67-1 Mem Iso Doyn MTN To Dismiss

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1 CHRISTOPHER J. ZOPATTI, Esq. (SBN 129497)
JOAN E. TRIMB E, EsCl: (SBN 205038)
2 CALLAHAN, THOMPSON, SHERMAN & CAUDILL, LLP
2601 Main Street, Suite 800
3 Irvine, California 92614
Tel : (619) 222-5700
4 Fax : (6l9) 232-2206
Emai l : czoatti .ctsclaw.com
5 Itrlm e Cl ,ctsc aW.com
6 Attorneys for Defendant
STEPHEN E. DOYNE, PH.D, and STEPHEN E. DOYNE, A Psychological
7 Corporation
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR
FAMILIES AND CHILDREN, et aI.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY BAR
ASSOCIATION, et aI.,
Defendants.
Case No.: 13cv1944 CAB (BLM)
Judge: Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo
Complaint Filed: August 20, 2013
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
STEPHEN E. DOYNE'S MOTION
TO DISMISS COMPLAINT OR, IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR MORE
DEFINITE STATEMENT
Date: 1124114
Time: 2:00 p.m.
Courtroom: 4C
rNO ORAL ARGUMENT UNLESS
_ _ _____ ____ ----' REQUESTED BY THE COURT.]
(13cv1944 CAB (BLM)) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
OF STEPHEN E. DOYNE'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 67-1 Filed 12/11/13 Page 1 of 32
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .............. .......... ................... ............... .................... ............... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................................................... 1
LEGAL ANALySIS .......................................................................................... 4
A. The Standard for Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 6) .......................... .4
B. The Standard for Dismissal Due to Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction Pursuant to Rule 12(b )(1) .................................................... 5
C. CCFC and LEXEVIA Lack Capacity To Bring Any Action .................. 5
D. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Time Barred ........................................................ 6
1. Plaintiffs' Claims Under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983, 1985, and
1986 Are Time Barred .................................................................. 7
11. The Lanham Act Cause of Action Is Time Barred ....................... 7
111. The Unjust Enrichment Cause of Action is Time Barred ............. 8
IV. The RICO Causes of Action Are Time Barred ............................. 8
E. Plaintiff Cannot Establish a 42 U.S.C. 1983 Cause of Action ............. 8
F. Plaintiff Cannot Establish Any 42 U.S.C. 1985 Cause of Action ........ 9
G. Plaintiffs' Complaint Fails To Establish The Elements of A Civil
RICO Claim ........................................................................................... 11
H. Plaintiff Cannot Establish A Claim Under The Lanham Act.. .............. 14
1. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Federal Jurisdiction .................................. 16
1.
11.
All Claims Arising From Dr. DOYNE's Participation In
STUART's Family Law Matter Are Barred By The Domestic
Relations Exception To Federal Jurisdiction .............................. 16
To The Extent That This Action Seeks To Challenge Any
Order Of The Family Law Court It Is Barred By The Rooker-
Feldman Doctrine ........................................................................ 17
J. Plaintiffs Claims Are Barred By The Doctrine Of Quasi-Judicial
Immunity ............................................................................................... 19
K. The Complaint Fails To Establish A Claim for Prospective Relief ...... 21
L. Dr. DOYNE is Immune from Liability Based Upon Reports of
Suspected Child Abuse .......................................................................... 21
(l3cvI944 CAB (BLM))
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
M. The Complaint Fails to Comply with Rule 8 ........................................ 22
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 23
(l3cv1944 CAB (BLM))
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1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Cases
3 Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 ............ 8
4 Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (U.S. 1999) ......................... 8
5 Ankenbrandt ............................................................................................................... 16
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Ankenbrant v. Richards (1992) 504 U.S. 689, 703, 112 S.Ct. 2206,2215, 119 L.Ed.
2d 468 .................. ...... .... ....................... .................................................................. 16
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (U.S. 2006) ........................................... 5
Arnoldv. Tiffany, 359 F. Supp. 1034, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 1973) ................................... 10
Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988) ..................... .4
Barber v. Barber (1859) 62 U.S. 582,21 HOW 582, 16 L. Ed. 226 ......................... 16
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) ........................................... .4, 5
Briscoe v. Lahue (U.S. 1983) 460 U.S. 325, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 75 L. Ed. 2d 96 .. 19,20
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons (1993) 509 U.S. 259, 268, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2612-13, 125
L.Ed. 2d 209 ......................................................................................................... .. 19
Buechold v. Ortiz (9
th
Cir. 1968) 401 F.2d 371 ......................................................... 17
Cal-Western Business Services, Inc. v. Corning Capital Group, 2013 Cal. App.
LEXIS 899,9-10 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Nov. 6, 2013) ................................................ 6
Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 725, 730 (9th Cir.
Cal. 1999) ............................................................................................................... 15
Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. Northern California Collection Service, Inc., 911
F.2d 242 (9th Cir. Cal. 1990) .................................................................................. 15
Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406,417 (9th Cir. Cal. 2010) ..................... 9
DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327,333 (9th Cir. 1979)
................................................................................................................................ 11
District of Columbia Court of Appeal v. Feldman (U.S. 1983) 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.
Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206 ...................................................................................... 18
(l3cvl944 CAB (BLM))
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1 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291-292 (U.S. 2005)
2 ............................................................................................................................ 5, 18
3 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-103 (1971) .............................................. 10
4 Harris v. RHH P 'rs, LP 2009 Ch. LEXIS 42 at 6 (Del. Ch. April 3, 2009) ................ 6
5 Imbler v. Pachtman (1976) 424 U.S. 409,416; 96 S.Ct. 984, 988 ............................ 20
6 In re Burrus 136 U.S. 586, 10 S. Ct. 850,34 L. Ed. 500, 1890 U.S. LEXIS 2233
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(U.S. 1890) ........................................................................................................... ... 16
Jack Russell Terrier Network of Northern California v. American Kennel Club, Inc.,
407 F.3d 1027,1037 (9th Cir. 2005) ...................................................................... 15
Kennar v. North American Rockwell Corp., 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5678,4 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 19, 1974) ................................................................................................... 7
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America (1994) 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct.
1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed. 2d 291 ................................................................................ 16
Kurzawa v. Meuller (6
th
Cir. 1984) 732 F.2d 1456, 1548 .......................................... 20
Lancaster Community Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397405 (9
th
Cir. 1991) ................................................................................................................ 13
McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. Cal. 1996), citing Schmidt v.
