The Kosovo War was an armed conflict in Kosovo that lasted from 28 February 1998 until 11

June 1999. It was fought by the forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which controlled
Kosovo before the war, and the Kosovo Albanian rebel group known as the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA) with air support from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and ground
support from the Albanian army.
[59]

The KLA, formed in 1991,
[60]
initiated its first campaign in 1995 when it launched attacks
targeting Serbian law enforcement in Kosovo, and in June 1996 the group claimed
responsibility for acts of sabotage targeting Kosovo police stations. In 1997, the organization
acquired a large amount of arms through weapons smuggling from Albania, following
a rebellion which saw large numbers of weapons looted from the country's police and army
posts. In 1998, KLA attacks targeting Yugoslav authorities in Kosovo resulted in an increased
presence of Serb paramilitaries and regular forces who subsequently began pursuing a
campaign of retribution targeting KLA sympathizers and political opponents
[61]
in a drive which
left 1,500 to 2,000 KLA combatants and civilians dead.
[62][63]
After attempts at a diplomatic
solution failed, NATO intervened, justifying the campaign in Kosovo as a "humanitarian
war".
[64]
This precipitated a mass expulsion of Kosovars by Serbs while Yugoslav forces
continued to fight during the two month-long aerial bombardment of Yugoslavia.
[65][66]
By the
year 2000, subsequent investigations had then recovered the remains of almost three
thousand victims of all ethnicities,
[67]
and in 2001 a United Nationscourt found that there had
been a "a systematic campaign of terror, including murders, rapes, arsons and severe
maltreatments", and that Serb troops had tried to remove rather than eradicate the Albanian
population.
[68]

The war ended with the Kumanovo Treaty, with Yugoslav forces agreeing to withdraw from
Kosovo to make way for an international presence.
[69][70]
The Kosovo Liberation Army
disbanded soon after this, with some of its members going on to fight for the UPMB in
thePreevo Valley
[71]
and others joining the National Liberation Army(NLA) and Albanian
National Army (ANA) during the armed ethnic conflict in Macedonia,
[72]
while others went on to
form the Kosovo Police.
[73]
The conflict was at the centre of news headlines around the world
for months, and gained major coverage from the international media. The NATO bombing and
surrounding events have remained controversial, as it never gained the approval of theUN
Security Council.
[74]

Background[edit]
Kosovo in Tito's Yugoslavia (19451980)[edit]

This section possibly
contains original
research. Please improve
it by verifyingthe claims made and
adding inline citations. Statements
consisting only of original research
should be removed.(September 2009)
Tensions between the Serbian and Albanian communities in Kosovo simmered throughout the
20th century and occasionally erupted into major violence, particularly during the First Balkan
War, World War I, and World War II. The socialist government of Josip Broz Titosystematically
repressed all manifestations of nationalism throughout Yugoslavia, seeking to ensure that no
republic or nationality gained dominance over the others. In particular, the power of Serbia
the largest and most populous republicwas diluted by the establishment of autonomous
governments in the province of Vojvodina in the north and Kosovo in the south. Kosovo's
borders did not precisely match the areas of ethnic Albanian settlement in Yugoslavia
(significant numbers of Albanians were left in the Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro,
and Central Serbia. Kosovo's formal autonomy, established under the 1945 Yugoslav
constitution, initially meant relatively little in practice. Thesecret police cracked down hard on
nationalists. In 1956, a number of Albanians were put on trial in Kosovo on charges of
espionage and subversion. The threat of separatism was in fact minimal, as the few
underground groups aiming for union with Albania were politically insignificant. Their long-term
impact was substantial, though, as someparticularly the Revolutionary Movement for
Albanian Unity, founded by Adem Demaciwere to form the political core of the Kosovo
Liberation Army. Demaci himself was imprisoned in 1964 along with many of his followers.
Yugoslavia underwent a period of economic and political crisis in 1969, as a massive
government program of economic reform widened the gap between the rich north and poor
south of the country.
Student demonstrations and riots in Belgrade in June 1968 spread to Kosovo in November the
same year, but were quelled by the Yugoslav security forces. However, some of the students'
demandsin particular, representative powers for Albanians in both the Serbian and Yugoslav
state bodies, and better recognition of the Albanian languagewere conceded by Tito.
The University of Pristina was established as an independent institution in 1970, ending a long
period when the institution had been run as an outpost of Belgrade University.
TheAlbanisation of education in Kosovo was hampered by the lack of Albanian language
educational materials in Yugoslavia, so an agreement was struck with Albania itself to supply
textbooks.
In 1969, the Serbian Orthodox Church ordered its clergy to compile data on the ongoing
problems of Serbs in Kosovo, seeking to pressure the government in Belgrade to do more to
protect the interests of Serbs there.
In 1974, Kosovo's political status was improved further when a new Yugoslav constitution
granted an expanded set of political rights. Along with Vojvodina, Kosovo was declared a
province and gained many of the powers of a fully-fledged republic: a seat on the federal
presidency and its own assembly, police force, and national bank.
[75]

After the death of Tito (19801986)[edit]
Power was still exercised by the Communist Party, but it was now devolved mainly to ethnic
Albanian communists. Tito's death on 4 May 1980 ushered in a long period of political
instability, worsened by growing economic crisis and nationalist unrest. The first major
outbreak occurred in Kosovo's main city, Pristina, when a protest of University of Pristina
students over long queues in their university canteen rapidly escalated and in late March and
early April 1981 spread throughout Kosovo, causing massive popular demonstrations in
several Kosovo towns. The disturbances were quelled by thePresidency of
Yugoslavia proclaiming a state of emergency, sending in riot police and the army, resulting in
numerous casualties.
Hardliners instituted a fierce crackdown on nationalism of all kinds, Albanian and Serbian alike.
Kosovo endured a heavy secret police presence throughout most of the 1980s that ruthlessly
suppressed any unauthorised nationalist manifestations, both Albanian and Serbian. According
to a report quoted by Mark Thompson, as many as 580,000 inhabitants of Kosovo were
arrested, interrogated, interned, or reprimanded. Thousands of these lost their jobs or were
expelled from their educational establishments. During this time, tension between the Albanian
and Serbian communities continued to escalate.
In February 1982, a group of priests from Serbia proper petitioned their bishops to ask "why
the Serbian Church is silent" and why it did not campaign against "the destruction, arson and
sacrilege of the holy shrines of Kosovo". Such concerns did attract interest in Belgrade. Stories
appeared from time to time in the Belgrade media claiming that Serbs and Montenegrins were
being persecuted. There was a perception among Serbian nationalists that Serbs were being
driven out of Kosovo.
In addition to all this, the worsening state of Kosovo's economy made the province a poor
choice for Serbs seeking work. Albanians, as well as Serbs, tended to favor their compatriots
when employing new recruits, but the number of jobs was too few for the population. Kosovo
was the poorest entity of Yugoslavia: the average per capita income was $795, compared with
the national average of $2,635.
In 1981, it was reported that some 4,000 Serbs moved from Kosovo to Central Serbia after the
Kosovo Albanian riots in March that resulted in several Serb deaths and the desecration of
Serbian Orthodox architecture and graveyards.
[76]
Serbia reacted by a desire to reduce the
power of the Albanians in the province, and a propaganda campaign that claimed that Serbs
were being pushed out of the province primarily by the growing Albanian population, rather
than the bad state of the economy.
[77]
In 1982 It was concluded
[by whom?]
that the Serbs were
victims of major prejudice and harassment, several murders had been committed by ethnic
Albanians, and forming of serious nationalist groups was reality.
[editorializing]
33 nationalist
formations were dismantled by the Yugoslav Police who sentenced some 280 people (800
fined, 100 under investigation) and seized arms caches and propaganda material.
[78]

Kosovo and the rise of Slobodan Miloevi (19861990)[edit]

This section possibly contains original research. Please improve
it by verifyingthe claims made and adding inline citations. Statements
consisting only of original research should be removed. (September 2009)
In 1987, David Binder wrote a report in The New York Times about the rising nationalism
among Albanians in Kosovo. In his report he writes about the Parain massacre, where an
ethnic Albanian soldier in the JNA killed four fellow soldiers and wounded five others.
[79]

The report quoting Federal Secretary for National Defense, Fleet Adm. Branko Mamula, shows
that from 1981 to 1987, 216 illegal Albanian organizations with 1,435 members were
discovered in the JNA. They had prepared the mass killings of officers and soldiers, poisoning
food and water, sabotage, breaking in and stealing weapons and ammunition.
[79]

In Kosovo, growing Albanian nationalism and separatism led to tensions between Serbs and
Albanians. An increasingly poisonous atmosphere led to wild rumors being spread around and
otherwise trivial incidents being blown out of proportion.
It was against this tense background that the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU,
from its Serbian initials, ) conducted a survey of Serbs who had left Kosovo in 1985 and
1986.
[80]
The report concluded that a considerable part of those who had left had been under
pressure by Albanians to do so.
Sixteen prominent members of the SANU began work in June 1985 on a draft document that
was leaked to the public in September 1986. The SANU Memorandum, as it has become
known, was hugely controversial. It focused on the political difficulties facing Serbs in
Yugoslavia, pointing to Tito's deliberate hobbling of Serbia's power and the difficulties faced by
Serbs outside Serbia proper.
The Memorandum paid special attention to Kosovo, arguing that the province's Serbs were
being subjected to "physical, political, legal and cultural genocide" in an "open and total war"
that had been ongoing since the spring of 1981. It claimed that Kosovo's status in 1986 was a
worse historical defeat for the Serbs than any event since liberation from the Ottomans in
1804, thus ranking it above such catastrophes as the Nazi occupation or the First World War
occupation of Serbia by theAustro-Hungarians. The Memorandum's authors claimed that
200,000 Serbs had moved out of the province over the previous twenty years and warned that
there would soon be none left "unless things change radically." The remedy, according to the
Memorandum, was for "genuine security and unambiguous equality for all peoples living in
Kosovo and Metohija [to be] established" and "objective and permanent conditions for the
return of the expelled [Serbian] nation [to be] created." It concluded that "Serbia must not be
passive and wait and see what the others will say, as it has done so often in the past."
The SANU Memorandum provoked split reactions: Albanians saw it as a call for Serbian
supremacy at local level, claiming the Serb emigrants had left Kosovo for economic reasons,
while the Slovenes and Croats, saw a threat in the call for a more assertive Serbia. Serbs were
divided: many welcomed it, while the Communist old guard strongly attacked its message. One
of those who denounced it was Serbian Communist Party official Slobodan Miloevi.
In November 1988, Kosovo's head of the provincial committee was arrested. In March 1989,
Miloevi announced an "anti-bureaucratic revolution" in Kosovo and Vojvodina, curtailing their
autonomy as well as imposing a curfew and a state of emergency in Kosovo due to violent
demonstrations, resulting in 24 deaths (including two policemen). Miloevi and his
government claimed that the constitutional changes were necessary to protect Kosovo's
remaining Serbs against harassment from the Albanian majority.
Constitutional amendments (19891994)[edit]
Events[edit]
On 17 November 1988, Kaqusha Jashari and Azem Vllasi were forced to resign from the
leadership of the League of Communists of Kosovo (LCK).
[81][82][83]
In early 1989 the Serbian
Assembly proposed amendments to the Constitution of Serbia which would remove the word
"Socialist" from the Serbian Republic's title, establish multi-party elections, remove the
independence of institutions of the autonomous provinces such as Kosovo, and rename
Kosovo as the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija.
[84][85]
In February Kosovar
Albanians demonstrated in large numbers against the proposal, emboldened by striking
miners.
[83][86]
Serbs in Belgrade protested against the Kosovo Albanian's separatism.
[87]
On 3
March 1989 the Presidency of Yugoslavia imposed special measures assigning responsibility
for public security to the federal government.
[86]
On 23 March the Assembly of Kosovo voted to
accept the proposed amendments although most Albanian delegates abstained.
[86]
In early
1990 Kosovar Albanians held mass demonstrations against the special measures, which were
lifted on 18 April 1990 and responsibility for public security was again assigned to Serbia.
[86][88]

