This article was downloaded by: [UNAM Ciudad Universitaria]

On: 09 February 2012, At: 16:14

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:
1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,
London W1T 3JH, UK
Australasian Journal of
Philosophy
Publication details, including instructions for
authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rajp20
In defence of structural
universals
D.M. Armstrong
a
a
University of Sydney
Available online: 02 Jun 2006
To cite this article: D.M. Armstrong (1986): In defence of structural universals,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64:1, 85-88
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048408612342261
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/
terms-and-conditions
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study
purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,
reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any
form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make
any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or
up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses
should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher
shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or
costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or
indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. 64, No. 1; March 1986
DI SCUSSI ON
I N DEFENCE OF STRUCTURAL UNI VERSALS
D. M. Ar ms t r ong
1. The central issue. At t he hear t of Davi d Lewis' case agai nst st ruct ural
universals lies his cont ent i on t hat t wo di fferent things cannot be composed
of exactly t he same part s.
Her e is what I t ake t o be a count er - exampl e t o his principle. Let a and
b be t wo part i cul ars, and R be a non- symmet r i cal rel at i on. Let it be t he case
that a has R t o b, and t hat b has R t o a. We have t wo distinct states of affairs
(' two different things' ), yet , in a cl ear sense of t he wor d ' composed' , t hey
are composed of exact l y t he same part s: a, b and R.
The t wo states of affairs may be called structures. In his i mpor t ant recent
book The Categorical St ruct ure o f t he Worl d (1983, Sect i on 101), Rei nhar dt
Grossman offers t he fol l owi ng i dent i t y-condi t i ons f or st ruct ures. S~ and $2
are the ver y same st r uct ur e i f and onl y i f (a) t hey cont ai n t he very same non-
relational part s; (b) t hey cont ai n t he ver y same rel at i ons; (c) t he same part s
stand in the s ame relations to each other. In my count er - exampl e, t he t wo
structures cont ai n t he very same non-rel at i onal parts, t he very same relations,
but it is not t he case t hat t he same part s st and in t he same r el at i on t o each
other.
My count er - exampl e t o Lewis' pri nci pl e was chosen because, al t hough it
involves st ruct ures, it does not i nvol ve st ruct ural universals. Thi s shows, I
think, t hat t he difficulty raised by Lewis is best t hought of as an ar gument
against post ul at i ng any uni versal s, st ruct ural or ot herwi se, or , at least, as
an argument agai nst post ul at i ng rel at i ons whi ch are universals.
Lewis, of course, woul d not allow t he count er-exampl e. By far t he simplest
way f or hi m t o deal with it is by adopt i ng a phi l osophy of what , fol l owi ng
D. C. Williams (1953), and, mor e recent l y, K. K. Campbel l (1981), he calls
' tropes' . Tr opes are pr oper t i es and rel at i ons, but t hey are propert i es and
relations concei ved not as universals but as part i cul ars. On this view of
relations, my alleged count er - exampl e becomes t wo states of affairs, a R1 b,
and b R2 a, where R~ and R2 are not identical, al t hough t hey may resembl e
exactly. (The universal R per haps reduces t o an equivalence-class of exact l y
resembling t r opes. ) Gi ven this account , I have cert ai nl y not pr oduced a
counter-example t o Lewis' view t hat t wo different things cannot be composed
of exactly t he same t hi ngs.
But is not t he di sput e now a st and-off? Lewis can use his pri nci pl e against
a philosophy of universals. I can use universals t o pr oduce a count er-exampl e
to his principle. Indeed, is not Lewis close t o begging the question against me?
85
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d

b
y

[
U
N
A
M

C
i
u
d
a
d

U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
a
r
i
a
]