Herrmann, 614 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1980) ............................................................. 22
Medallion TV Enters. v. SelecTV ofCa!., 627 F. Supp. 1290, 1294 (C.D. Cal. 1986)
................................................................................................................................ 12
Miller v. Gammie (9
th
Cir. 2003) 335 F.3d 889, 895-96 ............................................ 19
Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court, (9th Cir. 1987) 828 F.2d 1385, 1387 ..... 20
Myers v. Morris (8
th
Cir. 1987) 810 F.2d 1437, 1466-67 .................................... 19, 20
Noel v. Hall (9
th
Cir. 2003) 341 F.3d 1148, 1165 ...................................................... 18
Ovvens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 ............................................................................. 5
Robbins v. P 'ship for Bank Capital, L.P. 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 167 at 2 (Del. Ch.
July 23, 2010) ........................................................................................................... 6
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1 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (U.S. 1923) 263 U.S. 413,44 S. Ct. 149,68 L. Ed. 362,
2 1923 U.S. LEXIS 2824 ......................................................................... .i, 1,9, 17, 18
3 Schultz v. Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714,718 (9th Cir. Alaska 1985) ............................... 11
4 Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134 (9thCir.1997) .................. 14
5 Summit Tech. v. High-Line Medical Instruments, Co., 933 F. Supp. 918, 931 (C.D.
6 Cal. 1996) ............................................................................................................... 15
7 Taylor v. Regents ofUniv. of Cal. , 993 F.2d 710,711-712 (9th Cir. Cal. 1993) ........ 7
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TrafjicSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 820,826 (9th Cir. Cal. 2011) ...... 15
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep't, 911 F.
Supp. 2d 1118, 1124 (E.D. Wash. 2012) ................................................................ 11
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-829
(U.S. 1983) .............................................................................................................. 10
United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344 (9th Cir. Ariz. 1997) ....................... 11
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (U.S. 1981) ................................................. 12
W States Wholesale v. Synthetic Indus., 206 F.R.D. 271, 278 (C.D. Cal. 2002) ........ 7
Ward v Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1981) ................................................... 7
Washington v. Taser Int'!, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64609, 6 (E.D. Cal. June 16,
2011) ......................................................................................................................... 5
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985) ............................................................ 5, 7
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 555 U.S. 7,22 (2008) .............. 21
Statutes
15 U.S.C. section 1125 ............................................................................................... 14
18 U.S.C. section 1961 ......................................................................................... 11, 12
18 U.S.C. section 1962 ......................................................... ..... ................................. 12
42 U.S.C. section 1983 ............................................................... .i, 1, 7, 8, 9,16,19,20
42 U.S.C. section 1985 .......................................................................... i, 1, 7, 9, 10, 11
42 U.S.C. section 1986 .......................................................................................... i, 1, 7
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Business & Professions Code section 17200 ............................................................... 8
Business & Professions Code section 17208 ............................................................... 8
California Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 ....................................................... 7
California Code of Civil Procedure section 337 .......................................................... 8
California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 ................................................... 7,8
California Corporation Code section 2205 .................................................................. 6
California Evidence Code section 730 ....................................................................... 20
California Penal Code section 11165.7(21) ............................................................... 21
California Penal Code section 11166 ......................................................................... 21
California Penal Code section 11172 ......................................................................... 21
California Revenue and Taxation Code section 23301 ............................................... 6
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)( 1) ................................................. .i, 1, 5
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6) .......................................... i, 1,4,5,6
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8 .................................................................. 22
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1. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff COLBERN STUART contends that the San Diego Superior family
law court system, including judges, psychological professionals, and mediators
within the system, are engaged in a criminal enterprise and conspiracy to deny
parents of rights. STEPHEN E. DOYNE, PH.D. and STEPHEN E. DOYNE, A
Psychological Corporation (collectively referred to as Dr. DOYNE) requests this
Court dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(1)
for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter based upon the principles of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and domestic relations abstention. Dr. DOYNE further
submits he is entitled to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 6) because the action
against him is time barred. The underlying acts began in 2008, the alleged breach by
Dr. DOYNE occurred in June of 2009 and the SDCBA incident occurred on April
15,2010. [Complaint 114,219.] The applicable statutes of limitation therefore
bar plaintiffs' complaint. The complaint also fails to set forth the requisite elements
of the causes of action based upon section 1983, 1985, Lanham Act, RICO, and the
request for injunctive relief. Finally, Dr. DOYNE also is immune from suit in this
matter pursuant to the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity.
2. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs appear to assert the following categories of causes of action against
Dr. DOYNE: (1) Violation of 42 U.S.C. sections 1983, 1985, and 1986, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964; (2) Unjust enrichment; (3) Violation of 15 U.S.C. section 1125.
The Lanham Act; and (4) Violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1961 et seq., the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). [Complaint, Caption.]
Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2201 and a
protective order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1514(b). [Complaint
The complaint alleges the existence of an elaborate criminal enterprise in which San
Diego judges, attorneys, mediators, psychological professionals, and various service
(I3cvl944 CAB (BLM))
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providers exploit participants in dissolution and custody proceedings for financial
gain. [Complaint ~ ~ 342-385.] It further alleges that aforementioned professionals
colluded and conspired to violate the constitutional rights of COLBERN STUART
in particular, based upon his role as an advocate for children and families.
[Complaint ~ ~ 71-140.]
Cloaked within Mr. STUART's conspiracy allegations is an action against Dr.
DOYNE in which he makes various allegations stemming from Dr. DOYNE' s role
in Mr. STUART's custody proceedings, during which Mr. STUART lost custody of
his son. [Complaint ~ ~ 216-231.] Dr. DOYNE is a psychologist licensed by the state
of California who performs forensic psychology and child custody
evaluation/mediation services. [Complaint ~ 41.] Dr. DOYNE was court appointed
to act as mediator in Mr. STUART's dissolution case. [Request for Judicial Notice
("RJN") ~ 7.] Mr. STUART alleges that in September of 2008 Dr. DOYNE agreed
to act as a mediator in his custody dispute, and that during the course of his services
Dr. DOYNE reported Mr. STUART to San Diego County Child Protective Services
because Mr. STUART held his son "upside down over a balcony." [Complaint ~ ~
216-220.] According to the complaint the result of Dr. DOYNE's report, which Mr.
STUART alleges is untrue, was that Mr. STUART lost custody of his son.
[Complaint ~ 220.] Mr. STUART claims that he terminated the services of Dr.
DOYNE, and in retaliation Dr. DOYNE testified falsely against him and also
requested a bribe. [Complaint ~ 221-231.] The complaint alleges that Dr. DOYNE
breached the various agreements in June of 2009, but the complaint goes on to state
that Mr. STUART terminated Dr. DOYNE's services on March 1,2009 due to Dr.
