Cultural Revolution - Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia

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Cultural Revolution
[show]
[show]
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
Cultural Revolution propaganda poster. It
depicts Mao Zedong, above a group of soldiers
from the People's Liberation Army. The caption
says, "The Chinese People's Liberation Army
is the great school of Mao Zedong Thought."
Simplified Chinese

Traditional Chinese
Transcriptions
Commonly abbreviated as
Chinese
1.
2.
Transcriptions
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
For Iran's Islamic Cultural Revolution, see Iranian Cultural Revolution.
The Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution, commonly known as
theCultural Revolution, was a
social-political movement that took
place in the People's Republic of
China from 1966 until 1976. Set into
motion byMao Zedong,
then Chairman of theCommunist
Party of China, its stated goal was to
enforce communism in the country by
removing capitalist,traditional and
cultural elements from Chinese
society, and to
imposeMaoist orthodoxy within the
Party. The Revolution marked the
return ofMao Zedong to a position of
power after the failed Great Leap
Forward. The movement paralyzed
China politically and significantly
affected the country economically
and socially.
The Revolution was launched in May
1966. Mao alleged that bourgeoiselements were infiltrating the government and
society at large, aiming to restore capitalism. He insisted that these "revisionists"
be removed through violent class struggle. China's youth responded to Mao's
appeal by forming Red Guard groups around the country. The movement spread
into the military, urban workers, and the Communist Party leadership itself. It
resulted in widespread factional struggles in all walks of life. In the top leadership,
it led to a mass purge of senior officials who were accused of taking a "capitalist
road", most notably Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. During the same period
Mao's personality cult grew to immense proportions.
Millions of people were persecuted in the violent factional struggles that ensued
across the country, and suffered a wide range of abuses including public
humiliation, arbitrary imprisonment, torture, sustained harassment, and seizure of
property. A large segment of the population was forcibly displaced, most notably
the transfer of urban youth to rural regions during the Down to the Countryside
Movement. Historical relics and artifacts were destroyed. Cultural and religious
sites were ransacked.
Mao officially declared the Cultural Revolution to have ended in 1969, but its
active phase lasted until the death of the military leader Lin Biao in 1971. After
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Mao's death and the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976, reformers led by Deng
Xiaopingended the Maoist reforms associated with the Cultural Revolution. In June
1981, the Central Committee announced the official verdict: "The 'cultural
revolution', which lasted from May 1966 to October 1976, was responsible for the
most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the state, and
the people since the founding of the People's Republic."
[1]
Contents [hide]
1 Background
1.1 Great Leap Forward
1.2 Sino-Soviet Split and anti-revisionism
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This article
contains Chinese text.Without
proper rendering support, you
may see question marks, boxes,
or other symbols instead
ofChinese characters.
1.3 Precursor
1.3.1 February Outline
2 Early Stage: Mass Movement
2.1 The May 16 Notification
2.2 Early mass rallies
2.3 1966
2.4 1967
2.5 1968
3 Lin Biao phase
3.1 Transition of power
3.2 PLA gains pre-eminent role
3.3 Flight of Lin Biao
4 Gang of Four and their downfall
4.1 Antagonism towards Zhou and Deng
4.2 Death of Zhou Enlai
4.3 Tiananmen Incident
4.4 Death of Mao and Arrest of the Gang of Four
5 Aftermath
6 Policy and effect
6.1 "Educated Youths"
6.2 Slogans and rhetoric
6.3 Arts
6.4 Historical relics
6.5 Struggle sessions and purges
6.6 Ethnic minorities
7 Legacy
7.1 China
7.1.1 Communist Party opinions
7.1.2 Alternative opinions
7.1.3 Contemporary China
7.2 Outside mainland China
7.3 Academic debate
8 See also
9 Notes
10 References
11 Further reading
11.1 General
11.2 Specific topics
11.3 Commentaries
11.4 Fictional treatments
11.5 Memoirs by Chinese participants
12 External links
Background
Great Leap Forward
Main article: Great Leap Forward
In 1958, after China's first Five-Year
Plan, Mao called for "grassroots
Edit links
Ting Vit
Winaray

socialism" in order to accelerate his
plans for turning China into a modern industrialized state. In this spirit, Mao
launched the Great Leap Forward, established People's Communes in the
countryside, and began the mass mobilization of the people into collectives. Many
communities were assigned production of a single commoditysteel. Mao vowed
to increase agricultural production to twice 1957 levels.
[2]
The Great Leap was an economic failure. Uneducated farmers attempted to
produce steel on a massive scale, partially relying on backyard furnaces to
achieve the production targets set by local cadres. The steel produced was low
quality and largely useless. The Great Leap reduced harvest sizes and led to a
decline in the production of most goods except substandard pig iron and steel.
Furthermore, local authorities frequently exaggerated production numbers, hiding
and intensifying the problem for several years.
[3][4]
In the meantime, chaos in the
collectives, bad weather, and exports of food necessary to secure hard currency
resulted in the Great Chinese Famine. Food was in desperate shortage, and
production fell dramatically. The famine caused the deaths of millions of people,
particularly in poorer inland regions.
[5]
The Great Leap's failure reduced Mao's prestige within the Party. Forced to take
major responsibility, in 1959, Mao resigned as the State Chairman, China's head
of state, and was succeeded by Liu Shaoqi. In July, senior Party leaders
convenedat the scenic Mount Lu to discuss policy. At the conference,
Marshal Peng Dehuai, the Minister of Defence, criticized Great-Leap policies in a
private letter to Mao, writing that it was plagued by mismanagement and
cautioning against elevating political dogma over the laws of economics.
[3]
Despite
the moderate tone of Peng's letter, Mao took it as a personal attack against his
leadership.
[6]
Following the Conference, Mao had Peng removed from his posts,
and accused him of being a "right-opportunist". Peng was replaced by Lin Biao,
another revolutionary army general who became a more staunch Mao supporter
later in his career. While theLushan Conference served as a death knell for Peng,
Mao's most vocal critic, it led to a shift of power to moderates led by Liu Shaoqi
and Deng Xiaoping, who took effective control of the economy following 1959.
[3]
By the early 1960s, many of the Great Leap's economic policies were reversed by
initiatives spearheaded by Liu, Deng, and Zhou Enlai. This moderate group of
pragmatists were unenthusiastic about Mao's utopian visions. Owing to his loss of
esteem within the party, Mao developed a decadent and eccentric
lifestyle.
[citation needed][7]
By 1962, while Zhou, Liu and Deng managed affairs of
state and the economy, Mao had effectively withdrawn from economic decision-
making, and focused much of his time on further contemplating his contributions to
Marxist-Leninist social theory, including the idea of "continuous revolution".
[8]
This
theory's ultimate aim was to set the stage for Mao to restore his brand of
Communism and his personal prestige within the Party.
Sino-Soviet Split and anti-revisionism
Main article: Sino-Soviet Split
In the early 1950s, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union were the
two largest Communist states in the world. While they had initially been mutually
The purge of
GeneralLuo
Ruiqing solidified the
Army's loyalty to Mao
supportive, disagreements arose following the ascendancy of Nikita Khrushchev to
power in the Soviet Union after the death of Joseph Stalin. In 1956,
Khrushchevdenounced Stalin and his policies and subsequently set about
implementing post-Stalinist economic reforms. Mao and many members of the
Chinese Communist Party were opposed to these changes, believing that it would
have negative repercussions for the worldwide Marxist movement, among whom
Stalin was still viewed as a hero.
[9]
Mao believed that Khrushchev was not
adhering to MarxismLeninism, but was instead a revisionist, altering his policies
from basic Marxist-Leninist concepts, something Mao feared would allow capitalists
to eventually regain control of the country. Relations between the two
governmentssubsequently soured, with the Soviets refusing to support China's
case for joining the United Nations and going back on their pledge to supply China
with a nuclear weapon.
[9]
Mao went on to publicly denounce revisionism in April 1960. Without pointing
fingers at the Soviet Union, Mao criticized their ideological ally, the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia, while the Soviets returned the favour by proxy via
criticizing the Party of Labour of Albania, a Chinese ally.
[10]
In 1963, the Chinese
Communist Party began to openly denounce the Soviet Union, publishing a series
of nine polemics against its perceived revisionism, with one of them being titled On
Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and Historical Lessons for the World, in which
Mao charged that Khrushchev was not only a revisionist but also increased the
danger of capitalist restoration.
[10]
Khrushchev's downfall from an internal coup
d'tat in 1964 also contributed to Mao's fears of his own political vulnerability,
particularly because of his declining prestige amongst his colleagues following the
Great Leap Forward.
[10]
Precursor
Mao set the scene for the Cultural Revolution by
"cleansing" powerful officials of questionable loyalty
who were based in Beijing. His approach was less
than transparent, achieving this purge through
newspaper articles, internal meetings, and skillfully
employing his network of political allies.
In late 1959, historian and Beijing Deputy Mayor Wu
Han published a historical drama entitled Hai Rui
Dismissed from Office. In the play, an honest civil
servant, Hai Rui, is dismissed by a corrupt emperor.
While Mao initially praised the play, in February 1965
he secretly commissioned his wife Jiang Qing and
Shanghai propagandist Yao Wenyuan to publish an
article criticizing it.
[11]
Yao boldly alleged that Hai
Ruiwas really an allegory attacking Mao; that is, Mao
was the corrupt emperor andPeng Dehuai was the honest civil servant.
[12]
Yao's article put Beijing Mayor Peng Zhen
[13]
on the defensive. Peng, a powerful
official and Wu Han's direct superior, was the head of the "Five Man Group", a
committee commissioned by Mao to study the potential for a cultural revolution.
Peng Zhen, aware that he would be implicated if Wu indeed wrote an "anti-Mao"
play, wished to contain Yao's influence. Yao's article was initially only published in
select local newspapers. Peng forbade its publication in the nationally-
distributedPeople's Daily and other major newspapers under his control,
instructing them to write exclusively about "academic discussion", and not pay
heed to Yao's petty politics.
[14]
While the "literary battle" against Peng raged, Mao fired Yang Shangkun
director of the Party's General Office, an organ that controlled internal
communications on a series of unsubstantiated charges, installing in his stead
staunch loyalistWang Dongxing, head of Mao's security detail.
[15]
Yang's dismissal
likely emboldened Mao's allies to move against their factional rivals.
[15]
In
December, Defence Minister and Mao loyalist Lin Biao accused General Luo
Ruiqing, the chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), of being anti-
Mao, alleging that Luo put too much emphasis on military training rather than
Maoist "political discussion". Despite initial skepticism in the Politburo of Luo's
guilt, Mao pushed for an 'investigation', after which Luo was denounced,
dismissed, and forced to deliver aself-criticism. Stress from the events led Luo to
attempt suicide.
[16]
Luo's removal secured the military command's loyalty to
Mao.
[17]
February Outline
Having ousted Luo and Yang, Mao returned his attention to Peng Zhen. On
February 12, 1966, the "Five Man Group" issued a report known as the February
Outline (). The Outline, sanctioned by the Party centre, defined Hai Ruias
constructive academic discussion, and aimed to formally distance Peng Zhen from
any political implications. However, Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan continued their
denunciation of Wu Han and Peng Zhen. Meanwhile, Mao also sacked
Propaganda Department director Lu Dingyi, a Peng Zhen ally. Lu's removal gave
Maoists unrestricted access to the press. Mao would deliver his final blow to Peng
Zhen at a high-profile Politburo meeting through loyalists Kang Sheng and Chen
Boda. They accused Peng Zhen of opposing Mao, labeled the February
Outline"evidence of Peng Zhen's revisionism", and grouped him with three other
disgraced officials as part of the "Peng-Luo-Lu-Yang Anti-Party Clique".
[18]
On
May 16, the Politburo formalized the decisions by releasing an official document
condemning Peng Zhen and his "anti-party allies" in the strongest terms,
disbanding his "Five Man Group", and replacing it with the Maoist Cultural
Revolution Group (CRG).
[19]
Early Stage: Mass Movement
The May 16 Notification
In early 1966, the Politburo issued six Central Documents regarding the dismissal
of Peng, Luo, Lu and Yang in which they declared that the "Great Cultural
Revolution" had been launched. One of these documents, released on May 16,
was prepared with Mao's personal supervision and was particularly accusing:
[20]
Those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the
Party, the government, the army, and various spheres of culture are
a bunch of counter-revolutionary revisionists. Once conditions are
ripe, they will seize political power and turn the dictatorship of the
proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Some of them we
have already seen through; others we have not. Some are still
trusted by us and are being trained as our successors, persons
likeKhruschev for example, who are still nestling beside us. Party
committees at all levels must pay full attention to this matter.
[21]
This text, known as the "May 16 Notification," summarized Mao's ideological
justification for the Cultural Revolution.
[22]
Effectively it implied that there are
enemies of the Communist cause within the Party itself: class enemies who "wave
the red flag to oppose the red flag."
[23]
The only way to identify these people was
through "the telescope and microscope of Mao Zedong Thought."
[23]
The party
leadership was relatively united in approving the general direction of Mao's
agenda, but the charges against esteemed party leaders like Peng Zhen rang
alarm bells in China's intellectual community and among the eight non-Communist
parties.
[24]
Early mass rallies
After the purge of Peng Zhen, the Beijing Party Committee had effectively ceased
to function, paving the way for disorder in the capital. On May 25, Nie Yuanzi, a
philosophy lecturer at Peking University, authored a big-character poster along
with other leftists and posted it to a public bulletin. Nie attacked the university's
party administration and its leader Lu Ping.
[25]
Nie insinuated that the university
leadership, much like Peng Zhen, were trying to contain revolutionary fervour in a
"sinister" attempt to oppose the party and advance revisionism.
[25]
Mao, favouring
chaos as a means to "cleanse" the leadership ranks, ordered Nie's message to be
broadcast nationwide and called it "the first Marxist big-character poster in China."
Classes were promptly cancelled in Beijing primary and secondary schools,
followed by a decision on June 13 to expand the class suspension
nationwide.
[26]
By early June, throngs of young demonstrators lined the capital's
major thoroughfares holding giant portraits of Mao, beating drums, and shouting
slogans against his perceived enemies.
[26]
When the dismissal of Peng Zhen and the municipal party leadership became
public in early June, widespread confusion ensued. The public and foreign
missions were kept in the dark on the reason for Peng Zhen's ousting.
[27]
Even
the top Party leadership was unsure of the direction of the movement. Under the
auspice of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, work teams effectively 'ideological-
guidance' squads of cadres were sent to the city's schools and People's Daily to
restore some semblance of order.
[27]
However, the work teams were hastily
dispatched and had a poor understanding of student sentiment. Unlike the political
movement of the 1950s that squarely targeted intellectuals, the new movement
was focused on established party cadres. As a result the work teams came under
increasing suspicion for being yet another group aimed at thwarting revolutionary
fervour.
[28]
On July 28, Red Guard representatives wrote to Mao, stating that mass purges
Chinese propaganda poster:
"Destroy the old world; Forge the
new world." A Red Guard crushes
the crucifix, Buddha, and classical
Chinese texts with his hammer;
1967.
and all such related social and political phenomena were justified and correct.
Mao responded with his full support with his own big-character poster
entitled Bombard the Headquarters. Mao wrote that despite having undergone a
Communist revolution, China's political hierarchy was still dominated by
"bourgeois" elitist elements, capitalists, and revisionists, and that these counter-
revolutionary elements were indeed still present at the top ranks of the party
leadership itself. This was, in effect, an open call-to-arms against Liu Shaoqi,
Deng Xiaoping, and their allies.
[2]
1966
On August 8, 1966, the party's Central
Committee passed its "Decision Concerning
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution"
(a.k.a. "the 16 Points").
[29]
This decision
defined the Cultural Revolution as "a great
revolution that touches people to their very
souls and constitutes a new stage in the
development of the socialist revolution in our
country, a deeper and more extensive stage":
Although the bourgeoisie has

