Specpro Cases Part 1 To Part 2-1

SPECPRO Part 1 to 2.
1 Cases

1. INTRODUCTION

Nature of special proceedings
Applicability of ordinary rules of procedure

Assignments:

Rules of Court, Rule 72, Sections 1 and 2
Natcher vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 133000 (2 October 2001)
Pacific Banking Corp. Employees Org. vs. Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA 492 (1995)
Alan Joseph Sheker vs. Estate of Alice Sheker, GR No. 157912, 13 December 2007

Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. Rules of special proceedings are provided for in the following cases:
(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;
(b) Escheat;
(c) Guardianship and custody of children;
(d) Trustees;
(e) Adoption;
(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;
(g) Hospitalization of insane persons;
(h) Habeas corpus;
(i) Change of name;
(j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children;
(l) Constitution of family home;
(m) Declaration of absence and death;
(n) Cancellation of correction of entries in the civil registry.
Section 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

SPECPRO Part 1 to 2.1 Cases

PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HEIRS OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO
LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL ROSARIO-MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES,
ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BUENA, J.:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance and annulment of title
with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly in questions as
to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decisioni[1] of public respondent Court
of Appeals, the decretal portion of which declares:
Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside and another one
entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher,
and ordering the Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT No. 107443 without prejudice to the
filing of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court. No costs.
So ordered.
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of 9,322
square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the death of Graciana in
1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into
an extrajudicial settlement of Gracianas estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real
property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children
received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980
was issued in the name of Graciano and the six children.
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real
Property with Waiver of Rights where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980
into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land
amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Gracianos name, as covered
by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where
the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land
area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lotii[2] to a third
person but retained ownership over the second lot.iii[3]
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the land
covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 186059iv[4] was issued in the latters name.
On 07 October 1985, Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaintv[5] filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein private
respondents alleged that upon Gracianos death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation
and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June
1987vi[6] in favor of herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT No. 186059
in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of
such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
In her answervii[7] dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano on
20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further
alleged that during Gracianos lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein
private respondents may not anymore claim against Gracianos estate or against herein petitioners property.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996 holding:viii[8]

1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a
complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or
that there has been decreed a judicial separation of property between them, the spouses are prohibited from entering
(into) a contract of sale;
2) The deed of sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited by law under Article 133
of the New Civil Code;
3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be regarded as an extension
of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower courts decision ratiocinating, inter alia:
It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The court a quo,
trying an ordinary action for reconveyance/annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts
proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX
X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance inheritance. What the court should
have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a
separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. X X X
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court and assails the appellate courts decision for being contrary to law and the facts of the case.
We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise:
X X X a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention
or redress of a wrong.
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to
specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
X X X
c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An
action is a formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the
method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term special proceeding may be defined
as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the
remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion.ix[9]
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:
It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted
according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings
include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special
mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are
characteristics of ordinary actions. X X X A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and
independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or
motion upon notice.x[10]

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas
matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of
the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made
by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings;
and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word may, it is nevertheless clear that the same provisionxi[11]
contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings.
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an
adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as
Civil Case No. 71075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to
thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly
constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano
Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
At this point, the appellate courts disquisition is elucidating:
Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must first settle the estate in a special
proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo determined the respective legitimes of the
plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the subject property owned by the estate of the deceased to defendant-appellee without
observing the proper proceedings provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that
trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is subject
to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance
inheritance.xii[12]
In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeoxiii[13] and
Mendoza vs. Tehxiv[14] that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court (then Court of
First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a
mere question of procedure. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice which may be
waived.xv[15]
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the six children of the
decedent even assailed the authority of the trial court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of
advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that although
generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership.xvi[16]
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:
In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking appointment as estate
administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited the exercise of the
limited jurisdiction of a probate court.xvii[17] (emphasis supplied)
Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is
necessary that certain steps be taken first.xviii[18] The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all
payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all

donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the
compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had
prejudiced the legitimes.xix[19]
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that the trial court
failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This
Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under
the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate
and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosarios
estate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant
petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.


PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, PAULA S. PAUG, and its officers and members,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VITALIANO N. NAAGAS II, as Liquidator of Pacific
Banking Corporation, respondents.
[G.R. No. 112991. March 27, 1998]
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as Liquidator of the Pacific Banking
Corporation, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, DEPUTY SHERIFF RAMON
ENRIQUEZ and ANG ENG JOO, ANG KEONG LAN and E.J ANG INTL. LTD., represented by their Attorney-in-fact,
GONZALO C. SY, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
For consideration are (1) petitioner's Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 112991 seeking reconsideration of the Court's
resolution dated October 9, 1995, which denied the reconsideration of the decision in this case promulgated on March 20,
1995, and the resolution of October 13, 1995 which absolved the branch clerk of court of the RTC of Manila, Branch 31, of
charges of wrongdoing; and (2) the manifestation and motions for clarification filed by the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) concerning the request of petitioner in G.R. No. 112991 for the transfer of the funds of the Pacific Banking
Corporation (PaBC) to its other account in another branch of LBP and the alleged garnishment of the funds of PaBC
deposited in LBP in favor of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On March 20, 1995, the Court rendered a decision holding that a petition for liquidation under Sec. 29 of the Central Bank
Act, R.A.No. 265xx[1] is a special proceeding and , therefore, the rules prescribing a period of 30 days for appealing and
requiring a record on appeal apply. Accordingly, the appeal in G.R. No. 109373 was held to have been duly perfected but
the appeal in G.R. No. 112991 had not been perfected because of petitioner's failure to file a record on appeal.
Petitioner in G.R. No. 112991 moved for a reconsideration of the aforesaid decision but the Court denied his motion in its
resolution of October 9, 1995 on the following grounds (1) the clerks of the RTC and the Court of Appeals certified that no
record on appeal had been filed; (2) the branch clerk denied that the signature on the alleged copy of the record on
appeal was his; (3) counsel for private respondents and his clerk denied in their respective affidavits that they had been
served a copy of the record on appeal; (4) the identity of the person who allegedly received the record on appeal filed in
the trial court and whose initials appear on the first page of the alleged copy of the said record had never been
established; and (5) the copy of the record on appeal allegedly filed did not bear the stamp of the RTC showing due
receipt thereof.
In the resolution of October 13, 1995, the Court held Judge Regino Veridiano II, Deputy Sheriff Carmelo Cachero and
private respondent's counsel, Atty. Marino Eslao, guilty of indirect contempt for executing the decision of the trial court
despite the temporary restraining order issued by this Court. The Court, however, found no basis of holding branch clerk
Antonio Valencia Jr. guilty of any wrongdoing in certifying that petitioner failed to file a record on appeal.
On November 6, 1995, petitioner then filed the Omnibus Motion in question seeking to (1) reopen the case and/or
consider the resolution of October 9, 1995 which denied his motion for reconsideration, and (2) reconsider the October 13,
1995 resolution absolving the branch clerk of the trial court from contempt charges.
In his omnibus motion, petitioner insists that he filed a record on appeal. As proof, he presents a photocopy of the record
on appeal allegedly received by the branch clerk of the trial court bearing the handwritten notation "Received, 10-15-92,
3:45 PM" and the alleged initials of the said clerk. Petitioner explains that the record on appeal does not have the RTC
stamp "Received" because the trial court does not use a stamp but receipt of pleadings is acknowledged simply by
nothing this fact by hand. Petitioner submitted certain pleadings filed in the trial court which were acknowledged by the
branch clerk in the same way he allegedly acknowledged by the branch clerk in the same way he allegedl y acknowledged
receipt of petitioner's record on appeal. These are the notice of appeal filed by petitioner on October 14, 1992 (Annex E,
Omnibus Motion), Motion to Strike Out the Notice of Appeal with Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution filed by the
private respondents (Annex G) and Comment filed by another claimant (Solid Bank) dated May 26, 1995 (Annex H).

