Marxism and Positivism A Discussion

Marxism and Positivism
Author(s): W. Byron Groves

Source: Crime and Social Justice, No. 23, SOCIALISM, CAPITALISM, AND THE REPRODUCTION
OF CRIME (1985), pp. 129-150
Published by: Social Justice/Global Options
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/29766255 .
Accessed: 24/05/2014 17:06
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
.
Social Justice/Global Options is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Crime
and Social Justice.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 142.58.129.109 on Sat, 24 May 2014 17:06:14 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Pedagogy
Marxism and Positivism
W.
Byron
Groves
The
being of Spirit
cannot...be taken as
something fixed
and
immovable
(Hegel, 1977:204).
Introduction
What is the
relationship
between Marxism and
positivism?
One
might
suspect
that this
question
has been
answered,
as
positivism
has received a fair
amount of attention from radical
criminologists.
And
yet
the
relationship
be?
tween Marxism and
positivism
is not
clearly
defined. For
example,
after
listing
several
assumptions
characteristic of
positive inquiry1,
one
prominent
Marx?
ist
criminologist
concludes that
"virtually every
tenet of
positivist criminology
has been attacked
by
radicals"
(Greenberg, 1981:2).
On the other
hand,
this
same author
goes
on to note that "the concerns of
positivist criminology
and
its
empirical
research
findings
are not
inherently incompatible
with a Marxian
perspective" (Greenberg,
1971:65).
But what does this mean? Does it mean
that Marxism is best characterized as a
measured,
predictive
science of human
behavior;
or that causal
analysis
is the sine
qua
non of Marxist
inquiry?
To
add to the
ambivalence,
we
might
note that causal models are
implied
in the
efforts of radicals who are otherwise hostile towards
positivism (i.e., Taylor
et
al., 1973)
and are
openly supported by
others in the radical
camp (Gordon,
1971;
Spitzer,
1975).
For the
record,
we have no
quarrel
whatsoever with causal
analyses.
More
than that: the causal structures which inhere in
positivism
are
indispensable
for a balanced
understanding
of criminal
(or any other)
behavior. But let us
not make too much of this
claim,
for there can be no doubt that
criminology
is
top-heavy
with
positivistic thinking.
BYRON GROVES is
currently teaching
in the
Department
of Social
Change
and
Development,
University
of
Wisconsin,
Green
Bay,
WI 54302.
CRIME AND SOCIAL JUSTICE No. 23 129
130 GROVES
This
article, then,
stands as an
attempt
to substantiate claims made
by
criminologists wishing
to
qualify
the
assumptions
which underlie
positivism.
Specifically,
we wish to outline a neo-Marxist
conception
of human
agency,
and shall do so with the assistance of
Hegel,
Marx's most
important
philosophical predecessor.2 Continuity
between the two will be established with
reference to the
following
issues:
determinism,
praxis, labor, teleology,
the
relationship
between the natural and the social
sciences,
their
conception
of
the
"individual,"
and their
conception
of the
relationship
between the individual
and
society.
As will become
evident,
their stand
on
these issues is a far
cry
from that
presupposed by positive criminology.
Though
our concern is with both
Hegel
and
Marx,
this
critique
will draw
heavily
on
Hegel,
who allows us to do three
things:
first,
he serves as an ex?
cellent and
perhaps indispensable stepping
stone to
Marx; second,
he
provides
a
conception
of human
agency
which
challenges
the
hegemonic portrait
of?
fered
by positive criminology;
and
finally,
he foreshadows
many
of the most
important
themes to have
emerged
in social and
political theory
over the last
two decades.
Hegel began
a "revolution in the basic
categories
in which we
understand the self
(Taylor, 1977:5),
and the
way
in which we
conceptualize
the self has
everything
to do with the
type
of
criminology
we
subsequently
undertake. As Dawe
(1978:379)
sees
it,
this concern with human
agency
"is
the
problem
around which the entire
history
of
sociological analysis
could be
written...[it
is
the] single
most central
concept
in
sociology.''
4'Furthermore,
insofar as our choice of models
implies
an ordinal
ranking
in terms of "better"
or
"worse,"
we confront a moral as well as a theoretical
problem. Images
of
man,
theories of human
behavior,
models of
practical
intervention,
and
morality
?
these
go
hand in hand. Let us
see, then,
where Marx and
Hegel
stand on this crucial issue.
1.
Physiognomy
and
Phrenology
The
particular portion
of
Hegelianism
with which we shall be concerned
comes from a
chapter
of his
Phenomenology of Spirit
entitled
Physiognomy
and
Phrenology.
In
it,
Hegel
assesses a form of consciousness which he calls
the
"logic
of observation." When
Hegel
refers to the
"logic
of
observation,"
he is
speaking
of a method
presupposing continuity
between the natural and
social sciences. He wishes to know what use this method is in the
study
of
human
beings. Against
the view that there is no substantive difference between
the natural and social
sciences,
Hegel
will conclude that the further "observ?
ing
reason"3 rises above an
analysis
of
nature,
the less it is able to
explain,
for
"description
and classification of
things correspond
to a certain
logic
of
being
which is
adequate
to
elementary
existence"
?
not to the existence of
human
beings (Hyppolite, 1974:259).
Put
crudely,
a
methodology
such as this
errs
by treating persons
as
though they
were
objects,
which is
why Hegel
assails
oberving
reason for its
"fixity,"
for
treating
its
objects
as "frozen universals
and as "arrested
particulars."
The sum and substance of his
argument
is
that,
when
transplanted
from the natural into the human
realm,
"observing
reason"
Marxism and Positivism 131
will
prove
itself
incapable
of
grasping
the nature of the rational and self
conscious
agent.
For
Hegel,
human
beings
differ from rocks and
bugs
in that
they
have a
hand in their own
self-creation,
have a
capacity
to "transcend" themselves.
In his Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts,
Marx
(1975:386)
had
argued
that this was the most
important thing
to be
gleaned
from
Hegel's
Phenomenology of Spirit:
'
'The
importance
of
Hegel's Phenomenology..
.lies
in the fact that
Hegel
conceives the self-creation of man as a
process...and
conceives
objective
man...as the result of his own labor." It is
precisely
a
failure to
acknowledge
this which
...underlies all those would be sciences that
aspire
to
give
observa?
tion the same role in the
study
of human
beings
than it has into in?
quiries
into nature. For what we can observe in nature
is,
so to
speak,
all that there is to
discover;
but what we can observe in human be?
ings
is the
expression
of rational
activity,
which cannot be understood
as
merely
the sum of the movements that we observe
(Maclntyre,
1974:232-233).
Furthermore,
the
methodology
which
Hegel
intends to examine smacks
of
positivism
in its reliance on the
objectification, quantification,
classifica?
tion and observation of behavior.
Thus,
Hegel
is concerned to
distinguish
positivism,
discussed in terms of environmental and
physiological
determinism,
from a
decidedly Marxist/Hegelian
mode of
understanding
human action.
Marxism and Determinism4
Hegel begins by offering
a
critique
of determinism as a mechanism for
adequately understanding
human behavior. The
postulate
of determinism
underlies
virtually every explanation
of criminal
behavior,
and what follows
is a
passage
from
Kinberg's
Basic Problems
of Criminology (1935:66-67)
which
deals with the notions of free
will, determinism,
and indeterminism from a
positivist perspective.
We cite it in order to
provide insight
into the
way tWnking
existed
then,
and still exists
today,
in
criminology.
Metaphysical
theses and
misinterpretations
of
empirical
facts are ex?
tremely
harmful to
criminology..
.as
they
distort scientific
thought...
.The
general validity
of the law of
causation,
on the other
hand,
is essential
to all scientific work....The fundamental
predictability
of human ac?
tions,
and the
possibility
in
many
areas of
actually seeing
how a man
will act
are, however,
of
great importance
to
criminology....If
psychological
connections were
fortuitous,
practical
criminal
policy
would
collapse.
It would be
impossible
with
any degree
of
probability
to
predict...whether
and in what circumstances this
effect,
once ac?
tually
observed,
would
actually persist.
To treat criminal
etiological
problems scientifically
would also be
impossible_The
^deterministic
attitude is thus hostile to science. It.. .is hostile also to
morality.
132 GROVES
One
might suspect
that this last sentence is an anachronism. Indeterminism
may
or
may
not be
wrong
?
but immoral? Ernest
Becker,
perhaps
the most
eloquent
student of man to have
emerged
in the last 20
years,
stands this
equa?
tion of determinism with
morality
on its head with his declaration that
"if
we
had a science
of
the
precise
determinism
of
human behavior
we
should have
to
repudiate
it! It would be
incompatible
with the belief in human
possibility"
(Becker, 1964:216).
In
any event,
mainstream
positive criminologists
do
cling
to the notion of
determinism,
and do see its retention as
having something
to do with
morality.