been overthrown, it is still
trying to use the old ideas,
culture, customs, and habits
of the exploiting classes to
corrupt the masses, capture
their minds, and endeavour
to stage a comeback. The
proletariat must do just the
opposite: It must meet head-
on every challenge of the
bourgeoisie in the ideological
field and use the new ideas,
culture, customs, and habits
of the proletariat to change
the mental outlook of the
whole of society. At present,
our objective is to struggle
against and crush those
persons in authority who are
taking the capitalist road, to
criticize and repudiate the
reactionary bourgeois
academic "authorities" and
the ideology of the
bourgeoisie and all other
exploiting classes and to
transform education,
literature and art, and all
other parts of the
superstructure that do not
correspond to the socialist
economic base, so as to
facilitate the consolidation
and development of the
socialist system.

The Decision took the existing student movement and elevated it to the level of a
nationwide mass campaign, calling on not only students but also "the masses of
the workers, peasants, soldiers, revolutionary intellectuals, and revolutionary
cadres" to carry out the task of "transforming the superstructure" by writing big-
character posters and holding "great debates."
The freedoms granted in the 16 Points were later written into the PRC
constitutionas "the four great rights" of "great democracy (, Dmnzh)": the
right to speak out freely, to air one's views fully, to write big-character posters, and
to hold great debates (dmngdfngdzbo
dbinln the first two are basically synonyms). (In other contexts the second
was sometimes replaced by dchunlin the right to "link up," meaning for
students to cut class and travel across the country to meet other young activists
and propagate Mao Zedong Thought.)
[citation needed]
Those who had anything other than a Communist background were challenged
and often charged for corruption and sent to prison. These freedoms were
supplemented by the right to strike, although this right was severely attenuated by
the Army's entrance onto the stage of civilian mass politics in February 1967. All
of these rights were removed from the constitution after Deng's government
suppressed the Democracy Wall movement in 1979.
[citation needed]
On August 18, 1966, millions of Red Guards from all over the country gathered in
Beijing for an audience with the Chairman. Atop Tiananmen Gate, Mao and Lin
Biao made frequent appearances to greet approximately 11 million Red Guards,
receiving cheers each time. Mao praised their actions in the recent campaigns to
develop socialism and democracy.
[citation needed]
Marxist-Leninist ideology was opposed to religion, and people were told to become
atheists from the early days of Communist rule. During the Destruction of Four
Olds campaign, religious affairs of all types were discouraged by Red Guards, and
practitioners persecuted. Temples, churches, mosques, monasteries, and
cemeteries were closed down and sometimes converted to other uses, looted, and
destroyed.
[30]
Marxist propaganda depicted Buddhism as superstition, and religion
was looked upon as a means of hostile foreign infiltration, as well as an instrument
of the 'ruling class'.
[31]
Chinese Marxists declared 'the death of God', and
considered religion a defilement of the Chinese communist vision. Clergy were
arrested and sent to camps; many Tibetan Buddhists were forced to participate in
the destruction of their monasteries at gunpoint.
[31]
For two years, until July 1968 (and in some places for much longer), student
activists such as the Red Guards expanded their areas of authority, and
accelerated their efforts at socialist reconstruction. They began by passing out
leaflets explaining their actions to develop and strengthen socialism, and posting
the names of suspected "counter-revolutionaries" on bulletin boards. They
assembled in large groups, held "great debates," and wrote educational plays.
They held public meetings to criticize and solicit self-criticisms from suspected
"counter-revolutionaries."
The world is yours, as well as ours, but in the last analysis, it is

yours. You young people, full of vigor and vitality, are in the bloom
of life, like the sun at eight or nine in the morning. Our hope is
placed on you ... The world belongs to you. China's future belongs
to you.