In addition, petitioner claims that the certifications by the clerks of the RTC and the Court of Appeals that no record on
appeal was filed are unreliable, that his record on appeal was suppressed from the records of the case, and that the
certification of the Court of Appeals that no record on appeal was filed therein was to be expected because the record on
appeal was filed with the RTC and not with the Court of Appeals.
Commenting, private respondents contend that the Omnibus Motion is actually a second motion for reconsideration which
is not allowed by the rules since the issues raised therein had been fully considered and passed upon by the Court and
that there is no compelling reason to grant the motion. They maintain that petitioner's appeal was not perfected because
of the non-filing of a record on appeal. Branch Clerk of court Antonio Valencia, on the other hand, maintains that "no
record on appeal was filed and therefore none could be found in the expediente (records of the case)." He claims that the
record on appeal allegedly filed in the trial court could not have been unlawfully removed from the records because all
pleadings received by the court are immediately attached to the records. He denies that the signature appearing on the
alleged record on appeal was his.
Because of the serious ness of the petitioner's allegation that its record on appeal had been suppressed, the Court on
December 11, 1996, referred the question to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On June 18, 1997, the OCA submitted its report and recommendation, the pertinent portions of which state:xxi[2]
In the formal investigation conducted (please see attached transcript) it was disclosed that Atty. Antonio Valencia
Jr. was appointed as the Clerk of Court V on June 18, 1992 and officially assumed office on July 1, 1992.
As the Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 31, it is his duty to exercise control and supervision over the personnel of
the said court; examines records of all cases filed and calendared; issues court processes, prepares drafts of
orders and other matters which are assigned by the Judge Regino Verediano.
In their sala each personnel have their respective duties , from receipt of pleadings that are being filed to their
safekeeping. In no case is anyone allowed to interfere with the duties of each personnel except under extreme
urgency. Thus, receiving of pleadings is normally entrusted to the receiving clerk and no one else. It is, as
claimed by Atty. Valencia, only in the absence of the said receiving clerk that other employees are authorized to
receive pleadings.
For his part, Atty. Valencia claims that he rarely receives pleadings since before it reaches his table, the same
are already duly received. Besides, it is not one of his duties to receive pleadings.
With respect to the alleged receipt of the record on appeal by their office, specifically to him, Atty. Valencia
vehemently denied having received the same. First, because the stroke of the alphabet indicating his initials is
very different and so with the dates, secondly, if it was actually received it could have been brought to attention
of the late Judge Verediano who thereafter would have made a notation of the same, like all other pleadings
received in their office or simply instruct the preparation of an order if necessary and lastly, it would have been
included in their court calendar as there was a notice of hearing attached thereto.
In the court's calendar dated October 23, 1992, Sp. Proc. No. 35313 was never scheduled for hearing. Under
normal circumstances, if there was notice of hearing it would be outrightly included in the court's calendar for
October 23, 1992 as requested.
To substantiate the aforesaid allegations Atty. Valencia submitted copies of pleadings filed relative to the subject
case bearing the notation of then Judge Verediano and the Court's calendar for October 22 and 23, 1992.
In addition, he pointed out that if the Notice of Appeal (Record on Appeal) was actually filed in their sala, why
was it raised for the first time only in PDIC's Motion for Reconsideration. This according to him is suspicious.
He even insinuated that nobody could have done this (meaning inserted the notice of appeal [record on appeal]
in their pleadings) except the interested lawyer/s.
Moreover, Atty. Valencia vouches for the honesty and integrity of his staff, and if there be a need for the
examination of their signatures they would be very willing to go for a specimen signature examination only to
clear his/their names.
The office of the undersigned believes the claim of Atty. Valencia that no Notice of Appeal [Record on Appeal]
was filed at RTC Branch 31, Manila. As a CPA/lawyer, he was very well aware of his duties and responsibilities
as a Branch Clerk of Court. This is evidenced by the fact that in his more than five (5) years stay as a Branch

Clerk of Court, no single administrative complaint has ever been lodged against him, be it a harassment suit or
otherwise.
Moreover, if it has been actually filed it would not have passed unnoticed by then Judge Verediano who had to
approve the same.
The undersigned is in accord with the claim of Atty. Valencia as presented by him to Atty. Cunanan of this Office
that indeed no record on appeal was filed by the counsels of PDIC in the subject case, thus no administrative
action should be taken against him. (Memorandum dated June 5, 1997, pp. 1-2; Rollo, p. 538-539)
On July 23, 1997, after considering the report and it appearing that the investigation conducted by the OCA was limited to
hearing the evidence of the branch clerk of court and his witnesses, the required the OCA to hear the evidence of
petitioner that he had filed a record on appeal but it was suppressed and, after considering that totality of the evidence
presented, to determine liability for any wrongful act committed, and to submit its findings and recommendations.
On January 27, 1998, the OCA submitted its report and recommendation on the additional investigation it conducted from
which it appears that hearings were held on three dates; the parties, through their counsel, were duly notified of the same;
and that at the first scheduled hearing on October 7, 1997, only Atty. Marino E. Eslao, counsel for private respondent,
appeared. In order to expidite the proceedings, he was allowed to present documentary evidence without prejudice to the
right of the petitioner to comment thereon. During the hearing on November 5, 1997, the parties agreed to file position
papers after the testimony of branch clerk Atty. Valencia. On November 6, 1997, the respective testimonies of Atty.
Valencia and Atty. Pablo Romero, the sole witness for petitioner, were taken. In his report dated December 1, 1997,xxii[3]
Senior Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez summarized the evidence presented by the parties and his
findings on the same, to wit:
Atty. Pablo Romero, Manager of R&L Litigation Center, PDIC testifies that he was the one who prepared the
subject Record on Appeal. He likewise confirmed the fact that the President of the PDIC, Mr. Ernest Leung,
Atty. Rosalinda Casiguran and he then went to see Judge Veridiano and was informed by Atty. Valencia that he
cannot find a copy of the Record on Appeal which was allegedly filed. He cannot recall if Atty. Valencia ever
demanded from him a copy of said record (pp. 28-29, TSN dated November 6, 1997). No other relevant
information were given by Atty. Romero.
Atty. Antonio Valencia, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 31, Manila, was invited to testify as to whether a
Record on Appeal was actually filed before their court and the same was duly received by him. He was
examined by the parties, principally the counsel for PDIC.
In his testimony, Atty. Valencia, reiterated his previous stand that he never saw a copy of the Record on Appeal
and he was positive that indeed there was no Record on Appeal having been filed in his court. Counsel of PDIC
however insinuated that record on appeal might have been filed but the same was misplaced. Atty. Valencia
assured that "this is very remote". (TSN, p. 8, November 6, 1997).
He even stressed that when he was made earlier to comment on whether or not a record on appeal was actually
filed, he checked and double checked the original records, inquired from the employees of RTC, Manila
including the Judge whether they have knowledge of any record on appeal which was filed in their sala but all
answered in the negative. (pp. 21 & 22, TSN, Nov. 6, 1997).
Moreover, he also firmly denied having received the alleged copy of the record on appeal which was presented
to him for identification during his direct testimony since the signatures appearing therein are totally different
from his actual signature (pp. 23, TSN, November 6, 1997).
It is to be noted that the alleged duplicate original copy of the Notice of Appeal [Record on Appeal] which is
supposed to be with the counsels of PDIC was not presented as evidence. In fact when the counsel of PDIC
Atty. Romero was asked if the PDIC employee who allegedly filed the Record on Appeal could testify he
answered in the negative and claimed that the said employee is already in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. No evidence
was likewise presented to prove the same. No effort was exerted by PDIC to prove the authenticity of the
signature of Clerk of Court Valencia appearing in PDIC's copy of the Record on Appeal.
It is also worthy to note that other than the bare testimony of Atty. Romero, no other evidence were presented by
petitioner PDIC to substantiate their claim that a Record on Appeal was filed at the RTC of Manila and the same
was duly received by Atty. Valencia. The testimony was not even corroborated.

Be that as it may this Office still has to determine as to whether a Record on Appeal was actually filed at the
court a quo.
A review of the record impels a rejection of the petitioner's claim that a Record on Appeal was filed.
The private respondent was able to present proof which are affirmative, unequivocal convincing, and consistent.
In fact the testimony alone of Atty. Valencia which was a reiteration of his previous testimonies were very clear,
concise, and moreover consistent. For the record Atty. Valencia is viewed by the undersigned who personally
conducted the investigation as a plain, sincere and honest man who, not having been shown of any reason to be
bias or to favor any party, had no reason to deliberately tell a falsehood relative to his official functions. The fact
therefore that he submitted himself to an investigatin twice and in different occassions shows his determination
to vindicate his honor by proving the integrity of the records of his office.
From all indications and as the records of the case will show NO RECORD ON APPEAL was actually filed in
the court a quo.
Apparently, RTC, Branch 31, Manila has an effective records management (system) and it is improbable to have
missed one important document (RECORD ON APPEAL). In the absence of any convincing proof to the
contrary, the regularity of official function must be upheld.
Far from the assertions of the petitioner we conclude that there was no Record on Appeal actually filed.
(Memorandum dated December 11, 1997, pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 557-559)
The findings of the OCA are well taken.
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on the either side. Plaintiff
must therefore establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, i.e. evidence as a whole which is superior to that of the
defendant.xxiii[4] In other words, the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.xxiv[5] In this case, petitioner, as
the party claiming affirmative relief from this Court by contending that he had filed a record on appeal in the trial court,
must discharge the burden of convincingly proving his claim.xxv[6] As found by the OCA, however, the evidence of the
respondents even outweighs that of petitioner. Private respondents presented proof which are affirmative, unequivocal,
convincing, and consistent that no record on appel had been filed. As the OCA noted, petitioner not only failed to present
the PDIC employee who allegedly filed on the record appeal in the trial court but more importantly, he failed to prove the
authenticity of the alleged signature of Branch Clerk Antonio Valencia appearing in his copy of the record on appeal.
The firm and consistent denial of the branch clerk that he was the one who received the record on appeal and
acknowledged its filing was disputed by petitioner. But petitioner's witness, Atty. Romero, who allegedly prepared the said
record did not file it in the trial court. Nor did he have any personal knowledge of the actual filing of the record on appeal
in the trial court. According to Atty. Romero, the PDIC employee who allegedly filed the record on appeal in the trial court
could not testify because the said employee was already in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. This allegation is not persuasive since
no evidence was presented to prove the same.xxvi[7]
Even the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner to prove the authenticity of the signature of the branch clerk on
the alleged duplicate original copy of the record on appealxxvii[8] is not convincing. The signature and notation on the
alleged duplicate original copy of the record on appeal do not match the actual signature and handwriting of the branch
clerk as shown in the pleadings submitted by petitioner himself, namely, the notice of appeal filed by petitioner (Annex E,
Omnibus Motion), motion to strike out notice of appeal filed by private respondents (Annex G) and comment filed by
another claimant (Annex H). The branch clerk's alleged signature and notation are markedly different from his signature
and handwriting appearing in the submitted documentary evidence.xxviii[9] For one, the branch clerk's initial "AV" appear
"HV" in the alleged duplicate original copy of the record. In addition, numeral "5" was written with a rounded stroke
instead of a sharp one. Clearly, petitioner failed to discharge the required burden of proof. Hence, petitioner's assertion
that he had filed a record on appeal is not worthy of belief.
As regards petitioner's prayer that the Court reconsider its resolution of October 13, 1995 absolving the branch clerk of
court of charges of wrongdoing, suffice it to state here that no ground exists to impute bad faith on the part of the branch
clerk. Good faith is presumed and the complainant has the burden of proving any wrongdoing.xxix[10] Petitioner simply
failed to prove that the branch clerk either suppressed the record on appeal allegedly filed by petitioner did not file the said
record. The Court cannot find the branch clerk guilty of any wrongdoing in certifying that petitioner failed to file a
record on appeal in the trial court in the face of petitioner's failure to adduce convincing proof that such a record was in
fact filed therein.