On 8 May 1989 Miloevi became President of the Presidency of Serbia, which was confirmed
on 6 December.
[86]
On 22 January 1990 the 14 congress of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia (LCY) abolished the party's position as the only legal political party in
Yugoslavia.
[89]
In January 1990 the Yugoslav government announced it would press ahead with
the creation of a multi-party system.
[89]

On 26 June 1990 Serbian authorities closed the Kosovo Assembly citing special
circumstances.
[88]
On 1 or 2 July 1990 Serbia approved the new amendments to the
Constitution of Serbia in a referendum.
[88][90]
Also on 2 July, 114 ethnic Albanian delegates of
the 180 member Kosovo Assembly declared Kosovo an independent republic within
Yugoslavia.
[88][86]
On 5 July the Serbian Assembly dissolved the Kosovo Assembly.
[88][86]
Serbia
also dissolved the provincial executive council and assumed full and direct control of the
province.
[91]
Serbia took over management of Kosovo's principal Albanian-language media,
halting Albanian-language broadcasts.
[91]
On 4 September 1990 Kosovar Albanians observed a
24-hour general strike, virtually shutting down the province.
[91]

On 16 or 17 July 1990, the League of Communists of Serbia (LCS) combined with the Socialist
Alliance of Working People of Serbia to become the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), and
Miloevi became its first president.
[92][86]
On 8 August 1990 several amendments to the
federal Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) Constitution were adopted enabling
the establishment of a multi-party election system.
[90]

On 7 September 1990 the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo was promulgated by the
disbanded Assembly of Kosovo.
[90]
Miloevi responded by ordering the arrest of the deputies
of the disbanded Assembly of Kosovo.
[91]
The new controversial Serbian Constitution was
promulgated on 28 September 1990.
[85]
Multi-party elections were held in Serbia on 9 and 26
December 1990 after which Miloevi became President of Serbia.
[86]
In September 1991
Kosovar Albanians held an unofficial referendum in which they voted overwhelmingly for
independence.
[86]
On 24 May 1992 Kosovar Albanians held unofficial elections for an assembly
and president of the Republic of Kosovo.
[86]

On 5 August 1991 the Serbian Assembly suspended the Pritina daily Rilindja,
[91][93]
following
the Law on Public Information of 29 March 1991 and establishment of the Panorama publishing
house on 6 November which incorporated Rilindja, which was declared unconstitutional by the
federal authorities.
[94]
United Nations Special Rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki reported on 26
February 1993 that the police had intensified their repression of the Albanian population since
1990, including depriving them of their basic rights, destroying their educations system, and
large numbers of political dismissals of civil servants.
[94]

Eruption of War
The slide to war (19951998)
This section possibly contains original
research. Please improve it by verifying the
claims made and adding inline citations.
Statements consisting only of original research
should be removed. (September 2009)
Rugova's policy of passive resistance succeeded in keeping Kosovo quiet during the war
with Slovenia, and the wars in Croatia and Bosnia during the early 1990s. However, as
evidenced by the emergence of the KLA, this came at the cost of increasing frustration among
Kosovo's Albanian population. In the mid-1990s, Rugova pleaded for a United Nations
peacekeeping force for Kosovo. In 1997, Miloevi was promoted to the presidency of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (comprising Serbia and Montenegro since its inception in
April 1992).
Continuing repression convinced many Albanians that only armed resistance would change the
situation. On 22 April 1996, four attacks on Serbian security personnel were carried out almost
simultaneously in several parts of Kosovo. A hitherto-unknown organisation calling itself the
"Kosovo Liberation Army" (KLA) subsequently claimed responsibility. The nature of the KLA
was at first mysterious.
It is widely believed that the KLA received financial and material support from the Kosovo
Albanian diaspora.
[95][96]
In early 1997, Albania collapsed into chaos following the fall of
President Sali Berisha. Military stockpiles were looted with impunity by criminal gangs, with
much of the hardware ending up in western Kosovo and boosting the growing KLA
arsenal. Bujar Bukoshi, shadow Prime Minister in exile (in Zrich, Switzerland), created a
group called FARK (Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosova) which was reported to have
been disbanded and absorbed by the KLA in 1998.
[citation needed]
The Yugoslav government
considered the KLA to be "terrorists" and "insurgents" who indiscriminately attacked police and
civilians, while most Albanians saw the KLA as "freedom fighters". In 1998, the U.S. State
Department listed the KLA as a terrorist organization,
[96]
and in 1999 the Republican Policy
Committee of the U.S. Senate expressed its troubles with the "effective alliance" of
the Democratic Clinton administration with the KLA due to "numerous reports from reputable
unofficial sources ".
[97]

In 2000, a BBC article stated that Nato at War shows how the United States, which had
described the KLA as "terrorist", now sought a relationship with the group.
[98]

U.S. envoy Robert Gelbard referred to the KLA as terrorists.
[99]
Responding to criticism, he
later clarified to the House Committee on International Relations that "while it has committed
'terrorist acts,' it has 'not been classified legally by the U.S. Government as a terrorist
organization.'"
[97]
On June 1998, he held talks with two men who claimed they were political
leaders.
[99]

Meanwhile, the U.S. held an "outer wall of sanctions" on Yugoslavia which had been tied to a
series of issues, Kosovo being one of them. These were maintained despite the agreement at
Dayton to end all sanctions. The Clinton administration claimed that Dayton bound Yugoslavia
to hold discussions with Rugova over Kosovo.
The crisis escalated in December 1997 at the Peace Implementation Council meeting in Bonn,
where the international community (as defined in the Dayton Agreement) agreed to give the
High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina sweeping powers, including the right to
dismiss elected leaders. At the same time, Western diplomats insisted that Kosovo be
discussed, and that Yugoslavia be responsive to Albanian demands there. The delegation from
Yugoslavia stormed out of the meetings in protest.
[100]

This was followed by the return of the Contact Group that oversaw the last phases of the
Bosnian conflict and declarations from European powers demanding that Yugoslavia solve the
problem in Kosovo.
War begins[edit]
KLA attacks intensified, centering on the Drenica valley area with the compound of Adem
Jashari being a focal point. Days after Robert Gelbard described the KLA as a terrorist group,
Serbian police responded to the KLA attacks in the Likoanearea, and pursued some of the
KLA to irez, resulting in the deaths of 16 Albanian fighters
[101]
and four Serbian
policemen.
[102]
The first major act of war had occurred.
[citation needed]

Despite some accusations of summary executions and killings of civilians, condemnations from
Western capitals were not as voluble as they would become later. Serb police began to pursue
Jashari and his followers in the village of Donje Prekaz. A massive firefight at the Jashari
compound led to the massacre of 60 Albanians, of which eighteen were women and ten were
under the age of sixteen.
[103]
This March 5, 1998 event provoked massive condemnation from
the western capitals.Madeleine Albright stated that "this crisis is not an internal affair of the
FRY".
On March 24, Yugoslav forces surrounded the village of Glodjane and attacked a rebel
compound there.
[104]
Despite superior firepower, the Yugoslav forces failed to destroy the KLA
unit which had been their objective. Although there were deaths and severe injuries on the
Albanian side, the insurgency in Glodjane was far from stamped out. It was in fact to become
one of the strongest centers of resistance in the upcoming war.
The KLA's first goal was thus to merge its Drenica stronghold with their stronghold in Albania
proper, and this would shape the first few months of the fighting.
[citation needed][105]

A new Yugoslav government was also formed at this time, led by the Socialist Party of
Serbia and the Serbian Radical Party. Ultra-nationalist Radical Party chairman Vojislav
eelj became a deputy prime minister. This increased the dissatisfaction with the country's
position among Western diplomats and spokespersons.
In early April, Serbia arranged for a referendum on the issue of foreign interference in Kosovo.
Serbian voters decisively rejected foreign interference in this crisis.
[106]
Meanwhile, the KLA
claimed much of the area in and around Dean and ran a territory based in the village of
Gloane, encompassing its surroundings. So, on May 31, 1998, the Yugoslav army and the
Serb Ministry of the Interior police began an operation to clear the border of the KLA. NATO's
response to this offensive was mid-June's Operation Determined Falcon, an air show over the
Yugoslav borders.
[107]