Red Guards on the cover of an
elementary school textbook
fromGuangxi
This was one of many quotations in the
Little Red Book that the Red Guards
would later follow as a guide, provided by
Mao. It was the mechanism that led the
Red Guards to commit to their objective as
the future for China. These quotes directly
from Mao led to other actions by the Red
Guards in the views of other Maoist
leaders.
[32]
Although the 16 Points and
other pronouncements of the central
Maoist leaders forbade "physical struggle
(, wdu)" in favor of "verbal struggle"
(, wndu), these struggle
sessionsoften led to physical violence. Initially verbal struggles among activist
groups became even more violent, especially when activists began to seize
weapons from the Army in 1967. The central Maoist leaders limited their
intervention in activist violence to verbal criticism, sometimes even appearing to
encourage "physical struggle," and only after the PLA began to intervene in 1969
did authorities begin to suppress the mass movement.
During the Cultural Revolution, all politicians who had any history of being
anything other than dogmatically Maoist were almost immediately purged. Liu
Shaoqi, once the most powerful man in China after Mao, was sent to a detention
camp, where he later died in 1969. Deng Xiaoping was himself sent away for a
period of re-education three times, and was eventually sent to work in an engine
factory until he was brought back years later by Zhou Enlai. Many of those
accused were not lucky enough to survive their persecution, and were only
rehabilitated posthumously, after Deng succeeded Hua Guofeng as the
paramount leader of China.
On August 22, 1966, Mao issued a notice to stop "all police intervention in Red
Guard tactics and actions." Those in the police force who defied this notice were
labeled "counter-revolutionaries." Mao, drawing on his experiences from prior to
1949, suggested that "the sign of a true revolutionary was his desire to kill." Mao's
praise for rebellion was effectively an endorsement for the actions of the Red
Guards, which grew increasingly violent.
[33]
Public security in China deteriorated
rapidly as a result of central officials lifting restraints on violent behavior.
[34]
Xie
Fuzhi, the national police chief, said it was "no big deal" if Red Guards were
beating "bad people" to death.
[35]
The police relayed Xie's remarks to the Red Guards and they acted
accordingly.
[35]
In the course of about two weeks, the violence left some one
hundred teachers, school officials, and educated cadres dead in Beijing's western
district alone. The number injured was "too large to be calculated."
[34]
The most gruesome aspects of the campaign included numerous incidents of
torture, murder, and public humiliation. Many people who were targets of 'struggle'
could no longer bear the stress and committed suicide. In August and September
1966, there were 1,772 people murdered in Beijing alone. In Shanghai there were
704 suicides and 534 deaths related to the Cultural Revolution in September. In
1967 mass rally in Shenyang against cadres of the
Chinese Communist Party Northeast Bureau, Yu Ping,
organization department chief, and Gu Zhuoxin,
secretary of the secretariat. Yu Ping was accused of
being a "capitalist roader" and Gu, a traitor to
revolution. Both men survived the Cultural Revolution.
Wuhan there were 62 suicides and 32 murders during the same period.
[36]
On September 5, 1966, another notice was issued from the party leadership,
encouraging all Red Guards to come to Beijing over a stretch of time. All costs,
including accommodation and transportation, were to be paid by the government.
On October 10, 1966, Mao's ally, General Lin Biao, publicly criticized Liu and
Deng as "capitalist roaders" and threats. Later, Peng Dehuai was brought to
Beijing to be publicly ridiculed.
1967
On January 3, 1967, Lin
Biaoand Jiang Qing employed
local media and cadres to
generate the so-called
"January Storm", in which
many prominent Shanghai
municipal government
leaders were heavily criticized
and purged.
[37]
This paved
the way for Wang Hongwen to
take charge of the city as
leader of its Municipal
Revolutionary Committee.
The Municipal government
was thus abolished. In
Beijing, Liu Shaoqi and Deng
Xiaoping were once again the targets of criticism, but others also pointed at the
wrongdoings of the Vice Premier, Tao Zhu. Separate political struggles ensued
among central government officials and local party cadres, who seized the Cultural
Revolution as an opportunity to accuse rivals of "counter-revolutionary
activity."
[citation needed]
On January 8, Mao praised these actions through the party-run People's Daily,
urging all local government leaders to rise in self-criticism, or the criticism and
purging of others suspected of "counterrevolutionary activity". This led to massive
power struggles which took the form of purge after purge among local
governments, many of which stopped functioning altogether. Involvement in some
sort of "revolutionary" activity was the only way to avoid being purged, but it was
no guarantee.
[citation needed]
In February, Jiang Qing and Lin Biao, with support from Mao, insisted that the
"class struggles" be extended to the military. Many prominent generals of
thePeople's Liberation Army who were instrumental in the founding of the PRC
voiced their concern and opposition to the Cultural Revolution, calling it a
"mistake". Former Foreign Minister Chen Yi, angered at a Politburo meeting, said
factionalism was going to completely destroy the military, and in turn the
party.
[citation needed]
Other generals, including Nie Rongzhen and Xu Xiangqian also expressed their
discontent. They were subsequently denounced on national media, controlled by
Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, as the "February Counter-current forces"
(Chinese: , ryu Nli). They were all eventually purged. At the same
time, many large and prominent Red Guard organizations rose in protest against
other Red Guard organizations who ran dissimilar revolutionary messages, further
complicating the situation and exacerbating the chaos.
[citation needed]
This led to a notice to stop all unhealthy activity within the Red Guards from Jiang
Qing. On April 6, 1967, Liu Shaoqi was openly and widely denounced by a
Zhongnanhai faction whose members included Jiang Qing and Kang Sheng, and
ultimately, Mao himself. This was followed by a protest and mass demonstrations,
most notably in Wuhan on July 20, where Jiang openly denounced any "counter-
revolutionary activity"; she later personally flew to Wuhan to criticize Chen Zaidao,
the general in charge of the Wuhan area.
[citation needed]
On July 22, Jiang Qing directed the Red Guards to replace the People's Liberation
Army if necessary, and thereby to render the existing forces powerless. After the
initial praise by Jiang Qing, the Red Guards began to steal and loot from barracks
and other army buildings. This activity, which could not be stopped by army
generals, continued until the autumn of 1968.
[citation needed]
1968
In the spring of 1968, a massive campaign began, aimed at promoting the
already-adored Mao Zedong to god-like status. On July 27, 1968, the Red
Guards' power over the army was officially ended and the central government sent
in units to protect many areas that remained targets for the Red Guards. Mao had
supported and promoted the idea by allowing one of his "Highest Directions" to be
heard by the masses. A year later, the Red Guard factions were dismantled
entirely; Mao feared that the chaos they causedand could still causemight
harm the very foundation of the Communist Party of China. In any case, their
purpose had been largely fulfilled, and Mao had largely consolidated his political
power.
[citation needed]
In early October, Mao began a campaign to purge officials disloyal to him. They
were sent to the countryside to work in labor camps. In the same month, at the
12th Plenum of the 8th Party Congress, Liu Shaoqi was "forever expelled from the
Party", and Lin Biao was made the Party's Vice-Chairman, Mao's "comrade-in-
arms" and "designated successor", his status and fame in the country was second
only to Mao.
[citation needed]
In December 1968, Mao began the "Down to the Countryside Movement". During
this movement, which lasted for the next decade, young intellectuals living in cities
were ordered to go to the countryside. The term "intellectuals" was actually used
in the broadest sense to refer to recently graduated middle school students. In the
late 1970s, these "young intellectuals" were finally allowed to return to their home
cities. This movement was in part a means of moving Red Guards from the cities
to the countryside, where they would cause less social disruption.
[citation needed]
Lin Biao phase
Transition of power
Premier Zhou Enlai at the
Ninth Party Congress
[42]
The Ninth Party Congress was held in April 1969, and served as a means to
'revitalize' the party with fresh thinking and new cadres after much of the old guard
had been destroyed in the struggles of preceding years.
[38]
The institutional
framework of the Party established two decades earlier had broken down almost
entirely: delegates for this Congress were effectively selected by Revolutionary
Committees rather than through election by party members.
[39]
Representation of
the military increased by a large margin from the previous Congress (28% of the
delegates were PLA members), and the election of more PLA members to the new
Central Committee reflected this increase.
[40]
Many military officers elevated to
senior positions were loyal to Lin Biao, opening a new factional divide between the
military and civilian leadership.
[41]
Lin delivered the keynote address at the Congress:
a document drafted by hardliner leftists Yao
Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao under Mao's
guidance.
[43]
The report was heavily critical of Liu
Shaoqi and other "counter-revolutionaries", and
drew extensively from quotations in the Little Red
Book. The Congress solidified the role of Maoism
within the party psyche, re-introducing Mao Zedong
Thought as an official guiding ideology of the party
in the party constitution, and officially designating
Lin as Mao's successor.
[44]
Lastly, the Congress
elected a new Politburo with Mao Zedong, Lin Biao,
Chen Boda, Zhou Enlai, and Kang Sheng as the members of the new Politburo
Standing Committee. Lin, Chen, and Kang were all beneficiaries of the Cultural
Revolution. Zhou, who was demoted in rank, voiced his unequivocal support for
Lin at the Congress.
[45]
Mao also restored the function of some formal party
institutions, such as the operations of the party's Politburo, which ceased
functioning between 1966-8 because the Central Cultural Revolution Group
held de facto control of the country.
[46]
PLA gains pre-eminent role
Mao's efforts at re-instituting party and state institutions generated mixed results.
Many far-flung provinces remained volatile as the political situation in Beijing
stabilized. Factional struggles, many of which were violent, continued at the local
level despite the declaration that the Ninth Congress marked a temporary "victory"
for the Cultural Revolution.
[47]
Furthermore, despite Mao's efforts to put on a
show of unity at the Congress, the factional divide between Lin Biao's PLA camp
and the Jiang Qing-led radical camp was intensifying. Indeed, a personal dislike of
Jiang Qing drew many civilian leaders, including prominent theoretician Chen
Boda, closer to Lin Biao.
[48]
Between 1966 and 1968, China was isolated internationally, having declared its
enmity towards both the Soviet Union and the United States. The friction with the
Soviet Union intensified after border clashes on theUssuri River in March 1969 as
the Chinese leadership prepared for all-out war.
[49]
In October, senior leaders
were evacuated from Beijing.
[49]
Amidst the tension, Lin Biao issued what
appeared to be an executive order to prepare for war to the PLA's eleven Military
"We do not only feel
boundless joy because we
have as our great leader the
greatest Marxist-Leninist of
our era, Chairman Mao, but
also great joy because we
have Vice Chairman Lin as
Chairman Mao's universally
recognized successor."
Marshal Lin Biao was
constitutionally
confirmed as Mao's
successor in 1969
Graffiti with Lin Biao's foreword to
Mao's Little Red Book, Lin's name
(lower right) was later scratched out,
presumably after his death
Regions on October 18 without passing through Mao.
This drew the ire of the Chairman, who saw it as
evidence that his authority was prematurely usurped by
his declared successor.
[49]
The prospect of war
elevated the PLA to greater prominence in domestic
politics, increasing the stature of Lin Biao at the
expense of Mao.
[50]
There is some evidence to
suggest that Mao was pushed to seek closer relations
with the United States as a means to avoid PLA
dominance in domestic affairs that would result from a
military confrontation with the Soviet Union.
[50]
During
his meeting with U.S. PresidentRichard Nixon in 1972,
Mao hinted that Lin had opposed seeking better
relations with the U.S.
[51]
After being confirmed as Mao's successor, Lin's supporters focused on the
restoration of the position of State Chairman,
[52]
which had been abolished by
Mao after the purge of Liu Shaoqi. They hoped that by allowing Lin to ease into a
constitutionally sanctioned role, whether Chairman or Vice-Chairman, Lin's
succession would be institutionalized. The consensus within the Politburo was that
Mao should assume the office with Lin becoming Vice-Chairman; but for unknown
reasons, Mao had voiced his explicit opposition to the recreation of the position
and his assuming it.
[53]
Factional rivalries intensified at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Congress
inLushan held in late August 1970. Chen Boda, now aligned with the PLA faction
loyal to Lin, galvanized support for the restoration of the office of State Chairman,
despite Mao's wishes to the contrary.
[54]
Moreover, Chen launched an assault
onZhang Chunqiao, a staunch Maoist who embodied the chaos of the Cultural
Revolution, over the evaluation of Mao's legacy.
[55]
The attacks on Zhang found
favour with many attendees at the Plenum, and may have been construed by Mao
as an indirect attack on the Cultural Revolution itself. Mao confronted Chen
openly, denouncing him as a "false Marxist",
[56]
and removed him from the
Politburo Standing Committee. In addition to the purge of Chen, Mao asked Lin's
principal generals to write self-criticisms on their political positions as a warning to
Lin. Mao also inducted several of his supporters to the Central Military
Commission, and placed his loyalists in leadership roles of the Beijing Military
Region.
[56]
Flight of Lin Biao
Main article: Lin Biao incident
By 1971, diverging interests between the
civilian and military wings of the leadership
were apparent. Mao was troubled by the
PLA's newfound prominence, and the
purge of Chen Boda marked the
beginning of a gradual scaling-down of the
PLA's political involvement.
[57]
According
to official sources, sensing the reduction
of Lin's power base and his declining
health, Lin's supporters plotted to use the military power still at their disposal to
oust Mao in a coup. Lin's son, Lin Liguo, and other high-ranking military
conspirators formed a coup apparatus in Shanghai, and dubbed the plan to oust
Mao by force Outline for Project 571, which sounds similar to "Military Uprising" in