Also for consideration are two (2) manifestations and motions for clarification filed by the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP). In its Manifestation/Motion dated May 20, 1996, LBP alleges that on or about March 24, 1995, petitioner's deposit
accounts in LBP were garnished by Sheriff Carmelo Cachero in favor of private respondents pursuant to the writ of
execution issued by RTC Branch 31, Manila acting as the liquidation court; that on April 10, 1995, it received from
petitioner a copy of the April 7, 1995 order of this Court directing the parties to maintain the status quo in the case; that
on November 20, 1995, the Court issued another resolution directing the parties to maintain the status quo until further
orders; and that on April 1, 1996, it received as request from the petitioner to transfer the garnished funds to a different
account maintained by petitioner in another branch of LBP. LBP seeks clarification whether or not the garnishment of
petitioner's deposit accounts on March 24, 1995 is null and void considering the status quo orders issued by the Court. It
further inquires whether or not it may acquiesce to petitioner's request to transfer the garnished funds to petitioner's other
account in another branch of LBP.xxx[11] In its Manifestation dated October 7, 1996, on the other hand, LBP alleges that
on September 9, 1996, it received from Sheriff Adolfo Garcia a notice of garnishment over the same deposit accounts of
petitioner implementing the writ of execution issued also by the RTC, Branch 31, Manila, but for another claimant, the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); that on September 25, 1996, it wrote Sheriff Garcia informing him that the accounts
sought to be garnished were already garnished pursuant to the processes of the same court for another claimant (herein
private respondents); that on September 27, 1996, it received a letter from petitioner urging it to effect the immediate
release of the garnished funds to the BIR and that on October 2, 1996, it received from Sheriff Garcia the order to deliver
to him the garnished amount of P179,971,860.13. LBP manifests that it is holding in abeyance action on the order to
Sheriff Garcia and the letter of petitioner until the incidents in this case are finally resolved by this Court.xxxi[12]
These are matters largely relating to the execution of the decision of the trial court. As far as this Court is concerned, its
decision is now final and it no longer has any jurisdiction to pass upon these incidents, not to mention the fact that the
manifestation filed by LBP are in the nature of consultation by one not a party to this case.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to DENY petitioner's Omnibus Motion for lack of merit. The manifestations and
motions dated May 20, 1996 and October 7, 1996 by the Land Bank of the Philippines are NOTED.
SO ORDERED.


ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, G.R. No. 157912
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, REYES, JJ.
VICTORIA S. MEDINA-
Administratrix, Promulgated:
Respondent. December 13, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Order1[1] of the Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.

The undisputed facts are as follows.

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all the
creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a
contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of


certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred
and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim against
the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to
attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally.

On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim based on
the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per Omnibus Order dated April
9, 2003.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the following questions:

(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification against non-forum
shopping, failing which such claim should be dismissed?

(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be dismissed for failing to
pay the docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?

(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its failure to contain a
written explanation on the service and filing by registered mail?2[2]

Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon
filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are
applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.

The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly filed with this Court, pursuant to
Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.3[3]


The petition is imbued with merit.

However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary
to rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct.

Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but in the
absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be
applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.

The word practicable is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice, done or
accomplished.4[4] This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in
special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere
in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special
proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and
initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money
claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special
proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.

Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent money
claim against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against non-forum shopping?


The Court rules in the affirmative.

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The
RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present
case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's
will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all
persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of
their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.5[5]

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be
recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of
Appeals,6[6] the Court explained thus:

x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but
incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an
independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates
to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with and
dependent upon the principal remedy.7[7] (Emphasis supplied)

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the
claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein
petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-
forum shopping.

On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,8[8] that the trial court has jurisdiction to
act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist


her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall
constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the
payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time.9[9] After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the
action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is
not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.

With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de Macatangay10[10] is
squarely in point. Therein, the Court held thus:

In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of
the Rules of Court, held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said
rule is not complied with.

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite
action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate,
delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal
service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to
appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to
catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance,
responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered
mail containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly
procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in
the disposition of such pleading or other papers.

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring
personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to
consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were not resorted
to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first
place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service,
for Section 11 itself begins with the clause whenever practicable.

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing,
the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the
circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal
service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by
a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging
the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of
the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged
for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its
discretion and liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13:


As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings
must be done personally whenever practicable. The court notes that in the present
case, personal service would not be practicable. Considering the distance
between the Court of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was
posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would have entailed considerable
time, effort and expense. A written explanation why service was not done
personally might have been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so worded with
the use of may, signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the court
discretion whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While it is true that
procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the
interest of substantial justice. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

In the case at bar, the address of respondents counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner Sonias
counsels is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes
personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was not done
personally might have been superfluous.

As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of procedure has been
allowed where, among other cases, the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.11[11] (Emphasis
supplied)

In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent and the
RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have taken judicial notice of the
great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money claim
personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals,12[12] the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why
service has not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its
discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.

The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for the benefit of
creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have
been paid.13[13] The ultimate purpose for the rule on money claims was further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v.
Santibaez,14[14] thus:


The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. As
we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:

x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by
informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each
claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design
of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to
the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition
of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as
possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.15[15] (Emphasis supplied)

The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a written explanation for
non-personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated
January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan
City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in
accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.


G.R. No. L-33172 October 18, 1979
ERNESTO CEASE, CECILIA CEASE, MARION CEASE, TERESA CEASE-LACEBAL and the F.L. CEASE
PLANTATION CO., INC. as Trustee of properties of the defunct TIAONG MILLING & PLANTATION CO., petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Special Seventh Division), HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA, Presiding Judge,
Court of First Instance of Quezon, BENJAMIN CEASE and FLORENCE CEASE, respondents.

GUERRERO, J :
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 45474, entitled "Ernesto Cease, et al. vs.
Hon. Manolo L. Maddela, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, et al."
1
which dismissed the petition for
certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition instituted by the petitioners against the respondent judge and the private
respondents.
The antecedents of the case, as found by the appellate court, are as follows:
IT RESULTING: That the antecedents are not difficult to understand; sometime in June 1908, one Forrest
L. Cease common predecessor in interest of the parties together with five (5) other American citizens
organized the Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company and in the course of its corporate existence the
company acquired various properties but at the same time all the other original incorporators were bought
out by Forrest L. Cease together with his children namely Ernest, Cecilia, Teresita, Benjamin, Florence
and one Bonifacia Tirante also considered a member of the family; the charter of the company lapsed in
June 1958; but whether there were steps to liquidate it, the record is silent; on 13 August 1959, Forrest L.
Cease died and by extrajudicial partition of his shares, among the children, this was disposed of on 19
October 1959; it was here where the trouble among them came to arise because it would appear that
Benjamin and Florence wanted an actual division while the other children wanted reincorporation; and
proceeding on that, these other children Ernesto, Teresita and Cecilia and aforementioned other
stockholder Bonifacia Tirante proceeded to incorporate themselves into the F.L. Cease Plantation
Company and registered it with the Securities and Exchange Commission on 9 December, 1959;
apparently in view of that, Benjamin and Florence for their part initiated a Special Proceeding No. 3893 of
the Court of First Instance of Tayabas for the settlement of the estate of Forest L. Cease on 21 April,
1960 and one month afterwards on 19 May 1960 they filed Civil Case No. 6326 against Ernesto, Teresita
and Cecilia Cease together with Bonifacia Tirante asking that the Tiaong Milling and Plantation
Corporation be declared Identical to F.L. Cease and that its properties be divided among his children as
his intestate heirs; this Civil Case was resisted by aforestated defendants and notwithstanding efforts of
the plaintiffs to have the properties placed under receivership, they were not able to succeed because
defendants filed a bond to remain as they have remained in possession; after that and already, during the
pendency of Civil Case No. 6326 specifically on 21 May, 1961 apparently on the eve of the expiry of the
three (3) year period provided by the law for the liquidation of corporations, the board of liquidators of
Tiaong Milling executed an assignment and conveyance of properties and trust agreement in favor of F.L.
Cease Plantation Co. Inc. as trustee of the Tiaong Milling and Plantation Co. so Chat upon motion of the
plaintiffs trial Judge ordered that this alleged trustee be also included as party defendant; now this being
the situation, it will be remembered that there were thus two (2) proceedings pending in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon namely Civil Case No. 6326 and Special Proceeding No. 3893 but both of these were
assigned to the Honorable Respondent Judge Manolo L. Maddela p. 43 and the case was finally heard
and submitted upon stipulation of facts pp, 34-110, rollo; and trial Judge by decision dated 27 December
1969 held for the plaintiffs Benjamin and Florence, the decision containing the following dispositive part:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants declaring that:
1) The assets or properties of the defunct Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company now
appearing under the name of F.L. Cease Plantation Company as Trustee, is the estate
also of the deceased Forrest L. Cease and ordered divided, share and share alike,