DOYNE's alleged breaches. [Complaint ~ 216,219, and 221.]
The complaint goes on to describe an incident at a SAN DIEGO COUNTY
BAR ASSOCIATION ("SDCBA") family law seminar wherein Mr. STUART was
asked to leave but refused. [Complaint ~ ~ 113-140.] Mr. STUART was removed
(l3cvl944 CAB (BLM
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from the event by security because he refused to leave, and somehow this is the fault
of defendants because they asked him to leave. [Complaint ~ ~ 113-140.] Mr.
STUART admits that he was asked to leave and refused, and refused again when
told that ifhe did not leave he would be forcibly removed. [Complaint ~ ~ 133-136.]
Although the complaint indicates Dr. DOYNE was an "organizer and panel
member" of the SDCBA seminar, it does not explain how or if Dr. DOYNE was
involved in requesting that Mr. STUART leave the seminar. [Complaint ~ ~ 41, 113-
140.] Mr. STUART claims that he was asked to leave was because of his
involvement in "public benefit activities" which include various forms of advocacy
for reform of the family law court system. [Complaint ~ 137-140.] Mr. STUART is
a founding member of the advocacy organization CALIFORNIA COALITION OF
FAMILIES AND CHILDREN ("CCFC"), and also a found member of the law firm
LEXEVIA, both of which were involved in advocacy against the family law system.
[Complaint ~ 71-101,105,107-108.] Although it appears most causes of action are
being pleaded by all plaintiffs, it is unclear as to how defendants have damaged
CCFC or LEXEVIA, as the complaint does not describe facts indicating some direct
interference with the activities of either CCFC or LEXEVIA. In fact, paragraphs 71
through 101 of the complaint extoll the accomplishments of CCFC, paragraphs 102
through 106 describe Mr. STUART's successful legal career, and LEXEVIA's only
role appears to be legal representation of CCFC (Complaint ~ ~ 107-108). The
complaint later argues that defendants made "terrorized, seized, detained, arrested ..
." Mr. STUART, LEXEVIA, and CCFC but there are no facts alleged in the
complaint as to how the purported harassment occurred. [Complaint 143.]
Plaintiffs allege that defendants, all of whom have various professional roles
In the San Diego family law court system, be it judicial or offering forensic
psychological services, are engaged in a criminal RICO enterprise to exploit persons
involved in custody disputes. There are no specific alleged criminal acts mentioned,
(13cv1944 CAB (BLM
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OF STEPHEN E. DOYNE' S MOTION TO DISMISS
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other than Mr. STUART's removal from the SDCBA seminar, but the complaint
alleges 45 pages of ambiguous allegations that defendants engage in harassment,
witness tampering, fraud, and extortion of participants in family law matters.
[Complaint pp. 116-161.] As part of these services the defendants are engaged in
advertising, which plaintiffs claim is a breach of 15 U.S.C. section 1125, the
Lanham Act. [Complaint 260-267.] Plaintiffs seek prospective relief in the form
of an order enjoining defendants from harassing plaintiffs which shall expire 14 days
after issuance. [Complaint 386-391.] Plaintiffs further seek a declaratory
judgment rendering the "DVILS I ORDERS" and other orders of the state court
system from going into effect where those state court rulings conflict with
constitutional rights. [Complaint 392-396.] Plaintiffs filed this complaint on
August 20,2013.
3. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. The Standard for Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim where it fails to state
a cognizable legal theory or there are insufficient facts to support a cognizable legal
theory. (Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).)
The United States Supreme Court in Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly discussed the
pleading standard necessary to defeat a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 6)
in the context of a case alleging violation of 15 U.S.C. section 1, the Sherman Act.
(Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007).) In the context of the
Sherman Act, the pleading standard requires "enough fact to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement." (Id. at 556.)
Simply stating the elements of a claim without reference to supporting facts is
insufficient pleading to survive a motion to dismiss: " ... a plaintiffs obligation to
provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and
I "Domestic Dispute Intervention Legislative Scheme." [Complaint 277.]
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(l3cv1944 CAB (BLM)) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
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conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do ... " (Id. at 555.) As set forth below, despite its length plaintiffs complaint
contains insufficient facts to support the causes of action alleged.
Dr. DOYNE also seeks dismissal on the grounds that plaintiffs action is time
barred. A party may move for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 6) if it is apparent
from the face of the complaint that the statute of limitations has run. In determining
'First, ... decide what choice-of-Iaw rule governs the selection of the
statute of limitations. Second, the Court must apply that rule to
determine which jurisdiction's limitations law applies. Third, and
finally, the Court LInust] determine whether [the] pfaintiffs claims fall
within the relevant limitations period.
'
(Washington v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64609, 6 (E.D. Cal. June 16,
2011) citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250; Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,
280 (1985).) For the reasons set forth herein, the applicable statutes of limitations
for each of plaintiff s causes of action has run.
B. The Standard for Dismissal Due to Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(l).
Rule 12(b)(1) provides grounds for dismissal where the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over the claims set forth in the complaint. Lack of subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the litigation, and where it is found lacking
the action should be dismissed. (Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (U.S.
2006) (threshold number of employees for application of Title VII is an element of a
plaintiffs claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue.).) Under the circumstances of
this case and as set forth herein, the United States Supreme Court1s appellate
jurisdiction over state court jUdgments precludes subject matter jurisdiction. (Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291-292 (U.S. 2005).)
C. CCFC and LEXEVIA Lack Capacity To Bring Any Action.
CCFC and LEXEVIA have appeared in this action without representation by
an attorney permitted to practice pursuant to Local Rule 83.3. [Request for Judicial
(J3cvJ944 CAB (BLM
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Notice ("RJN"), 1-5.] Local Rule 83.3(k) also requires that only natural persons
2 may appear without representation of an attorney; therefore CCFC and LEXEVIA
3 may not appear in this action. To the extent CCFC argues it is organized under the
4 laws of the state of Delaware, the laws of Delaware likewise require that
5 corporations appear through counsel and not in propria persona. (Robbins v. P'ship
6 for Bank Capital, L.P. 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 167 at 2 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010),
7 Harris v. RHH P'rs, LP 2009 Ch. LEXIS 42 at 6 (Del. Ch. April 3, 2009).)
8 LEXEVIA suffers the additional defect of being a suspended California corporation,
9 and thus cannot sue even if represented. (Cal- Western Business Services, Inc. v.