Mandarin. It is disputed whether Lin Biao was involved in this process. While
official sources maintain that Lin planned and executed the alleged coup attempt,
scholars such as Jin Qiu portray Lin as a passive character manipulated by
members of his family and his supporters.
[58]
Qiu contests that Lin Biao was never
personally involved in drafting the Outline and evidence suggests that Lin Liguo
drafted the coup.
[58]
The Outline allegedly consisted mainly of plans for aerial bombardments through
use of the Air Force. It initially targeted Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, but
would later involve Mao himself. Were the plan to succeed, Lin would arrest his
political rivals and assume power. Assassination attempts were alleged to have
been made against Mao in Shanghai, from September 8 to September 10, 1971.
Perceived risks to Mao's safety were allegedly relayed to the Chairman. One
internal report alleged that Lin had planned to bomb a bridge that Mao was to
cross to reach Beijing; Mao reportedly avoided this bridge after receiving
intelligence reports.
In the official narrative, on September 13, 1971, Lin Biao, his wife Ye Qun, Lin
Liguo, and members of his staff attempted to flee to the Soviet Union ostensibly to
seek asylum. En route, Lin's plane crashed in Mongolia, killing all on board. The
plane apparently ran out of fuel en route to the Soviet Union. A Soviet team
investigating the incident was not able to determine the cause of the crash, but
hypothesized that the pilot was flying low to evade radar and misjudged the
plane's altitude.
The official account has been put to question by foreign scholars, who have
raised doubts over Lin's choice of the Soviet Union as a destination, the plane's
route, the identity of the passengers, and whether or not a coup was actually
taking place.
[58][59]
On September 13, the Politburo met in an emergency session to discuss Lin Biao.
Only on September 30 was Lin's death confirmed in Beijing, which led to the
cancellation of the National Day celebration events the following day. The Central
Committee kept information under wraps, and news of Lin's death was not
released to the public until two months following the incident.
[58]
Many of Lin's
supporters sought refuge in Hong Kong; those who remained on the mainland
were purged. The event caught the party leadership off guard: that Lin already
enshrined into the Party Constitution as Mao's "closest comrade-in-arms" and
"successor" could betray Mao de-legitimized a vast body of Cultural Revolution
political rhetoric. For several months following the incident, the party information
apparatus struggled to find a "correct way" to frame the incident for public
consumption.
[58]
Gang of Four and their downfall
Main article: Gang of Four
Antagonism towards Zhou and Deng
Mao became depressed and reclusive after the Lin Biao incident. With Lin gone,
Mao had no ready answers for who would succeed him. Sensing a sudden loss of
direction, Mao attempted reaching out to old comrades whom he had denounced
in the past. Meanwhile, in September 1972, Mao transferred a thirty-eight year-old
cadre from Shanghai, Wang Hongwen, to Beijing and made him Vice-Chairman of
the Party.
[60]
Wang, a former factory worker from a peasant background,
[60]
was
seemingly being groomed for succession.
[61]
Jiang Qing's position also
strengthened after Lin's flight. She held tremendous influence with the radical
camp. With Mao's health on the decline, it was clear that Jiang Qing had political
ambitions of her own. She allied herself with Wang Hongwen and propaganda
specialists Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, forming a political clique later
pejoratively dubbed as the "Gang of Four".
By 1973, round after round of political struggles had left many lower-level
institutions, including local government, factories, and railways, short of competent
staff needed to carry out basic functions.
[62]
The country's economy had fallen
into disarray, which necessitated the rehabilitation of purged lower level officials.
However, the party's core became heavily dominated by Cultural Revolution
beneficiaries and leftist radicals, whose focus remained upholding ideological
purity over economic productivity. The economy remained largely the domain of
Zhou Enlai, one of the few moderates 'left standing'. Zhou attempted to restore a
viable economy, but was resented by the Gang of Four, who identified him as their
main political threat in post-Mao era succession.
In late 1973, to weaken Zhou's political position and to distance themselves from
Lin's apparent betrayal, the "Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius" campaign began
under Jiang Qing's leadership.
[63]
Its stated goals were to purge China of new
Confucianist thinking and denounce Lin Biao's actions as traitorous and
regressive.
[64]
Reminiscent of the first years of the Cultural Revolution, the battle
was carried out through historical allegory, and although Zhou Enlai's name was
never mentioned during this campaign, the Premier's historical namesake,
theDuke of Zhou, was a frequent target.
With a fragile economy and Zhou falling ill to cancer, Deng Xiaoping returned to
the political scene, taking up the post of Vice-Premier in March 1973, in the first of
a series of promotions approved by Mao. After Zhou withdrew from active politics
in January 1975, Deng was effectively put in charge of the government, party, and
military, earning the additional titles of PLA General Chief of Staff, Vice-Chairman
of the Communist Party, and Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission in
a short time span.
[65]
The speed of Deng's rehabilitation took the radical camp,
who saw themselves as Mao's 'rightful' political and ideological heirs, by surprise.
Mao wanted to use Deng as a counterweight to the military faction in government
to suppress any remaining influence of those formerly loyal to Lin Biao. In
addition, Mao had become disenchanted with the Gang of Four's inability to
manage the economy and saw Deng as a competent and effective leader. Leaving
the country in grinding poverty would do no favours to the positive legacy of the
Cultural Revolution, which Mao worked hard to protect. Deng's return set the
scene for a protracted factional struggle between the radical Gang of Four and
moderates led by Zhou and Deng.
At the time, Jiang Qing and associates held effective control of mass media and
the party's propaganda network, while Zhou and Deng held control of most
government organs. On some decisions, Mao sought to mitigate the Gang's
influence, but on others, he acquiesced to their demands. The Gang of Four's
heavy hand in political and media control however, did not prevent Deng from
reinstating his economic policies. Deng emphatically opposed Party factionalism,
and his policies aimed to promote unity as the first step to restoring economic
productivity. Much like the post-Great Leap restructuring led by Liu Shaoqi, Deng
streamlined the railway system, steel production, and other key areas of the
economy. By late 1975 however, Mao saw that Deng's economic restructuring
might negate the legacy of the Cultural Revolution, and launched a campaign to
oppose "rehabilitating the case for the rightists", alluding to Deng as the country's
foremost "rightist". Mao directed Deng to write self-criticisms in November 1975, a
move lauded by the Gang of Four.
[66]
Death of Zhou Enlai
On January 8, 1976, Zhou Enlai died of bladder cancer. On January 15 Deng
Xiaoping delivered Zhou's official eulogy in a funeral attended by all of China's
most senior leaders with the notable absence of Mao himself, who had grown
increasingly critical of Zhou.
[67][68]
Curiously, after Zhou's death, Mao selected
neither a member of the Gang of Four nor Deng Xiaoping to become Premier,
instead choosing the relatively unknown Hua Guofeng.
The Gang of Four grew apprehensive that spontaneous, large-scale popular
support for Zhou could turn the political tide against them. They acted through the
media to impose a set of restrictions known as the "five nos": no wearing black
armbands, no mourning wreaths, no mourning halls, no memorial activities, and no
handing out photos of Zhou. Years of resentment over the Cultural Revolution, the
public persecution of Deng Xiaoping (who was seen as Zhou's ally), and the
prohibition against publicly mourning Zhou became associated with each other
shortly after Zhou's death, leading to popular discontent against Mao and the
Gang of Four.
[69]
Official attempts to enforce the "five nos" included removing public memorials and
tearing down posters commemorating Zhou's achievements. On March 25, 1976,
Shanghai's Wen Hui Bao published an article calling Zhou "the capitalist roader
inside the Party [who] wanted to help the unrepentant capitalist roader [Deng]
regain his power". Such propaganda efforts to attack Zhou's image only
strengthened the public's attachment to Zhou's memory.
[70]
Tiananmen Incident
Main article: Tiananmen Incident
On April 4, 1976, on the eve of China's annual Qingming Festival, a traditional day
of mourning, thousands of people gathered around the Monument to the People's
Heroes in Tiananmen Square to commemorate Zhou Enlai. The people of Beijing
honored Zhou by laying wreaths, banners, poems, placards, and flowers at the
foot of the Monument.
[71]
The most obvious purpose of this memorial was to
eulogize Zhou, but the Gang of Four were also attacked for their actions against
the Premier. A small number of slogans left at Tiananmen even attacked Mao
himself, and his Cultural Revolution.
[72]
Up to two million people may have visited Tiananmen Square on April 4.
[72]
All
levels of society, from the poorest peasants to high-ranking PLA officers and the
children of high-ranking cadres, were represented in the activities. Those who
participated were motivated by a mixture of anger over the treatment of Zhou,
revolt against the Cultural Revolution and apprehension for China's future. The
event did not appear to have coordinated leadership but rather seemed to be a
reflection of public sentiment.
[73]
The Central Committee, under the leadership of Jiang Qing, labelled the event
'counter-revolutionary', and cleared the square of memorial items shortly after
midnight on April 6. Attempts to suppress the mourners led to a violent riot. Police
cars were set on fire and a crowd of over 100,000 people forced its way into
several government buildings surrounding the square.
[71]
Many of those arrested
were later sentenced to prison work camps. Similar incidents occurred in other
major cities. Jiang Qing and her allies pinned Deng Xiaoping as the incident's
'mastermind', and issued reports on official media to that effect. Deng was formally
stripped of all positions "inside and outside the Party" on April 7. This marked
Deng's second purge in ten years.
[71]
Death of Mao and Arrest of the Gang of Four
On September 9, 1976, Mao Zedong died. To Mao's supporters, his death
symbolized the loss of the revolutionary foundation of Communist China. When his
death was announced on the afternoon of September 9, in a press release
entitled A Notice from the Central Committee, the NPC, State Council, and the
CMC to the whole Party, the whole Army and to the people of all nationalities
throughout the country,
[74]
the nation descended into grief and mourning, with
people weeping in the streets and public institutions closing for over a week. Hua
Guofeng chaired the Funeral Committee.
Shortly before dying, Mao had allegedly written the message "With you in charge,
I'm at ease", to Hua. Hua used this message to substantiate his position as
successor. Hua had been widely considered to be lacking in political skill and
ambitions, and seemingly posed no serious threat to the Gang of Four in the race
for succession. However, the Gang's radical ideas also clashed with influential
elders and a large segment of party reformers. With army backing and the support
of Marshal Ye Jianying, on October 10, the Special Unit 8341 had all members of
the Gang of Four arrested in a bloodless coup.
Aftermath
Although Hua Guofeng publicly denounced the Gang of Four in 1976, he
continued to invoke Mao's name to justify Mao-era policies. Hua spearheaded
what became known as the Two Whatevers,
[75]
namely, "Whatever policy
originated from Chairman Mao, we must continue to support," and "Whatever
directions were given to us from Chairman Mao, we must continue to follow." Like
Deng, Hua wanted to reverse the damage of the Cultural Revolution; but unlike
Deng, who wanted to propose new economic models for China, Hua intended to
move the Chinese economic and political system towards Soviet-style planning of
the early 1950s.
It became increasingly clear to Hua that, without Deng Xiaoping, it was difficult to
continue daily affairs of state. On October 10, Deng Xiaoping personally wrote a
letter to Hua asking to be transferred back to state and party affairs; party elders
also called for Deng's return. With increasing pressure from all sides, Hua named
Deng Vice-Premier in July 1977, and later promoted him to various other
positions, effectively catapulting Deng to China's second-most powerful figure. In
August, the Party's Eleventh Congress was held in Beijing, officially naming (in
ranking order) Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, and Wang
Dongxing as new members of the Politburo Standing Committee.
[76]
In May 1978, Deng seized the opportunity to elevate his protg Hu Yaobang to
power. Hu published an article in the Guangming Daily, making clever use of
Mao's quotations while lauding Deng's ideas. Following this article, Hua began to
shift his tone in support of Deng. On July 1, Deng publicized Mao's self-criticism
report of 1962 regarding the failure of the Great Leap Forward. With an
expanding power base, in September 1978, Deng began openly attacking Hua
Guofeng's "Two Whatevers".
[75]
On December 18, 1978, the pivotal Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCP
Congresswas held. At the congress Deng remarked that "a liberation of thoughts"
was necessary and the leadership must "seek truth from facts". The Plenum
officially marked the beginning of the economic reform era. Hua Guofeng engaged
in self-criticism and called his Two Whatevers a mistake. Wang Dongxing, a
trusted ally of Mao, was also criticized. At the Plenum, the Party reversed its
verdict on theTiananmen Incident. Disgraced former leader Liu Shaoqi was
allowed a belated state funeral.
[77]
At the Fifth Plenum held in 1980, Peng Zhen, He Long and other leaders who had
been purged during the Cultural Revolution were politically rehabilitated. Hu
Yaobang became head of the party as its General-Secretary. In September, Hua
Guofeng resigned, and Zhao Ziyang, another Deng ally, was named Premier.
Deng remained the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, but formal power
was transferred to a new generation of pragmatic reformers, who reversed
Cultural Revolution policies almost in their entirety.
Policy and effect
The effects of the Cultural Revolution directly or indirectly touched essentially all
of China's population. During the Cultural Revolution, much economic activity was
halted, with "revolution", regardless of interpretation, being the primary objective
of the country. The start of the Cultural Revolution brought huge numbers of Red