Travis
Hirschi,
for
example,
"has declared.. .that for
criminologists
to
neglect
research on
why people
commit crimes is
morally
indefensible.
He
argues
that this is what
criminologists
are
paid
to do and what
they ought
to deliver"
(Pepinsky,
1980:29
?
emphasis added).
In his American
Delinquency,
Lamar
Empey (1978:15)
refers to a
group
of theories which dominate
contemporary criminological thought (culture,
strain,
and control
theories)
and notes
that,
'
'Ultimately..
.all
imply
that human
behavior is determined and not free." This belief in determinism
promotes
crystal-ball criminology,
i.e.,
the frantic
quest
for a constellation of antece?
dent events which will enable us to
pin
down the "cause" of crime once and
for all. This is
why
Hirschi
(in Johnson, 1978:378) argues
that "the
postulate
of determinism is essential to social science. It asserts that
delinquency
can
be
completely explained.
It directs us to continue the search." But such a view
is not shared
by everyone,
and
no less a social scientist than Karl
Popper
(1977:85)
has
acknowledged
that "determinism is not a
necessary prerequisite
of a science which can make
predictions.
Scientific method
cannot, therefore,
be said to favor the
adoption
of a strict determinism."
Why,
then,
do certain
criminologists
see the notion of determinism as
"essential"? One common
justification
is that determinism allows for con?
tinuity
between the natural and social sciences. Christensen
(1980:19)
has this
in mind when he
argues
that the scientist "must
accept
one basic
axiom...,
an axiom
concerning
the
uniformity
in nature. The scientist must believe that
there is
uniformity
in nature because otherwise there can be no
science,"
which
is
something
like
saying
that the
theologian
must believe in God or there can
be no
religion.
In
any
case,
the bottom line for
Christensen,
and for
positive
criminology generally,
"is the notion of determinism." But the belief that it
is determinism which unites the natural and social sciences
only betrays
a lack
of
insight
into the natural sciences themselves. Werner
Hiesenberg,
the noted
physical
scientist,
points
out the a
priori
nature of universal causal determinism
under the rubric of his
'
'uncertainty principle.''
The
long
and short of his
posi?
tion is that the
presumed
existence of a universe
governed by
the law of cau?
sality
is
..
.sterile and
meaningless
?
and we wish to
emphasize
this
opinion.
Physics
is
only supposed
to describe the connection of
perceptions
in a formal
way.
The true situation can better be characterized in the
following way:
Since all
experiments
are
subjected
to the laws of
quantum
mechanics,
the
invalidity of
the law
of causality
is
definitely
proved by quantum
mechanics
(in Quinney, 1970:133).
Now,
we
certainly
do not
object
to the use of models which
presuppose
determinism for certain
purposes;
we
do, however,
object
to the miraculous
transubstantiation of a mere model into the eleventh commandment. Let us
be
very
clear on this
point:
determinism is a
metaphysical concept.
It is as
much a transcendental
starting point
as Kant could ever have
imagined.
Fur?
thermore,
this model
strips
human action of
any
creative or constitutive dimen?
sions
whatsoever,
makes the
subject
accidental,
and for this reason has been
denounced
by
Habermas
(1971:90)
as
"misleading ontology."
In
general,
positive
scientists disdain
philosophy,
and terms like
epistemology, ontology,
and
metaphysics
are
likely
to earn a
grimace
from the
tough-minded empiricist.
Against
those who see
philosophical
concerns as trivial or
irrelevant,
we should
argue
that more attention to them would
spare
students some of the more
glow?
ing
excesses of the
positivistic
tradition.
We shall return to this notion of determinism. For the time
being,
let us
see how
Hegel
deals with this issue.
Though
determinism takes
many forms,
it is convenient for
present pur?
poses
to
speak
of internal
(physiological)
and external
(environmental)
influences as
they impact
on behavior.
Hegel begins
with environmental deter?
minism,
points
out its
limitations,
and moves to a
critique
of
physiological
determinism under the
guise
of
physiognomy
and
phrenology (the
latter of
which is
quite
familiar to
criminologists).
Both forms of
determinism,
he
argues,
seek laws which
attempt
to relate structure
(be
that structure
physiological
or
environmental)
and function
(behavior),
and do so under the
rubric of the
logic
of observation.
Beginning
with external
influences,
Hegel
notes that there are two
"poles"
to the
relationship:
the individual and the environment. In
Hegel's
words:
The moments
constituting
the content of the law
are,
on the one
hand,
the
individuality
itself,
on the other
hand,..
.the
given
circumstances,
situations, habits, customs,
religion,
and so on: from these the
specific
individuality
is to be
comprehended....They
are
something given,
something
which
provides
material
for
observation and which... ex?
presses
itself in the form of
individuality (Hegel,
1977:183
?
second
emphasis added).
The
strategy,
then,
is to observe the
many
factors
(i.e.,
the
circumstances,
situations, habits, customs, etc.,)
which
"press"
on the individual from out?
side and are
presumably responsible
for
creating
that individual. The reason
that environmental determinism is amenable to the
logic
of observation is that
it is believed
possible
to observe the
individual,
count
up
all the environmental
contacts made over
time,
add them
up
and
specify
the influences which
'
'made''
the individual what he or she is
(Sutherland's theory
of
Differential
Associa?
tion is
unquestionably
the best
example
of this
mentality)5.
If
"observing
134 GROVES
reason" is to vindicate
itself,
it must live
up
to the
following requirement:
"The law of this relation
[i.e.,
between the individual and the
environment]
would have to state the kind of effect and influence exerted on the individual?
ity by
these
specific
circumstances"
(Hegel, 1977:183).
In other
words,
how
do these
general
circumstances
merge
to form this
particular
individual? Sartre
(1962:22) argues
that
analysis
such as this
"proceeds
from the
postulate
that
an individual fact is
produced by
the intersection of abstract universal laws....
The concrete is
only
an
organization
of abstract
qualities;
the individual is
only
the intersection of universal schemata." Put in terms of Sutherland's
theory,
we
might say
that the individual is a vacant intersection for stimuli which
vary
in
intensity, frequency, priority,
and duration.
Though
the location of the
independent
variable is in a different
place (i.e.,
in the
body
as
opposed
to the
environment), Hegel
sees
exactly
the same
strategy
underlying
the
pseudo-sciences
of
physiognomy
and
phrenology.
With refer?
ence to
physiognomy
the
hope
is that
individuality
can be deduced from facial
expressions,
while the
phrenologist hopes
to
explain
behavior
by measuring
skull formations. While the
specific findings
of these
pseudo-sciences
have
long
since been
discredited,
the
operative principle guiding
such
inquiries
has
not. In its continued
attempts
to locate
phrenology-like
causes,
traditional
criminology
has
generated
a veritable carnival of causes
(these
include
physical
type theories,
criminal
anthropology, phrenology, intelligence testing,
theories
of
heredity
and
hereditary
defects,
endocrine
imbalance,
XYY chromosomal
theories,
theories of the autonomic nervous
system, neuroticism,
and extraver
sion
?
and this list is limited to a
partial specification
of
dispositional variables).
It has reached the
point, especially
with
respect
to
dispositional
variables such
as
these,
that
theory
is abandoned in favor of the
"non-spurious
correlation."
David
Layzer (1973:122-123),
himself a
physical
scientist,
explains
this cor?
relation fetish as an
attempt by
social scientists to emulate methods assumed
in the natural or
physical
sciences. He
goes
on to
note, however,
that the belief
that this
type
of measurement emulates that used in the natural sciences
..
.is mistaken. The first and most crucial
step
toward an understand?
ing
of
any
natural
phenomenon
is not measurement. One must
begin
by deciding
which
aspects
of the
phenomenon
are worth
examining.
To do this
intelligently,
one needs to
have,
at the
very outset,
some
kind of
explanatory
or
interpretive
framework... .The
aspect
of scien?
tific measurements the non-scientists often fail to
appreciate
is that
they always presuppose
a theoretical framework....In
short,
signifi?
cant measurements
usually grow
from theories and not vice versa.
Despite
this
reservation,
much time in theoretical
criminology
is
spent
on
the "correlation
hunt,"
specifying, defining,
and
measuring
a
potpourri
of
ever-elusive
independent
variables.
Attempts
such as
these,
when carried to
the
extreme,
are a forceful reminder of what C.
Wright
Mills
(1977)
calls
"abstracted
empiricism,"
and
Hegel (1977:194) argues
that excessive reliance
on abstracted variables such as these is neither useful nor
interesting:
"to
recount that one man has more inclination than
another,
another more in?
telligence,
is...not
very interesting,...for
these
give
observation the
right
to
take them
[the correlations] singly
and
uncomprehendingly.