10 Corning Capital Group, 2013 Cal. App. LEXIS 899, 9-10 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Nov.
11 6, 2013); California Revenue and Taxation Code section 23301; California
12 Corporation Code section 2205.) To the extent that Mr. STUART purports to act on
13 behalf of LEXEVIA or CCFC, he is not licensed to practice law in any of the
14 jurisdictions in which he formerly practiced. [RJN 3-5.] LEXEVIA and CCFC
15 therefore lack capacity to bring this action and their claims should be dismissed
16 pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
17 D. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Time Barred
18 Plaintiffs complaint was filed on or about August 20, 2013. Each and every
19 one of Plaintiffs' claims against Dr. DOYNE are time barred by the respective
20 statutes of limitation. The complaint alleges that Dr. DOYNE and Mr. STUART
21 entered into a written agreement on September 12, 2008, which Dr. DOYNE
22 breached prior to March 1, 2009 or in June of 2009. [Complaint,-r,-r 216, 219, and
23 221.] The SDCBA seminar at which Mr. STUART alleges he refused to leave and
24 thus was escorted out of the seminar by security occurred on April 15, 2010.
25 [Complaint,-r 114.] For the reasons set forth herein, each of Plaintiffs' causes of
26 action are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
27 / / /
28
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1 I. Plaintiffs' Claims Under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983,
2 1985, and 1986 Are Time Barred.
3 The Supreme Court held in Wilson v. Garcia that the appropriate statute of
4 limitations period for 42 U.S.C. section 1983 actions is that of the state's statute of
5 limitations for personal injury cases. (Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 105 S.
6 Ct. 1938 (1985).) In California, the statute of limitations for personal injury causes
7 of action is two years. (California Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1.)
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However, for claims against a health care provider, the time for commencement of
the action begins one year from the discovery of the claim. (California Code of
Civil Procedure section 340.5.) Section 1985 claims are likewise governed by the
state personal injury limitations period. (Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 993
F.2d 710,711-712 (9th Cir. Cal. 1993).) Section 1986 contains its own limitations
period of one year. (Kennar v. North American Rockwell Corp., 1974 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5678, 4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 1974).) Given that the claims against Dr.
DOYNE accrued in 2008-2009, the sections 1983, 1985, and 1986 causes of action
are time barred. Although the complaint is uncertain as to whether or not Dr.
DOYNE was involved in the incident in which Mr. STUART refused to leave the
SDBCA event, the date of the event is April 15,2010 and thus claims related to that
incident are likewise time barred. [Complaint,-r 114.]
H. The Lanham Act Cause of Action Is Time Barred.
The Lanham Act does not contain a limitations period, and thus courts apply
the time period of the law of the state of origin that is most connected to the action.
(W States Wholesale v. Synthetic Indus., 206 F.R.D. 271, 278 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
citing Ward v Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1981).) As set forth above,
because Dr. DOYNE is a medical care provider the appropriate limitations period is
one year from the discovery of the claim. (California Code of Civil Procedure
section 340.5.) However, even assuming arguendo that the three year statute of
(I3cv1944 CAB (BLM))
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limitations for fraud, or the four year statute of limitations period for Business &
Professions Code section 17200, 17208 should apply, plaintiffs' claims are still
barred because the complaint alleges Mr. STUART discovered in June of 2009 that
Dr. DOYNE breached his agreement with plaintiff. [Complaint ~ 219,220.]
iii. The Unjust Enrichment Cause of Action is Time Barred.
The complaint alleges that plaintiff discovered that Dr. DOYNE had engaged
in various tortious acts in June of 2009. Dr. DOYNE asserts that the action against
him arises out of the provision of healthcare services and thus the limitations period
proscribed by California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5, but even assuming
the four year limitations period for breach of contract set forth by California Code of
Civil Procedure section 337 applies, the claim remains time barred based upon a date
of discovery in June of2009. [Complaint ~ 219,200.]
iv. The RICO Causes of Action Are Time Barred.
Civil RICO actions are subject to a four year statute of limitations. (Agency
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156.) The
complaint states that Mr. STUART discovered the alleged tortious actions of Dr.
DOYNE in June of2009, and thus the RICO claims are time barred.
E. Plaintiff Cannot Establish a 42 U.S.C. 1983 Cause of Action.
In order to establish a claim for violation of section 1983, the plaintiff must
allege deprivation of a Constitutional right and that the alleged deprivation was
committed under color of state law. (Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S.
40,49-50 (U.S. 1999).) Plaintiffs' complaint contains ten counts alleging breach of
section 1983 for acts ranging in nature from breach of duty, to trespass, to breach of
contract. [Complaint pp. 69-84.] Although each count contains a listing of various
constitutional amendments, the language of the causes of action does not specify any
constitutional right(s) of which plaintiffs claim they were deprived. [Complaint pp.
69-84.] To the extent Mr. STUART claims to have been deprived of familial rights
(13cv1944 CAB (BLM))
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due to Dr. DOYNE' s role in his custody dispute, such a claim is barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine as set forth below. The facts pertaining to the SDCBA
incident state that he was escorted by security from an event because he refused to
leave; there are no facts suggesting that the actions were taken under color of law on
the part of Dr. DOYNE. The complaint is unclear as to how Dr. DOYNE was
involved in the incident, other than being a speaker at the event. [Complaint ~ 113-
140.]
To the extent that Dr. DOYNE was acting in his capacity as a court appointed
mediator, Dr. DOYNE alleges he is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity as set forth
below. For any acts plaintiffs claim are outside Dr. DOYNE's role as a mediator,
the complaint fails to allege that as a private actor Dr. DOYNE acted under color of
law. In the case of Crowe v. County of San Diego three innocent teenage boys were
indicted for murder but were later exonerated when DNA evidence showed a
transient had committed the crime. (Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406,
417 (9th Cir. Cal. 2010).) The boys and their families filed a complaint against both
state and private actors involved in the arrest, interrogation, and detention of the
young men. (Id.) During the interrogation of the boys, the police consulted with
psychologist Lawrence Blum, Ph.D., who was later named as a defendant. (Id. at
420.) The court noted that in order to find a private citizen liable as a joint actor,
there must be some meeting of the minds on the common objective of violating
constitutional rights. (Id. at 440.) Because there are no facts setting forth the
deprivation of Constitutional rights there are necessarily insufficient allegations to
demonstrate any meeting of the minds and thus the section 1983 cause of action
24 should be dismissed.
25
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F. Plaintiff Cannot Establish Any 42 U.S.C. 1985 Cause of Action.
