Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Certified true copy of the letter date July 1999, if the Australian
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs stating that
as of July 1999, Quintos has not been granted of Australian
Citizenship.
Bureau of Immigration granted his application. In 2nd endorsement,
Secretary of Department of Justice disproved the application. But
upon submitting additional documents, it was then granted.
Respondent became a member of the Red Bull team in PBA.
On August 2003, the Senate Committees on Games, Amusement and
Sports and on Constitutional Amendments jointly submitted a report to
deport several Filipino-foreign PBA Players including the respondent.
The presented documents of the respondent herein were held highly
suspicious relying on the affidavits of Soliman and Peralta, barangay
officials of San Antonio Nueva Ecija. The affidavit stated that there
were no Quintos in that Place.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent herein is a Filipino Citizen based on
the documents that he submitted.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the authenticity of the documents
submitted by herein petitioners were remain undisputed. The
petitioner herein, People of the Philippines, mainly relied on the
affidavits of Soliman and Peralta.
Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that Pennisi
is a Filipino Citizen is affirmed.
BIRTH CERTIFICATE IS THE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF
CITIZENSHIP,
TECSON VS COMELEC
FACTS:
FPJ was a candidate for presidential election. However his
qualification was questioned, specifically he being a natural born
Filipino Citizen. Petitioner herein contended that FPJ, being an
illegitimate son of an alleged Filipino Citizen and an America Citizen
could have not acquired that Citizenship og his father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural born citizenship.
HELD:
In arriving at the answer whether or not FPJ is a natural born citizen,
the Supreme Court reviewed the following instances:
1. The citizenship of the father and the grand father of FPJ.
2. The constitutional provision existing at the time the father of FPJ
acquired his citizenship from the former's father, the grand father
of FPJ.
The Supreme court held that,t he the constitutional provision
applicable in finding out the answer is the Philippine Organic Act of
1902.
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects
on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the
United States, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris,
December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight."
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was
one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a
Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term
"inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born
inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of
Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained
Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.
Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only
be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years
old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when
the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected
in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby
extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light,
confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are
citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-
five.
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
TORRES VS TAN
FACTS:
Tan Chim, the petitioner here, arrived at the port of Cebu on January
18, 1937, and sought admission as a minor son of Alejandro Tan
Bangco. After hearing, the Board of Special Inquiry decided to deny
him entry on the ground that the status of his father had not been
passed upon by the Secretary of Labor. A petition for habeas corpus
was filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu (civil case No. 308),
which ruled that Alejandro Tan Bangco was a Filipino citizen jus soli,
having been born in Manila on February 27, 1893. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals, by decision of February 23, 1939, up- held the
conclusion of the lower court and declined to overrule the doctrine in
Roa v. Collector of Customs
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner herein is a Filipino Citizen.
HELD:
Yes. Following the doctrine laid down in Roa Case.
A comparison between this case and that of Roa v. Collector of
Customs, supra, will show the following similarities and dissimilarities:
Similar (1) in that Roa was born in the Philippines in 1889, whereas
Alejandro Tan Bangco (father of the petitioner) was born here in 1893,
both before the advent of American sovereignty; (2) the fathers of both
Roa and Tan Bangco were of Chinese nationality and their mothers,
Filipino; (3) at the time of the ratification of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, both were minor residents
of the Philippines; and (4) both, in their boyhood, went to China for
the purpose of studying there, returning thereafter to the Philippines.
When in Roa v. Collector of Customs we declared the applicant therein
to be a citizen of the Philippines, that declaration was a statement of a
general principle, applicable not only to Tranquilino Roa individually but
to all those who were in the same situation, that is to say, to all
persons born in the Philippines before the ratification of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain, of Chinese father and
Filipino mother; residents of the Philippines at the time mentioned in
the treaty of peace, although in their minority; thereafter, going to
China for the purpose of studying, and returning to the Philippines to
live here.
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE
PHILIPPIN BAR, VICENTE CHING
FACTS:
Vicente Ching was born on 1964, to a Chinese father and an Filipino
mother under the existence of the 1935 Constitution. Vicente , took up
Bachelors of Law and passed the same. Upon filing for bar
examinations, he submitted documents stating he being a Filipino
Citizen. He passed the bar examinations.
Upon passing the bar examinations, he was then required to take the
oath. But before he could take the same, additional requirement was
asked from him, among others is to elect Filipino Citizenship. In 1999,
Ching made an election.
ISSUE:
Can the election of citizenship, 14 years after reaching the age of
majority grant the Filipino Citizenship.
HELD:
No. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the
age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.
CA 625, which was enacted pursuant to the provision above,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a
valid election of the Philippine Citizenship. However it did not
prescribed the time to which the election shall be made.
The proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based
on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United
States Government to the effect that the election should be made
within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. The
interpretation however was mean to be within three years after
reaching the age of majority, but may be extended upon presentation
of special circumstances.