Guards to Beijing, with all expenses paid by the government, and the railway
system was in turmoil. Countless ancient buildings, artifacts, antiques, books, and
paintings were destroyed by Red Guards. By December 1967, 350 million copies
of Mao's Quotations had been printed.
[78]
The ten years of the Cultural Revolution brought China's education system to a
virtual halt. The university entrance exams were cancelled after 1966, and were
not restored until 1977 under Deng Xiaoping. Many intellectuals were sent to rural
labor camps, and many of those who survived left China shortly after the
revolution ended.
[citation needed]
Many survivors and observers
[who?]
suggest that
almost anyone with skills over that of the average person was made the target of
political "struggle" in some way. According to most Western observers as well as
followers of Deng Xiaoping, this led to almost an entire generation of inadequately
educated individuals. The impact of the Cultural Revolution on popular education
varied among regions, and formal measurements of literacy did not resume until
the 1980s.
[79]
Some counties in Zhanjiang had illiteracy rates as high as 41%
some 20 years after the revolution. The leaders of China at the time denied any
illiteracy problems from the start. This effect was amplified by the elimination of
qualified teachersmany of the districts were forced to rely upon chosen students
to re-educate the next generation.
[79]
As the bureaucracy in the Ministry of Health was marginalized, a large number of
health personnel were deployed to the countryside. Some farmers were given
informal medical training, and health-care centers were established in rural
communities. This process led to a marked improvement in the health and the life
expectancy of the general population.
[80]
Mao Zedong Thought became the central operative guide to all things in China.
The authority of the Red Guards surpassed that of the army, local police
authorities, and the law in general. Chinese traditional arts and ideas were
ignored and publicly attacked, with praise for Mao being practiced in their place.
People were encouraged to criticize cultural institutions and to question their
parents and teachers, which had been strictly forbidden in traditional Chinese
culture. The persecution of traditional Chinese cultural institutions was
emphasized even more during the Anti-Lin Biao, Anti-Confucius
Campaign.
[citation needed]
The Cultural Revolution also brought to the forefront numerous internal power
struggles within the Communist party, many of which had little to do with the larger
battles between Party leaders, but resulted instead from local factionalism and
petty rivalries that were usually unrelated to the "revolution" itself. Because of the
chaotic political environment, local governments lacked organization and stability,
if they existed at all. Members of different factions often fought on the streets, and
political assassinations, particularly in predominantly rural provinces, were
common. The masses spontaneously involved themselves in factions, and took
part in open warfare against other factions. The ideology that drove these factions
was vague and sometimes non-existent, with the struggle for local authority being
the only motivation for mass involvement.
[citation needed]
"Educated Youths"
During the Cultural Revolution, the Communist Party instituted the Down to the
Countryside Movement, in which "Educated Youths" (zhishi qingnian or
simply zhiqing) in urban areas were sent to live and work in agrarian areas, in
order to better understand the role of manual agrarian labor in Chinese society. In
the initial stages, most of the youth who took part volunteered, although later on
Members of the Down to the Countryside
Movement in Shenyang, 1968.
Remnants of a banner containing
slogans from the Cultural Revolution
inAnhui.
the government resorted to forcing
many of them to move.
In the post-Mao period, many of
those forcibly moved attacked the
policy as a violation of their human
rights. Historian Gao Mobo went as
far as to criticize such attitudes,
suggesting that "from the
perspectives of the rural residents,
the educated youth had a good life.
They did not have to work as hard as
the local farmers and they had state and family subsidies. They would frequently
go back home to visit their parents in the cities, and they had money to spend and
wore fashionable clothes."
[81]
Gao also claimed that during the Revolution, Mao
sent his daughter, Li Na, to work on a farm in Jiangxi.
[82]
Slogans and rhetoric
According to Shaorong Huang, the fact
that the Cultural Revolution had such
massive effects on Chinese society is the
result of extensive use of political
slogans.
[83]
In Huang's view, rhetoric
played a central role in rallying both the
Party leadership and people at large
during the Cultural Revolution. For
example, the slogan "to rebel is justified"
(, zofn yul) became a unitary
theme.
[83]
Huang asserts that political slogans were
ubiquitous in every aspect of people's
lives, being printed onto ordinary items
such as bus tickets, cigarette packets, and
mirror tables.
[84]
Workers were supposed
to "grasp revolution and promote
productions", while peasants were supposed to raise more pigs because "more
pigs means more manure, and more manure means more grain". Even a casual
remark by Mao, "Sweet potato tastes good; I like it" became a slogan everywhere
in the countryside.
[83]
Political slogans of the time had three sources: Mao, official Party media such
asPeople's Daily, and the Red Guards.
[83]
Mao often offered vague, yet powerful
directives that led to the factionalization of the Red Guards.
[85]
These directives
could be interpreted to suit personal interests, in turn aiding factions' goals in
being most loyal to Mao Zedong. Red Guard slogans were of the most violent
nature, such as "Strike the enemy down on the floor and step on him with a foot",
"Long live the red terror!" and "Those who are against Chairman Mao will have
their dog skulls smashed into pieces".
[83]
The faces of the Buddhas were
destroyed during the Cultural
Sinologists Lowell Dittmer and Chen Ruoxi point out that the Chinese language
had historically been defined by subtlety, delicacy, moderation, and honesty, as
well as the "cultivation of a refined and elegant literary style".
[86]
This changed
during the Cultural Revolution. Since Mao wanted an army of bellicose people in
his crusade, rhetoric at the time was reduced to militant and violent
vocabulary.
[83]
These slogans were a powerful and effective method of "thought
reform", mobilizing millions of people in a concerted attack upon the subjective
world, "while at the same time reforming their objective world."
[83][87]
Dittmer and Chen argue that the emphasis on politics made language a very
effective form of propaganda, but "also transformed it into a jargon of stereotypes
pompous, repetitive, and boring".
[87]
To distance itself from the era, Deng
Xiaoping's government cut back heavily on the use of political slogans. The
practice of sloganeering saw a mild resurgence in the late 1990s under Jiang
Zemin.
Arts
During the Cultural Revolution, there was an overhaul of many of the arts, with the
intention of producing new and innovative art that reflected the benefits of a
socialist society. As a part of this, many artists whose work was deemed to be
bourgeoise or anti-socialist were persecuted and prevented from working.
[88]
While traditional operas were banned as they were considered feudalistic and
bourgeoise, revolutionary opera, which is based on Peking opera, was promoted
under the direct supervision of Jiang Qing.
[89]
Traditional Peking operas were
modified in both content and form, and eight Model Operas were produced in the
first three years, the most notable of which was The Legend of the Red Lantern.
These operas were the only approved opera form and other opera troupes were
required to adopt or change their repertoire.
[90]
Another form of the arts which was influenced, much in the same style as was the
traditional theatre, was popular song. Many revolution-themed songs, such as
"Ode to the Motherland", "Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman", "The East
Is Red" and "Without the Communist Party, There Would Be No New China" were
either written or became extremely popular during this period. "The East Is Red",
especially, became popular; it de facto supplanted "The March of the Volunteers"
as the national anthem of China, though the latter was restored to its previous
place after the Cultural Revolution ended.
Historical relics
China's historical sites, artifacts and
archives suffered devastating damage as
they were thought to be at the root of "old
ways of thinking". Many artifacts were
seized from private homes and museums
and often destroyed on the spot. There
are no records of exactly how much was
destroyed. Western observers suggest
that much of China's thousands of years
Revolution.
Mao-era propaganda for struggle
sessions
of history was in effect destroyed or, later,
smuggled abroad for sale, during the
short ten years of the Cultural Revolution. Chinese historians compare the cultural
suppression during the Cultural Revolution to Qin Shihuang's great Confucian
purge. Religious persecutionintensified during this period, because religion was
seen as being opposed to Marxist-Leninist and Maoist thinking.
[91]
Although being undertaken by some of the Revolution's enthusiastic followers, the
destruction of historical relics was never formally sanctioned by the Communist
Party, whose official policy was instead to protect such items. Indeed, on May 14,
1967, the CCP central committee issued a document entitled Several suggestions
for the protection of cultural relics and books during the Cultural
Revolution.
[92]
Nevertheless, enormous damage were sustained. For example, a
survey in 1972 in Beijing of 18 key spots of cultural heritage including the Temple
of Heaven andMing Tombs showed extensive damage. Of the 80 cultural heritage
sites in Beijing under municipal protection, 30 were destroyed, and of the 6,843
cultural sites under protection by government decision in 1958, 4,922 were
destroyed.
[93]
Later Archaeological excavation and preservation after the destructive period in
the 1960s however were protected, and several major discoveries, such as that of
the Terracotta Army and the Mawangdui tombs occurred after the peak of the
Revolution.
[92]
The most prominent symbol of academic research in archaeology,
the journal Kaogu, however did not publish during the Cultural Revolution.
[94]
The status of traditional Chinese culture within China was also severely damaged
as a result of the Cultural Revolution. Many traditional customs, such as fortune
telling, paper art, feng shui consultations,
[95]
wearing traditional Chinese dresses
for weddings, the use of the traditional Chinese calendar, scholarship in classical
Chinese literature and the practice of referring to the Chinese New Year as the
"New Year" rather than the "Spring Festival" have been weakened in mainland
China.
Struggle sessions and purges
Main article: Struggle session
Millions of people in China were violently
persecuted during the Cultural Revolution.
Those identified as spies, "running dogs",
"revisionists", or coming from a suspect
class (including those related to former
landlords or rich peasants) were subject to
beating, imprisonment, rape, torture,
sustained and systematic harassment and
abuse, seizure of property, denial of
medical attention, and erasure of social
identity. At least hundreds of thousands of
people were murdered, starved, or worked to death. Millions more were forcibly
displaced. Young people from the cities were forcibly moved to the countryside,
where they were forced to abandon all forms of standard education in place of the
propaganda teachings of the Communist Party of China.
[75]
Estimates of the death toll, including both civilians and Red Guards, from various
sources
[5]
are about 500,000 between 1966 and 1969. Some people were not
able to stand the torture and, losing hope for the future, committed suicide. One of
the most famous cases of attempted suicide due to political persecution involved
Deng Xiaoping's son, Deng Pufang, who jumped (or was thrown) from a four-story
building after being "interrogated" by Red Guards. Instead of dying, he became
aparaplegic. In the trial of the so-called Gang of Four, a Chinese court stated that
729,511 people had been persecuted, of which 34,800 were said to have died.
[96]
According to Mao: The Unknown Story, an estimated 100,000 people died in one
of the worst factional struggles in Guangxi in JanuaryApril 1968, before Premier
Zhou sent the PLA to intervene.
[97][98]
In 1993, erotic fiction author
[99]
Zheng Yi
wrote the controversial book Scarlet Memorial: Tales Of Cannibalism In Modern
China, alleging "systematic killing and cannibalization of individuals in the name of
political revolution and 'class struggle'" among the Zhuang people in Wuxuan
County, Guangxi, during that period.
[97][100]
The book was roundly criticized in
China for its reliance on unpublished interviews and for its negative portrayal of a
Chinese ethnic minority,
[99]
although senior party historians have corroborated
some allegations of cannibalism.
[101]
Sinologist Gang Yue has questioned how
"systematic" the cannibalism could have been, given the inherent factionalism of
the Cultural Revolution.
[98]
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals also dispute that it was
communism that compelled the Zhuang in this area towards cannibalism, noting
that similar incidents occurred under pressure from the Kuomintang secret
policein the republican period.
[101]
The true figure of those who were persecuted or died during the Cultural
Revolution may never be known, since many deaths went unreported or were
actively covered up by the police or local authorities. The state of Chinese
demographics at the time was very poor, and the PRC has been hesitant to allow
formal research into the period.
[102]
In Mao's Last Revolution (2006), Roderick
MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals assert that in rural China alone some
36 million people were persecuted, of whom between 750,000 and 1.5 million were
killed, with roughly the same number permanently injured.
[103]
In Mao: The
Unknown Story, Jung Chang and Jon Halliday claim that as many as 3 million
people died in the violence of the Cultural Revolution.
[104]
Sociologist Daniel
Chirot claims that around 100 million people suffered and at least one million
people, and perhaps as many as 20 million, died in the Cultural Revolution.
[105]
Ethnic minorities
The Cultural Revolution wreaked much havoc on minority cultures in China.
InTibet, over 6,000 monasteries were destroyed, often with the complicity of local
ethnic Tibetan Red Guards. In Inner Mongolia, some 790,000 people were
persecuted. Of these, 22,900 were beaten to death and 120,000 were
maimed,
[106]
during a ruthless witchhunt to find members of the
alleged separatistNew Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. In Xinjiang,
copies of theQu'ran and other books of the Uyghur people were apparently
burned. Muslimimams were reportedly paraded around with paint splashed on
The central section of this wall
shows the faint remnant marks of a
propaganda slogan that was added
during the Cultural Revolution, but
has since been removed. The
slogan reads "Boundless faith in
Chairman Mao."