It is to take con?
scious
individuality unintelligently,
as a manifestation that is
single
and
separate," giving
rise to the
charge
that
"explanations"
such as these are
a-theoretical and a-historical in that
they arbitrarily bypass
human
agency
and
presuppose
a
complete
vitiation of
subjectivity.
Neither Sartre6 nor
Hegel
is satisfied with such abstracted
explanations,
and both are of the
opinion
that "laws"
specifying
a determinate
relationship
between environmental or
dispositional
variables and behavior will remain
forever elusive. Chambliss and Seidman
(1982:11)
have much the same reser?
vation in mind with their observation that "no sooner did social scientists
develop
'laws' about human behavior than eternal human cussedness
proved
them less than invariant." Much of what we have to
say
in the remainder of
this
paper
will be an
attempt
to examine
just
what this "eternal human
cussedness" is all about.
In a
depiction
of
individuality
which smacks of the existentialism of a
Dostoyevsky
or a
Sartre,
Hegel
will
argue
that the individual cannot be reduced
to
(or
deduced
from)
environmental circumstance because there are three
ways
in which the individual can
respond
to stimuli.
First,
he
may "directly
and
unresistingly
coalesce with the
given
universal
[i.e.,
the
environment],
the
customs, habits, etc.,
and become conformed to them"
(Hegel, 1977:183).
In this
case,
the individual could be deduced from the environment as he or
she would
passively
mirror the universal
and,
as D?rkheim
might
have
said,
the individual and the collective conscience would coincide. Should this
occur,
we would also have Marcuse's "one-dimensional
man,"
Erich Fromm's
"automaton,"
C.
Wright
Mill's "cheerful
robot,"
or Michel Foucault's
"docile
body."
But there is another side to this
story,
and that is that it is
in the nature of rational self-conscious
agents
that
they
can set themselves "in
opposition
to them
[i.e.,
environmental
influences]
and in fact transform them''
(Hegel, 1977:183).
Here the individual is seen as
having
the
ability
to
oppose
environmental influences
by interfering
with them in self-selected
ways.
Simone
de Beauvoir
(1966:111)
describes this two-fold
relationship
between
persons
and circumstance as follows:
"[Man]
asserts himself as a
pure internality against
which no external
power
can take
hold,
and he also
experiences
himself as
a
thing
crushed
by
the dark
weight
of other
things" (positivism
has done
justice
to
only
the latter of these dimensions of
experience). Finally,
the individual
may
"behave towards them
[the influences]
in its
individuality
with
complete
indifference,
neither
determining
nor
being
determined"
(Hegel, 1977:183).
Both these latter modes of interaction
preclude reducing
the individuals to the
myriad
of influences which
impinge upon them,
and this because
persons
"are
not dumb as
regards
their external
action,
because
they
are
thereby
at once
reflected into
themselves,
and
give expression
to the reflectedness into self
(Hegel, 1977:190).
This is not double-talk.
By
"reflected into
themselves,"
Hegel
means that we
possess
the
capacity
to reflect on our
extraversion,
our
136 GROVES
LQ.,
our
race,
social
class, etc., etc.,..
.and as a result
of
this
process of reflec?
tion
generate
action which can be
1)
in
conformity
with, 2)
opposed
to,
or
3)
indifferent to whatever the
specific
variable was that the self-conscious
agent
decided to reflect on.
Thus,
when
Hegel says
that we
"give expression
to that
reflectedness into
self,"
he is
referring
to action which is the
product
of that
reflection. Result: Action cannot be seen as the automatic
product of
the
disposi?
tion
(LQ.)
or state
of affairs (environment) itself.
Sartre
(1968:153)
has much
the same
point
in mind:
If
my companion suddenly
starts toward the
window,
I understand
his
gesture
in terms of the material situation in which we both are.
It
is,
for
example,
because the room is too warm. He is
going
to "let
in some air."
[Yet]
his action is not inscribed in the
temperature;
it
is not "set in motion"
by
the warmth as
by
a "stimulus"
provoking
chain reactions
(emphasis added).
This account is not without a touch of
ambiguity.
Earlier in his
Phenomenology (chapter
two
?
Sense
Certainty) Hegel
had
argued
that the
nature of
language
assured that
persons
were
essentially
social
beings.
In this
sense,
and
Hegel
is here
very
close to
D?rkheim, society
is a
necessary
con?
dition
for
the
production of individuality. Hegel expresses
this as follows: "if
these
circumstances, ways
of
thinking,
customs,
in
general
the state of the
world,
had not
been,
then of course the individual would not have become
what he is"
(Hegel, 1977:183).7
But this in no
way
dissuades
Hegel
from mak?
ing
room for
subjectivity,
and he
immediately goes
on to note that
the fact...that the state of the world has
particularized
itself in this
particular
individual
?
and it is such an individual that is to be
comprehended
?
implies
that it must also have
particularized itself
on its own account and have
operated
on the individual in this
specific
character which it has
given itself; only
in this
way
would it have
made itself into this
specific
individual that he is
(Hegel, 1977:184).
The
passage
is somewhat dense.
Hegel's point
is that the fundamental and
essential
"sociality"
of man "does not militate
against
his
capability
of modi?
fying
his environment or of
exchanging
one environment for another"
(Loewenberg, 1965:141).
This
permits Hegel
to
argue
for a social
being
which
is not a
wholly
determinate social
being,
a theme which will
re-emerge
in our
discussion of Marx.
Hegel's
reservation
against
wholesale environmental determinism functions
as a welcome
prophylactic against
the
type
of mechanistic
thinking
which afflicts
vulgar
Marxism and much of
positive criminology.
To
argue
that the individual
simply
and
wholly expresses
his or her environment is at bottom a crude
tautology
wherein the individual is the external
world,
which
Hegel derisively
characterizes as "a distinction without a difference." Were this the
case,
...we should have a double
gallery
of
pictures,
one of which would
be the reflection of the
other;
the
one,
the
gallery
of external cir?
cumstances which
completely
determines and circumscribes the in?
dividual,
the
other,
the same
gallery transplanted
into the form in
which those circumstances are
present
in the conscious individual
(Hegel, 1977:184).
Again,
the nature of the rational
agent
militates
against
this
tautologous
reduction,
for "what is to have an influence on the individual and what kind
of influence it is to
have...depend solely
on that
individuality itself (Hegel,
1977:183).
What
observing
reason as a form of consciousness
sought
was a "law"
linking
the outer with the inner. Now while it is true that the individual
can
merely
"coalesce with the
world,
let it enter into him and.. .behave as a mere?
ly
formal
consciousness,
"it is
equally
true that" "the world...can be
transformed
by
the individual."
Thus,
the individual "either allows free
play
to the stream of the actual world
flowing
in
upon
it
[in
which case we have
Hegel's
double
gallery
of
pictures],
or else breaks it off and transforms it
[in
which case there is room for the
subject]" (Hegel, 1977:185). Hegel
is not
arguing
that there is no such
thing
as an
influence;
nor is he
arguing
that these
influences cannot function as "causes" of behavior. What he is
arguing
is
that
attempts
to discover a "law"
establishing
a
necessary
connection between
a
specified
constellation of influences and a
particular
(an individual)
behavior
pattern
are of limited
utility
because such influences are too
amorphous
to
pro?
duce the desired
explanatory
result.
Hegel
describes lawlike
"necessity"
such
as this as "an
empty phrase,
so
empty
that what is
supposed
to have had this
influence could
just
as well not have had it"
(Hegel, 1977:185).
With reference
to its
attempt
to
"explain" individuality,
even the
specification
of an
apparent
law
connecting
a
dependent
to an
independent
variable
(i.e.,
a
strong
or even
a
perfect correlation)
needn't be taken as
binding,
for awareness of such a
law now becomes a source of information which
may
be utilized
by
the ra?
tional
agent
to alter the "lawlike" relation in
question. Hegel's
concern, then,
is that
explanations
which
presuppose physiological
or environmental deter?
minism aim at
"denying
the doer the character of Reason"
(Hegel, 1977:194),
as it is reason which bestows
upon
the self-conscious
agent
the
capacity
to
contradict the
"indeterminate,"
be it an innate
disposition
or a
general
en?
vironmental influence.
By becoming
aware that we
possess
this or that
disposi?
tion,
that we are
subject
to this or that environmental
influence,
we are in a
position
to
transform
stimuli into
information
which then allows us to
manipulate
our behavior in
light of
ends chosen
by
ourselves. It is "to
open up
to the
agent
the
possibility
of
exchanging
what he is for what he is not"
(Maclntyre,
1976:223).8
This
capacity
for self-consciousness or self-reflection means that
stimuli do not bombard a
passive
and inert
individual,
but on the
contrary
func?
tion as information that can be
processed
in accordance with
projects9
the
individual has selected for him or herself. As Chambliss and Seidman
(1982,
44) put it,
"knowledge...becomes part
of the
process determining
how and
138 GROVES
why people
behave."