In the case at bar, Ching was not able to explain the reason of his
delay for 14 years before having elected Philippine Citizenship. Hence,
the 14 years lapse is clearly beyond the contemplation of "upon
reaching he age of majority."
Wherefore, petition is denied.
NATURALIZATION / DENATURALIZATION
MO YA LIM YAO VS COMMISSIONER OF
IMMIGRATION
FACTS:
This is a case filed to enjoin the Commissioner of Immigration from
causing the arrest and deportation of the petitioner herein - Lau Yuen
Yueng.
Petitioner herein applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines
as a non-immigrant. She is a Chinese residing in Kowloon, Hongking
and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines and to
visit her great grand uncle for a period of one month.
When she arrived in the Philippines, Asher Y Cheng filed a bond in
the amount of PHP1, 000 to undertake among others that Lau Yuen
Yueng would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the
expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the
period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his
authorized representative might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, petitioner was allowed to stay until Feb.
13, 1962. But on January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy
Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino Citizen.
Because of the contemplated action of the respondent to confiscate
her bond and order her arrest deportation, after the expiration of her
authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with preliminary
injunction.
During the hearing, it was admitted that Lao Yuen Yueng could not
write either English or Tagalog. Except a few words she could not
speak either English or Tagalog. She could not even name any
Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not marriage by Lao Yuen Yueng made her ipso facto a
citizen of the Philippines.
HELD:
Pertinent part of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No 473, upon
which petitioners rely, reads.
Any woman who is not or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalised shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.
Citing several cases decided by the Supreme Court, the phrase, "who
might herself be lawfully naturalised," refer to a class or race who
might be lawfully naturalized, and that compliance with the other
conditions of the naturalization laws was not required.
Being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully
naturalised," what should be required is not only that she must not be
disqualified under Section 4 but she must also possess the
qualifications enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age,
residence, good moral character, adherence to the underlying
principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable conduct,
lucrative employment or ownership of real estate, capacity to speak
and write English or Spanish and one of the principal local
languages, education of children in certain schools, etc.
In Philippine jurisprudence it was held that an alien wife is required to
prove only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized, that she is not
one of the disqualified persons enumerated in the Section 4 of the
law, on order to establish her citizenship status as a fact.
Section 15 of the Naturalization law (Commonwealth Act 473), an
alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalised, becomes
ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of
the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. likewise, an alien
woman married to an alien who i subsequently naturalised here
follows the Philippines citizenship of her husband the moment he
takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer
from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
Seciton 4 reads:
1. Person opposed to organised government or affiliate with
any associations or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organised governments.
2. Persons defending or teaching the necessity
of propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for
the success and predominance of their ideas.
3. Polygamists, or believers in the practice of polygamy.
4. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.
5. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious diseases.
6. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the
Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or
who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos.
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines
are at war, during the period of such war.
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than United
States, whose laws does not grant Filipinos the right to
become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
EDISON SO VS REPUBLIC
CHA TEK LAO VS REPUBLIC
D U A L C I T I Z E N S H I P A N D D U A L
ALLEGIANCE
MERCADO VS MANZANO
CALILUNG VS DATUMANONG
FACTS:
Petitioner herein prays for the prohibition to stop the respondent from
implementing RA 9225 (An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine
Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for
the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other
Purposes. Petitioner avers the constitutionality of RA 9225,
specifically its Section 3 and 3:
Section 2: Declaration of Policy: It is hereby declared the
policy of the State that all Philippine Citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the condition of this Act.
Section 3: Retention of Philippine Citizenship: Any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of
the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic.
ISSUE:
Whether sections 2 and 3 of RA 9225, together allow dual allegiance
and not dual citizenship.
HELD:
During the deliberation of the Congress, it was clarified that the
purpose of these contended sections is to recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and his loyalty to the Republic.
Further, Rep. Locsin averred that doing what section 2 and 3 say, the
problem of dual citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the
foreign country because the latest oath that will be taken by the
former Filipino is one of the allegiance to the Philippines and to the
United States, as the case may be. And by swearing to the supreme
authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign
citizenship.
Further it was held that the bill recognizes the Philippine citizenship
but says nothing about the other citizenship.
Wherefore the petition is denied.
LOSS AND REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP
RA 9225 (CITIZENSHIP REACQUISITION AND
RETENTION ACT OF 2003)
BENGZON III VS HRET
BURCA VS REPUBLIC
TABASA VS COURT OF APPEALS
I N RE: PETI TI ON TO REACQUI RE THE
PRI VI LEGE TO PRACTI CE LAW I N THE
PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO MUNESES
SOBEJANA-CONDON VS COMELEC
CANCELLATION OF CITIZENSHIP
REPUBLIC VS LI YAO