a
t

1
6
:
1
4

0
9

F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y

2
0
1
2

86 In Defence of Structural Universals
It ma y be replied t hat Lewi s' view is t he mor e economi cal . He put s f or war d
an at t r act i ve- soundi ng pri nci pl e. I have t o deny t hat t he pri nci pl e hol ds in
all cases, and my r eas on is t hat it is def eat ed by t hose suspi ci ous char act er s:
uni versal s.
To this I r epl y t hat e c onomy in a met aphysi cs can onl y be j udged, as Mar k
J ohns t on has put it t o me, ' i n t he end- game' . For mysel f , I bel i eve t hat
uni versal s ar e gr eat expl ai ners. The loss on t he r ounda bout s as a resul t of
havi ng t o deny Lewi s' pr i nci pl e ma y well be ma de up wi t h i nt erest on t he
swings. I n any case, as t he gr eat Dr . Tar r as ch said, ' bef or e t he end- game,
t he Gods have pl aced t he mi ddl e- game' .
Wha t it woul d be nice t o have, but what I cannot suppl y, is f or ma l
descr i pt i on of an oper at i on whi ch will t ake one f r om any unor der ed set of
universals t o possible st ruct ural universals which involve not hi ng but member s
of t he set. (I say ' possi bl e' in or der t o respect t he Pr i nci pl e of I ns t ant i at i on
whi ch I believe shoul d appl y t o all uni versal s. ) Such an oper at i on will per mi t
t he one uni ver sal in t he ori gi nal set t o a ppe a r in mor e t han one ' pl ace' in
t he st r uct ur al uni versal . (E.g. an F havi ng R t o an F whi ch has R t o a t hi rd
F. ) A paral l el is t he way t hat , in a set of sets, t he ver y same i ndi vi dual ma y
be f ound as a me mbe r of di fferent sub-set s.
2. Tropes. Lewis agrees wi t h me t hat we need an obj ect i ve di st i nct i on bet ween
nat ur al and unnat ur al classes. I n a previ ous paper (1983) he r emai ned neut ral
bet ween t hree ways of account i ng f or t he di st i nct i on: hol di ng a sparse t heor y
of uni versal s, t aki ng t he nat ur al ness of cer t ai n classes as pr i mi t i ve, or usi ng
a compl ex pr i mi t i ve not i on of si mi l ari t y. Now he says t hat he has t ur ned
agai nst uni versal s f or t he r easons gi ven in his paper , but t hat he shoul d have
ment i oned, as anot her al t er nat i ve, a sparse t heor y of t r opes.
I a m i ncl i ned t o t hi nk t hat , f or account i ng f or t he na t ur a l / unna t ur a l class
distinction, by f ar t he best prospect s are universals and t ropes. The al t ernat i ve
t heori es seem t o face ver y seri ous difficulties wi t h r egar d t o relations.
A uni versal s t heor y t akes r el at i ons t o be entities: t hey are t ypes. A t r ope
t heor y t akes r el at i ons t o be entities: t hey are t okens. But i f uni versal s and
t r opes ar e deni ed, t hen r el at i ons have t o be const r uct ed out of pairs ( mor e
general l y, out of n-t upl es) o f par t i cul ar s.
These pai rs, however, will have t o be ordered, rat her t han unor der ed, pairs.
Tha t this is so can be seen by consi deri ng our non- s ymmet r i cal r el at i on R.
We mus t ei t her pos t ul at e a pr i mi t i vel y nat ur al class of pai rs, or else appeal
t o a compl i cat ed pr i mi t i ve si mi l ari t y hol di ng bet ween each me mbe r of t he
class of pai rs. But what of t he case where t he rel at i on holds in bot h directions:
a R b and b R a? I f we si mpl y use unor der ed pai rs, t hen we cannot distinguish,
as we want t o do, bet ween t he t wo st at es o f affai rs. Wi t h or der ed pai rs,
however , we can have bot h < a , b > and < b , a > .
But what of t he not i on o f order? I t cannot be expl i cat ed in t er ms of
rel at i ons. I t will have t o be t aken as a pri mi t i ve predi cat e, or r at her as a series
of pr i mi t i ve pr edi cat es cor r es pondi ng t o t he pol yadi ci t y of t he r el at i on in
i John Bigelow and Peter Forrest have independently given some preliminary thought to this
question.
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d

