails.
VI
NO MUNICIPAL CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM IS STATED AGAINST THE COUNTY
OF SAN DIEGO BECAUSE THE ALLEGATIONS DO NOT SHOW A
FACTUALLY PLAUSIBLE CLAIM

For a section a municipal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (2006), facts
must be alleged showing one of the municipalitys policies or customs directed the
commission of a constitutional violation. Monell v. N.Y. City Dept of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). This official policy requirement was intended to distinguish
acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make
clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually
responsible. Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986). This is because
municipalities cannot be held liable under 1983 on a respondeat superior theory for
constitutional violations committed by any of its officers or employees. Monell, 436 U.S.
at 691, 694.
The complaints general and conclusory allegations that the County maintained
rules, policied, customs, procedures, traditions, practices and permitted behaviors by
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policymakers themselves which perpetrated an intentional, reckless, and deliberate
indifference to the likelihood of constitutional injury are but conclusions without factual
support and thus insufficient to state a claim. (Cmplt. 173.) In Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662,
plaintiff sued both United States Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert
Mueller for holding plaintiff, a post-September-11th detainee in highly restrictive
conditions of confinement. Plaintiff alleged they "knew of, condoned, and willfully and
maliciously agreed to subject [him]" to harsh conditions of confinement "as a matter of
policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no
legitimate penological interest." Plaintiff also alleged that Ashcroft was the "principal
architect" of this invidious policy, and that Mueller was "instrumental" in adopting and
executing it. The Court found the assertions to be nothing more than a "formulaic
recitation of the elements" of a constitutional discrimination claim and were conclusory
allegations not entitled to be assumed true. Id. at 681. In Moss v. United States Secret
Serv., plaintiffs alleged Secret Service agents violated their First Amendment rights when
they ordered the relocation of their demonstration against then President George W. Bush
at a hotel. The Secret Service maintained that the relocation was requested to put the
President out of weapons range. Plaintiffs alleged the demonstration was relocated
because of its anti-Bush message, and that the Agents acted in conformity with an
officially authorized sub rosa Secret Service policy of suppressing speech critical of the
President. The complaint otherwise had no facts bolstering the allegations. The
allegations were found to be conclusory and therefore not entitled to an assumption of
truth and so the complaint failed to state a claim. Moss, 572 F.3d at 970.
The allegations in this matter are similarly conclusory, and without factual support
indicating existence of the alleged policies, or that there is a plausible claim therefor.
The sixth count of the complaint should therefore be dismissed.
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
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VII
NO TORT CLAIM NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION,CAN BE STATED BECAUSE
IT IS NOT A COGNIZABLE THEORY OF RECOVERY UNDER THE
CALIFORNIA TORT CLAIMS ACT (CTCA)

The CTCA provides the exclusive scope of tort liability for government entities
and employees. Cal. Gov't Code 810 et seq.; see also Legislative Committee Comment
to Cal. Gov't Code 814. [T]he intent of the [CTCA] is not to expand the rights of
plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental
liability to rigidly delineated circumstances. Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 838
(1976). Common law governmental tort liability was eliminated by the CTCA. Datil v.
City of L.A., 263 Cal. App. 2d 655, 660 (1968). As a result, in California all
governmental tort liability against a public entity or its employees is dependent on the
existence of an authorizing statute. Searcy v. Hemet Unified Sch. Dist., 177 Cal. App. 3d
792, 802 (1986); Cal. Gov't Code 815(a).
The fifth count appears to allege a lack of supervision claim possibly on state law
and under Cal. Gov't Code 1983; to the extent the complaint purports to assert a state
law claim for negligent supervision, the complaint fails to do so because negligent hiring,
training, and supervision is not a cognizable statutory theory of recovery under the
California Tort Claims Act. De Villers v. Cnty. of San Diego, 156 Cal. App. 4th 238,
253, 256 (2007). [T]here is no statutory basis for declaring a governmental entity liable
for negligence in its hiring and supervision practices and, accordingly, plaintiffs' claim
against County based on that theory is barred. Id at 253. We conclude that a direct
claim against a governmental entity asserting negligent hiring and supervision, when not
grounded in the breach of a statutorily imposed duty owed by the entity to the injured
party, may not be maintained. Id. at 256.
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
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VIII
NO CLAIM IS STATED AGAINST WILLIAM E. GORE
WHO WAS UNINVOLVED IN ANY INCIDENT