their bodies. In the ethnic Korean areas of northeast China, language schools
were destroyed. InYunnan Province, the palace of the Dai people's king was
torched, and an infamous massacre of Hui Muslim people at the hands of
the People's Liberation Army in Yunnan, known as the "Shadian incident",
reportedly claimed over 1,600 lives in 1975.
[107]
Concessions given to minorities were abolished as part of the Red Guards' attack
on the "Four Olds": old customs, old culture, old habits, and old
ideas. Communeswere established in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (Tibet had
previously been exempt from China's period of land reform) and reimposed in
other minority areas. Despite official persecution, some local leaders and minority
ethnic practices survived in remote regions.
[citation needed]
The overall failure of the Red Guards' and radical assimilationists' goals was
largely due to two factors. It was felt that pushing minority groups too hard would
compromise China's border defences. This was especially important as minorities
make up a large percentage of the population that live along China's borders. In
the late 1960s China experienced a period of strained relations with a number of
its neighbours, notably with the Soviet Union and India. Many of the Cultural
Revolution's goals in minority areas were simply too unreasonable to be
implemented. The return to pluralism, and therefore the end of the worst of the
effects of the Cultural Revolution to ethnic minorities in China, coincides closely
with Lin Biao's removal from power.
[108]
Legacy
China
Communist Party opinions
Main article: Ideology of the Communist
Party of China
To make sense of the mass chaos caused by
Mao's leadership in the Cultural Revolution
while preserving the Party's authority and
legitimacy, Mao's successors needed to lend
the event a "proper" historical judgment. On
June 27, 1981, the Central Committee
adopted the "Resolution on Certain
Questions in the History of Our Party Since
the Founding of the People's Republic of
China," an official assessment of major
historical events since 1949. The Resolution
frankly noted Mao's leadership role in the
movement, stating that "chief responsibility
for the grave 'Left' error of the 'Cultural
Revolution,' an error comprehensive in magnitude and protracted in duration,
does indeed lie with Comrade Mao Zedong." But it diluted blame on Mao himself
by asserting that the movement was "manipulated by the counterrevolutionary
groups of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing," who caused its worst excesses. The
Resolution affirmed that the Cultural Revolution "brought serious disaster and
turmoil to the Communist Party and the Chinese people."
[109]
The official view aimed to separate Mao's actions during the Cultural Revolution
from his "heroic" revolutionary activities during the Chinese Civil War and
theSecond Sino-Japanese War. It also separates Mao's personal mistakes from
the correctness of the theory that he created, which remains an official guiding
ideology in the Party. Deng Xiaoping famously summed this up with the phrase
"Mao was 70% good, 30% bad."
[110]
In rhetoric, Deng affirmed that Maoist
ideology was responsible for the revolutionary success of the Communist Party,
but abandoned it in practice to favour "Socialism with Chinese characteristics", a
very different model of state-directed market economics.
In Mainland China, the official Party view now serves as the dominant framework
for Chinese historiography of the time period; alternative views (see below) are
discouraged. Following the Cultural Revolution, a new genre of literature known as
"Scar Literature" (Shanghen Wenxue) emerged, being encouraged by the post-
Mao government. Largely written by educated youths such as Liu Xinhua, Zhang
Xianliang, and Liu Xinwu, scar literature depicted the Revolution from a negative
viewpoint, using their own perspectives and experiences as a basis.
[111]
After the suppression of the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989, both liberals
and conservatives within the Party accused each other of excesses that they
claimed were reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution. Li Peng, who promoted the
use of military force, cited that the student movement had taken inspiration from
the grassroots populism of the Cultural Revolution, and that if it is left unchecked,
would eventually lead to a similar degree of mass chaos.
[112]
Zhao Ziyang, who
was sympathetic to the protestors, later accused his political opponents of illegally
removing him from office by using "Cultural Revolution-style" tactics, including
"reversing black and white, exaggerating personal offenses, taking quotes out of
context, issuing slander and lies... innundating the newspapers with critical articles
making me out to be an enemy, and casual disregard for my personal
freedoms."
[113]
Alternative opinions
Although the Chinese Communist Party officially condemns the Cultural
Revolution, there are many Chinese people who hold more positive views of it,
particularly amongst the working class, who benefited most from its
policies.
[114]
Since Deng's ascendancy to power, the government has arrested and
imprisoned figures who have taken a strongly pro-Cultural Revolution stance. For
instance, in 1985, a young worker at a shoe factory put up a poster on the wall of
a factory inXianyang, Shaanxi, which declared that "The Cultural Revolution was
Good" and led to achievements such as "the building of the Nanjing Yangtze River
Bridge, the creation of hybrid rice crops and the rise of people's consciousness."
The factory worker was eventually sentenced to ten years in prison, where he died
soon after "without any apparent cause."
[115]
One of the student leaders of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, Shen
Tong, author of Almost a Revolution, has a positive view of some aspects of the
Cultural Revolution. According to Shen, the trigger for the famous Tiananmen
hunger-strikes of 1989 was a big-character poster (dazibao), a form of public
political discussion that gained prominence during the Cultural Revolution. Shen
remarked that the congregation of students from across the country to Beijing on
trains and the hospitality they received from residents was reminiscent of the
experiences of Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution.
[2]
Since the advent of the Internet, various people in both China and abroad have
begun to argue online that the Cultural Revolution had many beneficial qualities
for China that have been denied by both the post-Mao Chinese Communist Party
and the Western media. Some hold that the Revolution 'cleansed' China from
superstitions, religious dogma, and outdated traditions in a 'modernist
transformation' that later made Deng's economic reforms possible. These
sentiments increased following the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in
Belgrade in 1999, when a segment of the population began to associate anti-
Maoist viewpoints with the United States.
[116]
Contemporary Maoists have also become more organized in the internet era. One
Maoist website has collected thousands of signatures demanding punishment for
those who publicly criticize Mao. Along with the call for legal action, this movement
demands the establishment of agencies similar to Cultural Revolution-era
"neighborhood committees", in which "citizens" would report anti-Maoists to local
public security bureaus. The recent movement in defense of Mao was sparked by
an online column written by Mao Yushi (no relation), an economist, who
provocatively wrote that Mao Zedong "was not a god". The move to have Mao's
image publicly protected is correlated with the recent political career of Bo Xilai,
whose term as party chief in Chongqing has been characterized by the use of
Maoist propaganda not popular in China since the end of the Cultural
Revolution.
[117]
Contemporary China
Public discussion of the Cultural Revolution is still limited in China. The Chinese
government continues to prohibit news organizations from mentioning details of
the Cultural Revolution, and online discussions and books about the topic are
subject to official scrutiny. Textbooks on the subject continue to abide by the
"official view" (see above) of the events. Many government documents from the
1960s on remain classified, and are not open to formal inspection by private
academics.
[118]
At the National Museum of China in Beijing, the Cultural Revolution
is barely mentioned in its historical exhibits.
[119]
Despite inroads made by
numerous prominent sinologists, independent scholarly research of the Cultural
Revolution is discouraged by the Chinese government.
[118]
There is concern that
as witnesses age and die, the opportunity to research the event thoroughly within
China may be lost.
[120]
That the government still displays such heightened sensitivities around the
Cultural Revolution is an indicator that it still considers itself, at least in part, an
inheritor of its legacy. The government is apprehensive that academic probing
and popular discussions will lead to ideological conflict and increase social
instability. It may threaten the foundations of Communist rule. The focus of the
Chinese government on maintaining political and social stability has been a top
priority since the Tiananmen crackdown on reformers on June 4, 1989, and the
current government has no interest in re-evaluating any issue that might lead to a
split in the Chinese leadership, or which might polarize the Party on ideological
grounds.
[118]
Outside mainland China
In Hong Kong a pro-Communist anti-colonial strike inspired by the Cultural
Revolution was launched in 1967. Its excesses damaged the credibility of these
activists for more than a generation in the eyes of Hong Kong residents.
[121]
In
Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek initiated the Chinese Cultural Renaissance to counter
what he regarded as destruction of traditional Chinese values by the Communists
on the mainland. In Albania, Communist leader and Chinese ally Enver
Hoxhabegan a "Cultural and Social Revolution" organized along the same lines as
the Cultural Revolution. In the world at large, Mao Zedong emerged as a symbol of
the anti-establishment, grassroots populism, and self-determination. His
revolutionary philosophies found adherents in the Shining Path of Peru, the U.S.-
based Black Panther Party,
[122]
and the 1960s counterculture movement in
general. In 2007Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang remarked that the
Cultural Revolution represented the 'dangers of democracy', remarking "People
can go to the extreme like what we saw during the Cultural Revolution [...], when
people take everything into their own hands, then you cannot govern the
place".
[123]
The remarks caused controversy in Hong Kong and were later
retracted with an accompanying apology.
[123]
Academic debate
Various schools of thought have emerged surrounding the nature of the Cultural
Revolution. The movement's complexities contain many contradictions: led by an
all-powerful omnipresent leader, it was mainly driven to fruition by a series of
grassroots-led popular uprisings against the Communist establishment. While
Mao's leadership was pivotal at the start of the movement, Jin Qiu contends that
as events progressed it deviated significantly from Mao's utopian vision.
[124]
In
this sense, the Cultural Revolution was actually a much more decentralized and
varied movement that gradually lost cohesion, spawning a large number of 'local
revolutions' which differed in their nature and goals.
[124]
Academic interest has also focused on the movement's relationship with Mao's
personality. Mao had always envisioned himself as a wartime guerrilla leader,
which made him wary of the bureaucratic details of peacetime governance. With
the Cultural Revolution Mao was simply "returning to form," once again taking on
the role of a guerrilla leader fighting against an institutionalized Party
bureaucracy.MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, writing in Mao's Last Revolution,
paint the movement as neither a bona fide war over ideological purity nor a mere
power struggle to remove Mao's political rivals.
[125]
They reason that the Cultural
Revolution happened due to a series of complex factors: China's relationship with
the global Communist movement, geopolitical concerns, the ideological rift
between China and the Soviet Union, and the failures of the Great Leap
Forward.
[125]
The movement was, at least in part, a legacy project to cement
Mao's place in history, aimed to boost his prestige while he was alive and preserve
the invulnerability of his ideas after his death.
[126]
People's Republic of
China portal
The mass hysteria surrounding the Cultural Revolution was also unprecedented.
Historian Phillip Short contends that the Cultural Revolution contained elements
that was akin to a form of religious worship.
[127]
Mao's godlike status during the
period yielded him ultimate definitional power over Communist doctrine, yet the
esoteric nature of his writings led to endless wars over its interpretation, with both
conservatives and liberals drawing on Mao's teachings to achieve their divergent
goals. Many factional struggles were not unlike religious wars, with all sides
claiming allegiance to the most "authentic" form of Maoism.
Virtually all English-language books paint a highly negative picture of the
movement. Historian Anne F. Thurston wrote that it "led to loss of culture, and of
spiritual values; loss of hope and ideals; loss of time, truth and of
life..."
[128]
Barnouin and Yu summarized the Cultural Revolution as "a political
movement that produced unprecedented social divisions, mass mobilization,
hysteria, upheavals, arbitrary cruelty, torture, killings, and even civil war...", calling
Mao "one of the most tyrannical despots of the twentieth century."
[129]
In Mao:
The Unknown Story,Chang and Halliday attributed all the destruction of the
Cultural Revolution to Mao personally, with more sympathetic portrayals of his
allies and opponents.
[130]
A small number of scholars continue to hold positive
views about the Cultural Revolution. Mobo Gao, writing in The Battle for China's
Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution,
[131]
asserts that the movement benefited
millions of Chinese citizens, particularly agricultural and industrial
workers,
[132]
and sees it as egalitarian and genuinely populist, citing continued
Maoist nostalgia in China today as remnants of its positive legacy.
[133]
See also
Morning Sun (Chinese:
, B-Ji Dinzhng De Tiyng Wng
Jlpin), a documentary exploring the events
and effects of the Cultural Revolution
Red Scarf Girl, a memoir of experiences during the Cultural Revolution
Born Red: A Chronicle of the Cultural Revolution, an autobiography that
includes experiences during the Cultural Revolution
A Year In Upper Felicity, book chronicling a year in a rural Chinese village
during the Cultural Revolution
Cultural and Ideological Revolution in Albania, inspired by the Cultural
Revolution
Notes
1. ^ "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding
of the People's Republic of China," adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the
Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on June 27,
1981 Resolution on CPC History (1949-81). (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press,
1981). p. 32.
2. ^
a