During this time, the Yugoslav President Miloevi reached an arrangement with Boris Yeltsin
of Russia to stop offensive operations and prepare for talks with the Albanians, who, through
this whole crisis, refused to talk to the Serbian side, but not the Yugoslav. In fact, the only
meeting between Miloevi and Ibrahim Rugova happened on 15 May in Belgrade, two days
after Richard Holbrooke announced that it would take place. One month later, Holbrooke, after
a trip to Belgrade where he threatened Miloevi that if he did not obey, "what's left of your
country will implode", he visited the border areas affected by the fighting in early June; there he
was famously photographed with the KLA. The publication of these images sent a signal to the
KLA, its supporters and sympathizers, and to observers in general, that the U.S. was decisively
backing the KLA and the Albanian population in Kosovo.
The Yeltsin agreement included Miloevi's allowing international representatives to set up a
mission in Kosovo-Metohija to monitor the situation there. This was the Kosovo Diplomatic
Observer Mission (KDOM) that began operations in early July. The American government
welcomed this part of the agreement, but denounced the initiative's call for a mutual cease fire.
Rather, the Americans demanded that the Serbian-Yugoslavian side should cease fire "without
linkage ... to a cessation in terrorist activities".
All through June and into mid-July, the KLA maintained its advance. KLA
surrounded Pe, akovica, and had set up an interim capital in the town of Malievo (north
of Orahovac). The KLA troops infiltrated Suva Reka, and the northwest of Pritina. They moved
on to the Belacevec coal pits and captured them in late June, threatening energy supplies in
the region. Their tactics as usual focused mainly on guerilla and mountain warfare, and
harassing and ambushing Yugoslav forces and Serb police patrols.
The tide turned in mid-July when the KLA captured Orahovac. On 17 July 1998, two close-by
villages to Orahovac, Retimlije and Opterua, were also captured. Similarly, less systematic
events took place in Orahovac and the larger Serb-populated village of Velika Hoa. The
Orthodox monastery of Zociste three miles (5 km) from Orehovacfamous for the relics of the
Saints Kosmas and Damianos and revered also by local Albanianswas robbed, its monks
deported to a KLA prison camp, and, while empty, the monastery church and all its buildings
were leveled to the ground by mining. This led to a series of Serb and Yugoslav offensives
which would continue into the beginning of August.
A new set of KLA attacks in mid-August triggered Yugoslavian operations in south-central
Kosovo south of the Pritina-Pe road. This wound down with the capture of Kleka on August
23 and the discovery of a KLA-run crematorium in which some of their victims were found. The
KLA began an offensive on September 1 around Prizren, causing Yugoslavian military activity
there. In Metohija, around Pe, another offensive caused condemnation as international
officials expressed fear that a large column of displaced people would be attacked.
In early mid-September, for the first time, KLA activity was reported in northern Kosovo
around Podujevo. Finally, in late September, a determined effort was made to clear the KLA
out of the northern and central parts of Kosovo and out of the Drenica valley itself. During this
time many threats were made from Western capitals but these were tempered somewhat by
the elections in Bosnia, as they did not want Serbian Democrats and Radicals to win. Following
the elections, however, the threats intensified once again but a galvanizing event was needed.
They got it on September 28, when the mutilated corpses of a family were discovered by
KDOM outside the village of Gornje Obrinje; the bloody doll from there became the rallying
image for the ensuing war.
UN, NATO, and OSCE (19981999)[edit]
On 23 September 1998 acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter the UN Security
Council adopted Resolution 1199. This expressed 'grave concern' at reports reaching the
Secretary General that over 230,000 people had been displaced from their homes by 'the
excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav
Army',
[108]
demanding that all parties in Kosovo and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire. On 24 September the North
Atlantic Council (NAC) of NATO issued an "activation warning" (ACTWARN) taking NATO to
an increased level of military preparedness for both a limited air option and a phased air
campaign in Kosovo.
[109]

The other major issue for those who saw no option but to resort to the use of force was the
estimated 250,000 displaced Albanians, 30,000 of whom were out in the woods, without warm
clothing or shelter, with winter fast approaching.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Macedonia, Christopher Hill, was
leading shuttle diplomacy between an Albanian delegation, led by Rugova, and the Yugoslav
and Serbian authorities. It was these meetings which were shaping what was to be the peace
plan to be discussed during a period of planned NATO occupation of Kosovo.
During a period of two weeks, threats intensified, culminating in NATO's Activation Order being
given. NATO was ready to begin airstrikes, and Richard Holbrooke went to Belgrade in the
hope of reaching an agreement with Miloevi.
Officially, the international community demanded an end to fighting. It specifically demanded
that the Yugoslavia end its offensives against the KLA whilst attempting to convince the KLA to
drop its bid for independence. Moreover, attempts were made to persuade Miloevi to permit
NATO peacekeeping troops to enter Kosovo. This, they argued, would allow for the
Christopher Hill peace process to proceed and yield a peace agreement.
On 13 October 1998, the North Atlantic Council issued issue activation orders (ACTORDs) for
the execution of both limitedair strikes and a phased air campaign in Yugoslavia which would
begin in approximately 96 hours.
[110]
On 15 October the NATO Kosovo Verification
Mission (KVM) Agreement for a ceasefire was signed, and the deadline for withdrawal was
extended to 27 October.
[111][112]
The Serbian withdrawal commenced on or around 25 October
1998, and Operation Eagle Eye commenced on 30 October.
[111][112]

The KVM was a large contingent of unarmed Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) peace monitors (officially known as verifiers) that moved into Kosovo. Their
inadequacy was evident from the start. They were nicknamed the "clockwork oranges" in
reference to their brightly coloured vehicles. Fighting resumed in December 1998 after both
sides broke the ceasefire,
[113]
and this surge in violence culminated in the killing of Zvonko
Bojani, the Serb mayor of the town of Kosovo Polje. Yugoslav authorities responded by
launching a crackdown against KLA militants.
[114]

The January to March 1999 phase of the war brought increasing insecurity in urban areas,
including bombings and murders. Such attacks took place during the Rambouillet talks in
February and as the Kosovo Verification Agreement unraveled in March. Killings on the roads
continued and increased. There were military confrontations in, among other places,
the Vuitrnarea in February and the heretofore unaffected Kaanik area in early March.
On 15 January 1999 the Raak massacre occurred when "45 Kosovan Albanian farmers were
rounded up, led up a hill and massacred".
[115]
The bodies had been discovered by OSCE
monitors, including Head of Mission William Walker, and foreign news
correspondents.
[116][117]
Yugoslavia denied a massacre took place.
[117]
The Raak massacre
was the culmination of the KLA attacks and Yugoslav reprisals that had continued throughout
the winter of 19981999. The incident was immediately condemned as a massacre by
the Western countries and the United Nations Security Council, and later became the basis of
one of the charges of war crimes leveled against Miloevi and his top officials. This massacre
was the turning point of the war. NATO decided that the conflict could only be settled by
introducing a military peacekeeping force under the auspices of NATO, to forcibly restrain the
two sides.
Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, had been subjected to heavy firefights and segregation
according to OSCE reports.
[118]

The Rambouillet Conference (JanuaryMarch 1999)[edit]
On 30 January 1999 NATO issued a statement announcing that the North Atlantic Council had
agreed that "the NATO Secretary General may authorise air strikes against targets on FRY
territory" to "[compel] compliance with the demands of the international community and [to
achieve] a political settlement".
[119]
While this was most obviously a threat to the Miloevi
government, it also included a coded threat to the Albanians: any decision would depend on
the "position and actions of the Kosovo Albanian leadership and all Kosovo Albanian armed
elements in and around Kosovo."
[citation needed]

Also on 30 January 1999 the Contact Group issued a set of "non-negotiable principles" which
made up a package known as "Status Quo Plus"effectively the restoration of Kosovo's pre-
1990 autonomy within Serbia, plus the introduction of democracy and supervision by
international organisations. It also called for a peace conference to be held in February 1999 at
the Chteau de Rambouillet, outside Paris.
The Rambouillet talks began on 6 February 1999, with NATO Secretary General Javier
Solana negotiating with both sides. They were intended to conclude by 19 February. The FR
Yugoslavian delegation was led by then president of Serbia Milan Milutinovi, while Miloevi
himself remained in Belgrade. This was in contrast to the 1995 Dayton conference that ended
the war in Bosnia, where Miloevi negotiated in person. The absence of Miloevi was
interpreted as a sign that the real decisions were being made back in Belgrade, a move that
aroused criticism in Yugoslavia as well as abroad; Kosovo's Serbian Orthodox
bishop Artemije traveled all the way to Rambouillet to protest that the delegation was wholly
unrepresentative. At this time speculation about an indictment of Miloevi for war crimes was
rife, so his absence may have been motivated by fear of arrest.


Equipment of 72nd Special Brigade Yugoslav Army in the 1999 Kosovo War.
The first phase of negotiations was successful. In particular, a statement was issued by the
Contact Group co-chairmen on 23 February 1999 that the negotiations "have led to
aconsensus on substantial autonomy for Kosovo, including on mechanisms for free and fair
elections to democratic institutions, for the governance of Kosovo, for the protection of human
rights and the rights of members of national communities; and for the establishment of a fair
judicial system". They went on to say that "a political framework is now in place", leaving the
further work of finalizing "the implementation Chapters of the Agreement, including the
modalities of the invited international civilian and military presence in Kosovo".
While the accords did not fully satisfy the Albanians, they were much too radical for the
Yugoslavs, who responded by substituting a drastically revised text that even Russia (ally of
FR Yugoslavia) found unacceptable. It sought to reopen the painstakingly negotiated political
status of Kosovo and deleted all of the proposed implementation measures. Among many
other changes in the proposed new version, it eliminated the entire chapter on humanitarian
assistance and reconstruction, removed virtually all international oversight and dropped any
mention of invoking "the will of the people [of Kosovo]" in determining the final status of the
province.
On 18 March 1999, the Albanian, American, and British delegations signed what became
known as the Rambouillet Accordswhile the Yugoslav and Russian delegations refused. The
accords called for NATO administration of Kosovo as an autonomous province within
Yugoslavia, a force of 30,000 NATO troops to maintain order in Kosovo; an unhindered right of
passage for NATO troops on Yugoslav territory, including Kosovo; and immunity for NATO and
its agents to Yugoslav law. They also would have also permitted a continuing Yugoslav army
presence of 1,500 troops for border monitoring, backed by up to 1,000 troops to perform
command and support functions, as well as a small number of border police, 2,500 ordinary
MUP for public security purposes (although these were expected to draw down and to be
transformed), and 3,000 local police.
[120]

Although the Yugoslav government cited military provisions of Appendix B of the Rambouillet
provisions as the reason for its objections, claiming that it was an unacceptable violation of
Yugoslavia's sovereignty, these provisions were essentially the same as had been applied to
Bosnia for the SFOR (Stabilization Force) mission there after the Dayton Agreement in 1995.
The two sides did not discuss the issue in detail because of their disagreements on more
fundamental problems.
[121]
In particular, the Serb side rejected the idea of any NATO troop
presence in Kosovo to replace their security forces, preferring unarmed U.N. observers.
Miloevi himself had refused to discuss the annex after informing NATO that it was
unacceptable, even after he was asked to propose amendments to the provisions which would
have made them acceptable.
[122]