The Individual and
Society
Implicit
in
Hegel's
discussion is a view of both the nature of
individuality
and the nature of the
relationship
between the individual and
society.
Theorists
who
hypostatize
or
"reify" society by splitting
it off from the individual tend
to
assign persons
an
insignificant
role vis-a-vis their self-determination.
D?rkheim,
for
example,
characterizes social institutions as
"real,
living,
ac?
tive forces
which,
because
of
the
way they
determine the
individual, prove
their
independence
of
him; which,
if the individual enters as an element in
the combination whence these forces
ensue,
at least control him once
they
are
formed" (D?rkheim,
1966:39
?
emphases added).10
As is well
known,
"soci?
ety" possessed
a
reality
sui
generis
for
D?rkheim,
it was a
"thing"
or a "social
fact" which loomed over and determined the individual. But this view is
anathema to
Marxism,
and Alvin Gouldner
(1971:53-54)
sees it as
being
"at
the heart of the
repressive component
of
sociology."
What he means is that
when
society
is viewed as
being split-off
from the individuals who
"create,
embody,
and enact"
it,
the
stage
is set for a reified or alienated11 social science
which
erroneously
believes
society
to be an autonomous
thing.
True to his
theme that method follows domain
assumption,
Gouldner
goes
on to tie this
way
of
looking
at the
relationship
society
with the
tendency
to
adopt
a
positivistic methodology
modeled after the natural sciences:
The
emerging
academic social sciences thus
commonly
came to con?
ceive of
society
and culture as autonomous
things: things
that are in?
dependent
and exist for themselves.
Society
and culture were then
amenable to
being
viewed like
any
other "natural"
phenomenon,
as
having
laws of their own that
operated quite apart
from the intentions
and
plans
of
men,
while the
disciplines
that studied them could be
viewed as natural sciences like
any
other.
Method, then,
follows do?
main
assumption.
In other
words,
sociology emerged
as a "natural"
science when certain domain
assumptions
and sentiments became
prevalent;
when men felt alienated from a
society
that
they thought
they
had made but could not control.
It is for this reason that Gouldner
(1971:53)
describes academic social
science as "the social science of an alienated
age
and alienated man."
Hegel's position
should be
sharply distinguished
from this Durkheimian
type
of domain
assumption.
Marx
(1975:350)
too is
emphatic
on this
point,
noting
as he does that "it is above all
necessary
to avoid once more
establishing
'society'
as an
abstraction over
against
the individual. The individual is the
social
being....Man's
individual and
species
life are not two distinct
things,
however much
?
and this is
necessarily
so
?
the mode of existence of in?
dividual life is a more
particular
or more
general
mode of the
species
life."
This
position
is
exactly
the same as
Hegel's,
who also comes to the conclu?
sion that
"individuality
is itself this
cycle..
.of the
unity
of the world as
given
and the world it has made: a
unity
whose sides do not fall
apart..
.into a world
that in
itself'is already given,
and an
individuality existing
on its own account'1
(Hegel, 1977:185). Thus,
to cut the individual off from
society
is a dubious
division;
both Marx and
Hegel
would
say
that it is false.
We have
already
touched on
Hegel's position
that
persons actively
transform
reality by breaking
off the stream of the actual world as it flows in on their
individuality.
Let us combine this with Marx's claim and take the
argument
one
step
further: to
grasp
this active attribute of the
subject
is to
grasp
the
individual and
society
in their
unity
rather than over and
against
one
another,
as is the case
with, say,
"control
theory" assumptions
about human nature12.
With this
awareness,
'
'reason...
[will be]
led to observe
individuality
no
longer
as a reflection of the
putatively given
environment but as a concrete whole
in its own
right" (Hyppolite, 1974:164).
But what does it mean to
say
that the individual is a "concrete whole"?
What is
more,
hasn't
Hegel jumbled things up
here with his
request
that we
see the individual and
society
in their
"unity"?
Wasn't this the
position
he
argued against
with his
polemics against
the "double
gallery
of
pictures"?
Let us see if we can't clear
things up.
Concrete behavior does
not,
on
Hegel's
account,
automatically
reflect the
circumstances which "surround"
it,
for
"circumstances, situations, etc.,
ex?
press only
the indeterminate nature of the
individual,
which is not the
point
[here]" (Hegel, 1977:184). True,
the world
provides
the raw material for in?
dividual initiative. But it is
equally
true that individuals have a hand in
deciding
what will be
permitted
to influence them. As Alasdair
Maclntyre (1976:230)
puts it,
"it is universals concretized in their concrete occurrence to which we
respond
in our
actions,"
which is to
say
that we do not
automatically
and
unreflexively respond
to indeterminate circumstances and
dispositions.
On the
contrary,
in our
dealings
with
reality
we choose an actual
(a concrete)
behavioral
response,
and it is this actual revealed behavior13 that
Hegel
labels the "con?
crete
particularization"
of
general
circumstances and
dispositions.
From this
perspective,
the individual cannot be reduced to an echo of
general
conditions
"since on account of this freedom.. .the world of the individual is to be com?
prehended from
the individual
himself (Hegel, 1977:184).
The most we can
hope
for
by surrounding
the individual with a
myriad
of influences which are
alleged
to "cause" his or her behavior is some
appreciation
of what Maslow
(1978)
calls its "correlational
meaning,"
an
appreciation
of which is
impor?
tant. But such are not the
only meanings
available,
and
arbitrarily halting
one's
analysis
at this
point
is to circumvent
subjectivity by expelling
it into those
circumstances
alleged
to constitute the individual's life.
Thus,
Hegel
refuses to define
subjectivity
as redundant on circumstances
or
dispositions;
he is
opposed
to
reducing
the individual to an "intersection
of universal schemata" because
explanations
such as these
simply
cannot ex?
plain subjectivity.
As Sartre
(1962:24) puts it, attempts
to
explain
behavior
by
means of an exclusive reliance on "the
great
idols of our
epoch
?
heredity,
education, environment,
physiological
constitution...allow us to understand14
140 GROVES
nothing....The
transitions,
the
becomings,
the
transformations,
have been
carefully
veiled from
us,
and we have been limited to
putting
order into the
succession
by invoking empirically
established but
literally unintelligible
sequences."
The
parallel
between
Hegel's conception
of human
agency
and
Sartre's existential
portrait
is worth
noting.
Sartre defines man as a
being
whose
existence
precedes
his
essence,
which means that man has no
pre-ordained
or
metaphysical
human nature. As Sartre
puts it,
man "first of all
exists,
en?
counters
himself, surges up
in the world ?and defines himself afterwards.
If man as the existentialist sees him is not
definable,
it is because to
begin
with he is
nothing.
He will not be
anything
until
later,
and then he will be
what he makes of himself." Sartre
goes
on to make the
very Hegelian point
that "man is
nothing
else but the sum of his
actions,"
a
perspective
which
clearly
rules out motivational
portraits presupposed by positive criminology.
For both Sartre and
Hegel,
man is "a
project
which
possesses
a
subjective
life,"
is
"something
which
propels itself
toward a
future
and is aware that
it is
doing
so"
(Sartre,
1969:291
?
emphasis added).
For much of
positive
criminology, persons
are lost to a series of
proxies (Hegel
will call them
"empty
possibilities"
?we call them
"independent variables")
of which human
behavior is seen as a function. One needn't be an existentialist or a Marxist
to
repudiate
this
way
of
looking
at
things
?
a sensible
positivist (Karl Popper)
will do
nicely:
Beethoven.. .is
surely
to some extent a
product
of musical education
and tradition... .The more
important aspect,
however,
is that he is also
a
producer
of
music,
and
thereby
of musical tradition and education.
I do not wish to
quarrel
with the
metaphysical
determinist who would
insist that
every
bar that Beethoven wrote was determined
by
some
combination of
heredity
and environmental influences. Such an asser?
tion is
empirically entirely insignificant,
since no one could
actually
"explain"
a
single
bar of his
writing
in this
way....What
he wrote
can be
explained
neither
by
the musical works of his
predecessors,
nor
by
the social environment in which he
lived,
nor
by
his
deafness,
nor
by
the food which the
housekeeper
cooked for
him; not,
in other
words,
by any
definite set of environmental influences
or cir?
cumstances
open
to
empirical investigation,
or
by anything
else we
could
possibly
know of his
heredity'' (Popper,
1971:210
?
third em?
phasis added).
For all of
Popper's
vicious
polemics against Hegel,15
his
position
here is
exactly
the same as that taken
by Hegel
in this
paper.
As
Popper
makes
clear,
after we
hedge
Beethoven in with a host of
correlations, peer
into his life for
the variables which would
explain
his
work,
we are forced to admit that there
still exists an
inexplicable
remainder which embraces
nothing
less than the
problem
of
individuality
itself. The
point
is this: if correlations cannot build
up
to
subjectivity,
then the
completed
act cannot be reduced to a set
of
anterior
proxy
variables
of
which it is a
function.