b

c
Tang Tsou. [1986] (1986).The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms:
A Historical Perspective. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-81514-5
3. ^
a

b

c
Worden, Robert (1987). "A Country Study:China" . Library of Congress.
4. ^ Jin, Qiu (1999). The Culture of Power: Lin Biao and the Cultural Revolution.
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. pp. 2530.
5. ^
a

b
Historical Atlas of the 20th century
6. ^ Jin Qiu, p. 55
7. ^ Spence
8. ^ Jin Qiu, Ch. 2
9. ^
a

b
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006. pp. 0407.
10. ^
a

b

c
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006. p. 07.
11. ^ MacFarquhar and Schoenhals. pp. 15-18.
12. ^ MacFarquhar and Schoenhals. pp. 16.
13. ^ No relation to Peng Dehuai
15. ^
a

b
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006. Chapter 1.
16. ^ MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006. pp. 2027.
17. ^ MacFarquhar and Schoenhals. p. 24.
18. ^ MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006 Chapter 1.
20. ^ MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006. pp. 3940.
21. ^ Quoted in MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006. p. 47.
22. ^ Li Xuefeng quoted in MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006. p. 40.
23. ^
a

b
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006. p. 46.
24. ^ MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006. p. 41.
25. ^
a

b
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 5658
26. ^
a

b
27. ^
a

b
28. ^ MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 71
29. ^ Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution , adopted on
August 8, 1966, by the CC of the CCP (official English version)
30. ^ murdoch edu
[dead link]
31. ^
a

b
Yu, Dan Smyer. "Delayed contention with the Chinese Marxist scapegoat
complex: re-membering Tibetan Buddhism in the PRC." The Tibet Journal 32.1
(2007)
32. ^ MacFarquhar, Roderick and Schoenhals, Michael. Mao's Last
Revolution. Harvard University Press, 2006. p. 107
33. ^ MacFarquhar & Schoenhals; pp. 515
34. ^
a

b
MacFarquhar, Roderick and Schoenhals, Michael. Mao's Last
35. ^
a

b
36. ^ MacFarquhar & Schoenhals; p. 124
37. ^ Yan, Jiaqi. Gao, Gao. [1996] (1996). Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural
Revolution. ISBN 0-8248-1695-1.
38. ^ MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 285.
41. ^ MacFarquhar and Schoenhals. Chapter 17.
42. ^ As quoted in MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 291.
44. ^ MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 291.; At the time, no other Communist parties
or governments anywhere in the world had adopted the practice of enshrining a
successor to the current leader into their constitutions; This practice was unique
to China.
48. ^ Qiu, p. 115
49. ^
a

b

c
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 317.
50. ^
a

b
52. ^ This position, effectively China'shead of state, has been called "President" since
1982
56. ^
a

b
58. ^
a

b

c

d

e
Qiu, Jin (1999). The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the
Cultural Revolution. Stanford, California: Standard University Press.
59. ^ Hannam and Lawrence 34
60. ^
a

b
66. ^ MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Chapter 22
67. ^ Teiwes and Sun 217218
68. ^ Spence 610
69. ^ Tiewes and Sun, 213
71. ^
a

b

c
Spence, 612
72. ^
a

b
Teiwes and Sun 218
74. ^ People's Daily: September 10, 1976 1976.9.10 --
(Mo zhx shsh Zhnggng Zhngyng Dng Go Qungu Rnmn Sh)
retrieved from SINA.com
75. ^
a

b

c
Harding, Harry. [1987] (1987). China's Second Revolution: Reform after
Mao. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0-8157-3462-X
76. ^ Basic Knowledge about the Communist Party of China: The Eleventh
Congress
[dead link]
77. ^ Andrew, Christopher. Mitrokhin, Vasili. [2005] (2005). The World was Going Our
Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World. Basic Books Publishing. ISBN
0-465-00311-7
78. ^ Lu, Xing. [2004] (2004). Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact
on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication. UNC Press.ISBN 1-57003-543-
1
79. ^
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b
Peterson, Glen. [1997] (1997). The Power of Words: literacy and revolution in
South China, 194995. UBC Press. ISBN 0-7748-0612-5
80. ^ Huang, Yanzhong (2011). "The Sick Man of Asia. China's Health Crisis". Foreign
Affairs 90 (6): 119136.
81. ^ Gao 2008. p. 36.
82. ^ Gao 2008. p. 109.
83. ^
a

b

c

d

e

f

g
Huang, Shaorong. "The power of Words: Political Slogans as
Leverage in Conflict and Conflict Management during China's Cultural Revolution
Movement," in Chinese Conflict Management and Resolution, by Guo-Ming Chen
and Ringo Ma (2001), Greenwood Publishing Group
84. ^ Gao 2008. p. 14.
85. ^ Chan
86. ^ Dittmer, Lowel and Chen Ruoxi. (1981) "Ethics and rhetoric of the Chinese
Cultural Revolution," Studies in Chinese Terminology, 19, p. 108
87. ^
a