b
y

[
U
N
A
M

C
i
u
d
a
d

U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
a
r
i
a
]

a
t

1
6
:
1
4

0
9

F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y

2
0
1
2

D. M. Armst rong 87
question. That seems t o be an unwel come addi t i on t o t he appar at us requi red
by the Nat ur al class and t he Resembl ance t heor y. (The Universals t heor y and
the Tr ope t heor y, by cont r ast , can r at her nat ur al l y t reat t he pol yadi ci t y of
their entities as pr ope r t i e s of these entities, differing onl y as t o whet her these
second-order propert i es are universals or part i cul ars. )
Can we use t he Wi ener-Kurat owski device, and substitute f or t he or der ed
pairs an unor der ed set of sets? For < a , b > we substitute, perhaps, { [a},
[a, b}}, and f or < b , a > {{b}, [ a, b}. However , as a piece of serious
metaphysics, this seems quite unacceptable. For a start, the correlation between
ordered pairs and unor der ed sets of sets is quite arbi t rary. The substitution
just given coul d as well have been reversed. Still worse, t he existence of
unordered sets follows f r om t he mere existence of t he particulars a and b;
but, in general, a R b does not so follow. (I owe this poi nt t o Paul Hager. )
So a Nat ur al class view, or a Resembl ance vi ew, must t r eat t he not i on of
an ordered n-tuple as primitive, yet cannot t ake this orderi ng t o be a primitive
relation. Thi s is conspi cuousl y messier t han t reat i ng rel at i ons as part i cul ars,
and onl y af t er war ds i nqui ri ng what it is t hat unifies cert ai n classes of such
particulars.
A mor e fami l i ar difficulty f or t he t r adi t i onal Nat ur al class view is t he
possibility t hat t wo distinct pr oper t i es or rel at i ons mi ght be co-extensive. (A
similar difficulty arises f or t he t r adi t i onal Resembl ance view.) Ther e woul d
then be t wo pr oper t i es (or rel at i ons), but onl y one pri mi t i vel y nat ur al class.
This difficulty, however , does not di rect l y affect Lewis, because his nat ur al
classes span different possible worl ds. Gi ven t he plausible assumpt i on t hat
distinct propert i es and rel at i ons are separabl e, t he classes associ at ed with
distinct propert i es and rel at i ons will always be distinct, t hough overl appi ng,
classes.
Lewis' ext ra f r eedom here is ambi guous, however. For hi m, it shows part
of t he power of a Realistic view of possible worl ds t hat it solves t he co-
extension difficulty so simply. But suppose, as I woul d suppose, t hat such
an ant i -Nat ural i st view of possibility is t o be avoi ded i f at all possible. Then
we have a f ur t her argument in f avour of t he t ropes. For with t he t r ope t heor y
two co-extensive propert i es or rel at i ons fall i nt o t wo whol l y di sj oi nt classes
of t ropes, even in this worl d.
Once agai n I t hi nk t he mor al is: universals or t ropes.
3. Part i cul ari si ng uni versal s. As bet ween t hese t wo cont est ant s, I, of course,
would choose universals. Suppose t hat F is a monadi c universal, and R a
dyadic one. We t hen have a possible st ruct ural universal: an F havi ng R t o
anot her F. I f t her e act ual l y are t wo F-part i cul ars rel at ed by R, t hen, I woul d
say, we have an act ual st ruct ural universal. Thi s st r uct ur e has t wo marks
which, I suggest, are j oi nt l y sufficient t o make t he st ruct ure a universal. First,
it is identical in its different instances. Second, it is i ndef i ni t el y repeat abl e
(any place, any time).
I woul d like t o put f or war d a hypot hesi s about t he nOn-relational
component s of a st ruct ural universal: in this case t he uni versal F. I t hi nk
that t hey must be what I have elsewhere called a part i cul ari si ng uni versal
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d