Events proceeded rapidly after the failure at Rambouillet and the alternative Yugoslav
proposal.
[123]
The international monitors from the OSCE withdrew on 22 March, for fear of the
monitors' safety ahead of the anticipated NATO bombing campaign.
[123]

On 23 March, the Serbian assembly accepted the principle of autonomy for Kosovo and non-
military part of the agreement, while rejecting a NATO troop presence.
[123][124]

NATO bombing timeline[edit]
Main article: 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia


A Tomahawk cruise missile launches from the aft missile deck of the USSGonzalez on March 31, 1999


A U.S. F-117 Nighthawk taxis to the runway before taking off from Aviano Air Base, Italy, on March 24, 1999
For months, U.S. intelligence warned that Milosevic would react to the bombing by creating "a
virtual explosion of refugees".
[125]
Likewise, in early March, Italian Prime Minister Massimo
DAlema warned President Clinton that a result of the bombing would be a refugee crisis, to
which National Security Adviser Sandy Berger replied, then "NATO will keep bombing".
[126]

On 23 March 1999 at 21:30 UTC Richard Holbrookereturned to Brussels and announced that
peace talks had failed and formally handed the matter to NATO for military action.
[127][128]
Hours
before the announcement, Yugoslavia announced on national television it had declared a state
of emergency citing an imminent threat of war and began a huge mobilisation of troops and
resources.
[127][129]

On 23 March 1999 at 22:17 UTC the Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, announced
he had directed the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), US Army General Wesley
Clark, to "initiate air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."
[129][130]
On 24 March at
19:00 UTC NATO started its bombing campaign against Yugoslavia.
[131][132]

NATO's bombing campaign lasted from 24 March to 11 June 1999, involving up to 1,000
aircraft operating mainly from bases in Italy and aircraft carriers stationed in
the Adriatic. Tomahawk cruise missiles were also extensively used, fired from aircraft, ships,
and submarines. With the exception of Greece, all NATO members were involved to some
degree. Over the ten weeks of the conflict, NATO aircraft flew over 38,000 combat missions.
For the German Air Force (Luftwaffe), it was the second time it had participated in a conflict
since World War II after the Bosnian War.
The proclaimed goal of the NATO operation was summed up by its spokesman as "Serbs out,
peacekeepers in, refugees back". That is, Yugoslav troops would have to leave Kosovo and be
replaced by international peacekeepers to ensure that the Albanian refugees could return to
their homes. The campaign was initially designed to destroy Yugoslav air defenses and high-
value military targets. It did not go very well at first, with bad weather hindering many sorties
early on. NATO had seriously underestimated Miloevi's will to resist: few in Brussels thought
that the campaign would last more than a few days, and although the initial bombardment was
not insignificant, it did not match the intensity of the bombing of Baghdad in 1991..
Once NATO began bombing, atrocities vastly intensified, such as lootings, killings, rape,
kidnappings, pillage, and expulsions.
[133]
U.S.-NATO Commanding General Wesley Clark told a
reporter that it was "entirely predictable" that Serb atrocities would increase in reaction to the
bombing.
[134]
Clark would later add that the NATO operation "was not designed as a means of
blocking Serb ethnic cleansing."
[135][136]

On the ground, the ethnic cleansing campaign by the Yugoslavs was stepped up. In actions
unparalleled since World War Two, Yugoslav forces expelled hundreds of thousands of Kosovo
Albanians from Kosovo, in miserable conditions. UNHCR representatives reported on 3 April
that, "During 2 April, an estimated 45,000 Kosovars arrived at the Macedonian border with
Kosovo, of whom around 25,000 in six trains carrying people who report that they were
expelled from Pristina. The new arrivals were exhausted and traumatized.".
[137]
On 6 April,
UNHCR representatives were reporting that "at least 25,000 Kosovars arrived at the main
Albanian border point at Morini between Monday and Tuesday mornings and a further 15,000
at the mountain frontier of Qafa Prushit, bringing the estimated total to 262,000 ... Virtually
every Kosovar arriving at Qafa Prushit came on foot in very, very bad physical condition ...
refugees interviewed said men were both being tortured and even executed in front of their
families ... Serbian police stationed just opposite the Albanian border post warned journalists
they would shoot if the correspondents approached. Aid officials were told to withdraw 500
metres from the crossing.".
[138]
A report written for the UNHCR after the crisis
[139]
concluded
that 'half a million people arrived in neighbouring areas in the course of about two weeks, and
a few weeks later the total was over 850,000'. The Serbian authorities have never
acknowledged these UNHCR figures. On 25 March Arkan appeared at the Hyatt hotel in
Belgrade where most of Western journalists were staying and warned all of them to leave
Serbia.
[140]



Post-strike damage assessment of the Sremska Mitrovica ordnance storage depot, Serbia
NATO military operations switched increasingly to attacking Yugoslav units on the ground,
hitting targets as small as individual tanks and artillery pieces, as well as continuing with the
strategic bombardment. This activity was, however, heavily constrained by politics, as each
target needed to be approved by all nineteen member states. Montenegro was bombed on
several occasions but NATO eventually desisted to prop up the precarious position of its anti-
Miloevi leader, ukanovi. So-called "dual-use" targets, of use to both civilians and the
military, were attacked, including bridges across the Danube, factories, power stations,
schools, houses, nurseries, hospitals, telecommunications facilities and, controversially, the
headquarters of Yugoslavian Leftists, a political party led by Miloevi's wife, and
theRTS television broadcasting tower. NATO justified the bombing of such targets as they
were "potentially useful to the Yugoslav military " however, some see the actions as violations
of international law and the Geneva Conventions in particular.
At the start of May, a NATO aircraft attacked an Albanian refugee convoy, believing it was a
Yugoslav military convoy, killing around fifty people. NATO admitted its mistake five days later
and the Yugoslavs accused NATO of deliberately attacking the refugees;
[citation needed]
A later
report conducted by the ICTY entitled Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee
Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia
[141]
opined that "civilians were not deliberately attacked in this incident" and that
"neither the aircrew nor their commanders displayed the degree of recklessness in failing to
take precautionary measures which would sustain criminal charges." On May 7, NATO bombs
hit the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese journalists and outraging Chinese
public opinion. The United States and NATO later apologised for the bombing, saying that it
occurred because of an outdated map provided by the CIA although this was challenged by a
joint report from The Observer (UK) and Politiken (Denmark) newspapers
[142]
which claimed
that NATO intentionally bombed the embassy because it was being used as a relay station for
Yugoslav army radio signals. However the report by the newspaper contradicts findings in the
same report by the ICTY which stated that the root of the failures in target location "appears to
stem from the land navigation techniques employed by an intelligence officer."
[143]
In another
major incident at the Dubrava
[disambiguation needed]
prison in Kosovo, the Yugoslav government
attributed as many as 85 civilian deaths to NATO bombing
[citation needed]
of the facility after NATO
cited Serbian and Yugoslav military activity in the area
[144]
A Human Rights Watch only
reported nineteen ethnic Albanian prisoners killed.
[144]


Smoke in Novi Sad after NATO bombardment
By the start of April, the conflict appeared little closer to a resolution and NATO countries
began to seriously consider conducting ground operations in Kosovo. British Prime
Minister Tony Blair was a strong advocate of ground forces and pressured the United States to
agree; his strong stance caused some alarm in Washington as American forces would be
making the largest contribution to any offensive.
[145]
U.S. President Bill Clinton was extremely
reluctant to commit American forces for a ground offensive. Instead, Clinton authorised
a CIA operation to look into methods to destabilise the Yugoslav government without training
KLA troops.
[146]
At the same time, Finnish and Russian diplomatic negotiators continued to try
to persuade Miloevi to back down. Tony Blair would order 50,000 British soldiers to be made
ready for a ground offensive: most of the available British Army.
[145]

Miloevi finally recognised that Russia would not intervene to defend Yugoslavia despite
Moscow's strong anti-NATO rhetoric. He thus accepted the conditions offered by a Finnish
Russian mediation team and agreed to a military presence within Kosovo headed by the UN,
but incorporating NATO troops.
The Norwegian special forces Hrens Jegerkommando and Forsvarets
Spesialkommando cooperated with the KLA in gathering intelligence information. Preparing for
an invasion on 12 June, Norwegian special forces worked with the KLA on the Ramno
mountain on the border between Macedonia and Kosovo and acted as scouts to monitor
events in Kosovo. Together with British special forces, Norwegian special forces were the first
to cross over the border into Kosovo. According to Keith Graves with the television network
Sky News, the Norwegians were already inside Kosovo two days prior to the marching in of
other forces and were among the first to enter into Pristina.
[147]
The Hrens Jegerkommando's
and Forsvarets Spesialkommando's job was to clear the way between the striding parties and
to make local deals to implement the peace deal between the Serbians and the Kosovo
Albanians.
[148][149]

Yugoslav army withdrawal and the entry of KFOR[edit]
On 3 June 1999, Miloevi accepted the terms of an international peace plan to end the
fighting, with the national parliament adopting the proposal amid contentious debate with
delegates coming close to fistfights at some points.
[150][151]
On 10 June, the North Atlantic
Council ratified the agreement and suspended air operations.
[152]



U.S. Marines march with local Albanian children down the main street of Zegra on June 28, 1999
On 12 June, after Miloevi accepted the conditions, the NATO-led peacekeepingKosovo
Force (KFOR) began entering Kosovo. KFOR had been preparing to conduct combat
operations, but in the end, its mission was only peacekeeping. It was based upon the Allied
Rapid Reaction Corps headquarters commanded by then Lieutenant General Mike Jackson of
the British Army. It consisted of British forces (a brigade built from 4th Armored and 5th
Airborne Brigades), a French Army Brigade, a German Army brigade, which entered from the
west while all the other forces advanced from the south, and Italian Army and United States
Army brigades.
The first NATO troops to enter Pristina on the 12th of June 1999 were Norwegianspecial forces
from FSK Forsvarets Spesialkommando and soldiers from the BritishSpecial Air Service 22
S.A.S, although to NATO's diplomatic embarrassment Russian troops arrived first at the
airport. The Norwegian soldiers from FSK Forsvarets Spesialkommando were the first to come
in contact with the Russian troops at the airport. FSK's mission was to level the negotiating
field between the belligerent parties, and to fine-tune the detailed, local deals needed to
implement the peace deal between the Serbians and the Kosovo Albanians.
[153][154][155][156]

The U.S. contribution, known as the Initial Entry Force, was led by the 1st Armored Division,
commanded by Brigadier General Peterson, and was spearheaded by a platoon from the 2nd
Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment attached to the British Forces. Other units
included 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 10th Special Forces Group(Airborne) from Stuttgart
Germany and Fort Carson, Colorado, TF 16 Infantry (1-6 infantry with C Co 1-35AR) from
Baumholder, Germany, the 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment from Fort Bragg,
North Carolina, the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit fromCamp Lejeune, North Carolina, the 1st
Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment from Schweinfurt, Germany, and Echo Troop, 4th Cavalry
Regiment, also from Schweinfurt, Germany. Also attached to the U.S. force was the Greek
Army's 501st Mechanized Infantry Battalion. The initial U.S. forces established their area of
operation around the towns of Uroevac, the future Camp Bondsteel, and Gnjilane, at Camp
Monteith, and spent four monthsthe start of a stay which continues to dateestablishing
order in the southeast sector of Kosovo.