The complaint contains no allegations against William Gore upon which federal or
state tort liability can attach. Count 7 of the complaint purports to state a claim against
him based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Paragraphs 6 and 7 contain the only
specific allegations regarding William Gore, and in that regard only that he is the Sheriff
of the County of San Diego and in that office manages detention facilities and law
enforcement operations. The allegation is not so much as against him individually but
rather the office he occupies in his official capacity. A lawsuit against the Sheriff in his
official capacity is but a lawsuit against the County itself. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 167 n.14 (1985); Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 527 (9th Cir. 1996). Otherwise
no specific misconduct is alleged to have been committed by him on which any claim can
be premised. Under federal law he is not subject to vicarious. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d
1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993);
Jones v. Williams, 286 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 2002). And likewise under state tort
law he is not subject to vicarious liability. Cal. Govt. Code 820.8. Also, the head of a
law enforcement department is not liable for the acts of subordinates or co-workers:
A public officer is not responsible for the acts or omissions of
subordinates properly employed by or under him, if such
subordinates are not in his private service, but are themselves
servants of the government, unless he has directed such acts to
be done or has personally co-operated therein. Michel v. Smith,
188 Cal. 199, 201 (1922).

The complaint should be dismissed as to William Gore because it is devoid of any
allegation upon which personal liability can attach to him.
IX
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The complaint requests a restraining order and order enjoining defendants from
prospectively violating plaintiffs rights. (Cmplt. 386, 396.) The purpose of an
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injunction is to prevent prospective harm to a plaintiff. To obtain an injunction, the
plaintiff must establish that a "real or immediate threat" exists that he will be wronged
again. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983). The alleged threat cannot
be "conjectural" or "hypothetical." City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02
(1983). Where the activities sought to be enjoined have already occurred, and the Court
cannot undo what has already been done, and there is no prospective harm to the plaintiff,
the action is moot and no injunction can be granted. ICR Graduate Sch. v. Honig, 758 F.
Supp. 1350, 1354-55 (S.D. Cal. 1991) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Bergland, 576
F.2d 1377, 1379 (9th Cir. 1978)). Here, no conduct is alleged to be currently threatened
against plaintiff. Therefore the complaint fails to state a claim for injunctive relief.
X
SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT IS NOT A PROPER
DEFENDANT IN THIS ACTION

The complaint names San Diego County Sheriffs Department as a defendant;
however, it is not a proper defendant in this action. A department within a municipality,
is not considered a person within the meaning of 1983. Pellum v. Fresno Police
Dept., 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10698, [6-7] (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2011) surveying cases
finding that departments within municipality are not persons subject to suit for
constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
The Fresno Police Department is a municipal department of the City
of Fresno and is not considered a person within the meaning of
Section 1983. See United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1239 (9th
Cir. 2005) (Ferguson, J., concurring) (noting that municipal police
departments and bureaus are generally not considered persons
within the meaning of Section 1983); Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara,
928 F. Supp. 993, 995-96 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (dismissing sua sponte
Santa Clara Department of Corrections as improper defendant); Jewett
v. City of Sacramento Fire Dep't, No. CIV. 2:10-556 WBS KJN, 2010
WL 3212774, at *2 (E.D. Aug. 12, 2010) (finding fire department not
a person under Section 1983 and dismissing suit against it); Wade v.
Fresno Police Dept, No. Civ. 09-0588 AWI DLB, 2010 WL
2353525, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2010) (finding police department is
not a person under Section 1983); Morris v. State Bar of Cal., No.
Civ. 09-0026 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 966423, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 11,
2010) (finding that a fire department is a municipal department and
therefore not a person under Section 1983); Sanders v. Aranas, No.
1:06-CV-1574 AWI SMS, 2008 WL 268972, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29,
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2008) (finding Fresno Police Department improper defendant because
it is a sub-division of the City of Fresno); Brockmeier v. Solano Cnty.
Sheriff's Dep't, 2006 WL 3760276, *4 (E.D.Cal. Dec.18 2006)
(dismissing Sheriff's Department as an improperly named defendant
for purposes of Section 1983). Thus, Plaintiff's claim against the
Fresno Police Department is not cognizable under Section 1983.