And so "if
someday
we find the
chemical
[or environmental] equivalent
to these
[behavioral] processes,
so much
the better. But the
higher
level
integration,
the
completed
act,
will still exist
by
a
right
of its own. It will still be irreducible"
(Becker, 1964:98).
Hegel,
Sartre,
Popper,
and Becker are
squarely confronting
the nature of
individuality,
and their
position
is that
persons
cannot be
adequately
understood
apart
from their role vis-a-vis both the world and their own
self-development.
For
Hegel,
as for
Marx,
"the self-creation of man is a
process,"
and it is
this
processual
dimension which undercuts
any separation
of
persons
from their
life world. Let us see how these themes interact with reference to Marx's con?
ception
of
"praxis."
Praxis and
History
For Marx
(1976:48), history
is not "a collection of dead
facts,"
a
"high
sounding
drama of
princes
and states"
(Marx, 1978:210). Rather, history grows
up
in
action,
it is an "active life
process,"
which means that we are not talk?
ing
about
history
as a form of historicism. In The
Open Society
and Its
Enemies,
Vol.
2,
Karl
Popper (1971:81) argued
that Marx's
theory
of
history
was "the
purest,
most
developed
and the most
dangerous
form of
historicism,"
whose
defining
characteristic is that
history
is seen as
beyond
human control. Where
certain forms of
positivism
reduce
persons
to an
epiphenomenal
function of
an anterior set of
variables,
historicism reduces
persons
to an
epiphenomenal
dimension of a
history
made behind their backs.
Both,
in their
extremes, repre?
sent forms of irrationalism. With
respect
to
historicism,
irrationalism finds
expression
in the belief that "the main course of
history [is] predetermined,
and neither
good
will nor reason has the
power
to alter it"
(Popper, 1971:86).
Because
explanations
such as these circumvent
subjectivity, Hegel argues
that
they
amount to "a
complete
denial of Reason"
(Hegel, 1977:205),16
and if
Popper's
historicist
reading
of Marx were
correct,
persons
would have
nothing
to do with
history; they
would exist
only
as its victims.
History
would no
longer
be a dimension of man as a
praxical being
(Meszaros, 1978:251),
but man
would be a rather
insignificant
dimension of
history.
But if we are concerned
with human
history,
we would do well to ask: what can
history
do without
man? Marx
responds
as follows:
History
does
nothing;
it 'does not
possess riches,'
it 'does not
fight
battles.' It is
men, real,
living
men,
who do all
this,
who
possess things
and
fight
battles. It is not
'history'
which uses men as a means of
achieving
?
as
[if]
it were an 'individual
person'
?
its own ends.
History
is
nothing
but the
activity
of men in
pursuit
of their own ends"
(Marx
in
Israel, 1971:69).
Here is a
decidedly
nonhistoricist
Marx,
who sees
history
as the
process
by
which that same
history
is itself
brought
into
being
or,
as we
put
it
earlier,
history grows up
in action. The
production
of
history
is related to the dialectic
between man
(who
is never to be considered as its
passive pawn)
and cir?
cumstance
(which
is never to be considered as
separated
from the action which
142 GROVES
brought
it into
being),
and is summed
up nicely
in the
following passage:
History
is
nothing
but the succession of
separate generations,
each
of which
exploits
the
materials,
the forms of
capital,
the
productive
forces handed down to it
by
all
preceding
ones,
and thus on the one
hand continues the traditional
activity
in
completely changed
cir?
cumstances
and,
on the
other, modifies
the old circumstances with
a
completely changed activity (Marx,
1978:211
?
emphases added).
Note that Marx does not characterize "forms of
capital"
or "the
produc?
tive forces" as
things
which determine
history.
Were this the
case,
he would
fall from his
praxical platform
into a
vulgar
economism which sees the "mode
of
production"
as the sole determinant of historical movement. Marx was em?
phatically opposed
to those who would characterize
history
as a
rigid
succes?
sion of modes of
production
absent the mediation of human
activity.
In his
words,
"a certain mode of
production...is always
combined with a certain
mode of
cooperation..
.and this mode
of cooperation
is
itself
a
productive force"
(Marx,
1978:202
?
emphases added). Thus,
rather than
characterizing
them
as
"things,"
Marx refers to them as "traditional
(i.e., historical) activity,"
that
is,
as
objectified
or
congealed
forms of human
activity.
It is characteristic
of Marx's whole
way
of
looking
at
things
that he does not "freeze" this
pro?
cess
or,
as
Hegel put it,
this
"cycle."
Once
again
a contrast with D?rkheim
is instructive. In his Rules
of
the
Sociological Method,
D?rkheim
(1966:15)
had
requested
that we "treat social facts as
things,"
and it is this which led
D?rkheim to see
persons
as
being
on the
receiving
end of structures which
loomed
large
over the individual.17 Now Marx was
certainly
no
stranger
to
the
constraining
effects of circumstance and
history.
In his 18th
Brumaire,
to cite
just
a
single example,
Marx
(1959:320)
notes that:
Men make their own
history,
but
they
do not make it
just
as
they
please; they
do not make it under circumstances chosen
by themselves,
but under circumstances
directly
encountered,
given,
and transmitted
from the
past.
The tradition of all dead
generations weighs
like a
nightmare
on the brain of the
living.
But this should not be read as
saying
that
"history" (either
of the
species
or of the
individual)
determines
present
or future behavior.
Though history
and circumstance do confront the individual or the
species
as raw material
to be
reworked,
it would be an error to read this action as inscribed in either
circumstance or
history.
From a Marxian
perspective,
"if
history
means
anything
at
all,
it must be
open-ended" (Meszaros, 1978:117),
which
simply
means
that,
since
persons
create themselves in
action,
they
retain some
capacity
to decide what the future will hold. On this
view, history
is a
story always
in the
making
and never
fully
cast,
and this because man has a measure of
praxical prowess
which
ultimately
means that "there is no
prophetic sociology
to
help
us"
(Popper, 1971:208), i.e.,
to
help
us find the
key
to
history
in?
dependent
of our involvement in it.
Marx was
surely
sensitive to inevitabilist or historicist
interpretations,
and
on occasion reacted
very strongly against
them. For
example,
he notes that
the historical
begetting
of man via his own labor "can be
speculatively
distorted
so that later
history
is made the
goal
of earlier
history... [and] thereby history
receives its own
special
aims"
(Marx, 1973:211).
But as we have
seen,
it is
man who "continues the traditional
activity...modifies
the old
circumstances,"
and with this we are back to a nonhistoricist
reading
which sees "the whole
of what is called
world-history [as] nothing
more than the creation of man
through
human labor"
(Marx, 1975:357).18
Thus far
Hegel
and Marx have taken a stand
against
the
ontology
of deter?
minism and have shown that
methodological positivism
"cannot
really cope
with the
meshing
of the
given
and the self-made in
persons..
.but tries to
separate
these two
aspects
from one another"
(Taylor, 1977:162).
In the
process, light
has been shed on what
they
take to be the nature of
individuality
and the nature
of the
relationship
society. Certainly
human be?
ings
are
exposed
to influences which color their
interactions;
neither
Hegel
nor Marx were fool
enough
to
deny
this. But
they
do not stand in the same
relation to the environment as a rock or a
bug.
As Jean
Hyppolite (1974:265)
puts it,
"specificity
manifests itself at the heart of
individuality
as the
transcendence of all determinations." This
point
is at the heart of Sartre's
(1962:19)
existential
psychology,
and he too shuns
positivism
for its
attempt
to "avoid
everything
which could evoke the idea of transcendence." We shall
explore
this
point
further. For
now,
suffice it to note that individuals are not
always
and
everywhere
the
dependent
variable.
Teleology
Clearly, Hegel
is of the
opinion
that we cannot
adequately
understand
persons by way
of reference to fixed and stable
dispositions.
Marx too is critical
of such
efforts,
and for both Marx and
Hegel
"the human essence is not an
abstract inherent in the
single
individual. It is in
reality
the ensemble of social
conditions"
(Marx, 1962:71). Assuming
this to be the
case,
what are we to
make of
arguments
that
criminality
is a "continuous
trait,"
or that it is "in?
nate"
(Eysenck, 1977:78-79)? Explanations
such as this are an
implicit
denial
of man's fundamental
historicity,
his basic
sociality; they
are ill-conceived
attempts
to circumvent man's most
important distinguishing
feature ?his
historically
and
socially generated
consciousness. In
addition,
this reduction
of the
problem
of crime to the
problem
of the criminal is the direct result of
an
inability
to see the individual and
society
as
inseparable.
But what is the alternative
conception
of human
agency proposed by Hegel?