U.S. soldiers escort a Serbian civilian from his home in Zitinje after finding an automatic weapon, July 26, 1999
During the initial incursion, the U.S. soldiers were greeted by Albanians cheering and throwing
flowers as U.S. soldiers and KFOR rolled through their villages. Although no resistance was
met, three U.S. soldiers from the Initial Entry Force lost their lives in accidents.
[157]

On 1 October 1999, approximately 150 paratroopers from Alpha Company, 1/508th Airborne
Battalion Combat Team from Vicenza, Italy parachuted into Uroevac as part of Operation
Rapid Guardian. The purpose of the mission was primarily to warn Yugoslav President
Slobodan Miloevi of NATO resolve and of its rapid military capability. One U.S. soldier, Army
Ranger Sgt. Jason Neil Pringle, was killed during operations after his parachute failed to
deploy. The paratroopers of the 1/508th then joined paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne and
K.F.O.R. in patrolling various areas of Kosovo, without incident, through 3 October 1999.
On 15 December 1999, Staff Sergeant Joseph Suponcic of 3rd Battalion/10th Special Forces
Group(Airborne) was killed, when the HMMWV in which he was a passenger struck an anti-
tank mine planted by Albanians and meant for the Russian contingent with which SSG
Suponcic's team was patrolling in Kosovska Kamenica.


U.S. soldiers maintain crowd control as Albanian residents of Vitinaprotest in the streets on January 9, 2000
Following the military campaign, the involvement of Russian peacekeepers proved to be tense
and challenging to the NATO Kosovo force. The Russians expected to have an independent
sector of Kosovo, only to be unhappily surprised with the prospect of operating under NATO
command. Without prior communication or coordination with NATO, Russian peacekeeping
forces entered Kosovo from Bosnia and Herzegovinaand occupied Pristina International
Airport ahead of the arrival of NATO forces. This resulted in an incident during which NATO
Supreme Commander Wesley Clark's wish to forcibly block the runways with NATO vehicles,
to prevent any Russian reinforcement, was refused by KFOR commander General Mike
Jackson.
[158]

In 2010, James Blunt described in an interview how his unit was given the assignment of
securing Pristina during the advance of the 30,000-strong peacekeeping force and how the
Russian army had moved in and taken control of the city's airport before his unit's arrival. Blunt
shared a part in the difficult task of addressing the potentially violent international incident.
According to Blunt's account there was a stand-off with the Russians, and the NATO Supreme
Commander, Wesley Clark, gave provisional orders to over-power them. Whilst these were
questioned by Blunt, they were rejected by General Jackson, with the now famous line, "I'm not
having my soldiers responsible for starting World War III."
[159]

Furthermore, in June 2000, arms trading relations between Russia and Yugoslavia were
exposed which led to the retaliation and bombings of Russian Checkpoints and area Police
Stations. Outpost Gunner was established on a high point in the Preevo Valley by Echo
Battery 1/161 Field Artillery in an attempt to monitor and assist with peacekeeping efforts in the
Russian Sector. Operating under the support of 2/3 Field Artillery, 1st Armored Division, the
Battery was able to successfully deploy and continuously operate a Firefinder Radar which
allowed the NATO forces to keep a closer watch on activities in the Sector and the Preevo
Valley. Eventually a deal was struck whereby Russian forces operated as a unit of KFOR but
not under the NATO command structure.
[160]

Reaction to the war[edit]
It was Yugoslavia's resistance to the broader trends of political and economic reform not the
plight of Kosovar Albanians that best explains NATO's war.
John Norris, communications director for U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott,
"Collision Course: NATO, Russia, and Kosovo", 2005
[161]

Thanks to John Norris, they will know....how events looked and felt at the time to those of us who
were involved.
Strobe Talbott, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
[162]

Because of the country's restrictive media laws, the Yugoslav media carried little coverage of
events in Kosovo, and the attitude of other countries to the humanitarian disaster that was
occurring there. Thus, few members of the Yugoslav public expected NATO intervention,
instead thinking that a diplomatic agreement would be reached.
[163]

Support for the war[edit]
Support for the Kosovan War and, in particular, the legitimacy of NATO's bombing
campaign came from a variety of sources. Every member of NATO, every EU country, and
most of Yugoslavia's neighbours, supported military action
[164]
with statements from the leaders
of Bill Clinton, Vclav Havel and Tony Blair respectively describing the war as, "an attack by
tanks and artillery on a largely defenseless people whose leaders already have agreed to
peace,"
[165]
"the first war for values"
[164]
and one "to avert what would otherwise be a
humanitarian disaster in Kosovo.".
[166]
Others included the then U.N. Secretary General Kofi
Annan who was reported by some sources as acknowledging that the NATO action was
legitimate
[167]
who emphasised that there were times when the use of force was legitimate in
the pursuit of peace
[168]
though Annan stressed that the "Council should have been involved in
any decision to use force."
[168]
The distinction between the legality and legitimacy of the
intervention was further highlighted in two separate reports. One was conducted by
the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, entitled The Kosovo Report,
[169]
which
found that:
[Yugoslav] forces were engaged in a well-planned campaign of terror and expulsion of the Kosovar
Albanians. This campaign is most frequently described as one of "ethnic cleansing," intended to
drive many, if not all, Kosovar Albanians from Kosovo, destroy the foundations of their society, and
prevent them from returning.
It concluded that "the NATO military intervention was illegal but legitimate",
[170]
The second
report was published by the NATO Office of Information and Press
[171]
which reported that, "the
human rights violations committed on a large scale in Kosovo provide an incontestable ground
with reference to the humanitarian aspect of NATO's intervention."
[172]
Some critics note that
that NATO did not have the backing of the United Nations Security Council meant that its
intervention had no legal basis, but according to some legal scholars, "there are nonetheless
certain bases for that action that are not legal, but justified."
[167]

Aside from politicians and diplomats, commentators and intellectuals also supported the
war. Michael Ignatieff called NATOs intervention a "morally justifiable response to ethnic
cleansing and the resulting flood of refugees, and not the cause of the flood of
refugees"
[173]
while Christopher Hitchens said NATO intervened only, "when Serbian forces
had resorted to mass deportation and full-dress ethnic "cleansing."
[174]
Writing in The
Nation, Richard A. Falk wrote that, "the NATO campaign achieved the removal of Yugoslav
military forces from Kosovo and, even more significant, the departure of the dreaded Serbian
paramilitary units and police"
[175]
while an article in The Guardian wrote that for Mary Kaldor,
Kosovo represented a laboratory on her thinking for human security, humanitarian intervention
and international peacekeeping, the latter two which she defined as, "a genuine belief in the
equality of all human beings; and this entails a readiness to risk lives of peacekeeping troops to
save the lives of others where this is necessary."
[176]

Criticism of the case for war[edit]


Anti-American protests in Beijing, China, 1999
Some criticised the NATO intervention as a political diversionary tactic, coming as it did on the
heels of the Monica Lewinsky scandal. Some support for this hypothesis may be found in the
fact that coverage of the bombing directly replaced coverage of the Monica Lewinsky scandal
in American news cycles.
[177]
Also, some point out that before the bombing, rather than there
being an unusually bloody conflict, the KLA was not engaged in a widespread civil war against
Yugoslav forces and the death toll among all concerned (including ethnic Albanians)
skyrocketed following NATO intervention.
[177]
However, the absence of war did not mean the
presence of peace between Albanians and Serbs, as other sources have noted, citing the
deaths of 1,500 Albanians and displacement of 270,000 prior to NATO intervention
[164]
and the
systematic repression of the Albanian population
[178]
through constitutional changes by the
Milosevic
[179]
regime that imposed an "apartheid" in Kosovo.
[179][180]

U.S. President Clinton and his administration were accused of inflating the number of Kosovo
Albanians killed by state forces.
[181]
After the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade,
Chinese Premier Jiang Zemin said that the US was using its economic and military superiority
to aggressively expand its influence and interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.
Chinese leaders called the NATO campaign a dangerous precedent of naked aggression, a
new form of colonialism, and an aggressive war groundless in morality or law. It was seen as
part of a plot by the US to destroy Yugoslavia, expand eastward and control all of Europe.
[182]

The United Nations Charter does not allow military interventions in other sovereign countries
with few exceptions which, in general, need to be decided upon by the United Nations Security
Council; this legal enjoinment has proved controversial with many
[167][169][170]
legal scholars who
argue that though the Kosovo War illegal, it was still legitimate. The issue was brought before
the UN Security Council by Russia, in a draft resolution which, inter alia, would affirm "that
such unilateral use of force constitutes a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter".
China, Namibia, and Russia voted for the resolution, the other members against, thus it failed
to pass.
[183]

The war inflicted many casualties. Already by March 1999, the combination of fighting and the
targeting of civilians had left an estimated 1,5002,000 civilians and combatants dead.
[184]
Final
estimates of the casualties are still unavailable for either side.
John Pilger said that the bombing campaign was partly designed to prepare the way for a free
market-based reconstruction by wealthy foreign powers.
[185]
Perhaps the most controversial
deliberate attack of the war was that made against the headquarters of Serbian television on
April 23, which killed at least fourteen people.
Casualties[edit]
Civilian losses[edit]
In June 2000, the Red Cross reported that 3,368 civilians (2,500 Albanians, 400 Serbs, and
100 Roma) were still missing, nearly one year after the conflict.
[186][clarification needed]