b
y

[
U
N
A
M

C
i
u
d
a
d

U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
a
r
i
a
]

a
t

1
6
:
1
4

0
9

F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y

2
0
1
2

88 I n Def ence o f St ruct ural Universals
(1978, Cha pt e r 11, Sec. IV). A par t i cul ar i si ng uni versal is one where we can
s peak o f an i nst ance t he uni ver sal . Suppose t hat gr eennes s is a uni versal . It
is not a part i cul ari si ng universal, because we cannot speak of a green. Suppose
t hat bei ng l ead is a uni ver sal , but t hat t he at omi c t heor y of l ead is fal se and
l ead is ever ywher e homogeneous . We coul d not speak of a l ead, and l ead
woul d not be a part i cul ari si ng uni versal . (In Wi l fri d Sellar' s t er ms, greenness
and bei ng l ead woul d bot h ' l ack grai n' . ) Cont r ast an el ect ron, a ci rcul ar green
pat t er n of size S, a ki l ogr am of l ead.
The di st i nct i on l i nks up wi t h, but does not exact l y paral l el , Qui ne' s
di st i nct i on bet ween t hose r ef er r i ng phr ases whi ch do, and t hose whi ch do
not , ' di vi de their reference' . The parallel is not exact because while ' an el ect ron'
divides its r ef er ence, ' a ki l ogr am of l ead' does not . Consi der how ma ny
different part i cul ars, each of t hem a ki l ogr am of lead, t here are in a 2-ki l ogram
l ump of l ead.
We can, o f course, s peak of a gr een t hi ng or a l ead t hi ng. But here I t hi nk
t hat i f what are i nvol ved are real l y t o be uni versal s, t hen t he wor d ' t hi ng'
will have t o be a pl ace- hol der f or somet hi ng mor e det er mi nat e. I n t he case
o f ' gr een t hi ng' we mi ght per haps have ' gr een ci rcul ar pat ch o f size S' . The
l at t er pr edi cat e pi cks out a definite par t i cul ar wi t h definite boundar i es. So
it is at l east not i mpl ausi bl e t o t hi nk t hat a par t i cul ar i si ng uni versal
cor r es ponds t o t he pr edi cat e.
The j ust i f i cat i on of t he phr as e ' par t i cul ar i si ng uni ver sal ' shoul d now be
appar ent . Ther e is a sense in whi ch such universals enfol d part i cul ari t y within
t hemsel ves even whe n c ons i de r e d i n abs t r act i on f r o m t hei r i ns t ances . I n t he
schemat i c exampl e gi ven of a st r uct ur al u n v e r s a l - s o me t h i n g of t he F- sor t
havi ng R t o somet hi ng else of t he F - s o r t - F mus t be a par t i cul ar i si ng
uni versal : an F havi ng R t o a n o t h e r F. Thi s is what per mi t s r epet i t i on in the
st r uct ur e. I t al l ows di fferent non- r el at i onal el ement s in t he st r uct ur e t o be
di fferent i nst ances of t he s ame uni versal .
I shoul d like t o acknowl edge t he assi st ance of Ma r k J ohns t on and Davi d
Lewi s in compos i ng t hi s repl y.
Uni v e r s i t y o f S y d n e y Recei ved J a nua r y 1985
REFERENCES
Armstrong, D. M. (1978) Universals and Scientific Realism, Cambridge University Press.
Campbell, K. K. (1981) 'The Metaphysics of Abstract Particulars', Mid-West Studies in
Philosophy, 6.
Grossman, R. (1983) The Categorical Structure of the World, Indiana University Press.
Lewis, D. K. (1986) 'Against Structural Universals', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64,
pp. 25-46.
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d

b
y

[
U
N
A
M

C
i
u
d
a
d

U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
a
r
i
a
]

a
t

1
6
:
1
4

0
9

F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y

2
0
1
2