Plaintiff s complaint alleges violation of federal legislation prohibiting
conspiracies to interfere with civil rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1985 subdivisions
(I3cv1944 CAB (BLM))
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1, 2, and 3. The statutes asserted are inapplicable to the facts alleged in the
complaint. Section 1985(1) prohibits any conspiracy to prevent an "officer" from
holding office or discharging the duties of his office. The complaint fails to allege
that Mr. STUART held any office or was attempting to discharge any duties.
Similarly, the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate a violation
under section 1985(2), which prohibits any conspiracy to prevent a witness from
providing testimony in a court of the United States. Again, the complaint is absent
of any facts showing that defendants attempted to deter plaintiffs from providing
testimony in a federal court.
To establish a violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3) the following four
elements must be alleged:
(1 t a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either or
mdlrectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protectlOn of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the 1aws; and (3 an
act in furtherance of the conspiracy (4) whereby a person is either
injured in his person or property or depnved of any nght or privilege
of a citizen of the United States.
(United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-829
(U.S. 1983), citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-103 (1971).) In
discussing when section 1985(3) may apply to a class of private persons, the
Supreme Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge noted that the statute was not intended to
reach all conspiracies to interfere with rights, but was intended to address
"invidiously discriminatory animus." (Id.) The court in Arnold v. Tiffany
interpreted the animus to mean "that kind of irrational and odious class
discrimination akin to racial bias -- such as discrimination based on national origin
or religion." (Arnold v. Tiffany, 359 F. Supp. 1034, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 1973).) In
instances where the alleged animus against a class is not premised on discrimination
akin to racial bias, the class must demonstrate a government determination that the
class merits "special federal assistance in protecting their civil rights." (Schultz v.
(l3cv I 944 CAB (BLM))
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Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. Alaska 1985), citing DeSantis v. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1979).) "Government
determination" means case law or legislation indicating that the class requires
special protection. (Id.) The complaint sets forth the classes as "parent-child,"
"domestic relations," men involved in custody disputes, and the individual plaintiffs.
[Complaint ~ ~ 194-200.] There is no authority for the proposition that these
extraordinarily diverse groups of people can constitute a class, let alone a class that
requires special protection from invidious animus. The single unifying element
between plaintiff s alleged classes, involvement in the state court family law system,
demonstrates that the groups are not entitled to special protection as they already
have means of addressing grievances within the family law court system. The
complaint therefore fails to set forth the element of section 1985(3) requiring facts
showing a conspiracy against a class of persons.
G. Plaintiffs' Complaint Fails To Establish The Elements of A Civil
RICO Claim.
The elements of a civil Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO") are as follows: "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern
(4) of racketeering activity (known as predicate acts) (5) causing injury to plaintiffs
19 business or property." (United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Bldg. &
20 Constr. Trades Dep't, 911 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1124 (E.D. Wash. 2012).) The
21 complaint must establish a nexus between the predicate acts and interstate
22 commerce, albeit minimal. (United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344 (9th Cir.
23 Ariz. 1997).) "Racketeering activity" is defined as any act indictable under several
24 provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code. 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(B). As set
25 forth herein, the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate the
26 existence of an enterprise and fails to plead the predicate acts with requisite
27 particularity.
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(13cv1944 CAB (BLM
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The complaint attempts to bind vanous legal and other professional
individuals and entities by asserting that at one time or another each has been
involved in the California family law court system. Ships passing in the sea are not
an armada, and thus the complaint fails to set forth the enterprise element of a civil
RICO claim. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1961(4), "enterprise" "includes any
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union
or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity ... ". The
Supreme Court in United States v. Turkette held that a group of individuals
associated for the purpose of trafficking narcotics and other crimes were associated
in fact for purposes of being deemed an enterprise pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section
1962. (United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (U.S. 1981).) The Turkette court
noted that an enterprise is "proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal
or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing
unit." (United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (U.S. 1981).) The existence of
an enterprise is a distinct element that must be proven separate from the pattern of
racketeering activity. (Id.) As described in the Ninth Circuit, there are therefore two
requirements for demonstrating the existence of an enterprise:
First, there must be "evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or
informal, and . . . evidence that the vanous associates function as a
continuing unit." [Citation.] Second, the enterprise must have an
existence separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it
engaged.
(Medallion TV Enters. v. SelecTV of Cal., 627 F. Supp. 1290, 1294 (C.D. Cal.
1986).)
Here, there is no enterprise. The complaint fails to allege sufficient facts
demonstrating the existence of a continuing unit separate and apart from the
ambiguously alleged predicate acts. The only separate, continually existing
enterprise is the family law court system itself. The sole thread among the alleged
participants is their sometimes involvement in the California family law court
(l3cvl944 CAB (BLM
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1 system as professionals and their participation III longstanding mediation and
2 discovery practices. [Complaint ~ ~ 297-305.] Based upon the complaint's
description of the "Domestic Dispute Industry Legal Services Marketplace" anyone
participating in California's family law court system could be a member of the
"enterprise." The complaint fails to allege a separate enterprise, and thus the RICO
causes of action should be dismissed.
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The complaint also fails to set forth sufficient facts demonstrating the
predicate acts that constitute the racketeering activity. It is unclear from the
complaint exactly what acts plaintiffs are asserting constitute the predicate acts
necessary to establish a RICO claim, although the complaint claims there have been
"tens of thousands of [predicate acts]" ranging from slavery to violent crimes, but it
fails to specify any particular act that was committed by defendants in furtherance of
the goals of an enterprise, let alone any acts by Dr. DOYNE. [Complaint ~ 336.]
The sole acts alleged to have been committed by Dr. DOYNE are set forth in
paragraph 342, which alleges that Dr. DOYNE committed "one or more SAD
2
,
ABUSE OF PROCESS, BREACH OF CONTRACT, FRAUD, EXTORTION,
ROBBERY, and INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS."
This description requires Dr. DOYNE to speculate as to exactly what plaintiff claims
he committed. There is no reference elsewhere in the complaint to robbery or
specific acts of fraud by Dr. DOYNE, and it is unclear whether or not this paragraph
intends to allege that intentional infliction of emotional distress should be considered
a predicate act for a RICO claim. If plaintiffs intend to have fraud form the basis of
the predicate acts, then the complaint fails to satisfy the heightened pleading
standard applicable to fraud claims because Dr. DOYNE cannot determine from the
face of the complaint the nature of the allegations against him. (Lancaster
Community Hasp. v. Antelope Valley Hasp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397 405 (9
th
Cir. 1991).)
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The complaint fails to allege an enterprise of properly plead any predicate acts, and
thus the RICO causes of action should be dismissed.