For both
Hegel
and
Marx,
human behavior exhibits a
teleological
dimension
which forces us to
modify explanations
cast in terms of efficient
causes,
ex?
planations
where "one constant moment
[is
related
to]
another constant mo?
ment"
(Hegel, 1977:207).
That there are
strong teleological
overtones in
Hegel's conception
of
Spirit
is evident in the
following quote:
144 GROVES
Consciousness..
.produces
itself
by
its own
activity.
It is itself the End
at which its action aims
(Hegel, 1977:209).
Let us
unpack
this
quotation by way
of a
comparison
with Marx.
Nowhere are
Hegel
and Marx closer than on their view of human
agency,
and both Bernstein
(1974)
and Plamanatz
(1975)
have
argued
that
Hegel's
con?
ception
of
Spirit, teleological
overtones and
all,
prefigures
the Marxian con?
ception
of Praxis. Earlier we cited a
passage
from the Paris
Manuscripts
(1974:385-386)
which bears
repeating:
The
importance
of
Hegel's Phenomenology,
and of its final result
?
the dialectic of
negativity
as the
moving
and
producing principle
?
lies in the fact that
Hegel
conceives the self-creation of man as a
process.
For
Hegel,
"consciousness
produces
itself
by
its own
activity";
for
Marx,
"the self-creation of man is a
process."
Their
positions
are
indistinguishable.
When Marx refers to "the dialectic of
negativity
as the
moving
and
pro?
ducing principle,"
he is
highlighting
the
single
most
important
fact about self
consciousness,
described
by
Alasdair
as "its self
negating quality." Though
their
language
differs,
a number of
important
thinkers make much the same
point. Hyppolite speaks
of
"transcendence";
for
Heidegger,
man is
"going
towards a
possibility";
Sartre defines it as
"pro?
pulsion
towards a
future'';
and with Nietzsche it is a
4
'transvaluation of values.''
Alasdair
describes this
teleological
"self-creation" of
persons
as follows:
The
progress
of rational
agents
is seen as
moving
towards
goals
that
are
only
articulated in the course of the movement itself. Human
behavior is neither blind nor
goalless
nor the mere
implementation
of means to an
already
decided end....That it is
only
in the course
of the movement that the
goals
of the movement are articulated is
the reason
why
we can understand human affairs
only
after the event.
The Owl of
Minerva,
as
Hegel
was later to
put it,
flies
only
at dusk.
The
understanding
of human
beings
is not
predictive
in the
way
that
natural science is.
A
perspective
which
brings
this
teleological
dimension of human
striving
back into the theoretical fold allows us to substitute for the
question
?
4 4
what
caused this behavior?"
?
a concern with what the individual or
group
is
try?
ing
to
accomplish.
How can we
appreciate
this dimension of human action
if behavior is defined as an exclusive function of antecedent events? If Marx
and
Hegel
are
correct,
if we are in
possession
of a
subjective
life which is
not redundant on circumstance or
dispositions,
then we cannot exhaust our
understanding
of
persons by surrounding
or
stuffing
them with correlations.
The
question Hegel
and Marx
pose, then,
is this:
supposing criminality
were
a
bone,
what then?
NOTES
1.
Greenberg (1981:2)
lists five such
assumptions.
We shall be concerned to examine two
of them: that "the causes of crime are deterministic
(i.e., accurately predictable
from its initial
causes),"
and that "crime can be studied
through
the same methods
(quantitative
statistical tech?
niques)
and with the same
goals (the
formulation of
historically
invariant
laws)
as the natural
sciences."
2.
Unfortunately, Hegel
is
largely ignored by criminologists,
even
by
those who
acknowledge
an indebtedness to Marxism. Where references do
emerge,
it is evident that he is either
misunderstood or is not taken
very seriously (Pepinsky,
1980:300; Greenberg, 1981:14).
Such
neglect
is not evident
beyond
the confines of
criminology,
and over the
past
few
years
a number
of books have been written whose stated intention was to restore to
Hegel
the
prominence
he
so
richly
deserves.
Among
the works which have contributed to the resurrection of
Hegelianism
are the
following:
Alexandre
Kojeve's
Introduction to the
Reading of Hegel (1969);
Jean
Hyppolite's
Genesis and Structure
of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (1974); Quinten
Lauer 's A
Reading
of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (1978);
J.
Loewenberg's Hegel's Phenomenology (1965);
Charles
Taylor's Hegel (1975);
Richard Norman's
Hegel's Phenomenology (1976),
and J.N.
Findlay's Hegel:
A Re-examination
(1958).
Without
exception,
the bulk of each of these books
is devoted to
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit,
and the
majority
were written within the last 15
years.
In
addition,
all share
Findlay's (1959:26)
belief that
"Hegel
is worth
restating
and
reassessing
on account of the
great contemporary
relevance of
many aspects
of his
thought."
But a rehabilitation of
Hegel
is
only
half the
story;
the other half concerns the
relationship
between
Hegel
and Marx.
Again,
a number of
important
books have been written which
attempt
to establish this connection. The
groundbreaker
was
History
and Class Consciousness
(Lukacs,
1979),
which
attempted
to
nudge
Marxism
away
from both
positivism
and
determinism,
and did
so with the assistance of
Hegel. Among
the more
important
works which follow this Lukacsian
lead are: Richard Bernstein's Praxis and Action
(1974);
Shlomo Avineri's The Social and Political
Thought of
Karl Marx
(1971);
Istvan Meszaros's Marx's
Theory of
Alienation
(1978);
Adolfo
Sanchez
Vasquez's
The
Philosophy of
Praxis
(1977),
and
perhaps
most
importantly,
John
Plamanatz's Karl Marx's
Philosophy of
Man
(1975).
For additional information on how various
thinkers line
up
on the
Marx/Hegel
issue,
see
Perry
Anderson's Considerations on Western Marxism
(1979), especially pp.
49-74.
3.
Hegel
uses
"Observing
Reason" and the
"Logic
of Observation"
interchangeably
in this
chapter.
What he means
by
both is a method of
analysis
which has affinities with the natural sciences.
The reference to
"Observing
Reason" should not be confused with the
Hegelian emphasis
on
Reason,
which
Hegel equates
with the distinctive human
capacity
for
reflection, self-consciousness,
or
intentionality.
4. This concern with determinism will
emerge
time and
again
in the course of our
discussion,
and it is
perhaps
best to take it as a threshold
question:
is Marxism deterministic?
Turning
to
Marx for an answer is not
likely
to be of much
assistance,
as he himself
frequently
wavers on
this crucial
point.
One moment he is
castigating
others for
characterizing
social events in a one?
way,
linear causal manner,
and in the next breath does so himself. These
ambiguities,
and
they
abound in
Marx,
have led to incredible variations
among
his
interpreters.
Istvan Meszaros
(1978:115),
for
example,
notes that "Marx is often accused of 'economic determinism.' He is
supposed
to hold the naive idea
according
to which the
economy determines, mechanically, every
aspect
of
development.
Such
accusations,
needless to
say,
cannot be taken
seriously."
But there
are those who take a deterministic
interpretation
of Marx
very seriously.
John Hoffman
(1976:140),
who
specifically
addresses the
"praxical" interpretation
of Marx to be defended in this
article,
claims that "there is no doubt...that Marx is a
determinist,"
and he uses this claim to bolster
his case
against
what he calls "the
praxis mythology
about Marx"
(Hoffman, 1976:136).
This
determinism-praxis
debate can be extended to a number of authors. At the risk of
oversimplifica?
tion,
the battle lines could be drawn as follows: On the mechanistic or deterministic side we find
Robert
Tucker,
Daniel
Bell,
Louis
Althusser,
Karl
Popper,
and John Hoffman. On the
praxical
side are John Paul
Sartre,
Charles
Taylor, Georg
Lukacs,
Istvan
Meszaros,
Erich
Fromm,
Shlomo
Avineri,
and Richard Bernstein
(both
lists
could,
of
course,
be
extended).
Our
sympathies lay
with the latter
interpretation.
5. Sutherland's is an
attempt
to
bring
"crime" under the
heading
of a "universal law"
(i.e.,
all behavior is
learned).
He is of the
opinion
that his
theory provides
both the
necessary
and suffi?
cient conditions for individual criminal
behavior,
an ambition summed
up
in his observation that
146 GROVES
"the conditions which are said to cause crime should
always
be
present
when crime is
present,
and should
always
be absent when crime is absent"
(Sutherland
and
Cressey, 1966:77).
But this
model
presupposes
a total breakdown of
subjectivity,
and in
place
of the
person
we have a con?
tainer into which
culturally
derived definitions are
poured.
The individual is
nothing
more than
a vacant intersection for
stimuli,
and there is a view of human
beings
as
utterly passive,
as "machines
rather than
organisms."