among his six children the plaintiffs and the defendants in accordance with Rule 69,
Rules of Court;
2) The Resolution to Sell dated October 12, 1959 and the Transfer and Conveyance with
Trust Agreement is hereby set aside as improper and illegal for the purposes and effect
that it was intended and, therefore, null and void;
3) That F.L. Cease Plantation Company is removed as 'Trustee for interest against the
estate and essential to the protection of plaintiffs' rights and is hereby ordered to deliver
and convey all the properties and assets of the defunct Tiaong Milling now under its
name, custody and control to whomsoever be appointed as Receiver - disqualifying and
of the parties herein - the latter to act accordingly upon proper assumption of office; and
4) Special Proceedings No. 3893 for administration is terminated and dismissed; the
instant case to proceed but on issues of damages only and for such action inherently
essential for partition.
SO ORDERED.
Lucena City, December 27, 1969., pp. 122-a-123, rollo.
upon receipt of that, defendants there filled a notice of appeal p. 129, rollo together with an appeal bond
and a record on appeal but the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the judgment
was in fact interlocutory and not appealable p. 168 rollo and this position of defendants was sustained by
trial Judge, His Honor ruling that
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal interposed by plaintiffs is hereby dismissed
as premature and the Record on Appeal is necessarily disapproved as improper at this
stage of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Lucena City, April 27, 1970.
and so it was said defendants brought the matter first to the Supreme Court, on mandamus on 20 May,
1970 to compel the appeal and certiorari and prohibition to annul the order of 27 April, 1970 on the
ground that the decision was "patently erroneous" p. 16, rollo; but the Supreme Court remanded the case
to this Court of Appeals by resolution of 27 May 1970, p. 173, and this Court of Appeals on 1 July 1970 p.
175 dismissed the petition so far as the mandamus was concerned taking the view that the decision
sought to be appealed dated 27 December, 1969 was interlocutory and not appealable but on motion for
reconsideration of petitioners and since there was possible merit so far as its prayer for certiorari and
prohibition was concerned, by resolution of the Court on 19 August, 1970, p. 232, the petition was
permitted to go ahead in that capacity; and it is the position of petitioners that the decision of 27
December, 1969 as well as the order of 27 April, 1970 suffered of certain fatal defects, which respondents
deny and on their part raise the preliminary point that this Court of Appeals has no authority to give relief
to petitioners because not
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,
and that the questions presented cannot be raised for the first time before this Court of Appeals;
Respondent Court of Appeals in its decision promulgated December 9, 1970 dismissed the petition with costs against
petitioners, hence the present petition to this Court on the following assignment of errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED -

I. IN SANCTIONING THE WRONGFUL EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION BEYOND THE LIMITS OF AUTHORITY
CONFERRED BY LAW UPON THE LOWER COURT, WHEN IT PROCEEDED TO HEAR, ADJUDGE AND
ADJUDICATE -
(a) Special Proceedings No. 3893 for the settlement of the Estate of Forrest L. Cease, simultaneously
and concurrently with -
(b) Civil Case No. 6326, wherein the lower Court ordered Partition under Rule 69, Rules of Court -
THE ISSUE OF LEGAL OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES COMMONLY INVOLVED IN BOTH ACTIONS HAVING
BEEN RAISED AT THE OUTSET BY THE TIAONG MILLING AND PLANTATION COMPANY, AS THE REGISTERED
OWNER OF SUCH PROPERTIES UNDER ACT 496.
II. IN AFFIRMING - UNSUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER NOR CITATION OF ANY LAW TO JUSTIFY -
THE UNWARRANTED CONCLUSION THAT SUBJECT PROPERTIES, FOUND BY THE LOWER COURT AND THE
COURT OF APPEALS AS ACTUALLY REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF PETITIONER CORPORATION AND/OR ITS
PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST, THE TIAONG MILLING AND PLANTATION COMPANY, DURING ALL THE 50 YEARS
OF ITS CORPORATE EXISTENCE "ARE ALSO PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE OF FOREST L. CEASE."
III. IN AFFIRMING THE ARBITRARY CONCLUSION OF THE LOWER COURT THAT ITS DECISION OF DECEMBER
27,1969 IS AN "INTERLUCUTORY DECISION." IN DISMISSED NG THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, AND
IN AFFIRMING THE MANIFESTLY UNJUST JUDGMENT RENDERED WHICH CONTRADICTS THE FINDINGS OF
ULTIMATE FACTS THEREIN CONTAINED.
During the period that ensued after the filing in this Court of the respective briefs and the subsequent submission of the
case for decision, some incidents had transpired, the summary of which may be stated as follows:
1. Separate from this present appeal, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, docketed as
G.R. No. L-35629 (Ernesto Cease, et al. vs. Hon. Manolo L. Maddela, et al.) which challenged the order of respondent
judge dated September 27, 1972 appointing his Branch Clerk of Court, Mr. Eleno M. Joyas, as receiver of the properties
subject of the appealed civil case, which order, petitioners saw as a virtual execution of the lower court's judgment (p. 92,
rollo). In Our resolution of November 13, 1972, issued in G.R. No. L-35629, the petition was denied since respondent
judge merely appointed an auxilliary receiver for the preservation of the properties as well as for the protection of the
interests of all parties in Civil Case No. 6326; but at the same time, We expressed Our displeasure in the appointment of
the branch clerk of court or any other court personnel for that matter as receiver. (p. 102, rollo).
2. Meanwhile, sensing that the appointed receiver was making some attempts to take possession of the properties,
petitioners filed in this present appeal an urgent petition to restrain proceedings in the lower court. We resolved the
petition on January 29, 1975 by issuing a corresponding temporary restraining order enjoining the court a quo from
implementing its decision of December 27, 1969, more particularly, the taking over by a receiver of the properties subject
of the litigation, and private respondents Benjamin and Florence Cease from proceeding or taking any action on the
matter until further orders from this Court (pp. 99-100, rollo). Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of Our
resolution of January 29, 1975. After weighing the arguments of the parties and taking note of Our resolution in G.R. No.
L-35629 which upheld the appointment of a receiver, We issued another resolution dated April 11, 1975 lifting effective
immediately Our previous temporary restraining order which enforced the earlier resolution of January 29, 1975 (pp. 140-
141, rollo).
3. On February 6, 1976, private respondents filed an urgent petition to restrain proceedings below in view of the
precipitate replacement of the court appointed receiver Mayor Francisco Escueta (vice Mr. Eleno M. Joyas) and the
appointment of Mr. Guillermo Lagrosa on the eve of respondent Judge Maddela's retirement (p. 166, rollo). The urgent
petition was denied in Our resolution of February 18, 1976 (p. 176, rollo).
4. Several attempts at a compromise agreement failed to materialize. A Tentative Compromise Agreement dated July 30,
1975 was presented to the Court on August 6, 1976 for the signature of the parties, but respondents "unceremoniously"
repudiated the same by leaving the courtroom without the permission of the court (Court of First Instance of Quezon,
Branch 11) as a result of which respondents and their counsel were cited for contempt (p. 195, 197, rollo) that
respondents' reason for the repudiation appears to be petitioners' failure to render an audited account of their