H. Plaintiff Cannot Establish A Claim Under The Lanham Act.
Plaintiffs' Lanham Act cause of action alleges that defendants engage In
"commercial speech" that misleads the public. [Complaint ~ 266.] Although the
complaint does not identify the specific subdivision of the Act being prosecuted,
claims of misleading advertising would fall under 15 U.S.C. section 1125(a). A
false advertising claim requires that the plaintiff demonstrate (1) a false statement of
fact about the defendant's product in connection with its advertising; (2) deception of
or a tendency to deceive a substantial segment of the advertisement's audience; (3)
deception that is material, i.e., likely to influence a purchasing decision; (4)
defendant's introduction of its false statement into interstate commerce; and (5)
injury or likely injury to the plaintiff as a result of the false statement. (Southland
Sad Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134 (9thCir.1997).)
As an initial point, the complaint does not reference any specific item of
advertising, so it likewise fails to set out how any statements contained in the
advertising are false or misleading. The only advertising referenced is for the "sale
for their legal services" so it is unclear as to how this language applies to Dr.
DOYNE, who is a psychologist and not a lawyer. The complaint makes reference to
representations made by Dr. DOYNE, but does not set out where or how these
representations are made such that they would fall within the Act's definition of
advertising. [Complaint ~ 261.] The complaint does not identify where or how the
statements attributed to Dr. DOYNE are published, so there is no means of
determining if the statements constitute advertising. [Complaint ~ 261.] All but one
of the statements cited in the complaint are not representations of fact, i.e.
"mediations are safe," "prices for services are reasonable," and that Dr. DOYNE
will observe "professional, and moral restraint in his duties," and thus are not
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actionable under the Lanham Act. [Complaint ~ 261.] Liability under section
1125(a) requires that a statement be capable of being proven true or false. (Coastal
Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 725, 730 (9th Cir. Cal.
1999); Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. Northern California Collection Service, Inc.,
911 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. Cal. 1990); Summit Tech. v. High-Line Medical Instruments,
Co., 933 F. Supp. 918,931 (C.D. Cal. 1996).) The complaint therefore fails to set
forth any advertisement, nor any claim of a false representation of fact. Because
there is no actual advertisement alleged, the complaint fails to describe how the non-
alleged advertisement impacts interstate commerce. Without a statement of
advertising, none of the remaining elements for a Lanham Act violation can be met.
Plaintiffs also lack standing to bring a Lanham Act claim. CCFC and
LEXEVIA are corporations that are unrepresented by counsel, and LEXEVIA' s
corporate status has been suspended, and thus the only party in consideration for a
Lanham Act claim is Mr. STUART. In order to have standing, Mr. STUART must
show "'(1) a commercial injury based upon a misrepresentation about a product; and
(2) that the injury is 'competitive,' or harmful to the plaintiff's ability to compete
with the defendant. '" (TrafficSchool. com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 826
(9th Cir. Cal. 2011), citing Jack Russell Terrier Network of Northern California v.
American Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005).) In the Ninth
Circuit, standing is therefore conferred upon competitors of the defendant who have
suffered a competitive injury. (Jack Russell Terrier Network v. Am. Kennel Club,
Inc., 407 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th Cir. Cal. 2005).) Mr. STUART is not a commercial
competitor of Dr. DOYNE. The complaint does not allege facts demonstrating that
Mr. STUART is engaged in the business of providing psychological consulting
services. The complaint therefore fails to allege sufficient facts to support a claim
for violation of the Lanham Act.
III
(I 3cvl 944 CAB (BLM))
- 15 -
OF STEPHEN E. DOYNE' S MOTION TO DiSMISS
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I. Plaintifrs Cannot Establish Federal Jurisdiction.
i. All Claims Arising From Dr. DOYNE's Participation In
STUART's Family Law Matter Are Barred By The Domestic
Relations Exception To Federal Jurisdiction.
The burden of establishing federal court jurisdiction falls on the party seeking
to invoke jurisdiction. (Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America (1994) 511
U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed. 2d 291.) In this case, plaintiffs
cannot meet their burden because the gravamen of this lawsuit seeks to invalidate
orders of the San Diego Superior court pertaining to the management of family law
cases. The complaint both generally indicts the entirety of the family law system
and addresses orders made in Mr. STUART's dissolution. [Complaint ~ ~ 216-257.]
Since Plaintiffs are suing based on the California Superior Court's orders through
the guise of a Civil Rights Claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the action is barred
by the domestic relations exception (the "Exception"). The Exception "divests the
federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees."
(Ankenbrant v. Richards (1992) 504 U.S. 689,703, 112 S.Ct. 2206,2215,119 L.Ed.
2d 468.) In Ankenbrant v. Richards, the Supreme Court discussed the history of the
Exception and its origin in dicta from the case of Barber v. Barber (1859) 62 U.S.
582, 21 HOW 582, 16 L. Ed. 226, which stated that federal courts lack jurisdiction
over divorce and alimony suits. The Supreme Court in Ankenbrandt v. Richards
noted the expansion of the doctrine set forth in the case of In re Burrus 136 U.S.
586, 10 S. Ct. 850, 34 L. Ed. 500, 1890 U.S. LEXIS 2233 (U.S. 1890), wherein the
Burrus court stated, "the whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and
wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the
United States ... " (Jd. at 703.) Ankenbrandt held that the Exception formulated by
Supreme Court rulings was supported by sound policy considerations and that had
stood the test of time without any expression of Congressional dissatisfaction. (Id.)
(13cvl944 CAB (BLM))
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The Ninth Circuit's test for subject matter jurisdiction in domestic relations
cases was set forth in Buechold v. Ortiz (9
th
Cir. 1968) 401 F.2d 371. There the
court held that family law matters are the province of state courts:
... federal courts must decline jUloisdiction of cases concerning
domestic relations when the primary lssu.e concerns the status of parent
and child or husband and WIfe. [CItations.] As Justice Holmes said in
State of Ohio ex rei. Popovici v. Agler supra: lilt has been understood
that, 'the whole subject of domestic relations of husband and w i f e ~
p'arent and chi Id, belongs to the laws of the states and not to the laws of
the United States. til
(ld. at 372.)
The Buechold v. Ortiz court notes that state courts have developed
methodologies for determining child custody orders, which involve the
consideration of criteria such as living standards and wages that are dependent upon
conditions in the area where the parties reside, and thus regulation of domestic
matters should be left to state courts:
State courts deal with these problems daily and have developed an
expertise that should discourage the intervention of federal cOUlis. As a
matter of policy and comity, these local_problems should be decided in
state courts. Domestic relations is a field peculiarly suited to state
regulation and control, and peculiarly unsuited to control by federal
courts .