On this
view,
"socialization does not
produce
a minded
organism
or
an active self
capable
of
selecting among
stimuli those that are relevant to the self. It
produces
an individual
stamped by
the
printing press
of culture"
(Kornhauser, 1978:198).
We use Sutherland's
theory
as the best
example
of
anti-subjectivism
available in the
sociological
version of theoretical
criminology.
6. Sartre's existential
philosophy
owes a
significant
debt to
Hegel,
who is treated at some
length
in
Being
and
Nothingness.
For an examination of Sartre's relation to
Hegel,
see Mark Poster's
Existential Marxism in Postwar France
(1975).
For an
analysis
of the relation of Marxism to
existentialism,
see the collection of
essays
in Novack's Existentialism versus Marxism
(1966),
and for an examination of the relation of existentialism to both Marx and
Hegel,
see The Existen?
tialist
Rediscovery of Hegel
and
Marx,
by George
Kline
(1971).
7. This is an
important
observation.
Hegel
does not
argue
that environmental factors and
disposi?
tions do not
exist,
nor that
they might
not in some
way impact
on behavior.
Thus,
where
(in
the
text) Hegel
sees environmental factors as a
necessary
condition for the
production
of individuali?
ty,
he also notes that "the
original being
of
persons
consists of
dispositions" (Hegel, 1977:201).
He is
quick
to
add, however,
that
persons
are "free to do as
they
wish" vis-a-vis these
disposi?
tions.
Hegel's
aversion to
dispositional
variables
(I.Q., extraversion, etc.)
was shared
by
D?rkheim,
who dismisses
dispositional (in
his
words, extra-social)
variables as follows:
A
very general predisposition [does]
not
necessarily produce any special action,
but
[is] capable
of
assuming
the most varied forms
according
to circumstance. It is a field
in which the most varied tendencies
may
take root
depending
from the fertilization
it receives from social causes.
In a footnote to this
discussion,
D?rkheim notes that "a
single organic
state
[i.e.,
a
disposi?
tion] may
contribute to almost
opposite
ends"
(D?rkheim, 1966:77). Thus,
to
assign dispositions
to individuals and to then correlate them with a
specific
behavior
pattern might just
turn out to
be the
"empty possibility" Hegel
believes it to
be,
for
"individuality,
when it commits itself
to the
objective
element in
putting
itself into a
deed,"
might
contradict this
disposition.
The
point,
one which certain
criminologists
would do well to
remember,
is that "the murderer is not the
abstraction of a murderer"
(Hegel, 1977:202).
8. It is this which led Sartre to define man as follows: "Man is the
being
who is not what
he
is,
and is what he is not"
(in Poster, 1975:33).
It is also the same definition which
Hyppolite
attributes to
Hegel.
9. In his
Being
and
Nothingness,
Sartre
(1956:806) provides
the
following
definition of what
he means
by "project":
"It refers to the For-itself s choice of its
way
of
being
and is
expressed
by
action in the
light
of a future end." As is
evident,
a
teleological
dimension is built into the
definition.
10.
Though
this is the most common
interpretation
of D?rkheim's
position,
a thinker of his
complexity
cannot be reduced to a uni-dimensional
position
such as this without
qualification.
For
example,
after
defining
institutions as
constraining
forces which do not
depend upon
individual
wills,
D?rkheim
goes
on to note that "because beliefs and social
practices
come to us from
without,
it does not follow that we receive them
passively
or without
modification,
for. ..each of us colors
the world after his own fashion....Each of us
creates,
in a
measure, his own
morality, religion,
and mode of life. There is no
conformity
to social convention that does not
comprise
an entire
range
of individual shades"
(D?rkheim,
1966:lvii
?
emphasis added). Though
he here allows
for a realm of
freedom,
his true colors are revealed in his
closing
sentence: "It is nevertheless
true that this field of variations is a limited one
[so
much for the 'entire
range
of individual
shades']....One
encounters limits that cannot be crossed."
11. As
Berger
and Luckmann
(1967:89)
define
it,
"reification is the
apprehension
of human
phenomenon
as if
they
were
things....Reification implies
that man is
capable
of
forgetting
his
authorship
of the human
world,
and
further,
that the dialectic between man, the
producer,
and
his
products
is lost to consciousness."
12. Control theories assume that the motivation to
delinquency
is
"natural,"
that it can be
explained
with reference to "inborn
tendencies,"
which means
that,
so far as motivation is
concerned,
there is
nothing
to be
explained (Empey, 1982:11).
Whatever else this
might
be,
it
is a
decidedly
non-Marxist view of human motivation. Phrases like "inborn tendencies" and
"naturally delinquent"
have no
place
in a Marxist
criminology.
Control theorists take a fixed
anthropological
model as their
point
of
departure; they
base their beliefs on a hunch as to what
the individual is like outside
of society.
But a
proposition
such as this makes no
sense,
for we
know
nothing
of man outside of
society.
For Marx and
Hegel,
there can be no discussion of man
"outside"
history
and
society
because man does not exist there. For excellent discussions of this
issue,
see Plamanatz
(1975:36);
and Meszaros
(1978:45).
13. In line with
Sartre,
Hegel
is
suspicious
of
any explanatory
scheme which
attempts
to cir?
cumvent actual revealed behavior. In the battle between
disposition
and
deed,
there is no contest.
What
people
do is the more
important
of the two dimensions. To make this
point, Hegel quotes
Lichtenberg:
If
anyone said, "you certainly
look like an honest
man,
but I see from
your
face
[your
I.Q.]
that
you
are
forcing yourself
to do so and are a
rogue
at
heart,"
without a
doubt,
every
honest fellow to the end of
time,
when thus
addressed,
will retort with a box
on the ear
(Hegel, 1977:193).
14. The theoretical tension here is between
"explanation"
and
"understanding." According
to von
Wright (1971:6),
the
cutting edge
between these
concepts
is that
'"understanding'...has
a
psychological ring
which
'explanation'
does
not,"
and that
"understanding
is also connected
with
intentionality
in a
way explanation
is not." The
point
is not that
intentionality
is the
primary
component
of human
action,
but
only
that "intention and therefore the actor's views are
always
potentially
relevant and must be taken into account"
(Pitkin, 1972:256).
Hence Sartre's
(1962:24)
remark:
by surrounding
the individual with
correlations,
we limit ourselves to
"putting
order
into the succession
by invoking empirically
established but
literally unintelligible sequences."
For an extended discussion of the difference between
explanation
and
understanding,
see von
Wright's Explanation
and
Understanding (1971);
Brian
Fay's
Social
Theory
and Social Practice
(1980),
and
Chapter
7 in Habermas's
Knowledge
and Human Interests
(1971),
which deals with
Dilthey's
treatment of this distinction.
15. In his
Open Society
and Its
Enemies,
Vol.
2,
Popper
deals at some
length
with both
Hegel
and Marx. His treatment of
Hegel
is unfair in
many respects.
In
Conjectures
and
Refutations
(1965:330), Popper
offers his own
opinion
of
Hegel:
"I think it
represents
the worst of all those
absurd and incredible
philosophic
theories to which Descartes refers in the sentence which I have
chosen as the motto for this
paper" [that
sentence reads: "There is
nothing
so absurd or incredi?
ble that it has not been asserted
by
one
philosopher
or
another"]. Popper
is
certainly
entitled
to his
opinion,
but we should add that much of what
Popper
has to
say
elsewhere finds direct
expression
in this
chapter
of
Hegel's Phenomenology.
For a detailed examination of
Popper's
treatment of
Hegel,
see Kaufmann
(in Maclntyre, 1976:24),
where it is
argued
that
"Popper's
treatment contains more
misconceptions
about
Hegel
than
any
other
single essay."
16.
Hegel's emphasis
on Reason finds
expression
in a number of celebrated
books,
not the
least of which is Karl
Popper's Open Society
and its Enemies. C.
Wright
Mills defends a
concep?
tion of reason in his
Sociological Imagination (1977);
Marcuse in Reason and Revolution:
Hegel
and the Rise
of
Social
Theory (1960),
and in his
Negations (1968).
In
addition,
Reason was a
category
central to the Frankfurt
School,
and finds
expression
in the
following
works: Toward
a Rational
Society by J?rgen
Habermas
(1970);
the
Eclipse of
Reason
by
Max Horkheimer
(1974);
and in a collection of
essays by
Horkheimer entitled Critical
Theory (1972).
With the
exception
of Mills and
Popper,
the
conception
of Reason found in these latter works owes an
explicit
debt
to
Hegel.
See also Maurice Mandelbaum's
History, Man,
and Reason: A
Study
in 19th
Century
Thought (1971).
17. In The New
Criminology (1973), Taylor,
Walton,
and
Young correctly
note that D?rkheim
made an
important
break with
"analytical
individualism." It should be
added, however,
that
D?rkheim's was an undialectical break in that a
wedge
was driven between the individual and
society.