Pellum v. Fresno Police Dept., 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10698, [6-7].
Because the San Diego County Sheriffs Department is neither a legal entity nor
a person, the complaint fails to state a claim against the San Diego County Sheriffs
Department.
XI
CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN (CCFC), AND
LEXEVIA LACK CAPACITY AND CANNOT MAINTAIN THIS ACTION

A. CCFC And Lexevia Are Corporations That Cannot Proceed
Without Counsel.
A corporation's capacity to sue is determined by the law in which it was organized.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(2). CCFC is a Delaware corporation that was incorporated in
August 2013, more than two years after the operative event alleged in the complaint.
(Cmplt. Caption; see also Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. C thereto, filed by Superior
Court defendants as doc. 16-2.) Under Delaware law, a corporation must appear in court
through counsel and cannot proceed in propria persona. Robbins v. P'ship for Bank
Capital, L.P., 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 167, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jul. 23 2010); Harris v. RHH
P'rs, LP, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3 2009). In California, a
corporation also can only appear in an action through counsel. Merco Constr. Engrs,
Inc. v. Mun. Court, 21 Cal. 3d 724, 731 (1978); See also CivLR. 83.3(k) (requiring
corporations to appear in court only through an attorney permitted to practice law under
Civil local Rule 83.3.)
The Civil Local Rules for this Court require that the title page of every pleading
include the address and telephone number of the attorney appearing for a party or of an
individual appearing pro se. CivLR 5.1(j)(l). The title page of the Complaint in this
action identifies Stuart and Dean Browning Webb, a Washington attorney as plaintiffs
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attorney. Neither Stuart nor Mr. Webb, however, are counsel for either CCFC or
Lexevia. The complaint alleges Stuart is an attorney licensed and admitted to practice in
California, Arizona, and Nevada and is an officer of the courts. (Cmplt. 3, 102, 103.)
As shown by exhibits D, E, F, G, and H attached to the Superior Court defendants
Request for Judicial Notice, filed as doc. 16-2, Stuart is reported to be disbarred in
California effective December 2012, and his licenses in Arizona and Nevada are both
suspended. Stuart therefore cannot serve as counsel for any party in this case. As for Mr.
Webb, although the title page to the Complaint indicates a pro hac vice application is
pending, no such application is reflected on the Court's docket, and Mr. Webb also did
not sign the Complaint. Counsel for the Superior Court defendants, reports that she
received a voice mail from Mr. Webb stating that Stuart used his name on the complaint
without permission. (Kristine P. Nesthus Decl. 4, doc. 16-3.) Counsel for defendant
Fritz, also reports that he received an e-mail from Mr. Webb stating that he does not
represent any party in this action and that no pro hac vice application was filed in this
court in this matter. (Kyle Van Dyke Decl. 3, doc 48-2.) By these accounts, CCFC and
Lexevia are not represented by counsel and cannot proceed with this action; and therefore
the complaint should be dismissed as to those defendants.
B. CCFC Does Not Have Standing to Sue.
A corporation must also have s standing to sue in federal court. Paradise
Creations, Inc. v. U V Sales, Inc., 315 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2003). For standing,
the plaintiff must allege that it suffered an injury in fact an invasion of a legally
protected interest. (Id. ) CCFC cannot have standing for injury incurred because it did
not exist at the time of the event giving rise to the claim, that is on April 15, 2010.
C. Lexevia Is A Suspended Corporation Lacking Capacity To Sue.
Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the capacity of a
corporation to sue or be sued is determined by the law under which the corporation was
organized. Lexevia is a California corporation. (Cmplt. caption.) Under California law,
a suspended corporation lacks capacity to sue. Color-Vue, Inc. v. Abrams, 44 Cal. App.
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4th 1599, 1604 (1996); see also Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code 23301; Cal. Corp. Code 2205.
As shown the Superior Court defendants Request for Judicial Notice, by exhibit I
thereof, filed as doc. 16-2, Lexevia is a suspended professional corporation. The
complaint as to Lexevia should be dismissed because it lacks capacity to sue.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the motion to dismiss by the County of San Diego and
William Gore should be granted.
DATED: December 9, 2013 THOMAS E. MONTGOMERY, County Counsel

By s:/ RICKY R. SANCHEZ, Senior Deputy
Attorneys for Defendants County of San Diego
(also erroneously sued as San Diego County
Sheriffs Department) and William Gore
E-mail: ricky.sanchez@sdcounty.ca.gov

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