A study by researchers from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia
published in 2000 in medical journal the Lancet estimated that "12,000 deaths in the total
population" could be attributed to war.
[187]
This number was achieved by surveying 1,197
households from February 1998 through June 1999. 67 out of the 105 deaths reported in the
sample population were attributed to war-related trauma, which extrapolates to be 12,000
deaths if the same war-related mortality rate is applied to Kosovo's total population. The
highest mortality rates were in men between 15 and 49 (5,421 victims of war) as well as for
men over 50 (5,176 victims). For persons younger than 15, the estimates were 160 victims for
males and 200 for females.
[citation needed]
For women between 1549 the estimate is that there
were 510 victims; older than 50 years the estimate is 541 victims. The authors stated that it is
not "possible to differentiate completely between civilian and military casualties".
In the 2008 joint study by the Humanitarian Law Center (an NGO from Serbia and Kosovo),
The International Commission on Missing Person, and the Missing Person Commission of
Serbia made a name-by-name list of war and post-war victims. According to the Kosovo
Memory Book, 13,421 people were killed in Kosovo during the conflict, from 1 January 1998 up
until December 2000. Of that sum, 10,533 were Albanians, 2,238 were Serbs, 126 Roma, 100
Bosniaks and others.
[188]

Civilians killed by NATO airstrikes[edit]

Railway bridge and monument to civilian victims of NATO airstrike in 1999. on passanger train. 12 to 16 civilian
passangers died in this airstrike.
Main article: Civilian casualties during Operation Allied Force
Yugoslavia claimed that NATO attacks caused between 1,200 and 5,700 civilian casualties.
NATO's Secretary General, Lord Robertson, wrote after the war that "the actual toll in human
lives will never be precisely known" but he then offered the figures found in a report by Human
Rights Watch as a reasonable estimate. This report counted between 488 and 527 civilian
deaths (90 to 150 of them killed from cluster bomb use) in 90 separate incidents, the worst of
which were the 87 Albanian refugees who perished at the hands of NATO bombs, near
Koria.
[189]
Attacks in Kosovo overall were more deadly due to the confused situation with
many refugee movementsthe one-third of the incidents there account for more than half of
the deaths.
[190]

Civilians killed by Yugoslav forces[edit]


Royal Canadian Mounted Police(RCMP) officers investigate an allegedmass grave, alongside US Marines
Various estimates of the number of killings attributed to Yugoslav forces have been announced
through the years. An estimated 800,000 Kosovo Albanians fled and an estimated 7,000 to
9,000 were killed, according to The New York Times.
[191]
The estimate of 10,000 deaths is
used by the United States Department of State, which cited human rights abuses as its main
justification for attacking Yugoslavia.
[192]

Statistical experts working on behalf of the ICTY prosecution estimate that the total number of
dead is about 10,000.
[193]
Eric Fruits, a professor at Portland State University, argued that the
experts' analyses were based on fundamentally flawed data and that none of its conclusions
are supported by any valid statistical analysis or tests.
[194]

In August 2000, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
announced that it had exhumed 2,788 bodies in Kosovo, but declined to say how many were
thought to be victims of war crimes.
[195]
Earlier however, KFOR sources told Agence France
Presse that of the 2,150 bodies that had been discovered up until July 1999, about 850 were
thought to be victims of war crimes.
[196][page needed][dead link]

Known mass graves:
[197]

In 2001, 800 still unidentified bodies were found in pits on a police training ground just
outside of Belgrade and in eastern Serbia.
At least 700 bodies were uncovered in a mass grave located within a special anti-terrorist
police unit's compound in the Belgrade suburb of Batajnica.
77 bodies were found in the eastern Serbian town of Petrovo Selo.
50 bodies were uncovered near the western Serbian town of Peruac.
NATO losses[edit]


A downed F-16C pilot's flight equipment and part of the F-117A shot down over Serbia in 1999 on show at a
Belgrade museum.
Military casualties on the NATO side were light. According to official reports, the alliance
suffered no fatalities as a direct result of combat operations. However, in the early hours of
May 5, an American military AH-64 Apache helicopter crashed not far from the border between
Serbia and Albania.
[198]

Another American AH-64 helicopter crashed about 40 miles (64 km) northeast of Tirana,
Albania's capital, very close to the Albanian/Kosovo border.
[199]
According to CNN, the crash
happened 45 miles (72 km) northeast of Tirana.
[200]
The two American pilots of the helicopter,
Army Chief Warrant Officers David Gibbs and Kevin L. Reichert, died in that crash. They were
the only NATO fatalities during the war, according to NATO official statements.
There were other casualties after the war, mostly due to land mines. During the war, the
alliance reported the loss of the first US stealth plane (an F-117 Nighthawk) ever shot downby
enemy fire.
[201]
Furthermore an F-16 fighter was lost near abac and 32 unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) from different nations were lost.
[202]
The wreckages of downed UAVs were
shown on Serbian television during the war. Some American sources claim a second F-117A
was also heavily damaged, and although it made it back to its base, it never flew
again.
[203][204]
A-10 Thunderbolts have been reported as losses, with two shot down
[40]
and
another two damaged.
[40]
Three American soldiers riding a Humvee in a routine patrol were
captured by Yugoslav Special Forces across theMacedonian border.
[37][205]

Yugoslav military losses[edit]


Wreckage of Yugoslav MiG-29 jet fighter shot down on March 27, 1999, outside the town of Ugljevik, Bosnia
and Herzegovina


Destroyed tank near Prizren
NATO did not release any official casualty estimates. The Yugoslav authorities claimed 462
soldiers were killed and 299 wounded by NATO airstrikes.
[206]
The names of Yugoslav
casualties were recorded in a "book of remembrance".
Of military equipment, NATO destroyed around 50 Yugoslav aircraft including 6 MiG-29s
destroyed in air-to-air combat. A number of G-4 Super Galebs were destroyed in their
hardened aircraft shelter by bunker-busting bombs which started a fire which spread quickly
because the shelter doors were not closed. At the end of war, NATO officially claimed that they
had destroyed 93 Yugoslav tanks. Yugoslavia admitted a total of 3 destroyed tanks. The latter
figure was verified by European inspectors when Yugoslavia rejoined the Dayton accords, by
noting the difference between the number of tanks then and at the last inspection in 1995.
[citation
needed]
NATO claimed that the Yugoslav army lost 93 tanks (M-84's and T-55's), 132 APCs, and
52 artillery pieces.
[207]
Newsweek, the second-largest news weekly magazine in the U.S,
gained access to a suppressed US Air Force report that claimed the real numbers were "3
tanks, not 120; 18 armored personnel carriers, not 220; 20 artillery pieces, not
450".
[207][208]
Another US Air Force report gives a figure of 14 tanks destroyed.
[49]
Most of the
targets hit in Kosovo were decoys, such as tanks made out of plastic sheets with telegraph
poles for gun barrels, or old World War IIera tanks which were not functional. Anti-aircraft
defences were preserved by the simple expedient of not turning them on, preventing NATO
aircraft from detecting them, but forcing them to keep above a ceiling of 15,000 feet (5,000 m),
making accurate bombing much more difficult. Towards the end of the war, it was claimed that
carpet bombing by B-52 aircraft had caused huge casualties among Yugoslav troops stationed
along the KosovoAlbania border. Careful searching by NATO investigators found no evidence
of any such large-scale casualties.
However, the most significant loss for the Yugoslav Army was the damaged and destroyed
infrastructure. Almost all military air bases and airfields
(Batajnica, Laevci, Slatina, Golubovci, Kovin, and akovica) and other military buildings and
facilities were badly damaged or destroyed. Unlike the units and their equipment, military
buildings couldn't be camouflaged. thus, defence industry and military technical overhaul
facilities were also seriously damaged (Utva, Zastava Arms factory, Moma Stanojlovi air force
overhaul center, technical overhaul centers in aak and Kragujevac). Moreover, in an effort to
weaken the Yugoslav Army, NATO targeted several important civilian facilities (the Panevo oil
refinery,
[209]
Novi Sad oil refinery, bridges, TV antennas, railroads, etc.)
KLA losses[edit]

This section does not cite any references or sources. Please help
improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced
material may be challenged and removed. (September 2012)


KLA memorial in Smir, Kosovo
Kosovo Liberation Army losses are difficult to analyze. According to some reports there were
around 1,000 fatalities on the KLA side. Difficulties arise in calculating an accurate figure.
Things are complicated by the difficulty of determining who was a KLA member and who was a
civilian. For example, the Yugoslavs considered any armed Albanian to be a member of the
KLA, regardless of whether he was officially a card-carrying member, so someone who is
counted as a civilian by the Albanian side might be counted as a KLA combatant by the Serbs.
Also, many KLA members were not wearing any uniforms and had no identification.
Aftermath[edit]


Refugee camp in Fier, Albania
Within three weeks, over 500,000 Albanian refugees had returned home.
[citation needed]
By
November 1999, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 848,100 out of
1,108,913 had returned.
According to the 1991 Yugoslavia Census there were 194,190 Serbs and 45,745Romani in
Kosovo.
[210]
According to the Human Rights Watch, 200,000 Serbs and thousands of Roma
fled from Kosovo during and after the war.
[211]
The YugoslavRed Cross had also registered
247,391 mostly Serbian refugees by November. The persistent anti-Serb attacks and riots,
including against other non-Albanians, had remained in the anarchic stage until some form of
order was established in 2001. This order disintegrated during the 2004 pogrom against non
Albanians. More than 164,000 Serbs have left Kosovo during the seven weeks since Yugoslav
and Serb forces withdrew and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) entered the province.
[212]

War crimes[edit]
Main article: War crimes in Kosovo
Serbian war crimes[edit]
Main article: Serbian war crimes in the Yugoslav Wars
Before the end of the bombing, Yugoslav President Slobodan Miloevi, along with Milan
Milutinovi, Nikola ainovi,Dragoljub Ojdani and Vlajko Stojiljkovi were charged by
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia(ICTY) with crimes against
humanity including murder, forcible transfer, deportation, and "persecution on political, racial or
religious grounds". Further indictments were leveled in October 2003 against former armed
forces chief of staff Neboja Pavkovi, former army corps commander Vladimir Lazarevi,
former police official Vlastimir orevi, and Sreten Luki. All were indicted for crimes against
humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war.
Later, the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
legally found that Serbia "use[d] violence and terror to force a significant number of Kosovo
Albanians from their homes and across the borders, in order for the state authorities to
maintain control over Kosovo ... This campaign was conducted by army and Interior
Ministry police forces (MUP) under the control of FRY and Serbian authorities, who were
responsible for mass expulsions of Kosovo Albanian civilians from their homes, as well as
incidents of killings, sexual assault, and the intentional destruction ofmosques."
[213]