administration covering the period from May 31, 1961 up to January 29, 1974, plus the inclusion of a provision on waiver
and relinquishment by respondents of whatever rights that may have accrued to their favor by virtue of the lower court's
decision and the affirmative decision of the appellate court.
We go now to the alleged errors committed by the respondent Court of Appeals.
As can be gleaned from petitioners' brief and the petition itself, two contentions underlie the first assigned error. First,
petitioners argue that there was an irregular and arbitrarte termination and dismissal of the special proceedings for judicial
administration simultaneously ordered in the lower court . s decision in Civil Case No. 6326 adjudicating the partition of
the estate, without categorically, reasoning the opposition to the petition for administration Second, that the issue of
ownership had been raised in the lower court when Tiaong Milling asserted title over the properties registered in its
corporate name adverse to Forrest L. Cease or his estate, and that the said issue was erroneously disposed of by the trial
court in the partition proceedings when it concluded that the assets or properties of the defunct company is also the estate
of the deceased proprietor.
The propriety of the dismissal and termination of the special proceedings for judicial administration must be affirmed in
spite of its rendition in another related case in view of the established jurisprudence which favors partition when judicial
administration become, unnecessary. As observed by the Court of Appeals, the dismissal at first glance is wrong, for the
reason that what was actually heard was Civil Case No. 6326. The technical consistency, however, it is far less
importance than the reason behind the doctrinal rule against placing an estate under administration. Judicial rulings
consistently hold the view that where partition is possible, either judicial or extrajudicial, the estate should not be burdened
with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reason. When the estate has no creditors or pending
obligations to be paid, the beneficiaries in interest are not bound to submit the property to judicial administration which is
always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court, especially when judicial
administration is unnecessary and superfluous. Thus -
When a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are
bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for
the appointment of an administrator by the court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings
(Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil, 434; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34
Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367; Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317). Syllabus, Intestate
estate of the deceased Luz Garcia. Pablo G. Utulo vs. Leona Pasion Viuda de Garcia, 66 Phil. 302.
Where the estate has no debts, recourse may be had to an administration proceeding only if the heirs
have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out
of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and
compelling reasons. (Intestate Estate of Mercado vs. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383)
In the records of this case, We find no indication of any indebtedness of the estate. No creditor has come up to charge the
estate within the two-year period after the death of Forrest L. Cease, hence, the presumption under Section 1, Rule 74
that the estate is free from creditors must apply. Neither has the status of the parties as legal heirs, much less that of
respondents, been raised as an issue. Besides, extant in the records is the stipulation of the parties to submit the
pleadings and contents of the administration proceedings for the cognizance of the trial judge in adjudicating the civil case
for partition (Respondents' Brief, p, 20, rollo). As respondents observe, the parties in both cases are the same, so are the
properties involved; that actual division is the primary objective in both actions; the theory and defense of the respective
parties are likewise common; and that both cases have been assigned to the same respondent judge. We feel that the
unifying effect of the foregoing circumstances invites the wholesome exception to the structures of procedural rule, thus
allowing, instead, room for judicial flexibility. Respondent judge's dismissal of the administration proceedi ngs then, is a
judicious move, appreciable in today's need for effective and speedy administration of justice. There being ample reason
to support the dismissal of the special proceedings in this appealed case, We cannot see in the records any compelling
reason why it may not be dismissed just the same even if considered in a separate action. This is inevitably certain
specially when the subject property has already been found appropriate for partition, thus reducing the petition for
administration to a mere unnecessary solicitation.
The second point raised by petitioners in their first assigned error is equally untenable. In effect, petitioners argue that the
action for partition should not have prospered in view of the repudiation of the co-ownership by Tiaong Milling and
Plantation Company when, as early in the trial court, it already asserted ownership and corporate title over the properties

adverse to the right of ownership of Forrest L. Cease or his estate. We are not unmindful of the doctrine relied upon by
petitioners in Rodriguez vs. Ravilan, 17 Phil. 63 wherein this Court held that in an action for partition, it is assumed that
the parties by whom it is prosecuted are all co-owners or co-proprietors of the property to be divided, and that the
question of common ownership is not to be argued, not the fact as to whether the intended parties are or are not the
owners of the property in question, but only as to how and in what manner and proportion the said property of common
ownership shall be distributed among the interested parties by order of the Court. Consistent with this dictum, it has been
field that if any party to a suit for partition denies the pro-indiviso character of the estate whose partition is sought, and
claims instead, exclusive title thereto the action becomes one for recovery of property cognizable in the courts of ordinary
jurisdiction.
2

Petitioners' argument has only theoretical persuasion, to say the least, rather apparent than real. It must be remembered
that when Tiaong Milling adduced its defense and raised the issue of ownership, its corporate existence already
terminated through the expiration of its charter. It is clear in Section 77 of Act No. 1459 (Corporation Law) that upon the
expiration of the charter period, the corporation ceases to exist and is dissolved ipso facto except for purposes connected
with the winding up and liquidation. The provision allows a three year, period from expiration of the charter within which
the entity gradually settles and closes its affairs, disposes and convey its property and to divide its capital stock, but not
for the purpose of continuing the business for which it was established. At this terminal stage of its existence, Tiaong
Milling may no longer persist to maintain adverse title and ownership of the corporate assets as against the prospective
distributees when at this time it merely holds the property in trust, its assertion of ownership is not only a legal
contradiction, but more so, to allow it to maintain adverse interest would certainly thwart the very purpose of liquidation
and the final distribute loll of the assets to the proper, parties.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in its reasoning that substance is more important than form when it sustained the
dismissal of Special Proceedings No. 3893, thus -
a) As to the dismissal of Special Proceedings No. 3893, of course, at first glance, this was wrong, for the
reason that the case trial had been heard was Civil Case No. 6326; but what should not be overlooked
either is Chat respondent Judge was the same Judge that had before him in his own sala, said Special
Proceedings No. 3893, p. 43 rollo, and the parties to the present Civil Case No. 6326 had themselves
asked respondent Judge to take judicial notice of the same and its contents page 34, rollo; it is not difficult
to see that when respondent Judge in par. 4 of the dispositive part of his decision complained of, ordered
that,
4) Special Proceedings No. 3893 for administration is terminated and dismissed; the
instant case to proceed but on issues of damages only and for such action inherently
essential or partition. p. 123, rollo,
in truth and in fact, His Honor was issuing that order also within Civil Case No. 632 but in connection with
Special Proceedings No. 389:3: for substance is more important Chan form, the contending par ties in
both proceedings being exactly the same, but not only this, let it not be forgotten that when His Honor
dismissed Special Proceedings No. 3893, that dismissal precisely was a dismissal that petitioners herein
had themselves sought and solicited from respondent Judge as petitioners themselves are in their
present petition pp. 5-6, rollo; this Court must find difficulty in reconciling petitioners' attack with the fact
that it was they themselves that had insisted on that dismissal; on the principle that not he who is favored
but he who is hurt by a judicial order is he only who should be heard to complain and especially since
extraordinary legal remedies are remedies in extermies granted to parties ' who have been the victims not
merely of errors but of grave wrongs, and it cannot be seen how one who got what he had asked could be
heard to claim that he had been the victim of a wrong, petitioners should not now complain of an order
they had themselves asked in order to attack such an order afterwards; if at all, perhaps, third parties,
creditors, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, might have been prejudiced, and could have had the
personality to attack that dismissal of Special Proceedings No. 3893, but not petitioners herein, and it is
not now for this Court of Appeals to protect said third persons who have not come to the Court below or
sought to intervene herein;
On the second assigned error, petitioners argue that no evidence has been found to support the conclusion that the
registered properties of Tiaong Milling are also properties of the estate of Forrest L. Cease; that on the contrary, said
properties are registered under Act No. 496 in the name of Tiaong Milling as lawful owner and possessor for the last 50
years of its corporate existence.