Their turn to D?rkheim is
unobjectionable,
but Marx would have been more
appropriate
for the
point they
were
trying
to make.
18. What follows are some
passages designed
to
capture
the dialectical
relationship
between
persons
and circumstance from some of Marx's
interpreters,
each of whom
agrees
that circumstances
do
provide
the raw material for
action,
none of whom would
agree
that action is inscribed in
circumstance,
as is the case with a
thoroughgoing
materialism.
148 GROVES
Shlomo Avineri
(1971:71):
According
to
Marx,
nature cannot be discussed as if it were severed from human ac?
tion. Man
shapes
nature. This act also
shapes
man and his relation to other human
beings;
it is a total
process, implying
a constant interaction between
subject
and
object.
Nathan Rotenstreich
(1965:56-57):
The root of Marx's
critique
lies in the
recognition
of the
impossibility
of the
separa?
tion of the different facets of human
reality,
whether we consider the
separation
of
man from circumstance or... .This
critique
is
implied
in the idea of
practice... [and is]
fundamentally grounded
in the awareness of the
contiguity
between the
reality given
and the man who works within it. Circumstances...do not exist within an
external,
solid and
given boundary....Circumstances
do not have an
independent
status vis-a?
vis man....The fetishism of commodities
parallels
the fetishism of circumstance.
John Plamanatz
(1975:71):
If
society changes
it is
only
because men come to behave and to think and to feel dif?
ferently,
and so it is
just
as true to
say
that
society
is
produced by
man as to
say
that
it
produces
him. These two
assertions,
far from
contradicting
one
another,
refer to
two
complementary processes',
to the activities of men
socially
related to one another
and to the effects of these activities on them.
Wal
Suchting (1979:13):
In
praxis
there is a simultaneous transformation of both terms
[i.e., subject
and
object].
REFERENCES
Anderson, Perry
1979 Considerations on Western Marxism. London: Verso Publishers.
Avineri,
Shlomo
1971 The Social and Political
Thought
of Karl Marx. London:
Cambridge University
Press.
Becker,
Ernest
1971 The Birth and Death of
Meaning.
New York: The Free Press.
1964 The Revolution in
Psychiatry.
New York: The Free Press.
Berger,
P. and T. Luckmann
1967 The Social Construction of
Reality.
New York:
Doubleday
and
Company.
Bernstein,
Richard
1978 Praxis and Action.
Philadelphia: University
of
Pennsylvania
Press.
Cassirer,
Ernst
1972 An
Essay
on Man. New Haven and London: Yale
University
Press.
Chambliss,
W. and
Seidman,
R.
1982
Law, Order,
and Power. 2nd Edition.
Philippines: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Co.
Dawe,
Alan
1978 "Theories of Social Action" in T. Bottomore and R.
Nisbet,
A
History
of
Sociological analysis.
New York: Basic Books.
1975
'
'The Two
Sociologies''
in K.
Thompson
J. and
Tunstall, Sociological Perspec?
tives.
Penguin
Books Australia Ltd.
de
Beauvoir,
Simone
1966
"Ambiguity
and
Freedom,"
in
George
Novack
(ed.),Existentialism
versus
Marxism,
New York: Dell
Publishing.
D?rkheim,
Emile
1966a Suicide. New York: The Free Press.
1966 The Rules of the
Sociological
Method. New York: The Free Press.
Empey,
Lamar
1982 American
Delinquency:
Its
Meaning
and Construction.
Dorsey
Press,
2nd
Edition.
Eysenck,
Hans
1977 Crime and
Personality.
London,
Routledge
&
Keegan
Paul.
Fay,
Brian
1975 Social
Theory
and Political Practice. London:
George
Allen and Unwin.
Findlay,
J. N.
1958
Hegel:
A Re-examination. London and New York: Oxford
University
Press.
Fromm,
Erich
1978 Marx' s
Concept
of Man. New York: Frederick
Ungar Publishing Company.
Greenberg,
David
1981 Crime and
Capitalism.
California:
Mayfield Publishing.
Gordon,
David
1971 "Class and the Economics of Crime." Review of Radical Political Economics
3, pp.
51-72.
Habermas, J?rgen
1971 Toward a Rational
Society.
Boston: Beacon Press.
1971
Knowledge
and Human Interests. Boston: Beacon Press.
Hegel, Georg
1977 The
Phenomenology
of
Spirit. Oxford,
New York: Oxford
University
Press.
Hirschi,
Travis
1975 Social
System
and
Legal
Process. San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass Publishers, pp.
322-341.
1969 Causes of
Delinquency.
California:
University
of California Press.
Hoffman,
John
1976 Marxism and the
Theory
of Praxis. New York: International Publishers.
Horkheimer,
Max
1974
Critique
of Instrumental Reason. New York: A Continuum Book.
1974
Eclipse
of Reason. New York:
Seabury
Press.
1972 Critical
Theory:
Selected
Essays,
New York:
Seabury
Press.
Hyppolite,
Jean
1974 Genesis and Structure Of
Hegel's Phenomenology
of
Spirit.
Evanston,
111.:
Northwestern
University
Press.
Inciardi,
James
1980 Radical
Criminology:
The
Coming
Crises.
Beverly Hills,
London:
Sage
Publications.
Israel,
Joachim
1971 Alienation: From Marx to Modern
Sociology.
Boston:
Allyn
and Bacon Inc.
Kinberg,
Olaf
1935 Basic Problems of
Criminology.
Levin and
Munksgeerd.
Kline,
George
L.
1971
"
The Existentialist
Rediscovery
of
Hegel
and Marx." In
Mary
Warnock
(ed.),
Sartre: A Collection of Critical
Essays.
New York: Anchor Books.
Kojeve,
Alexandre
1969 Introduction to the
Reading
of
Hegel:
Lectures on the
Phenomenology
of
Spirit.
Ithaca and London: Cornell
University
Press.
Kolnh?user,
Ruth
1978 Social Sources of
Delinquency. Chicago: University
of
Chicago
Press.
Laing,
R.D.
1977 Self and Others. Great Britain: Pelican Books.
1967 The Politics of
Experience.
New York: Ballantine Books.
Lauer, Quinten
1976 A
Reading
of
Hegel's Phenomenology
of
Spirit.
New York: Fordman Univer?
sity
Press.
Lichtheim,
George
1974 From Marx to
Hegel.
New York:
Seabury
Press.
Loewenberg,
J.
1965
Hegel's Phenomenology.
Illinois:
Open
Court
Publishing.
Lukacs,
George
1971
History
and Class Consciousness. Great Britain: The Merlin Press Limited.
150 GROVES
Maclntyre,
Alasdair
1976
Hegel:
A Collection of Critical
Essays.
Notre
Dame,
London:
University
of Notre Dame Press.
Mandelbaum,
Maurice
1971
History,
Man,
and Reason: A
Study
in 19th
Century Thought.
Baltimore and
London: John
Hopkins University
Press.
Marx,
Karl
1977
Capital.
New York:
Vintage
Books.
1975 The Economic and
Philosophic Manuscripts
of
1844,
in
Early Writings.
New
York:
Vintage
Books.
1972 The 18th Brumaire of Louis
Boneparte.
Moscow:
Progress
Publishers.
1962 In C.
Wright Mills,
The Marxists. New York: Dell
Publishing
Co.
Marx,
Karl and Frederic
Engels
1976 The German
Ideology.
New York: International Publishers.
Marcuse,
Herbert
1968
Negations: Essays
in Critical
Theory.
Boston: Beacon Press.
1960 Reason and Revolution:
Hegel
and the Rise of Social
Theory.
Boston,
Beacon
Press.
Maslow,
Abraham
1978 The Farther Reaches of Human Nature. New York:
Penguin
Books.
Meszaros,
Istvan
1970 Marx's
Theory
of Alienation. London: Merlin Press.
Mills,
C.W.
1977 The
Sociological Imagination.
New York: Dell Publishers.
1975 The Marxists. New York: Dell Publishers.
Suchting,
Wal
1979 Marx's Theses on Feuerbach.
Taylor,
Charles
1975
Hegel. London,
New York:
Cambridge University
Press.
1964 The
Explanation
of Behavior. London:
Routledge, Keegan
Paul.
Vasquez,
A. S.
1977 The
Philosophy
of Praxis. London: Merlin
Press;
New
Jersey:
Humanities
Press.
Void,
G. and T. Bernard
1979 Theoretical
Criminology,
2nd Edition. New York: Oxford
University
Press.
Wright,
G. H. von
1971
Explanation
and
Understanding.
London:
Routledge, Keegan
Paul.

Marxism and Positivism A Discussion

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Marxism and Positivism A Discussion

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Marxism and Positivism

Author(s): W. Byron Groves

You might also like