Albanian war crimes[edit]
The ICTY also leveled indictments against KLA members Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala, Isak
Musliu, and Agim Murtezi for crimes against humanity. They were arrested on February 17 and
18, 2003. Charges were soon dropped against Agim Murtezi as a case of mistaken identity,
whereas Fatmir Limaj was acquitted of all charges on November 30, 2005 and released. The
charges were in relation to the prison camp run by the defendants at Lapunik between May
and July 1998.
In 2008, Carla Del Ponte published a book in which she alleged that, after the end of the war in
1999, Kosovo Albanians were smuggling organs of between 100 and 300 Serbs and other
minorities from the province to Albania.
[214]
The ICTY and the Serbian War Crimes Tribunal are
currently investigating these allegations, as numerous witnesses and new materials have
recently emerged.
[215][not in citation given]

On March 2005, a U.N. tribunal indicted Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj for war
crimes against the Serbs. On March 8, he tendered his resignation. Haradinaj, an ethnic
Albanian, was a former commander who led units of the Kosovo Liberation Army and was
appointed Prime Minister after winning an election of 72 votes to three in the Kosovo's
Parliament in December 2004. Haradinaj was acquitted on all counts along with fellow KLA
veterans Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj. The Office of the Prosecutor appealed their acquittals,
resulting in the ICTY ordering a partial retrial. However on 29 November 2012 all three were
acquitted for second time on all charges.
[216]
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), "800
non-Albanian civilians were kidnapped and murdered from 1998 to 1999". After the war, "479
people have gone missing ... most of them Serbs".
[217]

NATO war crimes[edit]
The Yugoslav government and a number of international pressure groups (e.g., Amnesty
International) claimed that NATO had carried out war crimes during the conflict, notably the
bombing of the Serbian TV headquarters in Belgrade on April 23, 1999, where 16 people were
killed and 16 more were injured. Sian Jones of Amnesty stated, "The bombing of the
headquarters of Serbian state radio and television was a deliberate attack on a civilian object
and as such constitutes a war crime".
[218]
However, a later report conducted by
the ICTY entitled Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review
the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia sided with
NATO's version of the attack, opining that, "Insofar as the attack actually was aimed at
disrupting the communications network, it was legally acceptable" and that, "NATO's targeting
of the RTS building for propaganda purposes was an incidental (albeit complementary) aim of
its primary goal of disabling the Serbian military command and control system and to destroy
the nerve system and apparatus that keeps Milosevi in power."
[141]
In regards to civilian
casualties, it further stated that though they were, "unfortunately high, they do not appear to be
clearly disproportionate."
[141]

International reaction to NATO intervention[edit]
Africa[edit]
Libyan Jamahiriya leader, Muammar Gaddafi had opposed the campaign and called
on world leaders to support Yugoslavia's 'legitimate right to defend its freedoms and
territorial integrity against a possible aggression.'
[219]

Asia[edit]
Cambodia was against the campaign.
[220]

The People's Republic of China deeply condemned and strongly opposed the
bombing, saying it was an act of aggression against the Yugoslav people, especially when
NATO bombed its embassy in Belgrade on May 7, 1999, riots and mass demonstrations
against the governments of the United States and Great Britain have been reported
against both the attack and the operation overall.
[221]
Jiang Zemin, the President of the
country at the time, called 'once more' for an immediate halt to the airstrikes and
demanded peaceful negotiations.
[219]

India had condemned the bombing.
[220]
The Indian foreign ministry also stated that it
'urged all military actions to be brought to a halt' and that 'FR Yugoslavia be enabled to
resolve its internal issues internally.'
[219]

Indonesia was against the campaign.
[220]

Japan's PM Keiz Obuchi had advocated the bombing, stating that Yugoslavia had
an 'uncompromising attitude.'
[220]
Moreover, Japan's foreign minister Masahiko
Kmura said that, 'Japan understands NATO's use of force as measures that had to be
taken to prevent humanitarian catastrophe.'
[219]

Malaysia had supported the bombing, stating that it 'was necessary to prevent
genocide in Kosovo.'
[220]

Pakistan's government was concerned about developing situations in Kosovo and
called for UN intervention.
[220]

Vietnam was against the bombing campaign.
[220]

Europe[edit]
Albania had strongly supported the bombing campaign. This resulted in the breaking
of diplomatic ties between Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, who had made
claims of the Albanian government harboring UK insurgents and supplying them with
weapons.
[citation needed]

France had mixed responses to the bombing, despite being a combatant.
[222]

Slobodan Miloevi, the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had called
the bombings, an 'unlawful act of terrorism' and the 'key to colonize Yugoslavia'.
The Yugoslav population also strongly opposed the bombing and showed defiance with
cultural-related themes. Miloevi also stated that, 'the only correct decision that could
have been made was the one to reject foreign troops on our territory.'
[223]
The Yugoslavs
who opposed Miloevi also opposed the bombing, saying that it 'supports Miloevi rather
than attacking him.'
Greece was opposed to the NATO bombings with around 97% of the Greek
population completely condemning it.
[citation needed]

The bombing was met with mixed reactions in Italy, despite the country's
participation in the air campaign. Silvio Berlusconi along with the centre-right had
supported the bombardment while the far left strongly opposed it.
[citation needed]

Russia strongly condemned the campaign. With the president Boris Yeltsin stating
that, 'Russia is deeply upset by NATO's military action against sovereign Yugoslavia,
which is nothing more than open aggression.'
[219]
They also condemned NATO at
the United Nations saying that NATO air strikes on Serbia was 'an illegal action.'
[224]
Many
Russians volunteered to Kosovo to not just fight the UK, but to also oppose NATO.
[225]

As a member of the bombing, the United Kingdom had strongly supported the
bombing campaign. A majority of the British population had supported it.
[226]

Despite former mutual cooperation, the Czech Republic, as a newcomer to NATO,
supported the bombing. Representatives of the Czech Republic did not want to criticise the
actions of NATO, even though most of population was against it. Vclav Havel used the
term "humanitarian bombing" for this campaign that he deemed as a peace-bringer to the
region.
Oceania[edit]
Australia had supported the campaign. Prime Minister John Howard stated that,
"history has told us that if you sit by and do nothing, you pay a much greater price later
on."
[227]

United Nations[edit]
The United Nations had mixed reactions to the bombing. The bombing had also
been carried out without its authorization.
[228]
However, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-
General had said this, "It is indeed tragic that diplomacy has failed, but there are times
when the use of force is legitimate in the pursuit of peace."
[219]

Military and political consequences[edit]


Members of the Kosovo Liberation Army turn over their weapons to U.S. Marines
Main articles: Kosovo status process and Constitutional status of Kosovo
The Kosovo war had a number of important consequences in terms of the military and political
outcome. The status of Kosovo remains unresolved; international negotiations began in 2006
to determine Kosovo's level of autonomy as envisaged under UN Security Council Resolution
1244, but efforts failed. The province is administered by the United Nations despite
its unilateral declaration of independence on February 17, 2008.


Seized uniform and equipment of U.S. soldiers 1999 in Kosovo War


US Marines captured Yugoslav soldiers on July 3, 1999 during theceasefire and the
implementation MTAfrom Kumanovo of 9 June.
The UN-backed talks, led by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari, had begun in February 2006.
Whilst progress was made on technical matters, both parties remained diametrically opposed
on the question of status itself.
[229]
In February 2007, Ahtisaari delivered a draft status
settlement proposal to leaders in Belgrade and Pristina, the basis for a draft UN Security
Council Resolution which proposes "supervised independence" for the province, which is in
contrary to UN Security Council Resolution 1244. By July 2007, the draft resolution, which was
backed by the United States, United Kingdom, and other European members of the Security
Council, had been rewritten four times to try to accommodate Russian concerns that such a
resolution would undermine the principle of state sovereignty.
[230]
Russia, which holds a veto in
the Security Council as one of five permanent members, stated that it would not support any
resolution which is not acceptable to both Belgrade and Pritina.
[231]

The campaign exposed significant weaknesses in the U.S. arsenal, which were later
addressed for the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. Apache attack helicopters andAC-130
Spectre gunships were brought up to the front lines but were never used after two Apaches
crashed during training in the Albanian mountains. Stocks of many precision missiles were
reduced to critically low levels. For combat aircraft, continuous operations resulted in skipped
maintenance schedules, and many aircraft were withdrawn from service awaiting spare parts
and service.
[232]
Also, many of the precision-guided weapons proved unable to cope with
Balkan weather, as the clouds blocked the laser guidance beams. This was resolved by
retrofitting bombs with Global Positioning System satellite guidance devices that are immune to
bad weather. Although pilotless surveillance aircraft were extensively used, often attack aircraft
could not be brought to the scene quickly enough to hit targets of opportunity. This led missiles
being fit onto Predator drones in Afghanistan, reducing the "sensor to shooter" time to virtually
zero.
Kosovo also showed that some low-tech tactics could reduce the impact of a high-tech force
such as NATO; the Miloevi government coperated with Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq,
passing on many of the lessons learned.
[233]
The Yugoslav army had long expected to need to
resist a much stronger enemy, either Soviet or NATO, during the Cold War and had developed
effective tactics of deception and concealment in response. These would have been unlikely to
have resisted a full-scale invasion for long, but were probably used to mislead overflying
aircraft and satellites. Among the tactics used were:
U.S. stealth aircraft were tracked with radars operating on long wavelengths. If stealth jets
got wet or opened their bomb bay doors, they would become visible on the radar screens.
An F-117 Nighthawk downed by a missile was possibly spotted in this way.
[234]

Dummy targets such as fake bridges, airfields and decoy planes and tanks were used
extensively. Tanks were made using old tires, plastic sheeting and logs, and sand cans
and fuel set alight to mimic heat emissions. They fooled NATO pilots into bombing
hundreds of such decoys, though General Clark's survey found that in Operation: Allied
Force, NATO airmen hit just 25 decoysan insignificant percentage of the 974 validated
hits.
[235]
However, NATO sources claim that this was due to operating procedures, which
oblige troops, in this case aircraft, to engage any and all targets, however unlikely they
may be. The targets needed only to look real to be shot at, if detected, of course. NATO
claimed that Yugoslav air force had been devastated. "Official data show that the Yugoslav
army in Kosovo lost 26 percent of its tanks, 34 percent of its APCs, and 47 percent of the
artillery to the air campaign."
[235]