We do not agree. In reposing ownership to the estate of Forrest L. Cease, the trial court indeed found strong support, one
that is based on a well-entrenched principle of law. In sustaining respondents' theory of "merger of Forrest L. Cease and
The Tiaong Milling as one personality", or that "the company is only the business conduit and alter ego of the deceased
Forrest L. Cease and the registered properties of Tiaong Milling are actually properties of Forrest L. Cease and should be
divided equally, share and share alike among his six children, ... ", the trial court did aptly apply the familiar exception to
the general rule by disregarding the legal fiction of distinct and separate corporate personality and regarding the
corporation and the individual member one and the same. In shredding the fictitious corporate veil, the trial judge narrated
the undisputed factual premise, thus:
While the records showed that originally its incorporators were aliens, friends or third-parties in relation of
one to another, in the course of its existence, it developed into a close family corporation. The Board of
Directors and stockholders belong to one family the head of which Forrest L. Cease always retained the
majority stocks and hence the control and management of its affairs. In fact, during the reconstruction of
its records in 1947 before the Security and Exchange Commission only 9 nominal shares out of 300
appears in the name of his 3 eldest children then and another person close to them. It is likewise
noteworthy to observe that as his children increase or perhaps become of age, he continued distributing
his shares among them adding Florence, Teresa and Marion until at the time of his death only 190 were
left to his name. Definitely, only the members of his family benefited from the Corporation.
The accounts of the corporation and therefore its operation, as well as that of the family appears to be
indistinguishable and apparently joined together. As admitted by the defendants (Manifestation of
Compliance with Order of March 7, 1963 [Exhibit "21"] the corporation 'never' had any account with any
banking institution or if any account was carried in a bank on its behalf, it was in the name of Mr. Forrest
L. Cease. In brief, the operation of the Corporation is merged with those of the majority stockholders, the
latter using the former as his instrumentality and for the exclusive benefits of all his family. From the
foregoing indication, therefore, there is truth in plaintiff's allegation that the corporation is only a business
conduit of his father and an extension of his personality, they are one and the same thing. Thus, the
assets of the corporation are also the estate of Forrest L. Cease, the father of the parties herein who are
all legitimate children of full blood.
A rich store of jurisprudence has established the rule known as the doctrine of disregarding or piercing the veil of
corporate fiction. Generally, a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from that of the
persons composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. By virtue of this attribute, a
corporation may not, generally, be made to answer for acts or liabilities of its stockholders or those of the legal entities to
which it may be connected, and vice versa. This separate and distinct personality is, however, merely a fiction created by
law for convenience and to promote the ends of justice (Laguna Transportation Company vs. Social Security System, L-
14606, April 28, 1960; La Campana Coffee Factory, Inc. vs. Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Campana, L-5677,
May 25, 1953). For this reason, it may not be used or invoked for ends subversive of the policy and purpose behind its
creation (Emiliano Cano Enterprises, Inc. vs. CIR, L-20502, Feb. 26, 1965) or which could not have been intended by law
to which it owes its being McConnel vs. Court of Appeals, L- 10510, March 17, 1961, 1 SCRA 722). This is particularly
true where the fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, defend crime (Yutivo Sons
Hardware Company vs. Court of Tax Appeals, L-13203, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 160), confuse legitimate legal or judicial
issues (R. F. Sugay & Co. vs. Reyes, L-20451, Dec. 28, 1964), perpetrate deception or otherwise circumvent the law
(Gregorio Araneta, Inc. vs. reason de Paterno, L-2886, Aug. 22, 1952, 49 O.G. 721). This is likewise true where the
corporate entity is being used as an alter ego, adjunct, or business conduit for the sole benefit of the stockholders or of
another corporate entity (McConnel vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Norton Harrison
Co., L-7618, Aug. 31, 1964).
In any of these cases, the notion of corporate entity will be pierced or disregarded, and the corporation will be treated
merely as an association of persons or, where there are two corporations, they will be merged as one, the one being
merely regarded as part or the instrumentality of the otter (Koppel [Phil.] Inc. vs. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496, Yutivo Sons
Hardware Company vs. Court of Tax Appeals, supra).
So must the case at bar add to this jurisprudence. An indubitable deduction from the findings of the trial court cannot but
lead to the conclusion that the business of the corporation is largely, if not wholly, the personal venture of Forrest L.
Cease. There is not even a shadow of a showing that his children were subscribers or purchasers of the stocks they own.
Their participation as nominal shareholders emanated solely from Forrest L. Cease's gratuitous dole out of his own shares
to the benefit of his children and ultimately his family.

Were we sustain the theory of petitioners that the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in deciding Civil Case No. 6326 as a case for partition when the defendant therein, Tiaong
Milling and Plantation Company, Inc. as registered owner asserted ownership of the assets and properties involved in the
litigation, which theory must necessarily be based on the assumption that said assets and properties of Tiaong Milling and
Plantation Company, Inc. now appearing under the name of F. L. Cease Plantation Company as Trustee are distinct and
separate from the estate of Forrest L. Cease to which petitioners and respondents as legal heirs of said Forrest L. Cease
are equally entitled share and share alike, then that legal fiction of separate corporate personality shall have been used to
delay and ultimately deprive and defraud the respondents of their successional rights to the estate of their deceased
father. For Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company shall have been able to extend its corporate existence beyond the
period of its charter which lapsed in June, 1958 under the guise and cover of F. L, Cease Plantation Company, Inc. as
Trustee which would be against the law, and as Trustee shall have been able to use the assets and properties for the
benefit of the petitioners, to the great prejudice and defraudation. of private respondents. Hence, it becomes necessary
and imperative to pierce that corporate veil.
Under the third assigned error, petitioners claim that the decision of the lower court in the partition case is not interlocutory
but rather final for it consists of final and determinative dispositions of the contentions of the parties. We find no merit in
petitioners' stand.
Under the 1961 pronouncement and ruling of the Supreme Court in Vda. de Zaldarriaga vs. Enriquez, 1 SCRA 1188 (and
the sequel case of Vda. de Zaldarriaga vs. Zaldarriaga, 2 SCRA 356), the lower court's dismissal of petitioners' proposed
appeal from its December 27, 1969 judgment as affirmed by the Court of Appeals on the ground of prematurity in that the
judgment was not final but interlocutory was in order. As was said in said case:
It is true that in Africa vs. Africa, 42 Phil. 934 and other cases it was held - contrary to the rule laid down
in Ron vs. Mojica, 8 Phil. 328; Rodriguez vs. Ravilan, 17 Phil. 63 - that in a partition case where
defendant relies on the defense of exclusive ownership, the action becomes one for title and the decision
or order directing partition is final, but the ruling to this effect has been expressly reversed in the
Fuentebella case which, in our opinion, expresses the correct view, considering that a decision or order
directing partition is not final because it leaves something more to be done in the trial court for the
complete disposition of the case, namely, the appointment of commissioners, the proceedings to be had
before them, the submission of their report which, according to law, must be set for hearing. In fact, it is
only after said hearing that the court may render a final judgment finally disposing of the action (Rule 71,
section 7, Rules of Court). (1 SCRA at page 1193).
It should be noted, however, that the said ruling in Zaldarriaga as based on Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso, XIV Lawyers
Journal 305 (May 27, 1942), has been expressly abandoned by the Court in Miranda vs. Court of Appeals, 71 SCRA 295;
331-333 (June 18, 1976) wherein Mr. Justice Teehankee, speaking for the Court, laid down the following doctrine:
The Court, however, deems it proper for the guidance of the bench and bar to now declare as is clearly
indicated from the compelling reasons and considerations hereinabove stated:
- that the Court considers the better rule to be that stated in H. E. Heacock Co. vs. American Trading Co.,
to wit, that where the primary purpose of a case is to ascertain and determine who between plaintiff and
defendant is the true owner and entitled to the exclusive use of the disputed property, "the judgment . . .
rendered by the lower court [is] a judgment on the merits as to those questions, and [that] the order of the
court for an accounting was based upon, and is incidental to the judgment on the merits. That is to say,
that the judgment . . . [is] a final judgment ... that in this kind of a case an accounting is a mere incident to
the judgment; that an appeal lies from the rendition of the judgment as rendered ... "(as is widely held by
a great number of judges and members of the bar, as shown by the cases so decided and filed and still
pending with the Court) for the fundamental reasons therein stated that "this is more in harmony with the
administration of justice and the spirit and intent of the [Rules]. If on appeal the judgment of the lower
court is affirmed, it would not in the least work an injustice to any of the legal rights of [appellee]. On the
other hand, if for any reason this court should reverse the judgment of the lower court, the accounting
would be a waste of time and money, and might work a material injury to the [appellant]; and
- that accordingly, the contrary ruling in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso which expressly reversed the
Heacock case and a line of similar decisions and ruled that such a decision for recovery of property with

accounting "is not final but merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable" and subsequent cases
adhering to the same must be now in turn abandoned and set aside.
Fuentebella adopted instead the opposite line of conflicting decisions mostly in partition proceedings and
exemplified by Ron vs. Mojica 8 Phil. 928 (under the old Code of Civil Procedure) that an order for
partition of real property is not final and appealable until after the actual partition of the property as
reported by the court appointed commissioners and approved by the court in its judgment accepting the
report. lt must be especially noted that such rule governing partitions is now so expressly provided and
spelled out in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, with special reference to Sections 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 11, to wit,
that there must first be a preliminar, order for partition of the real estate (section 2) and where the parties-
co-owners cannot agree, the court appointed commissioners make a plan of actual partition which must
first be passed upon and accepted by the trial court and embodied in a judgment to be rendered by it
(sections 6 and 11). In partition cases, it must be further borne in mind that Rule 69, section 1 refers to "a
person having the right to compel the partition of real estate," so that the general rule of partition that an
appeal will not lie until the partition or distribution proceedings are terminated will not apply where
appellant claims exclusive ownership of the whole property and denies the adverse party's right to any
partition, as was the ruling in Villanueva vs. Capistrano and Africa vs .Africa, supra, Fuentebellas express
rehearsal of these cases must likewise be deemed now also abandoned in view of the Court's expressed
preference for the rationale of the Heacock case.
The Court's considered opinion is that imperative considerations of public policy and of sound practice in
the courts and adherence to the constitutional mandate of simplified, just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action call for considering such judgments for recovery of property with accounting
as final judgments which are duly appealable (and would therefore become final and executory if not
appealed within the reglementary period) with the accounting as a mere incident of the judgment to be
rendered during the course of the appeal as provided in Rule 39, section 4 or to be implemented at the
execution stage upon final affirmance on appeal of the judgment (as in Court of Industrial Relations unfair
labor practice cases ordering the reinstatement of the worker with accounting, computation and payment
of his backwages less earnings elsewhere during his layoff) and that the only reason given in Fuentebelia
for the contrary ruling, viz, "the general harm that would follow from throwing the door open to multiplicity
of appeals in a single case" of lesser import and consequence. (Emphasis copied).
The miranda ruling has since then been applied as the new rule by a unanimous Court in Valdez vs. Bagasao, 82 SCRA
22 (March 8, 1978).
If there were a valid genuine claim of Exclusive ownership of the inherited properties on the part of petitioners to
respondents' action for partition, then under the Miranda ruling, petitioners would be sustained, for as expressly held
therein " the general rule of partition that an appeal will not lie until the partition or distribution proceedings are terminated
will not apply where appellant claims exclusive ownership of the whole property and denies the adverse party's right to
any partition."
But this question has now been rendered moot and academic for the very issue of exclusive ownership claimed by
petitioners to deny and defeat respondents' right to partition - which is the very core of their rejected appeal - has been
squarely resolved herein against them, as if the appeal had been given due course. The Court has herein expressly
sustained the trial court's findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the assets or properties of the defunct
company constitute the estate of the deceased proprietor (supra at page 7) and the defunct company's assertion of
ownership of the properties is a legal contradiction and would but thwart the liquidation and final distribution and partition
of the properties among the parties hereof as children of their deceased father Forrest L. Cease. There is therefore no
further hindrance to effect the partition of the properties among the parties in implementation of the appealed judgment.
One last consideration. Parties are brothers and sisters, legal heirs of their deceased father, Forrest L. Cease. By all
rights in law and jurisprudence, each is entitled to share and share alike in the estate, which the trial court correctly
ordained and sustained by the appellate court. Almost 20 years have lapsed since the filing of Special Proceedings No.
3893 for the administration of the Estate of Forrest L. Cease and Civil Case No. 6326 for liquidation and partition of the
assets of the defunct Tiaong Milling and Plantation Co., Inc. A succession of receivers were appointed by the court to
take, keep in possession, preserve and manage properties of the corporation which at one time showed an income of
P386,152.90 and expenses of P308,405.01 for the period covering January 1, 1960 to August 31, 1967 as per Summary
of Operations of Commissioner for Finance appointed by the Court (Brief for Respondents, p. 38). In the meantime,