(Jd.)
Where a party is unhappy with a state court family law decision, the party
may seek relief in the state court. As was the case in Buechold v. Ortiz, where the
party failed to seek relief in the California state courts, there is no indication in Mr.
STUART's complaint as to why he cannot seek relief in the state court.
II. To The Extent That This Action Seeks To Challenge Any
Order Of The Family Law Court It Is Barred By The
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a federal court from having
jurisdiction over general constitutional challenges if such claims are inextricably
(13cv1944 CAB (BLM
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intertwined with the claims asserted in state court. (Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.
(U.S. 1923) 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362, 1923 U.S. LEXIS 2824;
District of Columbia Court of Appeal v. Feldman (U.S. 1983) 460 U.S. 462,103 S.
Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206.) In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. the plaintiffs alleged an
adverse state court judgment violated the constitution, and sought redress in the
federal court. (Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (U.S. 1923) 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149,
68 L. Ed. 362.) The Supreme Court held in Rooker that if the state court's ruling
was wrong, the appropriate action was to pursue an appeal. (Id. at 416.) Similarly,
the Supreme Court in Feldman that the federal court lacked authority to review a
final judicial determination of the District of Columbia high court. (Id. at 476.) The
principals of these holdings have come to be known as the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, which applies to cases wherein a losing party in a state case seeks to have a
federal court reject a judgment of the state court. (Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., (U.S. 2005) 544 U.S. 280,291, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 161 L. Ed. 2d 454
("Rooker-Feldman doctrine is confined to cases of the kind from which it acquired
its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-
court judgments rendered before the federal district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments. ").)
As plaintiffs are seeking an injunction finding superior court orders to be
unconstitutional and thereby invalid, this case falls squarely within the parameters of
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. [Complaint,-r,-r 394-396.] As stated in Noel v. Hall
(9
th
Cir. 2003) 341 F.3d 1148, 1165, "(t)he 'inextricably intertwined' analysis of
Feldman applies to defeat federal district court subject matter jurisdiction when a
plaintiff s suit in federal district court is at least in part a forbidden de facto appeal of
a state court judgment, and an issue in that federal suit is 'inextricably intertwined'
with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision." (Id. at 1158.) This
complaint makes no secret of its intention to have this court invalidate state court
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orders, and thus all issues are inextricably intertwined with issues resolved by state
courts.
J. Plaintiff's Claims Are Barred By The Doctrine Of Quasi-Judicial
Immunity.
Dr. DOYNE was court appointed to act as mediator in Mr. STUART's
dissolution case, and as such is protected by the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity.
[RJN ~ 7, Exh. G p. 23.] He was appointed for the purpose of making
recommendations to the court regarding custody and visitation. [RJN ~ 7, Exh. G
p. 23.] It is clear that Congress did not intend section 1983 to abrogate immunities
"well grounded in history and reason." (Buckley v. Fitzsimmons (1993) 509 U.S.
259,268, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2612-13, 125 L.Ed. 2d 209.) The United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of witness immunity and section 1983 in the case of
Briscoe v. Lahue (U.S. 1983) 460 U.S. 325, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 75 L. Ed. 2d 96,
wherein the Court held that section 1983 does not abrogate the immunity provided to
participants in judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court has recognized that "when
Congress enacted 1983 it was aware of a well-established and well-understood
common-law tradition that extended absolute immunity to individuals performing
functions necessary to the judicial process." (Miller v. Gammie (9
th
Cir. 2003) 335
F.3d 889, 895-96, (Abrogated in part on other grounds).) The common law provided
absolute immunity from subsequent damages liability for all persons - governmental
or otherwise - who were integral parts of the judicial process." (Briscoe, supra, 40
22 U.S. at 335.)
23
24
25
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This protection extended to private counsel and witnesses for their
involvement in the "judicial proceeding itself." (ld. at 334.) Non-judicial persons
who fulfill quasi-judicial functions intimately related to the judicial process have
absolute immunity for damage claims arising from their performance of the
delegated functions. (Myers v. Morris (8
th
Cir. 1987) 810 F.2d 1437, 1466-67.)
(l3cvl944 CAB (BLM))
- 19 -
OF STEPHEN E. DOYNE' S MOTION TO DISMISS
1 Absolute immunity may properly be raised in support of a motion to dismiss for
2 failure to state a claim. (See Imbler v. Pachtman (1976) 424 U.S. 409, 416; 96 S.Ct.
3 984, 988; Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court, (9th Cir. 1987) 828 F.2d 1385,
4 1387). Further, the absolute immunity of therapists extends beyond the function of
5 testifying before the family court and encompasses the provisions of their reports
6 and recommendations to the family court. (Myers v. Morris (1987) 810 F.2d 1437,
7 1465.) Psychologists who fulfill quasi-judicial functions intimately related to the
8 judicial process have absolute immunity for damage claims resulting from their
9 performance of the delegated functions. (Kurzawa v. Meuller (6
th
Cir. 1984) 732
10 F.2d 1456, 1548.)
11 In Kurzawa, the defendants included a psychologist who examined the
12 plaintiffs' child and made findings used by the state court to determine what
13 environment best served the interests of the child. The court found that this function
14 of providing information to be analogous to that of a witness and under Briscoe and
15 its predecessors entitled the psychologist to immunity from a section 1983 lawsuit.
16 (Id. at 1458) The court noted that psychologists must be able to perform the tasks
17 necessary to achieve the goal of determining what is best for the child without the
18 "worry of intimidation and harassment from dissatisfied parents." (Id.)
19 The functions of a court-appointed 730 expert are "to investigate, to render a
20 report as may be ordered by the court, and to testify as an expert at the trial of the
21 action relative to the fact or matter as to which the expert evidence is or may be
22 required." (California Evidence Code section 730.)
23 Because it is plain from the face of the Complaint that Dr. DOYNE was
24 engaged in judicial or quasi-judicial acts, and that he was not acting in the clear
25 absence of all jurisdiction, he is immune from damages. (ld. at 1394.)
26 / / /
27 / / /
28
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K. The Complaint Fails To Establish A Claim for Prospective Relief.
Plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief both run afoul of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine and fail to set forth the requirements for injunctive relief. The complaint
fails to establish (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm in the
absence of relief, that the balance of equities favor the injunction, or (4) that the
injunction is in the public interest. (Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 555 U.S. 7,22 (2008).) The complaint fails to address any of these elements. It
also is entirely unclear as to exactly what the plaintiff is requesting. There are no
facts demonstrating interference with plaintiffs' interactions with federal or any
other law enforcement, so there cannot be any need for an order prohibiting said
interference. In sweeping fashion, the complaint also asks this court to invalidate
unknown past, present, and possibly future orders of the superior court related to
family law litigation. Without any demonstration of need or exigency, plaintiffs'
claims for prospective relief should be dismissed.
L. Dr. DOYNE is Immune from Liability Based Upon Reports of
Suspected Child Abuse
Dr. DOYNE is legally obligated by California Penal Code section 11166 to
report suspected child abuse as he is a mandated reported as defined by California
Penal Code section 11165.7(21). To the extent that the complaint alleges that Dr.
DOYNE was negligent or otherwise culpable in reporting suspected child abuse of
Mr. STUART's son, Dr. DOYNE is immunized from liability by California Penal
Code section 11172, which provides that "no mandated reporter shall be civilly or
criminally liable for any report required or authorized by this article ... " To the
extent that paragraph 220 of the complaint alleges that Dr. DOYNE was culpable
based upon Dr. DOYNE's report of suspected child abuse, Dr. DOYNE is immune
from liability.
27 / / /
28
- 21 -
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORlTIES IN SUPPORT
1 M. The Complaint Fails to Comply with Rule 8.
2 Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that claims for relief
3 contain "a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
4 Failure to comply with Rule 8 provides grounds for dismissal, even where the
5 heightened standard of pleading under Rule 9 applied. (McHenry v. Renne, 84 F .3d
6 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. Cal. 1996), citing Schmidt v. Herrmann, 614 F.2d 1221 (9th
7 Cir. 1980).) In McHenry v. Renne, the court upheld the dismissal of a complaint that
8 was "argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant." (Id. at
9 11 77 -11 78.) The court found there were adequate grounds for dismissal because
10 despite the length of the complaint, because despite the length of the complaint, "one
11 cannot determine from the complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on what
12 theory, with enough detail to guide discovery." (Id. at 1178.)
13 The Issue in McHenry v. Renne is precisely the Issue with plaintiffs'
14 complaint; the irrelevant facts, innumerable acronyms, and argumentative
15 descriptions create a pleading that instead of setting forth causes of action "seems
16 designed to provide quotations for newspaper stories." (Id. at 1177-1178.) The
17 parties are left to speculate as to which facts apply to which parties, and it cannot be
18 determined with certainty against which counts a party must defend. In light of the
19 failure to comply with Rule 8, plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed. In the
20 alternative, Dr. DOYNE requests that this court order that plaintiffs provide a more
21 definite statement pursuant to Rule 12( e).
22 III
23 III
24 III
25 III
26 III
27 III
28
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4. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss of Dr. DOYNE should
be granted without leave to amend.
DATED: December 11,2013 CALLAHAN, THOMPSON, SHERMAN
& CAUDILL,

JOAN E. TRIMBLE
for Defendant,
STEPHEN E. DOYNE, PH.D, and
STEPHEN E. DOYNE, A.P.C.
G:\ACE\0130009\Mtns\Mot. to Dismiss - Doyne\Doyne Mot to Dismiss P&A.docx
- 23 -
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORlTIES IN SUPPORT
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PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
COUNTY OF ORANGE
I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California, I am over the agt! of
18 years and not a p'arty to the within action; my business address is 2601 Main
Street, Suite 800, Irvine, California.
On this date, December 11,2013, I served the foregoing document described as:
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
STEPHEN E. DOYNE'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
I enclosed a true copy of said documents in a sealed envelope or package
addressed to the persons noted below.
(By United States Mail) I placed the envelope for collection and mailin9.'
rotrowmg our firm's ordinary business practices. I am familiar with our firm s
p'ractice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same
Clay that correspondence is placed for collectIOn and mailing, it is deposited in the
ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed
envelope with postage fully prepaid.
overnight delivery) I enclosed the documents in an envelope or package
provided by an overnight delivery carrier and addressed to the persons listed
below. I placed the envelope or package for collection and overnigl;lt delivery at an
office or a regularly utilizeo drop box of the overnight delivery carrier.
(By messenger service) I served the documents by placing them in an
envelope or addressed to the persons at tpe addresses oelow and providing
them to a professIOnal messenger service for service.
(By fax transmission) Based on agreement of the parties to accept service
OyTax transmission, I faxed the documents to the p'ersons at the fax numbers listed
below. No error was reported by the fax machine that I used. A copy of the record
of the fax transmission, which I printed out, is attached.
X (Bj' Electronic Service) To be filed electronically with the Clerk of the Court
lIiTOugli ECF, and that ECF will send an e-notice of electronic filing to the counsel
listed on the attached service list.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
above is true and correct. I further declare that I am employed in the office of a
member of the bar of this court at whose direction the servIce was rna e.
Executed on December 11,2013, at Irvine, Califo
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SERVICE LIST
Case Name
Court
Case Number
: CCFC V. SDCBA
: USDC - Southern District
: 13CV1944 CAB (BLM)
ECF ELECTRONICALLY-SERVED:
Daniel S. Agle
dagle@klinedinstlaw.com,traymond@klinedinstlaw.com
Charles R Grebing
cgrebing@wingertlaw.com,eruiz@wingertlaw.com,dstein@wingertlaw.com,dslack@wingertlaw
.com
Matthew L Green

Timothy R. Pestotnik
tim@tprglaw.com,russ@tprglaw.com,winslow@tprglaw.com,houston@tprglaw.com
Brian A Rawers
rawers@lbbslaw.comjennifer .cannone@lewisbris bois.com,katherine. weadock@lewisbrisbois.co
m,steven.meyer@lewisbrisbois.com,kathie.chapa@lewisbrisbois.com
Ricky R Sanchez
ricky .sanchez@sdcounty.ca.gov,odette.ortega@sdcounty. ca.gov ,stefanie.osbom@sdcounty.ca.g
ov
Dwayne Hoover Stein
dstein@wingertlaw.com
Colbern C Stuart, III
cole.stuart@lexevia.com,ricoman1968@aol.com
Kyle M Van Dyke
kvandyke@hurst-hurst.com,dretes@hurst-hurst.com
Richard F Wolfe
Richard. Wolfe@doj.ca.gov,Karina.Gutierrez@doj .ca.gov,celia.valdivia@doj .ca.gov ,kristin.hogu
e@doj.ca.gov
- 2 -

67-1 Mem Iso Doyn MTN To Dismiss

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