b
Dittmer and Chen 1981, p. 12.
88. ^ Gao 2008. p. 22.
89. ^ Xing Lu (2004). Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on
Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication . University of South Carolina
Press. p. 115.ISBN 978-1570035432.
90. ^ Richard King (ed.). Art in Turmoil: The Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966-76 .
p. 176.ISBN 9780774815420.
91. ^ Jiaqi Yan, Gao Gao, Danny Wynn Ye Kwok, Turbulent decade: a history of the
cultural revolution, Honolulu Univ. of Hawai'i Press 1996, p.73
92. ^
a

b
Gao 2008. p. 21.
93. ^ Jun Wang (2011). Beijing Record: A Physical and Political History of Planning
Modern Beijing . World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd. pp. 446447. ISBN 978-
9814295727.
94. ^ Journal of Asian history, Volume 21, 1987, p. 87
95. ^ Guoxue.com
[dead link]
96. ^ James P. Sterba, New York Times, January 25, 1981
97. ^
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Steven Bela Vardy and Agnes Huszar Vardy. Cannibalism in Stalin's Russia
and Mao's China .Duquesne University, East European Quarterly, XLI, No.2,
2007
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Yue, Gang (1999). The Mouth That Begs: Hunger, Cannibalism, and the
Politics of Eating in Modern China. Duke University Press. pp. 228230.
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b
Chen, Xiaomei (2002). Acting the Right Part: Political Theatre and Popular
Drama in Contemporary China. University of Hawaii Press. pp. 3031.
100. ^ Sun, Lung-Kee (2002). The Chinese National Character: From Nationhood to
Individuality. M.E. Sharpe. p. 142.
101. ^
a

b
102. ^ The Chinese Cultural Revolution: Remembering Mao's Victims by Andreas
Lorenz in Beijing, Der Spiegel Online. May 15, 2007
103. ^ MacFarquhar and Schoenhals. p. 262
104. ^ Chang, Jung and Halliday, Jon.Mao: The Unknown Story. Jonathan Cape,
London, 2005. p.569
105. ^ Daniel Chirot. Modern tyrants: the power and prevalence of evil in our
age . Princeton University Press, 1996. ISBN 0-691-02777-3 p. 198
106. ^ MacFarquhar, Roderick and Schoenhals, Michael. Mao's Last
107. ^ Yongming Zhou, Anti-drug crusades in twentieth-century China : nationalism,
history, and state building, Lanham [u.a.] Rowman & Littlefield 1999, p.162
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"Li Peng, the 'Butcher of Tiananmen,' was 'Ready to Die' to Stop the Student
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the Red Guard Generation; University of Washington Press (1985)
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91287-X.
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7283-61-4
122. ^ Up Against the Wall, Curtis Austin, University of Arkansas Press, Fayetteville,
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Chen, Jack (1975). Inside the Cultural Revolution. Scribner. ISBN 0-02-
524630-5.
Clark, Paul (2008). The Chinese Cultural Revolution: A History. Cambridge
and New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-87515-8.
Ewing, Kent. (2011, June 4). "Mao's Army on the Attack". Asia Times Online.
Asia Times Online (Holdings). Retrieved at
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MF04Ad01.html > on June 16, 2011.
Fong Tak-ho. (2006, May 19). "Cultural Revolution? What Revolution?" Asia
Times Online. Asia Times Online (Holdings). Retrieved at
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HE19Ad01.html > on June 15, 2011.
Gao, Mobo (2008). The Battle for China's Past: Mao and the Cultural
Revolution. London: Pluto Press. ISBN 978-0-7453-2780-8. Retrieved at
<http://www.strongwindpress.com/pdfs/EBook/The_Battle_for_Chinas_Past.pdf >
on September 2, 2012
Lee, Hong Yong (1978). The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution.
Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-03297-7.
MacFarquhar, Roderick and Schoenhals, Michael (2006). Mao's Last
Revolution. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-02332-1.
Solomon, Richard H. (1971). Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political
Culture. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Spence, Jonathan D. (1999). The Search for Modern China, New York: W.W.
Norton and Company. ISBN 0-393-97351-4.
Thurston, Anne F. (1988). Enemies of the People: The Ordeal of Intellectuals
in China's Great Cultural Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Teiwes, Frederick C. & Sun, Warren. (2004). "The First Tiananmen Incident
Revisited: Elite Politics and Crisis Management at the End of the Maoist
Era".Pacific Affairs. Vol. 77, No. 2, Summer. 211235. Retrieved from
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/40022499 > on March 11, 2011.
Zhao Ziyang. Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao
Ziyang. Trans & Ed. Bao Pu, Renee Chiang, and Adi Ignatius. New York:
Simon and Schuster. 2009. ISBN 1-4391-4938-0
Further reading
General
Michael Schoenhals, ed., China's Cultural Revolution, 19661969: Not a
Dinner Party (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996. An East Gate Reader). xix,
400p. ISBN 1-56324-736-4.
Richard Curt Kraus. The Cultural Revolution: A Very Short Introduction. New
York: Oxford University Press, Very Short Introductions Series, 2012. xiv,
138p.ISBN 9780199740550.
Revolution.Harvard University Press, 2006. ISBN 0-674-02332-3
Morning Sun, "Bibliography," Morningsun.org Books and articles of General
Readings and Selected Personal Narratives on the Cultural Revolution.
Specific topics
Chan, Anita. 1985. Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political
Activism in the Red Guard Generation. Seattle: University of Washington
Press.
Zheng Yi. Scarlet Memorial: Tales Of Cannibalism In Modern China. Westview
Press, 1998. ISBN 0-8133-2616-8
Yang, Guobin. 2000. China's Red Guard Generation: The Ritual Process of
Identity Transformation, 19661999. PhD diss., New York University.
Fox Butterfield, China: Alive in the Bitter Sea, (1982, revised 2000), ISBN 0-
553-34219-3, an oral history of some Chinese people's experience during the
Cultural Revolution.
Chang, Jung and Halliday, Jon. Mao: The Unknown Story. Jonathan Cape,
London, 2005. ISBN 0-224-07126-2
Ross Terrill,The White-Boned Demon: A Biography of Madame Mao
ZedongStanford University Press, 1984 ISBN 0-8047-2922-0; rpr. New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1992 ISBN 0-671-74484-4.
Commentaries
Simon Leys (penname of Pierre Ryckmans) Broken Images: Essays on
Chinese Culture and Politics (1979). ISBN 0-8052-8069-3
Simon Leys. Chinese Shadows (1978). ISBN 0-670-21918-5; ISBN 0-14-
004787-5.
Simon Leys. The Burning Forest: Essays on Chinese Culture and
Politics(1986). ISBN 0-03-005063-4; ISBN 0-586-08630-7; ISBN 0-8050-0350-
9; ISBN 0-8050-0242-1.
Simon Leys. The Chairman's New Clothes: Mao and the Cultural
Revolution(1977; revised 1981). ISBN 0-85031-208-6; ISBN 0-8052-8080-
4; ISBN 0-312-12791-X; ISBN 0-85031-209-4; ISBN 0-85031-435-6 (revised
ed.).
Liu, Guokai. 1987. A Brief Analysis of the Cultural Revolution. edited by Anita
Chan. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe.
Fictional treatments
Sijie Dai, translated by Ina Rilke, Balzac and the Little Chinese
Seamstress(New York: Knopf: Distributed by Random House, 2001).
197p. ISBN 0-375-41309-X
Xingjian Gao, translated by Mabel Lee, One Man's Bible: A Novel (New York:
HarperCollins, 2002). 450p.
Hua Gu, A Small Town Called Hibiscus (Beijing, China: Chinese Literature:
distributed by China Publications Centre, 1st, 1983. Panda Books). Translated
by Gladys Yang. 260p. Reprinted: San Francisco: China Books.
Hua Yu, To Live: A Novel (New York: Anchor Books, 2003). Translated by
Michael Berry. 250p.
Ying Chang Compestine, Revolution Is Not a Dinner Party : A Novel. (New
York: Holt, 2007). ISBN 0805082077. Young adult novel.
Memoirs by Chinese participants
Liu Ping, My Chinese Dream - From Red Guard to CEO (San Francisco, June
Find more about Cultural Revolution at
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Definitions and translations from
Wiktionary
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Textbooks from Wikibooks
Learning resources from
Wikiversity
2012). 556 pages ISBN 9780835100403
Nien Cheng, Life and Death in Shanghai (Grove, May 1987). 547 pages ISBN
0-394-55548-1
Jung Chang, Wild Swans: Three Daughters of China (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1991). 524 p. ISBN 91020696
Heng Liang Judith Shapiro, Son of the Revolution (New York: Knopf :
Distributed by Random House, 1983).
Yuan Gao, with Judith Polumbaum, Born Red: A Chronicle of the Cultural
Revolution (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987).
Jiang Yang Chu translated and annotated by Djang Chu, Six Chapters of Life
in a Cadre School: Memoirs from China's Cultural Revolution [Translation of
Ganxiao Liu Ji] (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986).
Bo Ma, Blood Red Sunset: A Memoir of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (New
York: Viking, 1995). Translated by Howard Goldblatt.
Guanlong Cao, The Attic: Memoir of a Chinese Landlord's Son (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1996).
Ji-li Jiang, Red Scarf Girl: A Memoir of the Cultural Revolution (New York:
HarperCollins, 1997).
Anchee Min, Red Azalea (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994). ISBN 1-4000-
9698-7.
Rae Yang, Spider Eaters : A Memoir (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1997).
Weili Ye, Xiaodong Ma, Growing up in the People's Republic: Conversations
between Two Daughters of China's Revolution (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2005).
Lijia Zhang, "Socialism Is Great": A Worker's Memoir of the New China (New
York: Atlas & Co, Distributed by Norton, 2007).
Emily Wu, Feather in the Storm (Pantheon, 2006). ISBN 978-0-375-42428-1.
Xinran Xue, The Good Women of China: Hidden Voices (Chatto & Windus,
2002). Translated by Esther Tyldesley. ISBN 0-7011-7345-9
Ting-Xing Ye, Leaf In A Bitter Wind (England, Bantam Books, 2000)
Zhang Xianliang, Grass Soup, ISBN 0-7493-9774-8
External links
Encyclopdia Britannica. The Cultural
Revolution
History of The Cultural Revolution
Chinese propaganda posters gallery
(Cultural Revolution, Mao, and
others)
Hua Guofeng's speech to the 11th
Party Congress, 1977
Morning Sun A Film and Website
about Cultural Revolution and the photographs of the subject available
from the film's site.
Memorial for Victims of the Chinese Cultural Revolution
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"William Hinton on the Cultural Revolution" by Dave Pugh
"Student Attacks Against Teachers: The Revolution of 1966" by Youqin
Wang
A Tale of Red Guards and Cannibals by Nicholas D. Kristof. The New York
Times, January 6, 1993.
Maoism
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Categories: 20th-century revolutions Chinese revolutions
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