ejectment cases were filed by and against the heirs in connection with the properties involved, aggravating the already
strained relations of the parties. A prudent and practical realization of these circumstances ought and must constrain the
parties to give each one his due in law and with fairness and dispatch that their basic rights be enjoyed. And by
remanding this case to the court a quo for the actual partition of the properties, the substantial rights of everyone of the
heirs have not been impaired, for in fact, they have been preserved and maintained.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.


G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989
VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC, respondents.
Benjamin J. Quitoriano for petitioner.
Linzag-Arcilla & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate without leaving any debts? May the
probate court appoint the surviving sister of the deceased as the administratrix of the estate of the deceased instead of
the surviving spouse? These are the main questions which need to be resolved in this case.
Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on January 3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite
without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and
his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private respondent.
On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Special
Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the
deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira.
1
In her verified petition, private respondent alleged the following: that she and
Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left no will; that there are no
creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left several properties, namely: death benefits from the Philippine Air Lines
(PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and
the Social Security System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and
finally, that the spouse of the deceased (herein petitioner) had been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as such
one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the deceased.
On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of private respondent
2
alleging that
there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does
exist, the letters of administration relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.
In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, appointed private respondent Rita Pereira Nagac
administratrix of the intestate estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00.
The trial court ordered her to take custody of all the real and personal properties of the deceased and to file an inventory
thereof within three months after receipt of the order.
3

Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
affirmed the appointment of private respondent as administratrix in its decision dated December 15, 1987.
4

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the following issues: (1) Whether or not there exists an
estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration; (2) Whether or not a judicial
administration proceeding is necessary where there are no debts left by the decedent; and, (3) Who has the better right to
be appointed as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the
surviving sister Rita Pereira Nagac?
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration for the
following reasons: firstly, the death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and the SSS belong exclusively to her, being the
sole beneficiary and in support of this claim she submitted letter-replies from these institutions showing that she is the
exclusive beneficiary of said death benefits; secondly, the savings deposits in the name of her deceased husband with the
PNB and the PCIB had been used to defray the funeral expenses as supported by several receipts; and, finally, the only

real property of the deceased has been extrajudicially settled between the petitioner and the private respondent as the
only surviving heirs of the deceased.
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner to decide what properties form part of the estate
of the deceased and to appropriate them for herself. She points out that this function is vested in the court in charge of the
intestate proceedings.
Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not belong to the estate of the deceased on the basis
of her bare allegations as aforestated and a handful of documents. Inasmuch as this Court is not a trier of facts, We
cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion or non-exclusion of the property involved from the estate of the deceased.
5

The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the administration proceedings are pending. The
trial court is in the best position to receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of the
decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if any.
6
The function of
resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by
the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court. However, the court's determination is only
provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by
the parties.
7

Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration,
We nonetheless find the administration proceedings instituted by private respondent to be unnecessary as contended by
petitioner for the reasons herein below discussed.
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the
deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein.
8
An exception to this rule is
established in Section 1 of Rule 74.
9
Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due
from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying
for the appointment of an administrator.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration
proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary
action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort
to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a
different course of action.
10
It should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no
debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is
possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and
compelling reasons.
11

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs,
whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or
to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings .
12

Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of a deceased when the heirs are all
of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on the circumstances of each case.
In one case,
13
We said:
Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of the
hereditary estate but only in the manner of partition does section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply
and that in this case the parties are at loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary estate because
respondents succeeded in sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument is unconvincing,
because, as the respondent judge has indicated, questions as to what property belonged to the deceased
(and therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such
property is in the hands of one heir.

In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity of
suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same
objective could be achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of administrat ion.
14

In still another case, We did not find so powerful a reason the argument that the appointment of the husband, a
usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary in order for him to have legal capacity
to appear in the intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased mother, since he may just adduce proof of his being a forced
heir in the intestate proceedings of the latter.
15

We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are only two surviving heirs, a wife of ten months
and a sister, both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent
is that these two heirs are not in good terms. The only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment as
administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for her own purposes, since these
properties are presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. We are of the opinion
that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. To
subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not appear to be substantial especially since the only real
property left has been extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only
unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered. In most instances of a similar nature,
16
the claims of
both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the
creditors, should there be any, are protected in any event.
We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration proceedings are pending was not justified in
issuing letters of administration, there being no good reason for burdening the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman
Pereira with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.
With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue of who, as between the surviving spouse Victoria
Bringas Pereira and the sister Rita Pereira Nagac, should be preferred to be appointed as administratrix.
WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby
revoked and the administration proceeding dismissed without prejudice to the right of private respondent to commence a
new action for partition of the property left by Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs.
SO ORDERED.


[G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005]
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., petitioners, vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN,
respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the September 24, 2002[1] Decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 124[2] which dismissed, after
trial, their complaint for annulment of title for failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following material allegations
prove by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo.[3]
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.[4]
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-
petitioner.[5]
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,[6] later baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent.[7]
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights[8]
over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964.[9] In the deed, Portugals
siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his
favor.[10]
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering
the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo.[11]
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person[12]
adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-172[13] in Portugals name was subsequently
cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 159813[14] was issued by the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988
in the name of respondent, Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer by respondent of the title to the
Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a complaint[15] against
respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her
name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not
entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made false representations in her
Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in her name be declared void and
that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in respondents name and to issue in its stead a
new one in their (petitioners) name, and that actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees and litigation
expenses be awarded to them.

Following respondents filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among other things, the
issues as follows:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose
Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the complaint.[16] (Underscoring supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001,[17] after giving an account of the testimonies of the parties and
their witnesses and of their documentary evidence, without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial, dismissed the
case for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners status and right as putative heirs had not been
established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.[18]
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at bar.
x x x
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth, pictures (sic) and testimonial
evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a status and right to the
estate of the decedent, was sought to be determined herein. However, the establishment of a status, a right, or a
particular fact is remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary civil
action whereby a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong
(ibid, a). The operative term in the former is to establish, while in the latter, it is to enforce, a right. Their status and
right as putative heirs of the decedent not having been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs cause to establish their status and
right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2,
supra).[19] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial courts ratio decedendi in dismissing the
case as diametrically opposed to this Courts following ruling in Cario v. Cario,[20] viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes other than remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto,
and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. (Nial, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such cases, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage
void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cario was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay
(in 1999), the appellate court found Cario to be inapplicable, however, to the case in this wise:

To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cario case was the validity of the two marriages contracted by
the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cario, whose death benefits was the bone of contention between the two women both
named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cario and Susan Yee Cario) both of whom he married. It is not disputed in said case
that SPO4 S. Cario contracted two marriages with said two women during his lifetime, and the only question was: which
of these two marriages was validly celebrated? The award of the death benefits of the deceased Cario was thus, merely
an incident to the question of which of the two marriages was valid. Upon the other hand, the case at bench is of a
different milieu. The main issue here is the annulment of title to property. The only undisputed fact in this case is that
the deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-34292. However, here come two contending parties, herein plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee, both
now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The status and rights of the parties herein have not, therefore,
been definitively established, as yet. x x x. Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be
properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary civil action, whereunder a party sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil suit
for that purpose in the present case is thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law prohibits or forbids directly,
it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship, or the establishment of the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child to be determined in an ordinary civil action, not in an appropriate special proceeding brought for that
purpose, is thus to impinge upon this axiom. x x x[21] (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002,[22] thus affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[23] faulting the appellate court to have erred when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed to state a cause of action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite the existence of a later and contrary ruling in
Cario, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the lower court failed to render judgment based on the evidence presented
relative to the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .[24] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that the questioned CA decision be reversed,
and a new one entered in accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on the above disquisition
and evidence adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the pronouncements in Cario apply, a decision
be entered remanding to the court a quo the determination of the issues of which of the two marriages is valid, and the
determination of heirship and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila preparatory to the determination of the annulment of title
issued in the name of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.[25] (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect
encouraged multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this Court as a reading of Cario shows; that Cario allows courts
to pass on the determination of heirship and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it is necessary to the
determination of the case; and that contrary to the appellate courts ruling, they had established their status as compulsory
heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine their
status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT
issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,[26] the therein petitioners executed on March 17, 1994
an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, owners-claimants of the two lots

mentioned therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994 that a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the
name of the therein respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which in turn sold portions thereof to
the therein individual respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles. The therein
respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of action and prove
their status as heirs. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or
even a semblance of itexcept the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchaysthat they
have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of
property. This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance . . .[27] (Italics in the original; underscoring
supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the petition was an improper recourse, found that the
trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera[28] and Solivio v.
Court of Appeals,[29] this Court held that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch
as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
In the above-cited case of Litam,[30] Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special proceeding for issuance of letters of
administration before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is the son of Rafael
Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived by him and his therein named seven (7) siblings who are
children of the decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent contracted in 1922 in
the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus
prayed for the issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, the surviving spouse of the decedent. The CFI
granted the petition and issued letters of administration to, on Marcosas request, her nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported siblings filed a civil case before the same court,
against the estate of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of
Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings substantially reproduced the allegations made in his
petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties allegedly acquired during the marriage of the
decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved incidents in the special proceeding, both were
jointly heard by the trial court, following which it rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that
the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for determination was whether they are the
legitimate children of Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael
Litam is the father of appellants Dy Tam et al., found substantially correct the trial courts findings of fact and its
conclusion that, among other things, the birth certificates of Dy Tam et al. do not establish the identity of the deceased
Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father [and] it does not appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael
Litam had in any manner intervened in the preparation and filing thereof; and that [t]he other documentary evidence
presented by [them] [is] entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between the deceased
Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as children of said decedent.
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that the lower court should not have declared, in the decision appealed
from, that Marcosa is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in the [civil case], it being within the
exclusive competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding.
In Solivio,[31] also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was a special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased, who was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding, Branch 23 of said
court declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedents maternal aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva, the decedents paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved to reconsider the courts order declaring
Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The court denied the motion on the
ground of tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia before
the same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of

the RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed the said
judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, among other issues, whether Branch 26 of the
RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanuevas share of the
estate of [the deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court, this
Court held that [i]n the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a
decedents estate, a court should not interfere with [estate] proceedings pending in a co-equal court, citing
Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.[32]
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon [c]onsidering that the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless [therein
private respondent-Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, opted
to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice, and declared her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas[33] cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez
Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive father was approved in the proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of the
decedent-adoptive mother, following which the probate court directed that the records of the case be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul the project of partition on the ground of lesion,
preterition and fraud, and prayed that her adoptive father immediately deliver to her the two lots allocated to her in the
project of partition. She subsequently filed a motion in the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to
her, among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties agreement to suspend action or resolution on
Juanitas motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots alloted to her until after her
complaint in the civil case had been decided, set said case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for trial on the ground that in the amended
complaint she, in the meantime, filed, she acknowledged the partial legality and validity of the project of partition insofar
as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she was seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside the
April 27, 1966 order setting the civil case for hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial question to her motion in the
testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial court, by order of April
27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
The probate courts approval of the project of partition and directive that the records of the case be sent to the archives
notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate estate proceedings had not been legally terminated as Juanitas share
under the project of partition had not been delivered to her. Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be
deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and
does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not
elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to
demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening
of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action,
which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r]
intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs.
Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman
Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).[34] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court setting the civil case for hearing, but allowed
the civil case to continue because it involves no longer the two lots adjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a
decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there
are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the

determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special
proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right
to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an
ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or
distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugals estate, executed on
February 15, 1988[35] the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court.[36] Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it
should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor
therein.[37]
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to
declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel
of land,[38] to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not
expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with
the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the
civil case subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which
assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to
administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by
petitioners,[39] the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render
a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose
Q. Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint.[40]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for
it to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties and render a decision on the above-enumerated issues defined during
the pre-trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.


[G.R. No. 115181. March 31, 2000]
MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO,
ANTONIO AVELINO, JR., TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK MICHAEL AVELINO and MARK ANTHONY AVELINO,
respondents. Sdaa miso
R E S O L U T I O N
QUISUMBING, J .:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 1994 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 31574 as well as its Resolution dated April 28, 1994 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed
Decision affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-10441
converting petitioner's petition for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first wife
private respondent Angelina Avelino.
The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony all surnamed Avelino are likewise
compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an American, is the second wife of Avelino, Sr. The other private respondents
are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.
The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
78, docketed as SP Proc. No. Q-91-10441, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Antonio
Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on April 10, 1989. She asked that she be appointed the administrator of the estate.
On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a motion to convert the said judicial
proceedings to an action for judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed.
On February 16, 1993, public respondent judge issued the assailed Order which reads:
"Acting on the Motion to Convert Proceedings to Action for Judicial Partition, considering that the
petitioner is the only heir not amenable to a simple partition, and all the other compulsory heirs
manifested their desire for an expeditious settlement of the estate of the deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr.,
the same is granted.
"WHEREFORE, the petition is converted into judicial partition of the estate of deceased Antonio Avelino,
Sr. The parties are directed to submit a complete inventory of all the real and personal properties left by
the deceased. Set the hearing of the judicial partition on APRIL 13, 1993, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
Notify all the parties and their counsel of this assignment.
"SO ORDERED."16[1]
On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated June 16, 1993.
On July 23, 1993, Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, in granting
private respondents' motion to convert the judicial proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for
judicial partition. Her petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31574. Sdaad
On February 18, 1994, the respondent appellate court rendered the assailed decision, stating that the "petition is DENIED
DUE COURSE" and accordingly dismissed."17[2]


On March 1, 1994, petitioner duly moved for reconsideration, but it was denied on April 28, 1994.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT
PARTITION IS PROPER UNDER THE PREMISES.
ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE THE PROPER REMEDY PENDING THE DETERMINATION OF THE
CHARACTER AND EXTENT OF THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE.18[3]
For resolution, we find that given the circumstances in this case, the sole issue here is whether respondent appellate court
committed an error of law and gravely abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's finding that a partition is proper.
Petitioner submits that: First, no partition of the estate is possible in the instant case as no determination has yet been
made of the character and extent of the decedent's estate. She points to the Court's ruling in Arcilles v. Montejo, 26 SCRA
197 (1969), where we held that when the existence of other properties of the decedent is a matter still to be reckoned
with, administration proceedings are the proper mode of resolving the same.19[4] In addition, petitioner contends that the
estate is in danger of being depleted for want of an administrator to manage and attend to it.
Second, petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for conversion of a motion for the issuance of letters of
administration to an action for judicial partition. The conversion of the motion was, thus, procedurally inappropriate and
should be struck down for lack of legal basis.
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent,
or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be
judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6
of Rule 78.20[5] The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 7421[6] which provide:
"SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no
debts and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives
duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register
of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.. Scs daad
"SEC. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value.- Whenever the gross value of the estate of a
deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that
fact if made to appear to the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an
interested person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three
(3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for three
(3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and after such other notice to
interested persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of
an executor or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there be, to
determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate and to apportion and divide it
among them after the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such
persons, in their own right, if they are lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees


legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the
possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. The court shall make such
order as may be just respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or
rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or
award, if it involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper register's office."
The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at the moment of the latter's death.22[7]
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves without need of delay and
risks of being dissipated. When a person dies without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to submit the
property for judicial administration, nor apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court.23[8]
We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case "the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of
age."24[9] With this finding, it is our view that Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court should apply.
In a last-ditch effort to justify the need for an administrator, petitioner insists that there is nothing to partition yet, as the
nature and character of the estate have yet to be determined. We find, however, that a complete inventory of the estate
may be done during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts. Hence, the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error when it ruled that the lower court did not err in converting petitioner's action for letters of
administration into an action for judicial partition. Sup rema
Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of the trial court converting an action for letters of administration to
one for judicial partition has no basis in the Rules of Court, hence procedurally infirm. The basis for the trial court's order is
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate
and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We
have held that where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of
them may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings.25[10] The trial court appropriately converted
petitioner's action for letters of administration into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents. No
reversible error may be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it found the trial court's action procedurally in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals is
CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.


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