Military decorations[edit]
As a result of the Kosovo War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation created a second NATO
medal, the NATO Medal for Kosovo Service, an international military decoration. Shortly
thereafter, NATO created the Non-Article 5 Medal for Balkans service to combine both
Yugoslavian and Kosovo operations into one service medal.
[236]

Due to the involvement of the United States armed forces, a separate U.S. military decoration,
known as the Kosovo Campaign Medal, was established by President Bill Clinton in 2000.
Weaponry and vehicles used[edit]
A variety of weapons were used by the Yugoslav security forces and the Kosovo Liberation
Army during the conflict. NATO only operated aircraft and various naval units for the duration of
the conflict.
Yugoslav security forces
The weapons used by Yugoslav government forces are listed below. Most of them were
Yugoslav made weaponry, while almost all of the AA units were Soviet made.
BOV
BVP M-80
D-20
D-30
MiG-21
MiG-29
M80 Zolja
M-84
SA-3
SA-7
SA-9
Soko J-22 Orao
Soko Gazelle
T-54/55
Zastava M70
Zastava M72
Zastava M76
Zastava M84
Zastava M90
Zastava M91
2K12 Kub
2S1 Gvozdika
SA-13
Kosovo Liberation Army
The weapons used by the Kosovo Liberation Army are listed below. They mostly consist of
Soviet Kalashnikov weaponry, also Chinese derivatives of the AK-47 and some Western
weaponry.
AKM
AK-47
Armsel Striker
[citation needed]

D-1 howitzer
RPK
SKS
Type 56 assault rifle
Zastava M70
Zastava M76
NATO
The aircraft used by NATO are listed below.
A-10 Thunderbolt
AC-130 Spooky
AH-64 Apache
AV-8B Harrier
B-1 Lancer
B-2 Spirit
B-52 Stratofortress
E-3 Sentry
E-8 JSTARS
EA-6B Prowler
F-104 Starfighter
F-117 Nighthawk
F/A-18 Hornet
F-14 Tomcat
F-15 Eagle
F-15 Strike Eagle
F-16 Fighting Falcon
F-4 Phantom
Harrier Jump Jet
L-1011 TriStar
[237]

Mirage 2000
MQ-1 Predator
Panavia Tornado
Panavia Tornado ADV
SEPECAT Jaguar
Guided missiles: AIM-9 Sidewinder, ALARM and Tomahawk
See also[edit]

Kosovo portal

War portal

1990s portal
Organ theft in Kosovo
Operation Horseshoe
State Security Service (Serbia)
Insurgency in the Preevo Valley
Insurgency in the Republic of Macedonia
2004 unrest in Kosovo
Gallery[edit]

Refugee camp in Kuks, Albania

USS Theodore Rooseveltlaunching an F/A-18 Hornet

Captured U.S. ArmyHumvee from 1st Division

Wreck of 2S1 Gvozdikanear Glogovac

Destroyed T-55 tank nearFerizaj

MQ-1 Predator drone shot down in Serbia

Fragments of the downed F-117 in museum

F-15 Fighter at Aviano Air Base, Italy on April 9, 1999

F-16 Fighting Falcon is being prepared for NATO operation, April 21, 1999

During the NATO bombing of Novi Sad in 1999

Footnotes[edit]
1. Jump up^ Serbia claims that 1,031 Yugoslav soldiers and policemen were killed by NATO
bombing.
[45]
NATO initially claimed that 5,000 Yugoslav servicemen had been killed and
10,000 had been wounded during the NATO air campaign.
[46][47]
NATO has since revised
this estimation to 1,200 Yugoslav soldiers and policemen killed.
[48]

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3. Jump up^ Daniszewski, John (1999-04-14). "Yugoslav Troops Said to Cross Into
Albania". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 2012-02-20.
4. Jump up^ Daly, Emma (1999-04-14). "War In The Balkans: Serbs enter Albania and burn
village". The Independent(London). Retrieved 2012-02-20.
5. Jump up^ Reitman, Valerie; Richter, Paul; Dahlburg, John-Thor (1999-06-10). "Yugoslav,
NATO Generals Sign Peace Agreement for Kosovo / Alliance will end air campaign when
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14. Jump up^ "US used wrong map for embassy attack". BBC News. 1999-05-11.
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26. Jump up^ "Serbia charges police officers with 1999 Kosovo murders". SETimes.com.
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27. Jump up^ John Pike. "Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA / UCK]". Globalsecurity.org.
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29. Jump up^ 12 mal bewertet (24 March 1999). "Die Bundeswehr zieht in den Krieg".
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30. Jump up^ John Pike. "Kosovo Order of Battle". Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 2012-02-20.
31. ^ Jump up to:
a

b

c

d

e

f
"NATO Operation Allied Force". Defense.gov. Retrieved 2012-02-28.
32. Jump up^ Kosovo Map The Guardian
33. Jump up^ "Fighting for a foreign land". BBC News. 1999-05-20. Retrieved 2012-02-28.
34. Jump up^ "Russian volunteer's account of Kosovo". The Russia Journal. 1999-07-05.
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35. Jump up^ Daalder & O'Hanlon 2000, p. 151
36. Jump up^ "Two die in Apache crash". BBC News. 1999-05-05. Retrieved 2012-05-06.
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38. Jump up^ "How to Take Down an F-117". Strategypage.com. 2005-11-21. Retrieved
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40. ^ Jump up to:
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41. Jump up^ "Nato loses two planes". BBC News. 1999-05-02. Retrieved 2012-05-06.
42. Jump up^ "[http://nl.newsbank.com/nojavascript.html F-117 damage said attributed to full
moon". Atlanta Journal-Constitution. 1999-05-06. p. A14]. Retrieved 2012-02-20.
43. Jump up^ Andrei Kislyakov (October 9, 2007). "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Increase In
Numbers". Radardaily.com. RIA Novosti. Retrieved 2012-02-28.
44. Jump up^ Robert Fisk (21 June 1999). "Serb army 'unscathed by Nato', KLA 'killed more
Serbs than Nato did'". The Independent (London). Retrieved 13 March 2013.
45. Jump up^ "Serbia marks anniversary of NATO bombing". B92. Retrieved 2012-05-06.
46. Jump up^ Bideleux, Robert; Jeffries, Ian (2006). The Balkans: A Post-Communist History.
Routledge. p. 558. ISBN 978-0-203-96911-3.
47. Jump up^ Chambers II, John Whiteclay (1999). The Oxford Companion to American
Military History. Oxford University Press. p. 375. ISBN 978-0-19-507198-6.
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51. Jump up^ Bacevich & Cohen 2001, p. 22
52. Jump up^ Mann (2005), p. 357
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[page needed]

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156. Jump up^ http://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/norske-elitesoldater-
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186. Jump up^ "3,000 missing in Kosovo". BBC. 2000-06-07.
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221. Jump up^ "Bombing fuels Chinese hostility". BBC News. 1999-05-08.
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225. Jump up^ "Fighting for a foreign land". BBC News. 1999-05-20.
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228. Jump up^ Doug Saunders (6 August 2012). "In Syria, is bloody history repeating
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229. Jump up^ "UN frustrated by Kosovo deadlock". BBC. 2006-10-09.
230. Jump up^ "Russia reportedly rejects fourth draft resolution on Kosovo
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231. Jump up^ "UN Security Council remains divided on Kosovo".Southeast European
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232. Jump up^ Antony Barnett (2000-01-23). "Hundreds of crippled jets put RAF in
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233. Jump up^ "NATO attack on Yugoslavia gave Iraq good lessons".Globe and Mail.
234. Jump up^ Benjamin S. Lambeth (2006-06-03). "Kosovo and the Continuing SEAD
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"Serb air defenders could have employed low-frequency radars for the best chance of
getting a snap look at the aircraft. Former F-117 pilots and several industry experts
acknowledged that the aircraft is detectable by such radars when viewed from the side or
directly below."
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237. Jump up^ "Kosovo crisis - military hardware". BBC News. 1999-03-25.
External links[edit]

Wikimedia Commons has
media related to Kosovo
War.
Indictment of Milosevic United Nations
Video on Kosovo War from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives
Text of Rambouillet Treaty "Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government In
Kosovo, Rambouillet, France February 23, 1999," including Appendix B University of
Pittsburgh Jurist
Beginning of discussion (May 14, 1999 to June 8, 1999, specifically) of Appendix B of the
Rambouillet Treaty on H-Diplo, the diplomatic history forum H-Net
Through My Eyes website Imperial War Museum Online Exhibition (Including images,
videos and interviews with refugees from the war)
Reports[edit]
Police in Kosovo charge 5, including ex-official, with international organ trafficking
UNDER ORDERS: War Crimes in Kosovo Human Rights Watch
OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission at the Wayback Machine (archived November 2,
2005) Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Operation Allied Force NATO
Humanitarian law violations in Kosovo HRW (1998)
Abuses against Serbs and Roma in the new Kosovo HRW (1999)
The Ethnic Cleansing of Kosovo U.S. State Department
Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting U.S. State Department
War and mortality in Kosovo, 1998 99: an epidemiological testimony The Lancet (PDF)
Trebinje danas.com K. Mitrovica: Vie od 100 povrijeenih Srba, UNMIK policajaca i Kfora
Books[edit]
Bacevich & Cohen, Andrew J., Elliot A. (2001). War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in
a Global Age. Columbia University Press. Retrieved 3 March 2013.
Daalder & O'Hanlon, Ivo H., Michel E. (2000). Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo.
Brookings Institution Press. Retrieved 13 March 2013.
Macdonald, Scott (2007). Propaganda and Information Warfare in the Twenty-First
Century: Altered Images and Deception Operations. Routledge. Retrieved 3 March 2013.
Mann, Michael (2005). The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing.
Cambridge University Press. Retrieved 4 January 2013.
Mincheva & Gurr, Lyubov Grigorova, Ted Robert (2013). Crime-Terror Alliances and the
State: Ethnonationalist and Islamist Challenges to Regional Security. Routledge. Retrieved
27 February 2013.
Thomas, Nigel (2006). The Yugoslav Wars (2): Bosnia, Kosovo And Macedonia 1992
2001. Osprey Publishing. Retrieved 12 June 2012.
Media[edit]
War in Europe PBS Frontline
Kosovo fact files BBC News
Focus on Kosovo CNN
How the (2008) Nobel Peace Prize was Won, by Gregory Elich, Counterpunch, published
by Global Research. Diplomatic intervention of Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari in the
conflict.
Maps[edit]
Maps of Kosovo, Perry-Castaeda Library Map Collection
[show]
V
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Armed conflicts in Europe following the end of the Cold War

[show]
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Kosovo topics

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